This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`



FROM THE LIBRARY OF
ROBERT MARK WENLEY
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY
1896 — 1929
GIFT OF HIS CHILDREN
TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Mirwickiwl del et sc
1938

B
1
.T4
Rumbaking

THE THINKER

A Review

OF

WORLD-WIDE CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

VOL. VII.

JANUARY TO JUNE

London:
JAMES NISBET & CO.
21 BERNERS STREET
New York:
THE CHRISTIAN LITERATURE CO., ASTOR PLACE
1895

PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,
LONDON AND BECCLES.

ft - Wenley
6-15-39

CONTENTS OF VOL. VII.

AUTHORS.

PAGE

J. Maitland Anderson, Esq. 67, 176, 262
Rev. Professor J. S. Banks 58, 164, 251, 347, 448, 469, 548
Rev. W. E. Barnes, B.D. 13
Professor Vernon Bartlet, M A. 377
Rev. Professor J. H. Bernard, D.D. 91, 92, 93
Rev. Professor W. G. Blaikie, D.D., LL.D. 508
Rev. Professor G. G. Cameron, D.D. 122, 413
Rev. J. C. Carrick, B.D. 492
Rev. J. Edwin Davies 220
Rev. Geo. Douglas..... 24
Rev. Wm. J. Deane, M.A. ... 117, 286, 381, 479, 575
Rev. Joseph Edkins, D.D. 291
Rev. Professor A. S. Geden, M.A. 34
Rev. William Glynne, B.A..... 474
Professor F. Godet, D.D. 390
Professor G. Godet, D.D. 143
Rev. E. Elmer Harding, M.A. 521
Rev. Ph. J. Hoedemaker, D.D. 286
Rev. Canon Hutchings, M.A. ... 78, 181, 269, 362, 456, 558
Rev. Professor J. Iverach, D.D. 227, 471, 473
Rev. Professor R. J. Knowling, M.A. 19, 503
Rev. J. P. Lilley, M.A. 487

PAGE

Rev. Hugh Macmillan, D.D., LL.D., F.R.S.E. 126
Professor John Massie, M.A. 312, 418
Rev. Professor Allan Menzies, D.D. 199
Rev. James Hope Moulton, M.A. 35
Rev. James Phillips 576
Rev. Professor A. Plummer, D.D. 94
Rev. R. Martin Pope, M.A. 91
Rev. Professor A. Roberts, D.D. 27, 301
Rev. A. Robertson, D.D. 6
Rev. G. H. Rouse, M.A., D.D..... 210
W. Taylor Smith, B.A. ... 90, 93, 288, 376, 377
Rev. Robert Stewart 308
Rev. W. S. Swayne, M.A. 39, 425
Rev. J. E. H. Thomson, B.D. 477, 498
Rev. R. Tuck, B.A. ... 45, 55, 153, 238, 249, 337, 436, 531, 544
Rev. A. Welch 109
R. M. Wenley, M.A., D.Sc. ... 135, 213, 285, 327, 380, 515, 574
Rev. D. Gath Whitley 527
Rev. J. Willcock, B.D. 64, 172, 258, 554
Rev. F. H. Woods, B.D. 404
Rev. Arthur Wright, M.A. 102
Rev. C. H. H. Wright, D.D. 92

SUBJECTS.

Acts xvi. 12, Note on 34
Acts xxvii., A Study of 35
Agnosticism 97
Agnosticism, Christianity and 471
Anabaptism, Early 389
Analysis, Critical, Specimen of 197
Ancestor-worship in China 195
Anselmic Theory of Atonement, Criticism of 160
Anthropology underlying Redemption ... 56
Apologetics, Future of 544
Apostles, Teaching of the Twelve 93
Art, Truth as apprehended and expressed in 45
Ascent of Man, Professor Drummond's ... 221
Assyriology, Primer of 93
Athanasianism 155
Atonement, Criticism of the Anselmic Theory of 160
Atonement Money 296
Auricular Confession in Church of England 193
Authorship of Epistle to Hebrews 210
Bampton Lectures for the Year 1894..... 284
Bible, King James's, Old Testament in 492
Bible, Testimony of Holy Spirit to 343
Biblical Critic, Spinoza as a 546
Birthplace, Paul's 388

PAGE
Brotherhood, Christian 355
Buddhism and Hinduism, Modern Theosophy in its Relation to 539
Bugeiliol, Yr Epistolau 474
Central Truths and Side Issues 574
China, Ancestor-worship in 195
Christ, Has the Church lost Faith in? ... 55
Christ is All 91
Christ, Life of, A Jewish 385
"Christ, What think ye of?" 71
Christian Apologetics, Studies in History of, New Testament and Post-Apostolic 376
Christian Brotherhood 355
Christian Dogmatics, Scope and Methods of 444
Christian Missions, Comparative Religion and 199
Christianity and Agnosticism 471
Christianity, St. Paul's Conception of ... 377
Chronology of New Testament 386
Church and Sciences 535
Church lost Faith in Christ, Has? 55
Church of England, Auricular Confession in 193
Church, Young Man and the 244
Coffin in Egypt, A 265
Coming Industrial Order 247
Common Errors as to Relations of Science and Faith 345
Comparative Religion and Christian Missions 199
Comrie, Alexander 487
Conception of Christianity, Paul's 377
Conception of Religion, Schleiermacher's 251
Concordance to Greek Testament 198
Confession, Auricular, in Church of England 193
Contemporary Theology, Logic of ... 135, 213, 327, 515
Critical Analysis, Specimen of 197
Critical Contradictions 101
Criticism and Book of Daniel 63
Criticism, Holy Scripture and 164
Criticism, Modern, of the Old Testament, What Position should Christians take with Reference to? 262
Criticism of Anselmic Theory of Atonement 160
Criticism, Old Testament 448
Cuneiform Parallels to Hebrew Scriptures 100
Curetonian Gospel Fragments 13
Curiosities of Early Gospel Tradition ... 290
Current Social Problems, Ministry and .. 53
Daisies of Nazareth 575

PAGE
Daniel, Book of, Criticism and 63
Daniel, Book of: Expositor's Bible 477
Daniel, Date of Book of 24
Daniel, Miraculous Element in 498
Darkness, Kingdom of, Seventh Petition, or 341
Day of Last Supper 387
Death, Life in View of 74
Deluge, What, where, and when was? ... 196
Descent of New Jerusalem 242
Destiny, Man's 527
Development of Earthly Life of Jesus ... 547
Devil, The 437
Diatessaron of Tatian 388
Didache, or Teaching of the Twelve Apostles 93
Divine Order of Providence and Grace ... 126
Divine Personality, Human and 284
Divine Revelation 241
Divine Sacrifice 194
Doedes, Professor, as a Teacher 176
Dogmatic Theology, Preliminaries of—
I. Possibility of Religious Dogma 39
II. Faculties by which Religious Truth is apprehended 425
Dogmatics, Christian, Scope and Methods of 444
Driver's, Canon, Edition of Leviticus in Hebrew 5
Drummond's, Professor, *Ascent of Man*... 220
Dynamics of Mind 436
Early Anabaptism 389
Early Gospel Tradition, Curiosities of ... 290
Earthly Life of Jesus, Development of ... 547
Education, Public, Scope of 447
Egypt, A Coffin in 265
English Bible, How to study 93
Epistle to Galatians 350
Epistle to Galatians, Roman Law in 484
Epistle to Hebrews, Authorship of 210
Epistolau Bugeiliol, Yr 474
Errors, Common, as to Relations of Science and Faith 345
Ethical Teacher, Dr. Luthardt as an ... 170
Ethics of Jesus, Social 531
Evolution of Love 473
Evolution, Recent Pantheistic 153
Expositor's Bible: Book of Daniel 477
Expression, Truthfulness in 249
Faculties by which Religious Truth is apprehended 425
Faith and Science, Common Errors as to Relations of 345
Faith in Christ, Has Church lost? 55
Faith in Resurrection of Jesus Christ ... 554

PAGE
Faith, What is the Foundation of our?... 143
Familiar Texts, Fresh Light on 289
Forgiveness, Did Isaiah preach? 4
Fourth Gospel, from a Jewish Point of View 404
Frontier of Promised Land 76
Future of Apologetics 544
Galatians, Epistle to 350
Galatians, Roman Law in Epistle to..... 484
Gehenna, Hades and 301
Genealogies, The Two 27
Geology and History, Meeting-place of 90
Glory of Old Testament 1
God, Kingdom of, Modern Views of 60
God, Man's Conception of 47
God, Man's Conception of, from Historical Standpoint 157
God, Moses Servant of 91
God of Zoroaster 536
God, Wrath of 49
Gospel, Fourth, from a Jewish Point of View 404
Gospel Fragments, Curetonian 13
Gospel, Some Prominent Difficulties in—
V. The Two Genealogies 27
VI. Hades and Gehenna..... 301
Gospel Tradition, Curiosities of Early ... 290
Gospels, Pillar Apostles and 19, 503
Grace, Providence and, Divine Order of 127
Greek Gods, Paul's View of 418
Greek New Testament, Brief Introduction to 376
Greek Testament, Concordance to 198
Guidance in the Way 73
Hades and Gehenna 301
Harpagmos: Phil. ii. 6: A Criticism and a Defence 312
Hase, Carl A. von 551
Hebrew, Canon Driver's Edition of Leviticus in 5
Hebrew, Introduction to Study of 92
Hebrew, Modern, Character, History of 483
Hebrew Prophets, Idea of Righteousness in 174
Hebrew Scriptures, Cuneiform Parallels to 100
Hebrew Studies 291
Hebrews, Epistle to, Authorship of the 210
Heterodoxy, Orthodoxy and 286
Hinduism and Buddhism, Modern Theosophy in its Relation to 539
Historical Account of Teaching of Jesus 469
Historical Method of Interpretation 533
Historical Rationalism, Latest Phase of 338
Historical Standpoint, Man's Conception of God from an 157
PAGE
Historical, Patriarchs of Israel 347
Historicity of Lord's Resurrection 198
History and Geology, Meeting-place of 90
History and Religion of Israel, Origins of 443
History of Modern Hebrew Character ... 483
Hofmann, Von, and Old Testament 453
Holy Scripture and Criticism 164
Holy Scriptures, Inspiration and Preservation of 521
Holy Spirit, the Paraclete 381
Holy Spirit, Testimony of, to Bible 343
Human and Divine, Personality 284
Human Constitution, What does Redemption do in? 250
Human Life, Threefold View of 70
Immortality, Theory of Telepathy, and the Light it throws upon Problem of 538
Immortality and Resurrection 227
Industrial Order, Coming 247
Inequalities of Life 266
Inertness of Society 344
Inheritance in the Old Testament, Our 91
Inspiration and Preservation of Holy Scriptures 521
Inspiration, Theories of 534
Interpretation of Old Testament as affected by Modern Scholarship 439
Interpretation, Historical Method of..... 533
Introduction to New Testament Greek, Brief 376
Introduction to Study of Hebrew 92
Irenicon, An 239
Isaiah preach Forgiveness, Did? 4
Israel, Origins of History and Religion of 443
Israel, Patriarchs of, Historical 347
Jerusalem, New, Descent of 242
Jesus, Development of Earthly Life of 547
Jesus Christ, Faith in Resurrection of ... 554
Jesus, Life of, prior to His Public Ministry 390
Jesus, Resurrection of 57
Jesus, Social Ethics of 54
Jesus, Teaching of 258
Jesus, Teaching of, Historical Account of 469
Jewish *Life of Christ*, A 385
Jewish Point of View, Fourth Gospel from a 404
Joel: The Locusts 123
Joel: The Summons to Repentance 413
Johannine Theology 479
John iii. 13, Is Last Clause of, Genuine? 109
John's Prologue, Julian the Apostate on 58
John the Baptist's Question to our Lord 308

PAGE
King James's Bible, Old Testament in ... 492
Kingdom of Darkness, Seventh Petition, or ... 341
Kingdom of God, Modern Views of ... 60
Kingdom of Ten Tribes: its Historical and Religious Significance ... 6
Laird and his Friends ... 576
Laity, Words to ... 94
Lamennais ... 66
Last Supper, Day of ... 387
Law of God, Unwritten ... 340
Leviticus in Hebrew, Canon Driver's Edition of ... 5
Life in View of Death ... 74
Life of Christ, A Jewish ... 385
Life of Jesus, prior to His Public Ministry ... 390
Life, Inequalities of ... 266
Light on Familiar Texts, Fresh ... 289
Lord's Resurrection, Historicity of ... 198
Lord's Supper ... 374, 548
Lord's Teaching on Prayer, Our ... 508
Logic of Contemporary Theology ... 135, 213, 327, 515
Love, Evolution of ... 473
Luke v. 37, 38 ... 101
Luthardt, Dr., as an Ethical Teacher ... 170
Luther, Socialism of ... 64
Magicians of Pharaoh ... 482
Man's Conception of God ... 47
Man's Conception of God from an Historical Standpoint ... 157
Man's Destiny ... 527
Meeting-place of Geology and History ... 90
Messianic Idea in the Prophets ... 542
Metaphysics *versus* Psychology ... 445
Mind, Dynamics of ... 436
Ministry, and Current Social Problems 53
Miracles, Prayer and ... 172
Miraculous Element in Daniel ... 498
Missions, Christian, Comparative Religion and ... 199
Modern Hebrew Character, History of ... 483
Modern Scholarship, Interpretation of Old Testament as affected by ... 439
Modern Theosophy in its Relation to Hinduism and Buddhism ... 539
Modern Views of the Kingdom of God ... 60
Money, Atonement ... 296
Morality and Religion ... 556
Moses: Servant of God ... 91
Moses, Socialism of ... 441
Nahum the Elkoshite, Vision of ... 481
Natural and Supernatural ... 238
Nazareth, Daisies of ... 575
New Testament, Chronology of ... 386
New Testament Greek, Brief Introduction to ... 376
New Testament Theology ... 469
Nietzsche, Friedrich: A Sign of the Time ... 67
Note on Acts xvi. 12 ... 34
Notions of Prayer, True and False ... 486
Occultism, True: its Place and Use ... 510
Old Testament and its Contents ... 93
Old Testament Criticism ... 448
Old Testament, Glory of ... 1
Old Testament in King James's Bible ... 492
Old Testament, Our Inheritance in ... 91
Old Testament, Interpretation of, as affected by Modern Scholarship ... 439
Old Testament, Religious Value of Certain Parts of ... 260
Old Testament, Von Hofmann and ... 453
Old Testament, What Position should Christians take up with Reference to Modern Criticism of? ... 262
Origins of History and Religion of Israel 443
Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy ... 286
Othniel ... 117
Pantheistic Evolution, Recent ... 153
Parables, Variations in ... 290
Paraclete, Holy Spirit the ... 381
Patriarchs of Israel, Historical ... 347
Paul gathering Sticks ... 361
Paul's Birthplace ... 388
Paul's Conception of Christianity ... 377
Paul's View of Greek Gods ... 418
Pentateuch, Sanitary Code of ... 288
Personality, Human and Divine ... 284
Pharaoh, Magicians of ... 482
Piety, Strained ... 358
Pillar Apostles and the Gospels ... 19, 503
Prayer and Miracles ... 172
Prayer, Our Lord's Teaching on ... 508
Prayer, True and False Notions of ... 486
Present-Day Primers ... 93
Present Religious Tendencies ... 353
Present State of Scripture Question ... 255
Preservation, Inspiration and, of Holy Scriptures ... 521
Primer of Assyriology ... 93
Problem, Synoptic ... 102
Promised Land, Frontier of ... 76
"Prophet," Word ... 99
Prophets, Messianic Idea in ... 542
Providence and Grace, Divine Order of ... 127
Psychology, Physiology, and Pedagogics 162
Psychology *versus* Metaphysics ... 445
Public Education, Scope of ... 447

PAGE
Public Ministry, Life of Jesus prior to His 390
Rationalism, Historical, Latest Phase of 338
Recent Pantheistic Evolution 153
Redemption, Anthropology underlying... 57
Redemption, What does it do in Human Constitution? 250
Religion and State..... 485
Religion and Wealth 245
Religion, Comparative, and Christian Missions 199
Religion, Morality and..... 556
Religion, Schleiermacher's Conception of 251
Religious Dogma, Possibility of..... 39
Religious Teacher, World's..... 243
Religious Tendencies of Present 353
Religious Truth, Faculties by which, is apprehended 425
Religious Value of Certain Parts of Old Testament 260
Resurrection, Historicity of Lord's..... 198
Resurrection, Immorality and the 227
Resurrection of Jesus 51
Resurrection of Jesus Christ, Faith in ... 554
Revelation, Divine 241
Righteousness, Idea of, in Hebrew Prophets 174
Roman Law in Epistle to Galatians 484
Sacrifice, Divine 194
Sanitary Code of Pentateuch 288
Schleiermacher's Conception of Religion 251
Science and Faith, Common Errors as to Relations of..... 345
Sciences, Church and 535
Scope and Methods of Christian Dogmatics 444
Scope of Public Education 447
Scripture Question, Present State of 255
Sermons, Village 90
Servant of God: Moses 91
Seventh Petition, or Kingdom of Darkness 341
Side Issues, Central Truths and..... 574
Sign of the Time, A: Friedrich Nietzsche 67
Sinaitic MS., Newly Discovered..... 13
Sin, Whence is?..... ... 337
Social Ethics of Jesus 531
Social Problems, Current, University and 53
Socialism of Luther 64
Socialism of Moses 441
Society, Inertness of..... ... 344
Spinoza as a Biblical Critic..... 545
State, Religion and 485
Sticks, Paul gathering..... 361
Strained Piety 358
Study of Acts xxvii. 35
Studies, Hebrew 290

PAGE
Studies in History of Christian Apologetics, New Testament and Post-Apostolic 376
Studies in Theology 380
Sunday in Church: The Sunday Lessons—
Festival of the Epiphany..... 78
First Sunday after Epiphany 79
Second " " 81
Third " " 83
Fourth " " 181
Septuagesima Sunday 183
Sexagesima " 184
Quinquagesima " 186
First Sunday in Lent 269
Second " " 271
Third " " 273
Fourth " " 275
Fifth " " 277
Sunday before Easter 362
Easter Day 364
First Sunday after Easter 366
Second " " 368
Third " " 456
Fourth " " 458
Fifth " " 460
Sunday after Ascension Day 462
Whitsun-Day 558
Trinity Sunday 560
First Sunday after Trinity 562
Second " " 564
Third " " 566
Sunday in School: The International Lessons—
John the Baptist beheaded 85
Feeding the Five Thousand 86
Christ the Bread of Life 88
The Great Confession 89
The Transfiguration; or, The Soul's Holiday 188
Christ and the Children 189
The Good Samaritan 190
Christ and the Man born Bliad ... 191
The Raising of Lazarus 279
The Rich Young Ruler 281
Zacchæus the Publican 282
Purity of Life..... 283
The Triumphal Entry 370
The Wicked Husbandmen 372
Watchfulness..... 374
The Lord's Supper 374
The Agony in Gethsemane 464
Jesus before the High Priest 465
Jesus before Pilate 466
Jesus on the Cross..... 468
The Walk to Emmaus 570

PAGE

Sunday in School—*continued.*
Peter and the Risen Lord 572
The Saviour's Parting Words 573
Supernatural and its Imitations 158
Supernatural, Natural and 238
Supper, Lord's 374, 548
Synoptic Problem 102
Tatian, Diatessaron of 388
Teacher, World's Religious 243
Teaching of Jesus 258
Teaching of Jesus, Historical Account of 469
Teaching of the Twelve Apostles 93
Teaching on Prayer, Our Lord's 508
Telepathy, Theory of, and the Light it throws upon the Problem of Immortality 538
Ten Tribes, Kingdom of: its Historical and Religious Significance 6
Testimony of Holy Spirit to Bible 343
Theology, Contemporary, Logic of ... 135, 213, 327, 515
Theology, Johannine 479
Theology, New Testament 469
Theology, Studies in 380
Theories of Inspiration 534
Theosophy, Modern, in its Relation to Hinduism and Buddhism 539
Things Undone 179

PAGE

Thomas à Kempis 553
Threefold View of Human Life 70
Time, A Sign of the: Friedrich Nietzsche 67
Tobit, Book of 3
True and False Notions of Prayer 486
True Occultism: its Place and Use 540
Truth as apprehended and expressed in Art 45
Truthfulness in Expression 249
Two Genealogies 27
Undone, Things 179
Unwritten Law of God 340
Value of Certain Parts of Old Testament, Religious 260
Variations in Parables 290
Village Sermons 92
Vision of Nahum the Elkoshite 481
Way, Guidance in the 73
Wealth, Religion and 245
Wellhausen's New Book 2
"What think ye of Christ?" 71
Whence is Sin? 337
Words to Laity 94
World's Religious Teacher 243
Wrath of God 49
Young Man and the Church 244
Zoroaster, God of 536

TEXTS.

PAGE

Gen. ii. 7 183
vi. 9 184
xviii. 1, 2 560
xxiv. 27 73
xxxii. 26 271
xlv. 5 275
l. 26 265
Numb. xxi. 9 368
Deut. x. 2 460
xxxiv. 4 76
Josh. vi. 17 562
xi. 15 179
Judg. v. 20 564
1 Sam. iii. 18 566
Eccles. ii. 70
vii. 16 358
Isa. liii. 7 79
lxvi. 1, 2 83
Ezek. xviii. 25 266
Matt. i. 1–16 31
i. 16 16
i. 19, 24 16
i. 25 17
iii. 16 15
vi. 18 17
xi. 2, 3 308
xii. 1–42 372
xvi. 13–23 89
xviii. 1–14 189

PAGE

Matt. xx. 16 126
xxii. 42 71
xxiv. 42–51 374
Mark vi. 14–29 85
vi. 30–44 86
x. 17–27 281
xi. 1–11 370
xiv. 12–26 374
xiv. 32–42 464
xiv. 53–64 465
xv. 1–15 466
xv. 22–37 468
xvi. 1–8 568
Luke i. 27 30
ii. 14 17
iii. 23–28 32
v. 37, 38 101
ix. 28–36 188
ix. 55 17
x. 1 17
x. 25–37 190
x. 41, 42 17
xi. 19 16
xii. 20 74
xix. 1–10 282
xix. 41 362
xxii. 43, 44 17
xxiii. 9 16
xxiii. 48 16

PAGE

Luke xxiv. 13–32 570
xxiv. 44–53 573
John i. 18 17
ii. 11 78
iii. 13 109
vi. 25–35 88
ix. 1–11 191
xi. 30–45 279
xx. 11 364
xx. 27, 28 366
xxi. 4–17 572
Acts xii. 5 81
xvi. 12 34
xix. 2 558
xx. 19, 20 181
xxvii. 35
xxviii. 3 361
Rom. viii. 13 186
xii. 1 269
xiii. 8–14 283
1 Cor. ix. 24 273
2 Cor. iv. 4 277
Phil. ii. 6 312
1 Thess. ii. 3, 4 456
1 Tim. i. 15 458
Heb. i. 3 462
1 John ii. 7, 8 355
Rev. xxi. 2 242

THE THINKER.

THE SURVEY OF THOUGHT.

THE GLORY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.—Under this suggestive title is reproduced, in the form of a pamphlet, an eloquent address delivered at a meeting of the Bible Society at Basle, by Professor Öttli of Bern. After a few introductory remarks, five reasons are urged for the closer study of the Old Testament. 1. Our Lord's indebtedness to it. Both He and His disciples lived and moved in it. All His thoughts were saturated with its thoughts. We cannot understand Christ if we do not understand the Word out of which His Word has grown as the blossom out of the bud. More than that, Jesus nourished His own inner life on the Scriptures, and learnt from them His work as a Saviour. He found there, too, His Father's house, where He must ever be. The Old Testament ought, consequently, to be a Holy Land to Christians. 2. It sketches, as with the point of a diamond, the outlines of the true relation between God and the world, thus supplying a strong weapon against dreamy pantheism and godless materialism. 3. The Old Testament points out not less clearly the relation between God and man. Man's original dignity, his fall, God's forgiving healing grace, and wise patient training, are pictured with wonderful distinctness and beauty. "Gaze steadily in this looking-glass, and you see your image; and better still, the face, yea, the heart, of a God in whom our hearts can trust because He is holy love." 4. The Old Testament traces also, with the same Divine precision, the true relation between man and man. "What touching thought for the poor, the lowly, and the down-trodden! and what flaming indignation against oppression and extortion! The hungry poor in a neighbour's cornfield or vineyard, and the female captive, are provided for with equal benevolence; nay, even the ox at the threshing-floor, and the frightened mother-bird, come within the sweep of the same loving care. Husbands and wives, parents and children and domestics, have principles set before them which are at the same time wise, serious, and kindly; and a perfectly just balance is applied in social life without respect of persons. Assuredly, those people who speak evil of the Old Testament when they are contending with the social ills of the present day know not what they are doing." Timely and forcible words, which many Christian folk as well as outsiders may well lay to heart. 5. The grandest and most glorious feature of the Old Testament is its foreshadowing of Christ. All through its pages moves

a veiled figure, the outlines of which become more and more distinct as we approach the end. At one time we catch a glimpse of a majestic kingly countenance, at another of the pale and bleeding face of a Man of sorrows. This well-reasoned and finely expressed address ought to be widely read.

WELLHAUSEN'S NEW BOOK.—The handsome volume just issued from the pen of the famous professor of Göttingen, entitled, *Jewish and Israelitish History*, is well worthy of the author's reputation. It is a scholarly and eloquent survey of the history of the chosen people from the time of Moses to the fall of the second temple—of course, in the light of the most advanced Old Testament criticism. It is assumed that no part of the Pentateuch was written by Moses. Even the Decalogue is probably not older than the time of Manasseh. The historical portions are regarded as in a large degree unworthy of credence. A few statements are accepted, but most are rejected. The Exodus is described as follows: "At a time when Egypt was visited by a grievous pestilence, the Hebrews left Goshen by night, with their wives and children and cattle, and marched to the peninsula of Sinai. After a few days' journey they settled at Kadesh, to the east of Goshen, on the southern frontier of Palestine." So the whole story of the descent of Jehovah on Mount Sinai, which made so profound an impression on the minds and hearts and consciences of later generations, is dismissed as a legend. Does not this way of treating the sacred history create more difficulties than it removes? Scant justice is done to David and Solomon as to the main features of their life and work. The idea that the former wrote hymns is scouted as a fabrication of the priests long afterwards. He was a very gifted man in several ways, but his significance was political rather than religious. His terrible fall is strangely extenuated by the modern historian: "David's behaviour in the matter of Uriah (if the narrative can be depended on) speaks really rather for than against him: not many kings would have exhibited open and deep repentance when reproached for guilt." Here, again, great demands are made on our credulity. It is hard to believe that the character and achievements of David can have been so completely misunderstood by the whole Jewish nation for a succession of ages, as must have been the case if our author is in the right. In the pages referring to the reign of Solomon, the building and furnishing of the temple occupy about ten lines of the text. The history of the kingdoms of Judah and Israel is traced with great ability, with the aid of recent research. Great attention is of necessity given to the rise and growth of prophecy. Much that is said on the subject is excellent, but the facts dealt with are very imperfectly explained. It is not in the least made clear how it came about that Elijah introduced or emphasized with unprecedented power the thought of the sole supremacy of Jehovah, and how later prophets attained to their sublime conception of the working of

God in the history, not only of Israel, but of the world. Surely the old idea of a Divine revelation on Mount Sinai, and the gradual development of it in after-ages comes quite as near, if not much nearer, a solution of the problem. The chapters treating of the influence of the Exile and the Restoration on Jewish life and thought, and of the gradual transformation of Judaism into the legalism of the time of Christ, are extremely interesting and suggestive, but crowded with controversial matter. . Not a single psalm is admitted to date from before the Exile. The Book of Isaiah is analyzed into three portions. All the books of the Old Testament, except the Book of Ezekiel, are said to have been adapted by redactors or editors to the taste of ages differing widely from those for which they were in the first instance designed. The most notable chapter is the twenty-third, with the simple expressive heading, "The Gospel." It is splendidly written, but painfully incomplete. What Jesus had in common with earlier teachers, and wherein He differed from them, is clearly shown; but the question who He was is to all intents and purposes left unanswered. Sometimes Divinity seems to be recognized, at other times nothing more than humanity. It is not certain that the fact of the Resurrection is admitted. To earnest seekers after truth, Wellhausen's treatment of the rise of Christianity will be disappointing. Theories, however, which have made some noise in the world meet with little favour. The Gospels are not considered myths, for they are held to furnish materials for a faithful portrait. Jesus was obviously not an Essene, as some recent writers have affirmed. The book as a whole will be of great use to the discriminating student, as it is a storehouse of information, clever comments, and sagacious hints; but it must be used with the greatest caution. It conducts into, but not through, the history with which it undertakes to deal. We are led all round the outer court by an unusually accomplished guide, but we do not even catch a distant glimpse of the Holy of Holies.

THE BOOK OF TOBIT.—Few books have occasioned more difference of opinion as to their date and purpose than the quaint old Jewish tale known as the Book of Tobit. Roman Catholics have dated it as early as the seventh century B.C. Ewald ascribed it to the close of the Persian period. Hitzig, Rosenthal, and Grätz put it in the former half of the second Christian century. So also Neubauer, in the preface to his edition of the Aramaic text of Tobit in the Bodleian Library, and of other Rabbinic texts. Kohut has come down as late as the time of the Sassanian ruler of Persia, Ardeschir I., about the middle of the third century. The extreme views, therefore, about the date of Tobit differ by about nine hundred years. A little book just published in Germany, *Studies on Tobit*, by Dr. Rosenmann, gives some good reasons for placing the composition of the tale in the time of the second temple, before its restoration by Herod. The thought and life which it implies are post-Biblical and pre-Talmudic. A Rabbinic Jew would have modified some

of the details considerably. Dr. Rosenmann goes as far back as the second century B.C. If he is right (or approximately right), the value of the book is much greater than on the assumption of a post-Christian date. It is in the former case an extremely interesting picture of Jewish family life at a period not very far removed from the days of our Lord, and before Jewish feelings had been embittered and Jewish ideas had been warped by the fall of Jerusalem and its sequel. It is, nevertheless, a work of fiction, for its unhistorical character is beyond dispute; but its usefulness as a source of illustration for the Gospels is in no way affected thereby. The purpose of the book, too, has been diversely apprehended. It has been regarded as a sort of commentary on the famous saying of Rabbi Akiba, "Everything which God does is well done." Its main lesson has been supposed to be the duty of interring dead Jews who had no relations to care for them. It was intended, according to another explanation, to encourage the Jews of the Dispersion to keep the Law. The last is substantially the conclusion arrived at by Dr. Rosenmann. "The book is nothing but an encomium on ἐλεημοσύνη and δικαιοσύνη."

Did Isaiah preach Forgiveness?—For two thousand years the words rendered in our English Bible, "Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; though they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool" (Isa. i. 18), have been understood as a declaration of the Divine readiness to pardon the penitent sinner. Some recent critics find the opposite. According to them, Isaiah is here, at any rate, a prophet of judgment rather than mercy. Duhm maintains that the words are either indignant questions, or an ironical challenge, and decides, although rather hesitatingly, for the latter interpretation. He renders, "Come now, and let us litigate. If your sins are as scarlet, make them white as snow. If they are red like purple, make them as wool." Wellhausen (in his latest work) prefers the other alternative, translating thus: "Do you think yourselves unjustly treated by Me? If your sins are as scarlet, shall they pass for white as snow? If they are red like purple, shall they be as wool?" This programme, he adds, referring to vers. 10–20, announces, not forgiveness of sin, but simply and solely righteous retribution. So, if we are to believe these learned guides who are in the forefront of modern criticism, the tender and sublime words which have comforted so many thousands of stricken penitents, are due to misunderstanding on the part of translators. Isaiah never wrote them. He would have disowned the thought they express as dishonouring to God. Stern, inflexible righteousness was for him the central attribute in the Divine nature as revealed to sinful man. It is not likely that the Church as a whole will follow these audacious leaders, and meekly surrender one of the most precious assurances of God's forgiving love in the whole Bible. Whilst it may be admitted that there is a little difficulty as to the

rendering of כְּצֶמֶר לָבָן, the general meaning of the passage and its context is beyond dispute. Israel is challenged to a trial. It is assumed that the decision will go against them. Nevertheless, the injured Jehovah will blot out the stained past, and bestow prosperity in the future on condition of practical repentance. The rendering with which we are familiar is the natural rendering, and has been current among the Jews in all ages. It is found substantially in the Septuagint; it was sanctioned by the great mediæval expositor Ibn Ezra, and was endorsed by the lately deceased scholar and historian Grätz. It is repeatedly assumed in the Talmud, and is said to have found expression in the ritual of the second temple. The bit of red wool attached to the head of the scapegoat when it symbolically bore away the sin of Israel was justified by this passage. They also said that another bit of red wool, which was fastened to the door of the sanctuary, turned white when the goat reached the desert, thus representing to the eye the fulfilment of the promise made through the prophet.

Canon Driver's Edition of Leviticus in Hebrew.—The interest of this new part of the international edition of the Hebrew Bible, which is very slowly coming out under the general editorship of Professor Haupt of Baltimore, lies chiefly in the representation, by means of colours, of the supposed origin of the component parts. The body of the work, which is printed on a white ground, is believed to have been written about B.C. 500, as part of the document usually known as the Priestly Code, or P. Three passages—namely, chs. iv.; vi. 23; and x. 16–20—which are regarded as later additions to P, are printed on brown. A few redactional notes, found chiefly in ch. xxiii., are indicated by lines above the text. The remaining portions, printed on yellow, are assigned to the document which is now generally designated as the Law of Holiness, or H. These portions, which are earlier than the bulk of P, having been composed not very far from the time of the Prophet Ezekiel (B.C. 570), are, of course, found principally in chs. xvii.–xxvi. The greater part of these ten chapters is ascribed to H, but with considerable exceptions in chs. xxiii., xxiv., and xxv. In fact, most of ch. xxiv. is assigned to P. Several traces of H are found outside of these chapters—chs. x. 10, 11; xi. 2–23, 42–47. The results arrived at by the English editors (for Canon Driver has been assisted by the Rev. H. A. White, M.A.) agree in no small measure with those of Professor Strack of Berlin, so far as the extent of H is concerned. The discussion of the arrangement must in fairness be deferred until the appearance of the English translation of this revised text, in the notes to which the reasons for the allocation of the different parts are to be given. The revision of the text has yielded no startling results, as this most legal of the Hebrew Scriptures has come down to us in a far less corrupt state than some other portions.

BIBLICAL THOUGHT.

THE KINGDOM OF THE TEN TRIBES: ITS HISTORICAL AND RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE.

By Rev. Archibald Robertson, D.D., Principal of Bishop Hatfield's Hall, Durham.

The object of the following pages is to discuss a result of Old Testament criticism which has been the subject of violently opposed *obiter dicta* [1] from different quarters, but which has received, so far as the present writer knows, no special discussion in a purely judicial spirit, namely, the modern rehabilitation of the Northern Kingdom.

Is this rehabilitation a mere critical paradox, or does it correspond to some neglected elements in the Biblical material? What was the prophetic estimate of the kingdom of the ten tribes?

The Old Testament, not read as material for history, but regarded from the standpoint of results, seems able to dispense with Northern Israel from its first revolt downwards. The great Messianic conceptions—Prophet, Priest, King—centre round the house of David, round the House of Jehovah, and round Isaiah the evangelical prophet of Jerusalem. The selective process which narrows down the religious history of mankind from Adam to Seth, from Noah to Shem, from Abraham to Jacob, seems to have concentrated itself from the first upon the house of David, as though God, who "loved Jacob and hated Esau," had also loved Judah and hated Israel.

And it may be allowed that this conception of the history is a very old one. We trace it—somewhat faintly, it is true—in the comments of the editor of the Books of Kings, who, applying the standard of the Deuteronomic Law, emphasizes from the first the religious schism inaugurated by Jeroboam the son of Nebat (cf. also 1 Kings xiii.); while the Chronicler, looking back from the standpoint of later Judaism, expurgates the history of nearly all references to the story of the Northern Kingdom, notably of its establishment by prophetic direction (1 Kings xi. 31), records a universal exodus of Priests and Levites to Judah (2 Chron. xi. 13) from all Israel, and introduces most emphatic protests against the schismatic and illegitimate character of the kingdom of Ephraim (2 Chron. xiii.).

On the other hand, many critics maintain that if we turn from the result to the historical process which led to it, we shall find that Northern Israel played, not only an indispensable, but the main part in the evolution of the history; that its numbers and power were incomparably greater, its civilization higher, than those of Judah; and more than this,

[1] See W. Robertson Smith, *Prophets*, pp. 48, 93–95, 115, *seq.*, 191–195; Wellhausen, *History of Israel*, pp. 24, 188, 477; J. Robertson, *Early Religion of Israel*, pp. 111, 412, 514.

that its superiority was equally marked in spiritual as in material things, that it was the cradle of prophecy, and, during nearly the whole of its existence, the exclusive scene of the work of the greatest prophets—of Elijah and Elisha the greatest prophets of action, of Amos and Hosea the first[1] prophets of the pen.

The problem before us, then, is to endeavour to sift this question in a more impartial spirit than has sometimes been shown with regard to it. We have to decide whether we ought to hold, with Wellhausen, that "the northern kingdom was in the olden times the proper Israel, and Judah merely an appendage to it;" or, with Dr. J. Robertson, to maintain that "the schism of the ten tribes was a breaking away from the national unity and from the national God."

I.

The question may be formulated thus—*What is the Biblical view* of the Northern Kingdom? Have the critics referred to unwarrantably set it aside? or have they rediscovered a true Biblical and contemporary estimate of the facts which later tradition has overlooked?

We must not too readily assume that there is *one* Biblical view of the matter, and one only. It is not without example for the Bible to hand down two alternative traditions of the same occurrence, two strictly alternative estimates of the same action, simply because, as a matter of fact, both prevailed. This might be shown to be the case with regard to the Tabernacle, the origin of the high-priestly family, the "temple" or "tent" of Shiloh. It is to some extent true of the estimate of the Jewish monarchy as a whole (the king enters indispensably into the Messianic idea from the first; but see 1 Sam. viii. 7). An interesting, and for us most relevant, example is the estimate of Jehu's massacre of the house of Omri in 2 Kings ix. 6–8, and especially in ch. x. 30, "Because thou hast done well in executing right in mine eyes," etc. But now turn to Hos. i. 4, "Call his name Jezreel, for yet a little, and I will avenge the blood of Jezreel upon the house of Jehu." A deed done by Divine command, and stamped after its completion with Divine approval, is singled out by a later prophet as meriting the direst retribution, and as involving Israel in ruin.

Something like this may be said of the Northern Kingdom. It was instituted by Divine authority. In the reign of Solomon, Jeroboam the governor of Mount Ephraim was stopped near Jerusalem by the Prophet Ahijah of Shiloh, and solemnly invested with the kingdom of the ten tribes, with the promise, conditional on his conduct, of a sure house like David's. "And this was the cause" (1 Kings xi. 27) "that he lifted up his hand against the king." Solomon heard of the prophecy, and sought to

[1] Joel must apparently be assigned a much later date than has been sometimes assumed (see Dr. A. B. Davidson, in *Expositor*, March, 1888).

kill him. He fled to Egypt, and in Rehoboam's time returned to fulfil the word of Ahijah. Yet Hosea (as understood by some [1]) can say of the monarchy of Northern Israel, "They have set up kings, but not by Me: they *have made princes, and I knew it not*" (ch. viii. 4). Here, again, there are two Biblical views, not one only.

II.

Let us now review the considerations which make for the two opposed estimates of the Northern Kingdom. On the one hand, the latter view, which assigned exclusive significance to the house of Judah, is not to be explained merely by the survival of Judah only to mould the final form of tradition. The Southern Kingdom enjoyed the historical glories and the national hopes bound up with the Davidic idea. Amos (ix. 11) associates the eventual regeneration of Israel with the raising up again of the fallen tent of David, while [2] Hosea (i. 11; iii. 5) looks forward to a renewed unity under "David their king" as the accompaniment of a renewed national life. It was felt on all hands that "the division of the tribes was inconsistent with the true destiny of Jehovah's people." [3] The relativity of prophetic revelation helps us to see this matter in its true light. All the great memories of the past, the deliverance from Egypt, the conquest, the story of Deborah, the expulsion of the Philistines, were associated with unity (more or less complete) of action and of feeling among the tribes. Jehovah was the God of all Israel, Jehovah of hosts, of the united hosts which had fought under His protection, and to whom He had given the victory. The ancient glories and mercies were celebrated in a "Book of the Wars of Jehovah." Yet, in their ordinary life and tribal organization, Israel formed a very loose unity, and the monarchy of Abimelech, then that of Saul and Ishbosheth, lastly even that of David and Solomon, all had come before Israel was ripe for monarchy. This was apparent [4] in the reign of David, and under Solomon Ahijah "voiced" the repudiation, by the national instinct, of the methods of centralized government. Yet it required no exceptional insight to see the weakness and impoverishment of the national life under the divided monarchy. Israel was not ripe for monarchy; yet the monarchy of

[1] The passage is referred to, clearly with this meaning, by the *Church Quarterly Review*, vol. xxxix. p. 81, note. The words should, however, be referred, either to the house of Jehu, anointed by Elisha (in which case the contrast is equally striking), or to the perpetual changes of dynasty in Israel (in contrast to the language of 1 Kings xiv. 7; xvi. 1).

[2] This would be undermined by Professor Sayce's view that Amos and Hosea "bear marks of having passed through the hands of a Jewish editor" (*The Higher Criticism, etc.*, pp. 449, 477). But the identification of such marks implies greater confidence in "the methods of the higher criticism" than the present writer feels called upon to share.

[3] W. Robertson Smith, *Prophets*, p. 49.

[4] Not only was the national unity loose, but such cohesion as there was, was in the direction of dual rather than of single integration. Israel and Judah are numbered separately in 2 Sam. xxiv. 9. The history of the rebellions of Absalom and Sheba is an example of the rooted tendency to a separate organization of Judah and of "Israel."

David had been so very nearly a success—had left an *ideal* of splendour and national well-being which was never again forgotten.

True, the house of David was not in reality destined to retain its throne, any more than that of Jehu. Both alike failed to comply with the traditions of their trust. The "sure mercies of David" were destined to be accomplished in a wholly different way, in which earthly monarchy had no concern. But it was the Davidic ideal, meanwhile, that to the prophets stood for the image of a glorious past, to be reproduced in a more glorious future, and which, progressively spiritualized in later prophecy, helped to train men's expectations in the right lines.

Once more, the Ark, though not expressly alluded to by Amos or Hosea, yet was, as might easily be shown, an abiding element of religious pre-eminence for Jerusalem. If Amos figures Jehovah as "roaring" from Zion, and uttering His voice from Jerusalem (ch. i. 2), it is hard to disconnect this from the presence of the Ark there (cf. Micah i. 2, 3; and the name 'Ohŏli-bah in Ezek. xxiii.). There is no assertion in either prophet of the *exclusive* legitimacy of Jerusalem as the place of worship; but the historic significance of the Ark as the *great* centre of national unity and religion is not absent.

The Northern Kingdom might have been instituted by God; but now it had falsified its promise, and must go—it was an obstacle to the destiny of Israel. Only the same would, in time, prove true of the kingdom of Judah also (cf. Hos. v. 5, 10). The Davidic ideal was, to both Amos and Hosea, in abeyance. It was for the future, and was to revive on the ruins, not only of the house of Jehu, but of corrupt Judah also.

III.

But was the position of Northern Israel, as a separate political unit, held to be in itself "schismatical," and therefore in itself a sin?[1] Did the existence of the separate kingdom mean, *ipso facto*, "a breaking away from the national unity and the national God"? Had its members, *ipso facto*, fallen out of covenant relation with Jehovah, lost continuity with the Divine promises of the past? Was "Israel" no longer the people of Jehovah? This is certainly not the Biblical view. Incidentally, even the Books of Kings preserve words[2] in which Northern Israel is spoken of as "My people Israel." "How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? how shall I deliver thee, Israel? . . . I will not return to destroy Ephraim" (Hos. xi. 8, 9). Amos addresses Northern Israel as standing, not less than Judah, in a unique position of knowledge and responsibility (ch. iii. 1, 2). This specially involves knowledge of the Divine will through the prophets (ver. 7)—a hint which we must needs illustrate by the

[1] *Church Quarterly Review, ubi supra.*

[2] Cf. 1 Kings xiv. 7 (Ahijah to King Jeroboam); xvi. 1 (Jehu the prophet to King Baasha); 2 Kings ix. 6 (Elisha's delegate anoints Jehu to be king over "the people of Jehovah, over Israel;" cf. Hos. iv. 6, 8; Amos iii. 1, *sqq.*; Ezek. xxiii. 5, "when she was mine").

previous history of prophecy in the Northern Kingdom—the history of Elijah and Elisha (compare also the exalted *office* of the unworthy priests in Hos. iv. 6, 9). The references to Law in Judah (Amos ii. 4, 5) are on a par with those relating to Israel (Hos. viii. 12, where note R.V.). Northern Israel is the elder sister ('Ohŏlah, Ezek. xxiii. 3), and her guilt is that of an apostate adulterous *wife* (Hos. ii.), explained by Ezekiel of her intrigues with Assyria and Egypt (cf. Hos. vii. 11; v. 14; viii. 9; xii. 1), not of her separate political existence, which is taken for granted.

But the *worship* of Northern Israel was sinful? "Ephraim hath made many altars to sin" (Hos. viii. 11); "come to Bethel, and transgress" (*i.e.* offer sacrifice); "and at Gilgal multiply transgressions" (*i.e.* sacrifices) (Amos iv. 4). This is clear. But what these prophets denounce is, not the *fact*, but the *manner*, of the local worship, or more particularly, in the case of Amos, the idea that *any* worship can cover moral uncleanness, in the case of Hosea, the low conception of Jehovah as a "ba'al," or local god (chs. ii. 16, 17; iv. 7*b*)—a conception visibly embodied in the calves[1] of Bethel, Dan, Bethaven, and elsewhere (ch. xiii. 1, 2). But the house of Jehu was, from the first, the avenger of Jehovah against the *ba'alim*, and Elijah, to whom Jehu owed his throne, associates the "covenant" of Jehovah with His local "altars," which had been thrown down under Ahab (1 Kings xix. 10). These altars, the "high places of Isaac, and the sanctuaries of Israel" (Amos vii. 9), could claim patriarchal consecration, and the authoritative recognition of Samuel, and of the Judges before him. But, says Amos, all worship from an unregenerate heart is hateful to Jehovah. And Isaiah says precisely the same thing of the worship at Jerusalem (cf. Amos v. 21–24 with Isa. i. 11–17; also Hos. vi. 6; Micah i. 5*c* and vi. 6, *sqq.*).

In a word, the essential guilt of Israel is not schism, but iniquity; not *local* worship, but *impure* worship. Judah is, so far, a shade better ("Though thou, Israel, play the wanton, yet let not Judah offend," Hos. iv. 15; as to xi. 12, see R.V. margin); but her guilt is the same in kind (Amos ii. 4; vi. 1; there is hope for *both*, Amos v. 15), and both alike are doomed to fall[2] (especially Hos. v. 5, 10, 14, and note ver. 12).

[1] That Amos does not expressly condemn the calves does not imply that he regarded them with approval; but certainly he singles out for condemnation the moral attitude of the worshipper, rather than the external form of the worship. Hosea emphasizes the devotional, Amos the ethical, side of religion. The early history of image-worship in Israel is obscure. It is quite clear that the calf-worship was ostensibly worship of Jehovah; that its origins go back to a very remote past; that, side by side with it, there runs back into the remote past a traditional feeling that it is unworthy of the highest conception of Jehovah (Exod. xxxii.); that by Hosea's time the local worship of Jehovah had become to some extent fused with the worship of local lords (or *ba'alim;* modern Madonna-worship offers a parallel); and that Hosea denounces the calves as "other gods" (ch. iii. 1). The derivation of the calves from Apis is most questionable.

[2] I omit, in order to avoid importing doubtful assumptions into our search for fact, the prayer in Deut. xxxiii. 7, which has been understood, even by Dillmann, as the aspiration of an Ephraimitish prophet, that Judah might be "brought in" to his people (see Gen. xlix., where Joseph also appears to be the royal tribe).

IV.

Finally, we must consider the importance of the Northern Kingdom, spiritual as well as material. The taunting reply of Jehoash to Amaziah (2 Kings xiv. 9, 10) unquestionably represents the ordinary balance of military power between the two kingdoms. While Israel bears the brunt of the dangerous growth of Damascus, and of the first waves of the world's cataclysm which transformed and unified human history, the destructive flood of Assyria, Judah was carrying on small border wars with Edom, Moab, the Philistines. Her only contact with greater enemies was when she was raided by the decrepit kingdom of Egypt. The Books of Kings bear witness to this general estimate of the two kingdoms. Eliminate, between Solomon and Hezekiah, firstly the history of Northern Israel, secondly the sections where Judah comes in simply in her relations with her northern sister, and all the colour and life are gone. Excepting the account of the revolt of Athaliah, and the succeeding repairs of the Temple, there is little but annalistic and chronological entries, with the recurring verdict on the character of the successive kings. The vivid charm and spiritual impressiveness of the Books of Kings are chiefly due to the materials they incorporate from the traditions of Northern Israel. This corresponds to the spiritual development. Whatever modern criticism of the Old Testament has done or failed to do, it has taught us that prophecy had a history, that its history stood in the closest relation with the spiritual development of Israel, and that the history of prophecy is the central problem of Old Testament history. Well, strike out, between Samuel and Isaiah, all the history contributed by the Northern Kingdom, and the history of prophecy has disappeared with it. It *was* in the Northern Kingdom that the spiritual "history of Israel mainly evolved itself;" and "the spirit and distinct utterances of the earlier prophets" are not opposed to this view, but form its immovable foundation.

On the whole, then, the critical rehabilitation of Northern Israel is justified. If we look, as theologians, merely at the result, Judah doubtless overshadows Israel; but if, as historians, we turn to the process, it is in Northern Israel that we are shown the great forces at work which were moulding the future—the first impact of the great Assyrian power, the inward fire of the prophetic life, the living and growing "word of Jehovah," the sharpest conflicts in the spiritual life of the nation. Amos came from Judah, but he had had no prophet's training there; his words caught fire in Israel, the land of Elijah. Isaiah of Jerusalem had predecessors, no doubt, but among them Amos and Hosea take the foremost rank. Israel lacked the Ark and the house of David, and her descent was more rapid; but her throne was of prophetic institution, she had a recognized worship of Jehovah (1 Kings xix. 10), and Judah followed but little later the same course of decline (Ezek. xxiii. 11; Jer. iii. 11).

V.

The use of the word "schism" in the preceding inquiry suggests modern applications. We have found that, in spite of the originally penal character of its foundation by Ahijah, in spite of the admitted evils which the existence of a divided kingdom involved, Northern Israel were not "in schism" in the strict modern ecclesiastical sense—in the sense in which the Roman Church pronounces a body outside her communion to be cut off from the visible Church and means of grace, and without any claim to be regarded as God's people. Israel are throughout spoken of as "the people of Jehovah;" and Mr. Gladstone, in his recent article in the *Nineteenth Century* (August, 1894, p. 166), has a perfect right to appeal to their case in favour of his general contention. The people of God in old times, the house of Israel, are in their constitution as an organized society a prototype, or rather the direct ancestors, of the visible Church of Christ (1 Cor. x. 1, 6, 11). Their government, like that of the Christian Church, assumed for a time the form of monarchy. The monarchy in each case was the surrender of an ideal, an accommodation to worldly precedent (1 Sam. viii. 7); in each case we must believe it served the purpose of God in its time. But monarchy cannot be entrusted to earthly hands without the certainty of abuse, and without a corresponding possibility that resistance on the part of the subject may become a duty. In the field near Jerusalem (1 Kings xi. 29), Ahijah ratified the inevitable correlative of human government, the right to rebel.

But though this right surely exists, it is one never exercised without peril to all concerned. He who rebels carries his life, and his soul also, in his hand. As a result of Ahijah's action, "Solomon sought to kill Jeroboam," and his doing so was in accordance with the recognized right and duty of governments in all ages. Bad and excessive as it was, the rule of Solomon can hardly have been as full of venality and abuse as that of Julius II. and Leo X.; the revolt of Luther we may believe to have been as truly prompted by the word of the Lord as was that of Jeroboam. Yet who can read the history of the Reformation without feeling that Luther paid in his character the price of his necessary but dangerous enterprise? Who can follow the fortunes of Christendom since the Reformation without feeling that on both sides there has been grievous loss? In the object-lesson of Northern Israel we see that the people of God may be outwardly separated, and that authority in human hands has as its correlative the right, in the last resort, to rebel. But we also see at what cost such a right must always be exerted; and we learn something of the weakness and deterioration which schism brings in its train. If, as the most gifted and lamented of Scottish Orientalists has expressed it, "it was felt that the division of the tribes was inconsistent with the true destiny of Jehovah's people," what are we to feel about the divisions of the great family of Christ?

THE CURETONIAN GOSPEL FRAGMENTS,

WITH SOME REFERENCE TO THE NEWLY DISCOVERED SINAITIC MS.

By Rev. W. E. Barnes, B.D., Fellow of Peterhouse, Cambridge.

(C. = Cureton's MS. of the Old Syriac; S. = the MS. discovered by Mrs. Lewis.)

The ancient Syriac translation of the Bible, generally called the Peshito (Peshitta), but from its position in the Syrian Church also called the Vulgate Syriac, has been known in Europe ever since the revival of learning. Being an "Authorized Version," it exists in a great number of manuscripts of various ages. The oldest of these of which the age is certainly known, is a portion of the Pentateuch bearing a fifth-century date. Of the New Testament one manuscript is dated as early as A.D. 548 (*vide* Scrivener); and there is an earlier, dating, perhaps, from the fifth century. The version itself is doubtless older than any of its manuscripts.

That the Peshito was the original form of the Syriac New Testament, the Gospels included, was doubted by Griesbach and Hug, about the beginning of this century (Hort, *Introduction*, p. 84). The internal character of the version supplied the standing-ground for these doubts. External confirmation of them from documents was hardly available until the year 1842.

In that year, however, Dr. Tattam brought to England, from a Nitrian monastery, a number of manuscripts, among which was one of the four Gospels. This manuscript proved to be heterogeneous, being composed of eighty-two and a half leaves of ancient writing, supplemented by others of more recent date, so as to form a complete volume of the Gospels. Dr. Cureton, then one of the officials of the British Museum, recognizing the superior age of the eighty-two and a half leaves, separated them from the rest, and, after a careful examination, was led to the conclusion that he had found fragments of a translation of the Gospels older than that contained in the Peshito.

The Curetonian Gospels are sadly defective. The first break in the text comes at Matt. viii. 22, and extends to x. 31. Fortunately, this gap may be partly filled up from the new Sinaitic MS. discovered by Mrs. Lewis, and edited by Professor Bensly, Mr. Harris, and Mr. Burkitt, which contains chs. ix. 12–x. 31 almost without a break. From ch. x. 32 the Curetonian text is unbroken until it comes to an end for St. Matthew's Gospel at ch. xxiii. 25. Again the Sinaitic MS. comes to our help, supplying us with more or less of each of the succeeding chapters. The whole of the parable of the virgins (ch. xxv. 1–12) is preserved, and the story of the Passion and Resurrection (chs. xxvi. 18–xxviii. 7) is marred in two short passages only (ch. xxvi. 58–60 and 64–67).

Of St. Mark it is well known that only the last four of the last twelve disputed verses remain in the Curetonian. The Second Gospel is,

on the contrary, comparatively well preserved in the Sinaitic. The first chapter is missing, but fragments are found of each of the four succeeding chapters. From ch. vi. 5 to xvi. 8 (end), where we read in rubric, "*The Gospel of Marcus is finished,*" we have an almost continuous text. Bad breaks occur in the middle of ch. viii. and in the middle of ch. xii. There are small breaks in ch. xiv., and eight or ten verses are gone from ch. xv.; but, with these exceptions, the text may be described as continuous.

Cureton's St. Luke begins at ch. ii. 48, with the words, "hast dealt thus with us;" but breaks off at ch. iii. 16 until ch. vii. 33. In S., however, we are fortunate enough to read St. Luke's preface, and a fairly continuous text (but for a gap at ch. i. 16–38) until ch. v. 16. At ch. vii. 33 C. begins again, and reaches ch. xvi. 12; and after a gap, which costs us the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, it begins again at ch. xvii. 1, and reaches ch. xxiv. 44, in the middle of which it breaks off.

The missing verses of chs. xvi. and xxiv. are, fortunately, contained in S. In ch. xxiv. 51 S. reads simply, "And as He blessed them He was lifted up from them." Plainly the translator read only *διέστη* (*ἀπέστη*) *ἀπ' αὐτῶν*, omitting *καὶ ἀνεφέρετο εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν*, with ℵ*, D, and several manuscripts of the Old Latin. "He was lifted up" will then be a paraphrase of the unusual word *διέστη*. The Old Syriac translator, no doubt, believed that the Ascension was referred to, although he read the shorter Greek text.

The Gospel of St. John in C. begins with ch. i. 1–42, and, after a break, begins again at ch. iii. 6. The gap is partly, but not wholly, filled in S. In ch. ii. 25 S. becomes paraphrastic: "[He needed not] that any should testify of *the work* of man, for He knew the *heart* in man." From ch. iii. 6 C. is almost continuous up to ch. viii. 19, the *Pericope Adulteræ* being absent, without any sign of omission. Similarly, S. gives no hint of the *Pericope*, but passes on from ch. vii. 52 to viii. 12, merely interposing the punctuation which marks the close of a paragraph. C. contains no more of St. John, save a few detached verses from ch. xiv.

S., though its text is much broken, does much towards giving us the Old Syriac of the rest of St. John. Important passages of chs. viii.–x. and of ch. xii. are preserved, and chs. xi. and xiii. are comparatively little damaged. Chs. xiv.–xvii. are full of gaps; ch. xviii. is fairly well preserved down to ver. 31. From ch. xix. 40 to xxi. 25 the text is preserved almost without a break. Ver. 25 of ch. xxi., which was omitted by Tischendorf on the authority of ℵ, is found in S. with *οἶμαι* only omitted.

The date of the manuscript of Cureton's Gospels is unhesitatingly given by Cureton himself, and by the late Professor W. Wright, as "fifth century." It is written in a large and clear Estrangela hand—the hand in which all the earliest Syriac manuscripts are written; does not contain the marks of the sections of Eusebius or Ammonius, nor, in the original hand, any marks of Sunday or Saint-day Lessons. Another mark of early date is the simplicity of the titles of the Gospels; *e.g.* at the beginning

of St. John stand simply the words, "Gospel of John," in the original hand, whereas a much later hand has provided the more elaborate title, "The Holy Gospel, the Preaching of John the Apostle, which he spake in Greek at Ephesus" (words which are found as a colophon in printed editions of the Peshito).

The question now arises—Does this fifth-century manuscript contain a corrupt text of the Peshito, or is it the relic of a more ancient translation? Dr. Scrivener inclines to the former view; Dr. Hort adopts the latter. The decision must come from a comparison of texts. Unfortunately, the comparison cannot be made with perfect fairness. The Peshito has to be represented by printed editions, the text of which may be derived from the more modern rather than the more ancient manuscripts. The Curetonian, on the other hand, has the advantage of being immediately drawn from a manuscript known to be ancient.

Allowing, however, for these somewhat unfavourable conditions, critics conclude that the Curetonian is the representative of a translation older than the Peshito. There are two chief arguments to be urged in favour of this conclusion. It may be said, in the first place, that the Curetonian is the freer and looser translation as compared with the Peshito, and that the looser translation usually precedes the more literal. In the second place, it is urged that the text underlying the Curetonian belongs to the early type called "Western," which is chiefly represented by D (Codex Bezæ), by the Old Latin version, and by the quotations in the ancient Latin translation of Irenæus; while the text underlying the Peshito is akin to the later type called "Syrian," which is represented, among other authorities, by the quotations of Chrysostom and (in the Gospels) by A (Codex Alexandrinus). In other words, the Curetonian was drawn from an ancient freely handled Greek text; while the Peshito, if originally translated from an ancient Greek text, was, at any rate at some time, conformed to a later "edited" Greek text.

The detailed proof of the priority of the Curetonian is too lengthy to give in an article, but a few specimens of its readings may be given here, to serve rather as illustrations than as a proof of the conclusion generally accepted. These specimens may be divided into three classes: (1) Readings peculiar to the Curetonian; (2) Curetonian readings supported by "Western," *i.e.* by Early Latin or Græco-Latin, authority; (3) Readings of intrinsic interest shared by the Curetonian with any other important authorities.

1. The following readings, as far as we know at present, are peculiar to the Curetonian, at least to the "Old Syriac:"—

Matt. iii. 16, "[The Spirit of God] descended as a dove, and *rested* upon Him" (so also S.). The Greek has, "descending as a dove, and *coming* upon Him." The Gospel according to the Hebrews, according to Jerome, makes the voice from heaven say, "My Son, in all the prophets I was awaiting Thee, that Thou mightest come, and that I might *rest* in Thee."

Cureton relies on some coincidences like this between the Curetonian and the Gospel according to the Hebrews, to support his view that the Curetonian St. Matthew is not a translation from the Greek, but a recension of the original Aramaic Gospel. The exact expression, "and rested upon Him," is, however, found both in C. and S. in John i. 32.

Luke xi. 19, "But if I by Beelzebub cast out devils *from your sons*, by whom do your sons cast them out?" The addition of the words, "from your sons," seems to have arisen from an easy corruption of the ordinary text; but it must be confessed that the corruption is, so to speak, a happy one, and adds further point to the question. [The new Sinaitic MS. is defective here.]

Luke xxiii. 9, "But Jesus answered him [Pilate] not a word, *as if he had not been there.*" The words in italics are added in C., but not in S. They are usually taken to refer to our Lord, though it seems that they might equally well apply to Pilate.[1] They have been compared with the words describing the fastening of our Lord to the cross in the apocryphal Gospel of Peter, "He kept silence, as suffering no pain."

Luke xxiii. 48, "They returned [from the Crucifixion] beating their breasts, *and saying, Woe to us! what has happened to us? Woe to us because of our sins!*" The words in italics have a parallel in the newly discovered fragment of the Petrine Gospel. We there read, "They began to beat themselves, and say, Woe to our sins! The judgment has drawn near and the end of Jerusalem." A manuscript of the Old Latin reads, "Woe to us! the things that are done to-day because of our sins, for the desolation of Jerusalem has drawn near."

[N.B.—S. contains the Curetonian reading word for word.]

2. Readings of the Curetonian supported by "Western" authority, *e.g.* by the Codex Bezæ or by manuscripts of the Old Latin.

Matt. i. 16, "Jacob begat [אולד = Hebrew הוליד] Joseph, *to whom was espoused* Mary the Virgin, who brought forth [ילדת = Hebrew ילדה] Jesus the Christ." So some manuscripts of the Old Latin. English R.V., "the husband of."

Matt. i. 19 and 24: we find in the Curetonian the same avoidance of the terms "husband" and "wife" as applied to Joseph and Mary. In ver. 19 we have simply, "Joseph being a just man," and in ver. 24, "he took Mary." The Greek has, "Joseph her husband" and "took his wife."

Note: The Sinaitic palimpsest strangely reads, "Jacob begat Joseph; Joseph, to whom was espoused Mary the Virgin, begat Jesus called Christ." The corruption of "who brought forth" into "begat" is a particularly easy one in the Syriac of this passage, especially as "begat" occurs in each of the preceding fourteen verses. A nodding scribe might also repeat the name "Joseph," because all the preceding names are repeated. If the alteration was intentional, and made by sectaries holding

[1] Not so with a similar addition in the Old Latin MS. *c*, "quasi non audiens."

that our Lord's birth was not supernatural, it is a very unhappy one. If there was nothing supernatural, why should the name of His mother be introduced at all? and why should she be described as "espoused" rather than "married," and as "the Virgin"? Further, we must not exclude the possibility of the action of an unintelligent scribe, with no thought of doctrinal consequences, who might add a link to the genealogy which seemed to him to be wanting. But careless corruption, or careless correction, or wilful dogmatism, whichever it be, has only obscured and not obliterated what St. Matthew wrote.

Luke ix. 55 (our Lord's rebuke to James and John, who wished to call down fire on the churlish Samaritans). C. reads, "And He said, Ye know not of what spirit ye are," with D and most manuscripts of the Old Latin, and gives also the second clause, "For the Son of man is not come to destroy lives, but to save," with six manuscripts of the Old Latin. Both clauses are omitted in ℵ, A, B, C, and also in S.

Luke xxii. 43, 44 (the appearance of the angel at the agony and the bloody sweat): C. contains both verses, only omitting "from heaven" after "angel." Other authorities containing the verses are ℵ*, D, the Old Latin, Justin Martyr, and Irenæus. The passage is "an early Western interpolation" (Hort). Among the authorities against it are A, B, and S. (which here again differs from C.).

3. The following table will further illustrate the relation between the Curetonian and other authorities, particularly with the newly discovered Sinaitic MS.:—

Matt. i. 25:	(Peshito) "She brought forth her Son, the first-born."
	(Curetonian) "She brought forth a Son." (So ℵ, B, Z, and most Old Latin MSS.)
	(Sinaitic) "She brought him forth a Son."
Matt. vi. 13:	(P.) "For Thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory" } omitted in
	(C.) "For Thine is the kingdom and the glory" } ℵ, B, D, Z.
	(S.) [defective].
Luke ii. 14:	(P.) "Upon earth peace, and good news [or, 'good hope'] for men."
	(C.) [defective].
	(S.) "Peace in the earth, and reconciliation for men."
Luke x. 41, 42:	(P.) "Martha, Martha, thou art anxious and troubled about many things, but that which is needed is one."
	(C.) "Martha, Martha, anxiety and distress for Me is present with thee about many things, but one thing is needed."
	(S.) Simply, "Martha, Martha, Mary hath chosen for her the good part which shall not be taken from her." (So D and manuscripts of the Old Latin. ℵ, B read, ὀλίγων δέ ἐστιν χρεία ἢ ἑνός.)
Luke x. 1:	(P.) "After these things Jesus set apart from His disciples others, seventy." (So ℵ, A, C.)
	(C.) "And after these things He set apart others also, seventy *and two*." (So B, D.)
	(S.) "And after these things He set apart from His disciples others, seventy *and two*."
John i. 18:	(P.) "The only-begotten One, God, who is in the bosom of His Father."
	(C.) "The only-begotten, the Son, who is of the bosom of His Father."
	(S.) [defective].

Among the peculiarities of translation rather than text, the following may be noticed:—

In the Lord's Prayer the fourth petition is, "Give us our continual [1] [or, 'unfailing'] daily bread." The next clause (Matthew) runs, "And forgive us our debts, in order that we also may forgive our debtors."

The "Mary" mentioned in Luke xxiv. 10 is described as "daughter of James." So the *Didascalia*—a Syriac work, which seems to be an earlier form of the *Apostolic Constitutions*—states that the Lord appeared to Mary Magdalene and Mary *daughter* of James.

Luke xxiii. 9, "And he questioned Him in many (ἱκανοῖς) words." Both C. and S. have, "in cunning (*ḥakkîmâthâ*) words."

John xiv. 17, τὸ πνεῦμα [τῆς ἀληθείας]. C. translates by the familiar feminine substantive "Ruḥa," and continues to keep up the feminine construction even in translating ἐκεῖνος (ver. 26). The Peshito, on the other hand, translates, "The Spirit of Truth, He whom the world cannot receive," making an instant change from the feminine "Ruḥa" to the masculine relative.

John xiv. 22: "Judas not Iscariot" appears in C. as "Judas Thomas," and more strangely in S. as "Thomas" simply. S., therefore, makes no distinction between the speaker of ver. 5 and that of ver. 22.

Lastly, some details of the Curetonian MS. itself may be given. It is a small folio, between eleven and twelve inches in height, and is written in a fine large Estrangela hand. Doubtless it was intended for Church use, though no Lessons were marked in it by the original scribe. The titles of the Gospels and the first word of each Beatitude are written in red ink, which has not yet lost all its brightness. The letters of the rest of the manuscript are in every shade of brown, but few have seriously faded.

Perhaps the most interesting palæographical fact connected with the manuscript is that it was once in danger of losing all its distinctive features. A recent hand, perhaps not more than two or three centuries old, has made a beginning of conforming its readings to the Peshito. Starting with the Sermon on the Mount, this corrector has partly washed out, partly written over in poor black ink, the original readings. Fortunately, the work has not proceeded far. Perhaps the corrector found too much to correct; at any rate, he did not reach the end of the great Sermon. The Curetonian manuscript is thus, as regards a few words—fortunately only a few—a palimpsest; it escaped further damage, owing, no doubt, to its excellent state of preservation. If we ask again the reason of this preservation, the answer is, I think, that the translation of which it is a manuscript was quickly superseded by the Peshito. The Curetonian escaped two of the greatest dangers to which manuscripts can be exposed, viz. constant use and exposure to light.

[1] So S. in St. Luke; the parallel verse in St. Matthew is lost, though the beginning of the Prayer is found.

With regard to the Sinaitic MS. it may be briefly said that there is nothing to show that it is later than Cureton's. It has all the marks of early date, *e.g.* the titles of the Gospels are extremely simple, and stops are used only to mark the end of paragraphs.

THE PILLAR APOSTLES AND THE GOSPELS.

No. I.

By Rev. Prof. R. J. Knowling, M.A., King's College, London.

The testimony of St. Paul to the historical Christ would be materially strengthened, if it could be shown to be in perfect harmony with that of the writings of "James, Cephas, and John, who seemed to be pillars" (Gal. ii. 9). An agreement between St. Paul on the one hand, and the Pillar Apostles on the other, as to the main facts of the gospel history, would justify St. Paul's statement to the Corinthian Church, "Whether it were I or they, so we preach, and so ye believed" (1 Cor. xv. 11). If we could thus appeal to the witness of three men who lived in closest intimacy with Jesus of Nazareth, not only as to the truth of the great facts of His life, His death, His resurrection, but also as to the belief from the beginning in His Divine personality, not merely does the mythical theory receive another damaging blow, but no room is left for the supposition that the Christology of St. Paul was at variance with that of the early Jewish Christians, or that we owe to him the creation of the belief in the unique relationship of Christ to God.

An opponent would no doubt object that the writings ascribed to the Pillar Apostles are by no means to be placed on a level with the accepted Epistles of St. Paul, and that their authenticity cannot possibly be regarded as proved. But it is not too much to affirm that the case on behalf of at least two of these writings is gaining strength, and that hostile criticism has been compelled to place them at an earlier date than that demanded by the Tübingen school and its followers.

With regard to the Epistle ascribed to St. James, the valuable list given by Professor Mayor, in his most important work,[1] might be increased and strengthened by the addition of the names of H. Ewald, Gess, De Pressensé, as maintainers of the authenticity of the Epistle; and, amongst more recent critics, by the names of Beyschlag in his latest writings,[2] and of Nösgen[3] in Germany, of Bovon in France, and of Hort in England[4] (although the two latter would not rank the Epistle in question as the *earliest* portion of the New Testament). For the refutation of Pfleiderer's views as to the date and authorship of the Epistle,

[1] *The Epistle of St. James*, Introd., pp. 124, 125.

[2] See his *Leben Jesu*, i. pp. 62, 63 (1887), and his *Neutestamentliche Theologie*, i. 329 (1891).

[3] *Geschichte der Neutestamentlichen Offenbarung*, ii. p. 47, ff. (1893).

[4] *Théologie du N. T.*, ii. 443, ff. (1894). Hort, *Judaistic Christianity*, pp. 147, 149. See also Ramsay, *Church in the Roman Empire*, p. 349.

most readers will probably be more than content with Professor Mayor's searching criticism; but the theory of Professor Harnack, to whom no reference seems to be made by Mr. Mayor, demands a brief notice. It is important to observe that this theory fails to commend itself to Von Soden (*Hand-Commentar*, iii. 2nd part, pp. 100, 146).[1] According to Harnack,[2] the Epistles James, 1 Peter, and Jude are to be ascribed to the nameless prophets or teachers, who assisted the apostles in the itinerant work which characterized the spread of Christianity in its first days. As time went on, the growing tendency to refer all the institutions of the early Christian Church to the apostles made itself felt more and more. And thus, in the second century, the apostles were credited as the authors of the Epistles in question.[3] But if this theory is correct, it is difficult to understand the simple and modest opening of the address, "James, a servant of God, and of the Lord Jesus Christ," or to see why the First Epistle of St. John should have been accepted as apostolic—an Epistle which commences without any salutation or author's name (Von Soden, *ubi supra*, p. 146).

The evidence for the First Epistle of St. Peter will be considered later, but even if, after considering it, we are not prepared to say, with Professor Schmid, that this Epistle, although the ancient Church ranked it amongst the *Homologoumena*, must be received as genuine from the results of modern criticism,[4] we are at least justified in maintaining that there is a growing tendency to place it at an earlier date than formerly. The alarm which we may feel at reading the list of authorities who reject this Epistle, compiled by W. Brückner, in his *Die chronologische Reihenfolge der Neutestamentlichen Briefe*[5] (1890), is very considerably modified, when we bear in mind that nearly every one of them bases his position upon the assumption, which Professor Ramsay's book has shown to be so entirely groundless, that the reign of Trajan is the earliest possible date for the letter in question.

In discussing the authorship of the Epistle of St. James,[6] an argument

[1] Von Soden, although he places the Epistle in the second century, makes a somewhat remarkable concession on p. 146 (see reference above), where he speaks of personal relations, or a connexion, between the unknown author and the head of the Church at Jerusalem. Mr. Mayor does not refer to Von Soden's essay in the volume dedicated to the honour of Weizsäcker (1892) on his seventieth birthday. Von Soden maintains the later date of 1 Peter and St. James, but admits some interesting points of connexion between the Epistles and the Gospels, which might fairly be explained by oral tradition, and not by presupposing that the writers of the Epistles must have had before them written Gospels. Further reference to this essay will be made below.

[2] See his edition of the *Didache*, p. 106; and *Dogmengeschichte*, i. 311, 2nd edit.

[3] For a criticism of Harnack, see also Bovon, *ubi supra*, p. 440; and Usteri, in his *Commentar* on 1 Peter, 2nd part, pp. 266, 344; and, in England, Dr. Sanday, *Inspiration*, pp. 375–382.

[4] *Biblische Theologie des N. T.*, p. 390 (1886), 5th edit. See also Beyschlag, *Leben Jesu*, i. p. 62; and Godet, *Introduction au N. T.*, i. p. 15 (1893).

[5] Page 78.

[6] It would be beyond our scope to examine the supposition that the writer of St. James

might be employed, very similar to that which was worked out so fully and successfully by Bishop Westcott in relation to the Gospel of St. John; and as we study the Epistle which bears the name of St. James, the conviction grows upon us (1) that the writer was a Jew; (2) that he was a Jew of Palestine; (3) that he was a hearer and a friend of Jesus.

To enumerate a few instances which support this conviction: the writer speaks of Abraham as "our father" (ch. ii. 21), not in a spiritual sense, but with reference to a fact well known to every Jew; the attempt of critics, mostly of the Tübingen school, to give to the opening words, "the twelve tribes which are of the Dispersion," a spiritual or symbolic meaning is to forget that we are dealing, not with an Apocalypse, but with the simple inscription of an intensely practical letter; the writer presupposes that his readers are well acquainted with the history of Job and the prophets (ch. v. 11, 17); and it may be added that the very example of faith (ch. ii. 25), which is supposed to prove the writer's dependence upon the Epistle to the Hebrews, and therefore to point to a late date, only shows his intimate acquaintance with Jewish tradition. We may further notice the stress laid by the writer upon the unity of God (ch. ii. 19); upon the Decalogue, as it is evident from ch. ii. 10, 11 that he means the Mosaic Law, and not, as is sometimes assumed, the new Christian law, to which a second-century writer might refer. We have, too, the significant fact that the writer, alone of all the New Testament writers, uses the word συναγωγή, not ἐκκλησία, for the place of Christian worship (ch. ii. 2),[1] and that he employs specific Jewish formula in reproving the light and immoral use of oaths (ch. ii. 12), just as he evidently presupposes that the rich masters, as well as the labouring poor, are acquainted with the Name, the specifically Jewish Name, of the Lord of hosts (ch. v. 4–6).

But the writer is not only a Jew: he is a Jew of Palestine. In support of this position, we are able to refer to two classes of allusions: (1) social; (2) local. With regard to the former, no one insists more strongly than Renan, that the social life depicted in the Epistle under review fully corresponds with the state of Jerusalem before A.D. 70, with its glaring contrasts between rich and poor, and the growing insolence of the wealthy classes. If the Epistle had been written later than the

was dependent upon the *Shepherd of Hermas*. A perusal of the two writings will best show how untenable this position is, and the valuable note of B. Weiss may be consulted, in which he points out how frequently Hermas leans upon St. James (*Einleitung in das N. T.*, p. 37, 2nd edit., 1889).

[1] Even Reuss admits that the word συναγωγή points to the high antiquity of the Epistle (*Geschichte der heiligen Schriften des N. T.*, p. 222, 6th edit.), and Weizsäcker seems almost driven to a similar conclusion by the force of the same word (*Das apostolische Zeitalter*, p. 379). For other testimony as to its significance, see, amongst more recent writers, Nösgen, *ubi supra*, p. 51; and the remarks of Dr. Sanday, *Inspiration*, p. 345. References should also be made to B. Weiss, *Einleitung in das N. T.*, p. 378, 2nd edit.; and to Mangold's edition of Bleek's *Einleitung in das N. T.*, p. 707. Dr. Hort, on the other hand, declines to lay so much stress upon the word in question (*ubi supra*, p. 150).

year mentioned, the writer could not have emphasized the social rank and riches, which no longer existed; and with the loss of Jewish position and wealth, there was also involved the loss of the influence and power to persecute. Renan is undoubtedly justified in maintaining that the fall of Jerusalem introduced such changes into the situation of Judaism and Christianity that one can easily distinguish between a writing subsequent to that great catastrophe, and a writing contemporaneous with the third temple.[1]

No doubt the local allusions, with which the Epistle abounds, appeal with varying force to different minds, but no one could read the list given by Beyschlag, or Mayor, or Salmon,[2] without feeling that it contains just the kind of allusions which might be expected from a Jew of Palestine, and that a somewhat more *definite* value might fairly be assigned to it than that allowed by Reuss.[3] Hug, in his valuable remarks on these local allusions, points out that, whilst many of them—*e.g.* references to figs. oil, wine—are so general that they might apply to many other countries. yet that others belong more peculiarly to Palestine; *e.g.* chs. i. 11; iii. 11. 12; v. 17, 18.

In this same connexion reference may also be made to the remarkable fondness of the author for parabolic imagery, so characteristic of Jewish teaching, and especially, it would seem, common in Galilee[4]—a fondness which gains in interest when we remember how our Lord Himself loved to clothe His thoughts in parables and proverbs.

If we desire to fix the date of the Epistle more precisely, and to define accurately the Jews of the Dispersion, whom the writer addresses, there is good ground for believing that they were Jewish Christians scattered abroad through the southern parts of Syria. There are notices, both in the Gospels and in the Acts, which point to numerous Jewish residents in the land of Syria (Matt. iv. 24). Thither the fugitives from Jerusalem fled after the death of Stephen (see also Acts xi. 19); thither also had Saul been despatched to bring the Christian prisoners bound to Jerusalem (Acts ix. 2). In Syria, no less than in Galilee, the Greek tongue was current, and even to the time of Titus the local synagogues appear to have preserved their judicial powers.[5] It may be that other countries were included in the writer's thoughts; but whether this was so

[1] *L'Antechrist*, Introd., p. 12, 3rd edit.

[2] Beyschlag, *Der Brief des Jacobus*, 5th edit. (in Meyer's *Kommentar*), p. 42 (comp. pp. 8, 9); Mayor, *ubi supra*, Introd., p. 118; Salmon, *Introduction to the N. T.*, p. 453, 5th edit.; and see also Farrar, *Messages of the Books*, p. 405. The striking imagery, so natural in Palestine, of such a passage as ch. iii. 12, is rightly appreciated by H. Ewald, *Jakobos' Sendschreiben*, p. 206.

[3] *Les Épîtres Catholiques*, pp. 112, 113.

[4] Mayor, *ubi supra*, Introd., p. 42; comp. Nösgen, *ubi supra*, p. 42; and the interesting and valuable articles of the late Dr. Samuel Cox, in the *Expositor*, i. 65 and iv. 448, 4th series. It is worthy of note that Dr. Cox speaks of the Epistle as "the first Christian document that was given to the world, the first of all the New Testament Scriptures."

[5] Beyschlag, *Der Brief des Jacobus*, p. 14.

or not, he evidently has ever in view his countrymen pursuing their enterprise and commerce—in some cases buying and selling and getting gain; in others, eating the bread of carefulness, and tempted to murmur against God for the cruel injustice which their rich Jewish neighbours and countrymen were inflicting upon them. For nothing is more arbitrary than to refer the dragging before the judgment-seats mentioned in ch. ii. 6 to judicial persecution by the Roman State.[1] The very process which is emphasized, viz. the compelling *to blaspheme* (ch. ii. 7),[2] points to something specifically Jewish (comp. Acts xiii. 45; xxvi. 11); and the earlier writers of the Tübingen school, who date the Epistle from the reign of Trajan, are well rebuked by Reuss, whilst even within the school itself a modifying influence has been at work. Nothing could be more emphatic than Hilgenfeld's statement that the reign of Domitian, and not of Trajan, marks the time of composition.[3] The whole contrast, which pervades the Epistle, between the rich and the poor, is best explained, as we have seen, by regarding both as of Jewish nationality. Certainly it crowns the absurdity of the representation of the Epistle as written in the second century, with a conciliatory tendency, to reconcile Jewish and Gentile Christians, the former being "the poor" and the latter "the rich," when we bear in mind that the writer has nothing wherewith to conciliate his opponents than a prophecy of destruction and the thunder of the last judgment.

It is not too much to add that the social conditions thus briefly described presuppose a very early period of the apostolic age. In fact, the Epistle does not contain any allusion whatever to the burning question at issue between Jewish and Gentile Christians, as to the admission of the latter to the Church of Christ.[4] Nösgen, indeed, has recently maintained that the silence of the Epistle as to the conditions agreed upon by the Council of Jerusalem, does not of necessity demand such an early date as A.D. 40, since in purely Jewish-Christian communities no question could have arisen of a right relationship towards Gentile believers. But both Nösgen and B. Weiss, who agrees with him in this criticism, are at one in placing the Epistle at a very early date—at the commencement of the fifties.

But if the case stands thus, who was more likely to speak with effect to all classes than James the brother of the Lord? Who was more likely to secure a hearing amongst the rich, and to commend patience to the poor, than James the Just, the head of the Church at Jerusalem,

[1] See the remarks of Professor Ramsay, *Church in the Roman Empire*, p. 349.

[2] The context, too, is very Jewish, if we render it "the honourable Name which was called upon you," since the phrase has many parallels in the Old Testament Scriptures (see Beyschlag, *ubi supra*, p. 111). It is a striking coincidence that this same phrase recurs in the few words of St. James which are recorded elsewhere (Acts xv. 17).

[3] *Einleitung in das N. T.*, p. 541.

[4] Mangold, who rejects 1 Peter, while he still maintains the authenticity of the Epistle of St. James, notes this argument as appealing to him most convincingly (*ubi supra*, p. 707).

whose esteem was high even amongst his unbelieving countrymen? The writer calls himself "*James, a servant* of the Lord Jesus Christ" (ch. i. 1); and the only fair account of this simple and modest title is to be found in the fact that he was the Lord's brother, and therefore stood in no need of distinguishing himself from others who bore the same name. A forger would have been only too anxious to claim such a title and distinction as "the brother of the Lord," if merely to vindicate his authority; but if the readers of the Epistle knew that its author possessed that high distinction according to the flesh, we can understand the reason of its omission and the absence of the self-assertion. It is admitted by Reuss and Renan, who leave the question of the actual authorship of the Epistle an open one, that all its contents agree with what we know or may conjecture of the religious views and character of James, the pillar apostle.[1] And if we cannot positively assert that he was a hearer of our Lord, it is at least certain that he would naturally acquaint himself with the side of His teaching so prominent in this Epistle, in which Christianity appears as the fulfilment of the old covenant, and with that aspect of it, in relation to the Law, which would impress the mind of a pious Israelite.[2] On a future occasion an endeavour will be made to show how far the writer was acquainted with the words, the life, and the Person of our Lord.

THE DATE OF THE BOOK OF DANIEL.

By Rev. Geo. Douglas.

Important and interesting light has been thrown upon the date of the Book of Daniel by the excavations which have been made in the East. It transpires that the Assyrians and Babylonians had a singular method of computing their regnal years. Instead of reckoning from the day of accession, they generally counted from the following New Year's Day.[3] When they had to refer to the year in which a king succeeded to the throne, they called it the year of his accession, or the year in which he began to reign, or simply the year of his reign; and what was technically called his "first year" did not begin till the New Year's Day. The broken year was assigned to the king with whom it began. Their method had this advantage—that in computing a long period they had simply to sum up the reigns of the kings; there was no overlapping. And to a people with an ancient history, and no Anno Domini from which to count, that was of no little consequence. The Jews, on the other hand, reckoned the portion which remained after the day of accession as the "first year," the New Year's Day introducing a "second year."

[1] See, too, amongst more recent writers, Bovon, *ubi supra*, p. 446; and Hort, *ubi supra*, p. 152.

[2] Schmid, *ubi supra*, p. 374. The whole treatment of the Epistle by Schmid is most valuable. Cf. also Hort, *ubi supra*, p. 151.

[3] See Geo. Smith's *Assyrian Discoveries*, p. 386; and his *Assyrian Canon*, p. 21.

This difference in method explains an apparent error in the opening verses of the Book of Daniel. It is there said that "in the *third* year of the reign of Jehoiakim King of Judah came Nebuchadnezzar King of Babylon unto Jerusalem, and besieged it; and the Lord gave Jehoiakim King of Judah into his hand." In Jeremiah the campaign of Nebuchadnezzar in which that siege took place is, on the contrary, referred more than once to the *fourth* year, and in such a way as to show that in the beginning of the fourth year the siege had not yet commenced. Before the present-day Assyrian explorations, this apparent discrepancy caused much contention. Some held it to be evidence that the Book of Daniel was unreliable as history and of late date; while others invented ingenious theories to prove that the dates were not inconsistent. Even to this day, writers who have not followed the researches in the East continue to range themselves on their respective sides, not knowing that the difficulty has vanished, and that what a prophet in Judah spoke of as a king's "fourth year," a statesman in Babylon, trained in "the learning and tongue of the Chaldeans," called the "third."

Now, the question arises—How did the writer of the Book of Daniel come to use the Babylonian method? If the writer was Daniel himself, the answer is easy; no other method would occur to him—he had been trained to that from his youth, and had used it all his life. But if the author was a Jew in the Holy Land, writing as late as, say, B.C. 168, and laying the scene of his book in Babylon from B.C. 605 downward, how did he come to compute after the Babylonian fashion? It may be thought that, unless he was careless, he could not commit the anomaly of making Daniel write as a Jew in Palestine. But how did he know that it would have been an anomaly for Daniel to say the "fourth year"? It may be supposed that the descendants of the exiles were familiar with Babylonian methods. That, however, is not in keeping with all that we know of them. The Chronicler, *e.g.*, when writing on the period of Nebuchadnezzar's invasions, names the same years for the reigns as the Books of Kings and Jeremiah, instead of adopting the Babylonian style, although it is common to place him a century and a half nearer to the Captivity than was the supposed author of the Book of Daniel. The writer of the First Book of Esdras does the same, and apparently without being conscious that the Babylonians had a style differing from that of the Jews. Indeed, so little acquaintance has he with the relation of his people to Babylon, that he cannot quote from the Chronicler on that subject without misrepresenting important facts. The Chronicler tells us that Nebuchadnezzar bound Jehoiakim "to carry him to Babylon," leaving us to understand, as we might gather from other narratives, that he was never taken thither. But the author of 1 Esdras, like many writers after him, misunderstanding the statement, boldly alters it into "carried him to Babylon." Nor is that a solitary misquotation. When we come to the Book of Judith, however, we find its author so unfamiliar with the country in which his fathers

had their bondage, that he not only calls Nebuchadnezzar habitually by the name of "the King of the Assyrians," but, beginning at the twelfth year of his reign, he makes him rule in Nineveh, and march with his army in and out of that city as his capital, although Nineveh had ceased to exist before ever Nebuchadnezzar came to the throne.

But, it may be asked, while some educated Jews of the late centuries after the Exile knew little of Babylon, may not the writer of the Book of Daniel have had access to documents which are now unknown? Berosus. a Chaldean priest, *e.g.*, wrote annals from which Josephus quotes. May this author not have had the use of such? Well, Josephus, with all his use of Berosus, knew nothing of the Assyrian method of reckoning time, and he has made many errors in his history of the period in consequence; but still there is nothing to prove that our author did not learn the system of dates from old documents; and if he was an artful writer, he might, while telling us (Dan. ix. 2) that he had specially studied Jeremiah's numbers, use in his own opening sentence a number which had the appearance of differing from that of the older prophet. And to make the artifice more complete, he might refrain from stating that his Babylonian "third year" was the same as Jeremiah's "fourth." But is that probable?

It may yet further be suggested that the Babylonian "third year" may, after all, not have been intended here; that the "third" may have been a mere blunder on the part of the writer, or even of a copyist; and that it may be only by a piece of singularly good fortune that, after having puzzled the scholars of all the centuries, it turns out, under modern Assyriology, to coincide with the Jewish "fourth year." Or, the writer may have correctly, but ignorantly, copied the date from a Babylonian list. That, however, is not the only coincidence in the book. As we read on in the first and second chapters, we come upon another, to which none of these suggestions will apply. It is said next that Nebuchadnezzar carried off Daniel and his friends, and gave instructions to have them trained *three* years, so that they might stand before the king; that after the three years the king communed with them; and, lastly, that in the king's "*second* year" Daniel interpreted his dream. Here the old discrepancy reappears, and this time in an aggravated form, for the variance is not now between two passages in different books, but between two verses in the same passage. When Nebuchadnezzar carried those youths to Babylon, he was himself hastening home to secure the throne on the death of his father. His sovereignty, therefore, and their captivity began together; and the question is—How could he be in the "second year" of his reign after they had been "three years" in training? According to the Jewish method of counting, it would have been impossible; but to a Babylonian nothing was simpler. Their first year of training fell in the king's "accession year;" their second, in his so-called "first year," and their third, in the "second year of his reign." Now, these are not numbers which could have been stumbled upon by accident. Nor are they ancient

blunders made correct by modern research. Nor could they have been culled from Berosus or other Chaldean historians, for they could hardly have come within the scope of their annals. We are driven, in fact, to the conclusion that our author, unlike the Jews of his supposed late time, was familiar with the Babylonian method of counting, and so familiar that that method came to his pen more readily than the Jewish.

But the greatest difficulty of all remains. What of the readers? The writer is supposed to be addressing men of the time of Antiochus. That was a century and a half after the date commonly ascribed to the Chronicler, who used the Jewish method alone, perhaps not even knowing that for a short period of their history his ancestors counted after a different fashion. It was, moreover, approaching the time when educated Jews, such as the authors of the First Book of Esdras and the Book of Judith, had so completely lost the knowledge of Babylonish matters of the period of the Exile as to make blunders like those mentioned. It was approaching the time when so well-informed a writer as Josephus was ignorant of a Babylonish method of computation, and was unable to handle his facts in consequence. And yet our writer presumed upon such familiarity with these things on the part of his readers, that he did not think it necessary to explain that when, in his opening sentence, he wrote the "third year," he meant the same as Jeremiah, who called it the "fourth;" and that in a book in which he calls special attention to Jeremiah's numbers by saying that he has been devoting himself to their study; and, above all, when the numbers given by Jeremiah are connected with the year under consideration.

In conclusion, many questions have to be considered in settling the date of the Book of Daniel. The present paper has occupied itself only with one—a question which its writer has not seen discussed elsewhere. If a late date is assumed for the book, he does not see how the difficulty submitted is to be met. But once allow that the author was a statesman in Babylon, trained in the learning and tongue of the Chaldeans, and using their methods all his life, and that his readers resided in or around the same capital,—then in connexion with this question all is plain.

EXPOSITORY THOUGHT.

SOME PROMINENT DIFFICULTIES IN THE GOSPELS.

V. *THE TWO GENEALOGIES.*

By Rev. Professor A. Roberts, D.D.

Those who delight to discover and parade so-called discrepancies in the Gospels, find a large amount of various material presented to them, without any trouble, in the two genealogies of Christ which are set forth by the evangelists. Writers like Strauss seem to rub their hands with glee

in dealing with this subject. Thus he says (*New Life of Jesus*, Engl. trans., p. 16)—

"If the genealogies are taken as historical records, the discrepancy between them requires, above everything, to be explained. How can Joseph have been at the same time a son of Jacob and of Heli? how have descended from David at the same time through Solomon and the kings, and again through Nathan and a line not royal?"

To the same effect he expresses himself in his earlier work, as follows (*Das Leben Jesu*, i. 146):—

"The principal difficulty lies in this—that Luke, for the most part, assigns to Jesus for ancestors different persons from those given by Matthew. . . . The point truly desperate is that, from David to the reputed father of Jesus, with the exception of two names in the middle, all the names are quite different in the genealogies of Luke and Matthew. According to Matthew, the father of Joseph was called Jacob; according to Luke, his name was Heli. According to Matthew, the son of David through whom Joseph descended from that king was Solomon; according to Luke it was Nathan. . . . The difference between the two lists appears to constitute a complete contradiction (*ein vollkommener Widerspruch*)."

Some surprise may, perhaps, be felt that it did not occur to Strauss that this was really too easy a triumph. A child could see, at a glance, how diverse are the lists of St. Matthew and St. Luke. It certainly did not require an adept in "the higher criticism" to make this discovery; and it hardly becomes one professing to be such to indulge in so great jubilation over it. Moreover, this is a case in which "out of the eater cometh forth meat." The striking diversity, or, if any one prefers to say, *contradiction*, between the genealogies presented by the two evangelists respectively, proves, at least, the independence of the writers. This is the clear verdict of common sense on looking at the matter. Had St. Matthew and St. Luke written in collusion, or had the one copied from the other, care would assuredly have been taken to avoid any appearance of contrariety. We hail, therefore, the differences which appear in their lists as plain evidence that we have in the writers two *independent* witnesses to the gospel history. This is a most important point, too often lost sight of, or abandoned, by Christian apologists at the present day. It has been put very strongly, but not, I believe, too strongly, by Dean Alford, in his remarks on Luke iii. 23. He says—

"If no other proof were in existence of the total independence of the present Gospels of Matthew and Luke, their genealogies would furnish what I conceive to be an undeniable one. Is it possible that either of these evangelists could have set down his genealogy with that of the other before him? Would no remark have been made on their many and (on such a supposition) unaccountable variations?"

It cannot, of course, be denied that many difficult questions arise in connexion with these genealogies. Whether placed side by side for comparison, or whether viewed each by itself, they present much which tasks the power of an exegete to the uttermost. But there is no reason why we should, with Alford, relinquish the various problems which are suggested, in despair. He says, respecting the two lists, "It is quite

beside the purpose of the present commentary to attempt to reconcile the two. It has never yet been accomplished; and every endeavour to do it has violated either ingenuousness or common sense." But he, nevertheless, immediately goes on to express some very decided opinions respecting them. He says, *e.g.*, with what humbly appears to me too great dogmatism—

"The two genealogies are *both the line of Joseph*, and *not of Mary*. Whether Mary were an heiress or not, Luke's words preclude the idea of the genealogy being *hers*; for the descent of the Lord is transferred putatively to Joseph by the *ὡς ἐνομίζετο*, before the genealogy begins; and it would be unnatural to suppose that the reckoning, which began with the real mother, would, after such transference, pass back through *her* to *her* father again, as it must do, if the genealogy be *hers*."

He ends, however, by going, perhaps, to the opposite extreme, and saying too modestly with respect to the genealogies, "It is over-curious and uncritical to attempt to reconcile them." Such attempts have, nevertheless, been made, and will still continue to be made, as long as the critical faculty exists in man; and, if some difficulties may remain uncleared even to the last, there is every reason to hope that serious and reverent inquiry, on this as well as other Biblical topics, will always be attended with a greater or less measure of success.

The first question which occurs respecting these genealogies, and also, as appears to me, by far the most important, is—*Do both belong to Joseph, or does one of them present to us the line of Mary?* This question has been generally answered by recent writers, as Alford answers it above, to the effect that both lists refer to Joseph only. And there must surely be some apparently very strong reasons for this conclusion, since it immediately gives rise to an obvious and formidable difficulty. For how can such discrepant lists describe the lineage of one and the same person? That is the hard problem which those have at once to face who ascribe both genealogies to Joseph; and, assuredly, they would not entangle themselves in the perplexities which it involves, did they not feel that they were compelled to do so by adherence to a fair and honest interpretation.

But, while giving the many able writers who have taken up the above position all credit for being actuated by the purest motives, I must hasten to say at once that I do not agree with them. I believe that the genealogy presented by St. Luke is that of Mary; and, in seeking to establish this point, I shall have, with respect to several passages, to traverse the reasoning which has led so many present-day critics to arrive at the opposite conclusion.

I begin, then, with the remark that it is a clear doctrine of Scripture that our Lord was descended from David according to the flesh. Much emphasis is laid on this point by St. Paul. Thus he says to Timothy (1 Tim. ii. 8), "Remember that Jesus Christ, *of the seed of David*, was

raised from the dead according to my gospel." And again he tells us of Christ (Rom. i. 3) that "He was made *of the seed of David* according to the flesh." At Luke i. 27 we read that the angel Gabriel was sent "to a virgin espoused to a man whose name was Joseph, *of the house of David;* and the virgin's name was Mary." It has been usual among recent interpreters to take the words, ἐξ οἴκου Δαυίδ, as here referring to Joseph, and not to Mary. For this they assign some so-called grammatical reasons, which, I confess, appear to me far from conclusive. Chrysostom, whose native language was Greek, seems to have perceived no weight in such arguments, since he expressly refers the words to Mary. And this seems to be their natural application. For, let it be observed that it is Mary who is here the subject of the evangelist's discourse. Joseph is quite subordinate in the narrative. He is merely mentioned *in connexion with* Mary, and it is on *her* that St. Luke desires to fix the attention of his readers. It would, indeed, be quite a meaningless thing *here* to say of Joseph, that he was "of the house of David." But when the words are regarded as applying to Mary, they acquire an admirable significance, and are in the happiest accord with the language immediately afterwards made use of by the angel, when he tells Mary (ver. 32), respecting the Son she was to bear, that "the Lord God shall give unto Him the throne of His father David." But whatever view may be taken of this passage, nothing could be more certain, both from the Old Testament and the New, than the true Davidic descent of the Messiah. This appears from such passages as 2 Sam. vii. 12; Ps. lxxxix. 35, 36; Isa. xi. 1; Jer. xxiii. 5; and from passages like the following: Matt. xii. 23, "Is not this the Son of David?" John vii. 42, "Hath not the Scripture said that Christ cometh of the seed of David?" No one, then, would have had any valid claim to be recognized as the Messiah, who could not be shown really and truly to be "of the house and lineage of David." That is an undeniable fact; and we thus seem to be furnished with a valuable exegetical principle in dealing with these genealogies of Christ. We are led almost of necessity to conclude that one or other of them will turn out to be that of Mary, the only true human parent of Christ. And here I am glad to be able to avail myself of the language of Lord Arthur Hervey, the late Bishop of Bath and Wells, in his learned work entitled. *The Genealogies of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.* He says (p. 2)—

"The truth of the claims of Jesus of Nazareth to be the Christ, and the heir of David's throne, rests in great measure upon the genealogies, upon their accuracy and their truth. If He had not been of the seed of David according to the flesh, He could not have been entitled to 'the throne of His father David' (Luke i. 32), nor could He have been what Pilate described Him to be in that trilingual inscription which he affixed to the cross, *The King of the Jews.* It seems evident too that the genealogies were inserted in the Gospels in order to establish, on indisputable ground, the truth of His descent from David, and His right to David's throne, within the provisions of the promise made to David by God (Ps. cxxxii. 11)."

And yet this writer thinks, and labours to prove, that neither of these precious genealogies belongs to Mary, but both trace the line of

Joseph, the mere putative father of our Lord; and thus, although we have two *stemmata*, or pedigrees, we are still left without any evidence of the real and true Davidic descent of Christ!

If this were the lame and impotent conclusion to be reached, we might well exclaim, with the Roman satirist, "Stemmata quid faciunt?" Here we have two genealogies, which have evidently been constructed with great care, and yet they leave us without any assured account of the genuine descent of Christ. But, in opposition to this, I maintain the position that St. Matthew gives us the true pedigree of Joseph, while St. Luke presents to us that of Mary; so that, in every respect, legally as well as naturally, the lineage of our Lord is set before us. In venturing to support this view, I am well aware of all that has been said against it by recent writers. It has been impugned by Meyer and Winer among German critics. It has also been assailed at some length by Lord Arthur Hervey, in the work already named, and by Dr. Mill, in his erudite tractate entitled, *The Evangelical Accounts of the Descent and Parentage of the Saviour.* But, notwithstanding all this, it still seems to me to be the only satisfactory solution of the question under consideration.

First, then, I maintain that St. Matthew gives us the true and natural pedigree of Joseph. This view is supported by Julius Africanus, a Christian writer who lived in the early part of the third century, and some fragments of whose works have come down to us. In his celebrated letter on the genealogies, addressed to Aristides, we find Africanus stating that Joseph was the son of Jacob "by nature (*κατὰ φύσιν*)," and the son of Heli "by law (*κατὰ νόμον*)." The same view is taken by Augustine (*De Cons. Evang.*, ii. 3); and in holding this opinion I think they are plainly right, though I believe them to be wrong in attributing both the genealogies to Joseph. But a different course has been followed by those who have maintained this latter idea in recent times. They have regarded Joseph as the real and proper son of Heli, while only the legal and adopted son of Jacob. This is the position occupied both by Lord Arthur Hervey and Dr. Mill. Hervey affirms again and again (p. 56, etc.) "that Joseph was truly the son of Heli, not of Jacob," and rests his whole argument on this supposed fact; while Mill says more cautiously (p. 173) that "in the Hebrew style the term יָלַד, *ἐγέννησε*, may be possibly used of an adoptative or merely legal parentage;" and he too rests his reasoning on this supposition. But there really ought not to be any doubt felt as to the meaning of St. Matthew. When he says, "Jacob begat Joseph," he obviously intends to indicate as true a paternity on the part of Jacob with repect to Joseph, as he does a true motherhood on the part of Mary with reference to Christ. Let us look at the whole verse together, and it will seem mere caprice to interpret it in any other manner. It stands thus: *Ἰακὼβ δὲ ἐγέννησε τὸν Ἰωσήφ, τὸν ἄνδρα Μαρίας, ἐξ ἧς ἐγεννήθη Ἰησοῦς ὁ λεγόμενος Χριστός.* Now, it is surely quite unreasonable to regard *ἐγέννησε* as having a mere legal, that is, factitious,

significance in the one clause, while ἐγεννήθη has its proper and natural import in the next. Lord Hervey labours hard to collect instances in which γεννάω may denote something else than "to beget;" but his whole contention on this point appears too forced to command assent.[1] No; Strauss is quite right when he says (i. 174) that in this passage "the word γεννᾷν does not appear capable of denoting anything else than the natural relationship." It is utterly in vain to attempt to extract any other meaning from it; and the sure conclusion therefore is that St. Matthew gives the true and actual pedigree of Joseph.

We now turn to the genealogy presented by St. Luke in ch. iii. 23–38 of his Gospel. According to Mill, Meyer, Hervey, and others, this is the *proper* pedigree of Joseph. Meyer goes so far as to doubt whether we can ascertain from Scripture that Mary was of Davidic descent at all. "Evidence" to this effect, he says (on Matt. i. 17), "from the New Testament is entirely wanting." But we have aleady seen how contrary this statement is to fact. We also find that any doubt concerning Mary's descent from David is opposed to a constant tradition in the Church even from the earliest times. Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Julius Africanus, and many other Fathers all bear witness to the belief which prevailed on this point among the primitive Christians. And now let us look at the manner in which the genealogical tree presented by St. Luke bears upon the question. Everything here depends upon the way in which ver. 23 is to be translated. Scholars are now generally agreed that the rendering given to the first part of the verse in our Authorized Version is a mistake. Instead of reading, "And Jesus Himself began to be about thirty years of age," we should read, as in the Revised Version, "And Jesus Himself, when He began to teach, was about thirty years of age." So far there is a general concurrence as to the proper translation of the verse. It is different, however, with what remains. Those who regard Heli as being the real father of Joseph, read it as in the Authorized Version, "being (as was supposed) the son of Joseph, which was the son of Heli." But if we have already been led to conclude, on the authority of St. Matthew, that Jacob was the true father of Joseph, this rendering becomes impossible. Our choice must now lie between the following alternatives: either (1) we must regard Heli, with some ancient writers, as being only the *legal*

[1] There is no difficulty in admitting that γεννάω may be used with respect to one who is not the immediate descendant of the person spoken of, but who is in the line of his posterity. Thus is it with the statement of St. Matthew that "Joram begat Ozias," that is Uzziah, who, as Hervey remarks, was separated from Joram by three generations. On a similar principle, all the Jews could be properly spoken of as "children of Israel," or "children of Abraham." But this is very different from maintaining that γεννάω might be used respecting one who had only a legal connexion with the person spoken of, and was not in the line of his posterity at all. The passages quoted from Ovid (in which Augustus is spoken of as the *sua progenies*, etc., of Julius Cæsar) seem mere examples of poetic licence, and would never be made the basis of a professed genealogy.

father of Joseph; or (2) we must accept the genealogy given by St. Luke as being that of Mary. No writer at the present day dreams of accepting the first of these alternatives; and there is, therefore, no escape from the second. And the clause in question ought, I think, to stand thus: Ὢν υἱὸς (ὡς ἐνομίζετο Ἰωσήφ) τοῦ Ἡλί, etc. The evangelist has it here in view to declare the real pedigree of Christ. "Being the Son," he says, and then guarding against the idea that He was more than putatively the son of the man who was popularly regarded as His father, he adds the parenthetical clause, "as was supposed of Joseph." These words, ὡς ἐνομίζετο, constitute a virtual negation, and it is quite a common habit of language to regard a denial of one thing as implying the affirmation of another, without any formal statement to that effect. In other words, the adversative conjunction may often be left out after a negative clause. Numerous sentences like the following might be quoted: Tacitus says (*Hist.*, iii. 12), "Ne in Vitellii quidem partibus quietæ mentes; exitiore discordia turbabantur;" that is, "Not even on the side of Vitellius were there quiet minds, *but they were really* disturbed with a more fatal discord." And so in the passage before us. It having been denied that Joseph was the real father of Christ, the mind is prepared for accepting Heli as his true human ancestor. There was no necessity to mention Mary; and, indeed, it did not enter into the purpose of St. Luke, as it did into that of St. Matthew, to name any woman at all. The evangelist, therefore, at once begins with Heli, the father of Mary, and then regularly traces the lineage upwards to David through his son Nathan. Christ is thus shown to have been of true Davidic descent; and the sacred writer, having established this vital point, next proceeds, in accordance with the all-embracing character of his Gospel, to pursue the line of the genealogy up to the fountain-head of the great human family.

Such, then, is the conclusion in which we rest; and surely it is one with which we may well express satisfaction. We have found—I trust there is no presumption in saying—ample ground for believing that Christ was both the legal and the natural Heir to the throne of David. He was so *legally*, in virtue of the connexion which existed between Him and Joseph, His reputed earthly father, whose lineage is traced up to David through Solomon, by St. Matthew. And He was so *naturally* by Mary, His true human parent, who was also descended from David through Nathan, as set forth in the genealogy given by St. Luke. Nothing could be more satisfactory than the result thus reached. So attractive, indeed, is it, that I have kept strict guard over myself throughout this whole discussion, lest I should be betrayed into too easy an acceptance of it. But I trust it has been established by a course of fair and adequate reasoning. If this is admitted, then, with its acceptance, there vanishes *the one* great difficulty which has been felt in regard to the two different genealogies presented by the evangelists. As to minor points, space will

not now permit me to enter on their consideration. Nor is that needful. They have been very ably dealt with by Lord Arthur Hervey and Dr. Mill, in the works which I have named above. Ebrard (*Gospel History*, 149–163) and Lange (*Life of Christ*, i. 380–384) have also done much to clear up the smaller points of difficulty which have been found in the records of Christ's descent. I shall conclude with a striking passage in which Lange sets forth the profound evangelical significance which pertains to that pedigree of the Messiah with which the New Testament opens.

"At last," he says (v. 229), "after having in the carpenter reached its lowest point, it suddenly rises, at least in the spiritual sense, by disclosing in the holy Virgin and her Son the fulfilment of all its substantial nobility. The number seven symbolizes the complete development of nature. Two is the number of life, of contrast, of sex. Consequently, the number fourteen is the number indicating the complete development of a genealogical line. But three is the number of the Spirit. Accordingly, the enumeration of three times fourteen members denotes the perfect unfolding of the theocratic lineal succession, or the complete substantial development of a stem which has been impenetrated by consecrations of the Spirit until it is made fit to become an organ for the Man of the Spirit. The genealogy of Christ may, in a certain respect, be considered as the briefest epitome of the Old Testament. It sets forth the very kernel and the highest pure product of the Old Testament development. For, properly speaking, the pure product of the old covenant is not so much the prophetic word concerning Christ, as the personal appearance of Christ Himself. In a general way, we can look upon all Scripture as the biography of Christ, for His life is the sum and substance of the Bible, and therefore also the principle of its exposition. Yet, when we look at the Old Testament by itself in this point of view, it appears to us as the introduction to the New Testament, or the introduction to the life of Jesus. On this ground we can see, in the genealogy which Matthew gives us, a short *résumé* of the Old Testament in its essential signification. The genealogy of Christ is the golden thread which runs through the whole. Matthew, therefore, has elaborately composed this genealogy with the scrupulous diligence and thoughtfulness of the highest reverence for the Lord, the Hero of this genealogical tree. This labour teaches us to estimate duly the significance of genealogical trees in general; for, as many a noble tree of human life may, by the curse of sin, be changed into a thorn-bush, so, on the other hand, many a wild tree can, by the blessing of the Spirit, become gradually ennobled."

NOTE ON ACTS XVI. 12.

By Rev. Professor A. S. Geden, M.A.

It is, perhaps, presumptuous and worthy of castigation to acknowledge that I have never been able to find in these words that difficulty of interpretation which is usually associated with them. I seem to myself to render with perfect loyalty to the accurate signification of the writer's expression, both as a whole and in its parts, when I translate to this effect: "And thence we journeyed to a city named Philippi, a place which is [or, 'one which is'] a chief city of its division of Macedonia, and a colony."

Philippi does not seem to have been the capital either of the entire province of Macedonia, or even of that particular district in which it was situated (see Conybeare and Howson, vol. i. p. 341, f., 1862 edit.; Mommsen, *Rom. Prov.*, i. pp. 298–302; Ramsay, *Church in the Roman Empire*, p. 157, f. and note). Neither does the writer hazard any such

statement. The careful and detailed accuracy of his narrative, no less than his language, forbids the supposition. Still less is he to be understood as condescending to say, as though teaching elementary geography, that they came next to Philippi, which was the first city to which they came. But although not the capital, it was undoubtedly *a* chief city, one of the leading towns of the province. For this meaning of πρῶτος, not absolutely the first, as being without a rival, but as a member of a select company, an aristocracy raised above the ordinary level, *cp.* Acts xiii. 50; xvii. 4; xxviii. 17; or Luke xiii. 30. It is true that in these passages the word is found in the plural. But from its collective use of the class to denote in the singular an individual of the class is not a great step, parallels to which could readily be produced in most languages.

Further, the relative pronoun here employed will hardly bear the construction that the ordinary interpretation of the words imposes upon it. Ὅστις classifies, but does not identify—expresses, not an equation in which subject and predicate are convertible terms, but a proposition in which the subject is embraced in a larger predicate. Philippi is one of a class to which the epithet πρώτη may be attached; not the unique possessor of the title. Had the writer, however mistakenly, wished to convey the meaning that Philippi was the capital of Macedonia, or of a part of the country, he would surely have expressed himself with ease and precision, εἰς Φιλίππους, ἥ ἐστιν ἡ πρώτη, κ.τ.λ. That he has chosen a different form indicates that it is quite another fact which he desires to assert.

Once more, the definite article with μερίς points out the particular division or district of Macedonia, of which Philippi was πρώτη πόλις. The best and nearest representative in English, as is often the case in the New Testament, is our possessive adjective pronoun; "*its* district" identifies the μερίς referred to, and is more idiomatic and precise than "*the* district" would be. Philippi is one of the chief cities of its own district, the region in which the apostle and his companions now found themselves. Thus the writer's statement is both perfectly intelligible, and in harmony with all that we know from other sources of the state of the country at that time.

A STUDY OF ACTS XXVII.

By Rev. James Hope Moulton, M.A., Cambridge.

St. Luke's purpose in writing this long chapter, occupying about four per cent. of his whole work, is not, perhaps, as obvious as we think it. So vivid a piece of writing might be supposed to be its own justification. But an historian who is capable of writing such telling narrative can generally rise superior to the temptation of letting his main purpose sink

out of sight, while he indulges himself in a mere purple patch. Moreover, if our author had such a weakness, why did he not indulge it over some other adventures of St. Paul, such as are just catalogued in 2 Cor. xi.? Those who distinguish the author of the "we" passages from the compiler of the Book of Acts, may say that this was probably the only adventure of the kind which the brilliant historian shared with St. Paul. But this only removes the difficulty a step further back. Whoever was the author or compiler of the book, he had keen sense of proportion and a steady devotion to purpose in the selection of incidents. No book needs a key as this does, to explain both what it inserts and what it leaves out. That it does not pretend to contain, in any sense, a biography of St. Paul for any period of his life, is evident enough from the omissions which the apostle's own casual allusions supply in abundance. Can we find, then, some trace of a deeper purpose, which will justify the insertion of this minute description of a shipwreck in the narrative of a book so severely indifferent to the persons apart from the cause? We shall understand the need of some such explanation the more when we reflect that, apart from St. Paul's dream, there is not a trace of the "supernatural" (so called) which might give the story a claim to be set down.

I think we may show that this chapter is an *epic* on a small scale, a narrative framed, not only to narrate facts, but to tell them in their connexion with a central dominating idea. This idea is the doctrine of providence, and its dealings with men of all classes in their hour of need. Viewed as epic, we find it constructed with perfect literary skill, arranged about a turning-point which gives the purpose of the whole. This turning-point I see in ver. 29, "And fearing lest haply we should be cast ashore on rocky ground, they let go four anchors from the stern, and wished for the day." Here, for "wished," the margin reads, "or, *prayed*." The latter meaning is given for εὔχομαι in 2 Cor. xiii. 7, 9; 3 John 2; and in the margin of the present passage and Rom. ix. 3. (In Jas. v. 16 the better reading is προσεύχεσθε.) "Wish" is given in the text of these two passages, and (practically) in Acts xxvi. 29. I think a careful reading of all these passages will show that the full Christian idea of *prayer* is absent from the uncompounded verb. The preposition in προσεύχομαι brings out so clearly the Object "towards" which human longing is directed when it becomes true prayer, that the compound was instinctively used when this was the meaning. The original idea of the simple verb is not quite easy to determine.[1] In the New Testament the

[1] Εὔχομαι in Greek has the not very easily reconcilable senses of *pray* and *boast*, which run through all the uncompounded derivatives of the root, except the (practically) post-Homeric εὐχή, and appear to be equally early. Unfortunately, we have no clear light from etymology. Many good authorities equate the Latin *voveo*, which would suit the sense excellently, but the phonetic objections are serious. An attractive equation would be with a Zend word regularly meaning "he speaks," and, just possibly, a Sanskrit word meaning "he considers." The Zend is perhaps the best comparison, and the resulting sense will probably be "assert," of a strong mental effort, uttered or unexpressed.

idea of an *earnest longing* will cover all the passages, it being remembered that, in a religious man, such longing practically becomes identical with prayer. The meaning of the word depends, in a sense, upon the character of the man of whom it is used.

We may now more clearly realize just what was going on at the point to which this verse refers. It is a scene strikingly like that portrayed in Jonah i. 5, except that there the prayer is more distinctly mentioned. The compassless mariners, beneath that impenetrable sky, have done absolutely everything which human skill and resource could suggest. They had fought the wild north-easter (ver. 14) with dogged determination, had secured the boat (ver. 16); strengthened the starting timbers with strong cables lashed round the hull (ver. 17), bared the ship's poles and yielded to the storm; and, finally, lightened the helpless vessel by casting overboard everything except the food, which they soon had no heart to eat (vers. 18, 19; cf. 33, 38). Then there was nothing more to do, and they were in the position which, at any rate for men, is the hardest experience in life—when action is impossible, and they can only *wait*. Days passed, and the sailors had action thrust on them once more. But it was only to prove that their keen perception of land coming nearer in the midnight was not wrong, and to check their rapid drifting on to rocks ahead by casting four anchors from the stern, lest the ship should swing round on certain destruction, which might be nearer than a single ship's length. Nothing could help them now but daylight, and no power in heaven or earth could hasten that daylight's coming. But, as they waited on in their helplessness, the very impossibility of hastening the dawn lent fervour to their longing, to which they applied themselves in all the diverse ways that the characters of seventy-six[1] human beings, united only by the common peril, would suggest. Some merely cursed the darkness in their impatient impotence; others uttered wild entreaties to the gods of their different nationalities, worshipped, perhaps, with but little real conviction in time of prosperity, but sought now with the eagerness with which men ever turn to the Divine in times when human resource has failed. Most often, doubtless, was heard the cry to the sailors' deities, to whom Paul's next ship was dedicated—the Great Twin Brethren—

> "quorum simul alba nautis
> Stella refulsit,
> Decidit saxis agitatus umor,
> Concidunt fluctus, cecidere venti,
> Et minax, quod sic voluere, ponto
> Unda recumbit."

While in one corner a little group of men, serene and unterrified, communed with One who had "muzzled" the storm before, and who now, in any event, would hold their souls in His hand, where no evil could touch them.

[1] So W.H. text; W.H. margin and R.V. text have 276.

And on this strange scene of mingled human emotions the Eternal Father looked down from heaven, His dwelling-place, and the cry of His children came into ears that are not deaf to the most unorthodox of prayers. Swiftly came the answer. How? Did the revolving earth accelerate its speed to bring the day some hours too soon? Did an angel of light glide from the darkness and reveal the shore in a blaze of unearthly glory? Did a voice sound above the wind and waves, bidding them cease their fury? No. So imperceptible was the Divine answer, that most of us read the inspired narrative without seeing where it comes in. What did God send? He sent *a man with his wits about him*, and to his shipmates the inclination to listen to him.

Now, Paul had been among those men for weeks, and he had spoken out at the first about the danger he foresaw. The centurion greatly respected him; but it is hardly wonderful that he listened rather to the nautical experts. Later on, Paul justified his prescience by the event, and tried to reanimate the despairing men by unveiling the future again. There is no hint that they listened to him then. But now comes our crisis verse. The prayer—for such we may really call it—is heard, and from this moment Paul becomes practically master of the ship. It is he who checkmates the heartless selfishness of the sailors, which the captain and the centurion had failed to fathom. And it is his cheery example that at last encourages the weary, hopeless men to take the food which was needed to give them strength for what had yet to be done. Any one with his wits about him could have taken either of those steps which saved their lives. Exactly; but it was trust in God that nerved Paul with this coolness in the hour of danger, as it has nerved thousands of humbler heroes since; and it was the unconscious result of prayer, however ignorant, that gave the helpless company the power to recognize and accept common-sense guidance when it was given.

The bearing of all this on the theory and practice of prayer need scarcely be developed. Some men expect an angel from heaven to appear when they have asked for guidance, and if they are helped out of perplexity by the sensible advice of some friend whom they have not attended to before, they fail to recognize God's messenger because they see no wings. The twenty-seventh of Acts will be not the least practical chapter in the Bible, if it teaches us that God answers prayer for light in difficult places by simply bracing our faculties to their highest pitch, and by giving that confidence and coolness of head which must always accompany a heart that abides in the shadow of the Most High.

THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT.

THE PRELIMINARIES OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

I. *THE POSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS DOGMA.*

By Rev. W. S. Swayne, M.A.

Before the study of dogmatic theology, in however elementary a form, is approached, it is necessary to deal with the question whether religious dogma be, after all, possible. It can hardly be questioned that at the present day, while there is among the few a genuine and growing desire that the matter of their faith should be presented to them in a clear, precise, and intelligible form, there is among the many a very real impatience and dislike of dogmatic statements. Here, as ever, may be noticed that conflict and opposition between the spirit of the Church and the spirit of the world, which is inevitable from the very nature of the case, and will continue to the end of time. Nor is this spirit only to be found in the members of those religious bodies which make it their boast that they have dispensed with dogmatic statements, and are free from the trammels of Creeds; it is a general and characteristic feature of the religious speculation of our time. Within the Anglican Church, no less than in the ranks of Nonconformity, there are to be found those who will admit that the Christian life is the highest and purest which has ever been proposed to the world for its imitation, but who, when brought to a point, are not willing to express their unqualified belief in such statements as those, for example, of the Athanasian Creed. There are others who are willing to regard the Christian faith as a beautiful poem, enshrining, somehow and somewhere, truths which are worthy of the consideration of rational men, but who could not honestly admit that they believed the statements of the Creeds to be literally true. The popular prejudice against dogmatic statement is shown by that most trustworthy indication—the ordinary usage of language. To call a man a dogmatist is unquestionably, in the minds of the many, to imply, if not to express, disapproval and reproach.

Now, what is this dogmatic statement, this dogmatic theology, of which the world so generally disapproves? Dogmatic theology is the science of God, of His characteristics and attributes, and of the relations between God and man. A dogma is a religious statement thrown into a clear and precise form. "There is but one God" is a religious dogma. To declare that God will certainly punish the wicked and impenitent, or that man is or possesses an immortal spirit, is to put forward statements which are properly dogmatic. To assert the simplest article of religious faith is to be so far a dogmatist.

If the objection to dogmatic statements be probed and analyzed, it is generally found to spring from the conviction that dogma fetters

thought. Thought should be free—free to inquire, to examine, to progress. But dogma, it is asserted, is the negation of inquiry, of examination, of intellectual progress. It is an utterance of irrational authority, warning the human mind off fields of inquiry where it might legitimately find scope for the exercise of its powers. But what, after all, is the object of intellectual inquiry? It is certainly truth. The mind of man does not exercise itself in examination and inquiry for the sake of the process, but for the sake of the result. Man is studious of truth. And the truth does not fetter—it liberates. "The truth shall make you free." Such a statement is axiomatic. It is acquiesced in as soon as stated. It is ever so; truth liberates, enlarges, stimulates. It is, and always has been, error that paralyzes and fetters. If, then, dogma be true, it cannot fetter thought. It will form rather a basis, a firm standing-ground, for future inquiry. The axioms or propositions of science and geometry do not fetter thought. They form the secure platform from which the mind reaches out to secure new conquests.

It is, then, absurd to object to dogmatic statements because they are dogmatic—that is, precise and defined. If they are to be deprecated at all, it must be on the ground that they are not true. If they are true, then, in the interests of the progress and liberty of the human mind, the more clearly defined they are, the better.

But, as a matter of fact, it will generally be found that the man who objects to dogmatic statements does so not so much in the interests of the dignity and liberty of the human mind, as because, either confessedly or unconsciously, he is doubtful of their truth. He who believes heartily that there is but one Supreme Personal Creator and Governor of the universe, has no objections to confessing, "I believe in one God."[1] To this statement, no doubt, many of the opponents of dogmatic theology would assent. They would, however, urge—This is precisely the difficulty. No one would object to dogmatic statements if we could be sure of their truth. No one objects to stating that twice two makes four, though that very statement denies that you are free to assert that twice two makes five, or any other number except four. But no man can be sure of the statements of dogmatic theology. We do object to the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Sacraments, just because they are uncertain. Something, no doubt, may be said for them; they may or they may not be true, but they are not necessary truths like the axioms of geometry, or ascertained facts like many of the truths of science. They are statements with regard to subjects which are confessedly mysterious and beyond the power of the human mind fully to grasp and understand. Such doctrines must necessarily be subject to revision as the powers and scope of the human mind become more ample.

In this argument, two very sweeping statements are really implied. It is implied, first of all, that God has given no clear revelation of

[1] Cf. Liddon's *University Sermons*, 1st series, p. 183.

Himself to man; and secondly, that, from the very nature of the case, man can know nothing of God—at least, nothing that is precise and definite.

It would be generally admitted that if God has granted to man a revelation, then dogmatic theology is not only possible, but necessary. A revelation which is incapable of being stated in an intelligible form is a contradiction in terms. If God has granted a revelation, it must be such as the human mind can deal with and embrace. On certain subjects it may be silent; on many points it may give us far less information than we could wish; but on those subjects on which it does speak, if it is to be a revelation at all, its statements must be sufficiently clear to be thrown into logical and definite form. Thus it will be generally found that opponents of dogmatic theology are bound finally to confess that they do not admit a revelation in any other sense than that revelation which is continually growing and shaping itself through the consciousness of mankind.

The question whether, as a matter of fact, God has revealed Himself to man or not—whether by sign, or miracle, or the special inspiration of chosen men, or, as Christians hold, by the coming in the flesh of the Second Person of the ever-blessed Trinity—is a question of evidence. It will be generally granted that if Jesus of Nazareth did rise from the dead the third day, and did ascend into heaven in the presence and sight of His disciples, then it would be futile to deny that God has given a revelation of Himself of most tremendous import. Similarly, if Moses did lead the children of Israel through the Red Sea, if the plagues of Egypt took place substantially as narrated, if the record of the journeyings of the children of Israel in the wilderness be historical and veracious, it would be an excess of scepticism to deny that Moses was chosen and inspired by God to make known His will in a special measure to his nation.

The question of fact falls within the sphere of Christian evidences. It is sufficient now to point out that it is a question of evidence whether a revelation has been given, and that, granted a revelation, the possibility and the necessity of a dogmatic theology can hardly be denied.

But there remains the still more sweeping statement to be dealt with, that from the very nature of the case man can know nothing of God; that the statements of theology deal with a subject which is indeed interesting, but so entirely outside and beyond the powers of the human mind, that it is presumption in a very marked degree for any man to presume to be certain on any theological question. This is the position of the religious agnostic. An attitude of reverent doubt is that which, he holds, best befits the human mind.

The Christian faith must, however, be judged as a whole. It is altogether beside the mark to take the unbeliever's idea of God and the unbeliever's idea of man, and to argue that any communication from

such a God to such a man is unlikely or impossible. The argument would probably be sound enough, but it would not touch the Christian position. If God be mere Force, or merely a First Cause, and be so conceived of; if man's destiny be limited by this life; if he be only a superior animal;—then, no doubt, it is true that any precise knowledge of such a God by such a man is impossible, unless it be held that the law of gravitation or of the conservation of energy must be pressed into the class of theological statements.

The Christian faith, however, begins by asserting that God is not mere Force, mere Power, but that He is a living, loving Personal Being; that He is, in His inmost nature, Love; and that all His other attributes are the attributes of Love. He is an All-holy Love, an All-wise Love, an Almighty Love. The Christian faith asserts, further, that God called man into being, compelled by no external necessity, to satisfy no felt need, but simply out of His abounding love and condescension, that He might impart the gift of conscious personal life and free-will to other beings. Again, it is a fundamental Christian doctrine that man is made in God's image, after His likeness; that there is in man something theomorphic; and that man can therefore know God because there is something in man's nature akin to God.

Obviously, between such beings, infinitely far removed from one another though they be, as the Christian faith supposes the Most High God, and man His creature to be, there will be, not only the possibility, but even the necessity, of communication.[1] The Divine Love will utter a word to man, and it will be man's highest happiness, his chiefest good fortune, to receive and embrace such a word.[2]

All this, however, it might be said, rests on pure assertion; it is not supported by argument or evidence. To begin by asserting that God is of such and such a nature, and that He has made man in such and such a way and for a certain end, and then on this basis of mere assertion to raise a complicated structure of dogmatic theology, is surely to build on the most sandy and insecure of foundations. But the Church is not really guilty of so great a piece of simplicity. There remains, of course, the question which conception of God—that inculcated by the Church, or that vaguely held by the world—best corresponds with the observed facts of life and being, and, above all, best responds to the imperious soul-hunger of man's inner being. If man by experience finds that the fundamental doctrines of the Church with regard to the Divine Being satisfy the needs of his own nature, and give him a sense of satisfaction, of

[1] Cf. Ewald, *Revelation, its Nature and Record*, p. 27, "The whole question respecting the necessity and truth of revelation resolves itself, in the last issue, into a question concerning the existence and truth of God Himself. He who does not acknowledge God in His full verity and His distinctness from man, cannot believe in a Divine revelation."

[2] Ewald, *ibid.*, p. 3, "To perceive a clear voice from Him, a direction for the life, is the purest happiness and good fortune."

spiritual and intellectual rest and peace; if he further finds that the theology of the Church is interpretive, and enables him to understand the problems of life and being, and presents the world to him as a cosmos, an orderly and organized whole, instead of a chaos;—then he has the strongest possible reason for believing that the theology of the Church is true. It is a postulate of thought that the world is rational, and every principle and statement which help to present the world to him as intelligible and orderly, man is naturally, by the very bent of his nature, inclined to adopt. Thus that faith which man receives in the first place on authority, he afterwards makes his own by experience. In this sense all religion, if it is to be lasting and endowed with sustaining power, must be experimental. "He that doeth the doctrine shall know whether it be of God."

It is not difficult to indicate ways in which Christian theology is interpretive and does correspond to the moral and spiritual needs of man. It is, to begin with, if not a necessity, at any rate a very strong tendency, of our nature to believe that the Supreme Being is not only almighty, but all-good. The belief in the necessary goodness of God seems to become more inevitable with the development of the moral consciousness of the individual or the race. Homer may put forward poetic legends about the gods, which by no means represent them as immaculate in virtue, but to Plato all such legends are blasphemy against the Divine Being, and an insult to the moral consciousness of man. A savage may ascribe vengeance, petulance, and cruelty to his sinister deities, but a cultivated agnostic in a Christian land would probably admit that, if there be a God, that God must be good.

But this is not all. Side by side with the development of the sense of the necessary holiness of God, the deeper must be the personal sense of sin. Man cannot refrain from contrasting himself and his shortcomings with the bright image of the Divine perfections. Man cannot escape from the admission that, if God be necessarily holy, he must require and delight in holiness in His highest creatures. The sense of sin must be developed, *pari passu*, with the sense of the sanctity of God. This double process must inevitably lead, in the long run, to pessimism and despair, unless some means be found of reconciling the double tendency. The contrast between what man is and what he ought to be becomes too flagrant and painful. It is just here that Christian theology steps in and raises man from the Slough of Despond into which he must otherwise fall. It recognizes and ratifies both tendencies, and teaches how they may be reconciled. Thus, without some such doctrine as the Atonement, the higher moral progress of the race would seem to be impossible.

Again, the Christian faith corresponds to an intellectual need of man's nature. The human mind is naturally and necessarily studious of unity. It loves to be able to refer manifold results to a single cause, and to discover a single principle underlying many phenomena. The readiness with which such doctrines as evolution, the conservation of energy,

universal causation, and the universal prevalence of the law of gravity, have been received, is evidence of this natural bias of the mind.

The world, however, taken in its totality, has little appearance of unity. It is apparently a blind and blundering system; if not the worst possible world, at any rate a very bad one. It has all the appearance of a system out of joint and out of gear. Left to ourselves, we should be at a loss to render any intelligible account of it. We should have to confess ourselves at all points confronted with mystery, and for the most part painful mystery. But man, with that characteristic optimism of his, which, apart from the Christian revelation, would be so irrational and pathetic, clings to the belief that a solution is to be found somewhere. Now, the doctrines of Christianity do evolve a certain unity out of the various and apparently conflicting phenomena of the material and moral world. They teach us that the world is out of joint, but that nevertheless it tends towards an end, and that end both an intelligible and an infinitely desirable one.

It teaches us also that a way has been found to restore the world to its pristine order, by means of the Incarnation of the Son of God. It speaks to us also of a future life completing and explaining that we now live, guaranteed to us by the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Thus the primal gospel, "Jesus and the Resurrection," is an intelligible idea, which, added to the diverse phenomena of the world, educes order and unity out of apparent chaos, and an all-wise and merciful plan from what would otherwise seem a mystery of cruel pain.

This is the strength of the Christian position. It is interpretive. It fits in with the observed facts of life and being. It corresponds to the needs of man's nature. But if God is such as the Christian faith declares Him to be, a revelation is not merely possible, but in a high degree probable, and it is simply a question of evidence whether such a revelation has or has not been given. Thus a great deal of the railing against dogmatic theology, on the ground that it ventures to make definite assertions on a subject on which precise statement is impossible, is altogether beside the mark. Those who would deny the possibility of a science of God must first of all prove that the fundamental postulates of the Christian faith, however come by, do not add strength to the will, give comfort to the conscience, and make the moral government of the world intelligible. They must, that is, first attack the antecedent probability of a revelation.

Having succeeded in this part of their undertaking, it will then be worth while to go on to disprove the evidence that is adduced on the Christian side, that a revelation has actually been granted. Until this has been accomplished, Christian theologians can afford to disregard petulant complaints launched against dogmatism because it is dogmatic. It is the business of theological statement to be primarily true, but, in the second place, as clear and distinct as possible. It is, indeed, a strange

modern theory that fog and truth should be akin. We need to go back to Descartes to learn that it is at any rate a step in the direction of truth that an idea should be "clear and distinct."

CURRENT AMERICAN THOUGHT.

TRUTH AS APPREHENDED AND EXPRESSED IN ART. By G. F. GENUNG (*The New World*).—There is a distinction to be observed between truth and reality. Reality is every thing which may affect the consciousness, whether it be a visible fact or a fact of the mind. The exact word for purely objective existence is "reality." Truth, on the other hand, is reality after it has passed, so to speak, through a subject; it is reality perceived and expressed. Not until reality comes at second hand does it become specifically truth. Truth, in its strict meaning, is not the fact, but the relation of perception to the fact—"the correspondence," as Herbert Spencer defines it, "of subjective to objective relations." A considerable part of the interest attaching to truth as such comes from the fact, that the source from which the interested person derives it is a reproduction rather than the first-hand existences of nature. What makes imitation interesting is the subjective element, in consequence of which reality, being perceived and expressed, reappears as truth. To the same subjective element is owing the whole mental and moral conception of veracity. Truth is reality with a subjective element—reality made interesting and ethical by the operation of a perceiving and uttering soul.

Just as truth has this double nature—the subjective and the objective—so there are two ways of dealing with truth. One glories in discovery; the other devotes itself to the endeavour after perfect expression. The one is the method that obtains in scientific observation; the other is the informing principle of art. Art may be defined as the expression of truth in some other medium than that in which it occurs. Art concerns itself with the effect of the object on the perceptive qualities. Art aims to produce an illusion, or effect, on one or more of the senses like that produced by the original object, but in a different medium or by a different cause. The translation of truth into a different medium from that in which it occurred to its discoverer is perhaps an essential feature of art. In other words, art is representation. Science is dominated by the processes of observation; art, by those of expression. The effort of science is to minimize the subjective element, and to push as far back as possible toward bare reality. Art tends to make the subjective impression or effect the whole substance of truth.

A gradation in the arts is founded on their subjectivity. As the truth observed or felt progresses from the outward to the inward, the means for expressing it becomes less imitative and more subjective; and it is interesting to consider the nature of that final truth which it requires the whole subjectivity of the man to express. It is with the rise of the feeling for impressions that the delineator may be said for the first time to enter fairly into the realm of art. Here he soon finds himself embarrassed by the multitude of truths and shadings which demand recognition and expression.

The truth for which art, as so far considered, has sought expression has been truth to which an actual counterpart exists in present fact. The artist's effort has been to express reality as he actually sees it. But there is a higher kind of truth—a kind to which the arts which concern themselves with time-sequences are perhaps more naturally adapted. This is truth of idea, truth of aspiration and spiritual

tendency, the existences of a higher world which is created by the mind of man rather than presented to his senses—the appearance of inner reality in that light that never was on sea or land. To the expression of such truth the pictorial art addresses itself, especially in mural painting, which deals more largely with symbolical or allegorical subjects. As its means of representation, however, are confined to actual objects portrayed, it gives the impression of an ideal world by exhibiting its figures in archaic scenery, or decking them in antique costumes. It is because of its suggestion of an ideal, unearthly world that the employment of the nude in art has its justification and its necessity. The nude, when elevated by idealization, presents pure being or action without the hindering accidents of earthly reality. As soon as the higher, inner truth of the spirit begins to press for expression, the purely imitative arts begin to be embarrassed.

To find arts, or forms of creative expression, which roam free in the world of ideas and spiritual entities, we must turn principally to those which deal with sequences in time rather than with forms in space, and appeal to the ear rather than to the eye. Such are the historical, the romantic, and especially the poetical and musical arts. These aim to express an inner reality rather than to imitate an outer one ; and their natural address is to the ear. If they present their creations to the eye, it is only by the employment of alphabetic or other arbitrary symbols, which do not become expressive until they are translated into terms of sound. As occupying the border-land, and partaking of the nature both of the visible and the audible arts, the dramatic art calls for consideration. This art, by its spoken or self-expressive features, raises expectations and encounters demands as a teacher of moral truth, while it is perpetually held down to the common function of the imitative arts by its spectacular or realistically visible side.

It is the audible rather than the visible that awakens the spirit. The arts that are imitative of objects in space may indeed, by sufficient idealization, introduce us to a world of fancy ; but it may be questioned whether the still higher, more distinctively spiritual world of motive, resolve, overcoming will and devotion, can be opened to mankind except through the agency of the spoken word. Perhaps in this denial of the power of the space-arts to awaken devotion we might except architecture. This art, however, even in its most carefully ordered suggestiveness, is less a teller of spiritual truth than a promoter of those subdued emotions under whose pressure certain forms of sacred truth become more weighty and impressive.

The vocal arts already deal in symbols. A word is the symbol of an idea, and, though never so closely associated with its idea in the mind, it in no sense resembles it. The spontaneous and natural movement of these symbolical instruments of expression, therefore, is to carry the mind to the idea which is beyond their own sound or beauty. They are the natural handmaidens of the world of ideas rather than of the world of forms. These spiritual arts alone are fitted to be the soul's uplifters in religion. There is profound wisdom in the second command of the Mosaic Decalogue, which enjoins that the imitative arts are not to be used to portray men's supreme object of worship.

Perhaps the simplest form of time-art, or vocal delineation, is the bare narration of outward events in their chronological order. The skilful narrator confines himself to a few of the most important features of the occurrence, and these he brings out in strong relief. His suppressing and modifying of the actual facts is only a kind of perspective delineation ; and it is as necessary to truth of subjective impression as is the pictorial artist's lineal and aerial perspective in drawing. In the one art, as in the other, the truth aimed at in expression is a certain state of the imagination in the

perceiving subject rather than the exact reality as it existed in its pure objectiveness. And such artistic adaptation of reality to the exigencies of true impression includes even the employment of exaggeration. The effectiveness of exaggeration is often seen in the art of the orator. It is the speaker whose rhetoric takes fire, and whose speech blossoms out, not only in tropes and splendours of diction, but in over-statements and hyperboles and logical violences, which the conscientious feeler of his way cannot reconcile with truth, who really produces the most adequate impression of the desired situation in his audience.

The arts which represent or reproduce existences in time are prompted to give study and utterance to evermore inward truths, as they rise to richer experience and sympathy with human nature.

We pass now to a form of art which is strictly self-expressive. In lyrical self-utterance the ardent possessor of a truth to tell no longer seeks elaborated symbols that adapt outward representation to inward reality, but, through the direct employment of language and movement, speaks forth what is in him, with a more or less exalted use of his natural means of expression. Poetry is the primal language of uplifted emotion. The art of music is perhaps still more purely creative. It does not even deal in definitely worded ideas; it acknowledges no allegiance to logical laws; its thought is purely in terms of sound. It imitates nothing in nature; it finds the laws on which its science is built simply in the degree of perfection with which pure emotion is expressed. It is strictly creative.

The highest human art is the same as Divine inspiration. It is the whole self expressing itself in its most absorbing and unselfish form of utterance. Inspiration is not a fact of human knowledge, but a fact of human character.

MAN'S CONCEPTION OF GOD. By JOHN W. SMITH, LL.B. (*The Biblical World*).—How are we to account for the universally prevalent disposition, or inclination, on the part of man to worship? Some have maintained that man's conception of God is an inheritance derived from an original and primitive direct revelation. Others have supposed that the idea of the existence and attributes of a Supreme Being resulted from a process of pure reasoning on the part of man. Others still have as strongly maintained that the idea is to be attributed solely to the observation of nature—its beauty, its grandeur, its harmony, its laws. Others have maintained that the idea of God is inconceivable, unknowable, and that man's conceptions on the subject are mere chimeras, and worship, in all its forms, a superstition. While still others have insisted that man was created a worshipping being, receiving from his Creator a divinely implanted faculty or instinct, capable of apprehending the Infinite, with an inclination and longing therefor; or, in other words, that religion is inherent in man, and is in him a mode of action, a potential energy quite as much as the forces and powers are inherent in material substances—gravity, for instance; "and if we will but listen attentively, we can hear in all religions a groaning of the Spirit, . . . a longing after the Infinite, a love of God."

This article proposes to outline the belief of man as to his objects of worship, as we find such belief embodied in the various phases of the religions of the world, viewed solely from an historical standpoint. The time has been when the Name of God was regarded as too sacred to be pronounced by mortal lips. Some nationalities or tribes have entertained comparatively well-defined ideas concerning God, that were analogous to those of strict monotheists; yet they never permitted those conceptions to assume or become embodied in appellative forms, much less proper names. If the heavens declare the glory of God, it cannot be sacrilegious to inquire into and examine the

impress that God has left on man. If man is the image of God, and we take into consideration his accomplishments thus far, and the possibilities of the future, with all nature and its laws at his command, it may be that *he* will be regarded in coming ages as the best and highest revelation of God.

Thanks to the patient and scholarly investigation of the nineteenth century, we are now enabled to read the thoughts, feelings, and emotions that actuated men in remote antiquity, long ages before Abram left Ur of the Chaldees. We find that there is a law applicable to every field of inquiry, every religion or branch of religion, and the various phenomena attending the outward forms of worship. That law is the law of progress, development, or evolution. We know that the earth, in its preparation for man's habitation, has been a series of progressive steps. We have many indications that the universe is undergoing a similar process of development. Prehistoric archæology conclusively shows that man himself has passed from the chipped stone age to the polished stone age, thence to a copper or bronze age, thence to an iron age, and thence to a steam or an electric age. Philology furnishes unmistakable evidence of the same law of progression, in opposition to the supposed primæval revelation of language, and that language the Hebrew. The same law of evolution is apparent in the forms of government, in art, in science, in literature.

A careful study of the world's religions will establish the existence of certain facts underlying them all. (1) In all religions man has recognized the existence of some being or beings, some object or thing, by him supposed to be superior to and above himself. (2) A feeling of weakness in himself, and a dependence upon that being or beings, object or thing, assumed to exist. (3) A belief or faith on his part in his ability to reach his God or gods, by the use of some form of sacrifice, or offering, or prayer. (4) A like belief or faith that, on the proper approach to that God or gods, his wishes, desires, or hopes will be realized.

At the very threshold of our investigation we are met by confusion and chaos. In his groping after the Infinite, man has laid hold of the tangible and intangible, the natural and supernatural—the earth, the moon, the sun, the stars, even the universe itself. This confusion, growing out of the multiplicity of gods, is somewhat dissipated, however, when we come to take into consideration the circumscribed horizon of the observer. Measured from our standpoint, with all the civilization of the past below us, we are disposed to be too critical of those who dwelt in the valleys of the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Indus.

Looking at man in his march down through the ages, we see his pathway strewn with errors innumerable. The most profound thought of the Indian of America was that there was a Great Spirit that would assist him in his chase, and that Spirit he made his god. The most exalted idea of the Hebrew was that of a national God, with jurisdiction and power confined to the limits of Israel. Herodotus and Strabo had no right to grow merry over the crudities of Egypt, nor has the pseudo-philosopher of to-day historical licence to interpret the past by the light of this or any other century. No two of us now would be found entirely to agree in our conceptions of God, His attributes and power. Thus it is that we find belief upon belief, strata upon strata, from the lowest forms in savage life to the highest forms in civilized man; and the true historian cannot expect to find imbedded in these beliefs or strata conceptions belonging to a higher form of civilization. It is not reasonable to read into the laws of Moses or Manu the psalms of Israel or Babylon, the science and philosophy, the religions and morals, of a later age.

And we must not expect the great streams of thought to be uniform in any branch of investigation. The great river, in its course, meets with many modifying influences,

many obstructions and confluent streams, all changing more or less its general character, or deflecting its course to the right or to the left. The Buddhas and Mahomets often change the whole current of thought, and these influences must be carefully weighed and estimated if we would correctly understand the history of the past, and oftentimes the current history of the present. There are many phenomena attending man's belief in God that the thoughtful student must carefully note, estimate, and weigh. Not infrequently are to be found, in the same people, and running parallel with each other, conceptions of God of the very highest excellence and moral grandeur, and conceptions of the most anthropomorphic nature. The various forms and phases of pantheism, polytheism, henotheism, monotheism, totemism, and fetishism, must be analyzed. And it must be asked whether polytheism was first in point of time, or monotheism.

The seeds of religion are universally the same, and Max Müller says that seed is "the perception of the Infinite." It is not claimed that this perception is in all people the same in degree, for apprehension does not include comprehension. Even if the starting-point should be the same, the growth in all cases will be more or less modified by the environments. The elemental factors that have wrought such changes in historic religions are many, but among them may be mentioned (1) difference in character of the races; (2) the nature of their homes and occupations; and (3) the political, social, moral, and industrial relations sustained to other preceding or surrounding nations or peoples. Thus we notice, as observed by Professor Tiele, "the joyous, careless disposition of the sensual negro is reflected in his religion as clearly as the sombre melancholy character of the American Indian is in his."

THE WRATH OF GOD. By Professor A. G. VOIGHT, A.M. (*The Lutheran Quarterly*).—Is there really any such thing as "the wrath of God"? The phrase is employed in the Bible; but can the expression be taken in the ordinary signification of the words? Can wrath be ascribed to God in the same sense as it is ascribed to man? The Biblical conception of the wrath of God is certainly surrounded with difficulties. The manner of conceiving the wrath of God depends in great measure on the mode of conceiving the nature of God generally. The general idea of God may be of such a nature that it excludes the thought of His wrath being anything *in Him*, but requires that it be understood of the *relations which men sustain towards Him*. Is it possible to conceive of the nature of God in such a manner that He is above all perturbation? Theological thinking has been dominated at various times by abstract philosophical conceptions, and especially in the idea of God. This was not only the case with the Scholastics of the Middle Ages. It was true also of the scholasticism of the seventeenth century. But the great dogmaticians, with all their efforts to build up a thoroughly Biblical system of theology, fell into abstractions which prevented a living conception of God. The hardened immutability which their form of thinking ascribed to God takes away from Him not only real wrath, but all real life.

Too great a dread of anthropomorphic conceptions of God will not be helpful towards understanding the truth in regard to His nature. The human language of Scripture will give a better idea of God than the abstractions of philosophy. It is highly important for Christian thinking to comprehend God as the personal God. And personal life includes emotions. Immutability is not immovability. Where the conception of an absolute immutability in God prevails, wrath in any true sense will be denied to God. According to the Scholastics, the expression, "the wrath of God," is only a figure of speech. It is not something in God, but something in the relations existing between man and God.

We need not deny that the assertions of the Bible about the wrath of God are

anthropopathic. But even in rhetorical and poetical language all is not figurative. Is there, then, anything in the character of the language used in connexion with the wrath of God, which may help us to determine whether that is a representation of God which must not be taken strictly?

Illustration is drawn from the sublime description of the winepress-treader coming from Edom, in Isa. lxiii. When we read, "I trod them in Mine anger, and trampled them in My fury," we must understand the expression as anthropomorphic. But in such a sentence the treading and trampling may be figurative, and the fury and the anger may not be. Other emotions are ascribed to God in this chapter—loving-kindness, goodness, mercy, affliction, love, pity. These are not anthropomorphic, and there is no good reason why wrath should be separated from the list of emotional terms in the chapter.

But it may be said—Would it not infringe on the moral perfection of God to attribute to Him such an emotion as anger? Will wrath of any kind work righteousness? Will perfect love admit of wrath? By some the wrath and the love of God are reduced to a unity. Wrath is nothing but love wrongly perceived. Thus Hamberger says, "What the creature experiences as Divine wrath is only based on its wrong relation to the everlasting love and perfection." The idea is certainly a plausible one, but an explanation which reduces so important a scriptural idea to a mere relation of the creature toward God, looks like a suspicious process of dilution.

The wrath of God is a cardinal feature of the Pauline theology. The argument in the Epistle to the Romans hinges on the double revelation of God, of His righteousness and of His wrath. This double revelation exhibits not only a twofold condition of men, but a twofold attitude of God towards men. The wrath is opposed to righteousness, as elsewhere it is opposed to mercy. The sin-forgiving righteousness of God is opposed by Paul to His sin-retaining and sin-punishing wrath. The former represents an energetic action of God in favour of men, whose spring is love; the latter also represents an energetic action of God against men, whose spring is the opposite of love. And the reaction of God's majesty against sin is not only chastening, but retributive. Otherwise, "how shall God judge the world?"

The first chapter of Romans is of itself conclusive against the idea that wrath is only a modification of the love of God. It is also conclusive against the idea that in the New Testament the wrath of God has only an eschatological force. Lactantius, in his treatise on *The Anger of God*, opposes the idea that God is immovable, and not subject to emotions. He ascribes a positive emotion of wrath to God. He says, "Since there are good and evil things in the affairs of men, it must be that God is moved to both sides—both to favour when He sees that just things are done, and to anger when He perceives unjust things." And this emotion is necessary to God. The reality of God's love is dependent upon the possibility of His wrath. "If God is not angry with the unrighteous, it is clear that He does not love the pious and righteous." To be true to the good, God must positively react against the evil. His majesty is moved energetically against the evil in proper indignation.

Is, then, wrath an attribute of God? It would hardly be right so to call it, because we can conceive of God without exercising wrath. Wrath is, properly speaking, a manifestation of other attributes, owing to certain conditions. It is this solemn and fearful fact of the wrath of God which is the condition of the vicarious atonement of Christ. The disposition is now very widespread to make the atonement something subjective. The atonement is thought of as bringing man round to a better mind, not as propitiating God. But as long as we believe the objective reality of Christ's work

of redemption, we must hold to the belief that God's attitude towards man has become different in consequence of the work of atonement. "Being now justified by His blood, we shall be saved from wrath through Him."

THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS. By ALBERT RÉVILLE (*The New World*).—The essential and permanent element in Christianity is the Christian ideal-filial faith in God and the brotherhood of man. Historically, this ideal sprang from the impulse given to man as a religious being by a pure heart, a beautiful message, and an heroic devotion equally extraordinary. This is the unassailable side of the Christian religion. It is not, therefore, a profanation of the sacred edifice to throw upon the documents and the traditions concerning its origin the light of independent criticism. Whatever may be the result of such research, we cannot destroy either this ideal or its attractive power. The affirmation of the bodily resurrection of Jesus is the indispensable foundation of the Christian religion, so that it would fall in ruins if this foundation-stone were removed. To M. Réville the early belief of our Lord's resurrection was much more the result than the foundation of the faith of the disciples.

The first portion of this article is an analysis of the gospel narratives of the Resurrection, to discover their agreements and their differences. The second portion is a reconstruction in order to give the true explanation of the miracle. Only a *résumé* of the second portion is here given. One may challenge the most skilful harmonizer to bring the various reports into an acceptable succession without doing violence to the texts. It is impossible, with such documents as we have, to construct a concrete and consecutive history of the resurrection of Jesus. But it is not impossible to disengage the central and fundamental phenomenon of which all these traditions are the more or less authentic echo.

We must first eliminate the explanation given in the last century, and still offered in our own by what is called "common rationalism." It amounts to saying that Jesus, taken down from the cross only a few hours after He was nailed to it, had swooned, but was not dead; that the quiet and coolness of the tomb revived Him, and that He was able to issue from it alive, and to show Himself to His disciples, taking precautions not to be seen by others. Every indication we have points to a *real* death. We must face the fact that, on the second day after the Crucifixion, very early in the morning, the tomb where the body of the Crucified One had been laid was found empty.

If it was removed by stealth, it is much more probable that the chiefs of the Sanhedrin removed it than that the disciples of Jesus did. Once the belief in the Resurrection was rooted in the group of primitive Christians, they could not even dream of making any investigation to discover what had been done with the body of the Master. We must now attempt to describe the transition which allowed them to pass from their first despair to enthusiastic confidence in the reality of His resurrection.

The doctrines which arose so quickly among the Christians as to the Person, the death, and the resurrection of Christ, threw no less quickly over Him and His words a nimbus of the supernatural which was inevitably to transfigure and change them. The traditional view is that, in repairing to Jerusalem, Jesus knew for a certainty that He would be arrested there and put to death. In the days which preceded His arrest He knew that Judas had decided to give Him up to the chiefs of the Sanhedrin. But He did nothing to save Himself from His persecutors. Indeed, it is precisely for this hour that He had come. His work was to have His suffering as its necessary complement, and this suffering was to be upon the cross. It was even

the essential part of His earthly ministry, since this sacrifice, voluntary and foreseen, was the price of the redemption which He brought to the world.

But a deeper study of the gospel documents allows things to represent themselves in a more natural and less paradoxical manner; for, represented as above, the death of Jesus almost resembles a suicide. The following summarizes the right view of these events.

Jesus, the noble Preacher of the kingdom of God which was to come, hesitated a long time before assuming, and a still longer time before accepting, the title of Messiah, or King of the kingdom which He announced. When, at last, He allowed His intimate disciples to confer on Him this supreme dignity, He ordered them to say nothing of it yet to any one (Matt. xvi. 20). He desired that it should be decreed to Him voluntarily by the Jewish people, and a national decision could only be made at Jerusalem. But the indirect appeal which He made to the people of Jerusalem had no appreciable result. After a brief moment of enthusiasm, He found Himself before a populace disdainful of the Galilæan, only moderately affected by His teachings, and settled in its political, rabbinical, and ritualistic prejudices.

It was the treason of Judas which suddenly and unexpectedly changed the probable march of events. In betraying to the leaders of the Sanhedrin the nocturnal retreat of Jesus, he enabled them to get possession of His Person without exciting a tumult, and with the hope that, by making haste, they could profit by the preoccupations of the feast to condemn Him and to deliver Him immediately to the Roman authority, which would charge itself with the execution.

Jesus was not without apprehensions of some unexpected blow; but the affecting and tragical character of the scene of the arrest should not lead us to suppose that Jesus expected to be arrested at this exact time. We all know those states of mind in which the most cruel and most rational fears do not deprive us of the vague hope that things may yet take another turn. Possibly Jesus accepted the fact of His failure in the Holy City, and proposed to return with His disciples into Galilee.

The belief that Jesus had left His tomb alive was, in the very first place, an intuition of His pious women friends, ascertaining that His body had disappeared. The visions of angels, and the words which these angels address to these protagonists of the faith are the form which their inward thought takes on. It is the sign of a psychological state, of a mental super-excitement, determining sensible but abnormal impressions. The disciples did not at first accept the statement of the women; but they were impressionable men; they were also simple and direct natures, vigorous and capable of reacting against a momentary prostration. They set out to see the tomb for themselves.

An immovable belief in the bodily resurrection succeeded to the dejection and the dark despair of the first hours. It was determined by visions of the ecstatic order, in which the first disciples saw the beloved features of the Crucified take form. The fluent, aerial nature of these apparitions, leading the less exalted often to desire to touch the risen body, as if they wished to assure themselves of its reality; the suspicion, quickly dissipated by the intensity of the ecstasy, that they had before them a phantom, a "spirit," rather than a body (Matt. xxviii. 17; Luke xxiv. 37; John xx. 20, 25); the surprising fact that Jesus appeared several times without being recognized at once (Luke xxiv. 16; John xx. 14; xxi. 4), as if the vision had for its determining occasion some suggestive accident;—these are so many significant features, the importance of which is measured by the very evident intention of the narrators to guard against the explanation, the elements of which they furnished themselves, without perceiving it.

Three principal objections must be noticed: 1. It is said that this explanation does not harmonize with the moral prostration and the dejected state of the disciples the second day after the unexpected death of their Master. 2. It has also been objected that the apostles of Jesus were persons too simple-minded, too sedate, and even prosaic, thus to create entire scenes in which imagination, mental excitement, and a strong element of poetic creativeness are indispensable to those who objectify in this way their feelings and ideas. 3. It has been said that if we could strictly conceive the ecstatic vision projecting a determined object on the visual field of a single individual, it would be inadmissible that several persons should be at once subject to the same illusion and see the same thing.

If any feel depressed by the idea that the whole glorious edifice of historic Christianity rests, in the last resort, upon an illusion, we may say to them that they are mistaken. The history of the Christian Church does not set out from the material fact of the resurrection of Jesus, but from the faith of the disciples in the Resurrection—a faith which, in its turn, is only the form, due to their previous education, of the reawakening of their previous faith in Him who had conquered them morally. It is this faith, become immovable, which is the true foundation of Christian history; and here there is nothing to depress.

THE MINISTRY AND CURRENT SOCIAL PROBLEMS. By Rev. E. D. WEIGLE, D.D. (*The Lutheran Quarterly*).—The time is upon us when theological training should have much to do with an applied Christianity. The pulpit for these times must grapple with the questions which agitate society to its deepest depths. The sphere and work of the pulpit are the enunciation and maintenance of far-reaching principles, as these are designed to affect the individual, the family, the Church, society, and the State.

We are in the world and in the body; and, whilst we dare not be of the former, nor live only for the latter, the Christian character, which will give us a passport to the skies, must be achieved here. The question of paramount importance is not one of speculative philosophy, nor of revealed theology, nor yet of Christian cultus as expressed in worship, but of Christianity as applied to the various relations of life—individual, social, industrial, commercial, and economic. To the minds of a growing class the name of Christ stands for one thing and that of the Church for another. What God has joined together, man has, for some reason, put asunder. Ministerial leaders in right thought, proper sentiment, and equitable action, cannot afford to leave the problems of social science in the hands of agnostics, materialists, and communistic anarchists.

Anything which agitates, perplexes, or threatens the love, peace, good will, stability, and welfare of society, in its three basic institutions—the family, the Church, and the State—is a current social problem. Many of these are not modern, but they may be so termed because they have found a fruitful soil in the complex civilization of the latter half of the present century, and are producing a rich harvest of everything which disturbs and endangers individual, family, social, and national well-being.

What should be the attitude of the ministry toward these current social problems as leaders in the encouragement of right thought, the creation of better sentiment, and the agitation of benevolent action? 1. It should not be an attitude of mere denunciation. It requires neither brain, nor brawn, nor skill, to denounce an evil. Men who indulge much in mere denunciation become hobbyists, can only see one thing at a time, and jump at conclusions from an inaccurate judgment of men and

things. Extremists are never safe reformers. The honest poor are suffering much at the hands of the apostles of denunciation and despair. False leadership is the bane of modern civilization. The pessimism which is preached on all sides is calculated to produce the raven of despair in those who are suffering from present social conditions. One apostle of encouragement and hope will do more towards bringing about a correct understanding than a multitude of calamity-howlers. 2. It should be one of patient study and conscientious discrimination. The claims of God, the rights of men, and the needs of society should be much studied. The minister who knows nothing about the problems of life which are perplexing the minds and hearts of those to whom he ministers, is not qualified to apply the gospel to their varying needs. When the wild statements of pessimistic and socialistic agitators are brought to the test of study and conscientious discrimination, they are found wanting. They neither possess the sanction of history, nor can they be verified by facts. Patient study will reveal the truth that "man is not entirely the creature of his environment;" that "labour is not the sole cause of value or wealth;" that it has the same right to organize and combine as capital; that strikes and lock-outs should never be encouraged, as they always inflict an unjust punishment upon a third and innocent party—the community; and that the final function of these combinations should be, not war, but arbitration. The law of Christ, which is the co-ordination of self-interest and good will, plus self-sacrifice in the interests of others, made dominant in our varied social and industrial relations, would make the many problems which now threaten social well-being, disappear, as the snow melts away under the power of incoming spring. We must, however, make this broad distinction between social science and Christianity, that, whilst of human nature and human history science can tell us much, of the grace of God, and salvation by grace, it can give us no satisfactory account. 3. It should be the attitude of Christlike helpful sympathy in the maintenance of a positive gospel as the only remedy for all the maladies which afflict society. The deepest needs of man are moral needs, and the strongest forces for his elevation are moral forces. Scientific socialism, struggling with these current social problems, renders Christianity valuable service, but it cannot furnish a remedy. This age is producing various plans for the reformation of society. All reformation which stops short of regeneration is as futile in society as in the individual. To accomplish this, the gospel of love, of life, and of peace is demanded. The reform needed is, not the destruction, but the Christianization, of society. Humanity's greatest defect is a defect of character; society's greatest defect is a want of obedience to the law of Christ. In the Christianization of society, the sentiments, theories, customs, institutions, laws, and governments of the people are to be penetrated with the Christian spirit, founded on Christian principles, and ruled by the Christian law. Christianity is more than a law; it is a spirit and a life. Not what man is, but what he may become, must be the standpoint from which we may study humanity aright, and apply the gospel to the needs of the race.

Hence, in the maintenance of a positive gospel as the only remedy for the ills which perplex society, the attitude of the ministry must be one of pronounced leadership in the Christianization of the prevailing sentiment of society. The end of Christianity is a perfect man in a perfect society.

CURRENT CANADIAN THOUGHT.

HAS THE CHURCH LOST FAITH IN CHRIST? By S. P. ROSE, Montreal (*Canadian Methodist Review*).—That the Church has lost faith in Christ is one of the cries of the times, and it is important to inquire whether, and in what senses, the charge is true. The term, "the Church," is not to be understood as representing any particular organization of believers, but the aggregate of all denominations, regarded as one great organization, and united by the confession of the Headship of Christ. By "faith in Christ" is meant much more than *profession*. Vital faith is that which expresses itself in obedience. Obedience is the fruitage by which the character and genuineness of our faith are tested. "True faith has hands and feet, and moves forward to duty under the impulse and inspiration of love. The problem may therefore be stated in this way—*Judged by her works*, has the Church lost faith in Christ?

History testifies to eclipses of the faith of the Church in the past. This is evident to every student of ecclesiastical history. The epistles to the seven Churches of Asia, Paul's Epistles to the Corinthians and Galatians, and Peter's warnings, recognize the possibility and the fact. A prolonged and almost total eclipse of faith occurred in pre-Reformation times; and in England, before the Wesleyan revival, the Church's faith was ready to die. We are therefore prepared for the possibility of an eclipse of faith in our own days. And candour will compel us to admit the existence of damaging and lamentable evidences of the absence of a strong, vigorous faith in Jesus Christ on the part of His Church. Take as an illustration the attitude of the Church, in many quarters, toward moral and social reform, temperance movements, the labour problem, political corruption, oppression of the poor, unrighteous legislation, etc. Let a minister speak out his whole mind, in the spirit of an old prophet, and he is often remonstrated with, and piously urged to preach the gospel, and let politics alone.

What is the cause of the half-hearted attitude of the Church on many of these problems which are dividing false men from true? Is it not lack of faith in Jesus? Is it not a practical unbelief either in His *right* to exercise dominion in the affairs of earth, or in His *power* to conquer His foes? To surrender politics, business, and a large portion of the social life of the nation to mammon; to say piously and contentedly, "This world lieth in the arms of the wicked one," as though that were a Divine decree against which it were vain to fight, is to give clear proof of absence of faith in Jesus.

But when we have admitted the sad truth that the Church's faith in Christ is weak in this direction, are we justified in concluding that the Church has *lost* her faith? Ecclesiastical history teaches us that the inspiration of the early Church, in the power of which she won such splendid victories, and endured such severe persecutions, was the confident expectation that Jesus Christ would speedily return to earth. That Jesus should triumph and reign in the universal spread of righteousness, through the ministry of the Church, was not, so far as we can interpret the sacred writings, the belief of the apostolic Church. As the years went by, faith in the speedy return of the Lord, in bodily presence, became weaker, and in that sense the Church may be said to have lost her faith, nor has she ever wholly recovered it. Gradually, another conviction seems to have arisen in men's hearts—a conviction that Jesus was to establish His kingdom upon earth in the triumph of righteousness, and that the instrument for the accomplishment of this great purpose was the Church. This truth, however, soon assumed a corrupt form. The Headship of Christ was interpreted to mean the headship of the Church, and the evils of papal interference

with national, civil, social, and personal liberties became so intolerable that, in the good providence of God, the Reformation occurred. But, in throwing off the perverted form of the Kingship of Jesus on earth, Protestantism, in large measure, threw overboard the truth which Romanism had corrupted. And so for centuries the doctrine that Jesus is *King of earth*, that it is His right to rule in all the affairs of this life, has been driven into the background, in part because that section of the Church which held it has abused it, and in part because the Protestant Church has buried it deep down under the doctrine of "other-worldliness."

It is hard to lose what one does not possess, and ecclesiastical history does not show a period when this faith in Christ was held in a purer form or by a larger section of the Church than to-day. Much of the talk about the Church's lost faith is an illustration of the almost universal tendency to idealize the past. There is no evidence of a stronger faith in some bygone golden age. Each age has had its own doubts; but that the Church of to-day occupies a less advantageous position than the Church of the past, that her faith is less vigorous, or her piety less practical, is more than the testimony of history warrants us in believing. The truth is, that the Church never so intelligently believed in Christ as she does to-day. That there is a weakening of faith in dogmatic forms; that interrogation marks are arising in men's minds regarding the value of a good deal of the ecclesiastical machinery in which we hitherto have been disposed to trust; that with the growth of intelligence there is a distinct abandonment of beliefs and practices which bygone days regarded as notes of godliness, is patent to all observers. But if there is any fact more plain than another, it is that Christ is a greater and brighter reality to this age than to the ages immediately preceding it. Those who are familiar with the religious literature of our time are impressed with the number of books dealing with the life and teachings of Jesus, that are now issuing from the press. They all indicate a desire to get into proper relations of knowledge with the real Christ. No theology will survive the critical spirit of this age which does not assign to Christ the place which belongs to Him as the ultimate Authority, as the supreme Teacher, as the Saviour of the world.

The Church never believed in Christ so sincerely, so heartily, so unreservedly, as to-day. She is believing in Christ with a growing confidence which will, when the occasion demands it, express itself in deeds of sacrifice and service more heroic and unselfish than the world has hitherto witnessed.

ANTHROPOLOGY UNDERLYING REDEMPTION. By A. C. COURTICE, M.A., B.D. (*Canadian Methodist Review*).—Psychology is the science of mind; anthropology is the science of man. Man is a more comprehensive and more scriptural basis for studying the theme of redemption than mind. There is an anthropology underlying sin. Is the nature of sin psychological (mental) exclusively, or ethical (moral) exclusively, or both, or wider than both, being physical as well? Did the first sin seriously affect the essential elements of manhood, or did it leave them perfectly intact, and simply weakened in their action or deteriorated in their condition? Is the work of Divine grace in the man psychological (mental) exclusively, or ethical (moral) exclusively, or both, or wider than both, being physical as well? The answer is, that both the work of sin and the work of grace are anthropological, *i.e.* they concern the entire man in all his parts.

The anthropology underlying redemption is partly *racial* and partly *individual*. What is racial is not only universal, but also absolute or unconditioned; while, on the contrary, that which is individual is conditioned, is founded in true probational conditions, and therefore necessitates personal responsibility. The racial *sin* would

have materially interfered with probational conditions; but racial *redemption* intervenes from the first, and restores probational conditions. The racial redemption is antagonistic to narrow views as to operations of grace here, or its results hereafter. It is opposed to the teaching that only some are effectively visited by Divine grace, and opposed to the view that only a few will be saved. In view of the racial redemption, "total depravity" is beyond human apprehension. It is not a scriptural term or idea. The race is not totally depraved, for it has been a redeemed race from the time that it sinned in Adam; and the individual is not totally depraved, for the racial redemption holds him in a probation of grace. The term, "total depravity," cannot be used without being half explained away and apologized for. All the total depravity that exists is man's insufficiency for his own salvation.

Do spirit (*pneuma*), soul (*psuche*), and body (*soma*) represent three natures? Delitzsch stands for trichotomy, and Weiss for dichotomy. Delitzsch, however, makes too much of the trichotomy implying three natures in man. Weiss, on the other hand, makes too little of the trichotomy, for there is a trichotomy of function and life in man. Scripture language favours dichotomy of nature, but trichotomy of function, the latter necessitating the three terms—*pneuma*, *psuche*, and *soma*. The *soma*, the body, is easily determined. Human life is threefold in its manifestation, viz. apprehending, regulating, and acting. The apprehending life is in the senses; the regulating life is in the nerves, especially the nerve-centres; the acting life is in a mechanical combination of muscles, bones, joints, and vital organs. *Psuche*, or soul, is used in the New Testament in two senses, a lower and a higher. In the lower meaning it designates merely the life which animates the body, and distinguishes man and the animals from lifeless nature. In the higher meaning it is the personal life; it is identified with the inner man, the *ego*, and partakes of its indestructibility. Perception answers to the power of sensation; judgment answers to the regulating power of nerves; and emotion answers to the appetites and instincts. *Pneuma* designates the immortal man in a higher life still, in Divine origin and nature, function and action. Here intuition answers to perception, conscience to judgment, and will to emotion. It is intuition that grasps the revelation of God as truth. It is conscience that grasps the revelation as duty. It is the will that puts into execution the truth that has been translated into duty.

The *Pneuma Hagios*, or Holy Spirit, works through the human *pneuma*. The *pneuma* elements—intuition, conscience, and will—receive directly the things of the Spirit of God. *Psuche* elements and *soma* elements are not able to do so. Sin began in the *pneuma*, the spirit. It began when the spirit was disturbed in its relation to God, its true Life-centre and Source. Suspicion of God's love and wisdom were the beginning of sin. The intuition in man failed to hold the truth of God's love; the conscience failed to interpret the truth into duty; and the will willed the man out of God. Evil, therefore, may be defined as the product of the will that wills itself out of God. Then the *pneuma* elements fail to be life-determining. The *psuche* and *soma* now determine themselves, which they were never intended to do; and the result is the *sarkikos anthropos*—the carnal man. The *sarx*, or flesh, is not an entity or essence in the human nature to be eradicated, but a condition of the whole human nature to be changed. This carnal condition of man constitutes human depravity.

The general view of sin, from the standpoint of anthropology, may be stated thus. Sin is *psychological* in its radical nature; it is spiritual (*i.e.* it is in the *pneuma*); it is the failure of the *pneuma* to be life-determining; it is death to the *pneuma*, because it is out of relation to God, the Source of its life. It is, therefore, a fundamental disturbance of the human constitution. Then sin is *ethical* in its results. Without

the control of the living *pneuma*, human nature—both soul and body—deteriorates through lawless life into a depraved or inferior moral condition. This process is progressive, and constitutes depravity. Then sin is *physical* in its results. The body is irrevocably sentenced to death.

CURRENT GERMAN THOUGHT.

JULIAN THE APOSTATE ON JOHN'S PROLOGUE. By A. HARNACK, Berlin (*Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kir.*, 1895, No. 1).—Dr. Harnack first of all gives extracts from Julian on the subject, and then summarizes as follows :—

1. Julian disclaims the modalistic and Photinian interpretation of the Logos in the Johannine prologue. He acknowledges that the Logos of John is not introduced as an allegory, but as a distinct Person and an external Person, therefore as a second God ; and he acknowledges, further, that in the prologue the perfect identity of the God-Logos, the only begotten Son, and Jesus Christ is expressed, and that to see God the Logos is to see God the Father. If he seems to say in one passage that the controversy of the Church and Photinus respecting the exposition is of no importance, this is only in appearance ; he does not consider a decision on the matter necessary there. When he is obliged to take a stand, he defends the Church interpretation.

2. Julian implicitly and expressly acknowledges that the Nicene doctrine agrees with that of the prologue. He therefore goes so far as to use the Nicene phrases and those of the prologue promiscuously. (It is instructive that Julian (A.D. 362–3) accepts the Nicene, not the Arian, teaching as that of the Church. On Arianism he is altogether silent.) Even, according to the prologue, Jesus Christ is "God from God," "from the nature of the Father," the Mediator in creation. Only two differences appear here. (1) He does not find the statement that without Jesus Christ nothing was made—according to Julian, the most extravagant and offensive doctrine of the Christians—*plainly and definitely* expressed in the prologue ; (2) for the phrase, "mother of God," which Christians even then often used, according to his testimony, he finds no room in the prologue, nay, finds it excluded ; for, so he argues not without reason, if the Logos is God from God, and has proceeded from the nature of God, a woman cannot be the mother of God.

3. Julian not merely acknowledges the identity of the orthodox Christology with that of the Johannine prologue, but he makes John exclusively responsible for it. "This mischief took its origin exclusively from John." Later writers certainly developed it in worse forms. Here, however, Julian is not thinking, or at most cursorily, of a further development of Christology, but of the offence of men not being satisfied with the worship of one dead man, but inventing "new dead men"—martyrs and saints. From the "mischief" of representing Jesus as God, Julian expressly declares the synoptics and Paul free. It is noteworthy that he combines Paul's Christology with that of the synoptics, although he says ill enough about Paul. Thus Julian did not find a *theologia Christi*, in the strict sense, in the letters of Paul.

4. In his explanations, Julian gives us information both about the origin and motive, and also about the plan, of the Johannine prologue. As to the former, he supposes that the prologue was written for Gentile Christians, and that at a time when they were already numerous. John's intention was (1) in general to give them corresponding instruction ; and (2) by this means to prevent the worship of Jesus being driven out by the worship of other dead men (as Julian is inclined to suppose,

the martyr-apostles, Peter and Paul). John saw—this must be Julian's meaning—the general inclination of Gentile Christians to worship their dead heroes; in order to secure the unique worship of Jesus, he represented Him as the incarnate God-Logos. This explanation first of all seems false and absurd; yet it is not altogether unhistorical, and in any case it significantly shows that Julian ascribed the prologue to regard for Gentile-Christian readers. But as to the specific case, we must remember, on one side, how already, in the second century, heathens expressed the fear that the Christians would forsake Jesus and worship their martyr-heroes, or unite their worship with that of Jesus. Let any one read the Smyrnæan letter respecting Polycarp's martyrdom, the writing from Lyons and Vienne, Lucian's *Peregrinus Proteus*, etc. On the other hand, it is to be noted that Phlegon-Adrian, in his *Chronicle*, according to the testimony of Origen, confounded Jesus and Peter. He could scarcely have done this unless the name of Peter had constantly met him from Christian lips. The special motive for the writing of the prologue, which Julian gives—of course, historically inaccurate—indicates, consequently, an error not first committed by a heathen author of the fourth century, but one already perceptible in the second century.

More instructive than the view of Julian, that the prologue is addressed to Gentile-Christian readers, and is to be explained by this purpose, is what he says, in the most condemnatory way, respecting its plan. Julian regards the prologue as a drama, a play, therefore a progressive action finishing with a climax; this climax he sees in the "Jesus Christ" of the seventeenth verse, therefore in this—that the God-Logos is revealed as Jesus Christ. The climax is carefully led up to by John; he first introduces the God-Logos, and he "nowhere calls Him Jesus or Christ as long as he calls Him God and Logos." The first stage of the revelation, after having spoken only of the God-Logos, is that he introduces an eye-witness, John the Baptist, and makes him say some things, *i.e.* about the God-Logos, but at the same time, about Jesus Christ who is not yet named. These few things prepare for the declaration, "The Logos became flesh"—the middle of the unfolding drama. Now "he whispers softly and cautiously into our ear;" for he makes the eye-witness say openly that we must regard Jesus Christ as the God-Logos (Julian takes vers. 15—17 as John's testimony, and assigns ver. 18 to the evangelist, interpreting like Heracleon, whereas Origen ascribes ver. 18 also to the Baptist). The "culminating wickedness" is the proclaiming of the historical Jesus Christ as God-Logos. But—this is Julian's meaning—John himself did not dare recklessly to perpetrate the blasphemy. As he did not expressly utter the inference, "By Jesus was the world made," so he "cunningly and deceitfully" threw doubt again on all he had said by the proposition, "No one hath seen God at any time." If we pass by the latter explanation as obviously incorrect—although Julian is right in this, that the joining of ver. 18 to ver. 17 is paradoxical, and supplies a certain limitation of what was just said—and if we ignore Julian's reference to cunning, when only the strongest conviction is meant to be rendered *intelligible* in public, the analysis is unobjectionable. And it is important that Julian puts his finger on the absence of the earthly birth in the prologue.

Is this analysis of the prologue Julian's own production? I think not. I conjecture that it is to be placed a century earlier. When we consider how dependent Julian was on the older neo-Platonic criticism of Christianity and the Christian records, when we compare the identical views of the heathen (Porphyry?) in *Macarius Magnes* about the God-Logos, Paul, John, we must hold it probable that Julian took his interpretation and criticism of the Johannine prologue from the neo-Platonists of the third century. The high value put on the first verse of the prologue by the neo-Platonists is no counter-argument. Julian's view of the prologue only confirms what

a Christian writer said about the beginning of the Gospels in general, "Evangelistis curæ fuit eo uti procemio, quod unusquisque judicabat auditoribus expedire" (*Fragm.* iii. *a Victore Capuano Polycarpo adscriptum*).

MODERN VIEWS OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD. By Professor G. SCHNEDERMANN, Leipzig (*Neue Kirchl. Zeitschr.*, 1894, No. 7).—In the Acts of the Apostles we find the Messiahship of Jesus to be the central article of the Christian faith (i. 6; ii. 36, etc.). This was the primitive Christian confession, the earliest Apostles' Creed; hence we get the name Christians (Acts xi. 26). This confession is Israelitish in origin and meaning. When Christian preaching went beyond the boundaries of Israel, its form became different, its wording was enlarged; yet the original sense remained. In Christ's teaching, especially in the synoptics, another phrase is used—"the kingdom of God." A comparison of passages suggests that the two ideas are synonymous. The apostles themselves inquire about the coming of the kingdom (Acts i. 6), and about its coming *to Israel.* They think of it as Israelitish in character. And Jesus Himself must have started from this thought. Thus the idea is not a new, specifically Christian one, but belongs to the Israelitish postulates of Christian doctrine—to the Israelitish background of the New Testament.

The modern treatment of the subject dates from Kant. It was, of course, discussed before, but not in systematic, scientific form. Since then we trace two lines of interpretation—a rationalistic one in the sense of Kant (the kingdom of God being found in the present, in the moral community of Church and state); another in the eschatological sense of Bengel. In later days Ritschl and Beck respectively have advocated these views; with the former are Kaftan and F. A. B. Nitzsch. The two views are maintained in two prize essays—one by Ernst Issel, the other by Otto Schmoller (1891); the former taking Kant's and Ritschl's line, the latter Bengel's. "The latter is by far the more important, because of its clearness and consecutive argument; it shows that Jesus held not a Kant-Ritschlian conception of God's kingdom, but an eschatological one." Baldensperger in his *Selbstbewusstseins Jesu* (1892), and Grau in an essay on the same subject, discuss the question; and Professor J. Weiss in his *Jesu Predigt vom Reiche Gottes* (1892) takes Schmoller's side. Bousset also enters the field with his *Jesu Predigt in ihrem Gegensatz zum Judentum* (1892). Baldensperger, Weiss, Bousset, represent a middle school—that of Biblical theology and religious history. These give partial support to the eschatological interpretation. While, however, Schmoller teaches a Christian eschatology, J. Weiss holds a Jewish one—a considerable difference. According to the former, the kingdom is still future, even for us; according to the latter, Christ Himself held to the end a mistaken Jewish conception, with which we have nothing to do. Professor Schnedermann himself has just completed an exhaustive treatment of the subject, in which he endeavours to combine the truth and avoid the error in all these views.

One question which arises is—How an idea which formed the starting-point of Christ's teaching fell so long into the background, and only came up for thorough examination in our days—indeed, may be said to have been rediscovered? The phrase, "kingdom of God," occurs in the Epistle to the Romans once, Galatians once, Corinthians five times, other Pauline Epistles seven times, other Epistles five times, John's Gospel twice. In the Fathers the idea is found in an eschatological sense, and often in connexion with the end of the world and millenarianism; the Fathers generally speak of Christ's kingdom. It is not found in the Apostles' Creed. The tendency of the Greek side of the Church was to spiritualize the phrase, or to treat it as a mere figure of speech, thus completely ignoring its original meaning. To the old

Roman State the whole conception was repugnant. It was Augustine who, in his *De Civitate*, first revived the phrase, and gave it a far-reaching meaning. His interpretation ruled the thought of the Middle Ages. But the sense given to the phrase was quite different from the original one. The empire of Charlemagne and the papal supremacy were attempts to give visible embodiment to the idea, quite in the material sense. The Reformation did not emphasize the doctrine. Still, modern discussions are quite in harmony with the Reformation, inasmuch as they aim at discovering the meaning of the phrase in the teaching of Christ Himself. Both the modern interpretations—the rationalistic and eschatological—have to show how far they agree with His meaning.

Albrecht Ritschl, following in the wake of Kant, gives a simply ethical definition of the kingdom of God, disavowing the eschatological and hierarchical elements. He rather assumes than proves that this view agrees with Christ's teaching, which he acknowledges has an eschatological aspect. According to him, the community of believers is a *Church* as the subject of Divine worship and the legal ordinances necessary to this; it is the *kingdom of God* as the subject of mutual action on the part of its members from the motive of love. His difficult style makes his meaning obscure. The following are some of his statements: "The kingdom of God is the highest *good* given by God to the Church founded by His revelation in Christ; but it is only the highest good as it is also the moral *ideal*, for whose realization the members of the Church bind themselves together by a definite mode of mutual action. That meaning of the idea is made plain by the *aim* also expressed in it." "In carrying out His work of revelation, Christ realizes the kingdom of God, in order to secure its aim for men." "In the exercise of righteousness, in the peace produced thereby among all its members, and the joy or happiness springing from the Holy Ghost, *consists* the kingdom of God." Thus to Ritschl, our critic says, that kingdom is "present and earthly, a community of moral agents, just as Kant uses the phrase to denote the organization of moral men as a kingdom of ends, and a kingdom founded on moral laws."

No doubt there is something attractive in a representation which accords with modern thought; and much in Christ's teaching, especially the parables, as well as in John's Gospel and Paul's Epistles, may be used to support it. But what becomes of all the eschatological thoughts which, even on Ritschl's admission, adhere to this idea in Christ's teaching? "No; however many elements of truth this theory may contain, it does not contain all the truth." The eschatological aspect is receiving from writers like Schmoller the attention it deserves. Dr. Schnedermann thus summarizes Schmoller's views: "The kingdom of God with Jesus is but one thing, and denotes a conclusion. It is not a relation or an aim, but a gift of God, a good, the highest good. (The latter Ritschl has not denied; but he has blended both views together, and thus made the idea of aim or task the ruling one for men.) With Jesus it is something individual, no longer national. (Here I permit myself to put a mark of interrogation. All the more important is what follows.) We cannot, according to the teaching of Jesus, have part in it unless it *comes*; and it comes only through *God's*, not man's, action, and that at the end of time. That this proclamation of the approach of God's kingdom is to be understood of the end of the world, is not doubtful; no single passage, rightly interpreted, proves the opposite. Jesus merely reckoned His own days as belonging, in a certain sense, to the last days. We must distinguish the kingdom of Christ from the kingdom of God as the higher conception, and, in any case, not think that Jesus, in His prophetic work, saw the founding of God's kingdom; since, on the contrary, He merely intended, by forming a Church of aspirants, to

prepare for it, and Himself, during His lifetime, was Messiah only in hope. The current phrase, that God's kingdom develops or must grow, is, in Jesus' sense, simply absurd; the kingdom either is or is not."

The idea of the kingdom of God on Christ's lips was not new. It was part of the Jewish inheritance to which He was born. What was new was the fact of the kingdom having come (Mark i. 15; Matt. iv. 17). Jesus was a Prophet of facts, not a Teacher of new views and ideas. And He was more than a Prophet—He was the Messiah to realize the ancient hope of His people. "Perhaps He merely 'adopted' the idea, and transformed it? But this notion of adopting and accommodating is too superficial; it has too Docetic a sound. We do not hold seriously enough that Jesus became man (John i. 14), and was made under the Law, not merely in appearance. We must believe that Jesus Himself thought as an Israelite. I am only too ready to concede that Jesus transformed the idea. But I am suspicious of the talk of a new idea of Jesus, because the notion of novelty is often exaggerated. We are fond of saying that His thought was the distance of a world from the Jewish." How, then, are we to conceive the relation of Jesus to the traditional idea of God's kingdom? As simply as possible. We must drop such expressions as "conception" and "idea." "A *representation* of something tangible lay in the phrase, 'kingdom of God,' but not a definable idea; therefore no successful definition has ever been given. Germans long thought of and desired a German empire; in 1871 it came. So the people of Israel longed for its kingdom; but this could only be the rule of God, earthly and yet heavenly, national and yet universal in aim. This kingdom Jesus also hoped and longed for; and He announced its coming. He led His people no longer to seek it afar off, but to believe in its approach. In this form He, as an Israelite with Israel, beheld the highest good, which we Christians, in consequence of His work, can just as well call and conceive differently. God's nearness, God's fellowship with His people, and through it with mankind,—this He announced. . . . And then He showed in the words of prophecy how deeply this kingdom is founded, how pure its members must be, and He declared against the pseudo-Israelite conception, which saw the way and aim of the kingdom in an outward, literal triumph of the Jews. Against this view, which we may call Jewish, there was certainly opposition. And now began the struggle which Jesus, as God's Messiah, maintained for the true ideals, the pure religion of Israel. The end was that the nation crucified its Messiah and handed over its hope to the Gentiles. The result cannot be that the idea from which Jesus started was abrogated, but it was put to death on the cross: with the Crucifixion the day of the conception of God's kingdom in the Israelitish sense, which underlay the preaching of Jesus, was past; since then the idea in the Israelitish sense is 'a stranger among the nations.'"

"In conclusion, that has come in part which Jesus preached; but what has come far surpasses the Israelitish conception. Israel had no higher notion than this—that its God, the God of Israel, is King over the nation and the world. Till Christ's days monotheism existed only in the form of nationality (Ranke). Now God has really entered on His universal rule; in all lands and tongues men pray to Him. Whether we call this 'kingdom' or not is no matter, provided we worship Him in spirit and in truth. If we use the word 'kingdom,' it is in a different sense from the one in Jesus' days. His business was to strip off the old Israelitish shell; He has procured for us new joy; He Himself had to be born under the Law in order to free us. The idea of Jesus was eschatological, like that of His people; we rejoice that in our missionary toil we behold the end, and cry, 'Come, Lord Jesus!' but our position is not quite the same as His. We rejoice also, like Ritschl, in the thought that a kingdom of God is already come; Jesus brought it to us; with the first Pentecost that began which

He announced. Let us ever accustom ourselves in the present and future to behold God's rule, and to believe and await a glorious consummation. But let us guard ourselves against shutting up the real, living God in a barren idea and dry doctrine; for this is the one thing which Jesus did not intend."

CRITICISM AND THE BOOK OF DANIEL. By Dr. O. ZÖCKLER (*Theol. Lit. blatt*, 1894, No. 47).—The Book of Daniel belongs to the signs spoken against from early days. Even the old synagogue tradition was not able to agree on a solution of the many problems of the book. Expressions of extravagant praise, like those of the Talmudists, who prefer it to all the other prophets, are balanced by sceptical utterances like those which make it spring, not from Daniel, but from the men of the great synagogue. Even in the Christian and Jewish literature of the last decade, despite the great predominance of critical leanings, defenders of the old Danielistic, and therefore Exilic, origin of the work have not died out, as is proved by pamphlets like Von Gerlach's (*Ist uns das alte Testament noch Gottes Wort?*) and Ed. Rupprecht's (*Der Pseudo-daniel und Pseudo-jesaja der modern Kritik*). Certainly, during recent years little or nothing has been done on the positive side in the way of elaborate scientific examination and refutation of the critical attacks on the book. The present situation of affairs almost favours the supposition that no equally well-equipped opponents in the strictly orthodox camp confront the many-voiced choir of critics and exegetes who assert the origin of the book in the Maccabæan age. Even the intermediate theory, according to which the author of the present form of the book, living in Maccabæan days, worked up a considerable nucleus of old Danielistic pieces, partly biographical and historical, and partly prophetic, seems to be supported by only a minority of the scholars who are occupied with the problem. In any case, not one of the three new works on the subject now to be mentioned takes any other standpoint than that the work belongs to the Seleucid epoch.

1. Last year Dr. Ad. Kamphausen (Bonn) published a lecture which earnestly advocates the view mentioned (*Des Buch Daniel und die neuere Geschichtsforschung*, Leipsig: Heinrichs). After a prefatory rejection of two erroneous positions, which were defended by Paul de Lagarde—the rending of the book into different parts, and the reference of the last of the four empires to Rome—he points out that Frz. Delitzsch (1878), in the second edition of his "Daniel" article in Herzog, gave up his former defence of the authenticity and early date of the book, and also accepted, with the unity of authorship, its origin from the time of the Seleucids. While rejecting also as untenable the modification of the division-hypothesis maintained by J. Meinhold (in the eighth part of Strack's *Commentar*, 1889), consisting in the supposition of an Aramaic source for chs. ii.-vi., belonging to the year B.C. 300, he adheres decisively to the view of the book as an apocalypse, written on one plan, belonging to Seleucid days. In the prophecies of the second half he therefore sees *vaticinia ex eventu*, and incidentally he denies that any historical matter is contained in the first half. He lays special stress on this last point, as the title shows. It may be hard "to clear out the orthodox leaven" on this point, as also in other respects; but here a clean sweep must be made. "To the Book of Daniel, as to the Book of Job, orthodoxy does grievous wrong in overlooking the fact that any historical aim is alien to it." The historical worth of the Book of Daniel is "not to be placed higher than that of the Books of Jonah and Esther, or Judith and Tobit."

2. The author of the latest German commentary on the book has been partially led by similar critical principles, although he does not adopt so sharp a tone in judging orthodox exegesis as Kamphausen. Dr. G. Behrmann (Hamburg) has made an able

contribution to Nowack's *A. T. Commentar*, in his translation and exposition of the Book of Daniel just published (Göttingen, 1894). He advocates the origin of the book in the Seleucid age, rejecting intermediate hypotheses. He admits the occurrence of "historical inaccuracies" in the first half of the book, but rejects the hypercritical view, which (like Hitzig, *et al.*) sees only fictions there, and rather approximates to the more sober critics (like C. v. Orelli, F. E. König, S. Driver), who make older traditions, in part written, formed by an apocalyptist of the Maccabæan age into the whole of the Book of Daniel. From ch. xi., whose contents he regards as an integral part of the book (which, however, he only makes up to ver. 39 inclusive a *vaticinium ex eventu*, depicting the history of the Seleucid kings, whereas the part of the description from ver. 40 "has an indefinite sound," and is therefore a picture of the future), he infers the origin of the same during the Maccabæan wars of emancipation, more precisely between B.C. 166 and 164. And, indeed, he makes it issue "from the Essæan wing of the Assidæans," and so makes it "the prototype of all apocalypses." From this critical, yet not extreme, standpoint he can be just to the theological import of the writing. This appears in a specially favourable light in his exposition of the Messianic bearing of such passages as chs. ii. 34, ff.; vii. 13, f.; ix. 24–27, where he tries to avoid as far as possible the superficiality of a purely historical line of interpretation.

3. That even outside Germany the theory of a Maccabæan date and origin of Daniel's prophecies is gaining ground, may be seen from the translation and exposition just published by the Upsala theological teacher, Erik Stave (Upsala, 1894). As well in his introductory explanations respecting the origin of the book as in his exposition, we see that the author takes his position within the modern critical tradition. Both the historical and the prophetic contents he is only able to understand from the circumstances created by the development of Israel during the Maccabæan age. In his inferences on this matter he goes beyond Behrmann. Whereas the latter rejects offhand such arguments for a post-Exilic date of Daniel as the *argumentum e silentio* taken from the Siracid *Hymn of the Fathers*, Stave uses it without scruple. His strictly historical method in expounding the proper prophetic section of the book is essentially that of the modern critical school. At the same time, he discusses carefully the grammatical and lexical problems presented by the book, and shows himself anxious to serve students of theology as a scientific guide to the understanding of the Hebrew and Aramaic parts of the book. His reading in modern scientific expository literature, especially the German, is remarkable in extent, reaching down to the latest days. He is acquainted even with Kamphausen's lecture just mentioned.

The three works are one in rejecting the intermediate theory, which assigns the book as a whole to the Exilic age, while excluding some things from the text, especially ch. xi., as an interpolation. This theory, which I held in my exposition in Lange's *Commentary*, is still held by some, as by M. S. Terry (*Prophecies of Daniel Expounded*, New York, 1893). This work, which holds the historical character of chs. i.–vi. and the Exilic age of the prophet, supposes the addition of interpolations in different passages of the text, and alludes to my hypothesis as to the eleventh chapter.

CURRENT FRENCH THOUGHT.

THE SOCIALISM OF LUTHER. By F. KUHN (*La Revue Chrétienne*).—It is the custom in the present day to trace back the origin of contemporary socialism to Luther. And assuredly Luther was a socialist, if by the word is meant one who has an unbounded

love of liberty of all kinds, a hatred of oppression and tyranny; one who preserves a fearless dignity in the presence of the rich and powerful of the world; who despises riches, ardently desires reforms, sympathizes with poverty, seeks in every possible way to lessen its might; and who, above all, seeks with his whole heart to hasten the coming of the kingdom of God, in which righteousness and goodness will flourish. But if by "socialism" is meant a collection of communistic doctrines and theories, such as were known in the Middle Ages and in the worst days of the Reformation, such as reappear in our own day, founded upon the chimera of communism, and using the revolutionary spirit as its tool, Luther, far from having been its promoter, or even its advocate, showed himself its most determined and constant opponent.

In his little book entitled *Christian Liberty*, he says, "The Christian is a free man, conqueror over life and death. He is an obedient servant—the servant of all. The end of life is to serve our neighbour, to bear each other's burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ. Our neighbour suffers in his poverty, and claims our riches, just as we claim God's pity in our need. The life of a Christian thus understood is stronger than sin, death, and hell. Let us take upon ourselves the sufferings of our neighbour, share his troubles and his bondage. Such is Christian charity, such is the Christian rule of life." And Luther took this rule literally in its absolute reality; he believed that this life is nothing but a continuation of the sacrifice of our Lord Jesus Christ, and it was through this sacrifice that he expected the renovation of society, and the coming of the kingdom of God among men. His friends and his disciples shared his hopes. "O Lord," wrote Albert Dürer, "grant that that new Jerusalem promised to us in the Apocalypse may soon descend to earth! give us Thy pure, holy gospel, undimmed by the teaching of men!"

In his *Letter to the German Nobility* he discusses such social questions as are connected with luxury, the tyranny of capital, the State's influence in checking immorality and drunkenness—the same questions which perplex modern society, in spite of the progress of three centuries and the great advances made by science.

During Luther's imprisonment in the Wartburg, men with motives less pure than his own took up the idea of social reformation, and proceeded to act upon it. Horrified at the danger of a revolution, he wrote, immediately upon his release, a small book entitled, *A Faithful Appeal to all Christians to guard against Rebellion and Sedition.* In it he speaks of the double danger which threatens Christendom; on the one hand, the blind resistance of the clergy to all attempts at reform; on the other, the increasing hatred of the people, and the imminent danger of a revolution. Against this new antichrist he declares relentless war. As to the authority of the State, his teaching is explicit. Its authority is to be over actions, not over thought. "Who can force men to believe? Such authority only encourages hypocrisy and falsehood. Let princes, therefore, remain within the limits of their duties, and not overstep them. Alas! how rare are such princes! of what injustice and iniquity the most of them are guilty!"

From such words his enemies argued that he had encouraged rebellion. He, on the contrary, boasted that no one since the apostles had spoken of civil authority as he had done. But his words were too wise and noble to be understood by those who were too oppressed and bowed down by tyranny to form true ideas of liberty. To them the words of fanatics like Carlstadt and Münzer appealed, with their promises of immediate overthrow of tyranny and of a social millennium. And so followed the Peasants' War.

The peasants appealed to Luther, Melanchthon, and to all those Reformers who, by bringing the gospel to men, inaugurated Christian liberty. "Is it not impious,"

they said, "to keep in slavery those for whose liberty Jesus Christ has died? Our tyrants fight against the gospel of Christ; they do not want the salvation of the poor." In his reply to their manifesto, Luther addresses both the nobles and the peasants. The former he upbraided as having provoked the insurrection by their pride, luxury, and oppression; and the latter he entreated to show the spirit of meekness and submission which distinguishes the true followers of Christ, such as they claimed to be. He also strongly advised both parties to come to an agreement by arbitration. His words could scarcely be expected to convince either peasants or nobles, but they for ever remain as the sacred formula of Christian socialism.

The frightful atrocities perpetrated by the peasants in this disastrous war caused Luther to assume a very different tone towards those with whose grievances he had at first sympathized. Their rebellion became hateful to him, and he spoke of it as a work of the devil, which must be overthrown and punished. He spoke of them as mad dogs, which it was right to slay. "The time of mercy is past," he exclaimed; "it is the time of the sword and of wrath. Every peasant who dies in this war loses his soul." His words were both cruel and useless; they alienated from him popular sympathy, while they did not gain over to his side the party that was hostile to the Reformation. His first exhortations were forgotten, and the violence of his language was used to justify the horrors which accompanied the suppression of the revolt. From that very time the Reformation entered upon a new path. The days of its youth were past; it ceased to be a powerful but dangerous ferment among the masses of society, and became a conservative influence. Among princes, who were guardians of public peace and stability, were to be found its most effective patrons.

The two great thoughts which inspired Luther's life were—"The Christian is a free man," and "The Christian is the servant of all." The former of these has become the patrimony of Protestantism; but the latter has not as yet gained possession of the minds of men. Yet who can doubt that if the idea of self-sacrifice, which is the cardinal doctrine of Christianity, be ignored, social science is doomed to failure, and all our greatest efforts will be fruitless in results?

LAMENNAIS. By G. CHASTAND (*La Revue Chrétienne*).—Two lives of Lamennais have recently appeared—the one by M. Roussel, and the other by M. Spuller—which are specially interesting from their bearing upon many questions discussed in the present day.

M. Roussel clearly shows that it was only through strong pressure on the part of his friends that Lamennais was induced to enter the Church. He, on his part, had no liking for chains, even if they were chains of love, and had a positive aversion to irrevocable vows; but they were anxious that his gifts should be used to defend the rights and avenge the honour of the Church. "After having studied the history of Lamennais," he says, "we come to the conclusion that if he had remained a layman he would have avoided most of the misunderstandings and persecutions to which his position as a priest exposed him. His melancholy would not have degenerated into incurable hypochondria, and his career from first to last would have been passed within the bounds of the Catholic Church. Lamennais is one of the most notable and lamentable victims of the good intentions of the world." Once that his path had been marked out for him by others, he walked in it as if he had chosen it himself, concealing an incurable sadness, which for ever remained in the depths of his heart, under an exuberant gaiety.

Lamennais was a pessimist by nature, and the mortifications which he experienced only rendered his melancholy temperament more sombre and gloomy. He foresaw

social overthrow, and thought that all efforts to stave it off would be in vain. The contradictions of the Pope, who approved highly of his *Essay on Indifference*, and shortly afterwards condemned it with excessive severity, wounded his upright soul, and detached him from the Church. Gregory XVI. condemned even the *Words of a Believer* in an encyclical containing, amongst others, this extraordinary statement: "The propositions of this book lead to anarchy, and are contrary to the Word of God; they are impious, scandalous, and erroneous, and have already been branded by the Church, in the case of the Vaudois, the Wickliffites, the Hussites, and other heretics of that type." It is, indeed, difficult to understand the fears of the Pope, as we now read the book, and find its apocalyptic language and declamatory rhetoric incapable of stirring within us any strong emotions.

How can we wonder that Lamennais left the Church which proclaimed him to be a disobedient son and an unworthy priest? In separating himself from a clergy which disavowed and condemned the ideas of which they were to become one day the zealous propagators, Lamennais devoted himself to the service of the people, and spent upon the poor and the humble all the love with which his heart overflowed, and which he could no longer consecrate to the service of the Church. He renounced Roman Catholicism in order to remain a Christian.

Strange to say, the successor of Gregory XVI. now instils those doctrines which that Pope had so fiercely condemned. Leo XIII. is forced to recognize in Lamennais a master and a forerunner. As M. Spuller says, "He was, whether we like it or not, the first initiator of that curious and significant movement which in our day seems to incline the Roman Church itself to the side of modern democracy." This change in papal policy is an unconscious and tardy justification of the position Lamennais took up. If Roman Catholic socialism continues to make progress, the Pope will be obliged to do for him what he has done for Joan of Arc, and to recognize as his true son the man whom he had publicly repudiated. The triumph of Roman Catholic socialism will be the signal for the apotheosis of Lamennais.

An extract from one of his letters reads like a passage from a modern Roman Catholic Review, and, while it reveals his tolerance and religious breadth, condemns his judges. "The *Imitatio*, like the Christianity of the Middle Ages, of which it is the most perfect expression, concerns itself only with the individual, and not with society; it tends to separate men from men by a kind of spiritual selfishness, which causes each to attend only to what he calls his salvation, and removes him as far as possible from active life. The gospel, on the contrary, impels to action, and to all that brings men together, and inclines them to join in common effort for the transformation of society, or, in gospel language, for the establishment of the kingdom of God. There is a world of difference between these two tendencies and spirits. Further, Jesus Christ, as I am most firmly convinced, did not bind the law which He announced to any dogmatic conception, and even expressly wished that it should not be so bound. It is not what men *think* that saves or destroys their souls; it is what they *do*."

CURRENT SCANDINAVIAN THOUGHT.

A Sign of the Time: Friedrich Nietzsche. By Aasta Hanstein (Norwegian *Nyt Tidsskrift*, 8de Hefte, 1894).—We stand at the end of a century—at the close of an historical period. We stand at an epoch in the world's history. Humanity is in a sickly condition: now it is feverishly excited; again it is downcast, relaxed, and

dispirited. This holds good of the more civilized nations. There is something that is dying; there is something that is dead long ago. We are sailing with a corpse in the cargo, as our most profound and sharp-sighted poet has already expressed it. That there is something which is being born; that there is something which has already been born,—this is also plain. The precursors of what is to come have long since announced this. But the warnings from the future, and the war-cry of its children, are received with dejection of spirits, and with deep mistrust by the men of the old *régime*. Every new thing that announces itself is to them merely a harassing unpleasantness. The confusion is boundless by reason of the want of judgment, and blindness of the reactionaries, and by reason of the stupid, thoughtless chatter of the indifferent. The old gods are dead, and the new ones are not yet understood.

It is good to have to do with something that has been accomplished—with a phenomenon that gives expression to our historical period. We have seen a prodigy which is like a reflection of the broken-up condition of humanity. We have seen a form which in these latter days has attracted to itself the attention of the intellectual world of Europe. It is a name that is now heard named in many quarters. The form is odd, the name is strange—it is that of Friedrich Nietzsche.

It seems as if the attention which the said personality is awakening is steadily on the increase. It is spreading from one centre of culture to another, very much as a comet moves across the vault of heaven. The significance of the phenomenon is, in fact, that the breach between democracy and aristocracy is here emphasized, is carried to its furthest consequences. Dr. Georg Brandes, the Danish critic, who has introduced this mind of high rank to the Scandinavian reading world, informs us that in the course of eighteen years Nietzsche has written a long series of books. The most of these volumes consist of stray thoughts; and the most of these thoughts turn upon moral prejudices. It is in this region that his permanent significance lies.

Nietzsche's greatest work, *Also sprach Zarathustra*, consists of four parts, written in the years 1883–85; each part in ten days, section by section, conceived during long wanderings, under a feeling of inspiration which, as it were, dictated every sentence to him—so Nietzsche himself has explained. We are thus led into other regions, beyond the domain of scientific attainment. For that reason Dr. Brandes calls it a wonderful book, a Koran, or rather an Avesta—dark and deep, high-flown and abstract, and immersed in the future.

I have said that we stand at the close of an historical period. We may call this magnate of literature of whom we are speaking, a dancing light, whose chief importance lies in this—that it points to the epoch of the world's history whose limit is fixed by our era. It is Jesus of Nazareth who is the starting-point. In Friedrich Nietzsche we have to do with a phenomenon that points back to this starting-point. The Polish-German philosopher manifests himself as a sign of completion, as a sign of the time that suggests the close of the period of two thousand years which began with the appearance of the Nazarene in the life of humanity. This period may be characterized by the words, "And the light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not."

There must be a fundamental clearing up of the conception of the word "Christianity," and a limitation of its use. It will no longer do to include Jesus of Nazareth among the accumulated mass of all that is most contrary to His spirit, but which goes under the name of Christianity. The consequence of this mixing up is that Christianity is held in small esteem in our day. The grossest materialism is therefore within its rights when it asserts that if all is Christian that goes by the name of Christianity, then it is better to keep outside of it; if all this is the highest that is attainable, then

it would be preferable to keep to the lower. One must necessarily nowadays speak straight out. It will no longer suffice to hold one's rags together and look as if everything were in perfect order. It is well that in Nietzsche we have to deal with a writer who speaks straight out, who goes to the root of the matter, and is thoroughly consistent.

If Nietzsche had set up an imperial will as life's highest expression, he would have heralded himself as the resuscitator of the lordly authority of antiquity—that authority which treads humanity under its feet, which in its wilfulness crushes everything under itself. The ancient lordly power, in conformity with the prevailing conditions of the time, enjoined the ethics of bondage. This was removed from its sway by Jesus of Nazareth. By Him the human was put in the seat of honour. Through Him righteousness and mercy became living powers in humanity. These powers have, in the course of our century, become more and more diffused and recognized in the civilized world. They have created a morality which no one ventures openly to defy. Therefore any old-world despot who wished to arise at the present day would have to declare that, upon the whole, he meant to dispense with morality. This being so, we should have to call him a Nero, because he openly set himself up as an opponent of Jesus of Nazareth. But he would have to carry on his opposition in quite another way than did the crazy old Roman emperor. He raved with external force against something which he did not understand. The fantastic Nero of the new age would have to set himself against something which lies open before the whole community, against something which even the simple and the unlettered have comprehended. The old Nero of Rome merely raved, while he set Rome in flames. It was, however, a beacon-light set on the world's highest cairn, and which cast a light over a threshold which was then for the first time overstepped. This Nero of intelligence in the new age casts, in his frenzied torch-dance, a light over the way which now leads onward to a new epoch.

This writer, whom Dr. Brandes has represented to the Scandinavian reading world as a poet, thinker, and mystic—whom Ola Hansson has portrayed for Germany in bold outline on a hazy background—has been sketched for the reading world of France with a clear, firm hand by T. de Wyzewa. It is an impressive figure that he brings before us, but it is his tragic fate that he emphasizes.

It is only accidentally that Germany is Nietzsche's birthplace. In appearance and in character he is thoroughly Slavonic. He was born without any illusions, with an irresistible tendency both to cry and to laugh over what he had destroyed. In the whole history of thought it is impossible to find a parallel to so destructive a disposition; but he is not a sceptic who refuses to take anything seriously. Rather he is an apostle who, in his thirst for truth, draws near to everything that he sees as to an altar, and thereupon turns away from it again with mockery on his lips and fear in his heart, feeling desperate that upon the altar he found nothing but the image of a false god. He studied the Greek authors. Plato and the Epicureans especially inspired him. Plato satisfied his craving for pictures and poetry; the Epicureans helped to dry up the last drop of illusion in his soul. Later he studied Schopenhauer, who strengthened him in his distrust of the world and man. After Schopenhauer, he studied French literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

At the moment when Nietzsche's so singularly developed brain began to create for itself, his body began to fail him. His nerves were irritated by the slightest movement; his eyes refused him their service. He became seized with a sort of terror that made his hair stand upon his head. So long as he had his reason, he suffered from the dread which even the most abandoned feels in presence of his dastardly nihilism. It was this fear which little by little unfitted him for all intercourse, and chased him for ten

years from land to land. Yet it was in these ten years that Nietzsche wrote all his philosophical works. One day his friends imagined that he had recovered his health. He had published a book, *Also sprach Zarathustra*, in which his thoughts were indistinct and fantastic, but also, so far as they could be understood, positive. This time, after years of violent efforts at destruction, it was an actual effort to build something up. A short time, however, revealed the nature of the change, and in a few years Nietzsche was confined in a lunatic asylum.

There is no greater contrast to be found between the ethics of the upward-soaring life and Christian conceptions of the world. How shall we explain this state of things? Was not He whom the Christian Church proclaims as her Master the Founder of that life? We may explain it in this way—that ecclesiastical teaching has transmuted the glad message of the gospel. The Church has in one respect followed the times. She has participated in the descent. She stands upon sinking ground. We hear this contemporary preacher of the aspiring life crying out, "Say, where is that righteousness which is love to be found? Find for me that love which not only bears all punishment, but also all guilt!" Strange to say, he does not receive the answer from the Church; he does not even look in that direction at all, but raises his eyes high over it to look towards the Light. He has separated from his inmost being all that has a downward tendency under a struggle that has broken down himself. It is by his tragic fate—his thorny crown—that Friedrich Nietzsche has reached the distinction of pointing backward to the starting-point of the two thousand years' epoch which is now closing. The Son of man will make His entry anew. These two thousand years have been but a period of preparatory endeavour.

SERMON THOUGHT.

THE THREEFOLD VIEW OF HUMAN LIFE.

ECCLES. ii.

THREE views of human life are given in this remarkable chapter.

I. We have THE THEATRICAL VIEW OF LIFE. The first eleven verses of the chapter state this view. The writer seeks to prove his heart with mirth and laughter; he treats his flesh with wine; he gathers peculiar treasure; he is enamoured of greatness, magnificence, and abundance; he delights in architecture, scenery, literature, music, song. Everything is spectacular, dazzling, wonderful. Now, this is a very misleading idea of the world in which we find ourselves. Solomon proved it to be so. This view of life is *partial*. Nothing whatever is said here of the problems which challenge us —of duty, enterprise, discipline, work, sacrifice, suffering; nothing about character or conduct. It really leaves out two-thirds of life, and the noblest two-thirds. This view of life is *exaggerated*. It contemplates great works, great possessions, and great fame. Life is largely made up of commonplace tasks, homely faces, uneventful days, monotonous experiences. This view of life is *selfish*. You see throughout how prominent the individual is. It is all "I." The writer never thinks of other people except as they may enhance his pleasure, or be spectators of his glory. This view of life is also *superficial*. There is not a word about conscience, righteousness, responsibility. Now I say to you, beware of the theatrical view of life—of the great, the gaudy, the glistering. True life, as a rule, is simple, sober, and severe. Beware of companions who would represent life to you in a gay and voluptuous light. Beware also of your reading, and see that it does not give a false and delusive idea of the life

that awaits you. The world is not a theatre, not a magician's cave, not a carnival; it is a temple where all things are serious and sacred.

II. We have THE SEPULCHRAL VIEW OF LIFE. The next twelve verses of the chapter are altogether pessimistic and despairing: "Therefore I hated life; because the work that is wrought under the sun is grievous unto me: for all is vanity and vexation of spirit." The fact is, men usually start with the rosy ideal of life, and then finding its falsity—that there are tears as well as laughter—they sink into vexation and despair, and paint all things black as night. Think of a young man educated with Despair for a schoolmaster! Why, the grandest thing that youth brings into the world is hope. The sanguine youth is far more to the community than the philosopher's logic, the millionaire's gold, the statesman's diplomacy. Yes, the education that would repress hope would be a disaster indeed; it would kill civilization in the eye. Thank God for all the bright dreams of a young heart. But the world is not emptiness; it is a cup deep and large, delightful and overflowing. Fulness, not emptiness, is the sign of the world. There is the fulness of nature. There is the fulness of intellectual life. There is the fulness of society. There is the fulness of practical life—the manifold and enduring unfolding of the interests and movements and fortunes of humanity. There is the fulness of religious life. A true man never feels the world to be limited, meagre, shallow. God is no mockery, and He will not mock us.

III. We have THE RELIGIOUS VIEW OF LIFE. The three concluding verses of the chapter give life the religious interpretation. For "God giveth to a man that is good in His sight wisdom, and knowledge, and joy." How different are the Beatitudes from the sad and sensual philosophy of Ecclesiastes! Here, then, is the teaching of Christ: we must be right ourselves, right within, loving God sincerely, and living with a clean heart and a contrite spirit. The secret is inward light, strength, purity, hope, and these gracious gifts are ours in Christ. 1. The purification and strengthening of the soul will secure to us all the brightness and sweetness of life. 2. And as the Spirit of Christ leads to the realization of the bright side of the world, so shall it fortify you against the dark side. Carry the Spirit of Christ into this dark side, and you shall rejoice in tribulation also. In one of the illustrated magazines I noticed a picture of the flower-market of Madrid in a snowstorm. The golden and purple glories were mixed with the winter's snow. And in a true Christian life sorrow is strangely mingled with joy. Winter in Siberia is one thing, winter in the flower-market of the South is another thing; and so the power of sorrow is broken and softened in the Christian life by great convictions, consolations, and hopes.

Do not accept the theatrical view of life; life is not all beer and skittles, operas, banquets, galas, and burlesques. Do not accept the sepulchral theory of life; it is absolutely false. Tocqueville said to Sumner, "Life is neither a pain nor a pleasure, but serious business, which it is our duty to carry through and conclude with honour." This is a true and noble conception of life, and it can be fulfilled only as Christ renews and strengthens us.—REV. W. L. WATKINSON, in the *Wesleyan Magazine.*

"*WHAT THINK YE OF CHRIST?*"

MATT. xxii. 42.

THE main features of Christ's character are familiar, but never can be repeated too often. Take His unsullied and perfect innocence. Never was a life so open, and never one less liable to reproach.

But innocence is a negative quality. Take His uniformly high moral elevation:

it is not merely lofty; it is uniformly lofty, extending along the whole course of His life on earth, and to every particular. There is no defect of quality in Him; He is glorious all round and all through. Take the wonderful combination of qualities which appeared in the Christ of God. Most of the distinguished class are great only in one or in a few respects, and those frequently bordering on weakness. His gentleness never ran into weakness, His tenderness never lost sight of holiness, His patience ever had a dignity about it, and sympathy with the sinner never betrayed Him into sympathy with sin. He was great in all particulars, deficient in none. Take His passive as well as His active qualities. His whole life was spent in doing good. He was Man, and He was God. The former was never disputed, except by a small transient sect; the latter was claimed by His frequent assertions, and demonstrated by His uniform and miraculous activity.

But now consider this wonderful Person's remarkable teaching: first as to its subject-matter, and then as to its manner or method. With respect to the first, how can we sufficiently indicate any of the great truths He came to enounce and enforce! He did not undertake to prove the being of a God—that was unnecessary; but He taught that God was One, and not many; that He was a Spirit, and not matter to be likened to gold; that He was a Person, not a blind energy, force, principle, or any such thing. The universal Fatherhood of God was preached by Jesus. So, too, were the individuality and brotherhood of man. Christ came in a materialistic age, when man was universally regarded, except he belonged to your little coterie, as cheap—a chattel, a beast of burden, a thing. The legislator recognized brotherhood amongst citizens only. Philosophers acknowledged only the cultured and enlightened. But Jesus taught that the pariah and the priest, the plebeian and patrician, the Jew and the Samaritan, were equally worthy or unworthy.

Further, no one can be in the least familiar with His teaching without having noticed such phrases as "the kingdom of God," "the kingdom of heaven" and "of righteousness," His Father's kingdom, and also His own. He says He is a King, and came to found a kingdom. What does He mean? Evidently a different thing from that of natural laws and forces, by which we all are darkly bound. It is the reign of God within; the reign of truth, and righteousness, and peace, and purity in every soul of man; the universal reception amongst men of that which is godly and Divine; the highest possible development of moral, intellectual, social, individual, universal good in the deliverance of man from sin and error. Other kingdoms depended on force, or power of inflicting evil and causing pain; this on the power of doing good, and achieved by love! Never were such ideas proclaimed before. The greatest philosophers of heathen Greece and Rome laughed at the idea of a religion embracing the stranger and the slave; and Jewish rabbis were nearly as bad. But this was the Galilæan Prophet's notion of the absolute and final religion.

Now look at His manner of teaching. This, like the matter of the Saviour's instruction, was thoroughly original. Some dispute this feature of His teaching because some of the Saviour's teaching is found germinant elsewhere. Hence the inartificiality of the Saviour's speech. There is no elaboration about His speeches; sometimes there is an orderly succession of thoughts built into a harmonious whole, as in the Sermon on the Mount; but mostly there is, as in Nature, a beautiful carelessness, like the creepers and the forest trees, the wild flowers and the mosses. No master in Israel ever owed less to phraseology: He was always simple, always familiar. The diamond lost none of its brilliance from its setting. There was always a quiet majesty about both His Person and His speech, yet such a tenderness of grace that the common people heard Him gladly. And oh, the tenderness with which He

spoke! The great lights of the world are often brilliant, but cold; if ever they speak to the people, they let you know they speak down; often they hate the profane vulgar, and drive them from them. Jesus never did that. But, after all, the work which Christ came from heaven to earth to accomplish remains to be discussed. The special work which He came to do was not to teach even the most important truths, or to teach them in the original simple, authoritative, winning, effective way He did; He came to die. All men knew that they must die; but He came for the very purpose—He, the Lord of life and glory, the Son of the Everlasting Father. To me, and I know to you, it is important that the Saviour's death should be substitutionary. I may not be able to explain it: who can?

Here then, sinner, is your warrant of salvation. "What think ye of Christ?" He is the only medium of pardon. "What think ye of Christ?" He is the Son of the Everlasting Father. What attribute of the Father did He not lay claim to and demonstrate? Hardly a miracle in which you do not find the union of the Divine and the human! What think *you* of Christ—the Christ? Is He not plainly the only Saviour, the world's greatest Teacher, and the world's destined universal King?—Rev. G. Short, B.A., in the *Quiver*.

GUIDANCE IN THE WAY.

"I being in the way, the Lord led me."—Gen. xxiv. 27.

So said Abraham's anonymous servant, when telling how he had found Rebecca at the well, and known her to be the destined bride of his master's son.

I. The first thing that these words seem to me to suggest is THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH WE MAY BE SURE THAT GOD LEADS. "I being in the way." The literal rendering is, "I in the way, Jehovah led me." No doubt the Hebrew idiom admits of the "I" being thus emphatically premised, and then repeated as "me" after the verb, and possibly no more is to be made of the words than that. But the fuller and more impressive meaning is possible, and I venture to retain it. So that suggests, first, how the people that have any right to expect any kind of guidance from God are those who have their feet upon a path which conscience approves. Many men run into all manner of perplexities by their own folly and self-will, and never ask whether their acts are right or wrong, wise or foolish, until they begin to taste the bitter consequences. Then they cry to God to help them, and think themselves very religious because they do! That is *not* the way to get God's help. But when we are "in the way," and know that we are doing what we ought to do, and conscience says, "Go on; never mind what stands against you," it is then, and only then, that we have a right to be sure that the Lord will lead us. Otherwise, the best thing that can happen to us is that the Lord should thwart us when we are on the wrong road. Resistance, indeed, may be guidance. We have no *claim* on Him for guidance, indeed, unless we have submitted ourselves to His commandments; yet His mercies go beyond our *claims*. Just as the obedient child gets guidance, so the petulant and disobedient child gets resistance, which is guidance too. Another consideration suggested by these words, "I being in the way," is that if we expect guidance we must diligently do present duty. We are led, thank God, by one step at a time. "Do the duty that lies nearest thee," and the remoter duty will become clearer. There is nothing that has more power to make a man's path plain before his feet than that he should concentrate his better self on the manful and complete discharge of the present moment's service. And, on the other hand, there is nothing that will so fill our sky with mists,

and blur the marks of the faint track through the moor, as present negligence, and still more present sin. But there is another lesson still in the words; and that is that, if we are to be guided, we must see to it that we expect and obey the guidance. This servant of Abraham's, with a very imperfect knowledge of the Divine will, had, when he set out on his road, prayed very earnestly that God would lead him. He had ventured to prescribe a certain token, *naïve* in its simplicity: "If the girl drops her pitcher, and gives us drink gladly, and does not grudge to fill the troughs for the cattle, that will show that she is of a good sort, and will make the right wife for Isaac." He had prayed thus, and he was ready to accept whomsoever God so designated. Now, there is a picture for us all. There are many people that say, "O Lord, guide me," when all the while they mean, "Let me guide Thee." They are perfectly willing to accept the faintest and most questionable indications that may seem to point down the road where their inclination drives them, and, like Lord Nelson at Copenhagen, will put the telescope to the blind eye, when the flag is flying at the admiral's peak signalling, "Come out of action," because they are determined to stay where they are. Do not let us forget that the first condition of securing real guidance in our daily life is to ask it, and that the next is to look for it, and that a third is to be quite willing to accept it. Only, let us be patient. We must wait till we are sure of God's will before we try to do it. If we are not sure of what He would have us do, then, for the present, He would have us do nothing until He speaks. "I being in the way, the Lord led me."

II. Now a word about THE MANNER OF THE GUIDANCE. There was no miracle, no supernatural voice, no pillar of cloud or fire, no hovering glory round the head of the village maiden. All the indications were perfectly natural and trivial. A thousand girls had gone to the wells that day all about Haran and done the very same thing that Rebecca did. But the devout man who had prayed for guidance, and was sure that he was getting it, was guided by her most simple, commonplace act. And that is how we are usually to be guided. God leaves a great deal to our common sense. His way of speaking to common sense is by very common things. So remember, God's guidance may come to you through so insignificant a girl as Rebecca. It may come to you through as commonplace an incident as tipping the water of a spring out of an earthen pot into a stone trough. None the less is it God's guidance; and what we want is the eye to see it.

III. And now, the last thing that I would say a word about is THE REALIZATION IN DAILY LIFE OF THIS GUIDANCE AS A PLAIN ACTUAL FACT. A realization of the Divine guidance is the talisman that makes crooked things straight and rough places plain; that brings peace and calmness into our hearts, amid all changes, losses, and sorrows.—REV. A. MACLAREN, D.D., in the *Freeman.*

LIFE IN VIEW OF DEATH.

"And God said unto him, Thou fool, this night thy soul shall be required of thee: then whose shall those things be, which thou hast provided?"—LUKE xii. 20.

WE are all familiar with the man who has a grievance, who thinks himself an injured person. We know the man with a religious grievance, with a political grievance, with a personal grievance, who expects that the great stream of the world's activity is to be diverted to turn his mill-wheel, or fill his cistern. It was a man like this who burst in upon the discourse of our blessed Lord—a discourse, too, primarily intended for the disciples. The rebuke is stern, the refusal to interfere is absolute: "Man, who made Me a judge or a divider over you?"

I. And Advent, as it comes round once more with its warning voice, is a wholesome recall to first principles. Hotly concerned as we are with different aspects of life, with its burning questions and its cruel wrongs, confident that we could put it all right, eager to take Christ with us, with all His authority, to force our brother to divide the inheritance, to equalize rights, to crush oppression, and turn Herod from his palace—is a Utopia of which most of us have dreamed at some time or another. But we hardly expected to hear this stern voice breaking in so rudely on the plans which we so cherished: "Thou fool, this night thy soul shall be required of thee." Any scheme for life must be seriously and fundamentally affected by the great fact of death. And it is this which Advent puts so clearly before us. Like a candid friend, in the midst of our eagerness and enthusiasm and exuberant life, when our plans are made and our schemes are ready, Advent brings forward a subject which we should all like to forget, or at least ignore. Remember you are but a tenant, and that for a short time, in a world which does not belong to you. Are we not in danger of forgetting two things? First, that this is a passing world, with no sort of stability in it, strewed with failures, littered with ruins, scattered with layers of schemes never realized, and paved with intentions never carried out. And, further, that this is a fallen world—a world on which is branded the mark of failure. Christ has laboured to tell us that this is a passing world; neither can we stay in it for long, nor will it last for ever. And, further, that it is an unhealthy world, injurious to a man's true life, in which he can live only on certain principles, and by carrying out certain precepts of action. Progress is only possible when we have reckoned with sin. This will rise up and spoil our best efforts like an intermittent fever if we forget it. Life is only possible if we arrange it in view of death, as those who must shortly pass on.

II. Now, we should make a great mistake if we supposed that the Advent call meant this: this world is so bad that it is not worth thinking about. It is so full of sin, injustice, and inequality, that a wise man will think as little of it as possible, and prepare for another and a better; not this. Neither is death brandished before us as a yearly scare, to frighten us from sin, or drive us into prayer. Death is rather put before us as a measure or a standard of life; it is an arch under which we must all pass, opening out into a region which represents, certainly, the greater portion of our life, a period to which the few years spent here can bear no comparison. And, therefore, the rich man was a fool, because he was heaping up riches which he could not carry away, and rooting himself down on a spot from which he must be violently torn, and accumulating wealth which had no currency in the other world. 1. For notice, first of all, that the rich man in the parable was, so to speak, earth-bound. The world to him had been merely a pander to appetite. The more it yielded, the faster he clung to its treasures. He was surrounded by things of earth; he planned for things of earth; he had no other outlook, no other future. "I will pull down my barns, and build greater." The great archway of death was looming black before him, but his eyes were bent on the ground, and he saw it not. It is only too easy to get earth-bound, and that before we are aware of it. The perfect Man passed through life without a fixed home in His work, with possessions so few that they were raffled for beneath the cross. Are we becoming earth-bound? Are we pulling down the tents of the pilgrim, who is here to-day and gone to-morrow, and building in their places solid houses, as men who are meaning to stop? Are we going to the doctor and saying, "Keep me alive as long as you can, and keep death and disease out of my path; I would rather not think about them"? Are we going to the different pleasure-vendors of life, and saying, "Amuse me; I want to forget the serious things

of destiny, and be happy"? Are we entering into jealous competition for the luxuries, prizes, enjoyments, of life? "Thou fool!" It is the voice of God, as the edifice of life crumbles around us. These things were not life; these things were not even enjoyable. What part of it all are you going to take away? "A man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth." A rich man, after all, is in the constant presence of a temptation which may ruin him. 2. But the rich man in the parable, besides being earth-bound, was a damaged, a maimed man. Fixing his aim on material well-being, he had lost peace, and lost satisfaction. "Money is not required to buy one necessity of the soul." He had lost the joy out of life. "I don't so much wonder at what people suffer, I often wonder at what they lose." The terrible consciousness will dawn on such a man at the last, that his whole life has been one vast mistake. What a shameful mortification, what a paralyzing despair, to find that all life has been spent on building barns, ever fuller, ever greater, and the end a blank, with nothing that can pass under the dark arch of death! Life one long failure, because we refused to face death. Death may veil its skeleton form and become a friend to us, if it reminds us of the truer joys which lie all around us, which will last beyond the grave. We ourselves may create the world in which we live. It is a richer world than we think; it contains something more than barns and money. We may read the lives of those who abjured its obvious enjoyments and its material pleasures to embrace poverty, to give themselves up to religion, or research, or philanthropy; and we may have thought them mad. Would that we realized more of the spiritual wealth there is around us, whose possession more than satisfied the saints of whom we read, and which lasts beyond the grave! 3. But the rich man in the parable was worse than maimed; he was dead—dead while he lived. "To be carnally minded is death." The outward prosperity of life had killed down the inner, truer self, until there was no connexion with God and the other world; and at last "they," those dread unnamed ones, demand his soul, which has slipped out of control. It is a startling thing when we first begin to recognize the working within ourselves of the motions of death, which, unless they are resisted, tend to become fatal. The most common development of this is when we first begin to act against our conscience, when the prospect of immediate advancement or present gain prompts us to do the dishonourable or shameful action. Or we are familiar, it may be, with another form of death—where we lose control over ourselves; where, having acted in defiance of a better self, and forced the will to follow, it is no longer able to command. It is bent and made unreliable for future action. The world has become too much for such; the will is paralyzed, and can, at the best, only look with a faint disapproval at the full barns and neglected duties as it looks down from the balcony of life, like the fatuous king on the revolutionary mob in Paris. It is a presage of death, too, when life becomes contracted, and when the voice of God dies out of the Bible, when we cease to hear the going of the Spirit in its pages. Advent, then, is just one of those merciful opportunities to help us to lift up our heads and study realities.—CANON NEWBOLT, in the *Church Times.*

THE FRONTIER OF THE PROMISED LAND.

DEUT. xxxiv. 4.

OF all stirring scenes, is there one more pathetic than that which represents Moses, after his years of toil, struggle, and suffering, after so many deeds of courage, perseverance, and faith, standing upon Mount Nebo, whence he beholds the Promised

Land, and hearing the Divine voice pronounce the sentence, "Thou shalt not go over thither"? Each of us is a Moses, not as regards mission, glory, or virtue, but as regards this last feature of his career. We are all standing on the frontier of a promised land which we shall not enter.

I. Yes; we are on the frontier, on the threshold, at the very door of a land of promise, and we shall die before entering it. REASON is made for truth, and seeks it; but who is there that knows all he would know? *Ignorance* has reached this point: in its instinctive regrets it stands still, gazing mournfully upon mysteries which it cannot penetrate, upon depths of knowledge of which it has an instinctive perception, but which it cannot fathom. *Science* has reached this point: all science ends in a final effort which it fails to accomplish, in a final secret which it is inefficient to discover, in a final word which it is unable to utter. *Unbelief* has reached this point. Remember the sceptical astronomer who endeavoured daily to explain the first movement of the planets without admitting that they had been set in motion by a Divine hand, and who dismissed his pupils day after day, bidding them "come again to-morrow"! *Faith*, too, has reached this point. Faith which knows that it cannot be changed into sight, and that "*no man hath seen God*," that "none knoweth the Father but the Son," that "great is the mystery of godliness," that even the angels tremble as they look into it. Yes; reason and faith behold a promised land stretching out before their eyes, but ever do they hear the stern and mighty voice saying, "Thou shalt not go over thither."

II. AND WHAT OF HAPPINESS? Is it not true that we are always on its limits? The desire for happiness is natural; more than this, it is lawful, it is religious. Every individual entertains it, notwithstanding his experience of life. We see it sometimes near, oftener at a distance; but this world is so fashioned that we are unable to cross the border and enter it.

III. WITHOUT PEACE THERE CAN BE NO TRUE HAPPINESS. Who is there that has not dreamed of a life of peace, harmony, and love? But no; the machinery of life seizes upon us; competition lays a barrier across our path; we have rights which we must defend, for the sake of those we love, if not for our own; we must adopt as ours the maxim of the Apostle Paul: "If it be possible, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men." In the very domain of religion, we are called to defend our faith, to stand out against the calumnies of intolerance; we would gladly pray and communicate with all, but we are repulsed; we long for an asylum of peace and rest, and the terrible voice is heard, "Thou shalt not enter into it!"

IV. THIS STATE OF THINGS INFLUENCES THE WHOLE OF OUR EXISTENCE, the progress of our soul, the entire labour of our life. Where is the man who brings all his enterprises to a successful issue, or realizes all his plans? Where is the man who attains a perfect equilibrium in his desires, faculties, sentiments, and duties? Where is the man who, in a moral and Christian sense, realizes his ideal? How many unfinished tasks! The world is full of them. Death comes and prevents their completion. When we examine ourselves, how far we are from sanctification! Alas! the perfect fulfilment of the plans of life, and of the progress of the soul, is a promised land, concerning which each of us is told, "Thou shalt not go over thither!" Who is he that, of all the human race, alone has entered his promised land? Who? Jesus. How? He has fulfilled His task; He has been able to exclaim, "All is accomplished," and as a consequence, to add, "I ascend unto My Father, and your Father; unto My God, and your God." For us, as for Him, there are two promised lands—the earthly, which no man can ever enter, even though its frontier may be reached; the heavenly, which the Christian is sure to attain. In Jesus Christ we are

enabled to march towards the goal, to increase in knowledge and faith, in happiness and peace, to achieve greater works, and to progress on our way until the last stage of the journey be reached—eternity !—A. COQUEREL.

SUNDAY IN CHURCH.

BY REV. W. H. HUTCHINGS, M.A.

FESTIVAL OF THE EPIPHANY.—EVENING SECOND LESSON.

"This beginning of miracles did Jesus in Cana of Galilee, and manifested forth His glory; and His disciples believed on Him."—JOHN ii. 11.

1. To-day is the Festival of the Epiphany. The Western Church especially commemorates "the Manifestation of Christ to the Gentiles." But St. Jerome calls it "a Day of Manifestations;" and the plural number is rightly used, for whilst the manifestation to the Magi "by the leading of a star" has priority, other Epiphanies form an integral part of to-day's teaching.

2. The Epiphany was called the Theophany, because upon this Festival the unveiling of God to man is celebrated. The hidden Deity of Christ is made known in various ways, and on various occasions. St. Augustine enumerates four. Whilst with regard to the particular incident of the visit of the Wise Men, we rejoice that Christ reveals Himself to Jew and Gentile alike; so we contemplate the Manifestations of His Divinity as so many evidences of the central truth of Christianity: "The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us" (John i. 14).

3. The Manifestation, the account of which forms the Second Lesson to-night, was wrought in the house at Cana, and so it has been called "Bethphania," when Christ turned water into wine. Let us look at the order of these Manifestations; and then at the result of the miracle.

I. THE ORDER OF THESE MANIFESTATIONS. 1. Take three. Christ was manifested by a star to the Gentiles. He was manifested from without, and by a beautiful object. God reveals Himself through Nature to all men. "The invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made, even His eternal power and Godhead" (Rom. i. 20). The visible universe is a testimony to the Being and power of God, whilst its beauty tells of His goodness. It was a star which God selected for the guide of the Magi, for "the heavens declare the glory of God," etc. (Ps. xix. 1). But further, Christ was manifested in the temple to the doctors by His words. They were "astonished at His understanding and answers" (Luke ii. 47). The revelation through Nature is not enough; there is the need of the higher revelation of His Holy Word. God unveils truths to man, which the human mind, without a special revelation, could not attain to; and many of which, when revealed, remain mysteries, and excite wonder in the finite understanding of man. But higher still is the revelation in Cana; it is the revelation of Divine glory —God "manifest in the flesh" (1 Tim. iii. 16). In the act of power Christ makes Himself known as "the Brightness of the Father's glory, and the express Image of His Person" (Heb. i. 3). This is the climax; the revelation through Nature, the revelation through the Scriptures, culminate in the Self-revelation of the God-Man. 2. Similarly, we may trace in successive mysteries different aspects of Christ's life and work. Thus, to go back a little further, Christ was made known to the shepherds as the "Saviour" (Luke ii. 11). This must ever be His primary work in

a fallen world. Then to the Magi He was the "King" (Matt. ii. 6). Obedience must follow pardon. In the temple He is the Teacher. Light must be given to the understanding if we are to progress in what is aptly called "the illuminative way"—the way of righteousness. Then in this Lesson Christ stands before us as the Transformer. He turns the water into wine. Christ came not merely to save mankind, but also to transform mankind, to infuse new qualities into our nature, to give strength and joy and brightness, to enable man to overcome sin and to follow Him, so that he may be "changed into the same image from glory to glory" (2 Cor. iii. 18). The miracle is a symbol of moral and spiritual transformation, which is the final work of Christ in humanity.

II. THE RESULT OF THE MIRACLE. 1. "His disciples believed on Him." This, at first sight, sounds remarkable. Surely, it will be said, they were His disciples already. He had called them, and they had followed Him, and one had made the profession of faith, "Rabbi, Thou art the Son of God!" But, upon deeper thought, the words remind us of an important truth. There are degrees of faith. At a later time the Apostles prayed, "Lord, increase our faith!" People draw a sharp line between those who believe in the Incarnation, and those who disbelieve that truth; but they are not so ready to admit that faith in a mystery is a *growth* in the soul; that with faith it is as with other graces—"first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear" (Mark iv. 28). 2. The occasion of this increase of faith was Christ's first miracle, or, as St. John calls it, "sign." Through that miracle the disciples were led to see that Christ in some way could control Nature, and the miracle was therefore a sign or intimation of His Divine Personality. The disciples gained thereby a deeper insight into the mystery of the Incarnation. There was One present at the marriage feast who was above Nature. God, every year, as St. Augustine remarks, turns water into wine through the vine trees; but there was no vine tree here. The "True Vine" alone was present, and made the material world the instrument of His manifestation for the moral purpose of deepening the faith of His disciples.

III. LESSONS. 1. We see that the knowledge of Christ must be gained step by step. We must "follow on to know the Lord" (Hos. vi. 3). The Epiphany of Divine truth is gradual, and shineth more and more unto the perfect day. 2. Faith must lead to *realization*. Faith may be traditional. We must seek in Epiphany for a more vigorous grasp of the doctrine of the Incarnation. It is evident, from what is written and said, that many do not realize that Christ is "God the Son," and not a human person. This is the season for inquiring into our convictions as to the "place of Christ in the scale of being." 3. Further, let us see whether we have relations with Him as Saviour, Ruler, Teacher, Transformer. 4. Remember the change which He works. He does not work *without us*. We have to "fill the waterpots with water." We have to contribute to the miracle of transformation, and without our response to His bidding, His mighty power cannot be exerted for our benefit (Mark vi. 5, 6).

FIRST SUNDAY AFTER EPIPHANY.—EVENING FIRST LESSON.

"He is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so He openeth not His mouth."—ISA. liii. 7.

1. St. Philip was travelling along the Gaza road, according to the angel's directions, when a man of Ethiopia was seen in a chariot, going in the same direction. As Philip drew near to the chariot, he heard the voice of the eunuch. He was reading

aloud "Esaias the Prophet," and had just come to the verse which forms our text. Being questioned as to his understanding what he read, he candidly admitted his need of guidance, which Philip at once readily supplied. The eunuch put the pertinent question, "Of whom speaketh the Prophet this?" (Acts viii. 39). And the question St. Philip answered and closed: he "began at the same Scripture, and preached unto him Jesus." There is only One in whom are fulfilled all the prophecies of this wonderful Lesson. It points to Christ, and "all its rays of light are concentrated in Him."

2. It may be noticed how animals are chosen in Holy Scripture as symbols of Divine Persons and mysteries; and Christian art has perpetuated the association. The dove has been the symbol of the Holy Ghost from earliest times. The man, the calf, the lion, and the eagle represent the four Evangelists, and are types of the Incarnation, Passion, Resurrection, and Ascension of Christ. Christ is represented by a lamb, for this was the symbol of our Lord both in the Old Testament and the New. Indeed, it was such a popular symbol in the early ages of the Church, that authority was invoked to check it as a substitute for His human body.

3. Throughout Holy Scripture, by hints and prophecies, by types and fulfilment, Christ is depicted by the lamb; as *e.g.* Gen. xxii. 8; the Paschal lamb; the daily sacrifice in the temple; St. John's exclamation, "Behold the Lamb of God!" John xix. 36; 1 Cor. v. 7; 1 Pet. i. 19; and in the visions of the Book of Revelation (v. 6, 12; vi. 1; vii. 14, etc.). The symbol has two aspects—that of the victim, and that of the example. Let us look at it in both lights.

I. The Victim. 1. The text expresses the willingness of the Sufferer. "He was ill treated whilst He bowed Himself," that is, "suffered voluntarily," as the simile of the unresisting animal explains. It is a prophecy of the self-oblation of Christ. He had power to lay down His life (John x. 18). "I lay down My life for the sheep" (John x. 15). The oblation was the result of love. He was led to the slaughter with the full knowledge of all that was before Him. This voluntariness of Christ's sufferings is a ground of merit and a secret of attractiveness. Sacrifice must be "the blood of the soul," the offered will, to have value before God; and it must be spontaneous, to touch and win the hearts of men. 2. Further, "He is brought as a lamb to the slaughter" reminds us of the greatness of Christ's sufferings. He was "obedient unto death," a sacrificial death—different from a mere martyr's death, as the words just before the text show. The Lord had laid on Him the punishment of Israel's guilt—nay, "the iniquity of us all." There can be no getting rid of "the *pœna vicaria* here" (Delitzsch). This is a great mystery. But it is not one *man* suffering for another, for "no man can deliver his brother;" but God Himself in man's nature suffering. Those who think such a mode of redemption unjust, it will be found, have not grasped the dogma of the Incarnation, or the oneness of will in the Divine Persons of the Blessed Trinity. It was an act of love. Death is the test of love, and the worst kind of death, that of the cross, the most convincing test. "He was brought as a lamb to the slaughter" is a sentence which at once would bring up before the mind of the Jew the sacrificial worship in which he had often taken part. In the language of St. Paul, Christ "became sin for us"—a Sin Offering—"who knew no sin" (2 Cor. v. 21). In the language of St. Peter, we were redeemed "with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish" (1 Pet. i. 19).

II. The Example. 1. One of the purposes for which Christ came was to be an Example. This truth is sometimes obscured by dwelling too exclusively upon the mystery of redemption; as, on the other hand, there have not been wanting those who have been too much absorbed in that view of our Lord as the True Light which

meets the cravings of the human intellect. To keep the proportion of faith is not always easy, especially as personal needs and experiences are apt to exaggerate some one aspect of a mystery. 2. Christ's life throughout has this twofold view—sacrificial and exemplary. We might have expected that the latter view would be associated chiefly with His public ministry, and the former with His Passion. But it is not so. Both culminate on the cross. "Christ *suffered* for us, leaving us an *example*" (1 Pet. ii. 21); and, as the context shows, the final sufferings are before the Apostle's gaze. A suffering world needs a suffering Example. The Passion brought out to view the virtues which man is ever requiring to exercise, and in a manner which exercises a spell upon all who look upon "that sight." Even those who are blind to the atoning efficacy of the mystery are touched by its moral loveliness. 3. "Brought as a lamb to the slaughter;" "dumb before her shearers." This is a difficult virtue which the words unveil—patience, or meekness. What we read in the prophecy we see in the Passion (Matt. xxvii. 12, 14; John xix. 9) and upon the cross: "All three hours His silence cried." "When He was reviled, He reviled not again." The lamb, innocent and silent, aptly represents the Lamb of God, meek and patient in the midst of His slaughterers.

III. Lessons. 1. Let us seek through the sufferings of Christ to realize the enormity and malice of sin. For aught we know, other ways were open to God of dealing with a fallen world, but He chose the best whereby to express His love and to impress upon man's mind the heinousness of sin. It has been said, "A God all mercy is a God unjust." Whether this be so or not, we will not inquire; but that pardon without any revelation of Divine justice and holiness might have demoralized mankind, ever ready to condone evil, we can easily believe. After all, the Atonement remains a mystery. We know not "*how* that satisfaction operated towards God," and the Church has not attempted to define this. That Christ died "for us men and for our salvation" is all that we are required to believe, and that is the kernel of the doctrine. 2. Seek to imitate the patience of Jesus—to be silent when "reviled," and to still within the movements of anger and pride. 3. To be able to do this we must meditate upon Christ's sufferings, and see in all things, as *they reach us*, the will of God, though our sufferings may arise from the faults and sins of others. We must "commit our cause to Him that judgeth righteously," accepting calmly all that we may have to bear. 4. Finally, we must pray for the help of the Holy Ghost, without which we cannot grow in patience and meekness, which are "fruits" of the Spirit (Gal. v. 22, 23).

SECOND SUNDAY AFTER EPIPHANY.—EVENING SECOND LESSON.

"Peter therefore was kept in prison: but prayer was made without ceasing of the Church unto God for him."—Acts xii. 5.

1. This evening's Second Lesson contains a detailed account of St. Peter's imprisonment and deliverance. The Acts of the Apostles tell us very little about the twelve Apostles, and in this chapter we have the last notice of St. Peter's doings and sufferings. The incident, however, is recorded at considerable length, and has evidently impressed itself upon the mind of the Church; for since the fifth century, when St. Peter ad Vincula was dedicated on the Esquiline Hill, St. Peter's deliverance from prison has been kept as a festival in the Western Church.

2. The Lesson presents us with a remarkable contrast. On the one hand, there is a description of the wonderful escape of St. Peter from the prison-house and impending death; on the other, there is an account of the terrible disease and awful end of

his persecutor;—a contrast so striking and edifying that it has been thought that St. Luke was partly thereby induced to present a full record of those events in the Book of "the Acts."

Let us consider St. Peter's imprisonment; the action of the Church; and the Apostle's deliverance.

I. St. Peter's imprisonment. 1. The cause of it. Outwardly, Herod Agrippa. After Caligula's death he received the rule over Judæa and Samaria (according to the Jewish historian), and therefore was in the position which enabled him to persecute the Christians. He killed James and put Peter into prison. It was the time of the Paschal Feast, and, without doubt, Herod had intended to strike terror into the hearts of Christ's disciples by the execution of the chief Apostle. The doctrine of the Cross is likely to produce antagonism in corrupt nature, and it is evident that a change of feeling had come over the people as regards Christianity. But, bad as Herod was, behind him was the spirit of evil, whose policy it was to gather opposition against the Apostles of the Lord, and especially against Peter. He who had desired to have him "that he might sift him" as wheat (Luke xxii. 31) was seeking now to destroy the Church. The promise that "the gates of hell" should not "prevail against" the Church almost implies that the evil powers would rage against it. 2. There is a higher view of the incident than this. The providence of God is manifested in overruling evil to the ultimate furtherance of good, as when Satan was permitted to try Job. Persecution is an instrument for perfecting the virtues of the saints and manifesting them. Success, continued success, has its dangers; interruption of active labours, seeming failure, sense of helplessness, apprehension of death, form a discipline to the character and become the occasion of manifold graces. Moreover, the behaviour of the Apostle in the midst of trial and peril had its effect. The calmness of the man waiting for execution—"sleeping between two soldiers, bound with two chains"—was an evidence of the transforming power of the Holy Ghost. It is the same man who trembled at the question of the little maid in the palace of the high priest, and denied his Master through fear of death, who now awaits his end with conformity and composure. The work of grace becomes visible in the hour of danger.

II. The action of the Church. 1. This mysterious Providence wrought good, too, in the believers—the Church. The death of one Apostle, and the incarceration of another, and the turn of popular opinion, might have led to despair; but the Church is never without resources. There was the power of prayer. It might have seemed hopeless—Peter in the inmost recesses of the prison, bound with chains, guarded with soldiers, "and the keepers before the door kept the prison." Their hope was in the Divine promise. In this evening's First Lesson we read, "He hath sent Me to proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the prison to them that are bound" (Isa. lxi. 1). 2. Their prayer was efficacious, for it was the prayer of Christ's disciples. The power of prayer depends very much upon the spiritual condition of those who pray (Ezek. xiv. 14). It was the prayer of the Church, of that Divine society in which the Spirit of God dwells, and which He created. Then it was united prayer, and there is a special promise that such prayer should have additional force (Matt. xviii. 19). Further, it was intercessory prayer. There is an unselfishness about this kind of petition which gives it special value, and it is in unison with the present occupation of the glorified Christ (Heb. vii. 25). And, lastly, it was prayer for one who, by his office and life of grace, was very near to his Lord. Sinners may put a bar to the effects of prayer which is offered for them, by their evil dispositions; but with one whose life was wholly surrendered to the Master, intercessions would have free course and unimpeded efficacy.

III. THE DELIVERANCE. 1. It was by means of angelic ministry. How absurd are the endeavours to get rid of the manifest meaning of the Lesson! One says it was an earthquake which set the Apostle free; another, some "Christian friends;" another, the keeper of the prison; another, that the cause was unknown even by the Apostle, who attributed the event to the intervention of an angel. But why shrink from the plain sense of the passage? Of course, if we do not believe in the existence of angels, or in the supernatural providence of God, or in miracles, or in the efficacy of prayer, we must cast about to account for the wonderful escape by natural phenomena. In that case we must give up the Bible altogether; for it is full of the supernatural from one end to the other. If "the angel of the Lord encampeth round about them that fear Him, and delivereth them" (Ps. xxxiv. 7), then there is an instance of such deliverance in this Lesson. If the angel of the Lord is also the instrument of Divine vengeance, and persecutes the wicked (Ps. xxxv. 6), and "smote the camp of the Assyrians" (2 Kings xix. 35), then we have an instance of such a judgment in the case of Herod in this Lesson. 2. The deliverance was *complete*—the chains fell off from the Apostle's hands; ward after ward was passed; the iron gate swung back upon its hinges; the angel accompanied St. Peter through one street. But it was *gradual*—chains, wards, doors, street of the city—an image of spiritual deliverance, and the progressive attainments of the perfect liberty of the sons of God.

IV. LESSONS. 1. Form the habit of seeing *beyond* the evils which we have to suffer—their moral and spiritual purposes (Jas. i. 12). 2. To cultivate the habit of prayer; "made without ceasing," or, perhaps, better rendered "fervent" prayer, of which our Lord Himself is an Example; for the same word (ἐκτενῶς) is used to describe the intensity of His supplication in His agony (Luke xxii. 44). 3. To rejoice in St. Peter's deliverance as an evidence of the efficacy of prayer, a witness to the overruling providence of God, and as a reminder of the spiritual agencies which protect and deliver the true servants of the Lord.

THIRD SUNDAY AFTER EPIPHANY.—EVENING FIRST LESSON.

"Thus saith the Lord, The heaven is My throne, and the earth is My footstool: where is the house that ye build unto Me? and where is the place of My rest? For all those things hath Mine hand made, and all those things have been, saith the Lord: but to this man will I look, even to him that is poor and of a contrite spirit, and trembleth at My word."—ISA. lxvi. 1, 2.

1. The tendency to make religion consist in external actions, apart from the inward dispositions which should accompany them, is very common. The reason for this is discovered from the fact that outward actions are easier than inward. It is easier, for instance, to become outwardly poor than to become poor in spirit; easier to adore with the body than to worship with the soul. The tendency is observable in all dispensations. For instance, whatever other differences there may have been between the sacrifices of Cain and Abel, we are expressly told that it was "by faith Abel offered unto God a more excellent sacrifice" (Heb. xi. 4). The outward act was linked with the right inward disposition. So, again, in the time of the Levitical Law, the tendency often manifested itself to put ceremonial above moral obligations (Ps. l.). And Isaiah, in his first chapter (vers. 11–18), shows how an outward service, without the putting away of evil, is an abomination to God. In the same way our Lord condemned the Pharisees. "This people draweth nigh unto Me with their mouth, . . . but their heart is far from Me" (Matt. xv. 8).

2. This closing prophecy of Isaiah seems to contain a warning against formalism,

that is, the punctilious permanence of external religious actions without the right frame of mind and heart. It is not that the outward is unimportant, for this would be to run from one extreme to the other, but that the outward alone will not avail. The return of Israel from captivity will be followed by the building of a new temple, as the event has shown; and the warning of the text is twofold—one, to remind the Israelites that Jehovah had no need of a temple; the other, to impress them with a truth they were very apt to forget, that religion must be a matter of the heart.

First, the text contains a revelation of Jehovah; secondly, a reference to the external temple; thirdly, to the internal.

I. A REVELATION OF GOD. "Heaven is My throne, and the earth is My footstool." 1. These words, or the substance of them, are again and again repeated in Holy Scripture; *e.g.* at the dedication of the temple of Solomon (1 Kings viii. 27; 2 Chron. vi. 4); in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. v. 34); in St. Stephen's defence (Acts vii. 49). Repetitions in the Bible show the importance of a truth, or our difficulty in remembering it. The engraver goes over the line again and again when the substance is unimpressionable. 2. What is the truth? That God is incomprehensible (*immensus*). He is everywhere, and cannot be localized or contained within the walls of a building. "Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord" (Jer. xxiii. 24). There is nowhere where God's power and essence and presence do not reach. He knows no limits of space or time, of knowledge or love. The Psalmist hymns this perfection, "Great is the Lord, and marvellous, worthy to be praised; there is no end of His greatness" (Ps. cxlv. 3, Prayer-book Version). He is within the world and without it; "Heaven is His throne, earth His footstool." He is the only "complete Personality," because without the limits which are of necessity a part of created personality, which is therefore but a faint imitation of the Divine.

II. THE REFERENCE TO THE EXTERNAL TEMPLE. "Where is the house that ye build unto Me?" 1. It goes without saying that these words are not intended to deter Israel from building a material temple when they had returned to their own land. In the first place, the Prophet would be contradicting himself (Isa. lvi. 5–7; lx. 7); and, in the second, he would be running counter to the solemn injunctions of other Prophets, such as Haggai and Zechariah, who were in part raised up by God to further the work of building the temple. What the words are intended to rebuke is the falseness of the ideas that God requires a temple, and that His presence can be restricted to its walls. "What kind of house is it that ye would *build Me?*" "What kind of place for My rest?" God does not need a temple, but we do. In heaven there will be no necessity for any temple (Rev. xxi. 22), where the glory of God and of the Lamb floods with its radiance the whole place. 2. Here the Church, with its sacred objects and associations, appeals to us and excites our devotion; here in the sacred place there is a distinct promise to prayer; here God acts upon us, and we upon God, through prescribed ordinances; here He promises to be present in some especial manner; here we act upon one another and kindle fervour, and therefore must not forsake "the assembling of ourselves together" in the house of God (Heb. x. 25).

III. But the text alludes to the internal temple—THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE SOUL OF THE WORSHIPPER, WHICH ATTRACT THE FAVOUR OF GOD. "To this man will I look, . . . who is poor, . . . contrite, and who trembleth at My word." 1. "Poor;" not merely outwardly, but poor in spirit—the condition of the first Beatitude (Matt. v. 3). God "hath respect unto the lowly, but the proud He knoweth afar off" (Ps. cxxxviii. 6). The man who at all realizes the Divine majesty will have a sense of His own nothingness. 2. "Of a contrite spirit;" that is, who has something of the publican's spirit, who smote upon his breast and cried, "God be merciful to me a sinner!" and so

returned from the temple to his house "justified" (Luke xviii. 13, 14). He who worships in "a contrite spirit," God will not despise (Ps. li. 17). A perception of the Divine holiness brings self-humiliation by force of contrast (Job xlii. 6). 3. "Trembleth at My word." Fear is ever an element of the spirit of worship. A sense of the Divine justice and judgments fills the soul with awe in approaching God. The Word or revelation of God is received, not in the spirit of criticism, but with reverence and godly fear.

IV. Lessons. 1. The remembrance of the all-pervading presence of God should be a deterrent from evil, and an incentive to good. 2. The obligation of regularity in attendance at Divine worship ought to be insisted upon, both as a recognition of God and our relations with Him, and for the sake of the subjective effects on human character. 3. But outward worship is of no avail without inward. There are tests, in the text, of the presence of the spirit of worship—lowliness, contrition, and awe, as products of the realization of God's Presence and Perfections.

SUNDAY IN SCHOOL.

JOHN THE BAPTIST BEHEADED.

Mark vi. 14–29.

Bad men and good men are always being brought into contrast, if not conflict, with each other. It does not always appear that the right triumphs as we should expect it would. Brute force and low cunning have often borne down excellence and virtue. In this account we have an illustration of the supremacy of unseen and spiritual forces over lower and mere visible powers. It is to be noted that these—

I. Inspire fear in the evil-doer. Here we have a monarch whose will in the provinces of Galilee and Peræa was absolute. Obedient bands of armed men marched, as he bade, to battle or to pillage. Strongholds up and down the land were garrisoned by them. He built magnificent palaces and castles, and filled them with whatever his heart desired. Gluttonous feasts, drunken orgies, licentious carousals,—in these he stinted not himself. A capricious, sensual, superstitious, passionate despot he was, with heart made hard as crime and unbridled sin can petrify one. He was the personification of merely brutal instincts and agencies. Yet he was a man who could be made to *fear*. Though sovereign in his kingdom, he could not banish fear from it nor from his spirit. Only in seasons of intoxication could he escape it. The one person in his kingdom who disturbed him was a penniless and harmless ascetic, with only a staff for a weapon, and not a soldier to draw sword for him, and this man securely shut away in the dungeons of Machærus. This servant of the Most High had faced him on his throne, and called him a sinner and an adulterer. Such boldness he had never seen in any of the daring captains of his army, or in any of the courtiers who surrounded him. Like instances might be multiplied through all Christian history. The trembling man or woman has often been, *not* the one who stood to answer before him who sat where sentence of life or death was pronounced, but he instead who decreed their fate. It has been well said, "Fear is the homage which vice pays to virtue." The unknown potency of righteousness, so often surprising both its friends and foes, inspires them who oppose it with a fear ill concealed. For him who has heavenly alliance, none can tell what strategy is possible. Innocence over against muscle! only deluded souls can ever think the latter the stronger. The unseen and spiritual powers—

II. CERTIFY TO A WORTHY CHARACTER. The king knew that his prisoner "was a righteous man and a holy." This humble soul, though priest and soldier and Pharisee came bending and begging to receive his baptism, made no claim to superior sanctity. It shone out, though, amid the general trickery, hypocrisy, and selfishness —the real godly heart and purpose—as the stars in the sky do, compared with the spangles which decorate some lofty ceiling, tinted after the blue of the heavens. A monitor who was himself morally weak would not have bearded this human lion in his den without being himself torn in pieces. Herod knew *that* man's heart had the stamp of God's mint on it. "One truth a man lives is worth a thousand which he only utters," says the Greek sage. As we ring coin on the marble, so is every man's character and reputation at some moments being tested. Then it gets popularly read as "righteous" or "unrighteous," "holy" or "unholy." One imprudent word or act on John's part had made Herod cease to fear him. His daily deeds made the people conclude John had a Divine mission, as no dress of sackcloth or prophetic staff or dervish-like frenzy could do. By the compulsion of unseen forces—

III. TRUTH GAINS A HEARING. Lighthouse-keepers have sometimes had their windows almost blinded by the flocks of birds which, in the wild stormy night, have flown swiftly toward the friendly gleam, and with shattered beak and broken wing have fallen to the foot of the tower. Hunters have watched, back of their camp-fire as it illumined the dark recesses of the forest, the bright and curious eyes of the deer as they stole out of their hiding-places, and so have been easy marks for the rifle-ball. Fishermen with flaring torch attract their game within thrust of the spear. There is a fascination which some natural objects have for others which yield to the charm—their lure to death. So the strong clear blaze of truth, as it dwelt in the prophet's soul, brought the king again and again within its revealings. It struck him hard in his evil course. It dealt honestly with him. The better man within him pleaded guilty to every count. The uneasy hearer could not help but listen and reflect. "Perplexed," the evangelist says he was. Repentance, however, was not a grace for the better man to impart to the worse. He could be the mouthpiece of righteousness, but not the giver of peace.—DE WITT S. CLARK.

FEEDING THE FIVE THOUSAND.

MARK vi. 30–44.

I. The first thing we notice in this narrative is CHRIST'S COMPASSION. When He saw the great multitude "He had compassion on them, because they were as sheep not having a shepherd." There is something that strangely stirs the heart in the sight of a crowd. There is a mass of humanity whose needs are beyond estimate. There are men and women, each with his own burdens, carrying his own sorrows, full of his own longings. Here are weighted hearts; here are souls fashioned in God's image, but battered and marred by sin. How much sorrow is there represented! What grand possibilities are there which as yet are sadly unrealized! There are occasionally men of our acquaintance whose dominating quality is sympathy with their fellows. The thing about them which impresses us most is their great heart. They love their kind, and are always trying to make others happier and better. Such a one was Christ in a pre-eminent degree.

II. But it is significant in the narrative that Christ's compassion WAS PRIMARILY EXCITED FOR MAN'S SPIRITUAL NEEDS. As a result of His sympathies for these multitudes that sought Him, "He began to teach them many things." Men's sympathies are ordinarily more deeply touched by the temporal disabilities of their fellows. All that

is well; but, after all, the body is of the least value. After the soul has fled, how utterly worthless is the body that is left behind! A while since a wealthy English lady lost her mansion by fire. It was burned to the ground. In the house at the time was a diamond necklace, worth far more than the house itself. After the fire careful search was made, and at last, among the ashes, as they were raked over, were found the diamonds uninjured, just as brilliant and beautiful as ever. In the same way the soul survives the body.

III. Yet while this great lesson is set out first in the narrative before us, there is an evident intent to lay emphasis on OUR OBLIGATION TO AID MEN IN THEIR TEMPORAL NECESSITIES. "Give ye them to eat." The times are laying great stress upon this duty. It involves questions of political economy and questions of legislation which only experts can solve, and they only after long and patient experiment. But the first steps towards a solution are taken when a nation permeated with the principles of Christ rises up determined to find a solution.

IV. We see here the OBLIGATION WHICH CHRIST LAYS ON MAN towards his fellow-man. "Give ye them to eat." Why did not Christ Himself feed the multitudes? He did, but only through the ministry of man. This is His universal method. He appeals to us to aid Him in supplying human needs. We must do it in temporal matters. Our gifts are few, our resources small, but if Christ is with us and sends us forth, somehow the little that we have is adequate to any need. It marvellously multiplies, and thousands are fed.

V. THE IMPORTANCE OF SYSTEM. Why was that order preserved in the miracle before us? Partly from the necessity of the case to facilitate the work and prevent confusion. But still more was this orderly method followed to teach the lesson of system to an impatient world. Christ proposes to save men by orderly methods. He does not encourage guerilla warfare, but organized companies.

VI. THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN INSTRUMENTALITIES. It appears both before and after the Divine blessing is offered. The five loaves and two fishes were furnished by a lad. There must be small beginnings. The seed must be sown by the hand of man, and then God takes care of it, and gives it marvellous growth. He teaches us thus to study the principles of self-help. It is an injury to men to aid them too much. Every follower of Christ, for his own good, needs to be assigned a place of service.

VII. There is here a lesson of FAITH. We do not know how this miracle was wrought. All acted on Christ's direction without question. They were glad to put themselves in His hands. They knew not how the blessing would come; it was not necessary, for they knew it would come. It is essential that we live to-day in the same spirit. We have Christ's directions in His Word, given us just as plainly as they were to the multitudes in the desert, and we are to accept them in the same unquestioning faith. When one says, as it is sometimes said, "I should like to be a Christian, but I am afraid I shall not hold out," it is lack of faith. Christ is as able to help us to continue steadfast to the end as He is to save us at the first. The same faith is needed also in the Christian life to battle with the tendency to spiritual despondency. All that we require is by faith to lay hold upon the mercies of God.

VIII. THE DIVINE SUPERABUNDANCE AND ECONOMY. There was a wonderful combination in this miracle. Not only were all fed, but there was more than enough. The tables were loaded. But Christ would allow nothing to be wasted. Look where we will in creation, we see the same superabundance. There is fuel and to spare, mines of coal and forests of timber seemingly inexhaustible. But all this is not to be wasted; for, if it be, it becomes naught. By man's improvidence forests have been destroyed and fair lands have become desert. The same law holds in the spiritual

world. Here is abundance for the needs of man; but if he slights it, if he casts the truth away from him carelessly, presently his supply has ceased, and, like the prodigal, he hungers and is in want.—ADDISON P. FOSTER.

CHRIST THE BREAD OF LIFE.

JOHN vi. 25–35.

JESUS fed the multitude with the five loaves and the two fishes, and crossed the Sea of Galilee that night to Capernaum. The next day the people also took shipping and came to Capernaum, seeking Jesus. And when they met Him on His way to the synagogue, He said to them sadly, "Ye seek Me, not because ye saw signs, but because ye ate of the loaves." What were the signs? The loaves were the signs. The loaf was not an end, but a sign pointing to something beyond itself, directing people on and up. Christ seeks to quicken their spiritual vision, that they may see the sign within the loaf. Through this whole passage Christ warns His hearers against entering physical satisfaction by one door, and resting in it. He opens a door on the other side, looking heavenward, that they may pass on through to the spiritual blessings. So this whole passage urges upon us the duty of spiritually interpreting God's bounty. In making the loaf a sign, Christ also points to the truth that bread transmits life. Bread is the fruit and result of life. The life of the wheat is stored up in the bread. And when bread is eaten, it hands that life on—it gives the stored-up life to the world. The life of God is the life of the world; all energy is of Him. But He gives that life through some medium. While these gracious words, promising such enduring satisfaction, fell on the ears of the Jews, they said, "Lord, evermore give us this bread." And they were thinking of something strange and far away. But Christ answered, "I am the Bread of life: he that cometh to Me shall never hunger." The intensely personal method of the Christian religion appears here as everywhere in the Gospels. "*I* am the Bread of life." Not some laws, or rules, or rites prescribed, but *I*, the personal Christ. Spiritual truth *must* come to us incarnate if we are to live and grow thereby. In that expression Christ seems to see the fundamental needs of men —hunger, weakness, emptiness—and He speaks to them all, saying, "I am the Bread of life. I stand over against the fundamental, universal needs of men, to satisfy them." No single term could cover and confront so much human want as the word "bread." His Word is exceeding broad. Christ offering Himself as the Bread of life points to the truth that His religion is a necessity.

I. BREAD SATISFIES. Not once for all; but, used daily, continuously, it satisfies. And being a plain staple, it never wears out as an article of food. Christ satisfies. Not once for all, as He gives Himself to the faith, just accepting Him as Saviour, but as He daily and continuously gives Himself to us He satisfies. A guilty man comes to Christ hungry for pardon; opens his mouth in confession; believes, and is filled with peace—Christ has satisfied his need. But a forgiven man hungers for positive righteousness, for usefulness. As he hungers, he is filled; Christ is satisfying his need. As he grows into a spiritual man, he hungers for still more; he needs more than when he was a spiritual child. And this process, in which Christ continually meets the enlarging needs of a believing soul, we call salvation. Every natural healthy man hungers for food. If any man does not feel the promptings of a keen appetite, we know he is diseased and unnatural.

II. BREAD STRENGTHENS. A starving man is weak and tottering. He demands bread, that his vital force may be renewed. That pictures Christ's work. He comes

to add to the vigour, intensity, and endurance of men. Lowered vitality gives disease its chance. Being saved is a vital process. It is the vigorous appropriation by the life of what it needs to make it healthy and strong. Our bodies grow plump, full of colour and energy, because of the rich and active process of vitalization within. And we grow spiritually strong, full of force and fire, as we vitally appropriate Christ. Christian truth is curative indeed, but Christ never narrows Himself by calling Himself the Medicine of life. He is Bread. This vital process of salvation strengthens men in the right way. A starved man who totters does not want canes and crutches; he wants food. The method of Jesus is not to prop men from without with fictions of imputed righteousness, but to make them stand erect, because they are alive. The strengthening of the life by Christ is a process subtle, unseen, mysterious as the building up of the body by food.

III. Bread enlarges. There is more of you bodily than when you were a year old. In eating food you have gathered and retained your increased size. Christ enlarges the life. He pardoned you. He blessed you here, He helped you there. He has spoken to you by the way. It has been a long experience. But gradually out of your experience with Christ you have gathered to yourself a richer personality, a fuller life. There is more of you now than when you first accepted Christ. The grace Christ gives us is not stored in us as in a warehouse; it is food, and is taken up into the circulation, and becomes a part of the life.—Charles R. Brown.

THE GREAT CONFESSION.

Matt. xvi. 13-23.

Thus, near Cæsarea Philippi, amid the perishing monuments of a Roman Cæsar, the loyal heart of Peter raised an immortal memorial to the Kingship of the Christ. Well has this exclamation of his been styled—

I. The great confession. 1. It is great in what it claims for Christ. Once, on the mount of His glory, loving hands would have builded Him an altar. But here, by the city bearing the Cæsar's name, Peter gave Him a Name that is above every name, and enthroned Him above all kings and all principalities: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God." These words claim for Christ the supreme adoration of men on the ground of His Divine Sonship. The manger, the carpenter's bench, Gethsemane, the cross, the grave, are incidents, not of a struggling, helpless human soul, but expressions of a Divine love and a Divine life. Peter sets Jesus apart from and above the world. Among men, He is not one of them. He is God walking the paths of His children. 2. This confession is great as an expression of human faith. It is the last and fullest expression of man's homage to the Christ, the highest tribute of the human child to the Divine Father. It is one of the shortest Creeds in the Bible or outside it. It is the source of all other confessions. It is the grandest Creed ever framed by the lips of men. As falling from Peter's lips, it is the confession of his surrender to the Being he sees in Christ. 3. It is great in contrast to the general expectation of the Messiah, and the popular feeling regarding Him. Men were looking for a Messiah, but not in the form of a peasant from Nazareth. Peter mounts above his day and generation. What they do not see, he beholds.

II. We are to regard the confession not as great alone, but as the corner-stone of the kingdom of Christ. Such Jesus regards it. "Whosoever shall confess that Jesus is the Son of God, God abideth in him, and he in God." Around this confession the witnesses of the New Testament gather. In their personal faith it is the corner-stone. In their preaching it is the central theme. In their personal experiences it

is the anchor of their hope. Without it there could be neither a gospel nor an evangelist. It was the heart in this confession which made it acceptable to Christ. This was its rock-element. Otherwise it could have been no better than the sand foundation on which the Pharisee, clean without and foul within, was building the temple of God.

III. We must not forget that WE REACH OUR HIGHEST SELVES IN THIS CONFESSION. This was one of the grandest moments in Peter's life. All the manhood in him swept up to his lips, and broke forth in this magnificent confession. We feel instinctively that here he was true to himself. This was one of his transfiguration moments, when he mounted at one bound to the summit of his Christian manhood. We climb to our highest levels in no other way. We give nothing else that is the equal of this. The honours we win for ourselves can never so dignify and ennoble us as this honour which we give to Him. Life finds itself in owning and adoring life.

IV. We are to remember, also, HOW MARVELLOUSLY GOD USES US THROUGH THIS CONFESSION FOR HIS GLORY. The confession of John the Baptist preceded the glorifying of Christ in the witness of God at His baptism. This confession of Peter preceded the glorifying of Christ on the Mount of Transfiguration. The connexion between the human confession and the glorifying of God is too apparent to need demonstration. Every human confession of Christ is a gateway by which God enters life to honour His Son in the eyes of men. Christ moves through man to men. By what men say of Him, by what men do for Him, He finds His way to other hearts.—J. E. TUTTLE.

THE BOOK CRITIC.

THE MEETING-PLACE OF GEOLOGY AND HISTORY. By Sir J. W. DAWSON. Religious Tract Society.

THIS work covers much the same ground as portions of *Modern Science of Bible Lands*, by the same writer, a second edition of which appeared two years ago. The object of the new book is "to give a clear and accurate statement of facts bearing on the character of the debatable ground intervening between the latter part of the geological record and the beginnings of sacred and secular history." The conclusions are substantially identical with those stated in the earlier work. Sir J. W. Dawson still finds strong geological evidence in favour of the historical character of the early chapters of Genesis. The argument is cogently presented, and the geological reasoning is supported by the results of Eastern research. In the application of the latter, however, a little more care is desirable. Although Assyriologists and Egyptologists have undoubtedly discovered much which may be safely accepted as solid fact, many of their suggestions are merely clever conjectures, which may or may not prove to be correct. Our author is too ready to adopt some of these. It is surely premature to regard Hommel's proposal to identify the ten patriarchs of Berosus with the Sethites of Genesis as proved, or to find the solution of "the mystery surrounding the Hyksos" in the discovery, by means of the Tell-el-Amarna tablets, of the non-Semitic character of the inhabitants of Mitanni. It is also regrettable that Zimmern's identification of the "chabiri" of the tablets with the Hebrews is not accompanied by a reference to the very different explanation of Professor Sayce. There is an awkward misprint in this paragraph (p. 179), "Zimmel" for "Zimmern." The book is well illustrated and neatly printed. W. TAYLOR SMITH.

OUR INHERITANCE IN THE OLD TESTAMENT. By W. BELLAIRS. Swan Sonnenschein and Co. 1894.

In this little volume, made up of eight sermons preached at the parish church, Margate, the author has made it his aim to set forth simply "what it is that we are called upon to believe, as Christians, with regard to the Old Testament, and what are the grounds of the reverence which we feel for it." And there can be little doubt that he has done a useful work in publishing these discourses. They are written so that any plain man may understand them, and yet they are not "popular" in the sense that they are inaccurate, as "popular" treatises so often are. The marks of wide reading and careful and reverent thinking are apparent throughout.

Into the details of criticism the author does not enter. He takes the Old Testament as containing a Divine message to mankind; as overruled in its growth by a Divine providence which determined the result in which it issued; but at the same time, he frankly recognizes the imperfections, moral and intellectual, of the men with whose names its various volumes are associated. "The books of the Old Testament were written and were preserved—to some extent, at least—in the same way that other books have been produced and handed down" (p. 13). But at the same time, they can only be rightly understood when it is recognized that they heralded the coming of the Christ, in whom they received at once their perfect explanation, their fulfilment, their sanction. We hope the book will have a large sale; it is just the book that was wanted.

J. H. BERNARD.

MOSES: THE SERVANT OF GOD. By F. B. MEYER, B.A. Morgan and Scott.

MR. MEYER gives us in this volume a series of expositions rather than a biography. His method is to take the events of Moses' life in order, and to draw spiritual lessons from them. No critical estimate of the history is attempted; for the author makes no pretensions to such careful scholarship as constitutes the value of Canon Driver's monograph on Isaiah. The object here is entirely expository, and excludes all questions of a controversial character relating to the structure of the Pentateuch or the origin of the Law. Within these limits, Mr. Meyer has produced a book which will be found useful by Bible-class teachers and others. Preachers, who occasionally undertake a series of popular discourses on Biblical characters, will also find here helpful suggestions as to method and matter. The style is bright and fluent, while the touches of rhetoric in the descriptive passages do not render the general effect unpleasing. The illustrations—which are placed at intervals through the volume—depicting some of the striking incidents of the history, are poor, and, for the class of readers contemplated by the writer, unnecessary. If anything of this sort was required, we might have been given a photograph of Michael Angelo's statue, from which Mr. Meyer tells us he elaborated his conception of Moses. The book deserves a more tasteful binding.

R. MARTIN POPE.

CHRIST IS ALL. By H. G. C. MOULE, M.A. Sampson Low, Marston, and Co.

No one can doubt the fitness of the title chosen by Mr. Moule to designate his latest volume of sermons. His preaching, as well as his theology, is Christocentric. And though all these discourses do not directly deal with aspects of the Person and work of Christ, there is not one which is not a "tutor to bring us unto Christ." This feature alone renders the book noticeable. Those who are specially interested in the

best type of evangelical teaching within the Church of England will regard Mr. Moule as a wise and earnest teacher. While always devout and spiritual in tone, he can speak with straightforwardness and strength when occasion demands. There is an effective appeal to young men in the sermon entitled "Christ the Liberator," and there are not a few discourses in the volume which enable us to understand the causes of Mr. Moule's influence among a large section of the youth of his university. "Heavenly Reasons for Liberal Giving"—a happy title—may be mentioned as a good example of Mr. Moule's more practical teaching, while "Justification" is a fair-minded study in Pauline theology, and a capital specimen of the way in which he modernizes theological truths which are not popular as pulpit themes to-day. He vindicates a forensic gospel on the ground that "a gospel from the region of eternal right must, if it is genuine, be a gospel in whose very life is law; a gospel in which infallibly, from one side at least, the Divine welcome must be expressed in terms of *justification*."

R. MARTIN POPE.

VILLAGE SERMONS. By Dean CHURCH. Second Series. Macmillan. 1894.

A VOLUME of Dean Church's sermons needs no recommendation. Few preachers of our time have been listened to with such respectful attention by those who have themselves to preach. His deep insight into human nature, his wide knowledge, his chastened eloquence, his beautiful character, all contributed to the peculiar charm of those cathedral sermons which have found a home in so many clerical libraries. As Spenser was "the poet's poet," so, it has been said, was Dean Church "the preacher's preacher." In the *Village Sermons*, of which a second series has now appeared, we hear him addressing, not the vast congregation at St. Paul's, but plain country-folk, and the charm is as great as ever. It is borne in upon one, as one reads them, how intensely the preacher felt the seriousness of life, and the reality and closeness of the spiritual world. It has been given to few men to think so profoundly, and to speak so simply, on the greatest of all topics.

J. H. BERNARD.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF HEBREW: CONTAINING GRAMMAR, EXERCISES, AND READING LESSONS. By J. L. T. MAGGS, B.A., Prizeman in Hebrew and New Testament Greek, London University. London: Charles H. Kelly. 1894.

THIS is a little volume intended especially for the benefit of those students who are compelled to commence the study of Hebrew without a master at hand to explain the difficulties met with in the beginning. It is, however, not solely intended for such persons, but for junior classes in Hebrew. And for both classes of students it will be helpful. The book is beautifully printed; the printing is clear, distinct, and accurate. The paradigms are so arranged that they can be drawn out at full length, and kept out while the student is engaged in the study of the sections which explain them. This is a feature which shows how carefully the author has kept in view the minor difficulties which beset the learner, especially those who have but little time available for the more or less irksome task of mastering the grammar of a language. On the whole, this little volume is sure to be a boon to junior students. But, however useful such books may be in the commencement of their studies, we cannot too earnestly impress upon those who really desire a knowledge of Hebrew, that they must not fancy they can do without the careful study of a larger grammar, such as that of Gesenius,

with the improvements of Professor Kautzsch. Mr. Maggs's book, however, will put them on the line, and give them a good introduction to begin with. We hope the book may prove useful to many. C. H. H. WRIGHT.

PRESENT-DAY PRIMERS. HOW TO STUDY THE ENGLISH BIBLE. By Canon GIRDLESTONE. PRIMER OF ASSYRIOLOGY. By Professor SAYCE. Religious Tract Society.

THE former of these two publications is one of the comparatively few books which can be recommended without reserve. The subject is handled intelligently, sensibly, and devoutly. No better book can be placed in the hands of the younger teachers in our Sunday schools, and even veteran students will read it with delight and profit. There are, of course, a few doubtful statements, two of which may be pointed out. The date assigned to the literary activity of Moses, "more than B.C. 1400," is too early, if (as most scholars suppose) the Pharaoh of the Exodus was Merenptah, the son of Rameses II., or one of his immediate successors. The number of places in Galilee given by Josephus is 204, not 240. The other contribution to the same series, which is from the prolific pen of Professor Sayce, is simply and interestingly written, notwithstanding its formidable title, and is wonderfully comprehensive. In little more than a hundred pages Assyria and Babylonia are described, the thrilling story of the discovery and interpretation of the monuments is once more retold, the history of these regions is sketched in outline, and glimpses are given of the religion, literature, and social life of the inhabitants. It is a pity that no index has been provided, as the little book abounds in illustrations of Scripture. Of course, the confidence so characteristic of Professor Sayce is a prominent feature. Cautious readers will accept some of the statements with hesitation; for example, the remark that "we are now acquainted with the history of Nabonidus, and the fall of his empire." If revised ten years hence, this work will doubtless exhibit many alterations.

W. TAYLOR SMITH.

THE OLD TESTAMENT AND ITS CONTENTS. By Professor ROBERTSON, D.D. *Guild and Bible-Class Text-books.* Edinburgh: Black. 1893.

THIS little book deserves very wide circulation among those for whom it is chiefly designed, as well as among older people who cannot make use of more elaborate works. A very large amount of information is supplied in a very small compass, "in such a form as will neither perplex nor mislead." Professor Robertson may be congratulated on his wise and scholarly discharge of a very difficult and delicate task. His caution is, indeed, excessive, but cannot be censured in view of the recklessness, verging on irreverence, with which the subject is often treated. An unimportant slip, which may be a printer's error, occurs on p. 92, "Tiglath-pileser II." for "Tiglath-pileser III." W. TAYLOR SMITH.

THE DIDACHE, OR TEACHING OF THE TWELVE APOSTLES, RESTORED TO ITS ORIGINAL STATE FROM VARIOUS SOURCES. By C. H. HOOLE. D. Nutt. 1894.

SINCE the publication, in 1883, by Bryennius, of the *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles*, from an eleventh-century manuscript, much has been written on the date of

this long-lost document, and its relation to the Christian literature of the first four centuries. It seems probable (as Harnack was the first to point out) that the *Didache*, in its present form, is somewhat longer than the document of that name mentioned in the *Stichometry* of Nicephorus; and that it presents many remarkable points of connexion with Hermas, Barnabas, the *Church Ordinances* (or, as Mr. Hoole, following Hilgenfeld, calls it, the *Judicium Petri*), and the seventh book of the *Apostolical Constitutions*, is obvious to any one who compares the various texts. But the problem is to ascertain what the character of these relationships is. Did Barnabas know the *Didache* in its present form, or in a Christian form at all? Is our present *Didache* based on the *Church Ordinances*, or do they both borrow from a common source? What view are we to take of the connexion between the *Teaching* and the *Apostolical Constitutions*? These are critical problems of the highest interest, and have received various answers. A very full discussion is given, for example, in Dr. Salmon's *Introduction to the New Testament*, not to speak of German books. Mr. Hoole, however, does not seem to place any reliance on what has been done before, and gives us the result of an independent investigation. He has done useful service in reprinting, though in a somewhat inconvenient form, the parallel passages from the writers above mentioned; but it does not appear that he has dealt with the questions which are involved with sufficient fulness.

He says (p. 45), "After a good deal of consideration, I have come to the conclusion that the *Didache* is not an original work, but a compilation or series of excerpts from the treatises already quoted. Any one who will compare the *Didache* with the passages taken from Barnabas, Hermas, the *Judicium Petri*, and the *Apostolic Constitutions*, will find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that the author of the *Didache* had these works in his hands, and compiled from them what he supposed to be the primitive doctrine of the Apostles; and the position of his work is not that of an original to an enlarged and completed copy, but that of a condensation and compilation from a number of other works." There is, however, nothing new in the theory that the *Didache*, as we have it, is a composite work based on older forms. Where scholars differ is as to the relative dates (say) of the Bryennian text and the seventh book of the *Apostolical Constitutions*. Such questions as these cannot be answered by merely printing the texts side by side; and, as a matter of fact, Dr. Salmon (*Introduction*, p. 561, 6th edit.) pronounces that the *Apostolical Constitutions* exhibits a clear use of Bryennius' text. We cannot but wish that Mr. Hoole had treated at greater length the critical problems which here present themselves. As things stand, we are not sure that his hypothetical reconstruction of the "original" *Didache* will be generally accepted by scholars. To restore a lost text is a difficult matter.

J. H. BERNARD.

WORDS TO THE LAITY: ADDRESSES AND PAPERS ON SUBJECTS OF CONTEMPORARY ECCLESIASTICAL CONTROVERSY. By the Ven. WILLIAM M. SINCLAIR, D.D., Archdeacon of London, Canon of St. Paul's, etc. London: Nisbet.

THIS collection of addresses and essays forms a temperate statement of the moderate Low Church position. It is steeped through and through with admiration for the Reformation, and for the men who brought it about and carried it through. The first paper is on "The Benefits of the Reformation," and it strikes the key-note of the whole volume. That movement, which freed the Church of England from the

trammels of Rome, which gave it back the Scriptures as the rule of faith, and the food and instruction of laity and clergy alike, and which abolished numberless superstitions and questionable or unedifying practices, is certainly one on which every loyal Anglican must look back with heartfelt thankfulness, whether or no he would agree with quite all that Archdeacon Sinclair says in its praise, or can refrain from lamenting some features in the movement which he passes over in silence. The book will certainly be useful to those who agree with it as a fairly complete statement of the facts of their case; and perhaps it may also be of service to those who do not agree with it, by showing them how much there is to be said for a position from which they feel bound to dissent.

But there is another way in which it may do good to those who are likely to read it with approbation; and that is by teaching them that it is possible to state what one holds to be the truth without bitterness, and to differ from others without expressing the difference in such a way as to cause needless irritation. It is possible to make points without, at the same time, inflicting blows. And the author speaks out uncompromisingly against that policy of persecution which has brought such discredit upon the Low Church party. "The adherents of the principles of the Reformation have made many disastrous blunders. They have, in the American phrase, 'given themselves away.' The policy pursued by a section of them in appealing to the law . . . has alike, whether victorious or unsuccessful, given a greater stimulus than any other contrivance could have supplied to the distinctive pre-Reformation sentiment, opinions, and practices." Yes, it was certainly a blunder; but was it not also a crime? It would have given still greater weight to the archdeacon's condemnation of the policy which sent official spies into parishes and churches, and which sent hard-working and conscientious priests to prison, if the unchristian character of persecution, as well as its folly, had been clearly pointed out. But the truth of the following encouragement and warning need not be doubted:—

"A great access of strength will necessarily come to the adherents of Reformation principles, now that they have dropped the fatal policy of persecution, or prosecution,—let it be called what it may. All talk about forming a Parliamentary party, and obtaining legislative changes, is futile. It can only increase the cohesion of those against whom the weapon is directed, and react unfavourably on the condition and estimation of those who employ it. Spiritual matters must be dealt with spiritually; that is, by discussion, arguments, appeals to Scripture and the primitive Church, by love and by prayer" (pp. 46, 47).

One can heartily sympathize with the writer when he condemns the common practice of a certain school in the English Church of calling ceremonies of which they are fond, and which they believe to be edifying, and perhaps of some antiquity, "Catholic." A "Catholic ceremony," if not a contradiction in terms, at least expresses a thing which, from the nature of the case, could not exist. We can have a Catholic faith and a Catholic Church, *i.e.* a faith and a Church that are universal. But a Catholic ritual, a Catholic custom, a Catholic vestment, never has existed, and never will exist. From the first there has been difference of usage about such things, and even the most ancient were never at any time universal.

Again, there are some sensible remarks on the mischievous claptrap of adopting some telling expression commonly claimed by the opposite party, and applying it to one's self with a twist of meaning, *e.g.* when an opponent of sacerdotalism talks in this way: "I am a sacerdotalist. You are sacerdotalists. We are all sacerdotalists. The sacerdotalism we all believe in is the sole Priesthood of our Lord Jesus Christ." But it is, perhaps, being hypercritical to object to the term "High Church," because

it meant something different in the time of Queen Anne from what it does now (p. 168). We must give up "Whig" and "Tory" for the same reason, if that is to hold. The modern practice of calling Dissenters by the name of "Nonconformists" is much more objectionable, and leads to real confusion of thought.

On p. 124 there is some arithmetic which will not work, perhaps in consequence of a misprint. We are told to take fifteen millions and two millions from twenty-nine millions, and then there will be nine millions left.

Waterland's eight sacrifices (*Doctrine of the Eucharist*, ch. xii.) are given in full twice (pp. 115, 230), which is not necessary, and lessens rather than augments the effect of quotation.

Perhaps the most useful chapters in the volume are those on "Current Fallacies in the Church," "The Principles of Church Music," and "Fasting Communion not Obligatory."

In conclusion, it may be worth while to point out an argument which cuts both ways. Archdeacon Sinclair lays much stress on "the fact that the formularies of the Church of England were arranged by those who carried out the Reformation, and, as plain matter of fact, express their convictions. They are as yet intact and unchanged" (p. 45). And he tells the laity that they have on their side the Bible and the Prayer-book. "Of this the innovators are conscious, for they have now made definite proposals for the Prayer-book's alteration" (p. 169). Can this refer to "The Protestant Prayer-book; being the Book of Common Prayer of the Established Church of England, Revised and *Largely* Amended in Accordance with Holy Scripture, for the use of the Protestant Church of England, and of other Evangelical Churches" (London: Charles J. Thynne, 1894)? Such an attempt at revision ought to be disowned by all who desire to be loyal to our present Book of Common Prayer.

ALFRED PLUMMER.

THE THINKER.

THE SURVEY OF THOUGHT.

AGNOSTICISM.—There appeared lately, in the *Nineteenth Century*, a remarkable article by Professor Max Müller, entitled, "Why I am not an Agnostic." For his position in this respect he offers two reasons: first, "because he strongly sympathizes with the objects which, in the beginning, Alexandrian Gnosticism and Neo-Platonism had in view; and secondly, because he holds that the human mind in its highest functions is not confined to a knowledge of phenomena only." In reference to the second reason, he argues that "that which appears is, before it appears, unknown to us; but it becomes known to us in the only way in which it can be known, that is, by its appearance." "It is known to us as that without which the phenomena would be impossible, nay, unthinkable." "We only see in this world one side of the moon, but we are as certain that there is another side as if we saw it. The unseen side is 'as real to our consciousness as the side we see.'" These forms of sensuous intuition admit of no exception. By similar necessity, we must submit to the law of causality, a category of our understanding, without which even the simplest phenomenal knowledge would be impossible." Certain effects are produced on our consciousness through our senses, and these effects presuppose a cause. We cannot escape this law of causality. In the same way, "I cannot help discovering in the universe an all-pervading causality, or a reason for everything, . . . because to a mind like ours, nothing can exist without a sufficient reason." Chance cannot be recognized in scientific studies, and "neither natural selection, nor struggle for life, nor the influence of environment, or any other *aliases* of it, will account for the *Logos*, the thought, which looks at us through the transparent curtain of nature, and calls for recognition from the *Logos* within us." "If we call that *Logos* the Son, and if we speak of a Father whom no one knows but the Son, we are using human language; but if we know that all human language is metaphorical, we shall never attempt to force these words into a narrow and literal meaning." "Call that Power the Father, or call it a Person, and you neither gain nor lose anything, for these words are metaphorical only; and what constitutes the personal element in man or any other living being, is as unknown to us as what constitutes the personal element in

the Author, the Thinker, the Speaker, or Creator of the *logoi.*" Holding these views, we can no longer "say that in the beginning was protoplasm, and that the whole world was evolved from it by purely mechanical or external means." "As Christians, we have to say, 'In the beginning was *Logos.*'"

In the *Contemporary Review* for last December there is an exceedingly able article, from another point of view, from the pen of Miss Caillard. Its title is, "The Knowledge of Good and Evil," and it is in continuation of one that appeared in the September number of the same magazine, on the relation of matter to spirit. Recognizing the principle of evolution, the writer refuses to accept Professor Huxley's limitation, "that the cosmic process has no sort of relation to moral ends." She adopts provisionally Mr. Spencer's definition of good as "that which under all circumstances is fitted to the purpose for which it was intended." Evil being taken as the converse of this, she assumes the truth of the Christian revelation "for the purpose of testing its competency to deal with the problem of evil;" and viewing "ethical man as the outcome of the cosmic process," finds the problem of evil most distinctly stated in him, and therefore proposes to study it in him. The Christian revelation gives no uncertain answer to the question—What is man's "good"? "The stamp of sonship to God" is on him. For human life to be "good," therefore, "it must be fitted to enter into conscious union with the Divine Life." Separation from God is "evil." "Every individualized existence" which draws from nature's store renders its tribute again; and in the whole range of nature the union of giving and receiving is seen; and man, "in order to realize himself, or help the self-realization of others, must obey the same law which in him reaches the height of willing sacrifice and mutual intelligent love. All phenomena, whether "inorganic, organic, or super-organic," are manifestations of a single developing life, and the law of its development does not operate by pressure from without, but by the principle of self-determination. This principle reaches its highest manifestation in the conscious life of man. He is thus endowed with a necessary freedom, which implies the possibility of error. The natural tendency of his nature is to its source, as St. Paul speaks of the heathen as "seeking after God, if haply they might find Him;" but the "certain independence of life," pointed to by the principle of evolution, renders separation possible, and it may be the separation was allowed in order "that the union of man with God might be perfect, the result of intelligent love, aspiration, and obedience, not of inability to choose." "For man to be united to God, it is not enough that he be innocent; he must be holy; hence his education through experience of evil." "The life of the universe is *derived from*, not *shared with*, God. God is not nature, but the Source of nature." "He is not mankind, but the Father of mankind, so that men have the distinctiveness, the individuality, the freedom of sons."

THE WORD "PROPHET."—The origin and exact significance of the Hebrew word for "prophet," as fixed by recent research, are traced by Professor Cornill, in the first of a series of lately published lectures on *Israelitish Prophecy*, with surprising clearness and force. There is nothing, indeed, that is new to specialists, but the latter form so small a proportion of Bible-readers that no apology is needed for giving a summary of the professor's remarks. The word *nabi* cannot be satisfactorily explained from the Hebrew, which shows that it describes a phenomenon that did not originate on Israelitish soil. It is, therefore, necessary to consult other Semitic languages, and, if we find one which supplies a perfectly distinct and transparent etymology, it is reasonable to assume that we have lighted on the home, not merely of the name, but of the thing. Now, the root *naba'a* is met with in Assyro-Babylonian and in Arabic. In Assyrian it means simply "speak," "declare," "name;" and the derived substantive signifies "declaration," "naming." Another derivative is *Nebo*, in Babylonian *Nabu*, the name of the deity of wisdom and knowledge, of word and speech, who was identified by the Greeks with their Hermes. *Nabi*, therefore, means "speaker;" but a man may be a speaker, and yet not a prophet. So the Assyrian does not lead us to the root of the matter. The additional help needed is gained from the Arabic, which has preserved the primitive Semitic type with greater purity than any other language of the group. There the root *naba'a* is used, not in the general sense of "speak," but in the special sense of "announce." He *naba'a* or *anba'a* who makes a definite announcement or executes a commission. So there lies in the root, as used in Arabic, the specific thought that the speaker speaks not of himself, but through an impulse from without—says nothing of his own, but only represents another. Consequently, the *nabi* would be the commissioned speaker, who has to make a definite communication, to deliver a message. There is a trace of this primary meaning of the word in a well-known passage in Exodus, the full import of which is only clearly seen when it is read in connexion with a preceding passage, "And the anger of the Lord was kindled against Moses, and He said, Is there not Aaron thy brother the Levite? I know that he can speak well. . . . And thou shalt speak unto him, and put the words in his mouth: and I will be with thy mouth, and with his mouth, and will teach you what ye shall do. And he shall be thy spokesman unto the people: and it shall come to pass that he shall be to thee a mouth, and thou shalt be to him as God" (Exod. iv. 14–16). "See I have made thee a god to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy brother shall be thy *nabi*" (Exod. vii. 1). Aaron, then, is the prophet of Moses, because he speaks in behalf of the latter, at his commission. When the word is used as a technical term, it is implied that the giver of the message is God. The Hebrew term thus explained corresponds very closely to the Greek word προφήτης, which strictly described one who translated Divine revelation into articulate intelligible speech.

CUNEIFORM PARALLELS TO THE HEBREW SCRIPTURES.—The distinguished German Orientalist, Professor D. H. Müller, of Vienna, has called attention, in some very suggestive *Studies in Ezekiel*, which he has just issued, to several illustrations of Hebrew thought and diction which he has noted in the cuneiform inscriptions. 1. In several of Ezekiel's prophecies of judgment (vi. 3–7; xxxii. 5, 6; xxxv. 8) mention is made of those slain on the mountains and in the valleys. Similar language occurs in cuneiform literature from the time of Tiglath-pileser I. to the days of Assurbanipal, five hundred years later. "I beat down the corpses of their warriors," says the former of these barbarous conquerors, "on the heights of the mountains like a storm of rain: I caused their blood to flow over the glens and the heights of the mountain." 2. In different parts of the Old Testament sinners are threatened with the sword, famine, and pestilence. This awful trio is mentioned eighteen times in the Book of Jeremiah. It appears thrice in Ezekiel (vi. 11; vii. 15; and xii. 16), and in two other places is accompanied (as in Lev. xxvi. 22–26) by a fourth horror — evil beasts. This terrible group of calamities was threatened by an Assyrian prophet to the enemies of his royal master, the great king Assurbanipal, who died in B.C. 626, the year after the Prophet Jeremiah commenced his prophetic career. Professor Müller quotes the passage *in extenso*, printing it side by side with two verses from Jeremiah; and the resemblance is in several points really very remarkable. The two portions which correspond most closely run as follows: The Assyrian saw in a dream inscribed on the disc of the moon the words, "To any one who plans evil and wages war against Assurbanipal, the King of Assyria, I shall apportion an evil death. By the iron quick sword, by famine, by the stroke of pestilence, will I put an end to their life." After repeating this prophecy, the monarch adds, "This I heard, and trusted on the word of Sin, my lord." The Hebrew parallel is found in Jer. xxvii. 8, "And it shall come to pass, that the nation and kingdom which will not serve the same Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon, and that will not put their neck under the yoke of the King of Babylon, that nation will I punish, saith the Lord, with the sword, and with the famine, and with the pestilence." 3. The idea that the violation of a covenant brought on the offender the curses invoked when the covenant was concluded, was common to the Hebrews and the Assyrians. It is said of the unfaithful Israelite, "All the curse that is written in this book shall lie upon him. . . . And the Lord shall separate him unto evil out of all the tribes of Israel, according to all the curses of the covenant that is written in this book of the Law" (Deut. xxix. 20, 21). Assurbanipal writes of certain people who had not kept their oaths, that they were punished with terrible famine, "according to the curses, as many as were written in the writing of agreement." These curious parallelisms are well worthy of notice, but they scarcely seem to prove Hebrew indebtedness to Assyrian

sources, as Professor Müller maintains. Whilst it is not impossible that Ezekiel and others of his nation may have been acquainted with, and a little influenced by, cuneiform literature, it is safer, until stronger evidence has been produced, to regard the phenomena as coincidences which can be accounted for by common origin, affinity of language, and manifold similarity in thought, expression, and habit.

CRITICAL CONTRADICTIONS.—Professors Cornill and Wellhausen are two well-known representatives of the same school of thought. Nevertheless, they contradict each other at times in a way which is rather puzzling to the unsophisticated. Here are a few examples culled from Professor Wellhausen's *Israelitish and Jewish History* and Professor Cornill's *Israelitish Prophecy*. 1. "Yahveh," we are assured by Cornill, means "the feller," the storm-god, who strikes down his enemies with the thunderbolt. Otherwise the oracle of Göttingen, who affirms that the word signifies "he who goes through the air, he who blows;" and adds that this etymology is quite transparent. 2. Elijah, according to Cornill, was not in principle antagonistic to Baal; he objected to him only in Israel. Wellhausen, however, assumes this antagonism: "Baal and Jehovah could not both be right and continue side by side." 3. The same scholar allows Jeremiah a hand in the introduction of Deuteronomy; but Cornill considers it out of the question that Jeremiah had anything to do with it. 4. The last twenty-seven chapters of Isaiah were written by one prophet during the Exile, in the opinion of Cornill. Wellhausen, on the contrary, holds it to be proved that eleven of those chapters were written by some one else at a later time. 5. The Law of Ezra is defined by one authority as the Priestly Code; by the other, as the Pentateuch. These curious divergences may strengthen the conviction, which has been long forming in many minds, that subjective criticism is not the most reliable of guides.

LUKE v. 37, 38.—There is an interesting note on this passage in the *Reformed Quarterly Review* (American). The writer dissents from the view of Archdeacon Farrar, that the "new wine" here mentioned is "must," or the unfermented juice of the grape, and that the risk of fermentation being set up and of the bottles being broken would arise from the presence in the old bottles of particles of albuminoid matter and of yeast-germs from the air, which would act upon the unfermented juice. The writer of the note in question says that it is undoubtedly true that the pure juice of the grape, tightly enclosed in skins, whether new or old, for the purpose of fermentation, would burst them at the sutures; but that the Saviour here speaks of "new wine," which, according to Acts ii. 13, denotes fermented juice of the grape. His explanation of the passage is as follows: "It is a fact," he says, "well attested by experience, that, even after the dregs have settled, new wine will again undergo

fermentation, if disturbed by being transferred from one vessel to another, unless this operation be performed at a certain low temperature. In a climate like that of Palestine, wines could not be easily and safely handled. It was a grape-growing country. Many, perhaps, were able to provide themselves with the means for the safe handling of wines; but the mass of the people, in the midst of whom and to and for whom the Saviour spake His parables, had very limited facilities for securing their preservation in the form referred to. Moreover, it is not always easy to determine the exact point of time at which wine becomes perfectly still, *i.e.* ceases to ferment, because fluctuations of temperature, when it nears that stage, readily affect it. Is it not more satisfactory to explain the passage by allowing that the *must* was permitted to ferment in the vat, and afterwards, as *new wine*, put into *new bottles*, so as to guard against loss by a renewal of fermentation? The new skins would admit of some distension, which might be discovered before any serious damage would ordinarily occur. And, even with this precaution, there would sometimes be a loss to both wine and skins. As to the presence of albuminoid matter and yeast-germs from the atmosphere in the old skins, they could readily be removed or destroyed by the use of boiling water or other means not unknown to the Jews, so that the danger from that source could be reduced to a minimum."

BIBLICAL THOUGHT.

THE SYNOPTIC PROBLEM.

By Rev. Arthur Wright, M.A., Tutor of Queens' College, Cambridge.

The six papers from the pen of the Rev. Paton J. Gloag, D.D., which appeared in The Thinker of 1894, form an admirable introduction to the study of the synoptic problem of the Gospels, and will, I hope, induce many students to work seriously at this fascinating subject, without some knowledge of which both commentator and preacher are perpetually at a loss.

St. Paul's Epistles engrossed the attention of Biblical students of the last generation. Old Testament criticism is the pursuit of the present. The Gospels remain for the future. They are unquestionably the most important of the three subjects. Fidelity to them is the measure of life in the Church. As children, we think them easy; their difficulties increase as we realize their profundity. In this matter of criticism, without which their historic truth cannot be vindicated, the widest and most varied field for labour is opened out, in which every worker may find something to do.

Dr. Gloag's papers appear to have been delayed in publication, for he

takes no notice of some important articles by the Rev. Professor Stanton, in the *Expositor* for February, 1893, and the three following months. Dr. Stanton's view of the synoptic problem is peculiar. He thinks it not improbable that St. Luke, when he wrote his Gospel, had a copy of St. Mark's Gospel before him, and used it for ascertaining the *order* of the narratives and for a few other details; but he maintains that St. Luke must have derived his *wording* of them from oral tradition, in which his first readers had been so thoroughly drilled that they would not have tolerated any considerable departure from it. On the other hand, he holds that the great diversities of order which those sections display which are common to St. Matthew and St. Luke, but are absent from St. Mark, prove that oral tradition alone was the source of those sections, no document being used.

When a man copies from a written document, he may easily omit words or verses through carelessness or design. He may easily add an occasional comment of his own or a few verses from another source. He may correct the grammar, polish the style, and remove barbarisms. But he cannot readily invert the order, still less can he habitually change from thirty to forty per cent. of the words, where he gains nothing by doing so, but rather blunts the sharpness of the original narrative. This last, as a literary feat, we may fairly pronounce to be impossible. It would require an almost infinite effort. And for what conceivable purpose should that effort have been made? To give a semblance of originality? But by these multitudinous variations the author irritates those who are familiar with the original document, and wastes his labour on those who are not. That one evangelist should have been guilty of this petty conceit is a shock to our moral sense. That two men, working independently in different parts of the world, should have hit on the same preposterous expedient for magnifying their task and diminishing its credit, is surely inconceivable. But with the oral hypothesis this stupendous difficulty disappears. The very changes which one man, copying direct from a document, could not have sufficient versatility to make, are made naturally and unconsciously by an army of catechists during thirty or forty years of oral tradition. This is the chief argument for the oral hypothesis, and the upholders of the documentary hypothesis are, as a rule, very reluctant to face it. Dr. Stanton has done so, and therefore propounded his startling compromise. Henceforth it became important to investigate this one point, whether St. Luke, when he wrote, had or had not a copy of St. Mark's Gospel before him.

In March, 1894, a paper of mine was published in the *Expositor* on the proper names in St. Mark, and in the following December a sequel to it appeared in THE THINKER, treating of the proper names in St. Luke. The purpose of these two papers was to show that, if St. Luke had possessed a copy of St. Mark's Gospel, he would not have omitted the proper names which occur in St. Mark, to the extraordinary extent to which he has

omitted them. Neither would he have omitted so many whole sections, nor is he likely to have so capriciously changed the order in certain places.

These arguments have not yet been answered, and I should like to supplement them now.

It is often assumed that St. Luke asserts in the preface to his Gospel that he had read and was making use of those narratives which "many" of his contemporaries had "undertaken to draw up." It seems to me that his language, when carefully examined, decidedly favours the opposite conclusion. He asserts that both they and he derived their information through tradition handed down by the regular catechists from the original eye-witnesses. He does not affirm that his precursors had actually published anything, but rather implies that they undertook the task of writing, and abandoned it. If, however, they did publish Gospels, his own was intended to supersede theirs, not so much by its greater comprehensiveness, as by its stricter accuracy—a result which he could not have attained if he had copied from them.

Again, it is often tacitly assumed that the twelve Apostles were all engaged in narrating their recollections of the words and deeds of Christ. But this cannot have been done officially to any great extent, or a diversity of tradition would have arisen instead of the one stereotyped record which we possess. St. Peter is the only member of the Twelve who is recorded in the Acts of the Apostles to have originated anything. The activity of St. John we gather from his own writings, that of St. Matthew from tradition. And these three are the only eye-witnesses who are said to have produced Gospel history. A number of anonymous authors, some of whom may have been apostles, contributed chapters or verses in St. Matthew and St. Luke, notably the great section Luke ix. 51–xviii. 14; but the other members of the twelve have left no known record.

Again, it is essential to distinguish sharply between St. Peter the preacher and St. Peter the teacher. In the former capacity he dealt with the fulfilment of prophecy, exhorted his converts to live up to their high calling, or reproved them for their failings; in the latter it has long been my contention that he made them commit to memory a Gospel section, repeat it every day, with the addition of new sections, until a considerable body of teaching was acquired, which was frequently recited, and always in the same order, until the order became as much fixed as the subject-matter.

In assuming this, I only assume that St. Peter was wise in his generation, and acted as every one in his circumstances and in that time and place must have acted. He had several thousands of converts to educate, who were all ignorant, and many of them eager to learn. Preaching would not satisfy them nor supply their need. The fashion of the day was to store the memory. There was an unreasoning prejudice against religious books. "Commit nothing to writing" was a maxim with the Rabbis. Neither St. Peter nor his fellows had any literary instincts.

Believing that the end of the age was at hand, they had no sense of duty to posterity.

In the unchanging East, the habit of committing to memory is still strong, and it may confirm what I have written if I produce some examples from ancient and modern times in illustration of the practice.

The first quotation is taken from *A Buddhist Catechism*, published by Messrs. Redway, in London, 1890.

"151. *Were these holy books composed and written by the Buddha himself?*

"Neither by him nor by any of the brethren who were the Buddha's first disciples. It was not the custom in India, in those times, to set in writing any religious or philosophic truths. They were taught by word of mouth from master to pupil, and impressed on the memory by incessant repetition of words and whole passages. In this way they were handed down from one generation to another."

The next quotation is from Professor Max Müller, in the *Christian Commonwealth* for October 4, 1894. It was kindly furnished to me by the Rev. Joseph Twidale.

"At a time when writing did not exist, the human memory was infinitely superior to what it is now. People could remember an enormous amount of what we call poetry, and even prose; nay, they could compose without any writing materials. This is very difficult for us to believe, but we have in Sanskrit literature an accurate description of how a man who was being educated had to learn every day so many lines, and how he learned them and repeated them, going on day after day, always repeating what he had learned, and adding to it. That system is described in books of the fourth century B.C. I have had people in this room who knew by heart the whole of the Rig-Veda, which consists of more than a thousand hymns of about ten lines each, and who could take it up at any point. That is not at all an uncommon thing among educated men in India, but women are not usually educated up to the point. I have had, however, staying here a lady, Rámabhai, who had committed to memory pretty well what would correspond in extent to our Bible. Her father, evidently an enlightened man, had allowed her to be present at the lessons of her brother, and in that way she learned all that he learned. When she was staying with us, I asked some of my friends, professors in the university, who are always somewhat sceptical about this faculty of memory, to come and test this young lady, who was only twenty-two. I gave them the Rig-Veda, the Bhagavad-gêtâ, and other books, telling them they might open them where they liked, and she would go on till they were tired. And so she did, never hesitating for a word."

The third witness is the Ven. Archdeacon Moule, of Mid-China, who said, at a public meeting in Chelmsford, that there is a school at Ning-po to which orphans are taken when twelve years old, and taught. He was asked to examine it, and promised to give an hour. "That will not do,"

was the answer; "it must be a morning." So he gave a morning. He discovered that the children knew the whole of the four Gospels by heart. They could be put on anywhere, and would go straight away, the beginning, middle, or end of a chapter, or the beginning, middle, or end of a verse. And it was no mere parrot-learning. They could explain in their way what they had been taught.

These examples, which I could easily multiply, will show that the memory is capable of the work which I have attributed to it, and that the men of that time and century would be likely to make use of it. But if the teaching was to be carried into distant lands, a band of teachers must have been prepared and sent forth, taking St. Peter's Memoirs with them. These, I maintain, were the catechists, about whose existence and work so much incredulity has been expressed in certain quarters. The Provost of Trinity College, Dublin, Dr. Salmon, objects that I use the word "catechist" in an unusual sense, to signify an instructor of the baptized, whereas, in the third century and afterwards, the catechist instructed the catechumens who were candidates for baptism. Dr. Salmon, however, admits that in the first century neophytes were baptized immediately on their profession of faith in Christ, without either instruction or probation. Does it not follow from this that a catechumen, in the apostolic age, was a newly baptized person? And must not his education have been in accordance with the pressing necessities of the time? When no written Gospel existed, a knowledge of the words and works of Christ was the one thing which was indispensable, and the one thing, therefore, which the catechists may be supposed to have taught.

But neither the catechists nor their work are inventions of mine. I have good warrant for what I have written about them. (1) St. Paul says, "Let him that is catechized in the Word give a share in all good things to him that catechizeth" (Gal. vi. 6). From this verse it is clear that the catechist was an unpaid agent, engaged in a highly important work, and that he taught "the Word," by which I understand the Gospel sections; for (2) St. Luke states that Theophilus had been catechized in that very Gospel history which St. Luke himself proposed to reduce to writing (Luke i. 4); and (3) Apollos "taught with precision the facts concerning Jesus" (Acts xviii. 25).

Dr. Gloag, like Professor Sanday, feels a strong objection to the oral hypothesis, not only in the order of the narratives (which we have already explained), but in the fact that so many insignificant words, such as conjunctions, remain unaltered in all the three Gospels. Surely, they say, such trivial words as these would be the first to disappear in oral teaching. Have we, however, any reason to think that it would be so? The human memory is particularly tenacious of connecting links. A man who recites poetry would break down if he neglected them. When once he has thoroughly mastered his lesson, they become as fixed as the weightier words. It is only during the process of learning, as the records

passed from catechist to catechist, or by deliberate effort, as often in St. Luke's Gospel, that they would be changed. Quite enough of them have been changed to make us suspicious about the use of documents.

If my view of the whole matter is right, the proper persons to write Gospels were the catechists, and the natural thing for them to write was that particular form of oral Gospel which had gradually grown up in their own Church, and which they had long been in the habit of frequently repeating to their pupils. To such persons the labour of writing a Gospel would be small. And we may well believe, as St. Luke tells us, that many of them attempted the task. Why they did not complete it, or why, if they did, their work never gained general acceptance, we are no longer in a position to examine.

St. Mark was a primitive catechist of the earliest type, a pupil of St. Peter, and the translator into Greek of his Aramaic sections. He has given us in his Gospel St. Peter's Memoirs, with a very few remarks and additions of his own. Historical criticism has brought to light the extreme value of his Gospel, as being the nearest approach to St. Peter's actual teaching.

Our First Gospel must have been written by a catechist also. It is called the Gospel "according to St. Matthew," because its distinctive feature is St. Matthew's "utterances of our Lord," which, however, are not given as St. Matthew taught them, but massed together into long discourses or collections of parables for the greater convenience of teaching. St. Peter's Memoirs, however, are the backbone of this Gospel also. And a considerable number of fragments from other sources are embedded in the narrative, but there is very little comment or explanation. It is usual to say that this Gospel was intended for Jewish readers: it would be truer to say that it had been formed in a Jewish Church. Where that Church was situated I do not venture to assert. Not in Judæa, for there is no local colouring, no additional geographical knowledge, such as a Palestinian must surely have contributed. Moreover, the Rev. Thomas Barns points out to me that the Holy Land is called "Syria" (Matt. iv. 24), which is the name of the Roman province of which it formed part. I infer that some Greek-speaking community within the Roman empire is indicated. Alexandria answers to the conditions, but I cannot at present pronounce anything definite. The cradle of this Gospel was Jerusalem, but it grew to maturity elsewhere.

St. Luke was both a catechist and an historian. The earlier part of his Christian life was spent at Philippi, and it is there that he must have formed the main part of his Gospel, though he had rare opportunities for collecting new matter while he waited on St. Paul for two years at Cæsarea. His first two chapters are direct translations from a written document, the original of which my colleague, the Rev. R. H. Kennett, suggests was in New Hebrew rather than Aramaic. They can be retranslated into Hebrew much more readily than into Aramaic, and Hebrew was used

by the learned as Latin is still used in University life. St. Luke was taught the Memoirs of St. Peter when about two-thirds of them only had been composed, and thus his omissions are easily accounted for. Into them he inserted such portions of St. Matthew's "utterances of our Lord" as reached him piecemeal in his distant home, finding places for them according to their subject-matter rather than by their strict chronology, which he had not the means of discovering. His arrangement of them, therefore, differs widely from that of the First Gospel, and is probably even further removed from the true order. The "third cycle" he inserted for the most part bodily into the middle of his work, without any attempt at chronological arrangement. Finally, he interspersed throughout his work a large number of comments and historical notes, thus making his book more complete as a work of art than either of the other Gospels.

Such, according to the oral hypothesis, was the genesis of our three Gospels. It was strictly in accordance with the habits of the time and the place of their birth. All the overwhelming difficulties about omissions and variations in order and language, which beset the documentary hypothesis, disappear. The Gospels were written for local use. In God's providence they were fitted for universal acceptance. They were written for the need of one generation. They have satisfied the requirements of sixty. They were published anonymously. Their authors' names we gather from tradition. They rapidly pushed their way over the Christian world, not by any apostolic edict or Church Council, but because they commended themslves as faithful records to the universal Christian conscience. Out of weakness they became strong.

The oral hypothesis receives very strong confirmation from the writings of the earlier Christian Fathers. These writings teem with quotations from the Gospel history, but it is the rarest exception for such quotations to agree *verbatim* with any one of our Gospels. No doubt the Fathers quoted from memory, but even that will not account for the facts. We hold that they found it easier to quote that oral Gospel which they had learned in their childhood, rather than these written Gospels which had become the treasure of their old age. Even though they read our four Gospels aloud in the Church services, their sermons and writings were embellished with the older reminiscences. For every considerable Church must, under the oral hypothesis, have had a tradition of its own, differing both in contents and wording from that of other Churches, and in particular exhibiting much mixture and many sayings of Christ which are not in our Gospels at all.

Now, contrast with this simplicity the difficulties which beset the documentary hypothesis. And first its advocates, as far as they venture upon any definite statements, are at variance between themselves. One school repudiates the catechists, the other gladly avails itself of their teaching. The former school is compelled to hold, either that the discourses in St. Matthew are free inventions, based on a few scanty reminiscences,

in which case they could hardly have gained the sanction of the Church Catholic; or else that certain documents, which have perished, were written within a few years or even months of the Ascension, while the recollection of our Lord's teaching was still fresh. In either case they do not account for the divergence in wording between St. Matthew and St. Luke, nor for the still wider varieties in Patristic quotations, nor for the loss of these pristine documents.

The other school holds, either that a hypothetical batch of documents based on oral tradition sprang into existence about A.D. 70, rapidly spread over the world so as to reach all our evangelists, were used as sources of our three Gospels, and then perished, leaving no trace behind; or else that St. Mark's Gospel alone was used as a source by St. Matthew and St. Luke, oral tradition doing the rest.

It is here that the problem becomes so complex as to be the despair of the most able and clear-headed thinkers.

To suppose that some of the documents were in Aramaic will not do, unless, as Professor Marshall holds, an oral Greek version accompanied them. The multitudinous varieties in wording are inexplicable unless we hold, with Dr. Stanton, that, if the evangelists had documents, they dared not use them. The circumstances of the time compelled them to prefer the oral tradition which was stored in their own memory, to the most venerable records by apostolic men. And if so, why should we postulate the existence of these documents at all? If the memory of the catechist supplied so much, why should it not have been equal to everything?

Let no one think that this is a barren controversy. Much depends upon it in establishing the truth, the trustworthiness, and the inspiration of God's precious gift to the Church.

EXPOSITORY THOUGHT.

IS THE LAST CLAUSE OF JOHN III. 13 GENUINE?

By Rev. A. Welch.

Καὶ οὐδεὶς ἀναβέβηκεν εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν εἰ μὴ ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβάς ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου [ὁ ὢν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ], T.R., etc.

"And no man hath ascended into heaven, but He that descended out of heaven is the Son of man."

The question before us is one of special interest, but, at the same time, one of special difficulty. We have indicated our opinion by leaving the clause untranslated. Whether that opinion is well or ill founded must be decided by the reader. We have four classes of authorities to examine. (1) Those which present the clause as it stands in the Textus Receptus, which is that exhibited at the top of this paper. (2) That which reads,

ὁ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ. (3) Those which read, ὁ ὢν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. (4) And those which omit the clause altogether. The trial of strength is really between the first and the last of these classes. The only undoubted evidence in favour of the second is the Gospel Lectionary 44. The idea that it was the original reading of Codex A rests, as we hope to show, on no evidence whatever. The reading of the third class is supported by the cursives 80 and 88. To these we are now able to add the recently discovered Sinaitic Syriac palimpsest of the Gospels. This manuscript has the preposition "from" in its full separate form. The fact is interesting and suggestive, but it does not alter our position that the decision must be in favour of either the first or the fourth class of authorities.

The rules of grammar are not to be forgotten in a case of this kind. It will readily be admitted that our translation entirely satisfies these rules. We do not need to justify the supplying of ἐστί. And we are at a loss to understand what necessity the translators of 1611 and the Revisers of 1881 saw for the supplementary word "even." It is in no way necessary to the sense, and only serves to obscure a well-known Greek idiom. Our translation is the natural one, according to the Greek *usus loquendi*. So far, therefore, as grammar is concerned, the verse comes to a legitimate termination with the word "man." If the clause was not added by John, its addition since was not called for to meet any grammatical difficulty. Its presence in the text may be due to some supposed logical necessity. When we read over the verse without the last clause, there is a feeling as if the protasis and apodosis did not perfectly balance. We expect a more explicit assertion in the apodosis than we actually find. Westcott and Hort suggest that the clause was probably introduced to correct any misunderstanding that might arise out of the position of ἀναβέβηκεν as coming before καταβάς. The feeling to which we have referred is very much relieved when we remember that εἰ μὴ does not introduce a directly negative or exceptive proposition. It prepares us rather for a qualification of the statement which preceded it. In this case it gives us to understand that, while no man has ascended into heaven to ascertain God's mind and will, Christ, the Son of God, has become incarnate to reveal to us all that it is necessary for us to know.

The addition of the clause makes the verse look like an ill-patched garment. It introduces a contradiction to the clause which states that Christ came down from heaven. Our Lord nowhere else speaks of Himself as being in heaven while He tabernacled upon earth. But those who plead for the retention of the clause use as one of their strong dogmatic arguments that it furnishes a remarkable proof of our Lord's Divinity. While He was on earth, we are told, He was also, through His Divine nature, at the same time, in heaven. How can such an exposition be harmonized with such words as these?—John vi. 62, "What, then, if ye should behold the Son of man ascending where He was before?" (John xx. 17); "Jesus saith to her, Touch Me not, for I am not yet ascended

to the Father." But, further, if we accept the clause, and construe the verse as our English versions do, we have no definite verb in the apodosis. Ὢν is a participle, introducing an assumption, but not containing a definite proposition. Our versions get over this difficulty *apparently*, but not *really*, by translating, "who is in heaven." A participial clause, without a definite verb, cannot be treated in this way. The literal rendering is, "who [or, 'He who'], being in heaven." This leaves the verse hanging in the air. We do not see how this grammatical difficulty can be overcome by those who accept the words of the clause in question. This clause should have been followed by some definite verb to satisfy the requirements of grammar. The following cases illustrate what we mean: John i. 18, "The only begotten Son which is (ὁ ὢν) in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him;" John vi. 46, "He which is (ὁ ὢν) from God, He hath seen the Father;" John viii. 47, "He that is of God (ὁ ὢν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ) heareth the words of God;" John xviii. 37, "Every one that is of the truth (πᾶς ὁ ὢν ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας) heareth My voice." Such examples might easily have been multiplied almost indefinitely. We have confined ourselves exclusively to John's Gospel, in case it should be thought that there is anything in this evangelist's style inconsistent with the position we have taken up. The rules of grammar, and the laws of thought alike, require a definite verb after ὁ ὢν. We do not, of course, object to the translation of ὁ ὢν by "he who is" when a definite verb follows; but as there is no such verb in the present case, we regard the rendering of our English versions as illegitimate. We go further, and say that, if we retain the clause, the verse cannot be translated grammatically. From all this we infer that the words in dispute could not have proceeded from John's pen, who is never guilty of a glaring grammatical inaccuracy of this kind. They have all the appearance of having been subsequently imported into the text, and in utter disregard of grammatical rule. They were probably put in the margin of some early exemplar, whose pious possessor wished to express his belief in our Lord's ascension, but who had no thought of adapting his words to the apostle's construction, or any desire to have them regarded as of sacred authority. The grammatical form of the clause stamps it with suspicion, to say the very least.

I. The external evidence in support of the clause is furnished at great length by Tischendorf, Scrivener, and Burgon, who proceed upon the fallacious principle of counting authorities without weighing them. Scrivener says, "The clause is contained in A, E, G, H, K, M, S, U, V, Γ, Δ, Λ, Π, and in all cursives save one." Burgon is more minute, "It is found in every manuscript in the world, except five of bad character—is recognized by *all* the Latin and *all* the Syriac versions, as well as by the Coptic, Æthiopic, Georgian, and Armenian—is either quoted or insisted upon by Origen, Hippolytus, Athanasius, Didymus, Aphraates the Persian, Basil the Great, Epiphanius, Nonnus, pseudo-Dionysius Alex., Eustathius; by Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Cyril, each four times;

by Paulus, Bishop of Emesa, Theodorus Mops., Amphilochius, Severus, Theodorus Heracl., Basilius Cil., Cosmas, John Damascene, in three places; and four other ancient Greek writers, besides Ambrose, Novatian, Hilary, Lucifer, Victorinus, Jerome, Cassian, Vigilius, Zeno, Marius, Maximus Taur., Capreolus, Augustine, etc." We have not noted the references which Burgon gives to the works of the different ecclesiastical writers here mentioned. This would have occupied too much of our space. They are all given at the foot of p. 133 of *The Revision Revised*—three articles reprinted from the *Quarterly Review*. We have given this evidence in full, to avoid all suspicion of unfairness.

It would be impossible to enter into a full analysis of all this evidence. The versions are the most difficult to dispose of. Some of them must have been made within two hundred years of John's death. But Griesbach, in his *Symbolæ Criticæ*, makes some remarks which go to show that they may not carry with them so much critical weight after all. He asserts that the manuscripts of the Alexandrian and Western recensions (according to his classification) were grossly corrupted in the age immediately succeeding that of the apostles; and that those which he held in the highest esteem bore evidences of being corrupted on every page by marginal *scholia* and interpolations of the Fathers, and contained innumerable and very serious errors. The recently discovered Syriac palimpsest supports Griesbach's remarks in a remarkable manner. From what has reached the public in connexion with this interesting manuscript, it would appear that the translator has taken great liberties with the words of the sacred penmen. The clause which we are discussing, if it stood in the copy which he used, was tampered with by him. Instead of making it contradictory to the first clause of the apodosis, he makes it a meaningless repetition of that clause. We do not, therefore, feel called upon to accept, without question, the evidence of these ancient versions.

Scrivener quotes Codex A in support of the clause. We are not satisfied that we have here the words of the original scribe. It is admitted on all hands that what was originally written has been erased, and the words of the clause, as they now stand, substituted in its stead. The British Museum authorities have published a beautiful photographic impression of the New Testament portion of this most valuable manuscript. Our examination of two different copies of this impression *at this passage* has revealed to us some important and interesting facts. The clause reads, ὁ ὢν ἐν τῷ οὖνῳ—οὐρανῷ being contracted in this way, evidently to avoid encroaching too much on the margin. The evidence of erasure extends from the right-hand side of ὁ to the marginal line, the letters νῳ being clear and distinct, and showing that they were written on a part of the parchment which had not been interfered with by erasing. The ο is normal in shape; the ω leans considerably towards the left hand, and thus occupies more space than usual. The N, when carefully examined, shows signs of having been originally a K. There are

clear traces of the upper slanting stroke, and what now constitutes the slanting stroke of the N begins about half-way down the left-hand upright stroke, contrary to the scribes' usual way of writing that letter. There is thus not a particle of warrant for the generally received opinion that the original scribe wrote the clause as it now stands, inadvertently omitting ὢν, and having to erase what he had written to get this word inserted. The evidence seems to warrant the conclusion that, as the manuscript originally stood, it contained a reading totally different from any one that has been transmitted to us. The examination of the passage, as presented in the photographic copies, took us so much by surprise that we distrusted our own eyesight, and asked two intelligent, sharp-sighted librarians, who knew nothing of Greek, and who could, therefore, be under no bias, what they saw in the clause. Without any prompting, they at once detected the facts which we have set down. We then began to consider what those facts pointed to, and we found it impossible to resist the conjecture that the original writing was ἐστί καὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ.[1] The ε in ἐστί was, of course, as an uncial, written Є. The erasure of the horizontal stroke would not affect the left-hand side of the letter, but only the right-hand one. The whole word, ЄCTI, written in uncials, would just fill up the space till we come to the N of ΩN, which, we have said, bears traces of having originally been a K. We have nothing to go upon in conjecturing that KΔI TOY ΘЄOY completed the verse, except the traces of a K and the extreme probability that a scribe, wishing to make the Divinity of Christ plain, would so write, thinking that the words had been omitted from the copy which he used, or at all events should have been there. The words, ἐστί καὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ, written in uncials, would just fill up the space to the marginal line, without trenching on the margin; and so we account for the last two letters of οὐρανῷ giving no evidence of erasure. If this way of accounting for the facts which Codex A presents be the true one, then we have succeeded in laying bare a part, at least, of the process by which this passage has been corrupted. No one can say this is not at least a plausible account of the facts. It rounds off the verse with a definite verb, the want of which appears to have been a stumbling-block to many, and seems to supply the matter necessary to balance the protasis and apodosis. Whether the alteration of the clause was made by the original scribe, or by some other hand, we are not expert enough to be able to give an opinion. But what we have said is, we think, enough to make us hesitate in accepting the clause as it stands as being the original words of the Codex, with the omitted ὢν inserted.

Of the other uncials enumerated by Scrivener, C is regarded by experts as belonging to the fifth century, E and Λ to the seventh or eighth, the rest to the ninth or tenth. It is clear, therefore, that these manuscripts do not carry with them overwhelming weight on the score

[1] Possibly Θεοῦ was contracted to Θυ, as in ver. 18.

of antiquity. The cursives are not enumerated, but they can hardly claim greater authority than the uncials.

Then it would be easy to over-estimate the testimony of the ecclesiastical writers referred to. Many of them, no doubt, never troubled themselves about critical questions. Finding the clause as a current gloss in the Churches in early times, many might introduce it into their sermons and writings without looking very carefully to see whether it was in their manuscript or not. There are similar glosses current in the present day, and we can well believe that many who use them, if sitting down to write, would transfer them to their pages, in the belief that they were genuine Scripture. This was far more likely to happen in primitive times, when there were few facilities for reference. Griesbach warns us against placing too much reliance upon the remains of Origen which have come down to us. We cannot be sure that the Latin of Rufinus is correct, and Griesbach says that the copies from which Origen quoted were not always reliable. As to Cyril of Alexandria, Westcott and Hort charge Aubert, his editor, with inserting the clause in question into the text which he printed in 1638; and they add that this is not the only instance in which Aubert has taken liberties with his author. If any one will take the trouble to turn up Cyril's Commentary on John, in *The Library of the Fathers*, at ch. iii. 13, he will find that, while the clause is printed in the text, not a word is said of it in the exposition. It is impossible to resist the conclusion that the words were not before Cyril when he wrote his Commentary, and that Aubert must have inserted them on his own authority. Subsequent editors have copied Aubert slavishly. Then it seems hardly fair to mention Nonnus as an authority on such a question. A metrical paraphrase of John's Gospel in Greek by him is the source of this reading. Burgon was too much of a partisan to be followed with implicit trust.

Scrivener attempts to defend the clause by appealing to the critical rule, that the more difficult reading is to be preferred to the simpler one. But this rule cannot apply here. He says the clause is doubtless difficult; but where is the simpler reading which any one proposes to substitute for it? The question really is between this reading and none at all. No critic in modern times, so far as we are aware, dreams of accepting either of the readings which we have classified as (3) and (4).

Alford appeals, in support of the clause, to ch. i. 18, "The only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him." We fail to see the appropriateness of the appeal. John speaks there of the ascended Christ. He has gone back into the bosom of the Father—*εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ Πατρός*. The phrase is a pregnant one. In this passage with which we are now dealing Christ is speaking of Himself as still on earth. There is no parallel between the two passages.

II. The evidence against the clause is given with considerable fulness by Westcott and Hort. Of the uncials they specify ℵ, B, L, T_b; of the

cursives they can adduce only number 33, which, however, has earned the honourable distinction of being called "queen of the cursives."[1] Of versions they mention the Memphitic and the best Æthiopic Codex. Of ecclesiastical writers they name Cyril of Alexandria's Commentary on the passage, referred to above.

A second branch of the evidence adduced by Westcott and Hort consists of proof of their statement that many quotations of ver. 13 stop short at τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, and that it is morally certain that most of them would have included ὁ ὢν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ if it had stood in the copies which the writers used.[2] They instance Origen on Proverbs, 110 of Tischendorf's edition; the Latin fragment by the same writer on Isaiah, and Eusebius, in two places. (Tischendorf tells us these references are to the work on Psalms, 403, and to the *Ecclesiastical History*, 82.) They refer to Adamant in Origen's *Works*, i. 855. (Is not Adamant another name for Origen himself?) They mention also *The Heresies* of Epiphanius, 487, 911. Gregory of Nazianzen, both in his letter to Cledonius, 87, and in that to Nectarius, his successor in the see of Constantinople, 168; Didymus on the Acts, in Cramer's *Catenæ*, vol. iii. p. 41, Oxon., 1838, which we have verified. They give, in brackets, an alternative reference, "= 1657 Mi." (Does this mean some passage in Migne's *Patrologia Græca?*) Then they adduce Gregory of Nyssa, *Against the Apollinarians*, 6; the spurious writings of Pope Julius of Rome, 119 lag. (? edited by Lagarde). We are told that there are thirteen places in Cyril's writings in which the clause would with moral certainty have been quoted[3] if Cyril had found it in the copy which he used. We are next invited, in brackets, to consult E. P. Pusey on Cyril's *Scholia de Incarnatione Unigeniti*, p. 128. Then we have Jerome on Eph. iv. 10; and, lastly, Ephraem Syrus, as represented by the Armenian translation of his Commentary on the *Diatessaron* of Tatian, 168, 187, 189.

It will hardly be denied by any fair reader that this furnishes a very powerful argument for the excision of the clause from the text, especially if we take into consideration the strong internal evidence which we have stated at the beginning of this paper. In the hands of a special pleader like Burgon, if he had held a brief for this side of the question, it would have been made to appear unanswerable. We attach all the more weight to this evidence when we think of the calm and dispassionate manner in which Westcott and Hort present it.

Scrivener and Burgon make attempts to discredit this evidence, in a way which does not seem to us to do them much credit. Scrivener tries

[1] Westcott and Hort say that C and D are defective here. Scrivener adds F to these.

[2] We here fill in the somewhat severe contractions of Westcott and Hort to the best of our ability. We cannot guarantee absolute, but only approximate, accuracy. Writing in the provinces, we have not had the facilities for reference which the contractions of Westcott and Hort require. We wish they had been a little more liberal with their information.

[3] Westcott (*Speaker's Commentary* on John) refers us to Pusey's *Cyril*, vii. 1, Pref. page xx.

to damage the testimony of ℵ, B, and L by saying that they read in ch. i. 18, μονογενὴς Θεός. This appeal to the *odium theologicum* seems strangely unworthy of so great a man. Burgon brands the five manuscripts which exclude the clause as of bad character. This cannot be called fair criticism, and we do not think the learned world will endorse this *ex parte* judgment. If you condemn these five manuscripts as bad, where, we ask, are the good ones to be found? We think we have shown that A has been tampered with since leaving the hand of the original scribe. No expert has given evidence as to the time at which the clause was inserted in that codex.

Burgon says, "Since we have *proved* that Origen and Didymus, Epiphanius and Cyril, Ambrose and Jerome *recognize* the words in dispute, of what possible textual significancy can it be if presently (because it is sufficient for their purpose) the same Fathers are observed to quote St. John iii. 13 no further than down to the words, '*Son of man*'?" The answer to this is that they may be quoting loosely and recording a popular gloss in the one case, while in the other they are adhering to the words of the codex before them. Again, he says, "Origen, Eusebius, Proclus, Ephraem Syrus, Jerome, Marius, where they are only insisting on the doctrinal significancy of the earlier words, naturally end their quotation at this place." This argument will hardly hold water. The great reason given for the retention of the clause is its doctrinal significancy. Authors writing with a doctrinal object, if they had occasion to quote this thirteenth verse at all, would certainly have quoted the clause in question if it had stood in their copies. The climax of false argumentation is reached when Burgon says, "The two Gregories, writing against the Apollinarian heresy, of course quoted the verse no further than Apollinaris himself was accustomed (for his heresy) to adduce it." There was nothing in Apollinarianism to induce its author to omit the clause in question, if it had stood in the copy which he used. The conclusion seems indisputable that neither the Gregories nor Apollinaris knew anything of it.

The view which we have sought to support is that which Tischendorf accepted in his *Synopsis Evangelica*, published in 1864. He has since repudiated it—we think on very insufficient grounds. We are glad to find ourselves in the company of such competent judges as the late Professor Milligan and Westcott and Hort. After all that has been said, it seems plain that it is much easier to account for its insertion, if not written by John, than for its omission, if it really came from the pen of the sacred writer. Scrivener's concluding words, in his note on the passage, are an outrage on critical intelligence. He says that the manuscripts which exclude the clause are convicted "of the deliberate suppression of one of the most mysterious, yet one of the most glorious, glimpses afforded to us in Scripture of the Saviour on the side of His Proper Divinity."

OTHNIEL.

By Rev. W. J. Deane, M.A.

Among the judges of Israel there are many with whose deeds and characters we are familiar. Eli, Samson, Jephthah, Gideon, Deborah and Barak, are well known, and their lives and actions have been discussed and illustrated in many books and by many authors. There are others, however, who are possessed of marked characteristics, and who exercised a notable influence upon their country's history, that are less recognized, and have met with too scant notice at the hands of students of the Bible. As an example of such, we may adduce Othniel, the deliverer of Israel from the yoke of Chushan-Rishathaim. His name means "Lion of God," and he may be well considered a type of "the Lion of the tribe of Judah" who delivers Israel from its enemies. The period in which he attained to eminence was during the second generation after the conquest of Canaan. His father was Kenaz, a younger brother of Caleb, the famous comrade of Joshua. This seems to be the most probable opinion on the subject of his parentage, but the matter has always been a difficulty. The English Version shows the ambiguity at once, giving, "Othniel the son of Kenaz, Caleb's younger brother" (Josh. xv. 27; Judg. i. 13; iii. 9). The question is whether "brother" is in apposition with Othniel, or with Kenaz. Of course, in a classical language there could be no doubt about the syntax. Thus the Latin Vulgate has, "Othniel, filius Cenez, frater Caleb junior." Of the Septuagint, the chief uncials present, Γοθονιὴλ υἱὸς Κενὲζ ἀδελφοῦ Χάλεβ; but the Alexandrian renders in one place (Judg. i. 13), Κενὲχ ἀδελφὸς Χάλεβ, though in the two other passages it retains ἀδελφοῦ. Pagninus and Montanus translate, "Hothniel, filius Chenaz, fratris Caleb minoris." Nothing can be determined from the Hebrew text, which, in fact, is patient of either rendering. But against the Vulgate translation we have two difficulties arrayed, one genealogical and one chronological. If Othniel is Caleb's brother, how is he son of Kenaz? Caleb's father is named Jephunneh (Numb. xiii. 6), and there is no reason whatever for supposing that Caleb's mother was twice married, and that Caleb and Othniel were half-brothers. In the genealogical list of 1 Chron. iv. 13 Othniel is named as one of the sons of Kenaz. The difficulty is unsatisfactorily met by conjecturing that "son of Kenaz" is equivalent to "Kenizzite," the appellation of the Edomitish tribe to which Jephunneh's family originally belonged, and which seems to have been incorporated with Judah. But why should Othniel be specially mentioned as belonging to this clan, when Caleb's descent was exactly the same (Josh. xiv. 14)? We lay no stress on the fact that, if Othniel is Caleb's brother, he is represented as marrying his own niece; such a union, however repugnant to our feelings and opposed to Christian regulations, being not actually forbidden by Mosaic Law. But it seems to be most

probable that Kenaz was Caleb's brother, and Othniel the latter's nephew. This conclusion is supported by chronological considerations.

It was in punishment of defection from Jehovah and lapses into idolatry and general laxity, that various heathen nations and tribes were permitted to harass and oppress the Israelites after they had won partial possession of Canaan. But this apostasy and indolence did not commence till after the death of Joshua and the elders that outlived him. Joshua died at the age of a hundred and ten; Caleb, probably, was not much younger; and the elder men could not have lived more than ten or a dozen years longer. If Othniel was Caleb's brother, he may have been ten years younger than he; this would make him a hundred years old at Joshua's death, and so would contradict the restriction as to the age of those allowed to enter Canaan (Numb. xiv. 29). Give fifteen years for the development and punishment of the national apostasy, and we have Othniel an old man of a hundred and fifteen at the time of the Mesopotamian invasion, acting as deliverer of his nation after eight years of thraldom, and as judge for forty years more. This would make him more than a hundred and sixty at his death. There can be no doubt that such calculation is erroneous, and we are thus reduced to adopt the other alternative, to which we have already been led. As Caleb's brother's son, Othniel may well have been not more than forty years old at the time of Joshua's death, and to have survived the great leader by thirty years, taking the forty years of his judgeship to be stated in round numbers, and not to be pressed as exactly accurate.

The first appearance of Othniel in Scripture is as the captor of Kirjath-Sepher ("Book-City"), afterwards called Debir, a town assigned in the distribution to his uncle Caleb, but still occupied by its old inhabitants. Joshua, indeed, had conquered it and slain its king and people (Josh. x. 39), but he had not been able to detach a force to retain it, and on his departure it had been repeopled by the natives. Situated about twelve miles south-west of Hebron, a frontier stronghold commanding the roads from Egypt and the desert, it had, if we may judge from the various names which it bore, a curious and eventful history. It was called not only Kirjath-Sepher, but also Kirjath-Sannah ("Town of Thorns" or "of Palms"), and Debir ("a Recess," or as Jerome renders, "an Oracle"). This last name is the term used to denote the holiest place of Solomon's temple (1 Kings vi. 5). From these appellations we gather that Kirjath-Sepher was once a seat of learning, a home of Canaanite culture, and the site of a celebrated oracle. Its modern representative is the village of *Dhaheriyeh*, where recent excavations have shown traces of strong fortifications and dwellings extending over a large area, and indicating a large and populous city. It was important that the Israelites should regain possession of the place, not only as being of itself a fair and strong town, but also as being the head of a certain confederacy of cities, whose allegiance depended upon the action and fate of the capital. Caleb perceived the necessity of promptness

in this juncture, and in order to stimulate the ardour of his soldiers in the attack, he promised to give his daughter Achsah in marriage to the warrior who succeeded in capturing it. She was a maiden doubtless of pre-eminent beauty, and many had aspired to her hand. She was also, as we see from her subsequent actions, one possessed of a large share of prudence and worldly wisdom, and her dower was large and valuable. Othniel, her cousin, knew and loved her, and determined to win her for himself. Such an offer as that of her father was made by Saul at the challenge of Goliath, when the guerdon was won by David; so David himself promised to give the generalship of the army to the hero who should first smite the Jebusites, and conferred the office on his nephew Joab, who bravely fulfilled the condition. Fired by love, and eager to distinguish himself, Othniel, now a man of mature age, led a chosen band of comrades against the city. The details of the attack are not narrated, but it was successful. Nothing could withstand the impetuous assault of soldiers who were fighting the battles of the Lord, and had full confidence in their leader. The city was taken, and Othniel received his promised reward. And now occurred an incident which gives an insight into the characters of the two chief actors. The wedding duly took place in accordance with the customs of the time. Othniel, accompanied by a cavalcade of friends, went to Caleb's house at Hebron, to bring his bride to his own house, probably at Debir. Achsah had received from her father as dowry a tract of land in the Negeb, which faced the south, and, like most of that district, was wholly destitute of water. The astute maiden was not satisfied with this possession, and determined to obtain from her father a field better fitted for cultivation. She had set her heart on a certain valley in the neighbourhood, which was blessed with a quite phenomenal supply of water. Here, at El-Dilbeh, is found a considerable brook which never dries up under summer heat, and both higher up the glen and lower down gush forth many perennial springs—"the upper and nether springs"—which gave to the region an unusual fertility. Achsah urged her young husband to ask this "field" of her father, now that his feelings were deeply excited in favour of the young couple. Othniel, however, could not be induced to make the request. Like all high-spirited men, he did not like to put himself under an obligation; he could not beg a favour. The reward of his prowess freely offered, he could accept, but to ask for more, as if he were a needy suppliant, or as if he did not deem his living prize sufficient guerdon,—this was repugnant to him, and he absolutely declined to move in the matter. Achsah was not so easily satisfied. She had no scruples about obtaining all she wanted; no delicacy of feeling stood in her way; worldly interest was paramount in her mind, and she was far from reciprocating the bridegroom's ideas. Riding in the cavalcade by her father's side, she suddenly, to Caleb's great surprise, flung herself from the ass which carried her, and with Oriental impressiveness, kneeling in the road and raising suppliant hands, she exclaimed, "Give me a blessing, a worthy

dowry; for that thou hast given me the land of the Negeb, give me also springs of water." Caleb could not refuse such a petition, and she was rewarded with the much-coveted inheritance.

We now come to the next appearance of Othniel in sacred history, which introduces him in the character of the first judge of Israel. After the death of Joshua and his contemporaries, a generation arose which rebelled against the restrictions of the sublime Law of Moses. Mosaic legislation was far above the level of the average Israelite, who, indeed, in culture and enlightenment, was vastly inferior to the Egyptian, from whom he had been rescued. The institutions under which he lived were not duly appreciated, and when the restraining hand and revered authority of the great leader were removed, the people turned readily to the surrounding tribes, taking example by them and learning their devotions and their vices. They made intermarriages with the heathen, worshipped at the same altars, forsaking the only Lord, and paying equal divine honour to Baal and Ashtaroth. National apostasy was followed by national chastisement. The Canaanite tribes, still suffering from recent defeat and very severe treatment, were not yet capable of making head against the dominant Israelites, but God raised up oppressors among surrounding nations. He used these as His instruments in punishing His backsliding people. Then, when their misery forced them to feel their entire dependence upon Jehovah and to flee to Him for relief, He inspired the men called judges to rouse them to resistance, to lead them to victory, and to act as rulers for a time. The first of these dictators was Othniel, who rescued his countrymen from their first great oppressor, Cushan-Rishathaim, King of Mesopotamia. It is difficult to identify this monarch with any potentate known to history or mentioned in the monuments. His name is explained to mean "Cush of double wickedness," or "Most wicked Cushite," but this is very doubtful. The Targum, Syriac, and Arabic virtually render, "Cushan the wicked, King of Syria on the Euphrates." Doubtless Rishathaim is not an abstract noun, but a proper name, and the whole word is not of Hebrew but of foreign origin. The LXX. attempts no interpretation, but transliterates the whole name thus: Χουσαρσαθαίμ. Mesopotamia is, in the Hebrew, *Aram-naharaim*, "Syria of the two rivers;" in the Greek, Συρίας ποταμῶν, or in some manuscripts, Συρίας Μεσοποταμίας ποταμῶν, which denotes the position of the country lying between the Tigris and Euphrates. Josephus (*Ant.*, v. 3. 2) calls the monarch "Chusarthos, King of the Assyrians." He is identified by Rawlinson with Asshur-ris-ilim, who ascended the throne of Assyria about B.C. 1150, was a great conqueror and builder, and is called in an extant inscription, "the powerful king, subduer of rebellious countries." He is also celebrated as being the father of Tiglath-pileser I., one of the most successful of the Assyrian kings, who extended the limits of his dominion in every direction. But there are fatal objections to the above identification. The tyrant of Othniel's time flourished B.C. 1300, some

hundred and fifty years before Asshur-ris-ilim; nor do we read that this king among all his conquests ever enumerated Canaan or Phœnicia. The name of the oppressor, experts tell us (*e.g.* Hitzig), is obviously Turanian, and he most probably was one of the potentates who reigned at Nineveh previously to the Semitic conquest of the country. But without further aid from the monuments, we are unable to fix on any personage in authentic history as the original of this conqueror. We know that Egypt had carried her arms into Mesopotamia before this period, and it is possible that it was in the course of operations or reprisals against that country that Cushan-Rishathaim invaded Palestine.

His oppression extended over the whole land, and was especially heavy in the territory of Judah. According to Josephus, the Hebrews had not submitted to the yoke without a struggle; but they had learned to live effeminately; the generation of hardy warriors who had won the promised inheritance had died out; they had no bond of union, now that true religion had lost its hold upon them; there was no great leader to rally them to organized resistance; and their desultory efforts met only with disasters. Numbers perished miserably; their strongholds were taken by assault or siege. Many of them, through base fear and cowardice, fell away to the invader, others submitted to a heavy tribute which it was almost impossible for them to pay. The impost, collected by the chiefs of the towns and villages, in kind, not money, had to be conveyed to the seat of the empire, probably Nineveh, and there presented to the king by the heads of the conquered nation. Such a proceeding is often engraven on the Eastern monuments; and we have an instance of the same in the age immediately following the present, when Ehud took the apportioned tribute to Eglon, King of Moab (Judg. iii. 17). A people accustomed to independence, and not inured to taxation, felt most bitterly, not only the weight of the exaction, but also the degradation of this public acknowledgment of their vassalage. This state of things continued for eight years, till the people had learned their error, and turned to the Lord for relief. Then deliverance came. We read, "The Lord raised up a deliverer to the children of Israel, even Othniel . . . and the Spirit of the Lord came upon him, and he judged Israel, and went out to war." Every good gift is attributed to the Holy Spirit, not only prophecy and the power of working miracles, but every act which overpasses the ordinary faculties of man, or which, uninspired and unassisted by Divine aid, he would not venture to undertake. Othniel's first movement probably was levelled against the tribute. He incited the people to refuse to send it as heretofore. This was deemed an act of rebellion, and was chastised by a fresh invasion, which might naturally have disheartened a chieftain who looked not beyond this present world. It was expected and provided against by Othniel. The Greek historian states that he was admonished by God not to think meanly of his countrymen, though reduced to the most abject condition, but to take courage and lead them to regain their

freedom. In obedience to this oracle, he collected some companions who were willing to share with him the perils of the enterprise, gallant souls who were ashamed at the present position of affairs, and were solicitous of a change for the better. With these he first attacked isolated posts of the invaders, and slew the troops placed there; then, when these first successes drew to his side a multitude of Israelites thirsting for freedom, and exasperated against the oppressors, he dared to join battle with the Assyrians, and, putting them to flight, forced them to retreat beyond the Euphrates. Details of the engagement are entirely wanting, and its locality is not determined. Scripture says merely, "The Lord delivered Chushan-Rishathaim, King of Mesopotamia, into his hand; and his hand prevailed against Chushan-Rishathaim." That the victory was complete and crushing is proved by the result: "The land had rest forty years." Othniel was a man of singular capacity, brave, straightforward, unselfish, a single-hearted patriot. His countrymen recognized his superiority, and confirmed the Divine election by unanimously acclaiming him as ruler and judge. And his rule was beneficent and effective, being always on the side of justice and religion, so that during his life there was no turning aside from the Law of the Lord, and a great, though only temporary, reformation was accomplished. Modest and naturally retiring, like Joan of Arc, he was drawn by irresistible influence to organize and to set himself at the head of a national rebellion; and he felt sure of success, because God was with him. He sank to rest in a good old age, respected and honoured by the whole community; and tradition long pointed to his resting-place on Jebel-er-Remeideh, near Hebron.

This was Israel's first encounter with the Assyrians, who afterwards proved such relentless enemies to them; and it shows the wonderful energy and skill of the Hebrew leader, that he was able to arouse the depressed spirits of his contemporaries, and to contend successfully against this great Oriental power. It was probably only a comparatively small force which he had to oppose, but one composed of hardy veterans, well armed, well officered, infantry and cavalry, to which, in all respects, the Hebrews were inferior. But Othniel, when once engaged in the enterprise, was not dismayed by difficulties. He had no private interests to subserve; he was fighting for God and his country, and could say with confidence, as he entered on the unequal contest, "The Lord of hosts is with us, the God of Jacob is our Refuge."

JOEL: THE LOCUSTS.

By Rev. Professor G. G. Cameron, D.D.

What an interesting book Joel is! It is not large, but it contains more evangelical truth, and more of the peculiar imagery employed elsewhere in the Bible, than one finds in many other prophecies of greater length.

Of late this book has become a puzzle to critics. It is embedded in the heart of the Old Testament prophetical books, and opinion is sharply divided as to whether it should be reckoned among the earliest or assigned a place among the very latest. The internal evidence, on which the determination of the date depends, has been variously understood; and at present it seems hopeless to arrive at a conclusion which will be generally accepted. The practical teaching of the book, however, which is of great value, is not seriously affected by the question of the date.

The most striking part of the book is that in which the locust-invasion is described. What are we to understand by these locusts? The answer to this question differs as widely as to that concerning the date of the prophecy. Some hold (and this is becoming more and more the general opinion) that the locusts are real, and that the prophet describes an actual locust-invasion. Others, believing that the nations summoned for judgment in ch. iv. 2 (A.V., ch. iii. 2) are represented by the locusts in the previous chapters, explain the references to the locusts allegorically. The creatures are not real, but figurative. What is before the prophet's mind is, the world-powers opposed to the Church, which are allowed to oppress and desolate the Church for a time, but in the end (as in the last chapter of the book) are taken in hand by Jehovah and disposed of. A third opinion is that the locusts are neither real nor figurative, but apocalyptic —a sort of supernatural creatures, which may fitly find a place in a vision of the last things, corresponding to the locusts in the New Testament Apocalypse (cf. Rev. ix. 2–11).

Now, it should be noted that, if the locusts are not real, the prophecy has no direct application to the prophet's contemporaries, or to the condition of the Church in his day. It is quite true that the prophecy contains a call to repentance of a serious character. It is also plain that the locust-invasion supplies the only reason for this appeal suggested by the narrative. But if the allegorical or apocalyptic explanation of the locusts is accepted, there is, of course, no actual invasion by locusts, and the appeal to repentance vanishes into thin air.

The question is—Can the locusts be disposed of figuratively or apocalyptically? The text must be examined, and allowed to answer the question. A severe drought is associated with the locust-invasion, and the details in which the calamity that falls upon the country is depicted are sufficiently striking. First, the most valuable fruit trees are selected. The vine is wasted. The fig tree is not merely stripped of its leaves—the very bark is torn off, and trunk and branches are left bare (ch. i. 7). Next, the grain-crop is dealt with, and the calamity is found to be as severe as in the case of the fruit (ch. i. 10, 11). The prophet lingers over the desolation which has been wrought. He returns to it again and again, as if he could not withdraw his mind from the contemplation of it. He pushes the description into regions which, if the visitation were not real, we should scarcely expect to be referred to. The soil is prepared for

the seed, and the seed is sown; but the drought is so severe that there is not moisture to bring the precious grain to life; the seed shrivels up in the hot earth and dies (ver. 17). The barns are empty and left to fall into decay, because the fields supply no crop to store in them (ver. 17). A calamity of this kind must involve the beasts of the field in great suffering; and the prophet's language in ch. i. 18–20 is specially interesting and important. "How do the beasts groan! the herds of cattle are perplexed, because they have no pasture; yea, the flocks of sheep are made desolate. O Lord, to Thee do I cry: for the fire hath devoured the pastures of the wilderness, and the flame hath burned all the trees of the field. Yea, the beasts of the field pant unto Thee: for the water-brooks are dried up," etc. How natural the picture is! The irrational creatures cannot understand the abnormal circumstances in which they find themselves placed. In their perplexity they turn for relief to the right and to the left, and, finding none, they give expression to their sufferings in inarticulate moans. The prophet sympathizes with them. Their mute appeal affects him, if possible, more powerfully than the sufferings of his fellow-citizens. In view of their pitiful condition, he cannot restrain himself. The appeal in their behalf seems to pass his lips instinctively, "O Lord, to Thee do I cry: for the fire hath devoured the pastures of the wilderness," etc. (ver. 19). Is all this a piece of fancy work? Are these dumb creatures, like the locusts, a pure creation of the prophet's? Was there not an actual drought? Was there not a single ox or cow whose sufferings evoked the prophet's abrupt appeal to Jehovah? Is the narrative in this part of the book a pure work of imagination, produced by some recluse of post-Exilic times, brooding over the past history of the Church, and giving this peculiar forecast of the future? If it is, the inspiration of Scripture, which, on any view, involves a problem of sufficient perplexity, becomes invested with difficulties from which it would be wise, if possible, to keep it free.

But this is not all. In ch. ii. the prophet returns to this subject. Further details are given of the drought and the locusts (vers. 2–10). And the picture presented is such that it is scarcely possible to regard the description as ideal. An invading army sweeps over the country. Before the invading host appeared, the land was like a garden of Eden; when the hostile force has passed, it is a desolate wilderness (ver. 3). The language should be carefully noted. If the reports of travellers who have observed the movements of locusts may be relied on, every detail in the prophet's description is true to nature. When crossing a mountain ridge, these creatures fly so close to the summit that to one at a distance, though they are on the wing, they seem to leap (cf. vers. 4, 5). The noise made by a countless mass of locusts on the move is compared by travellers to a variety of sounds with which we are familiar; our prophet, true to the thought of an invading army, which is before his mind, selects the rumbling of the wheels of the war-chariots (ver. 5; and cf. Rev. ix. 2, ff.).

Of great importance are vers. 7–10. If the language is figurative,

the locusts represent the world-power, or powers opposed to the Church. What the prophet has before his view, in that case, is men—warriors led by a Sennacherib, a Nebuchadnezzar, or such-like. He tells us that these invaders "run like mighty men" (ver. 7): like whom else or what else should they run, if they were actually mighty men? "They climb the wall like men of war" (ver. 7): if they were really human warriors, what does the prophet mean by this comparison? It is unnecessary to dwell on every detail of the picture presented by the prophet in these verses (7–10)—a picture as striking, perhaps, as any of the kind contained in Old Testament prophecy. It is the picture of an army going steadily forward, in unbroken ranks, to the accomplishment of its work. But, though these invaders climb upon the walls, it is not said that they overthrow them. They leap upon the city; but there is not a hint that their purpose is to destroy it. The ravages wrought by them are confined to the field. Not a man falls before them. The people suffer, indeed; but it is indirectly, through the destruction of their crops, trees, etc. Moreover, when the prophet urges the people to repent, with the view of propitiating Jehovah, the effect of the withdrawal of the judgment before his mind is, not the sparing of the lives of the inhabitants, but the renewal of fertility to the earth, so that there should no longer be the lack of the materials required for the daily meal offering and drink offering (ver. 14). The description in these verses (7, ff.), which is as striking and detailed as any in the prophecy, loses its point, and raises an important question as to the literary character and value of the book, if the locusts are not real, but figurative.

Entirely in keeping with the view just presented are the words of vers. 22–26, in which the Divine favour and blessing are promised as the fruit of repentance on the part of the people.

It is very difficult to suggest a satisfactory explanation of these verses if the prophet has before his mind, not real locusts, but a horde of cruel men sweeping over the country, and leaving ruin behind them; and not less difficult if the locusts are apocalyptic. The work assigned to the locusts by the apocalyptic seer is of so entirely different a kind from that described in Joel (cf. Rev. ix. 2–6), that, on general grounds, the probability is against the apocalyptic explanation of Joel; while the description in our prophet is so detailed and precise that it is scarcely possible to believe that he had not an actual locust-invasion before his eyes.

Upon the whole, there should be little hesitation in admitting a real invasion of locusts. Such an invasion is, in any circumstances, a serious calamity for an agricultural people like Israel. The invasion depicted in this prophecy is, obviously, exceptionally severe. The prophet finds in it the basis of his message to the Church. He recognizes it as a special judgment from Heaven; and, as the representative and spokesman of Jehovah, he proceeds to use it for the instruction of the Church.

THE DIVINE ORDER OF PROVIDENCE AND GRACE.

By Rev. Hugh Macmillan, D.D., LL.D., F.R.S.E.

"So the last shall be first, and the first last."—Matt. xx. 16.

A large class of plants produce their blossoms on a long spike or stem, which botanists call a *raceme*. One of the most familiar examples of this floral arrangement may be seen in the common foxglove. When this plant is in flower in July, it develops the largest and finest blossoms on the lowest parts of the inflorescence. The blossoms grow smaller in size and fainter in colour as they ascend the stem, until at the top they are mere green buds, causing the head of the stem to bend down with a graceful curve. Nature thus ordains that the blossoms that are lowest down and nearest to the broad foliage should expand first, and perform their part in the economy of the plant; and that step by step, in orderly succession, the blossoms that are above them should open their beautiful thimbles and become crimson and discharge their functions. In this way one after another unfolds, fulfils its part, and fades; so that long after the first blossom has withered and passed away, leaving behind on the stem the green fruit which it formed, the last blossom at the top, overlooking the embers of the preceding floral pageantry, is only opening its petals to the sun, and is in the first fresh flush of its beauty. The first blossom on the foxglove stem is thus the last, and the last first. Each has had its share in the vital effluence of the plant, its own day of unfolding, when it was the chief glory of the stem that bore it, its visitation of insects for the fertilization of its seed, its opportunity of doing its own special work and adding its own individual contribution to the general storehouse. Each in its turn is first, while it is in its prime; and each in its turn is last, when it has withered and given place to its successor. And the last, solitary survivor on the top of the stem concentrates in itself the beauty that vanished from the others, and in this last flush of floral splendour bids adieu to the summer world.

In the formation of the efflorescence of the foxglove—one of those lilies of the field whose mode of growth our Saviour bade us consider—we have a familiar illustration of all God's developments in the natural and human worlds. In an orderly succession of the same kind as we see on a miniature scale in the blossoms of the foxglove, all the great processes of nature and of human history proceed. The tribes of plants that were first and grandest in the floral history of the earth, and which covered uniformly the dry land from pole to pole, passed away, and gave place to other tribes of plants suited to the altered circumstances; and their survivors and representatives now occupy a subordinate rank in the vegetable kingdom, and an obscure position in the world. At one time the ferns and mosses which formed our coal-beds were the dominant forms that took possession of the whole earth, whereas now they are the mere

plebeians of the vegetable kingdom; while plants that during the Carboniferous period were hid and overpowered by the grandeur of primitive forms around them, now form magnificent forests, and plants of fairer form, brighter hue, and nobler use, formerly altogether unknown, beautify and gladden the garden, the meadow, the corn-field, and the forest, and exercise a most important part in the material prosperity and in the intellectual and spiritual discipline of man.

So likewise has it been in regard to the progress of the human race. Nations that early reached the summit of power and prosperity retrograded and retired, to give room upon the stage of history to new races that carried the growth of civilization a few points higher up the scale, only to fade and pass away in their turn. The Egyptians were the first to put forth the blossom of humanity and ripen its fairest fruit; next followed the Assyrians; then the Greeks; then the Romans; then the Teutonic races; then the Saracens and Moors; and now the Anglo-Saxon race is unfolding at the summit of the stem the highest and grandest flower which mankind has yet developed. Only by the withering of the old growths of civilization could the new be formed; and the races that were barbarous and unknown when other races were at the climax of their refinement and fame have come to the front, to lead the van of human progress and to unfold all the latent vigour of human nature, while the corruption of selfishness and luxury has wrought its disastrous work upon the preceding nationalities. There were first among the human races that are last now; and there were last in the zenith of the others that are first now.

So was it likewise in a most striking manner in regard to God's dispensations of mercy to mankind. The object apparently of our Lord's parable of the labourers in the vineyard was to show the law of orderly succession in these dispensations—to teach the same lesson which the common foxglove by the wayside conveys to every thoughtful and instructed passer-by. The kingdom of heaven, in its revelation to men and its establishment upon earth, was just like the successive unfolding of the flowery bells up the stem of the foxglove—one opening, while that below it is shutting; one expanding in fresh fair life and promise of usefulness, while another is withering away in the weakness and completed uses of old age. It is like a householder hiring labourers for his vineyard in the morning, at the third hour of the day, at the sixth and ninth hours, and finally at the eleventh hour. All the labourers, those who bore the burden and heat of the day, and those who wrought but one hour at the close, received the same reward; just as the flowers that appear in succession on the stem of the foxglove produce the same result; the fruit formed by the last blossom which opens on the top of the floral stem, developed more rapidly owing to the lateness of the season, being as good as the fruit formed long before by the blossom which first opened at the foot of the stem, and continued all the time working

out the purposes of life, while the other was idle and dormant in the green bud.

Looking at the interpretation of the parable from this point of view, the difficulties supposed to be involved in it vanish. Our Saviour uttered it, we have reason to believe, to meet and answer an idea which existed in the minds of the Jews and to which they must have given expression in His hearing. That idea was that the Jews stood first in the favour of God, because of the priority of their election; that they enjoyed a monopoly of the blessings of Heaven, because these blessings came to them first of all. By the parable of the householder employing his servants at different hours of the day, Jesus strove to dispel this delusion. He showed them that there must be an historical sequence in the revelation of God and the bestowal of His blessings. In the nature of things He must begin with some nation or race; but priority does not imply higher worthiness or special or exclusive favour. To be first is not necessarily to be best; to be last is not necessarily to be worst. It is merely an indication of the orderly arrangement that must exist in the providence of God, as in the succession of plants that bloom through the different seasons, or the succession of blossoms that open on the same floral stem. It would be as reasonable to suppose that the bluebell was less valuable in God's sight, because it blooms at the beginning of autumn, than the primrose, which puts forth its blossoms in spring; or that the lowest thimble on the flowering stem of the foxglove was more precious than the highest, because it put forth its petals first. All would have an opportunity, in due order and succession, of occupying the same position, and fulfilling the same function, and achieving the same result. There must be an order in the unfolding of God's dispensations and purposes of grace to mankind; but the order is in itself no proof of moral character or special favour. The workman that was first called to labour in the vineyard was not necessarily better than the workman that was last called. There is nothing in the parable to warrant the assumption that some of the labourers worked with greater skill or faithfulness, or produced more valuable results than the others. It is not a question of the fidelity of the work or the duration of it, but merely a question of the order in which different individuals are called to it—an order which God's wisdom and grace can alone determine; and on this footing of the different periods at which they are set to work, over which they themselves have no control, we can easily see the justice of an equal reward for them all. The calling of the Jews first was not privative to the Gentiles, who at a late period, but still in their own appointed order and time, were to be brought into the kingdom of God. The salvation of the Gentiles, when it should come, would be as good as the salvation of the Jews. The same reward would be given to both.

The parable was meant to teach the disciples also that their own earlier calling by Christ did not of itself confer upon them privileges and

blessings which would not be enjoyed by those who should be called at a later period. They should both be placed on an equal footing, according to the free and unconditional award of Divine grace. The last disciples would, in their turn, enjoy the advantages of the first disciples. The one would decrease while the other would increase, in the order of Divine providence. Instead of the fathers would be the children, who in their turn would be fathers of the succeeding race; and thus God's Church would be a joy of many generations. To patriarchs, prophets, and teachers, to office-bearers and members of the Church, it should be equally true that mere priority of calling or privilege would not involve meritorious precedence. Those who have lived at successive periods in the Church would not receive a special reward on account of the difference of place assigned to them in the gradual unfolding of the kingdom of God. The last in the order of providence shall be first when its own turn comes, and the first shall be last when its own turn is over. "None shall miss the blessing through the mere order of the dispensations."

And so interpreting the parable, we can easily understand how the sameness of the reward should be grounded upon the fact that the different times of men's calling is of Divine, not of human, appointment. It was not the labourers themselves who went voluntarily to work at different periods of the day, but God who called them; and over the times of their calling they could manifestly exercise no control. Their own choice had nothing to do with the matter. We are here face to face with the sovereignty of God. He adjusts each person to his own place in His providential scheme. He invites some labourers to work in His vineyard in the morning, some at midday, some in the afternoon, and some at the last hour. This is no capricious arrangement, no mere exercise of absolute power. We may be sure that a wise celestial equity regulates it. And He whose sovereign choice, and not any will of their own, determines the position of men in His *seriatim* scheme of work, admits the validity of the excuse urged by those who are waiting all day long in the market-place. They are in the place where work is to be found; they are waiting for it and equipped for it; they are willing to be hired; and it is no fault of theirs that no man has hired them. They are idle simply because they cannot help it. They would very much rather be at work; and they envy those who have found congenial tasks to do, as they wear out heart and soul in the dreary suspense. And does not this feature of the parable admirably represent the attitude of the heathen world towards the work of God? Even in their grossest idolatries they were seeking after God, if haply they might find Him; they were filling up, with their idols of gold, and silver, and wood, and stone, and with their superstitions, the dreary void of their hearts, that were crying out instinctively for the living God—the weary time that they were standing idle because no work of Heaven had been given to them to do. Their worship of God in ways of their own devising, the best that they knew, showed that they had not

abandoned the market-place where they expected God to hire them; that they had not given up the effort to get satisfaction in the service of God, where alone they felt, by a deep instinct of their hearts, they could find it.

We cannot fathom the mystery that underlies the postponement of the call of the Gentiles to a late hour in the world's history. We cannot understand why God should have waited during long ages for this unfolding of His purpose of grace to mankind. But we know that, while "the fulness of time" was slowly and silently accomplishing itself, through the almost interminably sad, weary day of pagan ignorance, the Gentiles had been longing for a Deliverer—waiting to be hired by the unknown God, whom, as Paul tells us, they ignorantly worshipped. We see, in the eagerness with which the Gentiles embraced the gospel of Jesus when it was preached to them, the explanation of the reason why they were kept so long waiting idle in the market-place. That long, dreary season of forced inaction and suspense was God's discipline of patience. While they were standing idle in the market-place, looking for work, God had been training them for the doing of that work when in the eleventh hour they should be called to it. And when the work of God came to them, how eagerly they rushed to the vineyard! How zealously they set themselves to do their one hour's work! Every careful reader of the Acts of the Apostles must be struck with the fresh enthusiasm with which the converts from paganism rushed into the kingdom of God when the gates were thrown open, compared with the unbelief and spiritual coldness and apathy of the Jews. And we feel that not in vain were the Gentiles left to stand idle in the market-place during the eleven hours of the day—that God was preparing all the time to do great things for them, whereof they should be glad. We feel that if the Jews were called first, and the pagans were left sad and wistful in the streets, the close of the day put matters right. God rewarded the work which it was in the hearts of those workmen who stood idle in the market-place all day to do, as He rewarded the work which those who bore the burden and heat of the day in the vineyard had actually accomplished. He took the will for the deed, and gave to their will the wages which their want of opportunity had not allowed them to earn. The Gentiles, aliens so long from the commonwealth of Israel, would be put on the same level, and admitted to the same privileges, as the covenant people. The last would thus be first, and the first last; and the sublime equity of God's dealings was thus displayed.

And is it not the same still? The problem of heathen darkness is as mysterious now as it was at the coming of Christ. We cannot understand why the fulness of time when Christianity shall be universal should be so long in coming, any more than thoughtful minds in the ages before the Christian era could understand why the fulness of time when the Messiah should come was so long in being fulfilled. Why are the heathen nations left all day to the eleventh hour standing idle in the market-place,

while God has given to the Christian nations work during all the day in His vineyard? I believe that the heathen can say, as truly now as the heathen in the pre-Christian ages, "No man hath hired us." They are standing idle, but it is in the market-place. They are waiting, but it is for work. They are groping in the darkness, but it is for God. They are worshipping idols, but these idols are all that they know of what their hearts are longing for. What else is the whole religion of heathendom but an evidence that "no man hath hired" these poor darkened labourers; that they are standing idle in the market-place, waiting, longing for the coming of Him who alone has the right and the power to provide adequate employment for all their faculties? What is all their superstition but a proof that they are seeking for God's work, and are miserable without it? And we may be sure that the compassionate God would not have allowed the heathen world to struggle through those eleven hours of weary suspense and enforced idleness if He had not arranged from the beginning the time and the way of their redemption. They are suffered to feel after God, because God is preparing to reveal Himself. The labourer is allowed to stand idle all day in the market-place, because God is thus training him up for the work to which He will assuredly come to call him in His own good time. Already we see tokens not a few that "at eventide it shall be light;" that the sun which has been darkened all day by clouds shall burst through and flood the world with radiance, transfiguring the very clouds that obscured his shining with his glory. And in the long run it will be seen that the weary delay in admitting the heathen to the enjoyment of the same blessings with Christian nations is part of a great plan of mercy, according to which they "shall come from the north, and the south, and the east, and the west, and sit down with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of God." There are nations still in the most rudimentary condition of knowledge and civilization that shall yet give their labours to the cause of Christ, and add their work to the vast attainments of mankind. And their work will not be less valuable because of the long delay. God will give unto this last even as unto us.

We are apt to think that we suffer many disadvantages because of our great removal in time from the first age of Christianity. That age seems to us to have been first in privilege. Those who lived in the days of our Lord, who heard His wonderful words, and saw His wonderful works, had the evidence of the senses. Daily miracles were performed to create and support faith; and heaven had become visible to men in the Person and ministry of the Son of God. We envy the disciples who lived with Him on the most intimate terms, and imagine that, were we placed in similar circumstances, we could not but believe. We look back with longing to the blessed intercourse on the shores of the Galilæan lake, and the glorious revelation of the Transfiguration Mount, and the endearing relations of the home in Bethany and the upper chamber in Jerusalem; and we feel that in the earthly presence of the Son of God we could not fail to have

a heavenly fellowship. Everything in those hallowed days tended to make it easy to lead a holy life. There was a freshness of spiritual feeling, a glow of heavenly hope, which have since vanished through the effect of long habit and familiarity. And if we could only have questioned the Lord Jesus, or even those who had seen Him, how many a difficulty which now seems insoluble would have been removed, how many an obscurity in which our faith loses its bright hues would be cleared up!

So we think. But there is a sense in which those who were thus first in the order of Christ's manifestation of Himself to the world were last, and those who are now last are first. We look back upon the experience of the first ages, as we look upon a landscape on the far horizon, and we yield to the enchantment which distance lends to every mental as well as physical view. The past is invested by fond memory with a sunset radiance, in which all its defects vanish, and it acquires a charm unknown in actual experience. And so with the retrospect of the early years of Christianity. All the disadvantages peculiar to the period have been winnowed away by the breath of time, and we see only the excellences, the lofty deeds, and the noble privileges for which they were distinguished.

But it was not all gain in those wonderful days when Jesus sojourned with men. His bodily presence was a hindrance to the faith of those who saw Him. It was difficult for them to realize spiritual fellowship with Him. They were so engrossed with wonder and observation that they had no calmness of mind or leisure for reflection. There was the veil of their own imperfect vision and of His humiliation between them; and it is certain that the disciples had not the rapture of communion, nor the assurance of His Divine nature and mission, with which we credit them. Indeed, the seeming contradiction between the claims of the Son of God, and the ordinary facts of His human life, as that life manifested itself day after day amid trivial commonplace circumstances, was a far greater trial of faith than any we have now.

There is, indeed, ample compensation in our later experience. Though Heaven is silent, and we "see not our tokens, there is not one prophet more," we have *that* to sustain us which the apostles had not, which was denied to the age of signs and wonders, and reserved for our day—the blessedness of those who have not seen, and yet have believed. Jesus is not further from us in His exaltation, but nearer than when the beloved disciple lay in His bosom. The dispensation of the Spirit under which we live has completed and unfolded the dispensation of sight. We are able to bear many things which Jesus could not show to the disciples. The peculiar difficulties of the first ages have disappeared altogether, or been smoothed over for us by the very lapse of time. The great historic facts of our faith rise high above the billows of time, that have abraded and washed away the incongruous circumstances in which they were set, and we see them in their true grandeur. They have come down to us supported and confirmed by the witness-bearing of all the intervening ages. Each

generation inherits the tradition of the faith; and each individual grows up in an atmosphere of belief. The marvellous which startled the first ages has become easy of acceptance through familiarity; and the incarnation of the Son of God, which the first disciples found it so hard to realize, has grown by custom so much a part of our ordinary thinking, that the difficulty has to a large extent vanished.

And have not all the Christian ages borne their continually increasing testimony to the marvellous results of the truths which they have handed down? The apostles, providentially placed beside the source of that mighty river of life which flowed from the throne of God and the Lamb, saw the heavens open above it, and the heavenly rains and dews distilling into it; but it was as yet but a tiny spring, and they saw not how it was destined afterwards to increase in volume and force, and to flow through the whole world, making the wilderness and the solitary place to be glad, and the desert to rejoice and blossom as the rose. There was no proof given of the Divine origin of the Christian religion, when our Lord dwelt among men, equal to that which we have now in the existence of the Christian Church, and of the Christian world which it has formed. We, therefore, who seem in these last days to have been born out of due season, have benefited by all the experiences of the preceding ages. We inherit a Christianity which they had to form. Our most precious spiritual possessions are the legacy to us of those who before us bore the burden and heat of the day. The last hour of our labour is enriched and made easier by the blessed results of all the previous hours of toil in the vineyard. The last are thus indeed made first, and the first last.

And do not the words of Christ apply to our ordinary circumstances in life? The problem here, indeed, becomes more complex. Our science teaches us that the arrangement of florets on the blossom-spike of a plant is adapted in every respect to the requirements of each. We can see the wisdom and beneficence that regulate the unfolding of each in its turn. There is nothing careless or accidental; no blossom springs here and another there quite independently of order. Each is set in the position most suitable to it, where it can get its own fair share of light and heat, and its own opportunity of opening its petals to the sun and air, and ripening its seed, and is developed according to a determinate plan. The gardener knows that his black currant berries do not ripen uniformly; that, owing to their peculiar mode of growth, clustering on a long floral stem, the lower berries are large, ripe, and juicy, while the upper ones are small, hard, and greenish. But he knows that when he has waited awhile after gathering the first crop, a second ripe crop, composed of those that were unfit to be gathered on the first occasion, and every bit as good as the first, will reward him. We can thus see the beauty of the order of nature. We can even understand the necessity and beneficence of the different times and dispensations of God's manifestation of Himself to men. But when we come to the busy scenes of ordinary human life, the sublime

order that rules in nature and in the course of history seems to be absent, and the acts and destinies of individual men seem to be confused and irregular. There are so many cross purposes, inequalities of gift, position, and opportunity, that our sense of the rightness of things seems often outraged.

There are two modes of weighing—by a pair of scales, and by the steelyard. The one seems more just than the other. We see at once the fairness of weighing in scales. It is a simple, direct process, which appeals immediately to the eye and to the judgment. But the fairness of weighing by the steelyard is not at once so apparent. It is a roundabout process. It requires calculation. There does not seem at first sight to be an equality of parts. Weight is given in another way than by symmetrical arrangement. And so, much of God's weighing may seem to be more by the steelyard than by the balance. And yet a thoughtful mind can distinguish a noble equity ruling through all seeming irregularities, through all outward inequalities of gift and opportunity, which constitute such a mystery and perplexity to thoughtful hearts. We are disposed to quarrel with the special advantages that are bestowed upon special individuals; and we are apt to look upon this Divine election as a species of favouritism. But we must remember that election to special advantage is never intended for personal enjoyment alone, but is God's wise and gracious method for the more effectual diffusion of His blessings; and the favourites of fortune are appointed His stewards to dispense His bounty to others. This is the design of Heaven, though men are continually frustrating it by their selfishness and covetousness. And if this Divine intention were faithfully carried out, not one of God's creatures would fail of obtaining his own fair share of the blessings of life. Each would have his own place and function set apart for him, with the same scrupulous regard for his well-being, as the individual blossom is arranged on the spike of the flower. Even as it is, with all the injustice and selfishness of our social order, that seek to hinder or defeat God's plan, is there not for every one an opportunity of self-assertion and self-unfolding? Is there not some compensation for previous privations and repressions given to each human being at some time or other? The wheel of life that to-day grinds a man into the dust, to-morrow in its revolution lifts him on its top to the sunshine of heaven. Every man has an opportunity, sooner or later, of showing what is worthiest in him; and the lateness of the opportunity will not affect the result if he will only improve it when it comes. And if there be a grievous failure so far as worldly success is concerned; if no man hires us for the work for which we are best qualified; and we stand practically idle all day, with a wealth of faculty in us unused, then our very disappointment may become to us a moral discipline. We may be doing the work of the labourers in our own souls; we may be exercising faith, and letting our patience have its perfect work; and in the end, when the night in which no man can work is come, He who has

thus appointed our lot will redress the overweighted balance, and give unto this last even as unto the first.

And what is thus true of men's circumstances is also true of their souls. I believe that God has His own time and way of revealing Himself to every human being. Even to those who seem ignorant of Him, He is nearer than we know of, and has more to do with them than we dream. The day of grace, the opportunity of salvation, comes to all without exception. And it is according to the use we make of this opportunity, and not according to the mere time of it, that we are to be judged. The time of the calling of man is in higher, wiser hands; the alert obedience to, and right improvement of, the calling is in men's own hands. It is obvious that we who live in a Christian land, and have enjoyed from our earliest infancy Christian instruction, example, and discipline, cannot plead, like the heathen, the excuse for our idleness—if we are idle—that "no man hath hired us." God hath come to hire us at every season of life—at morning, at noon, at the sixth and ninth hours; in our childhood, our youth, our manhood, our old age. We profess the Christian name, we use the ordinances of religion, and, so doing, we virtually agree to be hired by the Lord. And if in reality we refuse the work till the last hour of life—our reward cannot in the nature of things be the same as that of those who bore the burden and heat of the day. God will not, indeed, refuse to accept one hour of service at the close of the day; but the labourer who only comes then to the vineyard, when he might and could as well have come at the beginning, will not get the same pay as those who began their work in the fresh fair morning, and continued at it all day. The man who has devoted all his life to the service of sin and the world, and given only the dregs of his life, the decay of nature, to the service of God, cannot by any possibility find in that service the same unmixed enjoyment, and the same blessed reward, which he experiences who has given to God his heart and his life through all the fair sunshine and strength of his days. The last in such a case will continue to be last.

THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT.

THE LOGIC OF CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY.[1]

No. I.

By R. M. Wenley, M.A., D.Sc.

I.

Seven years ago, when it was my privilege to belong to your Faculty, an impression happened to be prevalent among us that theology was a dry, uninteresting study. Indeed, I fear that not a few were wont to indulge

[1] Being the Honorary President's Inaugural Address, delivered before the Glasgow University Theological Society, November, 1894.

themselves in the very doubtful luxury of contempt as they approached it. Time tries all, however, and I desire now, as a student speaking to students, not only to justify a complete reversal of this attitude on my own part, but also to show incidentally that such an opinion, especially at the present time, must be either devoid of foundation or based upon misconception. To-day each of the several departments of theology demands a scientific training, and so the preparation for any one contributes to the best kind of education; while theology proper is, perhaps, only equalled by speculative biology in the interest which surrounds its most pressing problems. Thought has been ceaselessly moving, and we have arrived at the stage when a new departure seems highly probable—a departure that cannot but be fraught with deep import to the moral and spiritual life of the generation in which we live.

At the outset, in order to keep discussion within the comparatively narrow limits available here, the general development of theology during the last seventy years, say, must be presupposed. The drawn battle of the eighteenth century, between the upholders of rationalism and supernaturalism, was brought to an end by the summary methods of Kant and Schleiermacher, who respectively conducted the contestant groups off the field. Thereafter, for a considerable period, notwithstanding the growth of theological schools with tenets inspired by these great thinkers, importance centred in philosophy. The systems of the elder Fichte, of Schelling, and of Hegel dominated nearly all noticeable work. In spite of the romantic tendencies of some theologians, and the refined Spinozism of others, like C. H. Weisse, it can hardly be said that either Fichte or Schelling succeeded in creating a theological following of his own. Very different was Hegel's case. Numerous and influential writers gathered round him, and applied his distinctive methods to religious questions. Men such as Marheineke, Göschel, and Daub in his third stage, devoted themselves to a restatement of dogmas directed towards bringing them into accord with the forms of the Dialectic. Their contribution is to-day of little more than historical interest—a fact that need occasion no wonder when their frequent lack of balance is remembered. Daub, for example, hardly inspires confidence when, in his anxiety to illustrate progress by antagonism, he confers the divinity of Satanhood upon Iscariot, so that the betrayer may oppose the Master on something like equal terms. The truth is that Hegel's epoch-making incentive to theological progress consists far rather in the central conception of his thought—the rationality of history—than in the peculiar framework with which he surrounded it. Accordingly, the new era may be dated, not from Marheineke and the rest, but from Strauss, Vatke, and F. C. Baur.

Their achievement, which would never have been accomplished without Hegel, constitutes, as we shall see, a permanent factor in contemporary controversy. When the clouds of critical dust raised by the scrimmage (I think this term best conveys the remarkable absence of

dignity) over the *Leben Jesu* of Strauss had to some extent subsided, theologians were better able to discriminate gains and losses. And, as a result, an eclectic tendency appeared. Of this Richard Rothe may be said to have been the most distinguished originator, and his *Theologische Ethik* marks a middle point between the earlier groupings of German theology and those now prevalent. Rothe drew elements from the Hegelian Right, from Schelling's follower Oetinger, and from Schleiermacher. His work, along with that of F. C. Baur—taking names for movements—furnishes a starting-point for more modern theories. Theology proper, in the classical speculative line, has a new Left and a new Right. Biedermann, Keim, Weizsäcker, and Otto Pfleiderer are chief representatives of the one; Dorner and Beyschlag, with whom we may, perhaps, name Bernhard Weiss, are associated with the other. Both parties maintain what is practically a composite scheme—the former being swayed most by the results of speculative interpretation and historical criticism, the latter by the desire for systematic statement of religious doctrine, as it affects man personally. The one, in short, emphasizes the objective, the other the subjective, aspect of theology. The theories represented by these, among numerous other writers, cannot be alleged to be free from mutual inconsistency. They at least agree in containing philosophical factors derived from a common source—no small matter, indeed, seeing that theology, like religion, has, until very recent times, invariably been concerned with the meaning of the universe. Accordingly, their supporters combine to show a solid front against that now leading theological school which has sprung up within the last twenty years under the leadership of Albrecht Ritschl. This, which may be termed the theology of the end of the century, has adopted different premisses. It derives largely from the sceptical factor in Kant, and from the empiricism of the scientific movement, to some extent from the epistemology of Lotze, and to a lesser degree from the subjective theology of Schleiermacher. Broadly, then, these two parties confront one another. They have their serious internal differences—as between Pfleiderer and Weiss, or between Herrmann and Bender—but these are comparatively trivial as compared with the gulf fixed between the two schools as a whole. It must, therefore, be our effort to understand the doctrines and aims of each, if we are to apprehend the problems with which at this moment theology is face to face.

Before proceeding to this task, it may be well to premise further that the progress of German theology just noted is not without parallel in our own country. During the early part of the period, no doubt, inefficient means of intercommunication rendered reciprocal influences somewhat feeble. Nevertheless, like German, English theology had its rationalism and supernaturalism, its pietism or subjectivity, its semi-sceptical, semi-empirical exponents. At present, too, the new Left and the new Right are not without representatives among us, and the parallelism is likely to become more and more striking. Biedermann

and Pfleiderer embody theological tendencies not widely different from those of Drs. Everett and Royce of Harvard, Stewart and Menzies of St. Andrews, of the late William Mackintosh and T. H. Green; while Principal Fairbairn occupies a middle position on the Right, which is shared largely by Professor Orr and partly by Professor Bruce. Parallel also to the Right, though with very considerable variations, due to the influence of Renouvier, stands Dr. Flint. Curiously enough, too, though without any collusion, Matthew Arnold and Mr. Gladstone furnish elements of agreement with the Ritschlian standpoint, which, in the realm of Christology, was to some extent anticipated by Macleod Campbell, and which has not been without influence over that independent and distinguished member of our own university, Professor Mackintosh of Manchester. It would not be surprising were some younger theologian of our Church to furnish us, at no distant date, with an authoritative pronouncement on Ritschlianism from the vantage-ground of discipleship; in the mean time, however, it would be premature, and probably unfair, to mention names. The German and English positions differ in many details, especially as concerns such development towards Ritschlianism as we can at present show. But interchange of opinion is incomparably freer than it once was, and substantially the same forces are at work, if allowance be made for the predominance of philosophical considerations on the continent, and of ecclesiastical ties in this country.

The most recent, and in many respects the most remarkable, of our own contributors to this discussion says, in a passing reference to method, "It may be observed in general that, when a controversy is carried on for centuries on any subject of pressing and practical human interest, without reaching, or even tending to reach, a consistent and satisfactory result—a result so commending itself to reason as to command universal assent—the reflection is obvious that the question or subject requires to be looked at from a point of view above that to which the disputants have been able to rise."[1] Ability thus to overcome half-truths is denied to all but a select few. Perhaps, in the present instance, a sincere desire to arrive at an accurate estimate of the positions maintained by others, biassed only by a sincerer desire to arrive at the truth, may subserve a similar, if less ambitious, aim. The extreme difficulty of absolutely setting down in every point the doctrine of a theological school must not be forgotten. At the same time, entire groups of theologians employ substantially identical first principles, and formulate deductions that tend practically in one direction. In short, the broad outlines on which we must concentrate attention *limn themselves* with sufficient clearness. The chief restriction which I am compelled to make relates to the mediating theologians so called. For the present purpose their tendencies are too indefinite, not perhaps regarded as a whole, but undoubtedly on certain pivoting points.

[1] Mackintosh, *The Natural History of the Christian Religion*, p. 13.

II.

The speculative school, to which we now turn, was a direct product of the Hegelian philosophy. And, no matter what further elements it may have assimilated since, this system still remains the basis on which the theology is founded. Baur's mildly sarcastic criticism[1] serves, however, to remind us that, on the philosophical presuppositions, a series of new developments leading beyond the comparatively orthodox conclusions of Hegel's *Religionsphilosophie* was inevitable. Nevertheless, the Berlin Lectures are the real point of departure, and continue to furnish the immanent first principles. Here the sphere of the religious consciousness is mapped out to begin with. God, struggling in the throes of self-realization, is the motive force of the evolution of religions; God, as a completed world-process, is the object of religion. Or, to take Hegel's own words, "The whole manifold of human relations, activities, joys, everything that man values and esteems, wherein he seeks his happiness, his glory, and his pride, all find their middle point in religion—in the thought, consciousness, and feeling of God. God is, therefore, the Beginning and the End of everything." This is the pictorial way in which religion frees man for a little from the harshness of the life-struggle that presses so sorely upon him. Philosophy, theology, and religion are accordingly identical in their subject. The first considers as such the permeating reason which is the efficient cause of the cosmos. The second is the science of God in His relation to man, and especially to the God-Man. The last leads to worship of God as the one Being in relation to whom man may achieve his highest vocation. Religion, that is, constitutes a particular instance, presented under certain limited forms, of the world-wide principle which is continually revealing itself under other guises in every sphere wherein activity capable of rational estimate takes place. As a result, speculative notions, in the strict sense of the term, reproduce themselves in the history of religions and in the essential constitution of the highest religion. To illustrate this reproduction and to prove at once its truth and its inevitableness is the task which Hegel set himself. After a discussion, in the first part, of the Absolute Idea as it presents itself in religious shape, he proceeds, in the second, to characterize the various historical religions, and to indicate their places in his scheme. In the third and final part, Christianity is shown to be the highest possible embodiment of religion—the religion beyond which, in the nature of the Idea itself, and according to its interpretation by Jesus, one cannot pass. For theology the most interesting portions of this analysis are unquestionably the speculative digests of the cardinal doctrines of the Christian faith. "Dogma is necessary, and must be taught as valid truth." The rationalizing of the Trinity is, probably, the most conspicuous example of the method adopted. Deity, in His loneliness

[1] Cf. *Kirchengeschichte*, vol. v. p. 378.

before the world was, enbosomed an infinite yearning, and God became a Creator in order to realize objectively that boundless love which is His pre-eminent quality. But the creature, born into the thraldom of time and space, remained separated from his Maker for ages. The conception of God's Fatherhood never revealed itself, and an awful antagonism subsisted between created and Creator. So, too, not recognizing their common Father, the children opposed one another, and were broken up into isolated groups. During this struggle men tasted of the forbidden tree, and became increasingly like gods, knowing good from evil. When the perception of evil, with its accompanying sense of sin, had been deepened to the uttermost, the perfect Man appeared, to stem the mightiest crisis of moral history. Then the great reconciliation was effected. In the Person of Christ God found Himself in man, and man found himself in God. The Creator whose creatures had thwarted Him so that He seemed to have lost somewhat of His life, received back in the good time of His energizing Spirit all that He had given, and in fuller measure. By the inevitable law of moral progress, God had in some sense died to live. The work of the immanent Spirit wrought its own self-development. The depth of the riches of the Divine nature was gradually revealed, and with the Incarnation of Christ became fully known.

This original, magnificent, and fascinating conception did not maintain itself intact, except in the speculations of Hegel's immediate followers, and, so far as I am aware, no contemporary theologian upholds it in the old form. But its influence is still widespread, and it presents undoubted attractions to many perplexed minds. Two principal factors are contained in it. First, a theory of the ultimate nature of the universe; second, a plan, or methodology, of the manner in which this nature reveals itself in the successive stages of its self-evolution. Broadly speaking, and remembering how hard it is to dogmatize on such matters, it may be said that the former embodies a truth of the last importance, whereas the latter is very largely, if not entirely, erroneous. In any case, no theologian now affects the dialectic method, and the one living thinker who seems to countenance it employs a wholly new form, one more general and elastic.[1] In this departure from the letter of Hegel theologians have evinced a wise instinct. There remains to them an untrammelled theory of the universe. This is still substantially accepted; indeed, from acceptance of it the title "speculative" comes. What, then, does it amount to? It is preferable to hear a statement from an accredited member of the school: "Even in the hypothetically assumed case, that there is only an ideal nature in the consciousness of thinking minds, we could not escape from the question how the different subjects come to a corresponding image of the world, and how they are able to distinguish what is merely subjectively represented from the common or

[1] E. Caird, in *The Evolution of Religion.*

objective mode of representation—that is to say, how they can distinguish truth from error. This question, however, can hardly be solved otherwise than by the assumption of a universal consciousness, which must be the common ground, as well as the ruling law, of all individual consciousnesses or minds. . . . If it holds true of the individual being, that the final end which results from the development of its life is also already the ideal prius of the whole process, then we shall be able to apply the same thought to the whole process of the life of our earth, and to draw therefrom a conclusion as to the principle of the process. And we are justified in doing so by the very fundamental thought of modern biology, according to which all the life of the earth forms *one* advancing development from the lowest to the highest forms of existence."[1] Moreover, God is revealing Himself, not only in the natural, but also in the moral and religious, order. "The historical order of the religious revelation, that it is a development from lower to ever higher stages, a development in which the new is always at once the fulfilment and criticism of the old, becomes nowhere more clearly apparent than in the relation of Christianity to Judaism. . . . I think assuredly that with the entrance of Christianity into the world, the firm foundation for its realization has been laid, so that the whole history of the world prior to Christianity may be regarded as the preparation for the realization of that ideal, and the whole of Christian history as the development of it. If, therefore, the whole history of the world shows itself as the teleological process of the advancing realization of the divine purpose of the world, we are entitled to find in the history of the world the revelation of the world-governing wisdom of God."[2] These statements may be taken as sufficient, because they are very recent, and because Dr. Pfleiderer is one of the least *doctrinaire* members of the school which he ornaments.

Setting aside the speculative treatment of such a theory in and for itself, its obvious interest is historical. And, accordingly, we find that minute study of the historical data has, since the disruption of the Hegelian school proper, attracted increasing attention among theologians. The leading workers in this department are often possessed, not only of philosophical discrimination and acuteness, but also of minute Biblical knowledge, which enables them to illustrate and support their speculative conclusions. When these two endowments are not concentrated in one person, a compensation is found in the superior attainments of single thinkers in one sphere or the other, and their united results serve as the basis for a review of the entire field. Our question, therefore, comes to be—What conclusions have been derived from the piecing out of the general doctrine of the immanence of Deity? How do the historic documents supplement and expand the speculative presuppositions?

The tendency to lay hold upon the documents, to regard them as *memoirs pour servir* to this special aspect of the general theory of the

[1] Pfleiderer, *Gifford Lectures*, vol. i. pp. 142, 156, 157. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 189, 202.

universe, and, at the same time, to exclude the peculiar dialectical framework, cannot be better illustrated than by the fate that has latterly overtaken the investigations of F. C. Baur. Not infrequently one hears the statement that the great Tübingen critic has formulated results only to have them overturned; that his influence has disappeared; that even his own followers have abandoned his positions at discretion. For the most part, this allegation is due to a misunderstanding. According to Baur's theory, Christian origins embodied an implicit antagonism, which, in the course of the early history of our religion, became explicit, and thereafter disappeared in a higher unity. Christ Himself incarnated the terms of this covert opposition. His religion was spiritually universal, but He identified Himself with a particularist principle when He accepted the Jewish Messiahship. Hence the partial truths defended by the contending parties of the first Church. Peter and the Judaizers were not wholly wrong, nor were Stephen, Paul, and the universalists wholly right. This scholastic dogma of progress by conflict, as thus originated, Baur employed to explain the beginnings and inner relations of the New Testament documents. When the schism was at its deepest, Paul's four genuine Epistles and the Book of Revelation were composed. The early period of conciliation, when the parties to the quarrel were tentatively seeking a truce, brought forth the synoptic Gospels, the Acts, the Deutero-Pauline Epistles, and the Epistles of Peter and James. Finally, when the reconciliation with its resultant access of power developed during conflict had been effected, the Gospel and the Epistles attributed to John, and the Pastoral Epistles were written. Now, it *is* true that Baur's dialectic method has been wholly dismissed, and that the conclusions traceable to the trimming of data in its interest have, for the most part, been departed from. For example, we no longer hold that Christianity *must* have advanced by thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; perhaps some of us are quite sceptical about the supposed influence of Jewish Christianity; therefore we do not agree that Matthew is the earliest, because the distinctively Jewish-Christian, synoptic; that Luke is the second, because the heathen-Christian; and that Mark is the third, because the product of an eclectic and non-partisan redaction of the two others. Neither can we accept the account of the Apocalypse. Our attitude, too, towards the Pauline Epistles and the Acts, to say nothing of other documents, is no longer that of Baur. Yet, in spite of all this, his problem remains till the present moment the problem which New Testament criticism, especially in the speculative school, is striving to solve. For instance, his questions respecting the authorship of the Fourth Gospel and the relation of Philo to its writer are to-day *sub judice*. Even the Ritschlians, as represented by Wendt,[1] preserve his conclusions when they assign this Gospel, "in its present form, to a writer of the second century belonging to the religious circle founded by the Apostle John." What remains,

[1] Cf. *Die Lehre Jesu* (Erster Theil, untranslated).

then, to the "historical school within theology" is the general theory of a rational development in early Christianity, and of a consequent explicable interconnexion between the integral portions of the New Testament. Or, as Holtzmann has put it, "Baur was a positive spirit, since he was by no means satisfied with denying to a Biblical writing the authorship ascribed to it by tradition or named in the superscription, but claimed emphatically to practise 'positive criticism'—to show the place which the various writings of the New Testament held in the general development of Christianity, and in which they are historically comprehensible."

WHAT IS THE FOUNDATION OF OUR FAITH?

By Professor G. Godet, D.D.

Let us study this question from a practical and popular point of view.

No one can deny its actuality. Of late years it has been observed that there is a growing tendency in atheism to return to religious ideas. But, if this be so, we notice another phenomenon which is not to be disregarded. If religion reasserts its dominion over minds that have become strangers to the Church, in the Church itself strong convictions are becoming incontestably rare. Where is the robust faith of the days that are past? Where is the Church whose creed is accepted by all its members and by all its clergy? I do not here refer to the Declarations of Faith of the sixteenth century, which have had their day; but I refer to the great beliefs professed by Christians of all ages—the Divinity of Christ, the Incarnation, the Atonement. As regards all these capital points, there is confusion in the mind, perplexity in the soul; and doubt, with slow, permeating action, drops from these heights till it reaches the foundations of the edifice—the Fall of man, revelation, the supernatural, the very Personality of God, and human responsibility.

Where must the blame of this state of things be laid? On Biblical criticism? In a certain measure, yes. But the negative attitude of criticism is itself but the symptom of a certain state of mind which is peculiar to this second half of our century, and which may be traced to many causes—manners, progress of positive science, determinative philosophy.

No need is there to lose ourselves in the study of causes. Rather let us seek the remedy for doubt, the fulcrum upon which to rest our faith. This prop once found will enable us to reconstruct the edifice of our belief; and, should this structure long remain unfinished, and more like a ruin than a palace, so long as this support shall stand firm, all the restorations of faith will be possible, and we shall be justified in expecting great things.

I.

What is the foundation of my faith? Evidently, I cannot answer, with the Roman Catholic—The authority of the Church. In the first place, this authority should be demonstrated, and then the basis of my faith would be a more or less plausible reasoning. Moreover, I should ask—Where is the Church? and whatever Church might be pointed out to me as the possessor of truth, I would have too many good reasons for doubting its infallibility.

Shall I, then, answer that my faith rests upon the Holy Scriptures? The scriptural doctrines are beautiful and sublime: I ask if they are true. The Bible presents itself as a Divine book: I ask for proofs of its inspiration. Protestant orthodoxy will supply evidences of the Divinity of the Scriptures which shall be forcible, and shall not fail to make a profound impression on my mind. But I feel that my faith is fragile if it has no other foundation than a series of arguments. I do not deny, I do not even question, the authority of the Scriptures. What I say is that I cannot build the edifice of my faith upon them, that I cannot take them as the starting-point of my Christian belief, for they require themselves to be established by evidence. I must find for my foundation a more immediate certainty, a proof more direct.

Shall I look for it in myself—in the religious experiences which I may have gone through? Many evangelical divines tell me that I must seek it there. In their opinion, the foundation of Christian conviction is the individual experience of salvation, the consciousness which the Christian possesses of forgiven sin, and of the inward transformation brought about by the action of the Holy Spirit. The Christian is conscious that a superhuman, a Divine factor has entered into his life, that a power from above dwells within him, that a new existence has dawned for him. This experience is to him the clearest attestation of the objective reality of God, of the Holy Spirit, of the entire work of Christ, to which his regeneration is indissolubly joined. Here we stand no longer on the ground of argument, but on that of fact, on a ground which is accessible to all, whatever be their intellectual or moral culture. Here we find ourselves in presence of affirmations which each of us is able to control in the light of his own experience.

Some go further still—they affirm that not only the basis of conviction, but the very source of our religious knowledge, is to be found in the experiences of the Christian conscience. And from the fundamental experience of the new birth they deduct all the Christian dogmas, like as many postulates implied in this experience. For instance, from the fact that we discover the action in ourselves of an objective factor, and that this action is of a moral order, they infer the existence of God and the Personality of this God. From the idea that the process of regeneration has three stages—the consciousness of sin and condemnation, the

assurance of redemption, and finally the communion with God into which we are brought—they deduce that God is One in Three Persons. . . . And so with all other evangelical doctrines.[1]

But is it not obvious that it is inexact to speak of *the* Christian conscience, of *the* Christian experience? In reality, I cannot speak of anything but *my* conscience, *my* experience. Now, it is a well-known fact that experience varies from one man to another, from one Christian to another, and that conversion, the new birth, assumes diverse forms according to individuals. If Christian experience be systematized and dogmas be drawn from it, then the starting-point will necessarily be an individual and, therefore, imperfect experience. The doctrines will be in accordance with the experience. The results will be as diverse as the Christian individualities who will have performed this work. Should some argue that there is a collective conscience, that of the Church, which corrects all possible errors on the part of individual sentiment, the question is still—Which among the Churches is that whose experiences should be accepted as the rule of belief?

If the individual or the collective experience of salvation cannot be the source of Christian doctrine, shall I, as some affirm, find in them at least the foundation of a strong religious conviction? Unhappily, I cannot but doubt this, for the following reasons: In the first place, this affirmation rests upon a confusion. To say that the conviction of faith rests upon the experience of the work of the Holy Spirit in us, is manifestly to invert the order of things. The experience of salvation is not the starting-point of religious development. It implies faith; it is the fruit of faith; it cannot exist save where faith has previously come to life. The experience of regeneration cannot be enjoyed save by the soul that believes in salvation through Christ. The man who waits for the experience that he may believe, will never have the experience at all. To admit an experience of salvation which would precede faith, which would be the foundation of faith, would be to suppose an experience in which the subject would be altogether passive, in which he would find himself placed under an influence unsolicited and unprovoked. Regeneration would, in such a case, be entirely independent of faith or will; it would lose its moral character to become an arbitrary and magical stroke of grace. Sudden conversions, such as that of Saul of Tarsus, ought not to be brought forward in support of this conception; for if, at the origin of this kind of conversion, there is a startling experience of the power of God, this experience cannot yet be said to be that of salvation; it is simply an opportunity given for accepting salvation. The part of faith and will is reserved, and the Christian experience, the work of the Spirit, is felt only later on by those who, like Saul, have willingly and freely yielded to the Divine solicitings.

[1] It is on these bases that Franck, the Lutheran theologian of Erlangen, has built up his system of apologetics and of Christian dogmatics.

Were the importance which some ascribe to experience real and evident, this would not be a sufficient reason for making it the foundation of a firm Christian conviction. By the experience of pardon I am convinced that God is my Father, and that Jesus Christ is my Saviour; by that of regeneration I am convinced of the reality of the glorified Person of Christ, and of the power of the Holy Spirit. This assurance satisfies me to-day. But to-morrow—under the influence of certain circumstances which shall modify my impressions, owing to a breach of fidelity, perhaps—this joyful assurance will have vanished, and I shall ask myself if I am truly forgiven, if I have really been freed from sin, so manifold are the traces it has left in me; I shall question the reality of my experience, and wonder whether it was not the produce of my imagination, whether I was not self-deceived; I shall be uncertain if an *objective* reality—God forgiving, the Holy Ghost regenerating me—answers to these impressions which formerly were so vivid, and are now so enfeebled, if not altogether destroyed. When a soul becomes a prey to this doubt, it cannot regain conviction unless it possesses a central point of support apart from its subjectivity. However deeply experience may be probed, it will not yield conviction, when the reality of experience itself is in question. As well might one attempt to consolidate a tottering wall by seeking a prop in the wall itself.

II.

Faith does not rest upon Christian experience. Rather is faith the condition, the source, of this experience. What does faith itself rest upon? It bears in itself a conviction, which religious experience confirms, but which it has not called forth, which is independent of it, for it precedes it—so entirely independent of it that in many cases it still exists when experience has ceased, or when it seems to be in contradiction with it. Where is this conviction to be found?

If I examine my faith in order to discover a reply to this question, I find but one thing to say—My faith rests upon a *fact*, which I cannot ignore, since it occupies the central position in history, and which I have no right to treat with indifference, because it is of such a character that my conscience cannot disregard it. Here I speak not of the religious, but of the *moral*, conscience.

We are indebted to Ritschl and his school for having reminded us that all Christian knowledge[1] has its foundation, its source, and its norm

[1] I say Christian *knowledge*. Ritschl goes further, and says, *religious* knowledge. For, he says, we can only have that knowledge of God which He Himself reveals, and He only reveals Himself to us in Christ. All we are able to do, apart from Christian revelation, is to establish His existence, which Ritschl endeavours to prove scientifically by a moral argument. But to say *what He is*, is utterly impossible. From the fact that, apart from Christ, we cannot know God, some disciples, more logical than their Master, have concluded that we cannot prove His existence, and that, Jesus Christ being the sole Revealer, His advent

in the advent of Jesus of Nazareth, and for having restored the historical Christ to His fundamental and central position in Christian dogmatics. We must acknowledge his vigorous reaction against the intrusion of philosophical speculation in this domain. It is, perhaps, a delusion to believe that it is possible to understand and interpret the Christian fact without having recourse to philosophical methods, and Ritschl himself has departed from his established principle, for he has brought into his theology a method and notions borrowed from a determinative philosophy. But that which philosophy has no right to do is to transform facts into ideas, or to alter them so as to make them correspond with its formulas. Ritschl is right in protesting stoutly against this device of metaphysics. We are justified in demanding of philosophy that, whilst seconding Christian thought in its examination of the Christian fact, it shall absolutely respect the latter.

This fact, *the historical Personality of Jesus*, is the rock upon which I presume firmly to build the edifice of my faith. Here I am arrested by those who say—Of this Person you know nothing save from the testimony of those who have known Him, that is to say, from the writings of the apostles, from the New Testament. Your faith, therefore, is based upon Scripture, and that is precisely what you disapprove!

Not so. For we have not yet come to the point of the Divine authority of the Scriptures, which point my faith will be led to acknowledge later on. The part of the Scriptures in the formation of Christian conviction is merely that of a witness. The man who does not yet enjoy this conviction, who has not faith, cannot yet realize the Divine character of the book; he takes it as a fact, for the book exists; it is an historical document for him. Like all other human work, this document is liable to criticism, and for the time being has no other guarantee than the character of its authors and its intrinsic value. But these are amply sufficient to make the testimony of the book worthy of attention. Criticism will doubtless be brought to bear upon certain portions of it. But it will not, unless it betrays a determined purpose of negation, refuse to acknowledge that the testimony of the New Testament, as a whole, emanates from the circle of the first disciples of Jesus, and therefore constitutes (the moral character of the authors not being concerned) an authentic and reliable record of His Person and of His work. If, however,

supplies us also with the only evidence which it is possible to have of the existence of God. As for me, I am inclined to believe that there are, even independently of the gospel, proofs sufficient—if not strictly scientific—of the existence of God. I believe also in a knowledge of God independent of Christian revelation. Else how account for the universal belief in Deity, and for the heathen conception of God, which, in many instances, is so pure and exalted? Both nature and conscience have, from the beginning, spoken to man a language not always understood, but sometimes intuitively perceived with surprising clearness. To deny this natural revelation which the Bible repeatedly attests, to refuse man all knowledge of God outside of positive revelation, is to sever the connecting link which binds the human conscience to Christianity. This is scepticism.

knowing no bounds, it should reject the greater part of the writings of the New Testament, or bring it down entirely to the second century, or question the historical reality of the Person of Jesus, then it would prove itself so intensely prejudiced as to lose all favour in the eyes of sensible and honest seekers after truth.

Besides, whatever may be said by this learned criticism, which seems sometimes to be in quest of novelties rather than truths, the New Testament establishes its credibility in a more direct manner. The witness is self-credited. A breath of truth reigns throughout; it is marked with the stamp of simplicity, sincerity, and honesty. This impression which it produces upon me whenever I open it, even superficially, is sufficient to inspire me with confidence. And when, on the strength of this first impression, I surrender myself to it for a short time, as I would to a guide whose eyes tell of frankness and energy, then it takes me by the hand and leads me to a height, in presence of a figure unlike any that I have ever met with. There are beings whose brow reveals a noble soul, exalted sentiment, generosity of character, and with whom no base or impure thought could ever be associated; beings both strong and tender, whose eyes beam with kindness, whose smile brings joy and gladness, whose very presence warms the heart, towards whom one feels inevitably drawn, even though one feels conscious of mediocrity or badness: their virtue condemns, their moral beauty subdues. . . . It is a similar yet different impression I feel in presence of Him who fills the pages of the New Testament with His works and words. I feel at once judged and attracted. Judged as I have never been by any mortal; for, although there are many whose moral character has produced a deep impression upon me, I still feel that they lack something; I have seen them, on some occasion, subject to human weakness, yielding to some selfish impulse, to some feeling of vanity inconsistent with their principles; I have seen them sinners like myself, fallen also, the only difference between them and me being in the degree of moral culpability. I know that their heart is like mine, wicked, whatever be the apparent purity of their lives. And I have (shall I confess it?) been comforted in my weakness and sin by seeing that they too were diseased!

I draw near to Jesus; I consider Him attentively. He is my brother, a Man, the most thorough man who ever walked the earth; for He feels, He loves, He suffers, He weeps, He struggles. His life passes before my eyes; and however attentively I examine and scrutinize, I see no failure, I discover no flaw, I witness no weakness. Or again, His virtue is the seamless robe; it is perfect, nothing is lacking; the most varied details are mingled in it without effort and blend in radiant harmony; holiness and love, austerity and tenderness, dignity and humility, indomitable energy and abnegation, consciousness of strength and sacrifice of self even unto death. . . . In presence of this figure my conscience bows, it has found its master; for it is impossible to conceive a loftier perfection than

that which in Him is realized and lived. I am constrained to confess it: Jesus is Good made man, the living Good.

And if my eyes turn from Him to myself, ah! then it is that I see myself sinful, that I feel judged and condemned. The ideal of this moral perfection which now shines for the first time before my eyes enables me to see my sin in its full light; it discloses my selfishness, my infidelity, my guilt. He is a revelation. My life appears to me as a web of malice, pride, and falsehood. My so-called good works are mere vanity and hypocrisy. The Holy One of God judges me; I abhor myself! And yet *He* does not hate me. He condemns me, for He hates sin. There is a gulf betwixt Him and me, since He is perfectly just and good; and yet He speaks to me in words of infinite gentleness; He opens His arms to me; I feel that I am loved.

Where has He learned the secret of thus uniting love the most tender with purity the most incorruptible? How is it that, although He condemns me, yet He does not reject me? Where is the source of so great love and holiness? A second look cast upon His life reveals this. I see Him praying often, sometimes throughout the night. He seeks communion with God, or, rather, He never departs from it. The foundation of the whole of His activity is a relation of love and cloudless intimacy with God. He calls Him Father, and Himself Son, and as a Son He has but one thought—to do His Father's will, all that is pleasing in His sight. "My meat is to do the will of My Father, and to finish His work. . . . Father, not My will, but Thine, be done." We feel it. He lives with God in a relation unexampled in any other human life, and a gulf separates the morality which has in some cases been attained by natural man, from the holiness of Christ which is filial obedience, the unreserved surrender of self to God, the moral and religious ideal, at length and absolutely realized.

And hence what I feel for Him is absolute respect, unlimited confidence—*faith*. Faith is naturally born of the union of conscience aspiring to the ideal good with Christ in whom it is realized.

Faith, and not admiration only, as when we gaze upon some beautiful and marvellous picture. For, truly, when I draw near to Him in the Gospel, I feel no doubt as to whether the character which fills this book has veritably belonged to reality or whether it is not an ideal conceived by a lofty soul, the fiction of conscience seeking and finding itself in its own dream. The ideal of a noble soul! But who, in the days to which the history of Jesus takes us back, could have created this ideal of moral and religious life which so infinitely surpasses all that a Jew could picture to himself as the perfection of piety and virtue? We know what were the representatives of morality and advanced piety in those days. We know the pharisaical ideal. No one can suppose that men trained in such a school could have created an ideal of spirituality and holiness which, after having bewildered and scandalized the contemporaries of Jesus, is

still far beyond our loftiest conceptions. No; such perfection, such communion with God, no fallen man could have conceived. To have been thus portrayed, it must have been lived.

In fact, is not this character which the Gospel depicts an eminently living one? It walks, it acts before our eyes; it struggles. This is a drama, the various scenes of which have all the poignancy of reality. It is not a mystic vision, a figure more or less distinct, enveloped in a nimbus of light. We are in presence of a history, the reality of which is plainly seen in numberless concrete, picturesque, or striking details. We are here on the ground of truth. The death of Jesus upon the cross is a fact. His spotless sanctity and His communion with God are also facts. Nor are we authorized to affirm this solely by the impression which they make upon our minds; Jesus Himself speaks of them as of realities absolutely certain for Him. He does not feel Himself separated from God by sin; He finds no deficiency in His life. He declares Himself boldly to be the Holy One, the Beloved of the Father. If I question the truth of these affirmations, then I am bound to accuse Him of folly, of falsehood, or of pride.

Moreover, there is another fact, which also belongs to history, and which confirms the twofold testimony of the works and declarations of Jesus; it is His resurrection. I am aware of the objections. . . . But it is too obvious that these are especially inspired by the fore-determined negation of the miracle. An impartial examination of the proofs of the Resurrection would show that no historical fact is more clearly attested than this; whilst, if it be denied, the history of the origin of Christianity finds itself in presence of the most insurmountable difficulties. Now, if the resurrection of Jesus be a fact, it is the Divine confirmation, the irrefutable proof, of His absolute holiness.

The truth and Divinity of Christianity rest entirely upon these facts. It follows that the teaching of Jesus upon the things of God must be the revelation of the Divine thought for our salvation. The words of Jesus, the truth of which is guaranteed by His holiness and resurrection, will, therefore, be the source where I shall henceforth seek the doctrine of salvation with perfect trust. My reason and my conscience acknowledge this teaching, but I surrender myself to it none the less, and in this submission I experience its truth. The lessons of Jesus find their daily verification in my intimate experience.

The truth and authority of the teaching of the apostles are alike established by these facts; for Jesus promised them the Holy Ghost and said, "Whoever heareth you, heareth Me." Their word is thus placed under the guarantee of His own, and therefore becomes also the norm of my faith and the source of my Christian knowledge. I accept its authority, not only when it relates the facts of the Saviour's life, but also when it supplies the explanation of such facts. Had the mission of the apostles been limited to the mere narration of facts, they had not needed

the assistance of the Holy Ghost; and, on the other hand, the simple knowledge of these facts would avail me but little without the divinely authorized interpretation which they supply. They have a right to say, "We know the mind of Christ. . . . These things had not entered into the heart of man; but God hath revealed them unto us by His Spirit" (1 Cor. ii. 9, 10, 16). Here, again, my daily experience confirms the truth of the teaching to which I adhere.

III.

I have essayed to analyze my experience, and to point out the means by which I believe doubt may be overcome. I have ascribed, in the formation of Christian conviction, an important part to historical facts, and to the book in which they are recorded. I make no apology for this. On the contrary, I go so far as to affirm that the historical fact of the advent (which, by its character of sanctity, is unique in history) of Jesus of Nazareth is the sole foundation upon which I may safely build my faith and religious conviction. Some may question or even deny that the subjective experiences of the believer correspond to an objective reality; others, like Ritschl, may relegate the mystic union with Christ amongst the reveries of a morbid piety. . . . Jesus Christ cannot be blotted out of history. His Person, His holy life, His death, His resurrection, remain undisputable facts. *Fact* is the firm point to which faith desperately clings in its hours of doubt, discouragement, and inward gloom. In my opinion, therefore, to scorn these historical facts would be a gross error on the part of apologetics.

It is unnecessary to remind us that Pascal finds the first proof of religion in the heart, or that Vinet demonstrates the truth of Christianity by its accordance with the requirements of the human conscience. For neither the one nor the other has set aside the historical proof. And, in fact, it will always be possible, on the ground of moral apologetics, to question whether that doctrine which is in harmony with the needs of the heart is not born of those very needs; whether the Christian truths might not be supposed postulates of the moral life without any corresponding objective reality. That this doubt may be dispelled, the reality must be laid hold of once more, and a firm stand taken upon the rock of history.

Moreover, the demonstration of this fact differs from that of any other historical fact. The Christian fact has peculiar characteristics which distinguish it from every other. Conscience is here face to face with the great moral miracle. When brought into contact with Jesus Christ, it acknowledges in Him the reality of the ideal good to which it aspires; from this contact springs faith which soon extends to all the sayings of Christ, and finds its sure confirmation in His resurrection. When we have reached this point, and consider the Divinity of the work of Christ sufficiently established, we are not left in doubt as to the reality

of the apostolic revelation and the New Testament; or, more correctly, the teaching of the apostles concerning salvation becomes, in its turn, an accepted authority.

I am aware that this transition from doubt to faith is by no means a necessity; or, if it be, it is of an essentially moral character. In order to believe, there must be an effort of the will. But what will be its object? Some undetermined authority to which man will submit blindly? some doctrinal *shibboleth* which shall exempt him from seeking and conquering truth? Shall faith be the fruit of caprice or of intellectual sloth? No! the object of our will must be that which is required of all who would believe—good, the will of God. If any *will* do that which is good, they will recognize in Jesus the Incarnate Good, holiness fully revealed—Him in communion with whom alone they can become good, and realize something superior to the morality of the honest man of the world—*holiness*, a life purified in its hidden source as well as in its outward manifestations. Then they will become attached to Him, and will experience the power of sanctification which emanates from Him. But if any *will not* do good, they will turn away from Christ after a moment's contemplation; they will endeavour to escape from the attraction exercised by Him upon their soul; they will act as did the rich young ruler—they will depart, bearing in their conscience the dart of truth despised, of the Divine call unresponded to.

We do not speak here of religious experiences the authenticity of which may be questioned, but of the most certain reality of our life—of a fact which we are bound to acknowledge, to respect, under penalty of being ranked amongst the wicked. If there be any man who does not believe in *duty*, who does not admit the supreme reality of good, who does not acknowledge in the moral law the final foundation of conviction, he may well doubt; he may well deny all these points; he is free to do so. For such a one the Person of Christ is nothing, because conscience is the sense through which He must be seen in order to be recognized and believed.

I allow for prejudice. There are men who seek good, and who are not brought—in this world, at least—to Jesus Christ, either because they have not really known Him, or because their conscience has been deluded, stifled by the deadly influences of the world, or because the true character of Christ has been hidden from them by certain doctrines which they have been unable to accept, or, finally, because the lives of Christians have been an inadequate rendering of it. However this may be, it is none the less true that conscience, left to itself and placed in presence of Christ, acknowledges in Him the Divine presence and the Foundation of religious conviction. Faith is born of the union between an upright will and Jesus Christ. Would you obtain faith? Be absolutely sincere, or, in other words, let your purpose be to do that which is good, and bring yourselves into relationship with Jesus Christ. I do not say that your doubt and

indecision will at once be dispelled. Some perplexity may remain; there may still be many a flaw in the edifice of your theology; but the centre will be certainty, for the centre will be Jesus Christ; and whatever may be the difficulties and doubts which shall assail you, conviction, once acquired, shall never fail you. In order to confirm your assurance in presence of the difficulties of thought, you will seek Jesus Christ, you will live with Jesus Christ, and in the experiences of this communion with Him you will find the continually strengthened conviction of the reality of the salvation He has offered you.

"To arrive at *conviction* in religious matters," says M. Henri Meyer, "is a task which no one should shun. . . . Solid religious convictions are rarely met with in the Protestantism of the day. The want of conviction is our great weakness and our imminent peril; uncertainty, doubt, is the worm which lies at the root of the tree and causes it to decay. . . . Our Catholic brethren establish their faith on the infallibility of the pope. Let us establish ours on this rock—the infallibility of Christ."[1]

CURRENT AMERICAN THOUGHT.

RECENT PANTHEISTIC EVOLUTION. By Rev. JOHN JALLING, S.J. (*American Catholic Quarterly Review*).—In accordance with the principles of pantheism, pantheistic evolution assumes the self-existent being as infinite, spiritual, eternal, unchangeable, and at the same time characterizes it as finite, imperfect, material, and subject to endless changes. Such a conception is a caricature of the Godhead. Pantheistic evolution also involves all the incongruities which are intrinsic to the general idea of evolution. For, according to it, the self-existent Being is self-evolving. Though admitted to be infinite, it is supposed to grow and develop constantly to ever greater perfection. This is apparent from its relationship to nature. The ever-changing universe is not merely an external manifestation of God or an effect produced outside of Him. It is His own being, His own life, His own power and activity. Growing by an ever-continuous differentiation to the fulness of beauty and perfection, the world is nothing less than the Deity unfolding its own being by immanent operation.

But if a process of evolution is going on in God, He must be conceived as determinate and indeterminate at the same time. According to pantheistic views, He may not be so utterly indeterminate as matter or abstract being is; still, indeterminateness must be in His nature, at least to such an extent as is to be removed from Him by evolution from all eternity. But at the same time, He is also fully determinate by virtue of His very essence. He is Self-existent, He is essentially the Infinite Spirit. But both these attributes are repugnant to evolution. If God is fully determinate by His own essence, a gradual transition from indeterminateness to determinateness is out of the question. If He is indeterminate, He cannot determine Himself by His own activity.

Pantheism is absolutely incompetent to explain the process of evolution, to prove either its starting-point or its final result, either its laws or its different stages. It begins with the cause, which, though first in the order of being, is last in the order of cognition. The explanation which it offers is a process from the unknown to the

[1] Translated by Ph. G. Adair.

known. Pantheistic evolutionists imagine that, by evolving the world from Himself, God evolves Himself and reaches the climax of perfection as a germ attains to its specific size and shape by developing organs and members. But the very supposition of a possible growth is a palpable denial of infinity; and therefore this position is wholly untenable.

Is the world into which God should evolve finite or infinite? Does it contain all things that are possible, or only some of them? Dr. Martineau is of opinion that it is finite, and that God passes from the indeterminate to the determinate by defining which out of all the possibilities are to be realized. But no view more inconsistent with evolutional principles could be espoused. A finite world cannot render the First Cause infinitely perfect. The determination on only some possibilities must be conceived as free or as necessary. It cannot be free; for in that case the evolutionists would, consistently with their principles, have to regard the world as the work of an arbitrary will. Nor can it be a necessary act of God. There is no conceivable limitation of His power to *some* possibilities.

Consistently, pantheists must admit the world to be infinite; that is, to possess all possible perfections and to include all possible beings. But the world is not and cannot be infinite. Pantheists admit the world to be finite at every particular moment of its existence; but they regard it as infinite in the whole course of its successive evolution. But the whole series of the forms successively produced must be finite, because the infinite cannot rise from finite parts—least of all, if these parts do not even coexist. And it is impossible to assign a reason for any particular form of the whole series.

Pantheism is not an explanation of unity. True, its theory appears to reduce all things to absolute oneness, since it teaches that God is all, and all is God. It would be a perfect unity if it were real. But it is not the kind of unity which we perceive in this visible universe. And the pantheistic theory does not explain that unity which, in reality, exists in nature—a unity in a variety of things distinct from one another. The unity it substitutes is the plainest impossibility. The infinite and the finite; the perfect and the imperfect; the simple and the compound; the active and the passive; the cause and the effect,—cannot be identical. The self-existent cause, reduced to absolute oneness with the finite world, is the aggregate of all possible contradictions and absurdities, which cannot be admitted as real existences without the complete stultification of reason.

Examine the ultimate source from which pantheists derive all being and all perfection. Though self-existent, it is imperfect and undeveloped, not actually perfect, but only tending to become so by further evolution. Its progress is extremely slow and uncertain. There is no prospect of its attaining to consummation. The self-evolving deity of pantheists may very well be likened to Sisyphus, who is always heaving the stone uphill, only to see it roll back into the valley. If God is all, He is not distinct from matter. Philosophers cannot lift matter above the lowest degree of being, nor can they rid it from certain properties intrinsic to it. And if God is identical with matter, the varying properties of matter must be applied to Him. God reaches the highest perfection in man, and therefore all the properties peculiar to mankind must be associated with Him; all ignorance and stupidity, all vice and error. And all belong to Him in the ultimate period of evolution, when He approaches the climax of perfection.

In most of the recent pantheistic theories, such as those of H. Lotze, Dr. Martineau, and Professor Schurman, God is represented as the world-soul, though not as if He and the visible world were two different components of one whole; the one a bodily

substance, the other a Divine spirit, each with its own distinct though incomplete reality, yet so united as to complete each other in one perfect nature. But nothing could be more inconsistent with monism than such a view. And, in fact, no theory, whether ancient or modern, has advanced a dualism of this kind under the garb of monism.

Are any of the absurdities involved in pantheistic evolution avoided by this latest conception of the world-soul? Certainly, the universal Deity is not thus cleared from incongruous attributes. Nor is this new theory an interpretation of the universe. Evolution is not explained. Cosmic unity is not accounted for. The nature of the universe and its component parts is not unfolded. Emanation is no expedient to unriddle the perplexities of pantheistic teaching. It leaves the conception of the Deity full of self-contradictions. Some have tried to prove that emanation is a real development by comparing it to the diffusion of bodies, or to the division by which germs increase. But no increase from without is possible in God, since, by the theory, there is absolutely nothing the being and existence of which is not derived from Him. Emanation, therefore, is a process essentially different from organic growth.

One other point demands attention. It is the new departure taken by some Protestant theologians for the purpose of disentangling emanative evolution from its difficulties. Denying creation out of nothing, they regard the world as having emanated, not from the nature, but from the will, of God. The theory, in order not to part with a personal Deity, seems to suppose that the Divine will gives issue to the world, not with necessity, but with freedom. But the intelligence that produces the world by a free act of the will must be conceived as completely developed. The world, if an effluence of free will, does not constitute, but *presupposes* the evolution of the Deity.

Evolution, according to its recent conception, is a necessary process. There is no creation by arbitrary will, but creation only by law. But let the world be an emanation from free will, then there is no longer necessity; then things come into existence, grow and combine, by an act which evolutionists term arbitrary. Therefore emanation from the free will of God is incompatible with the modern idea of evolution. And it is inconsistent with the denial of pantheism. If it maintains that God created the world out of nothing, and that produced things are distinct in being from Him who is self-existent and infinite, it is plainly theistic. If, on the contrary, it does away with creation out of nothing, and takes the things that make up the universe for parts and modes of the Divine nature, it is unmistakably pantheistic.

ATHANASIANISM. By LEVI L. PAINE (*The New World*).—What really is Athanasianism? and would Athanasius himself recognize many of his modern disciples? The Nicene theology was the product of three centuries of controversy and growth. But this evolution, in its further history, suffered one great break. A radically new epoch in the development of the Trinitarian dogma was begun by the North African Augustine. He gave a new turn to the doctrine of the Trinity, by which the way was opened for the Sabellianizing tendencies which have infected Western theology to this day. Augustine must not be classed with Athanasius and the Greek Fathers. He was not a Greek scholar. His philosophical ideas were drawn from Western Neo-Platonic and Stoic sources rather than from the pure Eastern fountains of Plato and Aristotle. Properly, the history of Trinitarianism divides itself into two distinct chapters—the Greek Athanasian and the Latin Augustinian.

The Old Testament is strictly monotheistic. The idea that a Trinity is to be found there is utterly without foundation. The monotheistic tradition is continued

into the New Testament. For the beginnings of Trinitarian theology we must look to St. Paul. He nowhere gives a full metaphysical statement, and it is not clear that he had developed any precise theological doctrine of the Trinity. Two points stand out clearly. 1. St. Paul remained a firm adherent of the Jewish monotheism. 2. St. Paul distinguished Christ from God, as a personal being, and regarded Him as essentially inferior and subordinate to the absolute Deity. He never confounded Christ with God Himself. The central feature of St. Paul's Christology is its doctrine of Mediatorship. This is a theological advance on the Messianic doctrine of the synoptic Gospels. St. Paul gives no evidence of acquaintance with the Logos doctrine; but he anticipates it by putting Christ above all human beings.

From beginning to end, Greek theology is distinctly monotheistic. The Father is God, in the primary and supreme sense. Christ as Son is God only in a derived or secondary sense. The doctrine of Christ's Mediatorship was the new truth of Christianity. Around it early controversies arose, and here began a Christological evolution which became the central factor of Greek ecclesiastical history through its whole course. It divides into four sections or stages, represented by the names of St. Paul, Justin Martyr, Origen, and Athanasius.

The Logos doctrine has no Jewish ancestry. It is essentially a mediation doctrine. It is based on the idea of a Divine transcendence, and of a cosmological void needing to be filled between the absolute God and the world. Three points are noticeable, which became fountain heads of tendencies that were finally to change the whole current of theological thought, and to substitute for the Pauline Christology something radically different. 1. The Logos doctrine emphasized the superhuman or Divine element in Christ's nature. When Jesus Christ was identified with the Logos, His whole being was transcendentalized. He was no longer the Son of man, but the Son of God, and even a *quasi*-Divinity. 2. The Logos doctrine, in its assertion of Christ's Mediatorship, emphasized the subordination element which characterizes St. Paul's theology, and tended to magnify it. It is the essence of the Logos doctrine that the Logos mediates between what is higher than itself and what is lower. 3. The Logos doctrine may be true, but, if so, its truth is metaphysical, not historical. In a single point the Johannine Christology advances beyond the Pauline. St. Paul has a transcendental view of Christ as the "form" and "image" of God; but the Fourth Gospel develops a metaphysical unity between the Father and Son, which is foreign to St. Paul. There is a marked resemblance between the Logos doctrine of the Fourth Gospel and that of Justin Martyr.

In the hands of Origen, the Logos doctrine suffered two amendments. The first is his view of the *eternal generation* of the Son. The second is the strict subordination of the Son to the Father. He insisted on *the difference of essence*. The Son was truly begotten of the Father, but His nature was different, since He lacked the attributes of absoluteness and self-existence, and derived His being from the Father's will. So Origen paved the way for Arius.

We are thus brought to the great crisis in the development of the Greek theology, and to the epoch of Athanasius and the Nicene Creed. Historically and critically, Athanasianism is simply a revolt from the subordination tendency, when carried too far. Arius had stretched subordination to its furthest point. Athanasius reduced it to a minimum. The term *homoousios* becomes the turning-point of the Nicene epoch. To Athanasius it meant that the Son was truly Son, not putatively or adoptively, and that, as true Son, He was of the same generic nature as His Father, and so equal to the Father in all Divine attributes. He was ready to accept the term *homoiousios* if it was explained to mean a likeness of essence in kind, which would allow that the Son

was a real Son, and derived from the Father His essential qualities. The Trinitarianism of Athanasius was radically Origenism. The Logos doctrine, in its Origenistic form of eternal generation and derived subordination, forms the backbone of the Nicene Christology. The difference between Origen and Athanasius is largely a matter of words. Yet Athanasius took one long step forward. He reduced the subordination of the Son to its lowest possible terms. He was ready to call Christ God. The object of dread ever present to the Nicene and post-Nicene Fathers was the spectre of tritheism. In Athanasian Trinitarinism three points are to be noted. 1. Athanasius never confounds the one God with the Trinity. The Three Persons are not one Being. 2. The Logos becomes endowed with His mediating function by virtue of His Sonship; but this Sonship is an eternal relationship. The real Sonship is what he means by *homoousios*. 3. Athanasius strongly opposes the doctrine of one personal Being in three modes of revelation and activity. Athanasius held to a Trinity of Three Personal Beings. He held the Second Person to be the true Son of God, of the same nature with the Father, and therefore not a creature. He saved himself from tritheism by the doctrine of one Supreme Cause. He says the Son is interior and proper to the Father. This doctrine of the interiorness or coinherence of the Son in the Father has been misapprehended by Augustinian theologians. Athanasius does not mean by *homoousios* "numerically one in essence."

MAN'S CONCEPTION OF GOD FROM AN HISTORICAL STANDPOINT. By JOHN W. SMITH, LL.B. (*The Biblical World*).—How should we account for the universally prevalent disposition or inclination on the part of man to worship? Some say man's conception of God is an inheritance derived from an original and primitive direct revelation; others, that the idea of the existence and attributes of a Supreme Being resulted from a process of pure reasoning on the part of man. Others attribute the idea solely to observation of nature, its beauty, its grandeur, its harmony, its laws. Others maintain that the idea of God is inconceivable, unknowable, and that man's conceptions on the subject are mere chimeras, and worship, in all its forms, a superstition. Others plead that religion is inherent in man, and is in him a mode of action, a potential energy, quite as much as the forces and powers are inherent in material substances.

The time has been when the name of God was regarded as too sacred to be pronounced by mortal lips. But if the heavens declare God's glory, it cannot be sacrilegious to inquire into and examine the impress that God has left on man. If man is the image of God, and we take into consideration his accomplishments thus far, and the possibilities of the future, with all nature and its laws at his command, it may be that he will be regarded in coming ages as the best and highest revelation of God.

Thanks to the patient and scholarly investigation of the nineteenth century, we are now enabled to read the thoughts, feelings, and emotions that actuated men in remote antiquity, long ages before Abram left Ur of the Chaldees. Exploration, archæology, philology, psychology, ethnography, mythology, and folk-lore have carried us back to the formative periods of the civilized races of men, and opened up to us vast treasure-houses of information stored when Europe was a wilderness and America unknown. And thus we are brought face to face with, hear the voice of, and learn the thoughts and yearnings of, man far back towards the infancy of the human race.

The law of progress, development, or evolution has a harsh and grating sound for those who entertain the traditional idea of a prehistoric and primitive special revelation at a time when mankind are supposed to have lived in a state of simplicity and moral rectitude, constantly in communion with God. But we can trace man from a

time when he was the contemporary of the *Elephas antiquus*, with perhaps no knowledge of fire or clothing, and certainly none of earthenware, when his only implement was a flint mallet or hatchet. Philology furnishes unmistakable evidence of the law of progression, in opposition to the supposed primæval revelation of language, and that language the Hebrew. The same law of evolution is apparent in the forms of government, in art, in science, in literature.

A careful study of the world's religions will establish the existence of certain facts underlying them all, and this is especially true regarding the conceptions of God, through the medium of the many forms of worship that have been adopted. 1. In all religions man has recognized the existence of some being or beings, some object or thing, by him supposed to be superior to and above himself. At first, however, all is confusion and chaos. In his groping after the infinite man has laid hold of the tangible and intangible, the natural and supernatural—the earth, the moon, the sun, the stars, and even the universe itself. This confusion, growing out of the multiplicity of gods, is somewhat dissipated, however, when we come to take into consideration the circumscribed horizon of the observer. Looking at man in his march down through the ages, we see his pathway strewn with errors innumerable, the greatest lesson from which to us should be charity. Are we yet on firm ground? Would any two of us entirely agree in our conceptions of God, His attributes and power? Does any one believe the conceptions of God entertained by Calvin coincided with those of Luther or Melancthon? Not infrequently are to be found, in the same people, and running parallel with each other, conceptions of God of the very highest excellence and moral grandeur, and conceptions of the most anthropomorphic nature. The elemental factors that have wrought great changes in historic religions are many, but among them may be mentioned (1) difference in character of the races; (2) the nature of their homes and occupations; and (3) the political, social, moral, and industrial relations sustained to other preceding or surrounding nations or peoples. 2. Another underlying fact is a feeling of weakness in man himself, and a dependence upon that being or beings, object or thing, assumed to exist. 3. A belief or faith on his part in his ability to reach his God or gods, by the use of some form of sacrifice, offering, or prayer. 4. A like belief or faith that, on the proper approach to that God or gods, his wishes, desires, or hopes will be realized. These phenomena, so far as they relate to man's religious manifestation, are universal, found in the most benighted savage as well as in the highest form of civilized man, everywhere and at all times, and under all circumstances and conditions.

THE SUPERNATURAL AND ITS IMITATIONS. By ARTHUR F. MARSHALL, B.A. (Oxon.) (*American Catholic Quarterly Review*).—In this article the subject is treated from a philosophical rather than theological point of view. That the mysteries of the faith should be above the natural reason is a matter of course to the believer; for, since a Divine religion is the communication of the Divine mind, it must follow that the merely natural intelligence cannot penetrate the mysteries of the faith. If the natural intelligence could penetrate Divine mysteries, it would follow (paradoxically) that such mysteries were not Divine, since the creature can no more aspire to the intelligence of the Creator than he can emulate His power or His holiness.

If Christianity be Divine, the supernatural must be its first characteristic; and it must attach to its whole compass, its whole life. Granted a supernatural origin, the continuance of the processes must be supernatural. Granted the Incarnation, then the link of God with man can never be broken or interrupted. The Incarnation could not fail to be followed by occasional glimpses of the unseen.

We may lay it down as the first postulate of sound philosophy, that God was the Alone from ever and ever—the Alone, not in the human sense of loneliness, but in the Divine sense of being All in all. Until we have well grasped this first postulate, we cannot even discuss the supernatural. Until we attribute all nature to the living God, and therefore deny that there can be anything that is not His, we are not in a position to rationally inquire, "Can the God who alone moves heaven and earth consistently vary those movements by unknown laws?"

Nature is a most powerful advocate for the reasonableness of the expectation of the supernatural. All nature is supernatural, in the sense that its cause is above nature, and the effect, therefore, is supernaturally produced. Nature not only presupposes the supernatural; Nature is herself supernatural; supernaturally sustained by the energy of Divine laws, which is the same thing as the energy of the living God. What are called "natural laws"—motion, force, gravitation—were not begotten by any element or by spontaneity; they could not be. They were begotten of a cause, whose intelligence and whose power must be absolutely boundless and eternal. And to suppose that God has retired from His own laws, instead of continuously perpetuating their operation, would be to suppose that life had abdicated its functions in favour of an inanimate materialism. The truth is that nature is a perpetual supernatural.

What, then, should we rationally expect from revealed religion, which is the communication of the Divine intimacies and confidences? We have the supernatural in dispensation, the supernatural as a consequence of revelation. The whole history of Judaism was supernatural. The dispensation to the Jews was miracle from end to end. Christianity is all supernatural. It is *all* God. The rejection of all miracle—not of this or that, but of all miracle—is transparently fatal to the belief that Jesus Christ is now "sat down on the right hand of God." See what a contradiction such a belief would establish between the thirty-three years of Christ's earthly life and the eternity of His life in the heavens. Instead of inferring—surely a most just inference—that the glorified Saviour is now more powerful with His Divine Father than before He had accomplished our redemption, it would insist that He had altogether ceased to work wonders, to do what He was constantly doing upon earth.

Considering the *facts* of the supernatural, we may say that there ought not to be any difficulty in believing them. There are true miracles, and there are false. There are true apparitions, and there are false. There are true records of miraculous interferences, and there are lying fictions by the score, by the hundred, not only in all countries, but in all times. And to be able to receive the supernatural, a man must be in full possession of the certainty that "the world" is really an intrusion upon the supernatural, not the supernatural upon the world. One reason why what may be called "the world" has such a hazy idea of the supernatural is, that the "imitations" of it are so grotesquely unreal that the true supernatural becomes clouded. It is a popular fallacy that the multiplicity of imitations throws doubt upon the existence of the real. Many persons, if they do not deny the real, either ignore it or treat it as speculative. But we must look for and expect imitations of the miraculous. What is there in religion that has not been imitated? There are true and sham doctrines; true and sham callings or vocations; there is true and sham piety. Let us rather speak of *systems* of the supernatural: (1) supernatural means of attaining sanctity; (2) supernatural means of learning Divine truths; (3) supernatural imitations or forecasts.

Take the system popularly known as mysticism, or the aspiring to arrive at close union with God, in a sense altogether above nature. No system has been more

imitated—and very successfully—even outside the whole province of revealed truth. The Wise Men of the East, Buddhist or Mohammedan, the Eastern and Western Platonists or Neo-Platonists, the more modern religious scientists, such as Behmen, the Swedish Swedenborg, the fantastic Muggletonians, the Cabbalists, Perfectionists, and hosts of others, have given us their ideas of "schools" of mysticism. True mystics, this author thinks, are represented by St. Teresa, St. Catherine, St. Bernard, St. John of the Cross, St. Francis of Assisi, etc. The imitation of the true mysticism is an imitation of the supernatural *life;* imitation of the supernatural *belief* may be found in *theosophy*, which is an apeing of a knowledge above nature. This "secret doctrine," as it is called, or the "synthesis of science, religion, and philosophy," is supposed to be a revival of esoteric Buddhism, or a fresh getting behind the veils of long-lost Aryan cabbalistic and occult speculation, in regard to the genesis and evolution of the universe, and particularly of man or human history. This occultism is, in its *modern* interpretation, a burlesque on the hidden life of grace and truth.

The word "superstition" suggests another system. In its popular sense it is a craving after the supernatural; a longing to find something which is above nature in what is really only consistent with or beneath nature. Yet superstition is a homage paid to truth. All these beliefs and dreads, foolish as they are, must be born of the conviction that there is and must be a supernatural in the natural life.

The worst of all imitations is that which we understand by the *preternatural.* Under such names as witchcraft, or necromancy, dark dealing, or enchantment, we are all familiar with preternatural wickedness; the precise boundary between the evil and the illusory being often beyond natural discovery. It would seem as though the evil one from the very beginning had tried to confuse his own work with the Divine work, so as to blind men to the true nature of evil. In our own days the new "spiritualism" at least *sometimes* works wonders, which neither science nor investigation can account for, furnishing evidence of a diabolical imitation which is indisputable as to origin and purpose.

"We have thus taken, (1) Nature, (2) Judaism, (3) Christianity, as all leading us to *expect* the supernatural in the sense in which it is popularly understood. We have (4) argued that the imitations of the supernatural are positive proof of the existence of the real. We have (5) urged that the disposition in all ages to believe in a supernatural religion has been made manifest by scores of inventions of false religions. And that (6) evil spirits, like wicked men, have tried to ape the supernatural, so as to confuse the Divine dealings with their own impiety."

Criticism of the Anselmic Theory of the Atonement. By A. J. Heller, D.D. (*The Reformed Quarterly Review*).—Anselm was the first theologian to plant himself upon the position of philosophy, and challenge for the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction both a rational necessity and a scientific rationality. The doctrine of Anselm, in its objective form, was adopted by the Reformers of the sixteenth century, and embodied in most of the confessional symbols of the time. It was supplemented, however, by the addition of a subjective element defining the mode by which the sinner comes into the possession of that which has been objectively provided for him. The thought of the present day seems to be travelling away from the theory of Anselm, and reaching after a better solution of the problem.

Anselm defines sin as debt. Man owes perfect obedience to the Divine Law and will. This obedience is not rendered; hence the guilt of man. The extinction of this guilt consists, not in subjecting the will to its rightful Sovereign, but in giving satisfaction for past offences. Man cannot find the satisfaction; God cannot fail to

demand it. There are two possible ways of satisfying Divine justice: inflicting the punishment on the transgressor; inflicting the punishment on One who stands in the place of the transgressor. "The required and adequate satisfaction must be theanthropic; *i.e.* tendered by a God-Man. The theanthropic obedience and suffering of Christ was not due from His mere humanity. This was sinless, and justice had no claims upon it in the way of suffering. And, moreover, only a man's obedience, and not that of a God-Man, could be required of a man. Consequently, this Divine-human obedience and suffering was a surplusage, in respect to the man Christ Jesus, and might overflow and inure to the benefit of a third party."

But Anselm failed to form a correct conception of the nature of sin, and consequently failed to define or characterize it properly. He called sin *debt;* but that term does not adequately express the nature of sin with its attendant consequences. It does not convey the idea of moral turpitude. Sin is crime. It is an offence against God, and also against the man himself, by which he becomes depraved. Man's transgression effects no change in God. He remains for ever the same immutable, absolutely moral Being. But man becomes corrupt, and falls under the just condemnation of God and his own guilty conscience. For this there is no equivalent to be found anywhere, nor in any person or thing. The Bible never calls sin "debt."

The fundamental error is in making human government the exact counterpart or model of the Divine. The parallelism does not hold. Human government consists in commandment alone. In Divine government the law does not consist in commandment alone. In respect to God it is *ex Divinâ naturâ*—inherent in Him. It is His mode of action. In respect to creation, the moral law is "a concreation of the human mind." The moral law is not simply an outward or objective statute to regulate man's outward life; it is inherent in his constitution. The Law is subjective as well as objective. Man suffers the penalty of death as the immediate consequence of his act.

The Anselmic theory alleges that, since man has sinned against an infinite God, his transgression is infinite, and that consequently the punishment must be infinite also. But how can a finite creature perform an infinite act? In Anselm's days offences were graded according to the rank or dignity of the persons against whom they are committed, and he argued on this line. Now, we see that sin is really a violation of man's own nature; and the punishment begins, continues, and ends with the transgressing.

The heart of Anselm's scheme is its substitutional and imputative character. Christ takes man's place and satisfies the justice of God by suffering the penalty which would otherwise fall upon man. But even if sins could be atoned for in this way, regeneration and sanctification are requisite, and must be accomplished in some other way than by simply cancelling man's debt. Substitution is possible where no exchange of mental or moral qualities is involved. Men cannot exchange consciences and states of mind. The moral consciousness of one person cannot become the possession of another. Every man must everywhere, and under all conditions of his life, be himself and answer for himself.

The absurdity of the theory of substitution becomes still more evident when we consider the idea of a double imputation which it involves. God imputes to Christ the sin and guilt of man, and punishes Him in man's stead; and then, in like manner, He imputes Christ's righteousness to men. Christ came into actual possession of that which was imputed to Him; otherwise the alleged penal sufferings of Christ would be a mere sham, and the theory would resolve itself into a mere juggling with words. If Christ is to fulfil all the requisite conditions of a real substitute, the imputation must clothe Him with the actual sin and guilt of man.

Anselm's thinking about Divine justice was dominated by the reigning system of philosophy, which regarded the attributes justice, guilt, righteousness, etc., as real entities having an existence independent of the persons to whom they belong, and separable from them. But it is never said that God is justice; God is love. Justice expresses that quality of God's nature by which He is true to Himself and to His purposes, which are altogether good. Justice is a personal attribute, and therefore not separable or transferable. If, according to the Anselmic doctrine of atonement, God's justice is satisfied, and more than satisfied, by the sufferings and death of Christ, how can it be said that God *forgives* sins? There is nothing to forgive—the debt is paid.

Again, if Christ by His sufferings and death rendered penal satisfaction for man's sin, and by His preceptive obedience fulfilled all righteousness in his stead, why, then, are not all men saved? Attempt is made to meet this difficulty by the theory of a limited atonement. But according to this theory, Christ made satisfaction for men's sins before they had committed them, even before they were born or it was possible for them to sin. They were thus justified and sanctified in advance of any transgression.

Christ's sufferings are sympathetic, incidental, altogether voluntary, but necessary for the perfecting of Himself as the Son of man. Because He is the Perfect One, the conflict is the more severe, and the suffering intense. The irrationality of the Anselmic theory is conceded by a recent advocate of it, when he says, "It may not be agreeable to our feelings, nor in accord with our views of right," that the sin of one should be laid upon another, and that other punished. There is, indeed, nothing more repulsive to reason.

Psychology, Physiology, and Pedagogics. By Rev. Thomas Hughes, S.J. (*American Catholic Quarterly Review*).—These three terms express the most important ideas of the day in that field of thought which is called science; they express, in their own way, the dominant ideas of materialism. Psychology is the science about the soul (*psyche*). It considers the ultimate causes or constituents of the noblest being in all nature—man. But such ultimate causes lie beyond the vision, observation, and experimentation of natural science, of physics, biology, and the rest, because ultimate causes are behind and prior to those phenomena which natural science begins with. The nature of the human soul exempts it from experimental investigation. It is simple and spiritual. Its world and atmosphere are in the first instance spiritual and abstract essences, and individual beings like itself, remote from matter and immortal. The question of the soul itself is philosophical or metaphysical.

Physiology is a science quite within the scope and circle of natural sciences, which proceed by the way of observation and experiment. It observes the living body, actuated as it is by the soul. It takes for its proper subject the functions of the living body.

Pedagogics is the name given to a scientific elaboration of those principles on which the education of man reposes. The final object of all education belongs to the sphere of pure psychology. It is the cultivation of the spiritual and immortal soul. It is the development of the spiritual intellect, and the training of the free-will of man. The human body, taken by itself, is not the subject of pedagogical culture. Animated as the bodily structure is by the spiritual soul, man comprises every perfection which is distributed at large about him, all that is material, vegetative, and sensitive. Education takes for its immediate subject the microcosm of the human person, soul and body, faculties and senses, all efficient for their purposes, and clamouring for culture in time, that they may bear their fruit in eternity.

This whole field is now explored by a new school. To understand the *new* psychology, nothing more is needed than physiology and physics. In it sensation becomes a question of mere molecular physics, a form of motion, vibration, extension. And there is some excuse for this. The matter which goes to build up our living body has not put off any of its necessary qualities in doing so. It is extended, ponderable, divisible, movable. There are vibrations in the cells and nerves; there is a mechanical response to external action in the reaction of the great mass of matter which constitutes the body. But it is one thing that a living body should not be found without mechanical movement and other physical qualities; and it is quite another thing that itself or its sensitive life should consist only of mechanical motion, or the manifestation of physical attributes. The functions of a live subject are of two classes. One regards the nourishment, growth, and reproduction of the body; another regards the life of relation. It is the same soul which, acting spiritually in its own conscious intellect, will, and memory, actuates also the animal body as a principle of life united with matter.

In all this department of philosophy we owe to modern physiology a debt or two; but no amount of experimentation on the things of nature or on ourselves need make us mere experimentalists or empiricists, who will accept only that which is tested by physical experiment or is observed by the physiologist's eye.

The expounder of modern psychology indicates that, in spite of Kant's prediction to the contrary, psychology has become an "exact science," that is to say, involving mathematical measurements. Three great proofs are offered us to establish a conviction in our minds that experimental psychology has grown, has followed methods of its own, and has achieved much. (1) There is Weber's law. (2) There are Fechner's measures for psychical phenomena. (3) There is Wundt's foundation of a psychological laboratory. To these may be added subordinate proofs. (4) The general harmony of the new psychology with evolution. (5) The need of emancipation on the part of psychology, or its right to "autonomy." (6) The perfectly obvious fact that the old peripatetic or scholastic philosophy about the soul passed out of existence somewhere in the sixteenth century. These so-called proofs are subjected to severe criticism by the author of this article.

What becomes of pedagogics, or the science of education, in a philosophical system which knows no ideas, no intellect, no spiritual emotion of a higher will, not even sense, which admits only sound-waves or light-waves as coming from without and playing on nerves, which understands nothing but the stimulation of ganglia, chiefly that which is called the brain, and considers the irritation of tissue from some undefined activities without to be the whole contribution of knowledge to what it denominates "consciousness" within?

Now, what degree of utility attaches to this psychology from the teacher's point of view? A commissioner of education writes thus: "I do not mean to discourage or disparage physiological psychology; for it is certainly the best part of physiology, and will bring with it stores of important knowledge useful in hygiene and the pathology of education." Three classes of works on psychology are before the public. 1. Works written from the so-called standpoint of common sense. 2. Works written by physiologists and physiological psychologists. 3. Works on rational psychology from the school of Aristotle or of Kant. The commissioner gives his opinion on the second class. Their treatises include two sub-classes. "(1) Those which make the senses the source of all our knowledge. (2) Those that seek in the study of the brain and nervous system the explanation of the phenomena of mind. Both of these sub-classes agree in making mental action something organic—a function of the physical

organism—instead of placing it in a soul transcending the physical body, and controlling the same. . . . The entire drift of their thought is negative to the aggregate of ethical and religious convictions which the age holds in its 'common sense,' which regards man as made up of an immortal soul, transcendent of matter, and charged with the ethical mandate to subdue the body, and use it only as an instrument for transcendent purpose, namely, for the knowing and willing of what is Divine. . . . Now, since education is simply the means of initiating youth into the forms and convictions of our civilization, we can see how negative is the attitude of all forms of materialism. Its study by the teacher, unless he is able to escape its implications, will be injurious. The only cure is to hold firmly to the dogmatic basis (of common sense), or to move forward to the psychology founded on philosophical insight. Without this resort to the first or third basis, agnosticism is the only result of studying physiological psychology, or materialism."

"Need more be said about this modern psychology as applied in the schoolroom, in connexion with which it is said so sententiously that 'to train the mind without a knowledge of the mind is absurd'? If so, this pedagogical psychology must be extravagantly absurd. For it 'titillates and tattoos' a ganglion called the brain, and, as to mind, *that* it neither knows of nor cares to use. For our part, we prefer a psychology that includes mind and soul. And if, thanks to the beneficence of Him who hath given wisdom to mankind, such psychology is old, we do not object to it on that account. Oftentimes the old wine is best."

CURRENT GERMAN THOUGHT.

Holy Scripture and Criticism. By Dr. Volck, Dorpat (*Neue kirchl. Zeitschr.*, 1894, No. 12).—Dr. Volck, as a Lutheran, endeavours to maintain a middle position between the extreme which on critical grounds rejects the inspiration and authority of Scripture altogether, and the extreme which denies the existence of error of any kind in Scripture. A few writers, both Lutheran and Reformed, still take the latter ground as the only security against the attacks of advanced criticism—as Dr. Volck thinks, unwisely. The Lutheran Church has always taken a freer attitude to Scripture than the Reformed. The seventeenth-century divines of both Churches, but especially the latter, held the most rigid views of literal inspiration and absolute inerrancy. Luther took a very free line. His test of canonicity was exceedingly subjective, namely, the extent to which any book of Scripture treated of Jesus Christ. He rejected James, Jude, 2 Peter, as failing to meet this test. He was doubtful also of the apostolic origin of Hebrews and Revelation. While Lutheran divines have no adopted all these opinions of Luther, they have been greatly influenced by his general attitude.

In the first place, Dr. Volck maintains the right and necessity of criticism in regard both to the text and canon of Scripture. We may appeal to the extreme care and accuracy of the Massorete editors of the text; but that care for rigid uniformity was by no means characteristic of earlier editors, as may be seen in the different forms of parallel passages (Isa. xxxvi.-xxxix. = 2 Kings xviii. 13-xx. 19; Ps. xviii. = 2 Sam. xxii.). We have an example of the different versions of the text in the *tikkune sopherim* (corrections of the learned), which Jewish tradition has brought down to us. The Massoretic text itself cannot be traced further back than the first centuries after Christ. The Hebrew text used by the translators of the LXX. was different from and sometimes better than ours. In face of these facts, how can we speak of a

fixed form of the text above the need of critical revision? As to the question of a canon, there are some modern writers (Haug, *Die Autorität der heil. Schrift u. die Kritik*, 1891; and the school of the *Theol. Lit.-Zeitung*) who describe the very idea of a canon as a mistake, the product of a degenerate religious age. As long, it is said, as the living sense of religion was powerful in the Church, either Jewish or Christian, no need of a written authority was felt or thought of. And yet these writers ascribe even to the Old Testament some sort of authority for the Christian Church. If so, is not an authoritative record of the primal revelation necessary? Certainly the question of the canon is not closed by decisions of synagogues and councils; inquiry is still necessary and free. But such inquiry will always proceed under two conditions—first with reverence and due regard to ancient investigations and decisions, and secondly with a clear understanding of what Scripture is and is not. The latter point is of special importance. Scripture is more than a testimony to Christ and a making known of God's will for our salvation. It is this in the form of historical transactions between God and man. Its very doctrine rests on historical conditions. Scripture contains much more than what is necessary to individual salvation. Its first message is to the Church, to which it gives an authentic account of the origin, growth, and consummation of the union and fellowship which it is God's aim to establish between Himself and mankind. The Church is the realization of that fellowship. To the Church, Scripture *is* God's Word, *i.e.* its law; to the individual, Scripture *contains* God's Word, *i.e.* for his salvation. The question of the canon involves two points—the historical circumstances in which the several parts of Scripture arose, and the organic unity of the whole.

That the Old Testament has any authority at all for Christians is strenuously denied by writers like those already mentioned, and advanced critics like Smend, who says that we do violence to the historical meaning of the Old Testament religion, and mistake its nature, when we regard it as a designed preparation for Christ's perfect revelation. This position cannot be reconciled with the attitude of Christ and the apostles (see Matt. v. 17). What Christ does in this passage is to bring out the full meaning of the ancient Law, and impose it anew on the Church. He uses the Old Testament in His own conflicts with Satanic temptation. Scripture governs His acts; Scripture governs His words. In His teaching, His suffering, His death, He has recourse to it. He Himself is the import of Old Testament Scripture (Luke xxiv. 27, 44; John v. 39). The same is true of the apostles, who find references to Christ in the narratives of Hagar and Ishmael (Gal. iv. 24, ff.); of the rock which Moses smote (1 Cor. x. 4); Isaiah's vision (John xii. 41). Modern criticism, indeed, condemns such use of the Old Testament by the apostles as irreconcilable with its "scientific conscience." But this use is right, because it is the consequence of the right view of Scripture as the testimony, arising out of the sacred history, to Him to whom that history pointed. The critical condemnation often appeals to Gal. iv. 21–30, which is described as a specimen of rabbinical exegesis. "But the exegesis is just as right as that of Matt. ii. 15 and Heb. ii. 12, ff. In the relation of Hagar and Sarah, and the antithesis of Ishmael and Isaac, Paul shows the relation of the legal to the evangelical order of things, and the antithesis of the Church of Jesus to the hostile Jewish nation; and he is right in this. That antithesis is the same for the beginning of God's Church in Abraham's days, as that in the New Testament between Law and faith, Judaism and Christianity. If this is rabbinical exegesis, it only shows that rabbinical and false are not one and the same." Not only in the New Testament, but in the earliest Church, the Old Testament was regarded as God's Word. At the same time, the difference between the two must not be overlooked—the difference between

prophecy and fulfilment. Salvation in Christ is the import of both: here is their unity. But in the Old Testament this salvation is still future, growing; in the New it has become fact: here is their difference. "The consideration of this unity and difference will keep the expositor in his right attitude to the Old Testament. It will preserve him from carrying over the Old Testament into the New, and also from merging its essential meaning in its historical conditions. Observing the gradual way in which Christ's coming is prepared for in the Old Testament, he will give their right value to the different stages through which the preparation runs, while not overlooking their living relation to their one subject, Christ; for He is the unity of the Old and New Testaments." The importance of the Old Testament even to systematic theology is seen in such doctrines as those of atonement and justification. The true meaning of Christ's Passion and death can only be fully discovered when it is considered in the light of Old Testament prophecy—sacrifice, prophetic teaching, and typical history. As to justification by faith, it is the Apostle Paul himself who takes the teaching of the Old Testament as his guide.

The New Testament bears testimony to the Old. In 2 Tim. iii. 16 "every Scripture"—an expression limited by the context to the Old Testament—is spoken of as useful for instruction as, or because, God-inspired. Where the Old Testament is quoted it is said, "God says," or "The Holy Ghost says," instead of "Scripture says." This may seem to justify the inspiration theory of the seventeenth century, but it does not. The human factor could not appear more emphatically than it does in the Psalms and prophets. There was no need to call attention to this aspect of the case.

The error of the old inspiration theory was in confounding Scripture and revelation. Scripture is not revelation, but the witness to the history of revelation, or the record of that history. If so, it stands in close connexion with the history, just as every record forms an integral part of the occurrences it narrates. It owes its origin to the same Divine Spirit who controlled the history. At the same time, human activity is seen both in the history and the record, human activity with its liability to error. There is abundant evidence that, as to matters of natural science, the writers stood on the level of their age. What about Matt. xxiii. 35, where the evangelist calls Zechariah "son of Berechiah," whereas, according to 2 Chron. xxiv. 20, he was son of Jehoiada; or Matt. xxvii. 9, where a citation from Zechariah is ascribed to Jeremiah; or Acts vii. 4 and Gen. xi. 39; or vii. 16 and others? It is no use to shut one's eyes to facts. Yet, despite such differences and mistakes, Scripture remains to us the Divine record of the sacred history; for such errors, however they arise, do not prejudice saving truth. It is only necessary to define the limits of possible error in Scripture, or of its essential contents. These limits must be drawn more closely than is done by those to whom Scripture is simply a testimony to Christ. It is evident what consequences such a view has for the historical contents of Scripture, especially of the Old Testament, which is regarded as non-essential, or a shell from which the essential truth has to be extracted. When we regard Scripture as the record of the sacred history, *i.e.* of the history having for its subject the restoration of fellowship between God and man in Christ Jesus, we judge every detail by its relation to the salvation described in the history. It then becomes clear in what field the possibility of error is to be conceded, namely, wherever things are treated of which either do not affect or do not materially affect the substance of the sacred story. Details of science, history, geography, numbers, belong to this neutral ground. "Holy Scripture is God's work, but a work carried out by human intervention. The Divine message becomes just as completely human as the Word became flesh in Christ. Because it is so, the servant's form is to be seen in Scripture also. But through it shines the glory of God,

to whom human language was not too mean for Him to reveal His gracious will in." Hamann says, "It is part of the unity of Divine revelation that the Spirit of God humbles and empties Himself by the pen of the holy men whom He inspired, just as the Son of God did by His human form, and as the whole creation is a work of the highest humility. When the Divine penmanship chooses the common and poor to shame the strength and genius of all profane writers, the enlightened, inspired eyes of a friend and lover, sharpened by jealousy, easily discern rays of heavenly glory in such a garb."

Many nowadays regard the presence of the miraculous in Scripture as demonstrative evidence of its unhistorical character. But the Christian is conscious of a change in himself, not to be explained by natural causes. This experience helps to render Scripture miracles credible. The believer is reproached with bringing certain presuppositions to Scripture. But the absence of presuppositions of some kind is incredible. "The spirit of the expositor is never a *tabula rasa*, on which Scripture writes its teaching, but occupies a definite standpoint. Whoever has come to Christ by the ministry of the Church knows not only an order of creation, but also an order of redemption; he knows also of a history in which redemption was worked out—a history of the revelation of the living God for the world's salvation, within Israel, the chosen people, and aiming at Christ the Redeemer. As he knows the difference of this history from that of other nations outside Israel, so he knows the difference of the record of this history from other historical works. He shares the faith of the Church, by whose ministry he became a Christian, in Scripture. He sees in it the original record of Christianity, given once for all, and therewith the rule of the Church's faith and life. And so he knows himself, as a member of the Church, a true Christian in the degree that his Christianity is in unison with Scripture. In this attitude to Scripture, when he makes it the subject of scientific investigation, he approaches it with the confidence that it will attest itself to be what the Church sees in it, and what he himself believes of it."

We now proceed to consider some special questions as further illustrating the right attitude to Old Testament criticism. We read in Smend's *Lehrbuch d. A. T. Religionsgeschichte*, "The history of the Old Testament religion begins, according to the Pentateuch, in a certain sense with the patriarchs. Yahveh bears relations to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, like those in which He stood later to Israel, and the piety of the patriarchs corresponds to Israel's attitude to Yahveh. But the narrative of Genesis is altogether legendary; historical recollection just as little goes back to the progenitors in Israel as in any other nation. The patriarchal history is merely an ideal example of the history of Israel, and Yahveh's intercourse with the patriarchs is merely an expression of the faith that His grace was already watching over the first beginnings of Israel." (Similarly, Bäntsch, in *Die moderne Bibelkritik.*) But just in this lies all the emphasis in Old Testament history, that the nation chosen by God to receive His revelation came into being in a different way from other nations, that it took its rise from an act of the living God, who called the Semite Abraham to be its progenitor. Therefore, in distinction from all other nations, in Israel historical recollection reaches back to the progenitors; and it is an offence against the very spirit of the history of Israel, as it is found in the Old Testament, to treat all the names between Arpaxad and Joseph inclusive, as even Ewald did, as names of tribes, not of persons. If Abraham was not the man he appears to be in Gen. xii. 1, ff., the entire Old Testament history loses the essential peculiarity by which it is distinguished from the history of all other nations. Whoever does not wish to see that history destroyed will not allow Abraham to be dissolved into a mythical figure, and just as

little Moses, from whom the race of Abraham received its peculiar character. Just as Israel's origin is different from that of all other nations, so also is the course of its development. Not in the way of natural development did this take place; but by an act of God, who redeemed it from Egypt, and gave it the laws of its life, it became an independent nation, and God's people. We may dispute about the extent of the Mosaic legislation; we may hold different opinions as to how many of the laws handed down in the Pentateuch are directly Mosaic; but that the legislation stands at the beginning of the history of Israel remains to us an historical fact, the denial of which renders it impossible to understand the historical development of Israel, and especially the existence and contents of prophecy. Just as much we maintain the actuality of what the Book of Joshua says about the march through the Jordan, and the conquest of Canaan; for even the way in which Israel obtained its land must have been essentially different from similar occurrences in other histories. And again, what is said in Gen. xii. 1, ff., of the promise made to Abraham, and of his obedience to the Divine command to forsake his country, that he might grow into a great nation, in which all nations should be blessed, is simply unintelligible unless revelations had gone before, to which these words of God attached themselves. And, therefore, in the first eleven chapters of Genesis, whose centre consists of these revelations, we are as little able to see "philosophical myths" as "ethnographical" myths in the patriarchal histories.

But, then, any discussion of the contents of the Old Testament rests on criticism of its literature. The date, origin, nature of the several books must be first ascertained. For a long time positive theology neglected this subject. Keil and Hengstenberg, who had no eye for critical questions, were its sole representatives in this field. König's *Introduction* has rolled away the reproach. Writers like Rupprecht and Adolph Zahn still advocate a return to the old standpoint, but this is out of the question. That different documents underlie the Pentateuch (or, more correctly, the Hexateuch), no one can deny who opens his mind to the impression which the history makes on the reader. Just as little can it spring from Moses himself. It nowhere claims to be composed by him in the form in which we have it. Only of particular things is it said that he recorded them (Exod. xvii. 4; xxiv. 4; xxxiv. 27; Numb. xxxiii. 2; Deut. xxxi. 9, 22, 24). What Christian interest is imperilled, if analysis shows that it is neither a homogeneous work nor originated in the first instance with Moses, no one can see. Do we think, then, that this portion of the Old Testament Scripture can no longer be called inspired? But why should an influence of the Holy Spirit on him who brought the work to conclusion be inconceivable? The mode of this influence will be different from what the old theory of inspiration supposed. That influence must have been much freer and more diversified than was formerly imagined. It is not only in the Pentateuch that a variety of documents is seen forming the background. The same is true of Samuel and the Book of Kings, where we find references to the work used by the authors.

As is well known, the second part of Isaiah is ascribed to Deutero-Isaiah as the great unknown. This view may now be regarded as established. Delitzsch, in the last edition of his commentary, accepted it. But no regret or fear need be entertained. Even if the author did live in the Exile, the contents of his discourses are unaffected. A chapter like the fifty-third remains the same, whether it was written before or after the Exile. "In my own opinion, after more than thirty years' study of the book, chs. xl.–lxvi. cannot be ascribed in their present form to the old Isaiah. But just as little can they have no connexion with him. Otherwise their position in the canon—to mention but one thing—under the prophet's name is an inexplicable enigma. The

truth lies in the middle. The book contains, without question, genuine discourses and materials from Isaiah. But these were revised and moulded into their present shape by one of the scholars of the prophet, in whose circle they continued in the time of the Exile, when the fulfilment of the prophecies was palpable. Only on this supposition of Klostermann, which is also approved by A. Köhler, can all the difficulties, in my opinion, be solved."

The Book of Daniel is in a similar position. Modern writers regard it as established that it is the work of a pious Jew of the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, who wished to encourage his persecuted brethren by the promise of the coming of the kingdom of heaven, and who put his exhortations into the mouth of an inspired prophet of the time of the Exile. It cannot be questioned that, in the case of this book also, serious doubts arise against its composition by him whose experience it narrates, and whose visions of the future it records, on which account even those who formerly defended its genuineness have given it up. But, on the other hand, one cannot avoid the impression that there are real predictions in the book, at least until it is proved by better evidence than has yet appeared, that the fourth of Daniel's empires is the Greek not the Roman, and until Zech. vi. 1–8 and xi. 8, ff., are satisfactorily explained without reference to Dan. vii. and viii. What is said in Zech. vi. of the war-chariots, which issue from the mountains of brass, and in Zech. xi. 8 of the three shepherds, to whom at the close of the chapter a bad shepherd is added, assumes Daniel's vision, of the empires, and is only intelligible on this basis. These prophecies of Daniel must have been extant and known when Zechariah appeared. But, of course, this does not prove the existence of the *Book* of Daniel at that time. It should not be overlooked that the portion of the book in which Daniel is spoken of in the third person does not claim to be composed by him. Between the record and the events it describes there may have been a considerable interval. As concerns the second part of the book, in a chapter like the eleventh, where the history of Antiochus Epiphanes is traced in such a way that we seem to be reading history, the suggestion is natural, that we have here, if not a *vaticinium ex eventu*, a revision of an original general prediction after its fulfilment; for, considered as prophecy in the full sense of the word, this chapter would be quite unique in the Old Testament.

We are driven to suppose revision of older documents in other parts of the Old Testament; and we must not be deterred from resorting to this explanation by the abuse of it in other writers. In Koheleth this may, perhaps, explain the strange fact that two opposing lines of thought lie side by side. The fact forces itself upon us in a series of psalms like Pss. liii. and xiv., lxx. and xl. 13–17, etc. The inscriptions need a careful sifting, which may reduce the number of Davidic psalms. In not a few cases the addition of the name of David may be due to the copyists. How, otherwise, can we explain the fact that the LXX. has "David's" in a number of psalms where the Hebrew text names no author, and that, conversely, it drops the name of David from four, and that of Solomon from one, of the psalms of degrees? (First case, Pss. xxxiii., xliii., lxvii., lxxi., xci., xciii.–xcix., civ.; second case, Pss. cxxii., cxxiv., cxxxi., cxxxiii., cxxvii.) At present it is a growing custom to deny any psalm to be David's. But only a criticism fond of denial can take such a position. Recently even Ps. xviii. is refused to David. If one psalm bears the stamp of genuineness on its face, it is this. Even Nöldeke has confessed that there is no reason for doubting the genuineness of the psalm.

"There are writings in the Old Testament which have been inserted by a later hand. An instance is found in the Elihu passages in Job. These cannot be an original portion of the book. Such an assertion has been described as dangerous. But where

the danger lies, it is the less easy to see, as the passages lose nothing of their value by the supposition. We must also reckon with the possibility that larger portions of the Old Testament canon are put in a wrong place or ascribed to wrong authors. This is asserted of Zech. ix.-xiv., which is ascribed to a pre-Exilic prophet of the eighth century, or is put in the days of the conflict of the Diadochi. I accept neither view, but believe that Zechariah here repeats old prophecies. The question must be fully examined, and not dismissed offhand."

"I have only wished to show that particular questions bearing on the origin of Old Testament books may receive different answers from those given by exegetical tradition without Christian faith being endangered. Our exegesis suffers from the influence of the old inspiration theory, which makes all scientific examination of Scripture impossible. It is time that it were finally set free from this interdict, and moved freely under the guidance of right views of the nature of Scripture. There is no danger of its falling into error, if its representatives remain within the spiritual movement begun by Old Testament revelation and its record, and perfected in the New. We will gladly learn from our opponents. The 'broad gulf' which divides us we neither can nor will bridge over. But we will not have it said that, in the interest of apology, we close our eyes to scientific truth, and make statements about Scripture which contradict truth. The older theology was not free from this reproach, because it did not rightly estimate the human factor in revelation. If modern criticism has striven to repair the neglect, we will not ignore the results of its inquiry, but endeavour to profit by and apply them. The believing Church, Frank says, will accustom itself to accept more on this side than it has been used to; but one thing neither the Church nor theology will ever accept—the elimination of the Divine, supernatural element, which essentially governed the history and the corresponding record of Israel, and differentiated them from all other products of antiquity."

Dr. Luthardt as an Ethical Teacher. By Pfarrer Winter, Meissen (*Sächs. Kirchenblatt*, 1894, No. 24).—During the past year Dr. Luthardt has completed his *History of Christian Ethics*. This work, as comprehensive in plan as it is stimulating and fascinating in style, in its last pages brings before us the chief ethical theologians of the present, a Scharling and Kähler, an Oetinger, Frank, etc., emphasizing their peculiarities. But a place among them is clearly due to the historian himself. Valuable as are his works on the history of ethics, he has not merely deserved well in this field, he is himself an eminent teacher of ethics of the day. His ethical lectures have always been highly prized by young theologians; they are regarded as his "best course." His writings on the subject are his well-known *Moral Truths of Christianity*, the brief instructive sketch in Zöckler's *Handbook*, the *Vorträgen über die modernen Weltanschauungen*, and the small treatise *Zur Ethik* (1891).

Strong will is a prominent element in Luthardt's character; hence his predilection even in theological thought for this field. In his theology he has of design turned aside from mere speculation, and put in the centre the living Christianity which shows itself in life; it is a theology ethical in spirit; as Dr. Luthardt is fond of saying, that God's nature is will, and this is the highest power in man. In ethics, therefore, he is in his own field; on this subject he can show the full strength of a personality which is a great attraction to students. His treatment of ethics is best described as decidedly Lutheran. It is the free and joyous, the historical and social character of Lutheran ethics which he everywhere brings to the front—the ethics of acceptance with God, which says with the apostle, "Being justified by faith, we have peace with God," and are called to freedom in which all is ours, which can use created things with joy and

thankfulness, and serve God in the use. Recently, Ritschl has often been praised as having first again seen the importance of an earthly calling for Christian ethics, and so taught us again to understand Luther. It is not so. It was Harless who again broke ground in this direction. And Luthardt has pursued these ideas further. This is what he says of Luther, in his *History*, ii. 37, "Here we find a complete moral theory, so certain, free, and wide of heart, and yet, on this account, so truly Christian, that there is nothing like it in the previous history of the Church." In the *Moral Truths*, again, "Christianity is not the negation of the natural life, which God created, but its right affirmation. It is not flight from the world, but the world's healing and holiness." "In making us sure of Divine salvation, it sets us inwardly free to enter into everything which life in the world offers us and demands from us—free and joyous in the world, because inwardly bound to God."

Through Roman, as through Reformed ethics, with all their differences, runs a common feature—they bear a legal character. Schleiermacher was the first in modern times to renounce the imperative form of ethics, and to give it a descriptive character. In this Hofmann followed him in the most decided way; he views theological ethics as the description of a moral actuality, namely, the Christian attitude. Luthardt speaks in the same sense. If dogmatics presents the realizing of Divine fellowship on God's side, ethics on that basis presents the realizing of Divine fellowship in the Christian's life on man's side, according to the apostle's saying, "Let us love Him"—here is the ethical side; "because He first loved us"—here is the dogmatic side of the matter. And so dogmatics are not two parallel sciences, as God's love and man's do not go on side by side. As man's love is conditioned, sustained, and surrounded by God's, so dogmatics and ethics form one system of Christian truth, in which the latter has always to go back to the former and to build upon it. It is a fundamental thought, running through the history of ethics, and always used as a test of ethical systems, that only after the right relation to God has been found in faith is the right relation to man possible.

A well-known difficulty in the exposition of ethics is the method of arranging the extensive and varied material. There is no tradition on the subject, as in dogmatics. Dr. Luthardt follows, in the main, the plan of Hofmann, taking as a basis the general categories of all life—becoming, being, and action; and treating (1) of the personal growth of Christian morality; (2) of its actuality as virtuous disposition; and (3) of its manifestation as dutiful conduct. There can be no question that this arrangement has the merit of great simplicity and comprehensiveness, and just as little that the different departments and questions of the moral life are here put in their right place. But the characteristic feature in their special treatment everywhere is the historical sense. That history is to be the guide of the present is the truth meeting us at every point. "We are what we are only within the community and in the connexion of history. Even the moral consciousness depends on the community, and is a matter of historical development." "This it is which gives a soul to life, making it full and warm, when the breath of history blows upon it." Hence, in examining the relation of morals and religion, he does not start from general propositions, but from the historical facts of the case; so also in expounding moral truth, Christian virtue, the nature of the State, the work of culture, humanity. A second point is suggested. Historical sense is peculiar to the present century in contrast with the last one; ethics also, since Fichte, and especially Hegel, bears this character; the world of the moral is seen, not merely in the individual subject, but in the great objective powers of life. It was Schleiermacher who, by emphasizing the idea of the Church, applied this thought to Christianity, and made it fruitful for theology. And Lutheran ethics has followed

in this track; some, like Hofmann and Frank, taking a more abstract line, and keeping the two spheres of creation and redemption further apart; whilst others, like Harless and Von Oettingen, direct the gaze more to the concrete, historical reality, and emphasize the interworking of the two. Luthardt follows the latter; this corresponds to his entire mode of thought, in virtue of which he always keeps the whole in view, and places it under the historical point of sight. He lays great stress on maintaining the alliance made between Christianity and the powers of the world's life, and on the latter being always permeated in their working by the religious and moral forces of Christianity. A complete severance of the world's life from Christianity would mean for us a ruinous break with history, and therefore a national calamity, and, even apart from this, would be a serious misfortune for the world's life itself; for Christianity is a source of rich and profound ideas to the whole life of culture. Everything, then, must be done to avoid this. The whole of Luthardt's apologetic work is ruled by this thought. He has always before his eyes the Lutheran ideal of the free harmonious co-operation of different lines of moral life, such as our fathers proposed—Luther, Melancthon, etc., especially Seckendorff, in his *Fürstenstaat*, and such as Ernest the Pious endeavoured with the greatest success to realize (*Gesch. d. Ethik*, ii. 234). It may have been going too far when our fathers made the Government formally the guardian and administrator of both tables of the Law; but the principle remains that the State should be administered in the Christian spirit because and so long as the nation itself as a whole is Christian. So understood, the Christian State is a truth, for it corresponds to a reality. We require all in politics "to take account of real relations. There is no greater reality than the religious confession of a nation." Christianity claims to be a national religion, the Church a national Church, the religion of the mass of the people, who have to work hard, and for whom healthy piety is a necessity of life. The thought occurs repeatedly in the *History of Ethics*, and is applied as a critical standard to different Church tendencies. To such a genuine and sound national piety a fixed code of morals is essential; for a nation cannot live on feeling—what lives in its heart must be embodied in a fixed, and at the same time living, code of morals. The decay of Christian morals is therefore an evil of the most perilous character.

CURRENT FRENCH THOUGHT.

PRAYER AND MIRACLES. By E. MENEGOZ (*Revue Chrétienne*).—When we study the miracles of the Bible, we must, as in every historical study, distinguish between the fundamental idea and the contingent and temporary form which clothes it. It is not very difficult to discover the idea which is at the base of all the miraculous narratives of the Old and New Testaments. It is the belief that, in certain circumstances, God intervenes in the course of things. He stills a tempest, heals the sick, feeds the hungry, sets prisoners free, and raises the dead. This is the religious belief, the inward conviction, of the sacred writers; and it is to be noticed that our religious faith is less concerned with the *historicity* of the facts recorded than with the *interpretation* of those facts which the sacred writers give.

It might be shown that all the facts related in the Bible are historical, without its being proved thereby that they are due to a special and miraculous intervention of God. In certain cases the reality of an extraordinary phenomenon can be demonstrated in the most conclusive manner, and yet it is impossible to say that it is due to a supernatural Divine action, and is not the effect of natural causes. In the case of a leper healed by a word, the Academy of Medicine would inquire into the natural

causes of the fact, and would not consider itself forced to see in the cure the finger of God.

I repeat that it is the interpretation of the fact, and not the fact itself, which is important from a religious point of view. Whether the miraculous story be true or legendary, if the narrator has believed it, his faith has a religious value. It is in this faith that religious truth lives; it is in it that God reveals His hidden, mysterious activity in the world. And in this order of ideas the testimony of Jesus Christ is for us the supreme revelation of the truth. Now, what does Christ teach us? He teaches us to pray, "Our Father, which art in heaven." Here we are far from the rigid laws of nature. We are taught that we are members of a great family, that we live in the sphere of free and personal relations, like those between a father and his children.

"Ask," He said, "and it shall be given you." Miracles are answers to prayer, and are accomplished without any violation of the laws of nature. Not that we confuse the miraculous with the ordinary operation of Divine providence. It is in quite another experience of social life that we must seek for the counterpart of a miracle. I am a father of a family; and it frequently happens that my children ask something from me which I give to them, but which I would not have given but for their asking. In this we have what corresponds to a miracle—a special action, distinct from the regular, normal course of things. And has not the heavenly Father the same power to give? Is He less free than we are, or is He compelled to violate the laws of nature in order to give us what we ask?

After all, what are the laws of nature but the expression of His will? It is strange to conceive of God as face to face with a foreign power called nature, and with independent entities called laws. The living and true God is not only the Ruler of nature and its laws, but the whole universe is the expression of His will. And when science has duly ascertained the immutable character of a law, we can fairly conclude that God does not wish that law to be violated, and will not Himself violate it. He does not act in opposition to His own will; and therefore we refuse to admit the possibility of a fact contrary to the laws of nature.

We believe in miracles no less firmly than the sacred writers did, but we explain them differently. For them a miracle was a free Divine act *contrary* to the laws of nature; for us it is a free Divine act in *accordance with* the laws of nature. The sacred writers accepted the scientific opinions current in their time, and never thought of combating them; and so their idea of miracles was that of their contemporaries. It is the theology of a later time which is responsible for the conflict between faith and science; and modern orthodoxy and modern liberalism have brought this conflict to an acute stage—orthodoxy, by ignoring the rights of science; liberalism, by ignoring the rights of faith. If orthodoxy with its anti-scientific spirit repels men of science, liberalism, with its scornful criticism, repels believers.

In a suggestive figure, Professor Sabatier has expressed in a vivid way the double truth—that of scientific laws and that of religious faith. He compares them to two pillars in a cathedral, which meet together in the arch. The one of the pillars is science, the other is faith. At their base they seem to be absolutely independent of each other, they rise and run for a time in parallel lines, yet they end by mingling together at the summit, in God.

And so miracles as the answers to prayer appear to us as most natural. Prayer without a response from God is a vain illusion; and His response is that special action which the word "miracle" describes. We pray, "Give us this day our daily bread," and although we know how the corn is sown and bread made, we believe that it is God who day by day gives us our food. Our scientific knowledge does not nullify the faith which prompts us to pray.

THE IDEA OF RIGHTEOUSNESS IN THE HEBREW PROPHETS. By X. KŒNIG (*Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*).—The Hebrew prophets have played a principal part in the evolution of religious thought. Contemporary criticism has restored to them the place of honour which belongs to them in the history of religion; so that we can now recognize them as factors in the progress from Sinai to Golgotha. A study of their thought and action is therefore of the highest interest; and we wish to offer some help towards it by tracing out the idea which they give of the nature of righteousness.

The words which serve to express the Hebrew notion of righteousness are used in the prophetic writing, with some variation of meaning. In Ezek. xlv. 10 the word צֶדֶק is applied to a material object, and signifies that that object is in conformity with a fixed standard—"just balances, and a just ephah, and a just bath." In Joel, whose writings belong, as the majority of critics believe, to the end of the Persian period, we have the word applied to the autumnal rain, as coming at the right time and in full measure (ii. 23). In Isaiah the words are applied to an upright judge, and to God as Supreme Ruler: he, too, is spoken of as righteous who observes carefully and sincerely the written Law. Righteousness is the state of the man who is reconciled with Jehovah; the Israelite has pleaded his cause before Jehovah, and is justified (Isa. xliii. 25, 26); Jehovah, therefore, wishes to save His people; He will redeem them from captivity, and bestow His favour upon them; and so righteousness is the salvation of the people—their entering again into the favour of Jehovah (Isa. xlv. 5–8; xlvi. 10–13).

The idea of righteousness passes through three distinct phases, which correspond to three definite stages in the history of the Hebrew people. While the nation is still standing, the progress of civilization, or that which is so often taken as progress, brings with it enervating customs, and creates a deplorable social condition. Then those who are partisans of antique national austerity rally round the religious tribunes, who strove with all their might against the new state of matters: an Amos, an Isaiah, a Jeremiah, preach *social righteousness.* Israel falls; Judah itself is carried into captivity. Ezekiel is with the captives on the banks of the Chebar. It is necessary to organize the community of exiles; the laws which guard the ancient tradition exist, and must be observed; the righteous man, according to Ezekiel, is he who faithfully obeys the written Law: he preaches, therefore, *religious righteousness.* At a later period, when the descendants of the exiles have wept over their sins, when the longing for restoration to the land of their fathers has led to humiliation before God, the unknown prophet arises (Isa. xl.–lxvi.). We know not whence he comes, nor who he is. He is a voice—a voice which consoles and transforms. He also preaches righteousness—that righteousness which is the condition of him who enjoys the favour of Jehovah, and to whom Jehovah sends salvation in the form of liberty and restoration to the land of his fathers. Here, therefore, we have what may be called *eschatological righteousness.*

I. *Social righteousness.* Amos is the first of the prophets whose written predictions have come down to us. He is also the first in whom we find the word "righteousness" used in a very definite sense. In chs. v. and vi. of the book which bears his name we learn what a prophet of the eighth century B.C. understood by that word. The righteousness which the shepherd-prophet desires is the destruction of the exceptional privileges of the rich and powerful, and the realization of the will of Jehovah that each one should receive that which is due to him. With no less energy the Prophet Hosea insists upon the same idea. According to both the prophets, there is a certain ideal of life in the will of Jehovah, which they reveal to the nation. They teach that righteousness is a virtue of the social order, manifested in benevolence, consideration for one's neighbour, and above all for the poor and oppressed. In Micah

the same spirit appears. He speaks to us as one of the people, and reveals to us, more clearly than any of the prophets, the feelings of the nation towards its oppressors. The poor are deprived of their goods and of their houses. The real enemies of the people are their rulers, and the prophet speaks with gratification of the approach of the destroyer, who will lead into exile "the delicate children" of this race of tyrants. That which he wishes is social righteousness—justice meted out to oppressors, and the restoration of the poor and down-trodden. In the writings of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Zephaniah, and Habakkuk we discover a doctrine of righteousness essentially of the same kind with that to be found in the prophets of the preceding age. The necessities of the time are the same; the vices and corruptions, the same; the religious and social ideal, the same. Righteousness is conformity to an ideal rule which is found in the will of Jehovah, and which should manifest itself in kindliness and justice in all social relations. The noble thoughts and generous appeals of the prophets were in vain, and Israel disappeared from among the nations.

II. *Religious righteousness.* We now come to a man who was a witness of a great and cruel catastrophe. Ezekiel, the son of the Priest Buzi, was led into captivity at Babylon at the same time as Jehoiachin. He lives at Tel-abib, on the Chebar, with the other captives. Priest and prophet, he is also the legislator and organizer of the Jewish community on foreign soil. As the nation no longer exists, it is necessary to isolate the remnant—the chosen band who will maintain the covenant with Jehovah by righteousness. Far from their country, the people must be imbued with the Law: when they have fully accepted it, they will be righteous.

According to the teaching of Ezekiel, the righteous man is he who follows the laws and ordinances of Jehovah (xviii. 9, 17, 21). This is a new aspect of matters. The ancient prophets did not so restrict the idea of righteousness. They never appealed to a fixed law—a code, more or less definite, remembrance and practice of which constituted a state of righteousness, violation of which meant unrighteousness and sin. A new departure is thus made by Ezekiel in insisting upon the written Law. We see this element of his teaching very clearly displayed in ch. xviii. 5-9. This doctrine is of capital importance in the development of Jewish religious thought. It marks the beginning of a new era. The kingdom of Judah having come to an end, the way is open for the Law; the religious community takes the place of the state; priests and scribes succeed to kings; obedience to the Law becomes the one great moral and religious obligation. On the return from the Exile, Malachi repeats the teaching of Ezekiel. If he rebukes people and priests, it is because they despise the ordinances, and defraud Jehovah in the matter of tithes and offerings. The unrighteousness of the people and of the priests arises from their not following in all its details the Law of Moses, the servant of Jehovah (Mal. iii. 22). Ezekiel had many disciples, yet there was one exception. In the time of the Exile an unknown prophet (Isa. xl.-lxvi.) taught a still higher and more spiritual righteousness. It differs both from that of Ezekiel and from the earlier teaching to which we have given the name of "social righteousness;" it is the ardent expression of the feelings of humiliation which transformed and moulded the small but faithful remnant of Jewish captives.

III. *Eschatological righteousness* (Isa. xl.-lxvi.). Properly speaking, the term "eschatology," as denoting questions connected with death, resurrection, and the final judgment, is inapplicable to the teaching of a Jewish writer, and a word of explanation is needed here. According to the belief of a devout Jew, the Divine favour is manifested in temporal blessings. His view is entirely limited to the earth, and especially to the land given to his fathers. If the Christian labours in view of heaven, the Jew of the Bible has before him the possession of earthly happiness as a sign of the mercy

of Jehovah. The aim of his moral and religious activity, when calamity comes upon him, is to be justified in the sight of Jehovah, in order that Jehovah, having accepted his defence, may give him back what he has lost. The Jew, therefore, has a certain eschatology, though its range is strictly limited to the earth. And so when we speak of eschatological righteousness, we mean that which has as its aim the justification of Israel, its re-entrance into favour with Jehovah, and its recovery of the land belonging to it.

And when we examine this portion of the sacred writings, we find the word "righteousness" used in a twofold sense, as referring respectively to the nation and to its God. The unrighteousness of Israel is its condition of discredit and disgrace in its relations with God. It sighs after righteousness, that is, it desires to regain the Divine favour, and to become once more the chosen people. And the word "righteousness," as applied to Jehovah, describes intellectual and moral attributes. He is a God of reason and order, who begins nothing that He is unable to carry through to completion, and who has especial regard to the moral and spiritual welfare of His people. These two aspects of eschatological righteousness seem to us very clearly defined in the work of this great prophet. The terrible overthrow which destroyed the last vestiges of the kingdom of Judah did its work. The people recognized their sinfulness. As soon as they realized the fact that their unrighteousness before Jehovah was the cause of their misfortunes, they humbled themselves, and at the same time learned the greatness of the righteousness of their God. The plan of Jehovah was at the same time revealed to the prophet, and it was in the accomplishment of His purpose that Jehovah manifested His righteousness. As the only and all-powerful God, He restores and saves His people (ch. xlix. 8–24), and rewards those that serve Him. But if Israel is the peculiar treasure of Jehovah, other nations are not despised by Him. The prophet passes beyond the narrow horizon which bounded the view of his predecessors. When Jehovah saves Israel He summons all the nations to happiness and peace (ch. lv. 1). The vision of the prophet is that of the nations of the earth going up to the holy mountain, united by a common faith and a common hope (ch. lvi. 6–8).

Thus it is that righteousness, by slow evolution, rises from stage to stage, until it expands into those ardent hopes which have their complete realization in the historical work of the founders of Christianity.

CURRENT DUTCH THOUGHT.

PROFESSOR DOEDES AS A TEACHER. By Dr. A. W. BRONSVELD (*Stemmen voor Waarheid en Vrede*, November, 1894).—On the 22nd of June, 1859, Professor Jacobus Isaac Doedes, of the University of Utrecht, delivered his inaugural address, speaking *de critica studiose a theologis exercenda.* Dr. Doedes had not quite reached the age of forty-two when he entered on his professorship, having been born on the 20th of November, 1817.

Before speaking of himself, let us glance briefly at the man whose place he came to fill, and at his colleagues in the Faculty. His predecessor in office was Professor Hermannus Bouman, who gave lectures in *Theologia naturalis, Historia librorum Veteris Testamenti, Critica sacra, Hermeneutica sacra, Exegesis Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, besides giving occasional lessons in Syriac, Chaldee, and Arabic. His chief glory, however, consisted in his mastery of the Latin language, although no one can deny to him great learning, the fruit of assiduous study. He spoke the classical Latin of Cicero ; but, either owing to the language or to his defective methods of teaching, his students failed to penetrate to the substance of his instruction, and consequently carried little away with them. Bouman's colleagues in the Theological Faculty were Vinke and ter Haar. The former was a pious and sociable man, and no mean scholar,

but he taught on the lines of an obsolete school, and was himself conscious that his dogmatic system was by no means proof against the assaults that were being made at Leyden upon antiquated supranaturalism. The latter was a kind-hearted and well-meaning person, but lacked the critical faculty. He endeavoured to weigh impartially the evidence for and against disputed questions in history and the science of Introduction; but so long as there was the least uncertainty as to the result, he invariably leaned to the conservative side.

Some fresh life was thus greatly needed at Utrecht. There was much to be done, and many new questions had arisen. The Groningen school had begun to wane, but had still strong forces to administer. Hofstede de Groot, Pareau, Meijboom, Witkop, Rutgers van der Loef, and others, were all at work in prominent positions, or in academical chairs, and by means of their journal, *Waarheid in Liefde*, they spread abroad their ideas with unwearied diligence. The questions with which they chiefly dealt concerned the infallibility of Scripture, the Divinity of the Lord, the doctrine of the atonement, and the authority of the symbolical writings. In 1859, however, the Groningen school was being cast into the shade by the light which beamed from the Theological Faculty at Leyden. There the Primarius Professor was at that time Dr. J. H. Scholten. The students were reading, not only his *Doctrine of the Reformed Church*, but also his *Initia Dogmatices Christianæ*, his *Introduction to the New Testament*, and his *History of Philosophy*. His *Introduction* was tolerably conservative. Until 1862 Professor Scholten defended the authenticity of the Fourth Gospel, and maintained, against the criticism of Tübingen, the historical character of the three synoptic Gospels. Leyden at that time had reached the summit of its fame, and regarded itself as *the* seat of knowledge. Utrecht was looked down upon as from a great height.

Not much was heard of Professor Kuenen in those days. Ewald, Knobel, and De Wette were the scholars who were regarded as the most advanced critics in the department of Old Testament Introduction and the history of Israel. Hengstenberg and Keil were still much read, but the ideas of the Tübingen writers received most attention—thanks largely to their more popular books, such as Heinrich Lang's *Ein Gang durch die Christliche Welt*, the Letters on the Bible of Busken Huet, and Carl Schwarz's book *Zur jüngsten Theologie*. It was then, and mainly through the influence of Professor Opzoomer, that the modern theology of Holland took its rise. Jesus of Nazareth who had taught us to honour God as Father, and to look upon all men as His children, was placed higher than the Lamb of God who bore the sins of the world. Metaphysical conceptions were cast aside, and men comforted themselves with ethical ones. People no longer believed in the bodily resurrection of the Lord, but, by way of compensation, began to speak of a spiritual resurrection. Further, that life was vastly more important than doctrine was a canon which was to be heard every day from the lips of the "Moderns." Two illusions were thus cherished. The first was that in abandoning the supernatural we lost nothing but forms, while we retained the essence of the Christian faith; and the second was that the means had been found whereby naturalism and religion were reconciled to each other. The first heralds of this modern theology in our country were, among others, Poelman, Hooykaas Herderschee, A. Pierson, Busken Huet, and A. Réville. The poetical interpreter of the tendency was P. A. de Genestet.

It was at this critical period that Doedes was transferred from pastoral work at Rotterdam to a theological chair at Utrecht. He had been with heart and soul a preacher. Van Oosterzee drew larger audiences in the same town, but Doedes had a more influential and solid congregation. His introductory address at once supplied

material for much exchange of thought. Like every lecture in those days, this first one was opened with prayer, and thereafter we students heard Professor Doedes give a sketch of the development of theology since he had begun to concern himself with it. What struck us at once was his unusual way of putting things; the peculiar manner in which he emphasized his words; and his unpremeditated digressions. These characteristics were very marked, but it was impossible to imitate them. I have never heard any one mimic Doedes with success, not even those proficients in this art which the student world never fails to produce. We were greatly pleased with the address, which, by the way, has never seen the light in print. The decidedly believing standpoint of the speaker was made perfectly clear. One knew what was to be expected from him. His first regular course of lectures dealt with textual criticism. A beginning was also made with hermeneutics, theological encyclopædia, and with the exegesis of the New Testament. The exegetical lectures were certainly the most attractive. We heard the Epistle to the Ephesians expounded, also the Sermon on the Mount, and later the parables. Every word was spoken in the mother tongue. We found it absolutely necessary to consult our Winer, and to possess a Bruder. We had also to exchange the *Receptus* for a smaller or a larger edition of Tischendorf. As we handled a text we received the impression that, in the first place, much had to be torn away that had been planted and had grown up around the original words of Scripture. All sorts of fantastical and untenable expositions were explained to us, and refuted in the most entertaining manner. Finally we stood face to face with the text itself in its original uncorrupted reading; and now no further questions were asked, either as to what this one or that one said about it. Advantage was taken of the aids of unfettered science to answer the only question that had any right to be asked, namely—What is written? What is written, whether or not it was at variance with the general view, no matter although the text thereby dropped out of the series of *dicta probantia*. Professor Doedes, in fact, gave us an exegetical conscience. He sought to compel us to be at least honest with regard to the *Codex sacer*. No mystical dalliance, no pious trifling, no comforting allegorization, no making *something* of a text, but simply and solely the investigation of the sense and meaning of the sacred writer, in order to reproduce this and show it to others—*that* must be the aim of exegesis.

But it may be asked whether the simplicity of this method was not, upon the whole, too great; whether a tradition or a view more or less identified with—not to say justified by—the practice of the Church was not here and there somewhat too violently seized hold of, and unmercifully, yea, even sarcastically, driven from the inheritance of theological science? To this I could not in every case unconditionally answer, "No." We had at least once sympathy with a cherished exposition which was set aside—it performed such good services in a sermon, according to our notions. But Professor Doedes taught us that we must not bring the Bible into unison with our preaching, but, on the contrary, that our preaching must be brought into harmony with the Bible. He did well, and cast no glance around him. It was with truth that he had to do. He was an honest exegete, and even in a professor character goes before knowledge. Upon his first pupils Doedes, the exegete, made the deepest impression. His *Introduction to the Doctrine of God*, like the *Doctrine* itself, had still to be written. We had the books of Scholten and Schwegler on the history of philosophy to study, and were satisfied with them. I dare not venture to assert that the older pupils have envied the younger in this respect.

Let me here add that we were all just a little afraid of Professor Doedes. When we thought that we had given an irreproachable answer, then it soon appeared that we

had said something ridiculous or silly. I still remember how some one who was responding drew from the professor the remark, "There are more scholars who have asserted that." The emphasis which fell upon the word 'scholars' was very well adapted to inspire the wish that one had not spoken at all. But we were all more than once driven into a corner by him—hunted from one place of refuge to another. We had sometimes the feeling that we were not getting fair play; that the boundary between acuteness and casuistry was overstepped; that the hyper-accuracy which was being pursued was injurious to clearness.

But we learned to shun fine phrases, to see with our own eyes, and to have reverence for the truth. Professor Doedes was not insensible to a feeling of satisfaction that his teaching was followed; but nothing was further from his thoughts than to make us soulless echoes of his words. He has trained pupils of all shades of thought who remain grateful to him, and who hold a place in his heart—his *heart*, for this profoundly learned critic is indeed a man with a heart. It is not every one that he permits to look into it, and his feelings are for the most part enclosed by a well-secured door; but just on that account a sympathizing shake of his hand and a single word from him count for more than the tears and passionate exclamations of others. What he says he means, and one can always count upon him, upon his word, and upon his help.

He has never renounced his love for the gospel and the Person of Jesus Christ, nor his deep reverence for the Holy Scriptures. He loves books with all the abandonment of a genuine friend; but the Holy Scriptures remain for him the Book of books. However highly he may esteem the Catechism—whose earliest history he has written—the Word of Christ remains for him the *norma fidei*. And his eye is not dimmed, nor his natural force abated. What a pity it is that, through the operation of a clause in an Education Act, he had to retire from his chair, and give place to another! But while generations of professors and students come and go, *manet Dei verbum in æternum*.

SERMON THOUGHT.

THINGS UNDONE.

"He left nothing undone of all that the Lord commanded Moses."—JOSH. xi. 15.

"THIS year *omissions* have distressed me more than anything." So speaks Andrew A. Bonar, concluding one of the years of his life. How many of us are similarly distressed! Let us think awhile about this disobedience of inaction.

I. THE THINGS UNDONE ARE MANY. We have not left undone a duty here or there merely, but we have the painful consciousness of having missed so much that more seems undone than done. Darwin's biographer relates that the great scientist "never wasted a few spare minutes from thinking that it was not worth while to set to work." His golden rule was "taking care of the minutes." And so he became rich and accurate in knowledge, writing his wonderful books, instructing his own and future generations. How much more might we have done in the home! We deal negligently with those about us until change or death takes them away! The real ghosts of human life are unwritten letters and unpaid visits. How much more might we have done in the world! We have loitered in the sheepfold to hear the bleating of the sheep, when we ought to have been in the high places of the field. We have always been ready with shuffling excuses for disregarded duties. How much more might we have given and taught and toiled in the Church of God! We are always evading manifest obligations, which are also precious privileges. With what fiery

energy the bird, the bee, the butterfly, carry out the special commission with which they are entrusted! In nature everything seems to be done that can be done with the granted measure of time, space, material, and energy. But we are conscious of a very different and far less satisfactory state of things in the human sphere. Here inertia, laziness, slipperiness, procrastination, prevail. There are great gaps in our work.

II. THE THINGS UNDONE ARE OFTEN THE THINGS OF THE GREATEST CONSEQUENCE. Emerson speaks of "the science of omitting." A very necessary and much-neglected science. "The artist," says Schiller, "may be known rather by what he omits." The master of literary style is best recognized by his tact of omission. The orator declares his genius as much by what he leaves out as by what he puts into his discourses. And in life the science of omission must have a large place. Life on its moral side, in its highest sense, becomes complete and successful by exclusion: if we are to make anything out of it, we must reject much. When, however, an artist understands the science of omission, he leaves out the trivial, the vulgar, the irrelevant. Pater, speaking of Watteau, the French artist, says, "Sketching the scene to the life, but with a kind of grace, a marvellous tact of omission in dealing with the vulgar reality seen from one's own window." Yes, leaving out the vulgar features and commonplace detail. But the defect in our moral life is that in our science of omission we too often leave out the primary, the highest, the essential. The trivial, the fugitive, the inferior, the accidental, are given a place in our life, whilst the large, the noble, the precious, and the supreme are excluded. It is thus with us in questions of *character*. "Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye pay tithe of mint and anise and cummin, and have omitted the weightier matters of the Law, judgment, mercy, and faith: these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone." The weightier matters are more difficult, and we evade them. It is thus with matters of *duty*. We shirk the calls demanding courage, diligence, sacrifice, and content ourselves by doing abundantly the things which are more immediately connected with our pride, our interest, or our pleasure. Here we are often condemned. Great principles are left out of our character, because they are difficult to acquire and maintain; great duties are ignored, because they mean heroism and suffering; great opportunities are forfeited, because they demand promptitude and resolution; great works are declined, because they involve consecration and sacrifice. Ah! many of us have led lives busy enough, full enough of thought and solicitude; we have been at it early and late, and yet have omitted the weighty things.

III. THE THINGS UNDONE ARE THINGS FOR WHICH WE MUST BE HELD RESPONSIBLE. We are often deeply concerned, as, indeed, we ought to be, with the things we have done amiss; but we are less troubled by the things left undone. Yet the negative side is as really sin as is the positive side. In these modern days it is rather fashionable for men of a certain type to stand quite aside from an active career. They are deeply impressed by the seriousness of life, by its difficulties, its mysteries; they decline, as far as may be, its relationships, its obligations, its trials, its honours, its sorrows. They will tell you that they have no gifts, no calling, no opportunity. But, however disguised, these lives are slothful and guilty. But most of us have somewhat of this slothful temper. We are chargeable with neglect in many particulars. True, we gloss with mild names this shirking of duty. We call it expediency, standing over, modesty, deliberation, forgetfulness, oversight; but it ought to be called sloth, hypocrisy, cowardice, sin. How great is our guilt on this side of life! How much undone for God, for man, for our own perfecting! And as for the future, let us put into life more purpose, passion, and will. Let us be more definite, prompt, unflinching. Let us be at once more enthusiastic and more methodical.—REV. W. L. WATKINSON, in the *Wesleyan Magazine*.

SUNDAY IN CHURCH.

By Rev. W. H. Hutchings, M.A.

FOURTH SUNDAY AFTER EPIPHANY—EVENING SECOND LESSON.

"Serving the Lord with all humility of mind, and with many tears, and temptations, which befell me by the lying in wait of the Jews: and how I kept back nothing that was profitable unto you."—Acts xx. 19, 20.

1. This Lesson contains an affecting scene. The vessel in which St. Paul sailed stopped for a little while at Miletus, and the Apostle utilized the interval by sending to Ephesus for the elders of the Church, that he might give them a parting address, which has been regarded as "an Apostolic pattern" of episcopal charges for all time. The Priests of the Ephesian Church gathered round him, probably on some quiet spot on the shore of Miletus, to hear the last words of the Apostle, and to take leave of him as he went back into the ship. He reminded them of their ministerial responsibilities, with which the Holy Ghost, at their ordination, had entrusted them, and of the terrible dangers which were imminent.

2. In the text St. Paul points to himself. He taught by force of example, and so he reminded them what manner of man he had been among them. As he said to the Corinthians, "Be ye followers of me, even as I also am of Christ" (1 Cor. xi. 1), so here he draws a picture of his mode of life for the edification of the elders of Ephesus. It seems to have been a "providential design" that St. Paul from time to time should unveil his feelings, his sufferings, his aims, his intercourse with his Master. And it has been thought that on this occasion St. Luke is giving no mere abstract of St. Paul's address, but that he records it as he heard it, and therefore it will be found to contain in many expressions a close likeness to the diction of St. Paul's Epistles.

In the text the Apostle makes four statements, which may be briefly considered.

I. "Serving the Lord with all humility of mind." 1. Here, it will be observed, that however much the Apostle was occupied in ministering to man, he was at all times "serving the Lord." This stands first of all. He was the "slave" of Christ, as the word means. This personal devotion and self-surrender to his Master was at the root of his missionary labours. 2. The spirit of that service: "with all humility of mind." The word and idea are of Christian birth. The humble mind and heart, the true estimate of self, accompanied this service. Meekness and humility are the two virtues which Christ singled out, to be learnt from Him; and St. Paul had caught the spirit of the Lord, who was "meek and lowly of heart." 3. Note, further, "with *all* humility." That is, in heart, as well as in word, action, manner, habit. Humility is not a mere "ecclesiastical grimace." The outward expression of the grace is the result of the conviction in the heart, that man is nothing and can do nothing without God. Those who contend that lowliness of mind destroys the spirit of enterprise and courage, have to account for the existence of all three in perfection in the character of St. Paul. If humility convinces a man that he can do nothing without God, it also convinces him that he can carry out great things with Him and for Him. It removes the enervating motive of self, and inserts the grand motive, *gloria Dei.*

II. "And with many tears." 1. There is no stoicism in the religion of Jesus Christ. Christianity does not involve the suppression of any true and pure element of our nature, but its direction and moderation. "Jesus wept," and therefore St. Paul might weep. We are not told, with one exception, the cause of those tears, but they are evidently connected with the service of Christ. Tenderness is a marked trait in the Apostle's character. He wrote to the Corinthians "with many tears" (2 Cor.

ii. 4). He tells the Philippians, "even weeping," of those who led inconsistent lives. 2. Tears are of many kinds—tears of contrition, tears of compassion, tears of devotion, etc. His own shortcomings and past offences; the sins of others; the sorrows of others—"Weep with them that weep" was his own admonition—the failures of converts; his successes in bringing back wanderers from the fold; and his earnestness in warning others of danger (Acts xx. 31);—these and other events and occasions made the ministry of the Apostle a ministry of tears.

III. "And temptations, which befell me by the lying in wait of the Jews." 1. This casts light upon the "three years'" ministry at Ephesus. For all we know about it, except in this passage, it might have been a time of prosperity and tranquillity up to the commotion which Demetrius, from no very disinterested motive, excited. Here we discover that it was throughout a time of trial. "Temptations" is used in its old sense for trials (R.V.), as in Heb. xi. 37 and Jas. i. 2. Probably the list of trials and sufferings which St. Paul gives in 2 Cor. xi. 23–28 might some of them have been experienced in this period. At any rate, "perils by mine own countrymen" formed a chief part of his trials, for he mentions "plots of the Jews." 2. He reminds the elders of Ephesus of what was before them, so that they might expect and prepare themselves for tribulations, and those not only from the Jews, but from false teachers from among themselves. There was no condonation of error in Apostolic days. Those who deviated from the Faith and then led others astray are described by St. Paul as "grievous wolves." Truth and error did not, in the Apostle's estimate, shade off into one another, and therefore "to speak perverse things" is with him the description of a grave offence—of apostasy. By means of this warning he was indirectly reminding the elders of the value of revealed truth, and how it should be declared and defended.

IV. "How I kept back nothing that was profitable unto you." 1. St. Paul now points to his method of teaching. He kept nothing back. The word is used for furling sails, and so, perhaps, suggested by the vessel which conveyed him. The sails are the doctrines of the Faith, as he says presently, "the whole counsel of God," and he had not reefed any part of it. There was "a fixed body of truth" which he had to deliver, and he had delivered all of it. 2. The words certainly imply that there were temptations to dilute the message, or dismember that body of truth. That there were features of it which were not altogether palatable, and which were not unlikely to excite opposition. Mystery would be an annoyance to mental pride; and self-mortification, for instance, would not be a theme likely to be congenial to corrupt passion. He rejoiced that he had kept nothing back, and by this statement sought to inspire with a like courage the teachers at Ephesus. 3. He had kept back "nothing that was profitable." His eye had not rested upon embellishments of style, nor was his mind occupied with curious questions which did not edify—he had taught all that related to salvation. Thus he followed the Divine Saviour, for the Prophet records the words of the Redeemer, "I am the Lord thy God, which teacheth thee to profit [Vulgate, *utilia*]"—a point in which the Apostle's range of teaching might be by many more closely followed than it is.

V. Lessons. 1. To copy St. Paul's example in humility, sympathy, endurance. 2. Especially to take St. Paul as a Christian teacher for our guide, not to "prophesy smooth things" only, but the whole Faith "once delivered to the saints," and whatever is profitable for the soul's salvation. 3. Such advice may primarily bear upon the ministerial life; but all, in some degree, need the same virtues, and all have sometimes to speak words of warning and rebuke, and to bear witness to truths which corrupt nature resents, and about which timidity or self-interest oftentimes tempts us to be silent.

SEPTUAGESIMA SUNDAY—EVENING FIRST LESSON.

"And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul."—GEN. ii. 7.

1. This Lesson contains an account of the creation of man, the first man. In the first chapter of Genesis, this morning's First Lesson, the beginning of the human race is also recorded. "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness;" and it is added, "Let them have dominion over" fish, bird, beast, and "every creeping thing." "So God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them" (Gen. i. 26, 27). In the first chapter, it has been said, we have the beginning of man's natural history; in the second, of his moral history. But apart from this, it is evident that the second chapter of Genesis has a more distinct and detailed account of the great event, which is related only in a general way in the first chapter. The separate formation of man and woman, and the inbreathing of the breath of life, whereby man "became a living soul," is supplied by the narrative in this evening's First Lesson.

2. There is no reason, now and here, to enter upon any of the controversies which have gathered round the earlier chapters of Genesis, as to what parts of the narrative may be interpreted in an allegorical manner, or what was the situation of Paradise. Four great truths stand out clearly on the canvas—the creation, temptation, and Fall of man, and the promise of the Redeemer, truths which have "wandered over the world;" and these make the first four chapters of this book a most precious part of revelation. It is with man's creation we have now alone to deal.

The text points us first to man's body; and secondly, to his soul.

I. THE FORMATION OF THE BODY OF MAN. 1. There are three spheres of being which God has called into existence. First, the angelic. He made His "angels spirits" (Ps. civ. 4). The former term denotes their office; the latter, their nature. They are spiritual and intellectual substances, complete without bodily organization. On the other hand, God created matter, or, if you like, atoms. God, St. Augustine says, made two things—"one, matter, nigh to nothingness; another, angel, near to Thyself." But there was to be a third kind of being, linking the extremes together—man, composed of soul and body. God "centred in his make such strange extremes." 2. "God formed man of the dust of the ground," or "formed the man, dust from the ground." Whether this formation was brought about "by steps," or at once, need not be discussed. Either way, it was God's work, which is the main point. There is no getting rid of this declaration by impugning the historical veracity of Genesis, for in the New Testament we read, "The first man is of the earth, earthy." St. Paul says, "made of dust (χοϊκός)" (1 Cor. xv. 47). So, again, in Eccles. xii. 7 it is written, "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was." 3. From this statement that God made man's body out of the dust, it has been argued that by the same Almighty Power God can at the last day raise the dead out of the dust. The ancient philosophers, who thought a bodily resurrection impossible, as Bishop Pearson remarks, "thought a creation impossible." And St. Cyril asks, when quoting our text, "Is dust transformed into flesh, and shall not flesh be again restored to flesh?" (*Catech.*, xviii. 13). 4. But there is evidently a difference between the creation of the lower creatures and the formation of man's body. Fish, fowl, and beast come forth from some vital forces apparently lodged in the different spheres in which they were to have their being; but man was "formed" by the hand of God of the "dust of the ground." The action of God is represented as the result of deliberation, a progressive action; first the body, then the soul of man is mentioned, the one from the ground, the other directly from God (Eccles. xii. 7). The Mosaic description, in this second chapter of Genesis, of the creation of man, is

evidently complemental to that in the first—the one is of the race; the other, of the individual.

II. THE CREATION OF THE SOUL. The Lord God "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul." St. Paul also says, "The first man Adam was made a living soul" (1 Cor. xv. 45). 1. Note here the dignity of man. The breath of life, or "lives," which seems to imply the richness of the insufflation. The expression has been held to mean that, besides the principle of natural life, the grace of the Holy Spirit was bestowed upon the first man, the gift of supernatural righteousness (see Bishop Bull, *State of Man before the Fall*). This inbreathing of God points to something higher than animal life, which the lower creatures possessed. The soul of man was in the "image" and "likeness" of God, words which betoken the presence of personality—understanding, memory, will, and a sense of right, the moral "light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world," and the superadded gift of grace. 2. It is not intended to imply that the first man was "a being of developed intellectual and spiritual capacity." His perfection was potential, not actual; but the Mosaic record, and St. Paul's reference to it (Col. iii. 10), establish the dignity of human nature in the scale of being, when at first created by God. 3. The superiority of man's natural form—his face, his hand, his erect posture, his capacity for speech—on his material side, leads us to expect a higher kind of life than the animal creation possesses, and a higher end. By the body he is linked on to the material world, but by the "living soul" he is in union with the spirit-world. The body of flesh is elevated by the accession of the human soul, inbreathed by God, as—if we may venture upon such a comparison—the human body and soul are elevated by their union with the Divine Word, the Son of God.

III. LESSONS. 1. The dignity of man's nature. Septuagesima Sunday reminds us of this in the First Lessons, in order that, on Sexagesima Sunday, we may form some true estimate of man's Fall, and of the heinousness of sin. A fall is measured by the previous elevation of the being. If man was created in the image of God, sin in man is the defilment of that image (Jas. iii. 9). 2. Further, the greatness of the soul indwelt by the Spirit of God is a truth which directs our thoughts to the end or purpose for which God called each one of us into being. The soul, as the direct creation of God, as it has so high an origin, has also an exalted end. God does not act without a purpose. We do sometimes, through feebleness, dulness, or habit, but God has revealed to us the end He has in view in making us: "I have created him for My glory" (Isa. xliii. 7), or again, "The Lord has made all for Himself" (Rev. xvi. 4), that is, not that He has any need of the creature, but that He may have sons, like Himself, "partakers of His glory and Divine blessedness," so far as creatures are able. In other words, man is made to know, serve, and love God in this life, and to be eternally blessed in His Presence hereafter. The human soul, with its natural capacities, is elevated by grace to the supernatural order, for the attainment of this supernatural end. The "glory" of God in an objective sense is in God Himself; but in a subjective, it is "the clear knowledge of Himself with praise," which His rational and spiritual creatures were created to share, if they are faithful to the grace which is vouchsafed to them in this life—of which glory is the evolution.

SEXAGESIMA SUNDAY—EVENING FIRST LESSON.

"Noah walked with God."—GEN. vi. 9.

1. Last Sunday's Lessons directed our thoughts to the mystery of the creation—the creation of the world and the creation of man. To-day we read of man's Fall. The Church is preparing us for the solemn season of Lent by deepening in our minds certain primary convictions, and so laying a foundation for the exercise of repentance.

2. We are reminded that evil is not a necessity. "God hath made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions" (Eccles. vii. 29). Adam's Fall was voluntary: "By one man sin entered into the world." In this evening's First Lesson we see how the poison had infected the whole human race. In this backward step of our first parent all were involved: "The wickedness of man was great in the earth, and every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually" (ver. 5). Humanity was like a blighted tree.

3. Yet the Fall did not reduce human nature to a ruin, though it damaged it seriously. The doctrine of *total* corruption is disproved by the existence of such witnesses for God as we find in the patriarchal period and in the time of the Law (as well as among the heathen), and whose names are held up for admiration by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (xi.). Noah was one of these. He became "heir of the righteousness which is by faith" (Heb. xi. 7). "Noah walked with God." Let us see how great praise this is; and, secondly, what it is to "walk with God."

I. Great praise of Noah. The same is recorded of Enoch, who "pleased the Lord, and was translated" (Ecclus. xliv. 16). 1. Noah's faithfulness was great in that he stood alone. It is difficult to stand alone in the midst of a tide of evil surging around. Companionship gives strength. St. Mark observes how Christ sent forth His disciples "by two and two" (Mark vi. 7). Noah was like a ray of light in the midst of darkness, a flower of grace in the land of barrenness—beauty by contrast. The lower life was blotting out the higher, as a shadow creeps across the sun's disc in an eclipse. The "sons of God" who had possessed in some measure the higher life had yielded to the seductions of the flesh, and the strivings of the Spirit had failed (ver. 3). Noah, when "all flesh had corrupted his way upon the earth," stood forth as God's witness. 2. Noah was great because of his steadfastness. He was a "preacher of righteousness." He denounced sin, foretold the Flood as a great temporal chastisement for sin, and "condemned the world" (Heb. xi. 7) by the building of the ark for the deliverance of his house—condemned the world, that is, by the contrast of his faith and obedience. Noah continued his preaching throughout the long period during which "the ark was a preparing" (1 Pet. iii. 20), but without any result. He appears to have made no convert, but, notwithstanding this, though the people would not believe, he never desisted from warning them. Their indifference is chosen by our Lord as an image of the conduct of mankind when the coming of the Son of man draws near: "They were eating and drinking, marrying and giving in marriage" (Matt. xxiv. 37–39). 3. Then Noah was faithful without the helps which are now ours through the Incarnation, and through the Personal Presence of the Holy Spirit. The example of Christ, the grace which flows from His Passion, the communion of saints, the full light of the New Testament, make faithfulness easier than it was in the days of Noah. He "walked with God" in the midst of universal apostasy; he "walked with God" when his witness was altogether unavailing; he "walked with God" without the assistance which we now have in the kingdom of Christ.

II. What is it to "walk with God"? 1. First, it is to believe in Him. It involves a realization of the Divine Personality. God could not be the constant Companion of Noah, if the name only implied a force, or idea, or cause—not a Person. Companionship is between persons, an intercourse of mind with mind, of heart with heart. God to Noah was a Being with "reason, will, and love." 2. Further, such companionship demands trust. Even fellowship between man and man cannot subsist where there is not trust. This is a part of the grandeur of Noah—to trust in the days of darkness, and when evil seemed universally dominant—to trust in the Divine power, goodness, providence. 3. Then, conformity of will is a part of close companionship: "Can two walk together, except they be agreed?" (Amos iii. 3). Conformity is

something higher than submission. Angels cannot know the cost of submission, in the land where there is no sorrow, or pain, or disappointment; but their wills are always conformed to the will of God. Conformity is active; it enters into the Divine purposes and rejoices in the Divine perfections. When God commanded Noah to do a very strange thing—to "make an ark" for his family to take refuge in—he blindly and unquestioningly and accurately carried out God's commands: "According to all that God commanded him, so did he" (ver. 22). 4. Therefore God Himself took delight in Noah; he "found grace in the eyes of the Lord" (ver. 8). Noah, avoiding sin, just and upright, faithful to whatever light he received from God,—the Divine gaze rested with complacency upon him in the midst of the sinful world, as our eyes turn with delight to an oasis in the desert. As our Lord says, "If any man hear My voice, and open the door, I will come in to him, and sup with him, and he with Me" (Rev. iii. 20), that is, a mutual refection; so the companionship between God and Noah is depicted as a joy to both. 5. To walk is to progress, and that gradually. The metaphor reminds us that the spiritual life must ever be progressive—it knows no limit. Length of time rivets and enriches human companionship. There are proverbs which give expression to the common feeling of the value of old friendships. Souls grow together, as the different phases of human life are experienced in union with one another; and mutual knowledge and sympathy, love and admiration, increase, as years pass by; so the fellowship of the soul with God becomes closer and stronger as life advances, in proportion to our faithfulness and self-surrender.

III. Lessons. 1. Examine yourself as to the condition of this Divine fellowship —faith in the Personal God; trust; conformity of will; a life well-pleasing in His sight. 2. Copy the faithfulness of Noah, his courage in witnessing for God, his perseverance, his readiness to leave results in His hand. 3. Each one will be judged according to his opportunities and privileges. Contrast yours with Noah's. 4. We can walk with God now, because Christ has become the "Way" to the Father, and, through the Incarnation, shares our human experiences: "Our fellowship is with the Father, and with His Son Jesus Christ" (1 John i. 3). But this fellowship demands renunciation of sin and faithfulness to grace. For if we say we have fellowship with God, "and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth." To enjoy this companionship we must "walk even as He," that is Christ, "walked" (1 John ii. 6).

QUINQUAGESIMA SUNDAY—EVENING SECOND LESSON.

"For if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die: but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live."—Rom. viii. 13.

1. These words come aptly on this Sunday, for Quinquagesima brings us to the threshold of Lent, and Lent is a season of mortification, when through the Spirit we "mortify the deeds of the body." This discipline may be prompted by a desire to make reparation for past sin; or as a precaution against future; or to elevate the soul to God and spiritual things. One, and that the last, effect of repentance is, according to St. Paul's enumeration, "revenge" (2 Cor. vii. 11). We are "severe against ourselves, in the hope that God will deal more mercifully with us." Mortification of the flesh is also a "preventive measure;" for by it the enemy is weakened. It is, too, a means whereby an increase of light is obtained, and the spiritual elements of our being become more buoyant and robust.

2. It has been noticed that in this remarkable chapter, from which our Second Lesson is taken, St. Paul makes mention of six different laws—the law of the Spirit of life; the law of sin, or of the flesh; the law of death; the law of God; the law of the mind; and the Law of Moses. By "the law" is meant the governing principle.

3. In the text two of these are referred to—the law of the flesh, and the law of the Spirit, though not expressly by name—the one, if ye "live after the flesh," ye shall die; the other, if through the Spirit ye "mortify the deeds of the body," ye shall live. These principles are represented as antagonistic. St. Paul depicts the spiritual life as a conflict. In the Epistle to the Galatians this antagonism is expressed more strongly: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; and these are contrary the one to the other." The spiritual life is based upon the mortification, the doing to death, of the opposite law or principle, the flesh.

Let us first consider the conflict; and then the enemy.

I. The conflict—its existence; its source; and its permission. 1. Its existence. It is clearly revealed to us in Holy Scripture from the beginning: "I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel" (Gen. iii. 15). The enmity was literally between the serpent and Eve, prophetically between Satan and Mary. And "between thy seed and her seed," that is, between evil spirits and evil persons on one side, and Christ and His members on the other. Moreover, the conflict was not merely exterior, but interior—opposing forces striving for the mastery in man. Job describes human life as one continual warfare (Job vii. 1, R.V.). The kingdom of heaven, Christ saith, "suffereth violence," etc. (Matt. xi. 12). St. Paul exhorts us for this warfare to "put on the whole armour of God" (Eph. vi. 11–18). And the condition attached to all the promises to the seven Churches of Asia Minor was, "To him that overcometh" (Rev. ii. and iii.). Experience bears witness to this conflict between the spirit and the flesh. The confession of the Apostle, "I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin" is one which represents universal experience. Jacob was selected as the model of the spiritual life, and he by a mysterious struggle was transformed into Israel, because he had "prevailed." The absence of struggle is a sign of death. 2. The source of this struggle. It was occasioned by the sin of man. God "made man upright" (Eccles. vii. 29). It is not to be accounted for by the union of flesh and spirit, for then this antagonism would have to be ascribed to God, who is the author of peace. The strife was a part of the penalty of sin—it originated in the disorder which the Fall of man brought about. Wherever sin enters, there is strife and confusion. The rebellion of the flesh is a consequence of original sin. 3. The permission of the conflict in the regenerate at first might surprise us. Those who have in Baptism been made the children of God by adoption, and the temples of the Holy Ghost, have still to wage war against their lower nature. The whole subject of the permission and continuance of evil is shrouded in deep obscurity. Yet we can see the uses of conflict. The contention against that which is lower in us strengthens and develops that which is higher, gives opportunities for self-sacrifice, and makes the service of Christ voluntary. The overcoming of evil in His Name and through His Spirit leads to everlasting life. None but victors enter the gates of heaven: "If ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live."

II. The enemy. 1. It may seem strange to speak of the enemy in the singular number, whereas we are constantly reminded that there are three foes to be overcome—the flesh, the world, and the devil. We are taught to pray for grace "to withstand the temptations of the world, the flesh, and the devil" (Collect for the Eighteenth Sunday after Trinity), and from our earliest days to "renounce them all." And if we refer to the original form of the Collect (*Gel. Sac.*) it will not help us, for in it "the contagions of the devil" stand for the present amplified wording. Yet St. Paul, in the text, distinctly mentions "the flesh," as if it were the solitary adversary with which

we have to reckon. 2. This difficulty disappears when we remember the full meaning of the term "flesh" (σάρξ) in the Apostle's teaching. It stands for man's bodily nature, but also for something more, as the enumeration of "the works of the flesh" indicates (Gal. v. 20, 21); for there we find, amongst other things, "hatred, heresies, envyings," which are sins of the mind. The antagonism is not only against "the body," meaning thereby our sensuous part, but against the evil tendency which through the Fall we have inherited, and through our own sins, it may be, strengthened. This tendency affects the mind as well as the body (2 Cor. vii. 1), and the Spirit is in conflict with it in whatever department of our complex being it is found. The "flesh" is the indwelling sin-principle, which, however weakened, still seeks to assert itself even in "the regenerate" (Art. IX.), and is named from that which is lowest in our nature. 3. This is a domestic enemy, and without its consent or dalliance the other two—world and devil—have no power; so to resist it is to resist all.

III. Lessons. 1. The realization that the spiritual life does involve conflict, so that opposition from the flesh may not surprise or discourage us. 2. Though conflict is the rule, there are intervals of peace; and in those intervals the soul must prepare itself for warfare, as soldiers in times of peace are drilled and exercised in the use of armour and arms. 3. Observe the power in which the fight must be carried on: "ye, though the Spirit." We must seek constantly the help of the Holy Spirit, if we are successfully to mortify the deeds of the body. 4. Remember, the immediate object of mortification, of fasting, and self-denial is to weaken the enemy; but the motive—which differences Christian mortification from all other—is the love of Christ: "They that are Christ's have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts" (Gal. v. 24).

SUNDAY IN SCHOOL.

THE TRANSFIGURATION; OR, THE SOUL'S HOLIDAY.

Luke ix. 28–36.

The spirit of man, or the man's real self, must have its recreation-days as truly as the body. The experiences on the Mount of Transfiguration were greatly needed by the Saviour and the disciples because of the tremendous spiritual strain under which they had been working, and because of the terrible spiritual ordeal through which they were about to pass. Such a respite from the vexing cares of His great mission was absolutely essential in the case of the Saviour. His life was an intensely spiritual one. That is, He was constantly doing what is called spiritual work, expending His soul-power in the form of love and sympathy, and in all kinds of ministering activity. Refreshed by these occasional retirements to the spiritual realm, brightened by these luminous hours, He returned to His duties strengthened and efficient.

The question might arise here—What constitutes a spiritual holiday? If we are to find our answer in the Transfiguration, we shall see that it is associated with such words as "retirement," "prayer," "meditation," "spiritual converse," "vision," "soul-rapture." Christ and His disciples were elevated on Mount Tabor, not only physically, but spiritually. They went up, so to speak, out of the flesh, and the environment of fleshly conditions, where they had a large freedom and a foretaste of heavenly experiences. Prayer is one medium of retirement. Not the prayer that racks the soul and tires it out, as did the prayer of Jacob or the Saviour's prayer in Gethsemane,—these are the soul's workaday prayers; but the prayer which rests the soul, the holiday prayer of the spirit, is not so much a petition as a conversation, a familiar talk with the Father of our spirits, a communion with God. The retirement with congenial spiritual friends into some quiet resting-place for religious conference

is another method of attaining unto something of the Transfiguration experience, and it is becoming more and more common among Christian people, especially among those who are distinctively engaged in Christian ministration. The prayer-meeting is, or should be, a Mount Tabor to the busy, careworn congregation. Sunday as a periodical rest-day is absolutely necessary to the physical health of the nation; but they belittle the day and fail utterly to recognize its beneficent design who neglect to make it a spiritual holiday.

Now, while all this may be said concerning the advantages of the spiritual holiday, there is much to be said concerning its dangers. The great danger is that the Christian will be tempted to do as Peter did—desire to make the Transfiguration rapture a substitute for all Christian service. Christians have been inclined to live in a perpetual holiday, or, in other words, to substitute the meditative, devotional, ecstatic experiences for everyday practical Christianity. Impressed with the importance of spirituality, they have mistaken emotional conditions for spirituality, and have thus lived on the inactive rather than the active side of their faith, in their feelings rather than in their service. This tendency leads, on the one hand, to an abnormal spiritual condition, a soul-life which is unnatural and morbid. It has led to all of the fanaticism and vagaries which have sprung up in the Christian Church for the past eighteen centuries. It leads people to ignore the practical work which is to be done down on the plain while they remain in the upper realm in the seclusion of their Transfiguration booth. People who get this wrong view of spirituality are very liable to emphasize the mere forms of religion, and church-going, psalm-singing, and prayer-meeting attendance are substituted for religion pure and undefiled. There can be no spirituality apart from service. The spirituality of a Church does not consist in the number of prayers which its people offer, nor in the mere expression of their faith in certain doctrines and dogmas. It consists in the life of its people, and its true test is the amount of ministration which blossoms out of that life.

Let us see to it that we make good use of the soul's holiday. Transfiguration scenes may, in a sense, come to all of us. You are tired and discouraged, and you say to yourself—What is the use? What profit is there in all this wearisome round in the Master's footsteps? What you need is to retire for a season to Mount Tabor. You need to come into touch with the unseen agencies and to see with the spirit's eye the luminous face of your Saviour. Keep a proper balance between the contemplative and active sides of your religion.—CHARLES A. DICKINSON.

CHRIST AND THE CHILDREN.

MATT. xviii. 1–14.

THE Bible is unique among works of ancient times in its attention to childhood. There is but one child in the *Iliad;* there is none in most of the ancient books. The Bible gives us the childhood of many of its most eminent characters. Joseph and David meet us first in their early youth; Moses and Samuel are known to us from their birth. The incident recorded in the lesson occurred through a dispute among the disciples concerning the greatest in the kingdom of heaven.

I. THE GREATNESS OF THE CHILDLIKE IN SPIRIT. "Except ye turn, and become as little children, ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven." The question of entering precedes that of relative greatness. Their spirit was even opposed to entrance. By becoming as little children is meant that we shall be childlike in our relations to God, and not that we are to be childish. We need not sigh for the immaturity of childhood or its irresponsibility. The Revised Version margin makes an interesting correction in ver. 4, "Whosoever therefore shall humble himself as

this little child, the same is *greater* in the kingdom of heaven." Greater than whom? Greater than his former self. The word "greatest" inevitably suggests comparison with others; the word "greater" suggests a constant outgrowing of self. It is still true that he who most fully does this is greatest. But this is not the thought.

II. THE SIN OF STUMBLING OR CAUSING TO STUMBLE. (Vers. 6–2.) Faith balanced upon a paradox seems to have a precarious footing. How shall a man maintain it? Will he not stumble and cause others to stumble? Woe to him if he does! What seems an uncertain poise is indeed the one stable equilibrium in the universe. To Jesus the thought of increased greatness by the outgrowth of self was no paradox at all. He beggared Himself that of His increased wealth He might enrich us. Only the heedless and half-hearted will stumble in the path the Saviour trod. These terrible verses must be interpreted according to the laws of rhetoric. No man has a right to mutilate himself, for no man has a right to decrease his power for good. Some of the early Fathers erred in their too literal interpretation of this and like passages. It would be better for a man to part with hand or foot than lose his life, and ten thousand times has the wounded man chosen to do so. But in the moral sphere the amputation is moral also. There is no use talking about ointment when the knife is needed. It is terrible to stumble one's self; it is doubly so to cause another to stumble, for his fall is ours inevitably. Jesus held in stable equilibrium the antithetic thoughts of self-renunciation and self-assertion.

III. THE VALUE OF THE SOUL OF A CHILD. (Vers. 10–14.) It is only because the soul is of so great value that the most terrible measures are justified in saving it. Every pain caused by the surgeon's knife is a tribute to the value of human life. Here our Saviour's words melt from the sternest to the tenderest. God is not only the Surgeon, but the Shepherd. The Revised Version omits ver. 11, which appears to have been added from Luke xix. 10, "For the Son of man is come to seek and to save that which was lost." Be it so: the thought is still there. To choose between two losses for another may seem easy, but God chooses rather to sacrifice Himself than lose His child.—WILLIAM E. BARTON.

THE GOOD SAMARITAN.

LUKE X. 25–37.

OF all the parables of Jesus there is probably none which appeals more strongly to the imagination than the parable of the good Samaritan. The characters stand out so humanly natural, we can almost feel the warmth of the blood which courses through their veins. We see yonder man coming. He is a priest. He has been in Jerusalem, performing the ceremonies of his sacred office. In his hand he holds a book. As he walks he reads, and as he reads he meditates on the goodness of God and the beauty of God's Law. We see the look of surprise and horror which comes over his face when first he beholds the wounded man lying by the road.

Scarcely has he passed from sight when we see another man approaching. He is a Levite, a singer in the temple choir. He, too, has been in Jerusalem, and is going home from worship. We can almost hear him as he hums the tune of some grand psalm which has just been chanted in the temple service. How he starts when his eyes first fall upon the half-murdered man lying by the road!

His footfalls have died upon the air, and, behold, a man approaches riding on an ass. By his dress we see he is a Samaritan. He at once leaps from his beast, goes to where the man is lying, gets down on his knees, examines the man's wounds, tears up his own raiment into bandages, and ties up the bruised flesh, pouring in wine and oil.

It is wonderful how Jesus takes old words and makes them new. Words shrive

and wither on the selfish lips of men. Jesus takes them, stretches them, breathes into them the breath of His own great soul, and the words become vital with wider meanings. The word "neighbour" had always been a narrow word, and is so still to many of us. Who is our neighbour? The man who lives next door, the man who does business in our street, the man who stands nearest to us in society. Jesus takes the word and stretches it until it takes in not only the man who stands nearest, but also the man who is furthest away. The man of a different religion, of a hostile race, of a social world entirely different from ours,—he is our neighbour. And notice his interpretation of love. "Love" is a sweet word to pronounce, but a hard word to live. "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." But what do we mean by love? Is it a pleasurable emotion or a delicious sentiment or a feeling of pity and compassion and kindness for others? So we sometimes like to think. We frame our narrow definition, and then Jesus flashes before us the photograph of the good Samaritan, and we see that "love" on the lips of Jesus means service, self-sacrifice, willingness to come down.

Coming down! ah! there's the rub. We can do everything else better than that. The trouble with the priest was he could not come down. He was riding a thought, a high and beautiful thought. But his thought was so lofty and the ground was so low that the priest could not get down to where the wounded man was lying. And so he simply looked down. And the Levite was like him in this inability to come down. The Levite was riding a song, a lofty and beautiful song. But the song was so high and the earth was so low that the very best the singer could do was to look down with eyes that pitied and a face that spoke mercy; but he could not come down. It is easy to sing mercy, but hard to live it. But at last there comes a man who has the genius of getting down. He is a heretic, as men count heretics, but he has in him the milk of human kindness, which is only another name for the Spirit of God. This man comes down—down from his beast, down on the ground, down under the man.

The parable illustrates finely the practical bent of Jesus' mind. In all His teaching He stood with both feet on the earth. No dreamer or visionary was He. He persuaded men to rise by going down. When men came to Him in search of light, He amazed them by pointing out neglected duties lying on earth. The rich young ruler asks what he must do to inherit eternal life, and is told, "Keep the commandments." To Jesus the supreme business of life is putting one's arms under men that are down.

Truth has two ends—an earth-end and a cloud-end. All truths as they rise from the earth become increasingly mysterious and misty until at last a cloud receives them out of our sight. Human nature has a fatal fondness for fumbling after the cloud-ends of truth. Jesus insists that we shall take hold of the earth-ends. The meaning of the Bible is clearest, not to the men who gaze skyward, but to those who look deepest into the wounds of men that are hurt. And what a mystery prayer is! Why should the soul pray? When does prayer become efficacious? These are the cloud-ends of prayer, and men grow dizzy in trying to grasp them. But the earth-end of prayer is within our easy reach. There are many distressed because they cannot get hold of the cloud-end of the Incarnation. To solve problems into which archangels desire to look is a privilege denied us; but to be a good Samaritan on the way of blood is open to us all.

"Go, and do thou likewise!" This is medicine for all who doubt and stumble.—CHARLES E. JEFFERSON.

CHRIST AND THE MAN BORN BLIND.

JOHN ix. 1–11.

BLIND! blind! What can we that have eyes know of it? All seasons and climes alike blackness. How small the world grows! Pity the sorrows of the blind! Yes, man pities them, God pities them. And with this, the man was a beggar.

SIN; SUFFERING; GRACE. There with the blind man sit evil and pain, twins, native-born on earth. "Rabbi, who did sin, this man, or his parents, that he should be born blind?" The disciples speak the first thought of us all. He is suffering; somewhere back of it must be sin. The instinctive logic of the soul runs a chain of causation from suffering back to sin. Nature, history, experience, confirm the conviction. Order requires law, law necessitates penalty. Suffering is also a danger-signal; the bell-buoy, whose knell for the sunken ship sends the full-sailed vessel off the reef. The Master's answer does not reject this conviction, as if He declared that here is a household wholly guiltless. Here, indeed, is grace. Some heavy blow falls upon a friend, or on ourselves; and the question starts—What has he done, what have I done, that God should punish us so? Nay, not punishment, as if this woe were balanced off against some distinct weight of guilt. "Neither did this man sin, nor his parents (that he was born blind): but that the works of God should be made manifest in him." Blessing lurks in the shadow. Whencesoever came the affliction, it hastens on to the manifestation of the works of God. The works of God shall be made manifest in thee. Still is Christ the Light of the world.

THE WORSE BLINDNESS. There is a darkness blacker than that of the sightless eye. Christ treats the miracle as a parable. "Blindness of mind, of heart, of soul, is the world's great affliction; and for this far more than for sightless eye has He come to be the cure. There is a world in which the spirit of man is at home as his body belongs to this earth. Rare aspirations of this world are its constant experiences. The ideal becomes the actual. The man becomes what here he dreams. It is the world of spiritual realities, in which are heaven and God. To us here it is the world of faith. Elect souls in all ages have imagined, aspired, lived in it. To be blind to that is to be blind indeed. A world without colour or distance or friendly faces may be affliction; but a universe without God is despair. And souls there are who dwell in such darkness, the blindness not their misfortune, but their fault. Such were these Pharisees, blind because they would not see. Wilful pride obscured the soul's vision, and though the very Son of God stood before them in the flesh, they saw Him not.

SIGHT GIVEN. One might almost accept the misery of this poor man's lot for the rapture of his release. Three things are necessary to seeing—the seeing eye, the object beheld, the illuminating light. That radiant, eternal world is real; it is about us. Our natural eye is dim, distorted, blind. Christ is the Light; He touches our closed eye, and, lo! the vision. We are left to imagine the rapture that came to this man with earthly sight, but not the light in his soul. An unsuspected affinity of spirit seems to leap out to meet the Master. Every requirement He accepts, every conviction He honours. The Saviour loves to complete His work, and the greater the ignorance, the surer His return. He finds the man who cannot find Him, and leads him swiftly and confidently along with disclosures of Himself clearer than a disciple had yet been granted, to faith more absolute than a disciple had yet achieved. Here is the blessed nobility of unhesitating faith: childlike in its charm, prophetic in grasp, apostolic in devotion, martyr-like in absorption. His testimony rings out the clearer beside the cowardice of his parents. "One thing I know, that, whereas I was blind, now I see." Nothing baffles infidelity like having men whom all have known as blind go about seeing. It will be a gracious lesson from this scene if Christians will learn the power of an unhesitating testimony rooted in an undeniable experience.

THE CLAY UPON THE EYES. The Master would crystallize faith in obedience. Therefore He lays a seemingly useless and added obstruction upon the sightless orbs, and requires a specific act of trusting obedience. Not the clay, any more than the waters of Siloam, but the man's unquestioning obedience, was the means through which Divine power wrought.—CHARLES M. SOUTHGATE.

THE THINKER.

THE SURVEY OF THOUGHT.

AURICULAR CONFESSION AND THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.—In a very able and interesting article in the *Nineteenth Century*, Canon Carter defends the rite of auricular confession as practised by many in the Church of England. He maintains that it was not confession itself, but its necessity, that was the main matter of dispute between the Roman Church and our Reformers. "Rome had ruled that a priest's absolution, following on private confession, was a necessary condition of membership, and this for every one alike, under all circumstances. What had in earlier days been dependent on special circumstances, became, according to Roman use, universally obligatory. And it was against this enforcement of authority over the spiritual life of souls and their individual responsibilities to God that our Reformers contended, as a matter of vital moment. They did not question the benefit or the need of confession, as a voluntary act or as a sacramental ordinance. They struck against the iron rule. They contended for personal freedom, and this not merely as a rightful Christian claim, but as securing for such an act, what alone can give it value, the free-will of a responsible agent." He makes it quite clear that the leading English divines of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries approved of confession as a salutary practice, while at the same time they shrank from prescribing it as obligatory upon all. This being so, it appears somewhat strange that many should regard auricular confession in the Church of England as an invention of the Oxford Movement. Canon Carter's explanation of this impression is as follows: "I cannot myself," he says, "doubt as to the cause. There supervened upon the Revolution the secession of the Non-jurors, and this comprehended no less than four hundred priests and eight bishops, including the primate. The men who clung to the belief of the Divine right of kings, and to whom their oath to the exiled family was a part of their religion, were also the upholders of the higher view of the Church's system. They were succeeded by men of a different stamp, and with these came in a lower view of the Church's life. There is no mistaking the difference between those who seceded in consequence of their reverence for their oath, and those who were able to accommodate themselves to the new order of things and the new principles of government. The consequences of such a change extended

throughout the Church as well as throughout the State. There were families that retained the old usages. There were individual witnesses to the forgotten truths among the clergy, but they were comparatively few and far between, as *voces clamantium in deserto.* The Oxford Movement was, as it were, the rising up again to the surface, for the first time after more than a century, of the stream which had so long been hidden underground, bringing with it the treasures of Catholic truth held in abeyance during the interval. The Oxford Movement is as the rising to the surface of the teaching and uses of the days of Andrewes, and Jeremy Taylor, and George Herbert, and Cosin, and Ken. The strength of those who held firm, and still taught, and have prevailed, arose from their clearly seeing that the Tractarian theology was nothing new in the Church of England, was simply a recovery, through faithful witnesses, of the good old system for which a long line of our forefathers prayed and suffered, before the Revolution in Church and State led to the decline and torpor of the last century. This is the true explanation of the contrast between the last century and the present, which so many view with surprise and suspicion. The Evangelical Movement led the way out of the 'Slough of Despond;' the Oxford Movement completed the recovery."

THE DIVINE SACRIFICE.—In a series of articles by Emma M. Caillard, that have appeared in the *Contemporary Review*, an attempt has been made to state in present-day terms, and to regard in the light of present-day knowledge, some of the great mysteries of life. The last of these articles is entitled, "The Divine Sacrifice," and in it the writer states her conviction that the solution of the problem of the existence of evil, as of other great problems, is to be found in the character of the Supreme Being—in the Divine nature itself. She argues that it is possible for man to realize the character of God, and thus departs at once, and in the most sharply defined manner, from the conclusions of agnosticism. We know each other—we can therefore know God, both kinds of knowledge being limited. Such knowledge implies reciprocal action, and in accordance with this, God has made Himself known to us in Jesus Christ. "In Christ we see God putting Himself in the place of His creatures, entering into the conditions which so perplex them, submitting to the limitations that so harass them, and this in order that He may explain Himself to them by meeting them on their own ground, and speaking to them in the only language they can understand. We call this the sacrifice of Christ, and in it we have the clue to all that we can know of the character of God, and therefore of the constitution of the universe and the destiny of man. If God is the key to His creation, then without God it will be for ever an insoluble problem; with Him an open book, in which there may indeed be written things hard to understand, but which little by little we shall learn to decipher and to master." This sacrifice, made clearly known to us in the life of Christ, began with

creation. The sonship of the creature was the end and aim of the Creator; the son must grow into his Father's likeness, and to become holy must have knowledge of good and evil. "To an all-holy Being the rendering possible the existence of evil is the sacrifice—how great, how awful, it is not for the mind of man to fathom; but the realization of the fact that this is indeed what the sacrifice consists in opens before us a depth of meaning in the revelation of God through Christ which otherwise is hidden from us; for here to a small extent—so far as our human powers of understanding go—we look into the tremendous mystery of what evil is to God. . . . If Christ suffered through evil, that is because and only because God suffers through evil also. 'I and My Father are one.'" If you ask—Why did God not prevent the necessity of this suffering? the answer is—Because sonship would be impossible without it. "And because of the pre-eminence of the Fatherhood in God, because He would have a universe of sons, not a universe of automata, He circumscribed His own action, and rendered possible the existence of evil by communicating to His creation His own self-determining life, to which, nevertheless, this evil, this darkness of separation and disunion, is absolutely and eternally opposed." Thus to the reason as well as to the heart the Fatherhood of God is the one sufficient answer in all perplexities.

ANCESTOR-WORSHIP IN CHINA.—A strong plea is presented by Mr. R. S. Gundry, in the *Fortnightly Review*, for some compromise being made by the Christian Churches in China with what is commonly known as ancestor-worship. He quotes the opinion of a distinguished missionary, Dr. Martin, of Peking, that "as long as missionaries manifest a determination to pluck this keystone out of China's social fabric, so long will the innumerable clans that form the nation, rallying round the altars of their forefathers, form an impenetrable phalanx, barring at every point the ingress of a disintegrating doctrine." There can be no doubt that ancestor-worship is the expression of a beautiful and touching sentiment, and was originally merely a reverential and affectionate rite in memory of the departed; but it is equally certain that in it, as now celebrated, adoration is offered to the spirits of the dead, and that they are invoked to bless and help their living descendants. It is difficult to see that any good end would be secured by a compromise between Christianity and such superstitious and idolatrous customs. If it would, on the one hand, materially aid the success of Christian missions in that country, it could scarcely fail, on the other, to lower the character of Christian teaching and worship. Mr. Gundry indulges in some special pleading on behalf of the compromise he desires to see effected, but his arguments are very ineffective. He points out that the Roman Catholic Church, in allowing prayers for the dead, and in adopting heathen festivals while giving them a Christian character, is untrue to its own traditions in setting its face against ancestor-worship. We may leave Roman Catholics to try to

account for this inconsistency. But when he goes on to say that monuments in Protestant churches, and galleries of ancestral portraits, and decorating graves with flowers, prove that we are addicted to that which, in the case of the Chinese, we call superstition and idolatry, his whole plea begins to assume a ridiculous aspect. The opinion of the majority of those who are engaged in missionary work in China is that ancestor-worship is inconsistent with Christianity, and this opinion cannot be lightly set aside. At the same time, it is quite evident that those who are called upon to deal practically with the question have need to exercise special tenderness and care, so as to avoid doing violence to the sentiment of filial piety from which the practice sprang.

WHAT, WHERE, AND WHEN WAS THE DELUGE?—These questions are answered with considerable freshness in a thick volume entitled, *The Deluge and the Emigrations of Peoples*, by Franz von Schwarz. This writer, who is familiar with Central Asia through long residence there in the service of the Russian Government, ascribes the Deluge to the discharge, through an opening in the west, of the water of a great inland sea which once covered a wide region in that part of the world. This sea, the existence of which is generally allowed by modern scientists, but is supposed by them to have ceased before historic times, is believed to have contained about as much water as the Mediterranean. It was bounded, in our author's judgment, by the Pamir and Thian Shan Mountains on the west; by the Zungarian Alatau and the Tarbagatai on the north-west; by the Altai, the Tannu-ola, and Yablonoi Mountains on the north; by the Kinghan Mountains on the east; and by the Inshan and Nanshan Mountains, the Altyn-tag, and the western Kuenlun on the south. Its length, in round numbers, amounted to about 2485 miles, and its greatest breadth to about 869 miles. Its level lay about 6000 feet above that of the ocean, and its depth must have amounted to at least 7000 feet. This enormous mass of water is supposed to have been suddenly released by the bursting of its western bank through an earthquake occasioned by an explosion of subterranean steam. Such explosions are known to occur in Turkestan at the present day, and it is thought that on a large scale they are sufficient to account for the opening up of a way for the imprisoned waters to rush forth towards the west. As the ancestors of the various races possessing the most notable Deluge-stories all dwelt about this sea, the wide diffusion of the memory of it can be readily accounted for. A reminiscence of this vanished sea, represented now only by a few lakes, may be preserved in the Chinese names of the Desert of Gobi: *Schamo*, or "Sea of Sand," and *Han-hai*, or "Dried-up Sea." The flowing off of the sea is supposed to have been sudden, thus occasioning a tremendous inundation exceeding all the other floods of history, and therefore well meriting the title of *the* Deluge. It is identified with the awful flood said by the Chinese historians to have

occurred during the reign of the Emperor Yao, and to have caused great loss of life. In that case it occurred in the year B.C. 2297. This date is not very probable, and many of the details of the theory may be doubtful, but its general features are striking, and not in themselves improbable. An inundation, produced by the bursting of a large inland sea, would fit in much better with the language of the Bible about the breaking up of the fountains of the great deep than the mere submergence of the country round the Euphrates and the Tigris by the overflow of those rivers. If the date of the sea in Central Asia can be shown to have fallen in historic times (and our author thinks that his own observations supply some such evidence), the explanation is tempting. The weight of this evidence, however, can be determined only by specialists. The way in which the Bible account of the Deluge is dealt with is extremely unsatisfactory. It is strained to mean what it need not mean; and its marvellous purity, grandeur, and instructiveness are unrecognized.

A Specimen of Critical Analysis.—The new edition of the Books of Samuel in Hebrew, by Professor Budde of Strasburg, in the series of texts coming out under the editorship of Professor Haupt, reminds the imaginative reader of a patchwork quilt. Not fewer than eight colours are made use of to indicate the sources from which the unknown compiler has drawn his materials. The effect may be pretty to the eye, but it is bewildering to the judgment. A good specimen of the results at which Professor Budde arrives is furnished by the analysis of the chapters which relate David's introduction to Saul, a portion of the book which is well known to present considerable difficulties to the expositor and the historian. The first thirteen verses of ch. xvi. are printed in dark orange, to show that they are taken from a popular expansion of the book made about B.C. 400. This is supposed to be identical with the Midrash, or commentary mentioned in 2 Chron. xxiv. 27. The remainder of the chapter, printed without any additional colouring, belongs to the Judaic document, the main body of which was compiled before B.C. 800, with one small exception. The words at the end of ver. 19, "who was with the sheep," have been inserted from the Midrash referred to above. The first verses of ch. xvii. are printed in dark blue, the colour marking the older strata of a source described as the Ephraimitic document, the bulk of which dates from before B.C. 750. Then, in vers. 12 and 13, we have another bit from the Midrash, printed, of course, in dark orange. The remainder, extending from ch. xvii. 14 to xviii. 4, is referred to the Ephraimitic document, but with one curious exception. The reader is puzzled at the beginning of ver. 15 by a new colour. The words representing, "Now David went to and fro from Saul," are printed in purple. What does this signify? That in these five words we have a redactional addition by the redactor of JE, working about B.C. 650. So in this part of the book, containing only about two chapters, we have four colours—dark

orange, black, dark blue, purple—representing four different authorities in four ages. These diverse materials were worked up by some nameless compiler, who cannot be put before B.C. 440 to 400. He seems to have lived in the same period with the compiler of the Hexateuch. Is not this analysis greatly overdrawn? Is it in the least likely that we can track the work of a compiler, writing at least twenty-three centuries ago, line by line and word by word? Whilst the existence of more than one authority for these chapters may be conceded as probable, it is surely like a *reductio ad absurdum* to pretend to know what the author or redactor did as completely as if we had been looking over his shoulder from the beginning to the end.

THE HISTORICITY OF THE LORD'S RESURRECTION.—A lecture on "Miracle in the New Testament," delivered a few months ago in Vienna, by Professor Feine, includes an interesting discussion of the historical evidence for the resurrection of Christ. The impossibility of fully reconciling the reports in the Gospels is frankly admitted; but it is argued that there is complete agreement (confirmed by the testimony of Paul) on three cardinal points: (1) The conviction of the disciples that they had seen the risen Lord. (2) The fact that the grave of Jesus was empty. (3) The resurrection on the third day. In view of this agreement, the significance of the variations is comparatively small. Professor Feine has done well to repeat the weighty words of Lessing on the subject, which, it is to be feared, are but little known to the readers of this generation; and he has justly added that they indicate more historical sense than is displayed by many a critic of the present century. The hypotheses of theft, of fraud, of apparent death, are regarded as now out of court. The vision-hypothesis (whether the vision is considered to have been subjective or objective) is shown to be untenable. In reply to the question, "What became of the body of Jesus which was buried?" it is cautiously suggested that we may have a hint in the direction of the answer in the words, "that what is mortal may be swallowed up of life" (2 Cor. v. 4). "It may, perhaps, be permissible to assume that Paul believed also, in respect of the resurrection-body of the Lord, that the earthly body was consumed, swallowed up by it." Whilst, however, regarding historical research as necessary, the professor is strongly of opinion that it does not speak the last word on the question of miracle. The Christian's belief in miracle starts neither from historical inquiry nor from philosophical exposition, but from personal acquaintance with a personal God.

CONCORDANCE TO THE GREEK TESTAMENT.—A new concordance to the Greek of the New Testament is undoubtedly a *desiderandum*. Bruder's is virtually based entirely on the Received Text, and, though somewhat extended in late years, still exhibits many unestablished readings, and

fails when used with many modern editions. Its cost, too, is considerable, and has not been lowered to suit modern purses. The present work takes as its standard the revision of Westcott and Hort, noting the variations of Tischendorf (viii.). If we can believe in the infallibility of Westcott and Hort's text, we shall find here a complete concordance to the genuine wording of the New Testament. But it must not be forgotten that there is not that "practical unanimity" among scholars in this matter of which the editors speak, and that many will be disappointed when they discover no traces of words and passages with which they have been familiar all their lives, but which are excluded from mention in this work. We can fancy good Dean Burgon's displeasure at such omissions. Some new discovery, or some gigantic critic, may disturb the foundation of the Revisers' sentence, and compel students to resort once more to discarded Bruder. The forthcoming work, of which we have received a specimen page, seems, on its own lines, to be exceedingly well-arranged and executed. In words of most common occurrence, merely a list is given of the places where they are found, but in all other cases the references are printed at some length, and have a certain grammatical completeness. By means of asterisks and obelisks are denoted particular words which do not occur in the Septuagint or in classical Greek, and small numerals prefixed call attention to remarkable usages or constructions. The editors, Dr. W. F. Moulton and Mr. A. S. Geden, may be congratulated on having achieved a most useful work, for which scholars will be grateful. Is it altogether beyond hope that some enterprising publisher will some day be found to put forth a concordance of the complete Greek Testament, not confining that term to the New Testament, but comprising the Septuagint Version as well? English and Latin concordances contain references to the whole Bible: why should not Greek ones do the same?

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

COMPARATIVE RELIGION AND CHRISTIAN MISSIONS.[1]

By Rev. Professor Allan Menzies, D.D.

It has been felt, ever since the science of religion began to be studied, that the new knowledge of the non-Christian faiths now opening to our eyes must have an important bearing on the theory at least, if not also on the practice, of Christian missions. Before this science made its voice heard, the theory of missions was very simple indeed. It was believed, as it had been ever since the days of the Church Fathers, that the religions of the world ought to be divided into two classes, the false and the true —the latter class consisting of Christianity alone, with its preparation in Judaism; while the former embraced all the rest. If all the religions

[1] An address delivered to the Missionary Society of the University of St. Andrews.

outside of Christianity were, as Calvin expressed it, nothing but a "huge welter of error," then the duty of the Christian world was very plain. We are all familiar with the appeals for missions which were based on that conviction. If the whole world outside of Christianity was lying in darkness and error, if the Christian religion alone could save, while the votaries of other faiths were inevitably doomed to perish, then indeed the case was urgent. Whenever Christians came to be at leisure, to some extent, from their internal strifes, and began to realize how they alone possessed the medicine for want of which all the millions of mankind outside the Church were perishing, they were bound by every obligation they acknowledged, either to God or man, to do their utmost to spread the remedy and to bring to every child of Adam, with what speed they might, the knowledge of the one and sole salvation.

The science of religion, of which every one is now coming to know something, disturbs this simple theory, into the working out of which such noble earnestness and such heroic labours have been poured. It does so, to put the matter briefly, by showing us that the religions outside of Christianity are not false, but are all, in their place and in their measure, true. They are all seen to have sprung from the same root in human nature. The infinite variety and inconsistency which we see in them when we consider them *en masse*, turn out, when we consider them in detail, to be due, not to an original falsity in them, but to the manner in which the original religious motive has been modified by the infinite diversity of circumstance and history in which men have been placed. Each religion corresponds accurately to the character of the people who follow it, and to the position and the fortunes they have had. All men in all ages and in all parts of the world have sought to carry on intercourse with higher beings; human nature imposes this effort on all races of men. But they have carried it on as their national character suggested, and with the resources they possessed in each case, since they had no others. The Greeks found religious nourishment in representing the gods as fair men and women; the Latins, in maintaining punctilliously a system of worship which they did not understand; the Germans, in practising exciting rites; the Chinese, in the observance of filial piety and of stiff propriety; the Hindus, in mystic contemplation and asceticism. And each religion, not only the great ones, but each also of the numberless cults of savages and barbarians, is a part of the civilization of the people practising it, which has grown with the growth of that people and suffered in its reverses, which is entwined in its nature and fits it as no other religion could. The religion of each people is inextricably connected with its character, corresponds to the stage of civilization to which the people has attained or lags a little behind it, and is the sacred vessel containing the most prized memories of the people's past, the ideals it cherishes in the present, and its hopes for the future. Thus, though some religions are no doubt better than others, since some nations have richer characters than others, or have

met with more stimulating influences, or have had a happier history, yet each religion is good and natural in its own place. No two nations could possibly exchange religions; no nation can part with its religion without destroying its mental continuity and cutting itself off in a fatal way from the sources of its strength. The religions of the world cannot, then, be spoken of as being, with one exception, false. Not to speak of those worships which are evidently debasements and effete remainders of greater worships formerly existing in their place (and this description applies to a great part of the beliefs of savages), we may say that the religions of the world appear, when studied as they now are, to be not false, but true. Each of them represents the ideals of the race practising it, and the effort made by that race in the way which was natural to it, to connect itself with the ideal world. The religions of the world, therefore, are not to be hastily condemned. The attitude science bids us take up with reference to them is that which Spinoza described as the attitude the wise man should take up towards the various human beings he encounters in the world—*Non odisse, non ridere, non timere, sed intelligere.* They have a right to their existence, and our first duty towards them is to understand them.

Now, if we agree to all this, and hold that the educated person and the true Christian who has this insight, is bound to regard the religions of the heathen world, not with condemnation, but as far as possible with sympathy, then it is a matter which calls for explanation that Christians send missionaries to peoples of other faiths, to try to draw these nations away from the religions which have been so intimate a part of all their growth and history, and ultimately, for this must presumably be the ultimate end, to subvert these religions altogether. We can no longer do this on the old ground that the heathen religions are nothing but error, and that those who live and die in them must perish everlastingly. It is twenty-three years since Dean Stanley declared in Westminster Abbey, that the belief that all the heathens are everlastingly lost was extinct. That statement, though it no doubt corresponds with the belief of the apostles and first Christians, is, if not quite extinct, yet rarely heard. Failing such a belief, and recognizing that the heathen religions are relatively true, and that each of them is an inseparable part of the life of its votaries, on what grounds do we still send missionaries to the heathens?

It is for our own sake that I propose this question—for the sake of our intellectual consistency as at once students of the science of religion in the forms it now assumes, and members of a missionary society. Were I speaking from practical knowledge of any part of the mission field, or from the point of view of the working missionary, no doubt the question would appear to some extent irrelevant. What I feel at present is the need for those who stay at home and encourage missionary effort abroad, to have a true theory of their action. They are responsible for the acts of the agents they send out, and if they go on sending missions to those

for whose religions there is so much to be said, it is desirable that they should be able to justify themselves for doing so. My remarks will fall into two parts. I shall try to show first that comparative religion does not condemn the efforts Christians feel themselves bound to make to bring about the universal diffusion of their religion; and secondly, that our science suggests certain conditions which Christians ought to keep in view in making these efforts.

I. There is no need to dwell on the impulse which is felt, wherever the Christian religion is truly alive, to seek its extension to those who are to a less degree or not at all, subject to its influence. The statement that those who have not known Christ must perish, is a coarse way of putting the fact, which is familiar to all Christians, that Christ can do for men what we are sure that no other messenger sent to the world by God can do. And the statement that Christ Himself bade His apostles carry the tidings of Him to the whole creation, may be regarded as the external expression of the profound inner truth that the religion of love causes us to take an interest in all our fellow-men for their own sake, and to desire that they should all know that secret, the possession of which alone raises human life to its full dignity and freedom and power. To know Christ in a living way as He prayed and laboured, as He loved and helped His brethren,—this for us is to know God, a God who lays upon us just and holy laws, and who yet is full of compassion for us and is daily helping us and making all things work together for good to us. This knowledge is so paramount, so incomparable to us, that we feel we could not face the duties and trials of life without it. But at the same time, it makes the same love stir in our breasts towards others as that with which God has loved us; and these two things working together in our minds—the love God bears to us and the love He has caused us to feel towards other men—necessarily produce in us the missionary impulse. Even if we do not believe that the heathen are all perishing, and even if we do not quote in connexion with the matter any direct command of Christ, but act on a free inward impulse of our own, we feel missionary enterprise to be a necessary feature of our position as Christians. Whether we know much or little about the religions of heathendom, it appears to be a matter on which no choice is left us, that we should send the knowledge of Christ to those who do not yet possess it. This is a duty which arises directly out of our Christian experience; no one who knows God as the loving Father of Jesus Christ can shake off that duty. While we continue Christians, comparative theology can do nothing to alter this conviction.

The assurance we thus reach by our own inner spiritual experience, that we ought to do what we can for the diffusion of our religion, is supported by observation of the character of our religion and of the effects it is fitted to produce where it is received. Before we go on to compare it with other religions, and to show that they find in it their natural consummation, we may ask—What is Christianity, and how does it act on

men and on society? is it desirable, from this point of view, that it should spread? And here we at once notice certain features in Christianity which mark it out as fitted, if any one religion is fitted, to prevail over other faiths, and to become the sole religion of mankind. We speak of Christianity, of course, not as it is worked out in any of its existing forms. These are all defective; but our ideals of what it must be and our conviction and determination that it must yet come to correspond with these ideals,—these also are a part of Christianity. We feel it, then, to be a religion in which the endeavour after goodness and righteousness is dominant. There is no salvation in it apart from the constant effort to be good, and to do all the good we can. The Christian salvation consists in intercourse with a God who is supremely good and holy, and who desires goodness and holiness in us to such an extent, that whenever we are not seeking His kingdom and righteousness, we cut ourselves off from Him. God, we feel, has no other desire for us than that we should be brought to the full enjoyment and the constant exercise of the highest goodness of which we are capable; and He is able and willing to help and encourage us in our endeavours to tread the narrow path. To convert men to Christianity, then, if that is done in the right way, is not to subject them to a conventional law or to a Church having selfish objects of her own, nor is it to start them in a method of procuring selfish benefits and enjoyments for themselves. It is to win them to the pursuit of the highest goodness they can think of, and to guarantee to them in that pursuit, the highest aids.

Our religion, that is to say, is a religion of freedom and of self-respect; it is one in which the moral good of the individual stands above all other ends, and in which, therefore, the best energies of human nature are set to work and fresh springs of moral force unsealed. It is not denied by any whom we need here consider that Christianity has tended, on the whole, towards the emancipation of men. We may be certain that when it is better understood and is presented in its simplest and most natural form as being, whatever more it be, a union of man through Jesus Christ with the holy and living God, it will show that virtue still more strikingly. The abolition of the outward institution of slavery, which Christianity has brought about, will prove to be symbolic of the emancipation of the human mind wherever Christianity prevails, and of the gradual removal of arrangements which keep men down as the mere instruments of others, or as undistinguished and unvalued units of a crowd. By the importance it attaches to each individual, because he is dear to God, and by the encouragement it extends to each freely to develop his nature and his powers, Christianity will yet further enlarge human liberty, and will increase the number of those who of their own free motion are applying themselves to seek after what is best both for themselves and for their fellows.

On the one hand, then, we have convinced ourselves that to be true

to our own experience as Christians who have found the secret of happy and successful living, we must strive to communicate that secret to others. On the other hand, we have convinced ourselves that it must be a good thing for the world that Christianity should spread in it, since its spread means the increase of human freedom, human happiness, and human power. And now we remember that to spread Christianity is to weaken and extinguish other religions which have also been good in their own place and among their own peoples; and we turn to comparative religion to see whether science justifies us in our desire to make our religion supreme over all others. Does science pronounce Christianity to be fitted for such a position of supremacy?

This question may confidently be answered in the affirmative. Science declares that religion is in proportion to civilization, and that the deepest and strongest religion is to be found where civilization reaches its highest advancement. Now, Christianity is the religious side of a civilization which is richer and more many-sided and affects the whole population to a greater degree than any civilization ever did before. It may, therefore, be presumed to be the highest religion, and to form the last stage of the long growth of the world's faith. In Christianity, if the principles still hold true in the highest stage, which have been observed to have force at lower stages, religion should be deeper, purer, more moral, than at any earlier stage, and should pervade with its influence, to a higher degree than ever before, the whole of man's life and thought. How far it still may be from having reached its best, we cannot tell; that there is great room for improvement, every man who thinks, is well aware. But what is certain is, that the various developments which form part of the one great development of religion, all converge and reach their last stage, so far as we can see, in Christianity, so that its claim to be considered the ultimate religion is, in manifold ways, confirmed. We can notice only a few of those lines of growth which issue at last in Christianity.

There is growth in religion in respect of the object which is worshipped. This is the main development traced in Professor Caird's *Evolution of Religion.* At first men worshipped what was outside themselves—objects of nature, great or small, the sun, the fountain, the animal, or whatever it was in which he believed that power to reside which he was seeking. When art awoke, then images of God were made, and with the growth of art man came to worship the beautiful human form, highest of all the subjects of art, and thus he came in time to know that the gods, though still outside himself, were human. Then the time came when man felt that there was that within himself which had authority for him at least equal to any that could be exercised by any outward power: the god outside grew pale, man's eye was turned within. A one-sided and defective religion this latter was, as well as the former. But in Christianity the God outside man, who controls the movements of all things, and the God who is present to man's mind, came together. The God who made heaven

and earth is to the Christian the same Being as He who is present to each man in his closet; the God of love, to whom the heart rises through Jesus Christ, holds the reins of government, and guides all things with a view to the welfare of His human children. Beyond this view of the Deity as the Almighty Father of mankind, there is no further advance to be made; and Jesus Christ, by revealing God in this way, has done that which can never be done again in human history, and has attained a unique position in the religion of mankind, which He must always continue to occupy, and which makes Him, to say no more, a Personage most deeply interesting to all men.

This, no doubt, is the most important development of religion, in which man has risen from the external object of worship to adore the spiritual God, who rules the universe, but finds His principal manifestation in the mind and conscience of man. Many other lines of evolution, however, may be traced, in each of which the ultimate stage seems to be reached in Christianity. We may trace the progress from the many gods worshipped by early man, who added the new god to the old one, the god of one district to that of another, the god of the foreigner to his own. Though he worshipped many beings, there was a law in his mind which bade him worship only One; and, indeed, only one Supreme Being could possibly stand at a time in the temple of his mind. Thus, though he appears to have worshipped many beings indiscriminately, in reality he exalted now one and now another god above the rest. From this stage of henotheism, as it is called, advance was made to monotheism—to the permanent and stable rule of one God only, who will have none other worshipped beside Himself. But monotheism, on the one hand, grew hard till the one God had too little sympathy with men, and they had recourse to a host of minor beings; or, on the other hand, it grew vague, God not being sufficiently distinguished from His works, and evaporated in pantheism, which leaves the life without guidance and the conscience cold. Thus, in both cases alike, monotheism ceased to retain a hold of man's whole nature. But the Christian worship of one God escapes from both these dangers. The God of the Christian rules without a rival, and yet He is real, personal, and human. He has in His nature such rich life and movement that He is not too far away from us, and His rule over the whole does not prevent His caring for the individual. He is a Father with an eternal Son, and it is through the exercise of the purest human affections that the soul rises to lay hold on Him.

Again, we may trace the history of worship from the rude, common meals of savages and the exciting and cruel rites of barbarism, through the stately ceremonials of the great sacerdotal systems, the self-abnegations and mutilations of ascetics, the ecstasies of mystics, to the broad and simple ideas so familiar to ourselves, that the sacrifice God would have from man is not anything that lies outside man's own person, but is the offering of the man himself, a living and reasonable service. In

this view each man becomes a priest to God, and, standing before God as a priest, continually carries his living sacrifice into all his activities, and continues it during his whole lifetime. Where this idea of sacrifice is attained, all magic disappears out of worship; the religious acts of the Christian congregation are symbolic representations, instinct with the exercise of thought, and not without a constant striving after Divine truth and beauty, of that service which each individual is daily offering to God, and which the Christian community is helping its members to offer.

Or we might trace the relation between religion and morality. In early stages religious duties are not essentially moral. Things are done in connexion with religion, not because they are right in themselves, nor because they are reasonable and fitting—far, indeed, are they in many cases from being so—nor because they will do any one any good, but simply because tradition requires them. The favour of the Deity depends on their being correctly done in a particular way, and no one can tell why. In this state of matters, virtue consists, not in following one's ideal, nor in living according to reason, but in practising artificial duties, in doing things which are customary, in bowing down to things and persons not in themselves venerable, in believing things which are in themselves incredible. Good and evil are alike conventional and artificial, and it is dangerous to follow even the most generous impulses. A step removed from this moral system is that, of not unfrequent occurrence in history, of a double morality—a higher for the religious person, who is thus exalted above nature, and a lower for the layman, who is thus discouraged and depressed, since the highest goodness is quite out of his reach. But in Christianity, rightly understood, religion and morality cover the same ground, and are the same for all. No religious duties are required which do not bear on the task of being good, and there is no sphere of goodness which lies outside the ken of religion; God is present in every part of life, and all our duties, of whatever sort, are done for Him.

In all these cases it may be claimed for Christianity that, in its highest form, it is not an artificial system, but answers to the best ideas men have been able to form of what religion ought to be, and of the services it ought to render to the individual and to society. Christianity corresponds to the idea of religion; it is, as Hegel expressed it, religion itself made manifest. When, therefore, we offer it to races of men who have not yet accepted it, we are not asking them to exchange one imperfect form of religion for another—an exchange humiliating for them, and such as no good man could ask them to submit to; on the contrary, we are asking those who are somewhere far behind us on the road of the religious development of the world, to come up to us who stand in the front of that development, and to accept the highest religion that man has attained. Nor can it be said that Christianity is a religion for advanced European races, and that it is, perhaps, not fitted for the adoption of other races. Christianity is, in its essence, such a simple thing that nationality forms

no bar to its acceptance. It has proved in the past that it is neither Jewish nor Greek, neither Oriental nor Western, but that it is capable of being the religion of the most diverse races of men, and of men in all stages of civilization. It is not national, but human; no artificial definitions or restrictions are essential to it. Whoever can understand the life of Jesus, a human life full of God, and capable of lifting up to God all who come in contact with it, knows enough to be a Christian. This is what we mean when we say that Christianity is a universal religion. Its simplicity makes it universal. It is like bread; all can be nourished by it. It is like sunshine; all can rejoice in it.

Our conclusion is, therefore, in this part of our subject, that comparative religion does not discountenance Christian missions, but rather regards them as the natural and logical outcome of the past religious history of the world. Similar claims are made, it is true, for Buddhism and for Mohammedanism; but it is not necessary for our present purpose to discuss these claims. The science which teaches us to trace the progress of the world's religion teaches us that it must be right to offer to all men the religion which we know to be the highest, and after which all nations have unconsciously aspired.

II. On the other hand, the scientific study of religions suggests certain considerations as to the method to be followed in the conduct of missions, and as to the aim which should be kept immediately in view. We shall mention only two of these.

1. In the first place, we learn from that study that religion is a national thing, and is always closely interwoven with national character and national history, so that no nation can possibly exchange its religion for another on a sudden. Any change of the kind must be gradual, and must take place in accordance with national sentiment. It has been questioned, indeed, whether any nation ever really changes its religion. Where such changes appear to have taken place, as in the case of the Northern peoples of Europe in the early Christian centuries, it is contended that the change was one rather of names than of substance. New gods were adopted, and Christian saints took the place of heathen heroes and wizards, but the sacred places and times remained as before, and so also did many sacred usages. In proof of this, we are bidden to consider how widely different a thing Christianity became in different nations adopting it. The religion practised north of the Alps and that practised south of the Alps are both called Christianity; but the two can scarcely be called one religion, so widely do they differ in sentiment and in practice, and so difficult is it to specify the element which is common to the two. It may be said that the old religion of Italy and the old religion of the Teutons still survive in the two countries, though both have assumed the name of Christianity. We need not go so far as this. But we shall be on safe ground if we adopt from these examples the great principle that in every change of religion as much as possible is carried forward from

the old faith to the new. Sentiments, practices, associations, sacred places and times, are not obliterated when a nation begins to address a god with a new name. Some of these may pass over into new forms, but in the new vessels the old wine still lives.

This is a fact of which Christians, in their missionary zeal, must take account, and for which they ought to make generous allowance. It cannot be our aim, in our attempts to win converts for Christ, to destroy the sentiment of patriotism in their breast, or to compel them to think that they have been conquered in soul as well as outwardly by a power across the sea. We cannot wish to make them break absolutely with the history and the traditions of the land of which they are, and are still to remain, citizens. Poor and weak and ineffective for the spread of Christianity must be the fruits of such a policy. Mean-spirited creatures must be the converts of a mission which aims at such conquests. It should be our policy, on the other hand, to represent Christ as in sympathy with the nation which we seek to win for Him, as knowing its history and its ideas and feelings, and encouraging whatever in all these can be encouraged to grow up into higher forms. In a word, the point to which this tends is that we ought to aim at converting, not individuals only, but the nation; we should not be impatient for individual conversions, but should wait patiently to see the nation, perhaps only very gradually, perhaps, at first, only in very small matters, yield to Christian ideas. Is not this in accordance with the words of the Saviour? "Go ye," He said, "and make disciples of all the nations:" the nation, as a whole, is to be addressed and challenged; the nation, as a whole, is to be made Christian. And the practical bearing of this is that we must aim at a national, and not an exotic, Christianity in the countries we seek to win. It must be our desire to see a native Church spring up and develop itself freely in accordance with the thoughts and feelings of the nation. We must forbear attempting to plant a Christianity which, from the rigidity of its forms or from too great elaboration in its doctrine is likely to prove incapable of acting as the germ of a national movement. The Christianity we plant in foreign lands should be of the simplest, of the most purely human type. It is not our part to rear a structure, but to sow a seed; it is a germ, not an organism, for which we are responsible. If Christianity has in it such life and vigour as we believe it has, the germ will not fail to grow, and the structure, according to the nature of the particular race in question, to make its appearance in due time. This great principle has been recognized by many of the greatest missionaries; the working out of it in detail is a matter on which we cannot now enter.

2. If comparative religion teaches any one lesson with clearness and emphasis, it is that religion always keeps step with civilization. There cannot be a lofty religion where men are sunk in outward hardships, in such a struggle for existence as savages generally are engaged in, or in overwork, or in slavery. The exceptions to this rule are many, but we

so instinctively recognize them as exceptions that they prove the rule abundantly. Bad government, poverty, ignorance, the prevalence of ancient errors, brutish arrangements and habits of life, and whatever other agencies depress men and obscure their thoughts,—all these are the enemies of pure religion. Even Christianity, as the preachers of the gospel, both in town and country, in our own land are well aware, can make no head where these prevail, but is obliged to press for their removal, and in a measure to wait until they are removed. In every land, therefore, the preaching of Christ has to be accompanied by efforts not aimed directly at conversion, but at the bettering of the lot of the people, and at getting them transferred from a state of depression and irritation to a state of freedom and ease. On the success of these efforts, as well as on direct preaching, does the extension of Christianity depend.

In many cases these efforts might seem to lie outside the province of the Christian missionary. But many great missionaries have felt that it was their duty to befriend the people they were sent to evangelize, in every possible way. The London Missionary Society always recognized that, in sending the gospel to peoples of low civilization, it was necessary to send not only the word, but the arts and arrangements of Christian life, so that the savages might not only hear Christ's gospel, but be trained practically in His ways. The mission sent to a South Sea island consisted of a complete Christian village. The minister was at the head, but his wife went with him, so that the islanders saw the family as Christianity has made it; and besides the minister and his wife, went the doctor, the teacher, and, further, a representative of each of the principal industries, a joiner, a smith, a tailor, and so on. The heathen were to see all that Christianity has made of human life: they were to learn a better social arrangement; they were to receive education; they were to wear clothes; they were to make acquaintance with the arts of Europe; in these ways they were to be lifted up to a higher level of human life. In the new outlook they thus received into higher possibilities, they would be disposed to think that a better religion also should be adopted than that associated with their former habits. The same principle, that to Christianize we must civilize, is practically followed in every part of the mission field, though in some more thoroughly and consistently than in others. Missions to backward races, as in South Africa and in Melanesia, are of an industrial character; missions to countries of old civilization, such as India and China, are partly educational. It is to be hoped that no fanatical outcry for the pure gospel alone, and for more conversions, will be allowed to lead to any reversal of this policy. Conversions of individuals are of slight value except as symptoms of the impression made on the general mind of the people addressed. It is the nation we aim at converting, and we can well afford to wait, though there are very few conversions, if the mind of the nation is being educated and placed in a position to judge truly, when the time comes, on the question of religion.

What the Spirit of Christ bids us seek to do for India, to take that great example, is not to insist that Hindus shall at once accept baptism, but to aid the mind of India to attain to a position of freedom; so that, released from the ancient superstitions of his land, and trained to compare and judge for himself, the Hindu may, when the hour comes, see with his own eyes what is true and what is false in various religions, and desire to have a true religion of his own. This, Christian feeling, as well as every scientific consideration, tells us is what we ought to do for India; even though it does not seem to be the direct way to bring the Hindu to the gospel, yet, if we have faith in our own religion, we must be sure that it is the only satisfactory and only certain way to bring him to it in the end.

In the latter part of Isaiah the Jewish nation is addressed as God's missionary to the world. "Thou shalt call a nation which thou knewest not:" so the chosen people is addressed; "and nations which knew not thee shall run unto thee, because of the Lord thy God, and for the Holy One of Israel, for He hath glorified thee." It is still true that the nation is God's missionary to other nations. The permanent spread of a religion on a large scale—let us take this as our last lesson from the science of religion—often takes place less by propaganda than by filtration. When two races are brought in contact with each other, what is best in each passes over to the other, not all at once, but in the end permanently; and often not by direct efforts to that end, but by a process as quiet as it is inevitable. A religion spreads not only by preaching, but by the communication of the knowledge and culture which have grown up under its influence, by the manifold contact of commerce, by the weight of the character of those who profess it. No small part, therefore, of what we are called to do for the Christianizing of the world must be done at home. We have to see that the religion practised by our nation is one thoroughly worthy and fitted to extend its influence through these channels. If our nation is truly Christian, then we may be of good cheer in our missionary enterprise, and may be sure that a thousand influences, which we can neither control nor measure, are seconding our efforts.

BIBLICAL THOUGHT.

THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

By Rev. G. H. Rouse, M.A., D.D., Calcutta.

As this subject has been brought recently before the readers of The Thinker by the Rev. W. M. Lewis, I should like to suggest a theory which has for many years appeared to me to meet the facts of the case better than any other.

In the *Life of Lord Lawrence* it is stated that when he was Governor of the Punjab, he felt it necessary to have some one better skilled than he was in the art of composition, who might prepare state documents for him. Sir Richard Temple, then a young man, was sent to him; and it is stated in the memoir that on his arrival, Sir John Lawrence said to him, "Remember, you have not to express the opinions of Richard Temple; your turn will come in time; you have now simply to express *my* opinions and decisions."

Mr. Temple accordingly did so. Sir John Lawrence would tell him what were to be the main lines of the papers he prepared, and furnish him with a good deal of material in detail, but the whole had to be worked up by Mr. Temple's mind in his own style. The document, thus drafted, would be brought to Sir John, who would add, omit, and alter here and there. When the document was published, it would be essentially Lawrence's, and not Temple's; it would express Lawrence's views, be issued in his name and on his authority; and yet the style would be essentially different from his natural style, and even many shades of thought in working out the ideas represented would be Temple's way of putting them, though adopted by Lawrence and issued as his own.

A similar case of double authorship is illustrated in *Darkest England.* In the preface, General Booth states that he has had the assistance of an eminent journalist; and any one who reads the book will constantly see exhibited the style and even the thoughts of the journalist; yet the book is essentially General Booth's, and is issued in his name.

My suggestion is that the Epistle to the Hebrews has a somewhat similar double origin. The Apostle Paul felt it important to leave on record a somewhat systematic treatment of the relation of the Messiah to the Old Testament economy, for the use especially of Jewish believers. He had a particular Jewish community specially in view, in Jerusalem or elsewhere; but the subject was one of so much importance that he wished to write what would be useful to believing Jews everywhere. He thought it well to have the actual writing of the Epistle done by some one else, for one or two reasons. One was that he himself was apt to be carried away by his strong feelings into digressions, and he wanted the treatise to be carefully worded and systematically arranged. And the other reason was that he knew that many believing Jews had a strong prejudice against him, and he wished therefore to keep his own personality in the background, in order that the readers might calmly weigh the arguments adduced rather than think of the person who was bringing them forward. There may, of course, have been other reasons. The plan adopted by the apostle would therefore be this: he would give to Luke, or some other helper, the main line of thought which he wished to be followed. This helper would express this line of thought in his own style, and perhaps with some modifications of thought representing his own way of looking

at the matter. The treatise thus prepared would be read by the apostle, altered here and there, and then adopted and issued as his own; while he himself would add the closing section (ch. xiii. 18–25), which seems to have a genuine Pauline ring about it.

This theory seems to account for all the facts. The thoughts are Pauline, the style is not. Paul's name does not occur in the beginning, because it was written by another, and was not a proper Epistle, like the others in the New Testament, but a sort of treatise-Epistle. Also he did not wish to bring his personality into prominence. The tradition as to the Pauline authorship arose because the Epistle is essentially his; the doubts as to the authorship arose because the composition was the work of another, and was un-Pauline in style.

Heb. xiii. 23 seems to me of itself enough to prove the Pauline origin of the Epistle. The writer says that if Timothy comes to him soon enough he will take him with him to the persons to whom he is writing; he *never thinks of asking whether Timothy will consent to go,—he takes that for granted.* It was a long journey that he proposed to take, perhaps from Rome to Jerusalem, at a time when travelling was a far more serious matter than it is now, and yet the writer assumes at once that if Timothy comes in time he will go with him as a matter of course. Who could treat Timothy thus but Paul? If we get hold of a seventeenth-century letter in which the writer says, "I expect to go to York soon, and will take Milton with me," we should say Cromwell was the author of that letter; no one else would order Milton about in that way. Or if in an eighteenth-century letter we read, "I will take Boswell with me," we should say that Dr. Johnson wrote that letter. And just so, I cannot conceive of any one but the Apostle Paul taking it for granted that Timothy will be ready to take a long journey with him if he wishes him to do so. It is also noteworthy that the writer does not say of Timothy, "If he should come *to me;*" he takes it as a matter of course that, as he is now at liberty, he will come soon to see *him;* the only doubt is whether he will come "quickly" enough.

The fashionable theory recently was that Apollos was the author of the Epistle. It seems to be getting a little less popular now. But was Apollos a man who could order Timothy about in that unceremonious manner? Timothy became Paul's companion before Apollos definitely came out as a fully instructed Christian, and after being so many years the apostle's right-hand man, he must have reached a prominent position in the Christian Church; why should he, on his release, hasten to Apollos, and be willing to go anywhere he pleased? So far as we know, the two had not been much together. By comparing Acts xix. 22 with 1 Cor. xvi. 10, 12, it seems that only a few years before the Epistle to the Hebrews was written, Timothy and Apollos had been with Paul at Ephesus; Paul sent Timothy to Greece, and urgently entreated Apollos to go with him, but Apollos refused. When we think of the reverence with which Timothy

regarded Paul, we must feel that he would have been much pained at this flat refusal on the part of Apollos to do what the apostle *entreated* him to do; and yet we are to suppose that a few years later, as soon as he is free, he at once would be sure to go to Apollos, and be ready to follow him anywhere he pleases to take him. If the Epistle was written in Paul's lifetime, Timothy would be *his* companion, or would be engaged in some work to which he had sent him; he would not on his release go to somebody else, and be willing, as a matter of course, to take a long journey with him. And after Paul's death, Timothy, who had been the right-hand man of the great apostle, would be too prominent a member of the Christian Church to be ordered about by Apollos or any one else.

THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT.

THE LOGIC OF CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY.

No. II.

By R. M. Wenley, M.A., D.Sc.

Notwithstanding the defection from Baur's strict tenets, the speculative theology and the theory of the documents continue to be complementary. As the former teaches, in its general principles, the entire history of the universe is witness to the presence of an immanent self-developing Spirit, which commits no leaps in the course of its majestic evolution. Christianity is not an exceptional phenomenon, and so the writings which record its inception and early progress must form a connected organism. On the other hand, detailed examination of the books furnishes forth proof and illustration of the cosmic development at once during one of its most momentous stages, and in its highest aspect—the spiritual. A spiritual consideration of the recorded phenomena supplants a supernatural. Miracles, as isolated and inexplicable disturbances of the world-order, do not happen; the single miracle lies in the constitution of the universe itself. What, next, are the resultant theological inferences?

Time forbids more than a very bald statement of results; and, perhaps, this is not without advantage in the direction of definiteness. For it has only too often been the custom to express these conclusions in language which, hallowed by long association, does not fully convey all that is implied.

1. *The doctrine of God.* Setting aside, meantime, the difficult question of personality, which, indeed, Professor Pfleiderer alone seems anxious to emphasize, it may be said that God is at once the Prius, the Immanent Principle, and the Final Cause of the universe. Being a subject or eternal consciousness, He finds His most eminent "manifestation" in our spirits. We are all His sons, not simply because He is the synthetic power implied

in that "single and unalterable order of relations" that we call nature, but specially because "our consciousness may mean either of two things: either a function of the animal organism, which is being made, gradually and with interruptions, a vehicle of the eternal consciousness; or that eternal consciousness itself, as making the animal organism its vehicle and subject to certain limitations in so doing, but retaining its essential characteristic as independent of time, as the determinant of becoming, which has not and does not itself become."[1] If this be true, then nature is a manifestation of God in one degree, while humanity is His revelation in another and higher mode. We are all brethren because "only in such a universal fellowship, in which the individuals are bound together through the same devotion of all to the common end of humanity—to the Ideal of the good and true—can we behold the ultimate final end of history."[2] Consequently, God is to be regarded primarily as the principle of unity in the material world, in individual selves, in the relation between these two, and in the communion of selves or spirits with each other. So the whole round universe is an organism of which we are parts, and of which He is the life-preserving principle. Accordingly, "a supernaturalism which tries to survive alongside of naturalism, dividing the kingdom with it, will soon have taken away from it 'even that which it seemeth to have.' The only hope of a successful issue is to carry the war into the enemy's quarters, and to maintain what Carlyle called a *Natural Supernaturalism*: i.e. the doctrine, not that there are single miracles, but that the *universe is miraculous*, and that in order to conceive it truly, we must think of it, not as a mechanical system occasionally broken in upon from above, but as an organism which implies a spiritual principle as its beginning and as its end."[3] Christianity is, therefore, to be viewed as an integral, and in nowise exceptional, portion of the absolute miracle. It is a stage in the manifestation of the immanent spiritual principle. Different in degree, no doubt, from Buddhism or the Greek religion, or even from Judaism, it cannot but be regarded as the same in kind. When we contemplate it as the mightiest instance of spiritual development, we do well. But, emphatically, we must not permit our special interest in it to mislead us into supposing that it stands in a class by itself or constitutes an inexplicable phenomenon. The *principle* of God's relation to man was set forth afresh in Jesus, who accomplished His mission under conditions which do not differ, except in their special temporary combination, from those operative in the case, say, of Gautama or Socrates, Luther or Hegel, Dante or Shakespeare, or of any other vehicle of epoch-making ideals.

2. *The value of the New Testament documents.* All these writings are *post factum*, some having been produced at greater, others at lesser, intervals after the martyrdom of the Master. They may be conveniently

[1] Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 72. [2] Pfleiderer, *Gifford Lectures*, vol. i. p. 202.
[3] E. Caird, *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. i. pp. 319, 320.

divided into four groups. (1) The synoptic Gospels, which state the religion of Jesus with the highest purity and least complexity, and among which, notwithstanding its laconic severity, Mark alone affords a basis for a trustworthy account of the world's greatest religious genius. One must note, too, that these three Gospels are characterized by an absence of evidence for doctrines that afterwards became dogmatically embodied in the belief in the Divinity of Christ. (2) The genuine Epistles of Paul, which summarize the religion of the Christ—a system to be carefully distinguished from the religion of Jesus. Paul founds his dogmatic teaching upon the death of Jesus, which he views as an atonement, thus reinstating that very Jewish idea which Jesus had striven to break in pieces. The "doctrines of the incarnation and of the divinity of Jesus are inevitable inferences from that of atonement, provided this is regarded as of objective significance and as an offering presented to God, which was certainly its significance for the mind of St. Paul."[1] (3) The Deutero-Pauline Epistles, which partake of the character of Christian Gnosticism. Here, owing to a dualistic theory of the world-order, Christ has come to be regarded as the one Mediator between God and man. With these Epistles emerge the modified doctrines of justification by faith, of grace, and of Christian liberty. Christianity is now regarded as a mystic saving process, of which Christ is the instrument and man the subject. This view of the matter is so much at odds with that of the synoptic Gospels as almost to cancel their most essential teaching. (4) The Fourth Gospel, in which a more highly evolved and broadened Christian Gnosticism is formulated. Here Christ is no longer a mere mediator—a being standing between God and man—but has come to be identified with God Himself. Hence the book has been aptly entitled, "The Gospel of a Divine Humanity." Christ has become the Word—not, indeed, a transcendent emanation from Deity, but a human incarnation, who thus presents a practicable moral ideal to mankind. Baur's general theory accordingly remains, although its method has been forsaken, and his conclusions cut, as it were, to the order of this method, abandoned. The documents are still taken as integrally related elements in the record of a developing history, and so can be treated entirely as the books of any other religion. They are literature, and, as such, they do not furnish authority for dogmas, but rather serve as aids towards an explanation of the manner in which these very dogmas came to be originated.

3. *The doctrine of Christ and of the so-called cardinal tenets of the Christian faith.* On these matters it is most satisfactory to record the words of the authorities themselves. "It is no longer possible to regard Jesus as an incarnation of the divine Being, who wrought miracles, and by his death made atonement for the sins of men, and rose again from the dead, and afterwards ascended into heaven in the presence of his disciples; but as one who, by nature and from first to last, was a member,

[1] Mackintosh, *The Natural History of the Christian Religion*, p. 397.

pure and simple, of the human family—a link of the human chain just as any of ourselves are; having all the properties of human nature, but those of no other; as one whose nature, faculty, and character were to the same extent with those of other men the product of his ancestry and of his surroundings; and whose life and work went to determine and to influence the life and history of succeeding generations."[1] As a result, the miraculous birth of Jesus, His mystically consecrating baptism, His transfiguration, His institution of the Supper as a saving sacrament, as well as the accounts of the Resurrection and of the Christophanies, and the dogma of the atonement in its ordinary sense, are to be regarded, "not as facts at all, but only as quasi-historical or mythical forms, in which Christian phantasy clothed the facts of Christian experience."[2] In the same way, Paul's conversion, Pentecost, and other special manifestations receive explanation. All are but symbols, in which the essence of Christianity happens to have become enclosed during the course of history, and, if taken literally, they only serve to obscure the "new world of the holy spirit it was the purpose of Christianity to found."

There is, perhaps, little reason for wonder that many good people, on learning these conclusions stated thus without any trappings of religious language, should have exclaimed, with Mary, "They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid Him." But this is no refuge for the instructed theologian. The inferences have been reached by speculative insight, by critical and historical research, and to these methods and processes they continue to remain amenable, by them they must in the issue stand or fall. For theology is not a matter of faith, but of intellectual grasp and careful scholarship. On these lines we must, accordingly, proceed, although very briefly.

None but the most blindly prejudiced would take it upon themselves to deny the lasting benefits conferred upon theology by the speculative group. Indeed, one hardly oversteps the mark in declaring that Hegel, Strauss, and Baur, along with the many less eminent men who worked in their spirit, renewed the science. Once for all they put an end to the peddling rationalism of Paulus and his coadjutors. They gave the *coup de grâce* to the deadening deism of the eighteenth century. Their protest against the naturalism of fifty years ago did not stop short at mere criticism, but included a complete and far more adequate theory. Most of all, perhaps, they brought back somewhat of the essence of Christian teaching to theology when they attacked individualism, and set forth in permanent form the doctrine that no man can divest himself of responsibility for being his brother's keeper. In carrying out the constructive achievements for which they are so conspicuous, they, no doubt, "clapped wings" to a lot of the "solid old lumber of the universe," and erred in disregarding much that was of real value. But, even thus, they performed a service that can by no means be minimized. Their hypothesis

[1] Mackintosh, *The Natural History of the Christian Religion*, p. 56. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 83.

was not a vague, mystical suggestion, but a rounded whole worked over and over in many of its parts with rigorous care and magnificent determination. The theory gave rise to an extraordinary ferment of inquiry into the origin and early development of Christianity, and so effected results which, if not without parallel, have gone far to change the face of theology. In one aspect, these studies have largely narrowed the vital problem, with great advantage to perspicuity and directness; while in another, new difficulties have been laid bare, the very existence of which had not previously dawned upon thinkers. We who live to some extent in the midst of this movement, or who owe to it far more than we are fully aware, can hardly be expected to estimate aright the stimulus it has imparted. We can, at all events, acknowledge that the material on which it has turned our thoughts is not likely to be sterile. What our present Gifford Lecturer has said of philosophy is plainly capable of still deeper application in the theological sphere. "The greatness of a philosophy is its power of comprehending facts. The most characteristic fact of modern times is Christianity. The general thought and action of the civilized world has been alternately fascinated and repelled, but always influenced, and to a high degree permeated, by the Christian theory of life, and still more by the faithful vision of that life displayed in the Son of Man. To pass that great cloud of witness and leave it on the other side, is to admit that your system is no key to the secret of the world, even if we add, as some will prefer, of the world as it is and has been."[1] Thanks to such a spirit as this, we now perceive that the important problems centre round God, round the nature of God's manifestation of Himself in Jesus, and round the relation in which we, sons of men, stand to the Son of God, our spiritual ensample and elder brother.

The Christian conception of Deity, we are told, is a complex one, containing two main elements—"the moral-religious ideal of the anthropomorphically represented holy Lord and merciful Father; . . . and the metaphysical principle which sprang from the Greek speculation of the infinite Spirit exalted above all human limitation, the ground of the existence and of the order of the universe."[2] So, too, when we muse upon God's relation to man, we feel the force of the lines in which the chief poet of this movement has sung of

> "that Infinite
> Within us, as without, that All-in-all,
> And over all, the never-changing One
> And ever-changing Many, in praise of Whom
> The Christian bell, the cry from off the mosque,
> And vaguer voices of Polytheism
> Make but one music, harmonizing 'Pray.'"[3]

So, once more, no small part of the credit for what has been called the

[1] Wallace, *Prolegomena to the Logic of Hegel*, new edit., p. 32.
[2] Pfleiderer, *Gifford Lectures*, vol. i. p. 129. [3] Tennyson, *Death of Œnone*, pp. 34, 35.

rediscovery of Jesus by the nineteenth century is due to these inquirers. They, at least, have urged His moral ubiquity more persuasively than others, and have taught that to-day men in all ranks may hear His voice and walk in His ways without one whit more difficulty than the fishers of Galilee or the Pharisee of Tarsus. Some, no doubt, may be attracted by different types of Christian goodness. One may hold to Paul, the author of a systematically subtle faith; another to James, the apostle of good deeds; a third to John, the herald of a mystic affection. But all are shown to be necessary parts in a mighty plan. They subserve their vocation in the universal order, and this, in turn, is vindicated by a view of life which looks upon nothing as common or unclean. Knowledge has its office, so too belief, so too works. All are logically connected, and thus come to have absolute value. Hence the optimism of the speculative school, by which its contribution to theology in a manner stands crowned. "The reverse side of universal sin and need of redemption is found in the universal ability of all men to be redeemed, which is based on the indestructible essence of the Divine image that is in every man, and, even amidst the thorn-thicket of sin and worldly lust, never becomes entirely extinct, but remains, the living germ of a better future, of a new man in God. . . . In this manner an entirely new estimation of man is reached. It is no longer what he is and does externally, or what he is considered by the community to be, that decides his worth. This is determined by his inmost feeling, the tendency of his soul towards the divine good, even if this be at first only a painful regret for the loss of it, and a heartfelt desire to regain it." [1]

Yet, if progress is to continue, if truth, always sought but grasped partially and with much misgiving, is ever to be unveiled, one cannot afford to be blinded, even by sense of exceptional obligation, to the difficulties and weaknesses attendant upon this theological scheme. And. in the first place, though occupying admirable ground for protest, the members of this group, it seems to me, run to extremes. As against the crude superstition, that sees in Christianity nothing but a miraculously founded organization whose associates are destined to heaven, leaving hell as the portion for all others; as against an equally crude materialism. which traces in the sons of men no more than a higher, and perhaps undesirable, animality, the protest can scarcely be overvalued. Yet there are reasons for fearing that it has still to subject itself to clarifying criticism—a criticism, by the way, which had far better come from within. The system of the universe envisaged by it embodies a conception so overpowering that little play is left for the single parts of the organism. Philosophy of the absolute, speculation concerning the infinite, tends to rule out theological notions, strictly so called, of God the Father, of God the sinless, of God the personal friend of the truly religious man. The current sets towards emphasizing an ideal plan for which man is in

[1] Pfleiderer, in *The New World*, vol. i. pp. 414, 415.

nowise responsible, but in the interests of which, on cognizing it, he is bound to co-operate with the Eternal. The drift is clearly away from personal religion, where the life of the individual predominates, and is as clearly in the direction of what many now openly pursue, as a substitute for religion, under the name "ethical culture," where membership of a social organism and its attendant claims swamp other considerations. What this tendency involves has been very distinctly stated by Mr. F. H. Bradley, in that most brilliant book which would not be miscalled the *Disappearance of Reality*. "Nothing is outside the Absolute, and in the Absolute there is nothing imperfect. . . . The individual never can in himself become an harmonious system. And in the wider ideal to which he devotes himself, no matter how thoroughly, he can never find complete self-realization. For even if we take that ideal to be perfect, and to be somehow completely fulfilled, yet, after all, he himself is not totally absorbed in it. If his discordant element is for faith swallowed up, yet faith, no less, means that a jarring appearance remains. And, in the complete gift and dissipation of his personality, *he*, as such, must vanish; and with that, the good is, as such, transcended and submerged. . . . Goodness is an appearance, it is phenomenal, and therefore self-contradictory."[1] In other words, the protest against raw supernaturalism and equally raw materialism has run too far towards aggrandizing the transcendental universality of the timeless One, and has taken too little account of the active personality of the temporal many. So far as I am capable of grasping this immensely difficult problem, I would suggest that the correction is not unlikely to come from the side of religion. It is therefore of the last importance that theology should not too mildly acquiesce in its own reduction to a subordinate department of speculative inquiry. Personality, especially in those aspects wherein it differs from mere thinghood, must put in a claim for reconsideration. Man, at least as a religious being, cannot afford to class this with "appearances;" indeed, even were he rich enough to do so, his ability to compass the bare statement might very well be called in question. For personality is the highest category known to us, and the more we can expand its content, the less hopeless does the search for absolute truth become. Only in a spiritual person limited like ourselves, yet uplifted as we are not, can we obtain any reassuring glimpse of the infinity for which we yearn.

The meagre Christology, already outlined above, takes its source in the implicit denial of originating power to personality. Jesus, like other men, was a vehicle of universal principles, or, as metaphysicians would have it, a symbol of essential truth. I cannot agree that the explanation is altogether satisfactory. If nothing more, it confounds Christ's Person with His works. The one, as I maintain, was primary, the others alone were secondary. The uniquely consecrated life, by being set in a timeless

[1] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 419.

series of lives, may be partially rationalized; the uniqueness and the daily resurrection in other lives are not thus accounted for. In short, a *theory* of Christ, though necessarily of a wholly different kind from that which was diffused among the Jews prior to His advent, is employed to perform a precisely parallel service. A want is thus supplied—a want due to a specific collocation of intellectual and ethical circumstances. But whether the satisfaction sufficiently tallies with the facts of Christ's appearance and of His continuous life in the souls of believers, is another matter. Be this as it may, what He effected was not brought about once for all by the co-operation of prior and contemporary influences. He was not, and is not, a mere vehicle. His genius is not the simple expression of what others thought and urgently desired; it is a living force which still remains and reproduces its own qualities in the lives of men now and here. "Heroes" and "representative men" are the quintessence of epochs; He is the germ which fructifies at all times. In this respect He is without parallel, and so we cannot separate His *Person* from His work.

The central theological problems—of God and of Christ—are thus problems as much as ever. For it cannot be denied that, both in theology and philosophy, the positions here reviewed demand very careful consideration. If we are to give up Christ's mediation till He becomes "little more than the spiritual brother in God, and Christ-worship becomes practically impossible;" if we are to adopt this theology "with all its catholicity, but also with all its vagueness and its want of touch with the practical religious life,"—we must at least do so, not on authority, but by conscientiously rethinking the entire scheme for ourselves. No other method is in any respect defensible relative to matters so fundamental. The logic of the situation substantially is—Must we, in order to a metaphysical theory of God and a speculative explanation of the life of Christ, put up with a bare minimum of personal religion?

PROFESSOR DRUMMOND'S "ASCENT OF MAN."

By Rev. J. Edwin Davies.

This masterly contribution to the literature of evolution has been some time before the public. The reading public has, no doubt, made up its mind with regard to its value, and specialists have, doubtless, noted the fallacies which infect its author's conception of nature. It is a wonderfully interesting book. The fact that it comes from Professor Drummond's pen is a sufficient guarantee of that. May I, through the medium of The Thinker, be allowed to select a few points for criticism?

The value of the book lies, *inter alia*, in the author's grasp of facts. He gives a fresh colouring and a new meaning to evolution. On the biological side, he finds it necessary, in the interests of the evolution of ethics, to

postulate an altruistic factor. The physical basis of this is found in the reproductive process. The struggle for life is based on the nutritive process. The implications of this theory are obvious. Mr. Kidd, likewise, in his *Social Evolution*, finds it necessary, on the sociological side, to postulate altruism; but it may be noted that Mr. Kidd's method, though dealing in sweeping generalizations, is more strictly inductive than Drummond's. If the egoistic factor is allowed to have a monopoly of evolution, it inevitably strikes at the root of the unity and solidarity of the race. It makes a theoretic acceptance of love impossible. Now, this is not a new discovery in evolutionary science, but hitherto it has not been duly recognized. After rising from *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, one would never have suspected Drummond of any intention to desert the "idealistic" creed. If anything, "natural law" inclines strongly to idealism. But in the *Ascent of Man*, the pendulum has swung to the opposite extreme. Once more protoplasm is made to explain and to contain all the possibilities of human life, and the promise of a distant eternity. He rigidly adheres to the doctrine of Huxley and Tyndall, in other words, to ultra-Darwinism, with reference to questions of origin. He does not state it in so many words. This is quite unnecessary. He quietly adopts the hypothesis. After all, the most consistent view of the cosmos and of human life is an uncompromising idealism. This is the tendency of modern speculation. There may be regions into which logic cannot penetrate, but it is a fatal policy to violate its first principles. The protoplasm theory does not materialize spirit; it only spiritualizes matter (see Caird, *Philosophy of Religion*). It really matters very little *how* man and his history, how the rational creation, has come to be what it is. But the evolution that explains man is not the evolution that looks on thought as a function of matter. Granting that natural selection explains, and explains satisfactorily, a vast array of phenomena, both natural and mental, it is still pitiably inadequate to explain all. When the advocate of natural selection ignores the fact of the original involution, the whole theory is painfully weak and impotent. The great significance of natural selection lies in its revelation of design. No doubt there is a good deal of circumstantial truth in his exposition of the genesis of morality. First, it denotes *mores*, customs. What pleases the father comes in time to be good. What displeases him, is the reverse. So that, logically, the basis of morality is the father's caprice. The tendency to good conduct is registered and conserved in the consciousness by the action of heredity.

At this point we might quarrel with the professor for his exaggerated estimate of the power of heredity. He assumes that acquired characteristics are transmitted—the very point that is debated by Weismann. It would be at least more scientific to leave that factor out altogether, until science gives the verdict. This kind of morality is, of course, merely empirical, utilitarian. It explains satisfactorily the etymological pedigree of morality, but it does *not* explain "the categorical imperative." Where does this

come from? Etymology does not always give the clue to the truth. By parity of cavil, one might argue that religion is the apotheosis of ceremonialism, because *religio* originally denotes that. An empirical law, *quâ* empirical, can never have the force of a necessary law, and, out of its own store, cannot even develop into one. In fact, he disproves, by implication, the very point he attempts to prove. Man, he says, is to be judged from the top, from the end of the process, not from the beginning. At the top we find "the categorical imperative," "the ought;" we do not find it, according to Drummond, in the lower reaches of evolution. If not, why not? He is condemned out of his own mouth. Reason, the spiritual, stands at the top, while feeling, the natural, stands below. "We feel as individuals, we think as sharing in the universal reason" (Caird, *Philosophy of Religion*). He ignores the difference which is here pointed out by Caird. Man emerging from the womb of chaos, man struggling for survival in the primæval forest with his boon companions, the tiger and the ape, and man finally, organizing a rude civilization, is the hero of Drummond's drama. And the story reads like a romance.

But the professor, lost in the interesting details of the long tale, seems to lose sight of the metaphysic of the vast process going on so slowly. He seems again to over-estimate the power of environment in his account of man's mental and social development. He compares environment to the different altitudes in the ascent of a mountain. The analogy is very apt and suggestive, but analogy is not always a safe guide. It generally conceals a fallacy. And that is the case here. Man can react on his environment. To some extent he can create his environment. This is due to his power of spontaneity, his free-will. But in the analogy drawn by Drummond, the environment of the ascent up a mountain is quite independent of the climber. He has no control over it; it is purely objective. There is no causal connexion between the individual's efforts and the fresh air and extended view which his environment gives him. Whereas, in human progress, man must have organic connexion or correspondence with his environment. He must bring a certain subjective state to be acted upon by the environment. After all, environment only reveals mental possibilities, it does not create them. The professor pleads eloquently for Nature. The nutritive process, he argues, is the physical basis of the selfish struggle, while the reproductive process is the physical basis of the struggle for the life of others. This ushers in the ethical process. Nature, from the beginning, has set herself the task of providing man with a pattern, a model, an example. He is to imitate her *modus operandi*. Go now, and do likewise. Her method, it seems, is the method of love. The reproductive process in plants is a manifestation of love, a struggle for the life of plants. True, it is mechanical; but this is the first stage of love. The highest stage is reached when the mother clasps her babe to her breast. Of course, he admits, we cannot predicate ethical qualities of physiological functions; but still, the function is the physical

basis of the ethical truth. He seems to find some difficulty in deciding at what point this ethical factor, altruism, can be consistently interpolated in the process. To begin with, we are told that, up to a certain point, the struggle for existence *alone* carried on the work of evolution. Then, as he develops the importance of the altruistic factor, he insists that it is really present even at the beginning, and that it has escaped observation owing to its unfamiliar aspect. This uncertainty and contradiction is indicative of hasty inferences and some confusion of thought. It is a task of consummate difficulty to attempt to prove that the merely mechanical process of reproduction, under stress of evolution, afterwards appears as altruism, love, duty.

We gather, then, that the professor looks upon the ethical process as a continuation of the cosmic process. There is, according to his statement, no interruption, no confusion, no breach of continuity. The cosmic process comes to its natural and preordained limit, and the ethical process starts where the other breaks off, and continues the work of evolution without a break or a pause. The conclusion, then, arrived at is that there is no antagonism between the cosmic and the ethical process. The superlative value of this view is that it emphasizes a modification of our conception of nature. The professor has no sympathy with that conception of Nature which pictures her "red in tooth and claw." He holds that Nature is the incarnation of beauty and love: "The entire beauty of the world is the beauty of love, the crown of flowers" (pp. 297, 298). It may be that this manifestation is only a manifestation of embryonic love, or what, by the pressure of analogy, we must infer to be love. It is well that we should sometimes be taught to be tender in our judgment of Nature, and that our dormant benevolence should at least give a hearing to the "return to nature," so eloquently preached by Drummond and Rousseau. It is always possible for an ambiguity to lurk under the folds of the term "nature," but it is unnecessary to press that point here. We are, then, to adopt for ethical action the method of Nature, and in this we must include, of necessity, the results of the method. The method of evolution is to be in a line with the ethical method. But evolution, as Professor Huxley has pointed out, has evolved not only the good, the virtuous, and the benevolent, but it has also evolved the evil, the vice, and the suffering of to-day. If, on the one hand, evolution is credited with the phenomena of morality, peace, and optimism, it must, on the other hand, be held responsible for vice, anarchy, and pessimism, phenomena which apparently gain in quantity and intensity, as civilization becomes more complex and organized. "Cosmic nature is no school of virtue, but the head-quarters of the enemy of ethical nature" (Huxley, *Romanes Lecture*). "The cosmos works through the lower nature of man, not for righteousness, but against it" (*ibid.*). "Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it"

(*ibid.*). The ethical has to guide, correct, and subordinate the cosmic process. As we cannot run away from Nature, the next best thing is to make Nature a willing and obedient auxiliary, and force her into a subordinate position. This line of argument is very clearly and philosophically developed by Caird (*Philosophy of Religion*), in his chapter on morality, in which a very sound exposition is given of the scriptural statement, "First that which is natural, and afterwards that which is spiritual."

If Drummond would only undertake to show us, by the strictest scientific method, *how* reproduction develops into altruism, it would not be difficult to persuade us to imitate the cosmic process instead of combating it. It is very strange that he fails to see the antagonism. The reason is not far to seek. He relies too much on the prospective ethical significance of the reproductive function. According to his statement of the case, the altruistic factor is the leading principle in the evolutionary process, and leads the egoistic factor in its train, thus eliminating the antagonism. The selfish struggle, on the professor's own showing, has brought the race to a considerable level of efficiency, and now that he wishes to substitute the altruistic process in its place, he would fain put the selfish struggle, if not out of the process altogether, at least behind the other factor. But it refuses to suit his convenience. The facts are terribly against him. Let us take his two assumptions: (1) Love is the guiding principle in evolution; (2) there is no antagonism between the ethical and cosmic. Now, love can only manifest itself in self-sacrifice. This is the burden of the story according to Drummond himself. If there is no antagonism all along the line, what scope does the professor find for self-sacrifice? What space has he left for its accommodation?

The inconsistency is so obvious and so glaring that one is surprised that a keen mind like Drummond's should fall into the snare. The antagonism is undeniable. Kidd, in his *Social Evolution*, maintains that it is fundamental. He postulates a fundamental, an irreconcilable antagonism between the individual and the organism, between the ethical and the cosmic. Again, it is precisely this antagonism which is denied by Drummond, that is the logical basis of the struggle for existence, and, apart from this inherent antagonism in the web of the phenomena of human nature, the word "struggle" would have no meaning whatever. And looking at the antagonism from the opposite point of view, it is the fact of antagonism that provides for the duty of self-sacrifice a scope and justification.

These are sober facts, plain realities. They are no *à priori* speculative trifles. They receive corroboration, not only from abstract reason, but from the mature experience of life as well. Now, granting that the nutritive and reproductive processes are the physical bases of these ethical truths, we are still unable to draw the conclusion from his

premisses that, *e.g.*, reproduction becomes love, inevitably becomes love. By parity of reasoning, the law-court or the prison is the physical basis of justice, and ritual is the physical basis of religion; but not one of these bases can, by any perversion of logic, be identified with the spiritual truths which give them their *raison d'être.* This is a profound and difficult theme. It is, to say the least, premature to pronounce on the subject, and to expect too much from the lower reaches of evolution in our present stage of scientific knowledge. Once the professor seems unconsciously to interpolate a breach of continuity in the rigid naturalism of his thesis by borrowing a little help "from above" (p. 440). There are vast differences in nature, both of kind and of degree, and, as he himself admits, it is irreverence to tamper with these and to treat them as unreal. It is well to remember that naturalism, while it fascinates the imagination, has yet to conquer man's sober intellect. Darwin, in discussing the genesis of the moral sense, says, "Man comes to feel, through habit, that it is best for him to obey his most persistent instincts" (*Descent of Man*, p. 88). He also admits (p. 86) that "the wish for another man's property is perhaps as persistent a desire as any that can be named." It will be noticed that Darwin here identifies instinct with desire. The logical conclusion is that the ethics of nature do not set any value on the virtue of honesty. Professor Drummond might object to this argument on the ground that it takes no account of the "rational," and deals merely with the tottering guidance of instinct. The answer is that the rational is *sui generis;* it is the universal, the real, the necessary, and the eternal; while the purely "natural," with the ethics of naturalism included, is contingent, tentative, empirical. The rational has therefore no part or parcel in nature, as the professor understands "nature." He is quite conscious of the difficulties of his position, and fights against them well. It is a long stride from the lower forms of intelligence to rational, conscious man. Science has never yet stepped across that chasm, but in a complete system of naturalistic ethics, that "bridgeless space" must be crossed. How does Drummond cross it? He is "carried by invisible hands." And yet the process is described as "natural." "In any case," he goes on to say, "it is Nature's staircase" (p. 160). The process may be natural enough, for all we know, in the sense that there is no break in the continuity of natural law, and that there are no invisible somersaults; but from Drummond's point of view it can only be natural by an extension of the meaning of "natural;" and, when tested by the thesis of the *Ascent of Man*, this means supernatural—an implication which vitiates the whole line of argument.

He has failed to prove that man is subject to the laws which govern the rest of creation. No doubt the physical part of man is subject to the laws of nature just as any other organism is. But, in the fuller sense of the word, man is a new creation in nature. Professor Drummond would only admit that he is a fresh creation bound by natural

ties to the rest of the world. But he is a new creation, and differs in kind from anything else in the natural world. If it is Nature that has brought him to the birth, she has given birth to one who is destined to tyrannize over her, and mould her to his own sweet will. If we saddle his parentage on natural selection, we find that his first act on attaining his majority is to reject Nature's selection, and substitute his own.

But let me note one more point. Where does free-will come in? Professor Drummond believes in free-will, because he believes in duty and responsibility. Can he, does he find room in this tight-fitting system for the exercise of free-will? Is not the fact of free-will of itself enough to put natural selection out of court when it proceeds to deal with man? Is not free-will the supreme justification of the doctrine which holds that man is a unique creation, and bears a new relation to Nature? Yes, man is something more than the passive instrument of natural forces. Man has the power of initiative, the gift of spontaneity. No amount of sophistry or equivocation can hide that fact from our eyes, and, that being so, the mechanical factors of evolution become obsolete. The professor would probably call his position that of a determinist, but it looks like necessarianism. How does he reconcile this with his theology? Preaching the ethics of naturalism, he advocates Christianity. How he reconciles the two systems of ethics, the one utilitarian and empirical, the other transcendental and intuitive, passes all understanding. His description of Christianity is equally applicable to Buddhism, with reference to both development and love. There is as real and as fundamental an antagonism between the naturalistic creed which he advocates and the Christianity which crowns the process of development, as there is between the cosmic and the ethical. Men, strong in imaginative power, and bent on analogical inferences, do not hesitate to proclaim the ethics of nature. It is the commonplace characteristic of able men, but of men who are invariably cramped by a too exclusive devotion to special departments of science, and are consequently the victims of a one-sided realism. It is not overbold to say that the solution of high themes, such as duty, religion, and immortality, can never come from specialists in science, however authoritative they may be in their own particular department, unless they have had a sound metaphysical training to correct the crude realism of the "philosophy of dirt." The more we grasp the facts and the results of natural law, the more closely do we see that Nature proclaims directly no ethics. Nature may not be, at the last analysis, "red in tooth and claw," but it is certain that a negative is the utmost that can be predicated of her. She certainly does not concern herself about our felicity, still less our ethics. Nature is quite neutral and indifferent on these points. The only end she has in view is our survival; and in order to this end, the other-regarding tendencies are, by the agency of natural selection, arrayed before man in all the magnificence of sensuous beauty, "in order

to trick him into the performance of altruistic action" (Balfour, on "Naturalism and Ethics," *Internat. Jour. of Ethics*).

On the naturalistic hypothesis, there is no basis for the "sense of reverence," or for "authority." Knowing the pedigree of his ethics, these phenomena cannot commend themselves to man. The finest chapter in the book is that on the "evolution of a mother." The last, in which he moralizes on evolution, is unsatisfactory.

But it is almost a pity to criticize such a magnificent production as the *Ascent of Man*. Apart from the merits or demerits of the argument, it were more becoming to sit quiet and receive the subtle influence of the poetry of science.

IMMORTALITY AND RESURRECTION.

By Rev. Professor J. Iverach, D.D.

In the *Fortnightly Review* of September, 1893, there appeared a characteristic article from the pen of Mr. Grant Allen. It bore the title, "Immortality and Resurrection." It has all Mr. Grant Allen's magnificent scorn of his opponents, and his equally magnificent confidence in himself. He says, "I am not arguing with theologians: I would as soon think of arguing with the Duke of Argyll. I am merely stating the conclusions of science." It is, no doubt, a great source of comfort to a man when he can say of his own opinions, "I am merely stating the conclusions of science." It reads grandly, has a sound in it of something far removed from mere prejudice, or subjective opinion, or caprice. Science is objective, and if I can state my view so, it gains something of validity even for myself.

Mr. Grant Allen states at the outset, "The earliest form of the superstitious notion of a continuance of life after death is the belief in the resurrection of the body. A later form is the belief in the immortality of the soul. The idea of resurrection arose from, and is closely bound up with, the practice of burial, the earliest and simplest mode of disposing of the remains of the dead. The idea of immortality arose from, and is closely bound up with, the practice of burning, a later and better innovation, invented at a later stage of human culture. During the early historical period, all the more advanced and cultivated nations burnt their dead, and, in consequence, accepted the more ideal and refined notion of immortality. But modern European nations bury their dead, and, in consequence, accept, nominally at least, the cruder and grosser notion of immortality." Such are the conclusions he wishes to establish, and the way he goes about it is somewhat curious. For Mr. Grant Allen the continuance of life after death is a superstitious notion. It does not matter to him that it is a notion which has been in possession of the human mind ever since man has been on the earth. Whence is the belief in the continuance of life after death? "How did this odd and baseless idea of a

surviving ghost or spirit after death arise at all? Clearly, it is a result of the crude and unscientific nature of early psychology." And Mr. Grant Allen proceeds to give us some hints as to the way in which the idea arose, and refers us to Mr. Herbert Spencer for the detailed account of the origin of belief in ghosts. "It must suffice to say that a number of facts, such as the existence of the breath, the phenomena of dreams, the peculiar conditions of fainting, sleep, epilepsy, and catalepsy, and other similar observations, suggested inevitably to the minds of every man the quaint notion that the human being was of a dual nature, consisting of two parts, one material and physical, the other immaterial and 'spiritual,' that is to say, partakers of the character of breath or wind." We have read the detailed account of Mr. Herbert Spencer, thus summarized by Mr. Grant Allen, and we have never ceased to regard it with surprise. If only men have "minds" as Mr. Allen supposes them to have, we can easily see how the notion of dualism might arise without having recourse to the far-fetched explanation of Mr. Spencer and Mr. Grant Allen. There is, first of all, the fundamental distinction between himself and other people, between himself and the world. This gives him otherness to start with. He knows himself as a source of energy. He can do things, and this gives him the notion of a similar source of energy in other things, and so he comes to know himself in relation to a world somehow related to himself and like himself. But this simple explanation is not sufficient for Mr. Spencer and Mr. Allen. They must have an explanation which will from the outset involve religion in artificiality and delusion, which also will keep it without relation to reality, and in the sphere of illusion from first to last.

The idea of continuance after death is due, says Mr. Grant Allen, "to the crude and unscientific nature of early psychology." Let us see what is the scientific psychology of Mr. Grant Allen. "This primitive and long-lasting conception (that of ghost or spirit), the parent of all the delusions known as religions, is due to ignorance of the physiological fact that the act of breathing is merely a function of the lungs, and the act of thinking merely a function of the brain or nervous system. Misapprehension of these points has led to the curious notion that the ghost, spirit, breath, or soul can exist apart from the body to which it belongs, and can even survive it." Mr. Grant Allen hurries us back to the original meaning of the words which now bear the names of spirit, ghost, soul, and he gravely tells us that the act of breathing "is a function of the lungs." When he uses the word "consideration," does he ever think of a "constellation"? Most words have a physical significance if we trace them back to their origin; but the question is—What do they mean now?

More curious, however, is Mr. Grant Allen's assertion that "the act of thinking is merely a function of the brain or nervous system." In this statement Mr. Grant Allen stands almost alone. Even Mr. Herbert Spencer, whom he usually follows with an adhesion almost servile, is

against him here. For Mr. Spencer cannot get on without a consciousness. From the brain and nervous system Mr. Spencer can get nothing but matter and motion. "So far from helping us to think of subject and object as of one kind, analysis serves but to render more manifest the impossibility of finding for them a common concept—a thought under which they can be united. Can we think of the subjective and objective activities as the same? Can the oscillation of a molecule be represented in consciousness side by side with a nervous shock, and the two be recognized as one? No effort enables us to assimilate them. That a unit of feeling has nothing in common with a unit of motion becomes more than ever manifest when we bring the two into juxtaposition" (Spencer's *Psychology*, vol. i. pp. 157, 158). Again, he says, "No effort enables us to assimilate mind and motion" (p. 403). Yet Mr. Grant Allen has no difficulty in making the act of thinking to be a function of the nervous system. Have we not here a psychology as crude and as unscientific as the psychology of the early man, and for the existence of which there is less excuse?

As we have Mr. Grant Allen's psychological position, we have also a brief hint of both the ethical and religious ideal he prefers to the ideals of Christianity. "In displacing the civilized religions of Greece and Rome," Christianity "brought with it into Europe various ideas properly belonging to a lower and Asiatic stage of culture. It brought with it the ugly practice of burial, in place of the sane and wholesome practice of cremation. It brought with it the vulgar Jewish conception of resurrection, in place of the elevated, though erroneous, notion of immortality. It brought with it the hateful Oriental notions of asceticism and repression, in place of the graceful and artistic Greek ideals of happiness, beauty, and equal development." Thus the Greek ethical ideal is preferred by Mr. Grant Allen to the Christian ideal. The one set is to him "hateful," and the other is "graceful and artistic." But here, too, Mr. Grant Allen is in a minority; and the Christian ideal has now the supremacy. There is no ethical system of any worth that does not prescribe some measure of "asceticism and repression." Has not Mr. Grant Allen heard of the paradox of hedonism?—that happiness is never found when directly sought for? Does not his master, Mr. Herbert Spencer, set up an ideal standard? and does he not set forth maxims of repression, not very different from those of the New Testament? Not self-assertion, but self-repression, self-renunciation, has come to be regarded as the higher law of ethical realization of self. Mr. Grant Allen will perhaps listen to Professor Huxley: "The practice of that which is ethically best—what we call goodness or virtue—involves a course of conduct which in all respects is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion, it demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside or treading down all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect, but shall help, his fellows; its influence is

directed not so much to the survival of the fittest as to the fitting of so many to survive. It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence" (*Romanes Lecture*, p. 33). Take any school of ethics we please—utilitarianism as set forth by Stuart Mill, the ethics of positivism, the ethics of Hegelianism, and even some systems of the ethics of evolution, and they all place in the forefront, as of the very essence of ethical attainment, the idea of self-restraint, of self-sacrifice, of repression, the notion which Mr. Grant Allen describes as hateful and Oriental. On this point, again, we may leave him to his solitude.

He speaks also of "the civilized religions of Greece and Rome." It is easy to write the phrase; it is difficult to suppose that any man, with any knowledge of the subject, could mean to approve of these religions. The point of view of Mr. Grant Allen may, perhaps, be something like this. All religions for him are superstitions, and, as he desires that all religions should vanish, then the worse the religions have become, the better for his purpose. I do not mean to describe the religions of Greece and Rome at the beginning of the Christian era. Old beliefs were almost gone; the people, particularly the more educated portion, had outgrown them,—they were in search of religious truth, and could not find it. The old mythologies had become to them nauseous and disgusting, and the Roman Empire had dwarfed the local gods, and the worship had become, in the beginning of the second century, a worship of the Roman emperor. Is this the kind of worship that wins the approval of Mr. Grant Allen? Is this what he means by "the civilized religions of Greece and Rome"? Is this his religious ideal?

Having seen somewhat of his ideal of psychology, of ethics, of religion, it is time now to study what Mr. Grant Allen calls the conclusions of science. I have first a remark to make as to ancestor-worship, which both Mr. Spencer and Mr. Grant Allen make out to be the source of all religions. It seems to me that they do not take into account the simple fact that the greater part of the rites, ceremonies, sacrifices, with regard to the dead are to be interpreted as not offered to the dead, but for them. The garments, tools, weapons, buried with them or burnt with them; the horses, dogs, companions, slain with them, buried or burnt with them,—were not, properly speaking, offerings to the dead, but gifts to fit them for the toil, the strife, of the other life. It seems to me that what Mr. Frazer puts first is not primary, but secondary. It arises from the belief that the dead man was supposed to return because he had not been sufficiently equipped for the journey to the home of spirits. Worship of the dead may well have thus arisen from worship for the dead. At all events, it is remarkable how large a proportion of the evidence for ancestor-worship lends itself to this interpretation.

With this also agrees the universal fact that in almost all mythologies the ghosts of the departed are not thought of as lords of the other world. They are not masters, but subjects. They are tried, they are

judged, they are sent to places of torment or to places of blessedness, and generally they are subject to higher powers. It is impossible, it seems to me, to account for this universal characteristic of religious belief on the theory of ancestor-worship, or on the ghost theory. Certainly, neither Mr. Grant Allen, nor Mr. Spencer, nor Mr. Frazer has accounted for it. But we have not space to enter into detail. I may, however, observe that there was a conscious distinction in the Greek mind, and a consistent use of language descriptive of the distinction, between offerings and services directed to the gods and to their own ancestors. The altar to the gods was *βωμός*, the altar connected with the dead was *ἐσχάρα*. The offering of the sacrifice was *ἐναγίζειν, ἐντέμειν*, never *θύειν*, and the libations to the dead were *χοαί*, to the gods *σπονδαί*.

We come to the main question. Mr. Grant Allen's thesis is that burial and resurrection are connected together, and so also are cremation and immortality. The first is earlier, cruder, grosser; the second, though a superstition still, is more refined, etc. We have looked at Mr. Grant Allen's paper for evidence, and we have found none. We obtain, instead of evidence, the statement that burial was the earliest way of disposing of the bodies of the dead. And Mr. Grant Allen proceeds to give us an explanation of the origin and meaning of the custom. It is, in substance, that of Mr. Frazer. Men did not pay attention to the dead so much from affection as from terror. The living were afraid of the dead, and afraid also of the return of the dead. Hence the custom of heaping earth on the dead, of heaping stones on them, even of diverting a river from its course, "burying a dead man in its bed, and then allowing the stream to return to its channels." The facts are admitted; the explanation of them is very doubtful. A nearer, less recondite, more likely, explanation is to look on graves, tombs, cairns, as, in the first place at least, signs and tokens of the care for the bodies of the dead which existed in the mind of the living. Mr. Grant Allen says, "What was at first a precaution against the return of the dead becomes in the end a pious duty." But it is as well to begin with the pious duty and to lay stress on it from the outset, and to look at the fear of the return of the ghost as a punishment for the neglect of the pious duty. Besides, how, on the terms of Mr. Allen's explanation, are we to account for the widespread custom of feast for the dead, and the portion of the daily meal set apart for them? If people were always in such mortal terror of the dead, how could they live in their presence as they consciously and continuously did? The Lares were the ancestral spirits of the Roman family, and were believed to abide in the house; a part of every meal was offered to the Lar, and the Lar was regarded, not with terror and aversion, but with reverence and fear. We submit, then, that Mr. Grant Allen's explanation is inadequate, and does not take all the facts into account. "Burial, I take it," he says, "is simply by origin a means taken by the living to protect themselves against the vagrant tendencies of the dead." May we not say, on the contrary, burial

is a sign of the care and affection which the living feel for the dead? They would not allow the dead to be desecrated, hence they laid them carefully in the lap of Mother Earth.

We come to the evidence for Mr. Grant Allen's theory, which connects burial with resurrection, and cremation with the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Are the facts so? He does not deal with the question historically? Nor does he say that all people who bury their dead believe in a resurrection of the dead, and that all people who burn their dead believe in the immortality of the soul. If he could have shown this to be the case, he would have proved his theory. But he does not do so. And he cannot. For the evidence is against his theory. In truth, Mr. Grant Allen seems just to have thought of the Platonic doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and of the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, and connected the first with cremation and the second with burial, and set forth his theory without any induction of facts. It gave him an opportunity of having a fling at theologians, and to say that religions are superstitions, and to state his own opinions as "conclusions of science;" and he took full advantage of it.

Take the Platonic doctrine of the immortality of the soul, is it connected in any way with cremation? Unfortunately for Mr. Grant Allen, the custom in Attica was not to burn their dead, but to bury them (Duncker's *History of Greece*, vol. i. p. 50). In the *Phædo*, Plato allows Socrates to say—

"I would not have him sorrow at my hard lot, or say at the burial, 'Thus we lay out Socrates,' or 'Thus we follow him to the grave or bury him;' for false words are not only evil in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. Be of good cheer, then, my dear Crito, and say that you are burying my body only, and do with that as is usual, and as you think best" (*Phædo*, 116, Jowett's translation).

Clearly to Plato and Socrates the doctrine of the immortality of the soul has no connexion whatsoever with the manner in which the body was disposed of. It might be buried or it might be burnt; they had reached the conclusion on other grounds, irrespective of the body altogether; and Plato and Socrates contradict Mr. Grant Allen.

"During the same winter," says Thucydides, "in accordance with an old national custom, the funeral of those who first fell in this war was celebrated by the Athenians at the public charge. The ceremony is as follows: Three days before the celebration, they erect a tent in which the bones of the dead are laid out, and every one brings to his own dead any offering which he pleases. At the time of the funeral the bones are placed in chests of cypress wood, which are conveyed on hearses: there is one chest for each tribe. They also carry a single empty litter decked with a pall for those whose bones are missing and cannot be recovered after the battle. The procession is accompanied by any one who chooses, whether citizen or stranger, and the female relatives of the deceased are present at the place of interment, and make lamentation. The public sepulchre is situated in the most beautiful spot outside the walls; there they always bury those who fall in war: only after the battle of Marathon the dead, in recognition of their pre-eminent valour, were interred on the field. When the remains have been laid in the earth, some man of known ability and high reputation, chosen by the city, delivers a suitable oration over them; after which the people depart. Such is the manner of interment" (Thucydides, 36, Jowett's translation).

Thus the Greek notion of immortality was quite consistent with the Greek practice of burial of the dead. In his speech, Pericles says (we quote from Mr. Lloyd, *The Age of Pericles*, vol. ii. p. 145), "The citizens who died for their country," he said, according to the more congenial report of Stesimbrotus, "are living still, and live for ever; for their immortality we have the same warrant as for that of the gods, of whose being we become cognizant by the benefits we receive from them, and by the honours which they command from all mankind." Other evidence might also be brought to show that, as far as Greece is concerned, Mr. Grant Allen's opinion is not a just "conclusion of science."

Shall we go to Rome and Roman custom for a proof of his view? Alas for him! the Roman custom, down nearly to the end of the Republic, was that of burial, and we find in their religious views no trace of a doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. Nor do we find any change of view with regard to immortality when the practice of cremation began. Shall we go to China or to Egypt? In these countries we have burial, or what may be considered forms of burial; but we do not find any trace of a doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. Shall we go to India, where we shall find the custom of cremation prevalent ever since the time when the Rig-Veda was composed? What kind of doctrine of immortality have we in India? Certainly not one to help Mr. Grant Allen. "At the outset, it may be well to point out that the main object of a Hindu funeral is very different from that of European rites. It is nothing less than the investiture of the departed spirit with an intermediate gross body—a peculiar frame interposed, as it were parenthetically, between the terrestrial gross body which has just been destroyed by fire, and the new terrestrial body which it is compelled ultimately to assume. . . . Were it not for this intermediate frame—believed to be created by the offerings made during the funeral ceremonies—the spirit would remain with its subtile body in the condition of an impure and unquiet ghost, wandering about on the earth or in the air among demons and evil spirits, and endeavouring itself to be an evil spirit" (*Religious Thought and Life in India*, by Sir Monier Williams, pp. 276, 277). Thus the destruction of the body by fire set the Hindus to devise a way by which the spirit might be intermediately reclothed, until the time when a new terrestrial body was fitted for it—a view which looks like the contradiction of Mr. Grant Allen's view.

Shall we find any support in Mazdeism for Mr. Grant Allen's scientific conclusion? It does not seem so. We have many inconsistent positions in the Zend-Avesta. For one thing, we have the notion of a resurrection and renovation of all things, along with the notion of the infinite pollution caused by death. So great is that pollution, that one dead body is enough to corrupt the whole world. For the followers of Zoroaster, the body is to be disposed of, not by burial nor by cremation, but by being devoured by birds or wild animals. And this does not help Mr. Grant

Allen. It is well known also that the Jews bury their dead, and that there is a remarkable silence regarding the dead throughout the whole of the Old Testament. The doctrine of the resurrection of the dead was believed by a large part of the Jews at the beginning of the Christian era, but was as strenuously denied by others. Thus it would seem that a cursory glance at the available evidence is sufficient to disprove Mr. Grant Allen's main assertions—assertions, let me repeat, which he gravely advances as "the conclusions of science."

While the main contention of Mr. Grant Allen is thus seen to be merely fanciful and unsupported by evidence, he has made other assertions which are even more hazardous and gratuitous. "Readers of Mr. Frazer's wonderful book, *The Golden Bough*, will all have drawn for themselves the obvious inference, which Mr. Frazer everywhere prudently refrains from drawing, that early Christianity was in all its essentials a special development of the common religious ideas of Asia Minor and Syria. It was the creed of Adonis, the creed of Altis, dressed up afresh and applied with minor differences to a certain historical or mythical personage said to have lived in Galilee about the beginning of the Christian era. Of this personage himself we know really nothing but the name or names; every supposed fact or incident related of him is merely one of the common and universal incidents related of all the other gods, each of whom is represented as being a man as he was; each of whom is slain by a violent death; each of whom undergoes resurrection, as a rule, on the third day; each of whom is identified with corn and the vine; each of whom is sacramentally eaten, under the guise of bread and wine, by his worshippers. It is now abundantly clear that the Christian religion was one among a number of competing religions of the East, which became popular among the slaves and lower classes of the Mediterranean world towards the decline of the Roman Empire; and Christianity was the winner in the race for the mastery of the world, just because it embraced and synthesized in itself so many separate elements of many other creeds and superstitions. But in displacing the civilized religions of Greece and Rome, it brought with it into Europe various ideas properly belonging to a lower and Asiatic stage of culture. It brought with it the ugly practice of burial, in place of the sane and wholesome practice of cremation. It brought with it the vulgar Jewish conception of resurrection, in place of the elevated, though erroneous, notion of immortality. It brought with it the hateful Oriental notions of asceticism and repression, in place of the graceful and artistic Greek ideals of happiness, beauty, and equal development."

Now, this is a most wonderful passage. We do not think that any other man could have written it. And it is a considerable feat even for Mr. Grant Allen. I do not know whether Mr. Frazer will altogether like the compliment which Mr. Grant Allen pays to his prudence, or whether he himself would draw the inference which has been drawn for

him. I rather think that he is too well acquainted with Christianity, and with the social and other conditions of the people among whom Christianity began, to have drawn such an inference. At all events, he has not drawn it. And it certainly does not follow from his book, or from the principles expounded in it. We have not space to deal with *The Golden Bough* here. We may say this, however, that if Mr. Frazer has not said anything of Christianity in his works, we know what Dr. Robertson Smith has said about it. Dr. Robertson Smith is a man whose character, attainments, and work will command the respect of Mr. Grant Allen. The theory which Mr. Frazer elaborates with such skill and learning is largely due to Dr. Robertson Smith. We know also what Dr. Smith has said about Christianity, and he does not draw the inference which Mr. Grant Allen has drawn. On the contrary, he believes in God and in Christ, in the reality of revelation, and in the fact that God has made Himself known to man.

Both Mr. Frazer and Dr. Robertson Smith know the facts too well to have ever made such an assertion as that "early Christianity was in all its essentials a special development of the common religious ideas of Asia Minor and Syria." It was not the creed of Adonis or of Altis. It was something far different. Mr. Grant Allen might have known that the worship of Adonis had made some progress among the Jews, and he also might have known that, after the return from Babylon, the Jewish attitude to the common ideas of Asia Minor was that of intense and fierce antagonism. The graphic description in the eighth chapter of Ezekiel tells us of the kind of ideas and practices which once threatened to overcome the people of Israel. If these practices and ideas had become naturalized among the Jews, we can form some kind of notion of what a religion would be which would have these for its origin and rule. It is a matter known to every one who cares to inform himself on the matter, that these ideas and practices were denounced by the prophets of Israel, and the teaching of the prophets became the creed and practice of the people. The conspicuous fact about the Jews was their isolation. They did not share in the common religious ideas of Asia Minor. They hated and repudiated those practices and ideas.

In truth, those who hate the supernatural as keenly as Mr. Grant Allen does, have seen that they must account for the belief in the risen Christ on some principles which will, so far at least, recognize the facts of history. Baur and Strauss had some respect to the conditions of the problem, and also to the peculiar position of the Jews. And they endeavoured to account for Christianity by a reference to the traditions of the Jews, and specially of the Messianic hope. They and their followers recognized the ethical character of the religion of the Jews. The unique historical position, the singular traditions, the character of the Old Testament writings, and also the expectation of a Messiah by the Jews,—these and other positions, ignored by Mr. Grant Allen, were recognized by men

like Baur and Strauss, because they knew something of history, and knew what must be done if they were to account for Christianity on natural principles. It was reserved for Mr. Grant Allen to make an attack on Christianity which had for its essential feature an entire ignorance of the religious history of the Jews for four hundred years, and a complete misrepresentation of their whole attitude towards the religious ideas of Asia Minor.

To say about Christ, "Of this personage himself we know really nothing but the name or names," implies a hardihood of assertion at which we can only wonder. It is really impossible for us to argue this question. Where has Mr. Grant Allen been living in recent years? Is he altogether unacquainted with the theological and historical literature of the last eighty years? He has heard, no doubt, of Baur and Strauss and Renan; he may also have come across such names as Harnack, Schürer, and Weizsäcker. I purposely choose names which do not represent what is known as the traditional view. These are men who claim to be scientific, and to come to conclusions on scientific grounds alone. From their writings, Mr. Grant Allen will learn a great deal about Christ. From Schürer he might also learn much—as much, at least, as would keep him for all the future from writing in this ignorant and pretentious way.

Christianity "brought with it the vulgar Jewish conception of resurrection:" so Mr. Grant Allen writes. Let us see what the Christian conception of resurrection is. We have already noticed the reticence of the Old Testament about the other world and the other life. It is a most remarkable fact. The literature of all other nations teems with references to another world and to a life after death. The present life among the nations may be said to be ruled by a reference to what comes after death. The Old Testament, for the most part, is silent about it all. Not until late in their history do we find the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. So conspicuous is that fact, that Professor Sayce seeks to prove that the Jews borrowed the doctrine from the Babylonians, and Canon Cheyne and Dr. Mills seek to show that the Jews borrowed it from the Persians. We do not ask whence they obtained the doctrine; we simply say that the Jews had not the doctrine until very late in their history. What had they in its place? What view had they in early times of the future life? The question is too large to be answered here; but we may see how the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the dead is the complement of the Hebrew doctrine of fellowship with God. The ancient Hebrews believed that they were made for God, that they were to have fellowship with Him. They believed that God was the living God, the God of their fathers. They trusted Him with themselves and with all that was theirs, assured that somehow, they knew not how, and some time, they knew not when, it would be well with them and theirs. They trusted in Him, and were content to leave all the future and the future life in

His hands. They did not even speculate on it, as other peoples did, and they waited until He came who brought life and immortality to light.

Again, the Christian belief in the resurrection of the dead is based on the fact, as they believe, that Christ is risen from the dead. It might easily be shown that the Christian belief in the resurrection of the dead is unique of its kind; that it is unlike the Persian belief in a resurrection, as it is unlike the Greek belief in the immortality of the soul. With the Persians "the body, as soon as the soul has left it, belongs to Angromainyu. The fiend of death, the Druj Naçu, obtains possession of it, and from it she springs on all who touch it or who come near it" (Duncker, *History of Antiquity*, vol. v. p. 214). We are thus brought into a circle of beliefs which have no counterpart in Christianity. Among the Parsees, the belief in the resurrection is grossly materialistic, and has not the slightest resemblance to the Christian doctrine of the resurrection. In the teaching of the New Testament we find that all things are or may be consecrated to the service of Christ. The body is not vile; it is the temple of the Holy Ghost. Man, the whole man, is by faith brought into union with Christ. In virtue of this union, body and soul are both alike made perfect; and though they are separated from one another by death, they remain in union with one another, and will be reunited again. But not as before. The soul is raised to the higher life of the Spirit, and the body becomes a body fit for the manifestation of spirit. The Christian doctrine of the resurrection gives a new meaning to the course of nature, and gives a new significance to our bodily existence. Everything that God has made is good, and He has made nothing vile.

The Christian doctrine of the resurrection means that an endless life awaits man after death—a life in which the whole man, body as well as soul, will have part. No doubt we are not able to imagine, hardly able even to conceive, what the life shall be. "We know not yet what we shall be;" but we believe that man shall be complete, and the risen body will be as fit for the future life as the present body is for the present life. We are in another region of thought, and in quite a different circle of ideas from any which existed in the mind of Greece. For the Christian the σῶμα is not a σῆμα, to use Plato's play of words in the *Gorgias* (493). The body is not a prison or a tomb. The body for the Christian is a real part of the man. It is not something which weighs us down, hinders us, and enslaves us. It is not the source of evil and pollution, as it was to the Greeks. Rather for the Christian the idea of bodilessness is something from which he shrinks.

We must close this discussion. We have not had space to unfold the Christian doctrine of the resurrection. We may refer to the masterly discussion of the whole question by Principal Edwards, in his *Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*. We desire to say to Mr. Grant Allen that he should try to understand what the Christian belief is; that he should discriminate between his own opinions and

the conclusions of science; that he ought not to make statements in the name of science which are untrue. He does not do much harm when he writes, for instance, about "the lucky accident" which happened to the strawberry. But it would seem that writing on topics from the point of view of evolution has begotten a loose and metaphorical mode of speech far removed from scientific accuracy, and but little troubled with a desire to find a true causation. The possible is the worst enemy of the real, and explanations which are only possible are the greatest possible hindrance to the advance of true science.

CURRENT AMERICAN THOUGHT.

NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL. By Professor B. P. BOWNE, LL.D. (*Methodist Review*).—That the natural is or is not all-embracing is one of the perennial contentions. The antithesis of natural and supernatural is one of the most important in our thought. It contains the reason of the opposition of science and religion, so far as that opposition has an intellectual root. The arguments on this subject depend upon a certain conception of the *natural*. Evolution would never conflict with religion but for a peculiar conception of the natural.

When seeking to define the natural, a first thought is to limit it to the world of matter, leaving spirit and the spiritual as something apart. But the natural, as the antithesis of the supernatural, is by no means confined to the physical realm. The reign of law is soon discovered in the inner world, and thus gradually the spiritual also is drawn into the sphere of the natural. Mental movements, as well as physical changes, arise naturally. Life, mind, society, all human activity and progress, are said to be subject to laws as fixed as those of the planets. When this is apprehended, it is usual for it to produce a sensation; an order of law is discovered, and this is forthwith transformed into *necessity*. Then nature is erected into a mechanical and self-sufficing system, and its laws are made self-executing necessities. Then nature is hypostasized as a cause, and, under the form of "Nature," appears as a very able cosmic manager. By this time the speculator is prepared to maintain natural causation against supernatural, and continuity and uniformity against miraculous break and irruption.

But in all this two things quite distinct are confused. (1) The observed order; (2) its cause. That observation reveals only the order of coexistence and sequence, and does not extend to causation, is a commonplace of modern philosophy. The order of being and happening must be learned from experience. The nature of the cause or causes is a problem of speculation. Matter, as a general name for the bodies about us, is an undeniable fact; but matter, as cause, is a very obscure notion, and, indeed, it may well be doubted if there is any such thing. Nature, likewise, as the observed order of things and events, is a perfectly clear conception; but "Nature" as cause, as self-administering system, is a piece of more than doubtful metaphysics.

What is a natural event? As a matter of experience, we find that things and events are connected with other things and events in certain ways. There is an order discernible in their happening and their mutual relations. Such an order we call a law. Among these laws themselves we find a higher order, which unites them into a system. Thus we are led to think of a system of law which embraces all events, and

prescribes to each its nature and position in the whole. The system which embraces all things and events we call nature. In so doing, however, we must recognize that this conception of nature transcends experience. Nature is not given as a systematic whole; only the natural event is given, that is, the event which is connected by rule with other events. Fix attention, then, on what may be called "a natural event."

A natural event does not imply a rigid monotony of events. The continuity of natural law is compatible with great phenomenal discontinuity. We often have apparent departures from the apparent order; but, on closer inspection, it is found that the essential order of law is maintained, even in its seeming infraction. A natural event is one which is comprised in an order of law, and is explained by it. Explanation is of several forms. An event is explained when it is seen to be a case of a kind, or when it is seen to be an implication of the laws which concur in its origination, or when it is referred to its efficient cause, or when it is related to a purpose. Only in the first two senses have we a natural explanation. What lies beyond these is metaphysics and teleology. But our spontaneous dogmatism will insist that a natural event is causally or dynamically explained by its antecedents. The conception of nature as a system of mechanical and unpurposed causation, still dominates uncritical thought.

If a natural event is one which occurs in an order of law, then even the influence of the human will in the physical world is natural. It is not, indeed, something which the physical system produces of itself, but in the total order of life it is a familiar fact. It is also highly obscure and mysterious in its causation; but, as a fact of constant occurrence under certain conditions, it is natural.

The true conception of the natural simply claims that events are connected in an order, and that, when we analyze an event, we find it connected with other events, according to fixed rules. When the rules prove to be well-known ones, we have an event of a familiar class. When the event cannot be classed under known laws, we still believe that there are laws under which it might be classed, if we knew them. Pushing this thought to the limit, we come again upon the thought that all events are natural, or that all are bound up in a system of law which prescribes to each its place and the mode of its occurrence. Thus the natural becomes all-embracing, and leaves no place for the supernatural.

What are we to understand by "Nature" as a system and ground of events? Metaphysical continuity there must be somewhere; but whether it is to be in the system itself, conceived as something substantial, or rather in the ontological cause and ground of the system, does not at once appear. It might turn out that the continuity of the system is not one of stuff or substance, but one of law or plan, so that all things and events, new and old alike, are subject to the one order of law, just as the continuity of a web does not consist in having only the same threads, but in weaving all threads according to the common pattern. All events may well be comprised in an order of law.

If it should turn out that the cause behind the law is essentially personal and purposive, and that the system of law represents only the general form of this free causality, there would be no difficulty in holding that events in general are at once natural in the mode of their occurrence, and supernatural in their causation. The true cause of all things is that supernatural thing—a living Will.

An Irenicon. By Professor G. Frederick Wright (*Bibliotheca Sacra*).—In current discussions concerning the inspiration and inerrancy of Scripture, it is evident that many of the disputants are proceeding at cross purposes. Not only do they see different sides of the shield, but much of the language employed by them is understood

by each in a sense different from that intended by the other. Many who object to the doctrine of the inerrancy of Scripture do not fully take into account the qualifications introduced, and the explanation of terms given, by its advocates. And the advocates of inerrancy do not all of them see how nearly their liberal principles of interpretation bring their statement of the doctrine down to the level of that of the moderate members of the opposing party. Neither do all of the so-called liberal party seem to be aware that, in magnifying the discrepancies of Scripture as they do, they fall into the same error of extreme literalism which they charge upon the so-called conservatives.

A careful examination of representative statements of prominent writers upon both sides of the question readily reveals the basis of much present misunderstanding. When Dr. A. A. Hodge says that the Scriptures convey, "with absolute accuracy, . . . *all that God meant them to convey*," the qualifying clause throws the whole field open for criticism to determine just what information God did mean to convey. Likewise, when Drs. Warfield and A. A. Hodge say that "all affirmations of Scripture . . . are without error," the sweep of their qualifying clauses should be carefully noted. The affirmations are to be "interpreted in their natural and *intended* sense." Here, too, the whole field of criticism is thrown open. The definition is not closed. It remains to determine what is the *natural* and *intended* sense.

1. The doctrine of the inerrancy of Scripture is to be limited to the autographs. But we cannot reproduce the original text. The most we can do is to reduce the textual uncertainty to an inconsiderable quantity. And it is to be noticed that the prominent leaders in the work of correcting the text of the New Testament, such men as Tischendorf and Tregelles, have held very high views concerning the inerrancy of the original text.

2. Some theory of accommodation is held by all interpreters. Conservative scholars have to make large use of this principle. The only legitimate claim they can make to superiority in this respect is that they use the principle within more reasonable limits than others do. As instances, our Lord's statement that the mustard seed is "the least of all seeds" may be cited, or the assertion of Moses that the coney chews the cud. We all assume the principle that the meaning of words is largely determined by the known nature of the subject. The difficulty of agreement as to the meaning of terms largely arises out of different assumptions as to our amount of present knowledge concerning the subject under discussion. In dealing with the morality of the Old Testament, the disputants have different definitions of right and wrong, and different standards for measuring external morality.

3. Both letter and spirit are to be duly emphasized. Few are aware how seldom they interpret language literally. But the margin of error, like the "personal equation" of an observer, can usually be determined with a "reasonable" degree of accuracy. Both the conservatives and the liberals throw themselves open to the charge alike of undue literalism and of undue freedom in the interpretation of Scripture.

The argument upon each side is largely one of degree; but there are extremists who manifestly go unreasonable lengths. The one party insists on the strict letter, in order to bring reproach upon the sacred writers; while the other insists upon it from a mistaken notion of what is real reverence for the Bible. But the extremist need not be considered.

This author makes no plea for universal tolerance, nor maintains that the truth is usually to be found by splitting the difference between two disputants. It is simply his purpose to emphasize a caution against harsh judgments of one another for accepting

or rejecting certain concise statements of doctrine which it requires a volume to unfold. "More attention to the infirmities of human reason, and to the difficulties of making statements in human language so exact that the meaning cannot be misunderstood, will enable the true Israel to draw closer together, and cause Ephraim and Judah to envy and vex each other less than they now do."

DIVINE REVELATION. By J. F. CHAFFER, D.D. (*Methodist Review*).—The fact of a Divine revelation we ought to be able to assume. We posit that when we postulate an Intelligence in this universe other than our own. For if the universe have a Maker, it cannot but be that He shall stand revealed in what He has made. The Spirit of God in communication with the spirit of man is indeed a reasonable assumption. The Being "not ourselves" could not make for righteousness if He could not write His law on the hearts and consciences of men. The moral nature of man demands such a law, and that in itself is the highest proof that the demand has been met. The want is normal, and the supply is natural; and the natural supply should never be put in the category of the miraculous. The miracle should rather be in the fact that, the want once having been met, its supply should ever cease. In point of fact, it never has ceased; for God's revelation of Himself is not confined to any one day or age. It is not limited to any speech, or writing, or book. Revelation is not so much a consummation, as it is a movement or process. God is infinite, therefore the last word concerning Him can never be uttered. Revelation is always conditioned by the limitations of the finite. It is never, therefore, so much a question as to what God has given, as to how much we have been able to receive.

The manifoldness of the *Verbum Dei*, Revealer of truth, and the universality of its manifestations, are not sufficiently understood. It is not limited to one book, but is found in many books. It is not the basis of any one religion alone to the exclusion of all others, for God hath not left Himself without witnesses in any nation. God is in all the ages, among all the peoples, in all things, and manifesting Himself every hour. By "universal," however, is not meant that God and truth have been equally known in all the ages, nor among all the nations, any more than they are equally known by all persons now in the same nation; nor by "manifold" that God is equally in all events, or equally revealed in all books and persons. So long as the gods were simply national deities, so long were the religions but ethnic; but when Jesus revealed God as Father and Lord of all, the foundation was laid for a cosmopolitan religion. That the supreme revelation is to be found in one book and in one Person is no reason why fragments of truth should not be found in many books and in many persons, and in all things and everywhere. We do not rob the infinite when we postulate the finite.

But a universal revelation carries with it a revelation throughout all time. The limitations are always on the side of the finite. But the finite is moving up, is gaining in power to receive and comprehend. If men are increasing in knowledge, it must be that they are increasing also in their knowledge of God. Nature will reveal to us more and more of God, because we are to understand nature better and better. It is not necessary to disparage God in nature in order to exalt Him in His written Word. And the revelation of God in nature and in the written Word, as well as in the Person of Jesus Christ, is for all men during all future time. The book and the revelation contained in it are not identical. The results, however, of recent critical investigation go to show that the treasure is in earthen vessels, in order that the excellency of the power may be seen to be of God, and not of men. It is a distinct gain to know, approximately what elements in the Bible are human and what are Divine, because

the vehicle should bear the burden of the treasure, and not the treasure that of the vehicle. The vehicle that brings to us the knowledge of Jesus is by that fact a revelation. The better knowledge of nature, the better interpretation of the book, and the better comprehension of the Christ, all go to constitute a continuous, progressive revelation.

But is there nothing more? Is there no longer any "open vision"? Is God now precluded by "the reign of law" from speaking to men? If so now, why not, then, always? The reign of law, whatever that may mean, was never less than it is now. We do but discredit the fact of revelation during all the past when we assign reasons against inspiration and revelation now which have always existed. We complain, and with good reason, when men by their theories shut God out of His universe: with still greater reason may we complain when He is denied contact with the human spirit, that He may illuminate and guide it.

No age ever more needed the direct and immediate contact of God with men than this. It has problems to solve such as no other age ever had. That they may be truly and rightly solved there is urgent need that "additional light should break forth out of God's Word" from and in all directions.

THE DESCENT OF THE NEW JERUSALEM. By Rev. WILLIAM E. BARTON (*Bibliotheca Sacra*).—If to the Occidental mind some of the minutiæ of the Apocalypse defy accurate analysis, its three or four leading ideas may be read by him who runs, and about these the imagery of the book is draped. The plan of the book is iterative and cumulative. It is a work of art. It might be spoken of as a magnificent drama. The mistake of the ages, as respects this book, has been that it has been viewed through a microscope instead of an opera-glass.

The leading ideas may be grouped thus: 1. The overthrow of Jerusalem. 2. The downfall of pagan Rome. 3. The overthrow of all the power of evil. 4. Through it all God is with His Church.

The Jerusalem of the old dispensation was passing away when the apostle wrote in the autumn of A.D. 68, but there was even then visible to the eye of faith a New Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, to which would be brought the glory of the nations.

The New Jerusalem is present and personal, not local, or dependent upon external conditions. The New Jerusalem is not geographical; it is spiritual. Each progressive descent of the holy city begins in an individual call, as to Luther, Huss, etc. There is no sort of wholesale social regeneration worth having that overlooks the necessity for individual consecration.

We have transferred most of the Bible teachings concerning the coming blessedness of mankind on earth to heaven. But it was neither heaven nor a *post-mortem* earth that John saw. The New Jerusalem is but another term for this present earth, with its present tides and seasons, inhabited by people like those who at present live here, but under the sway of the Spirit of Christ. It is more than personal redemption. It is social, industrial, and political. To redeem a man is to make scores of relations redemptive, seeing that men live in many relations. That Christ is to reign in human society means simply that He is to reign in the hearts of its individual members, so that they shall manifest His spirit in all their manifold relations. With all these relations sanctified, there will arise a new condition of affairs on earth between man and man, and between man and God. There could be no greater mistake than that God means us to cultivate our religious nature alone, at the expense of every other part of our being. Christ's law commands neither worldliness nor other-worldliness,

neither egoism nor altruism, but fidelity to all interests, and the sanctification of all human relations. The New Jerusalem is not to descend for the purpose of depriving us of the wholesome necessity of working for our living, or relieving us of uncongenial tasks, but to lift all life and all service into its true position of dignity and glory. And there is no occasion for waiting for the city to descend.

The holy city is to ascend from earth, and descend from heaven. Viewed in progress of construction, it seems ascending. Viewed historically, or as John saw it, in apocalyptic vision, it is more exact to speak of it as coming down from God out of heaven. It is even now ascending and descending. There is evidence of this in the collapse of atheism, and the substitution for it of agnosticism, with its altar to the unknown God. There is evidence of it in the earnest thought which men, in the Church and out, now give to the consideration of spiritual questions once passed upon flippantly. There is evidence of it in the impatience of the age with doctrine whose bearing has no apparent relation to character. There is evidence of it in the extent to which Christian principles have come to be accepted as social and business laws. There is evidence of it in the eagerness of men of all schools, sometimes with injustice to the equally important truth of the Atonement, to emphasize anew the vital truths of the Incarnation, that Jesus as a real Being may come into closer union with the lives of men. There is evidence of it in the study of Biblical criticism; and in the social movements of our time. We call it a sceptical age; it is not so. It is an inquisitive, an inquiring, challenging age. It has profound faith in the natural, and none too much in the supernatural. With all its materialism and speculation, it still is foremost among the ages in which men have not seen, but yet have intelligently believed. And therein is a sign of the descent of the holy city.

THE WORLD'S RELIGIOUS TEACHER. EDITORIAL (*The Biblical World*).—Unusually interesting editorial notes begin the December number of the *Biblical World*, and these we venture to combine and summarize.

The universal elements of the character, claims, and influence of Jesus bring Him into comparison with the other great religious teachers of humanity. Was He greater than the greatest of these? In what respect will it enlarge our knowledge of Him to view Him in the light of the life, teachings, and character of other religious leaders? For Jesus is one of a company of religious founders. Other systems of religion have at their centre personalities who give form, motive, and even name, to the organizations. The import of great names, such as Zoroaster, Confucius, Buddha, Mohammed, we are just beginning to appreciate at something like their real worth. Is it not clear that Jesus Himself chose to take His stand among them, to work on their level, from this level to invite comparison with them, and in this comparison to illustrate Himself and His teaching more clearly and convincingly?

Each one of these religious teachers is a part of his own age, both in personal life and experience, and in religious activity. Jesus was no unnatural Jew, out of sympathy with His own times because beyond them. All the great leaders use methods determined by time and place, whether it be Judæa in the first century, or Arabia in the seventh. These teachers all manifest and work in the human relations and conditions in which they are born, speaking in words which their brethren in the flesh can best understand, and to needs which they pre-eminently feel. Wonderful underlying resemblances with these teachers develop more clearly the Christ's relations to them. In much He was no exception, no unique phenomenon. This may seem surprising, but it only shows the wonderful adaptability of the life and teaching of Jesus to the human mind and heart. He is perfectly natural in His dealings with humanity. His

doctrine is not something external, superimposed from without, to which man must adjust himself.

What, then, are the qualities of an ideal religious teacher and founder? 1. He must have the quality of *inwardness*. He knows man in his inmost self, and the essentials of man's need. The springs of life are searched and purified, renewed and directed, under His hand. He acts, He speaks, from the spirit to the spirit. 2. There must be the quality of *universality*. The principles enforced must be useful in all ages. The great teacher brings his religious thought to bear upon all the relations of life, not by specific and particular declarations, but in the wide reach of his maxims, the applicability of his general ideas, and the transparent reference of his precepts and example to all realms of human effort, concerning alike the individual and society. 3. He must be an *illustration* and *example* of his doctrine. The truth which he proclaims not merely comes forth from his lips, it belongs to his life, it is a part of himself. The world demands of him that he exemplify it. Doctrine is most clearly exhibited when it is incarnated. 4. He must have *inspirational quality*. His teaching must be enkindling. A true religious leader fires us with enthusiastic belief in his message, and leads us to the realization of it. He possesses and conveys power. He is a great personality, endowed with spiritual vitality, winning by sweet reasonableness, drawing by irresistible conviction, transforming by the force of example and self-communication to the springs of the inner life.

These four characteristics of the ideal religious leader are not all that might be named, but they are fundamental and wide-reaching. They suggest a helpful and somewhat unique method of study. We may apply these characteristics to the life and teaching of Christ. That marvellous life thereby gains a new setting, grows in beauty through the discovery of the harmonious adjustment of qualities, discloses a depth and breadth not before realized. Or, again, we may measure all these teachers by this standard, endeavouring to ascertain how far they approach it, contrasting them, one with another, from this point of view. Both procedures are thoroughly scientific, and cannot but prove profitable. There can be no question that the outcome will be a fuller and more truthful conception of Jesus.

THE YOUNG MAN AND THE CHURCH. By EDWARD W. BOK (*The Cosmopolitan*).—The pastor of the fashionable city church and the minister of the humblest country meeting-house are alike in one respect—they both want the young man of to-day at the church. But the universal idea of the clergy is, that the blame of not coming rests upon the young man. But are the clergy right in this assumption? Is it not possible that some of the fault may lie with the pulpit, and not entirely with the young man? It is not true that the young men are ungodly, or disrespectful of sacred things. The truth is that very many of them are just as desirous of attending church as the Church is anxious to have them; and we must find out what prevents the association which each desires.

The usual plan of the clergy, who would get in young men, is to announce a series of "sermons to young men," or of Sunday evening talks on "the manly sports and amusements of the day." But this clerical bait does not largely take. They generally mean discourses on the prodigal son or some kindred subject; and the young people are not all prodigal sons, and are not attracted by having to hear about such people. And as to sermons on sports, the young man knows this is only a bait to get him to church, and he is more than likely to avoid the bait.

What the young man asks for is a common-sense religion, a vigorous affirmative religion, to help him meet the requirements of his daily life. He wants to feel, when

he goes to church, that there is a man in the pulpit who understands him, who knows and appreciates what are the problems which a young man must face, and who tells him in a clear, honest, practical manner how he must solve those problems. He wants an affirmative religion, not a negative creed. He does not seek from the pulpit the groundwork on which to build a goody-goody boy, but the strong, honest, fundamental principles upon which he can rear a sterling character. The discourse of the average minister is absolutely uninteresting to the great run of young men. The one point is turned over and over—Be good. But what a good life means is either left to the hearer's inference, or is explained in such a prosaic manner as to leave nothing tangible in the mind. The modern pulpit is sluggish and stagnant. This is the reason why young men will not attend ninety-nine out of every hundred religious services: they lack interest.

It is said that modern absorption in business affairs tends to keep young men from church. But that very fact makes them all the more anxious to hear something really practical and helpful from the pulpits. There are ministers who can draw and interest young men. Wherever they are, young men respond to them, and attend their services in crowds, as they did Ward Beecher's church, and as they do Dr. Abbott's or the Rev. S. D. McConnell's.

It is a lamentable fact that the average minister of the day is wholly out of touch with the times in which we live. The modern requirements are as an unopened book to him. With a tenacity which does him no credit, he clings to the traditions of a generation ago. He lives with his books rather than with men. "We don't expect our ministers to be business men," is the apology usually made for them. It is a poor apology. How, then, are they to understand the needs of the business men of their congregation? Of what value are higher thoughts, if they cannot be applied to material facts? The crying need of the American pulpit is for men who are more in touch with the world at large; in other words, who have an intelligent knowledge of those elements which enter into and form the greater part of nearly all men's lives.

It is not an indication of religious degeneracy that the young man wants shorter sermons than did his forefathers. But he does want them, and he will go where he will get them. In every branch of literature the order is concentration. Space and time are alike valuable commodities in journalism. Why should they be of less value in the pulpit? The minister of to-day must remember that he is not the only fount of intellectual or moral inspiration in the community, as was true a hundred years ago. Men and women are thinking more for themselves than ever before. The minister can better hope to suggest than to teach. Therefore should his sermons be more compact, filled with a living knowledge of the times rather than with a borrowed knowledge from history. The minister of the present cannot afford to be behind the times in thought or method. He should rather be in advance of them. Let him show that he is a man of the day, that he knows what is going on around him, and the problem of the young man and the Church will be solved.

(This somewhat provocative article is certainly also very suggestive and searching.—Ed. Thinker.)

Religion and Wealth. By Rev. Washington Gladden, D.D. (*Bibliotheca Sacra*).—In a perfect social state, what would be the relations of these two? Religion is the devout recognition of a Supreme Power. It is belief in a Creator, a Sovereign, a Father of men, with some sense of dependence upon Him and obligation to Him. The religious life is the life according to God, the life whose key-note is harmony with the Divine nature, and conformity to the Divine will. What will the man who is

living this kind of life think about wealth? If all men were, in this highest sense of the word, religious, should we have wealth among us?

Wealth consists in exchangeable goods. But the popular use of the word is hardly covered by the economic definition; some measure of abundance is generally connoted. The question before us has in view the abundance, the profusion of economic goods, now existing in all civilized nations. If all men lived according to God, in perfect harmony with His thought, would the world contain such an abundance of exchangeable goods beyond the owner's power to use?

The life of the pious Brahmin culminates in mendicancy. Buddhism does not demand of all devotees the ascetic life; but its eminent saints adopt this life, and poverty is regarded as the indispensable condition of the highest sanctity. The sacred order founded by Gautama was an order of mendicants. The monastic rule has had wide vogue, however, in Christian communities, and great numbers of saintly men have adopted the rule of poverty. Many of the early Christian Fathers use very strong language in denouncing the possession of wealth as essentially irreligious. The trend of their doctrine is ascetic, and the germs of the later monasticism are in the words of the early Fathers. The corner-stone of monasticism is the sanctity of poverty. And many good Protestants, even in these days, feel that there is an essential incompatibility between the possession of wealth and the attainment of a high degree of spirituality.

The ascetic doctrine with regard to wealth cannot be clearly drawn from the New Testament; and yet the minds of devout men have been troubled by the feeling that riches are essentially evil, and that some taint attaches to wealth, no matter how moderately it may be sought. And this feeling has been strengthened by the abuses of wealth. It is often difficult for ardent and strenuous souls to distinguish between uses and abuses.

It may be well to resolve this abstraction, wealth, into its concrete elements. It consists in the development of the earth's resources. The processes of agriculture and mining are the foundation of it all. The material resources of the earth readily submit themselves to the process of development under the hand of man. Is it not equally plain that these processes of development have followed, for the most part, natural laws? We are told by a high authority that, "for science, God is simply the stream of tendency by which all things fulfil the law of their being." For faith God is more than this. But if this be true, then those who are working for the improvement of natural products, and for the development of the earth's resources, and for the utilization of natural forces, are workers together with God. In the production of wealth men are constantly co-operating with the Creator. Their work may be, and it ought to be, a religious service.

All religious beliefs assume that the perfection of man is part of the Divine purpose. For the attainment of the perfection to which man is called wealth is the indispensable condition. When man lives in utter penury, from hand to mouth, having no surplus beyond the day's need, his powers can reach no large development. In order that men may realize their own manhood, may fulfil, in any adequate degree, the law of their own being, they must live beyond the reach of immediate want. There must be abundance in order that there may be leisure, that the higher interests of man may be cultivated.

That wealth should exist is plainly in accordance with the will of God; but in whose hands? Religion justifies the production of wealth: what has religion to say about the distribution of wealth? There is a great deal of wealth in the world: are we satisfied that it is, on the whole, where it ought to be?

It is pretty clear that the world has not yet discovered God's plan for the distribution of wealth. The existing practice is far from being ideal. Inequalities so gross as those which actually exist cannot be in harmony with the will of a God of righteousness.

What is the rule by which the wealth of the world is now distributed? Fundamentally, it is the rule of the strongest. That rule has, indeed, been greatly modified in the progress of civilization; and yet still, *to every one according to his power*, is the underlying principle of the present system of distribution.

What other rule of distribution can religion suggest? Dr. Newman Smyth says, "Three socialistic principles have been proposed—to every one alike; to every one according to his needs; to every one according to his work. But would either be a sufficient ethical distribution? What, under perfect economic conditions, would be an ideal distribution of goods? The first principle of distribution, to all alike, would itself occasion an unequal distribution, because all have not equal needs, or the same capacity for reception and ability to use what is received; heaven can be no communism; every cup will be filled, but there may be differences in the sizes of the cups. The second principle may be charitable; but it is not just, as needs are no standard either of service rendered or true desert. The third may be just, but it is not merciful. In a perfect distribution of good, justice, mercy, and regard for possible use must be combined."

The Divine wisdom must follow somewhat closely the rule of the man in the parable, who distributed his goods among his servants, giving "*to every man according to his several ability.*" But ability here is not *ability to take*, ability to grasp, to get, *but ability to use beneficently and productively*, which is a very different matter.

The other socialistic maxims—"To each according to his needs," and "To each according to his work"—are evidently ambiguous. What needs? What work? According to the Divine plan, the function of wealth is the perfection of character, and the promotion of social welfare. The Divine plan must be that wealth shall be so distributed as to secure these great results. And religion, which seeks to discern and follow the Divine plan, must teach that the wealth of the world will be rightly distributed only when every man shall have as much as he can wisely use to make himself a better man, and the community in which he lives a better community—so much and no more.

THE COMING INDUSTRIAL ORDER. By JAMES G. CLARK (*The Arena*).—Our industrial order has reached its last form of life and expression. At the same time, the sentiment of human brotherhood the world over is just rising into the first general expression and assertion, warm with all the vitality and vigour of aggressive youth. More and more the masses are becoming conscious that there is no real "self-preservation," save through an extension of the "first law of nature," until the law reaches out from and beyond and above the mere individual, and serves and vitalizes the interest of all. It is too late to ignore or oppose socialism as an *idea*. Latter-day socialism simply means co-operative interest and effort; in short, public partnership—in the public advantages and wealth-producing agencies of a community. It contemplates organic structure and order that tend to social and political equilibrium—a structure and order which are no less essential to a healthy body politic than is a bone-and-sinew structure to the flesh, blood, nerves, and vital organs of the human body. Socialism is our only escape from ultimate anarchy or despotism.

We sometimes confound competition with *aspiration*—that higher, nobler, and more elastic and subtle quality, which is the soul of true art, but which wage-slave

competition, and corroding uncertainty and dread, tend to paralyze. The competitive instinct is in the travail-throes of a new birth, through which it is to be delivered from the lower evils of animalism and the struggle for physical existence to a plane where it shall take the form of *emulation.* It is certain that economic competition must soon give place to *reciprocity* among the masses, as it already has among the classes. The constant tendency intelligently to conserve and utilize human vitality, must necessarily force this result. Industrial force along every line of man's material necessities—such as production, exchange, and distribution—has, through mutual understanding growing out of more intelligent use of methods and improved machinery, been lifted above the realm of uncertainty and conjecture into processes almost scientific in accuracy of calculation, and cannot possibly reassume its pioneer phase of condition and expression. Competitive commerce virtually expired in giving birth to its last but legitimate offspring, the modern trust, which, in turn, must merge its life in a still broader and final principle of partnership. The central idea involved—the conservation of force—has come to stay and expand, because it is a righteous one, that cannot always be confined to its present narrow class limits. The hour is near when humanity shall arise and shake off the superstition that the good things of this life are designed for kings, nobles, and usurers. The time is not far distant when the municipality and the state and the nation are to be the only "great capitalists" tolerated in a free republic, and simply because they cannot "fail" and become insolvent. Public economy and safety demand state socialism.

The true idea of socialism is given in the following sentences of Herbert Spencer's: "The citizens of a large nation, industriously organized, have reached their possible ideal of happiness when the producing, distributing, and other activities are such that each citizen finds in them a place for all his energies and aptitudes, while he obtains the means of satisfying all his desires."

There is but one true ideal of government for an enlightened people, *i.e.* government of, for, and by the people. This ideal is now struggling for the fresh air, and the light and environment of its new and predestined birth. A nation properly governed is organized citizenship—a complex family, in which certain members are chosen by the whole to conduct the community business.

"There is in the moral, no less than in the physical realm, a central and controlling force, that makes for equilibrium, that cannot long be defied, and from whose ultimate decrees and penalties there can be no appeal. In the physical world the attitude or manifestation of this force is positive, unmistakable, and uncompromising; and hence we adjust ourselves to it accordingly, without questioning its righteousness. But in the moral realm, where man's free moral agency, so called, constitutes a wheel within a wheel, our relation involves experience, and more or less of compromise, governed or moulded in degree and expression by circumstances; and thus the penalty, like the offence, is not necessarily sudden in operation, but may be prolonged through generations, until the infinite Judge forecloses the mortgage."

Socialism is not properly a "system;" it is an "idea." The *expression* of social equilibrium, or equality, follows in its evolution the lines and channels of mental and moral enlightenment as naturally as water runs downhill, or as light follows the risen sun when artificial walls and temporary mists and obstructions are removed.

CURRENT CANADIAN THOUGHT.

TRUTHFULNESS IN EXPRESSION. By A. C. MOUNTEER, B.E. (*Canadian Methodist Review*).—Browning says, "Art remains the one way possible of telling the truth." When a man is most true to himself he is most consistent with the fundamental principles of art. All art is but the unfolding of personality—a revealing to others what the artist is or has assimilated. This is true of the art of expression.

Subjectively considered, man is a trinity; *i.e.* an intellectual, emotional, and volitional being; in other words, man subjectively *thinks*, *feels*, and *wills*. These powers are interdependent. Nature has provided for this threefold subjective nature a corresponding *trinity of means* for unfolding or manifesting that nature. We have three languages, or means of expression, common to all men, viz. the *verbal*, *vocal*, and *pantomimic languages*. The pantomimic language includes all that part of expression which is *seen*, while the vocal includes all that is *heard*. There cannot be any adequate unfolding of personality, or expression of thought, without the harmonious exercise of all three factors in this trinity of means.

The verbal is primarily the language of the intellect. The vocal and pantomimic are more closely allied to the emotional and volitional natures, the activities of which are, in large measure, unconscious and unconsciously expressed. They are the languages of *experience*, by means of which every normal being unconsciously reveals *himself*. The verbal is an *acquired* language. All these languages are "means of expression;" hence they are primarily expressive, not decorative. Each is a language only so far as it performs the functions of a language; *i.e.* only so far as it reveals that which is its subjective cause. That cannot be called a language which consists merely in verbal, vocal, or pantomimic display.

There is implanted within every one of us a conviction, more or less definite, that if the person speaking does not unanimously adopt his own statements by giving them the active support of all parts of his being, he does not mean what he says, and consequently he is untruthful. Nothing short of *unanimity*, or the whole man speaking, can awaken perfect confidence in him. The vocal and pantomimic languages are, by a fundamental law of our being, the direct means of revealing the subtle experiences of the soul. These experiences, when revealed, will either substantiate or contradict that which is verbally stated. So long as we are what we would seem to be, so long shall we give unmistakable and irrefutable evidences of this through the unconscious revelations of the natural languages which God has ordained should reveal the soul. By a fundamental law of our being we are compelled to believe those languages which directly reveal experience, and only those.

By this standard our truthfulness in the pulpit, on the platform, or on the stage, may be measured. Many public readers, speakers, actors, vocalists, and even preachers, allow their vocal and pantomimic languages, either actively or silently, to contradict their verbal utterances of some of God's most sacred truths.

The first duty and aim of the great actor, as well as the great preacher, is to himself experience that to which he is giving public expression. With such genuine experience *present during delivery*, he cannot fail to be effective in delivery. Was it ingenuity of oratorical plan, magnificence of presence, perfection of rhetoric, or unanswerable logic, which gave such potency to the oratory of a Cicero, a Cromwell, or a Gladstone? Add to all these and many more equally desirable qualities the superlative importance of their theme, and have we accounted for the ennobling,

inspiring influence of a Whitefield, a Knox, a Brooks, a Spurgeon, or a Beecher? By no means. That which they spoke came from the profoundest depths of present, personal experience. It was but the unfolding of themselves, intellectually, emotionally, and volitionally, through the three corresponding languages, or means of expression.

There is, as Emerson says, a natural and an unnatural way of doing everything. Then, if variety in religious service is what we seek, there is only one natural way of getting it—get its cause, which is truthfulness. There never was and never can be monotony in truthful expression of thought. With truthfulness there may be as much variety in the expression of a single sentence as in a chapter that is read for the sake of variety. When truthful, the whole being is thoroughly alive to the ever-varying thoughts, feelings, and purposes to be expressed.

WHAT DOES REDEMPTION DO IN THE HUMAN CONSTITUTION? By Rev. A. C. COURTICE, M.A. (*Canadian Methodist Review*).—This is the continuation of an article on "Anthropology underlying Redemption; or, A Psychology of Regeneration, Sanctification, and Resurrection," and deals with one particular relation and application of the writer's point.

Redemption in Christ Jesus through the Holy Spirit is God's remedy for sin—for all there is of sin. The redemptive remedy meets the sin according to its origin and progress and power. Redemption is radically and initially psychological. It is in the *pneuma*, the spirit. Redemption proceeds at once into the *depraved ethical or moral condition* for its renovation. Redemption is also physical. The *soma*, or body, though participating in the sanctification, is not relieved of the sentence of death.

Regeneration is the work of the Holy Spirit in quickening the human spirit (*pneuma*) to life-determining vitality and power. The work of regeneration is in the spirit. It means an opened intuition of God, a quickened conscience, and a surrendered will. The will does not act of itself, it acts under motive, higher or lower. To maintain a holy will, only the highest motive can be allowed: hence conscience is involved. The Holy Spirit's work of conviction is a quickening of the conscience. The fruits of regeneration are assurance, peace, and power not to sin. Let the intuition be divinely clear, and assurance is secured. Let the conscience be divinely clear, and peace is assured. Let the will act under this light and right, and victory over sin is assured.

Regeneration is psychological rather than ethical, is instantaneous rather than progressive. It is the quickening of deadened spiritual powers into use, and not their development by use. It is thus a radical work affecting the very constitution of man. Regeneration is a perfect work *in its sphere*. It is a present, conscious experience, not a sacramental, unconscious deposit in the nature, nor an imputed condition that is not inwrought. But it necessarily introduces a state of conflict, the conflict of a regenerated and sanctified spiritual nature with the yet unsubdued portion that is in the lawless and sarkic condition.

Sanctification is the work of the Holy Spirit and of the regenerated human spirit in annulling and reversing the lawless and sarkic condition of soul and body. The first noticeable point is this: There is a conjunction of agency. The powers of the regenerated spirit can only be kept by use; therefore to prevent the regeneration from being useless, the renewed spirit of man must become a real and efficient agent. The work of sanctification in the *pneuma* is simply growth and development through exercise. The Holy Spirit is also a real and efficient agent in this work.

Sanctification is ethical and progressive, not psychological and instantaneous. It does not effect a radical change in the constitution of human nature, but a reversal of

condition, and a strengthening, an elevating of the whole manhood. It is not presented in Scripture as any conscious crisis of experience, any radical change of nature like regeneration. Sanctification is by a concurrent process of death and resurrection, in which the dominion of the regenerated nature and life is asserted and assured. It is not by the Law, but by union with Christ. It is not through the flesh, but through the indwelling Spirit. Paul's teaching about sanctification may be expressed by three terms: holiness in Christ; holiness without the Law; and holiness by the Holy Spirit. The regenerated, spiritual man is not all-sufficient. The regenerated, spiritual man, must be a Spirit-filled man. Concerning the flesh Paul declares: (1) That it is weak. (2) That it is wicked, therefore incapable of pleasing God. (3) That the flesh is hopelessly lawless. Then he describes the spiritual man who is Spirit-filled: (1) He has no condemnation. (2) He has found a higher power than indwelling sin. (3) He attains to practical righteousness. (4) He is in a condition of habitual obedience. (5) He mortifies the deeds of the body through the Spirit. And (6) the powerful working of the indwelling Spirit through the renewed man brings physical quickening. And so a full doctrine of sanctification leads to the borders of resurrection.

What will resurrection accomplish in the human constitution? The present body (*soma*) is called by Paul "a natural body" in 1 Cor. xv. 44. It is not *phusikon soma*, designating the body as a part of nature (*phusis*), but *psuchikon soma*, designating the body as grounded in the *psuche*, or soul. The resurrection-body will be both animated and controlled by the spirit. Godet says, "The resurrection will not only change the *fact* of death into life, but it will transform the *nature* of the body which, from being mortal, will become incorruptible." Paul declares three particulars of important change. 1. Decay gives place to incorruptibility. All activity wastes the present body, and waste calls for constant repair. It is impossible to conceive what an emancipation it will be to be free from this inevitable decay. 2. Weakness gives place to power. The resurrection-body will be capable of all the service that an active and consecrated and spiritual will can call for. 3. Humiliation gives place to glory. The changes of the body in these important particulars are all due to the change in its nature or constitution, when it yields to the perfect transformation that the Holy Spirit will accomplish.

There is thus a part of our redemption in the perfect spiritualizing of our natures that remains to be fulfilled, and necessarily awaits the great revealings of the end, which will be but a consummation and a new beginning.

CURRENT GERMAN THOUGHT.

SCHLEIERMACHER'S CONCEPTION OF RELIGION. By Archdeacon H. KIESER, Eisenach (*Zeitschr. f. wissensch. Theol.*, 1895, No. 1).—Schl.'s work begins a new era in modern Protestant theology. Every theological school since, friendly or opposed, bears marks of his influence. In the newly founded university of Berlin he was a foremost figure, alongside Hegel, Humboldt, Fichte, Niebuhr, Savigny. His influence was due to the blending in his character of seemingly opposite qualities—delicate mysticism and biting logic, profound feeling and strong intellect, poetical fervour and philosophical severity, all forming a personality of unique force. H. Schmidt asked, "Was Schl. greater as a philosopher or a theologian? Did he belong to the Kantians or Fichteans; to the followers of Schelling or Jacobi? Is he a Spinozist? Is he idealist or realist, empiricist or rationalist, critic or dogmatist?" His chief, although not his only, work was in the field of theology. While he struck out new paths in ethics, philosophy,

and even politics, systematic theology owes most to him. His *Glaubenslehre* takes rank beside Calvin's *Institutio* in epoch-making influence—"a masterpiece of its kind, governed by one thought, and working it out with the keenest logic; the theological master-work of modern times, a knowledge of which is essential to an understanding of modern theological development." Now, it was his *idea of religion* which determined his entire system of teaching; to understand this is to understand all.

1. If we ask—What is religion? what is its peculiar nature? the answer given in the *Reden über die Religion* is, "Feeling and perception of the infinite, sense and taste for the infinite." The meaning of this can only be understood by a reference to Schl.'s general theory of the world. His standpoint is that of strict immanence. The absolute is not outside the world, but "works in it, permeating all its members." Everywhere it pours forth the abundance of Divine life, and manifests itself in an endless variety of forms. Human existence rests on the "combining of the universal with the particular life." Every form of life has its ground in this invisible union, in the "marriage of the *universum* with the reason made flesh." How, then, does religion arise? What is its special sphere? Religion points back to that mysterious act in which the *universum* unites with the finite. "You," Schl. says, "lie directly on the bosom of the infinite world, at this moment you are its soul; for you feel, although only through one of its parts, all its forces and its infinite life as your own; at this moment it is your body—for you permeate its muscles and members as your own, and your thinking and musing set its innermost nerves in motion." Such is the first origin of religion. This point lies outside consciousness, because in it consciousness and object have become one. And this is "perception or feeling of the infinite." This, again, is preceded by a working of the *universum* on us. By these impressions of the infinite the search for the infinite is awakened in us, so that we perceive it and are inwardly moved by it. Feeling and perception are originally one. Schl. uses sometimes one, sometimes the other, of these two terms; but at last the first one holds the field. He says once, "There is no feeling that would not be pious, if it did not rest on a morbid, corrupt state of life." Of course, if everything is a working of the *universum* on us! Feeling is religion, not knowledge. It is neither physics, nor metaphysics, nor ethics. It is only the direct consciousness of the universal being of everything finite in the infinite and through the infinite, of everything temporal in the eternal and through the eternal. Nor is religion action, artistic or civic, for piety has also a passive side. And yet, different as they are from one another, philosophy, art, culture, and religion are inseparably connected; for if in knowledge things are in us, in our reason, and if in art and culture our being appears in them, giving them shape, religion is the sphere in which the finite and the infinite coalesce, the eternal unity of reason and nature is realized. Schl. inveighs strongly against the dogmatists who sink religion in dogmas and formulas. Knowledge is necessary, indeed, but it is merely a description of feeling, not feeling itself. Nor would he mix religion with morals. "Man should do everything with religion, but not from it." Religion is to accompany all he does—"like holy music."

On this view the significance of Scripture, in the sense of the old dogmatics, vanishes. "Holy Scripture is a mausoleum, showing that a great spirit was there, but is there no longer." What are miracles and inspiration? The world is full of them; they are all and nothing—so it follows from the standpoint of immanence. The personality of God? Schl. raises many philosophical objections against it; his view first and last is irreconcilable with the idea. Immortality? He tries to show its dispensableness for religion. The individual is merely a form of the infinite, reflecting the Divine; man must rejoice to burst the limits separating him from Deity.

In later works, *Christl. Glaube* and *Glaubenslehre*, the earlier definition is more precisely given as, "Piety is essentially a form of feeling," and "the consciousness of absolute dependence." In feeling we abide in ourselves, whereas knowledge and action have reference to outside things. Feeling is also described as "immediate self-consciousness," in distinction from the self-consciousness which springs from reflection; it is the consciousness of our own state simply. The absolute cannot appear in knowing and willing, only in feeling, in that identity of ideal and real in which these two are combined, for the absolute is unity without difference. As to the final definition, the changing states of the self imply relations with outward things; we thus become conscious of receptiveness and self-activity. In regard to the world, both capacities come into play. The consciousness that we are not absolutely free, present in all our states, is the absolute feeling of dependence; and this cannot refer to the world, which partly depends on us, but only to God. Thus this consciousness of dependence is equivalent to the consciousness of relation to God. It is not an original knowledge, such as is given in philosophy; it is the innermost, immediate reflection on our form of self-consciousness; but in every clear, perfect self-consciousness there is the absolute feeling of dependence and the consciousness of God, so that "God is given us in feeling in an original way." We thus see that there are differences between the earlier and the later forms of definition. Instead of "feeling and perception, sense and taste," we have "feeling" only. Whereas formerly every sensation was called religious, because in it the infinite unites with the finite, here religious feeling is distinguished from every other by its contents as the feeling of dependence. Whereas there the *universum* only is spoken of, and God appears as the All-One, here God is unity without difference, the unity of ideal and real.

2. The sources of Schl.'s peculiar teaching are to be sought in three places. First, in the Moravian associations of his early life; he never shook these off. He himself acknowledges the debt. In moments of conflict he fell back on Herrnhut teaching. Zinzendorf's mysticism "celebrated its spiritual resurrection in Schl.'s theology." Schl. says, "Piety was the maternal womb in whose obscurity my young life was fed and prepared for the world as yet unknown to it; in it my spirit breathed before it had yet found its peculiar field in philosophy and practical life; it helped me when I began to sift my fathers' faith, and to purge thought and feeling from the rubbish of the old world; it remained with me when even the God and immortality of childhood vanished from my doubting eye; it let me unconsciously into active life; it showed me how, with my merits and defects, I could keep myself pure in my unsevered existence, and through it alone I have learnt friendship and love." The whole of his theology showed the influence of Herrnhut. As there inner communion with the Saviour is put first, so also is it the centre of Schl.'s faith and piety. So too the definition of religion as feeling is merely the expresion of his own religious experience, which he first gained at Herrnhut, where everything depends on the awakening of pious feelings. Again, Schl. felt the influence of the romance spirit in literature. Subjective, immediate sense and feeling breathed in that movement. Friedrich Schlegel was his friend; he calls Novalis "the divine youth."

In philosophy it was Spinoza who made the deepest mark on Schl. Schl. exclaims, "Join me in offering with reverence a lock to the manes of the holy, outcast Spinoza. The lofty world-spirit filled him; the infinite was his beginning and end; the *universum* his only and external love. In holy innocence and deep humility he was mirrored in the external world, and strove to become himself its lovely mirror. He was full of religion and full of the Holy Spirit, and therefore he stands alone and without peer, a master in his art, but above the profane crowd, without disciples and

without civic rights." However much Schl. protested against the charge of Spinozism and pantheism, we cannot get rid of the impression that in the *Reden* the world is only distinguished from God, like Spinoza's *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*; and *universum*, "world-all," "world-spirit," are Schl.'s favourite phrases for the infinite. It is not, indeed, Spinozistic to speak of Spinoza as a mirror of Deity, but it describes a characteristic thought of Schl., who always makes the ego, the individual, a manifestation of the infinite. The absolute feeling of dependence can only exist if God appears as substance, and man as one of its modes, determined by it at every point. Schl.'s theory carries with it the doctrine of determinism.

3. Schl.'s work effected a revolution in the religious thought and work of Germany. The *Reden* were greeted with enthusiasm. Schl. accused supranaturalists and rationalists equally of making religion something outward. The former regarded it as a body of conceptions and doctrines, having no living, original relation to the heart; the latter also regarded it as given historically, and appealing to common sense. Schl. puts it in the depths of the spirit, makes it an essential function of self-consciousness, thus placing himself at the standpoint of modern thought. As Lessing effected a reformation in art by exactly defining its limits, so Schl. did in religion by setting it free from the fetters of metaphysics and morals. Although he founded no school, every school has learnt from him—the mediation school of Ullmann, Dorner, Umbreit; such a unique personality as Neander; men so wide apart as the intellectual, critical Schweitzer, and the speculative Richard Rothe, with his certain God-consciousness and deep inwardness; Schenkel and Schwarz, with their attempt to make the conscience the central religious organ. "If, finally, we cast a glance at philosophy and the science of religion, we encounter everywhere the traces of Schl.'s influence. Hegel's idea of religion was formed in antagonism to him, and many of his discussions are devoted to argument with him. Feuerbach goes back, in a one-sided emphasis of one element of Hegel's conception, to Schl., although he comes to quite different conclusions. The general science of religion was founded by Schl., as he did not make his idea of religion specifically Christian, but drew it from all religions, and acknowledged partial truth in every historical religion."

4. We may briefly allude to some defects in Schl.'s conception. The speculative background of his theory was deterministic—Spinozistic. Where the Godhead appears as all-conditioning causality, as in the *Glaubenslehre*, these can be no question of real freedom. There is a close connexion here between the definition of religion as feeling, and its definition as the feeling of absolute dependence. The latter idea we must oppose on philosophical grounds. It contains a contradiction. Every theory of determinism is wrecked on the fact of consciousness. If I have a feeling, a consciousness of absolute dependence, something is posited above this dependence as positing it. If there is nothing but absolute dependence, this does not explain my consciousness, my feeling of it. The very act implies freedom. With as much right we might infer the feeling of absolute freedom. The two are very closely connected.

"But, strictly speaking, can there be a feeling of absolute dependence? I think not. My actual feeling always has a definite relation, and there is no relation in which, according to Schl., dependence and freedom are not mixed, and therefore the feeling of absolute dependence can fill no moment. And how do I come to such a feeling at all? Certainly not in the way of actual feeling, but in the way of reflection, thought. The feeling of absolute dependence is an abstraction of feeling; absolute dependence, itself a result of the thought, which posits the absoluteness of the dependence, of which immediate consciousness can tell me nothing."

The same is true of Schl.'s doctrine of "an existence of God" in immediate

feeling. "God" is said to mark "the whence of our receptive and active existence." This conception is said to be the most immediate reflection on the feeling of absolute dependence. "But then it is already more than feeling; it is a process of thought, by which the consciousness of absolute dependence arises."

"We are to put the nature of religion in feeling. Let us picture to ourselves for a moment the history of our inner religious life. What are those holiest moments in which we have tasted the love of God, and our soul has risen to heights of glory? They were the moments when, as Rothe reminds us, our soul was touched by the eternal, and the chords of our spirit were smitten by God's finger; they were the hours of holy feeling, when our heart was full of the Divine, full of the love of the Father in Christ; when we felt something like inspiration and Divine revelation. Certainly, feeling marks the sphere of human self-consciousness, in which the individual is permeated by the Divine, and without it piety would lack fervour. And that Schl. brought back religion from arid intellectualism into the inner world of the heart, and that he showed it to be an essential in the development of self-consciousness, is his incontestable merit. But it is not exclusively feeling. If, according to his canon, the nature of a function may be defined by the degree of its rise or fall, and the corresponding perfection or imperfection, then cultured feeling in itself would yield the most perfect religion, which cannot be said. And if we analyze those highest moments of piety, *e.g.* prayer, religious feeling is undeniably the prominent element, but still the idea, though unscientific, of an object is present—without the conception of God the act would not be religious. Moreover, a willing is present—an elevation above the temporal to the eternal, and a self-surrender to the Divine. Is it mere chance that in all religions we come upon a mythology or dogmatic, a series of definite ideas? Does not the idea of God give religions a definite character? Is, *e.g.*, the Christian idea of Father of no importance to piety? Was not Schl., despite his conception of religion, forced to divide religions, according to the idea of God, into monotheistic and polytheistic, and, according to practical willing, into teleological and æsthetic? Is not faith aroused by preaching? If this is so, then knowledge, a conceiving, an objective consciousness, is, if not the nature, yet a necessary element of religion. Just as little is the acting of piety unessential. We find worship everywhere, and no intelligent man will say that it is indifferent to piety whether good or bad acts are done, or any acts are done. What is said in the *Reden* about keeping the moral and religious apart, can only apply to an unsound piety, and must lead to quietism. It is a defect of Schl.'s conception of religion, that it does not go beyond the poesy of devout moods, making religion inferior to religiosity. Knowledge, action, feeling, are indeed to pass into one another; but it is not easy to see why feeling should go on to form conceptions and purposes, if religion were included in feeling. This view has forced itself on Schl.'s scholars, such as C. T. Nitzsch, and from it has issued the further development of the philosophy of religion to our days, some seeking a mode of reconciliation with Church doctrine, others taking the line of philosophy. . . . Certain it is that in religion *the entire man*, as finite, strives after the eternal; that the instinct of his nature leads to the Divine; and that this instinct expresses itself in the three spheres of self-consciousness. Its satisfaction is experienced in feeling, and thus feeling is the primary place in which the Divine enters into the human, but not the only place—with it thought and action are closely connected."

PRESENT STATE OF THE SCRIPTURE QUESTION. By G. VON ROHDEN (*Christl. Welt*, 1894, No. 4).—The following is a summary of the results of five previous articles which discussed various recent publications on the subject.

We have heard very different testimonies from students and friends of the Bible, and would guard against making light of the differences. Theologians of the school of Grau, Schlatter, and Kübel would accuse us of misrepresentation if we attempted to confound their views respecting Scripture with those of Gottschick and Bassermann. It is all the more important to note that there is unity on certain essential principles among all those who do not, with dogmatic prejudice and unbelieving fear, deny all advance in knowledge, turn the back on all scientific investigation, and see salvation only in immovable adhesion to the dogma of verbal inspiration. In this way one may, perhaps, satisfy the wants of small communities whose faith rests on the position that the Bible is word for word God's utterance. But where this faith has once fallen to the ground, or is even shaken at all—and this is almost everywhere the case in evangelical Christendom — all traditional evidences avail no longer. . . . A complete transformation has of necessity taken place in the use of Holy Scripture through advancing Biblical study and the general development of thought in the course of the last century. It is impossible to remain at the naive and dogmatic view since one has learnt what history is, and begun to inquire what historical circumstances condition the rise and development of revealed religion. We have advanced, too, in the knowledge of mind, and understand that God does not work magically on men, but always from spirit to spirit, or by spiritual, *i.e.* psychological, means. Finally, we have come to form a different estimate of the personal element between God and man as compared with material media. These three closely connected points of view—the historical, psychological, and personal—are thoroughly acknowledged by present-day theology, conservative as well as "modern" and liberal.

The *historical* principle demands respect for facts, even if they are adverse to favourite opinions and dogmatic traditions. Whoever thinks that, in acknowledging the legal authority of inspired Scripture, he stands on a rocklike objective foundation, reproaches "moderns" with subjectivism and arbitrary hypotheses. But, in fact, it is the latter who humbly submit to the objectively certain; the former, on the other hand, can only hold the position of verbal inspiration by means of the most arbitrary and subjective choice. In this the modern mode of view has impregnable strength, that, standing on its independent, purely religious, foundation, it has no need to be afraid of anything that can be proved; that it can give full scope to historical investigation, of which criticism is only one part, without any apprehension that really religious positions will be endangered by the overthrow of tradition; whereas those to whom separation from old ways is too hard, because their faith depends on the idea of the absolute infallibility of the Bible, either shut their eyes to the objective state of things or are never free from anxiety as to the results of complete knowledge, and are always tempted to make truth bend to an axiom. But, even in these circles, the historical view is gaining ground, in so far as it is seen that revelation consists not so much in words as in acts, in history, and that therefore the Bible-language really does nothing but testify to this true and original revelation. This growing knowledge makes us hope that, among these friends of the Bible, faith in the Word of God will become more and more independent of subjection to the letter. . . .

The second element is the *psychological* one. Schlatter describes it as a mark of unbelieving, idolatrous Bible-worship, when honour is paid to Scripture not opened and not understood. But it is only opened and understood when we find in it a word of God *to us*. The older view laid the chief stress on this—that Scripture, as such, is God's Word, and would have the Bible regarded as God's objective Word in itself, apart from its Divine effect upon us; as when we speak of the sun apart from its light and warmth. We, on the other hand, conclude from the judicial, saving effect of

Scripture to its Divine character and origin, and hold this proof to be the only decisive and possible one. The Bible is God's Word to us, because we feel that God speaks to us through it. Of course, this does not mean that the objectivity of Divine revelation is put in question, *i.e.* that we deny that it is really God who speaks to us through the sacred writers; we do not dissolve the idea of God's Word into a psychological transaction in man's heart. If I say that the conviction that a house stands there arises only from the fact that the figure of a house is pictured on my retina and in my mind, I do not deny the objective reality of a house outside me. We may, therefore, accept with complete truthfulness and delight the customary position. The Bible is God's Word, although we place the certainty on psychological, or, if one will, subjective, grounds.

On the other hand, as we hear God speak to us within, and in a spiritual way, so we have to think of His influence on the Biblical writers as mediated psychologically; *i.e.* God's communication to prophets and apostles was not simply miraculous, not a mechanical inspiration or suggestion of Divine oracles, the recipient's own mental activity being suppressed. On the contrary, the influence of God's Spirit on the writer's spirit, as even Kübel remarks, is not different from an ordinary psychological occurrence, *i.e.* it takes place by assimilation, so that the new ideas are blended with the writer's own, and therefore never without a certain modification by existing conceptions. Paul apprehended the gospel differently from John, each one on the basis of his existing line of thought. If, then, the writer's own activity is not utterly abolished, the possibility of error is not in principle excluded.

The two former conditions lead to the third and most important factor, the *personal* one, which may be described as one of the noblest gains of modern thought. Religion is exclusively a matter of person; God reveals Himself, in the proper sense, only in and through persons. All religion is propagated from person to person. That we are Christians and have God, we owe to direct or indirect intercourse with religious persons—an intercourse which, in the last resort, goes back to intercourse with the person in whom God was perfectly, in whom He communicated Himself to us in unique fashion, in whom the Word became flesh. The Word of God is, therefore, in the proper and highest sense, God's personal revelation in Christ; Christ is God's Word in the original sense, the Bible only in a derived sense, because it is that which testifies of Christ.

But in any case Holy Scripture is God's wondrous instrument for bringing us into spiritual contact with Christ and the other persons penetrated with the Spirit of God and Christ—the apostles and prophets. Thus we have no Christ without Scripture. In intercourse with these men of God, and looking into their hearts, we are touched by God's Spirit, and hear through their words or writings God's Word to us. Thus the Word of God can only exert its full power on our hearts when it approaches us through men of flesh and blood like ourselves, standing in the same conflicts and temptations. But then we shall no longer require that these chosen men, however elevated by the Spirit of God, shall be other than men, and so liable to error. Even Kübel only ascribes to the spirit of revelation the purest and most adequate knowledge of revelation possible, and the most adequate expression of such knowledge.

When now these thoughts, in regard to the Bible and God's Word, have become the common property of all theological circles, what does a more conservative or free attitude to tradition matter, or the opinion as to whether the idea of inspiration is to be retained or given up? One says, "If I can prove the Divine power of Scripture upon myself or Christendom, I must regard it as inspired." Good; no one objects.

If another says, "I feel only the power of God's Word coming to me in unique fashion in Scripture; I need no hypotheses as to whether this effect is to be explained by special inspiration or not," are we to force such hypotheses on him? About the idea "inspiration" there is no dispute, for no evangelical theologian denies that Holy Scripture is thoroughly penetrated by God's Spirit as no other book is; only the moderns deny the old inspiration view, which made the holding of a certain theory of the origin of the Bible a condition of Christian faith; but Kübel, Schlatter, and other advocates of Bible truth do the same. . . .

No criticism in the world is able to discredit the position, "The Bible is God's Word," just because it has nothing to do with the religious judgment, but only with the matter of fact relevant to science. On the Word of God, as such, no criticism can be exercised, but only on its human form; the Divine character of the Bible, seated in its inner power, is not touched by critical inquiry. And whoever understands the case knows that the unwearied, penetrating criticism of our scholars, so far from disparaging Scripture, on the contrary brings out its true inner glory all the more fully; nay, that all the critical labour on the Bible, such as is devoted to no other book in the world, is one of the most victorious testimonies to the dignity and Divinity of Holy Scripture.

If, then, theology is to remain Protestant, it must advance in the path of historical Scripture study. But the Church cannot keep step with science in this vital matter. Theologians and students must pay more regard to this inability than is often done. The publications of critical theology, especially, should not seem to justify the widespread opinion that their chief delight is in denying and upsetting the venerable and sacred, instead of theoretical, investigation of the problem, how the authority of Scripture is to be retained despite the results of criticism. They should give practical proof that delight in the Bible can only gain by the research of the day. Nothing but such practical proof of the Christian spirit of scientific research will overcome the deep-rooted distrust of the Church of all criticism—a distrust from which even the work of the theological faculties which aim at serving the Church, must suffer.

CURRENT FRENCH THOUGHT.

THE TEACHING OF JESUS. By EUG. BERNARD (*Revue de Théologie*).—In the last number of this review M. Bernard gives an elaborate analysis of the monumental work by Professor Bovon, entitled, "A Study of the Work of Redemption," which has lately appeared. From it we extract the section which deals with the teaching of Jesus.

M. Bovon distinguishes the teaching of Jesus, as given in the synoptic Gospels, from that contained in the Fourth Gospel: in the former Jesus lays especial stress upon His *work*; in the latter, upon His *Person*; and thus the one supplements the other.

The work of Christ is summed up in one word—the kingdom of God; and it is round this central idea that M. Bovon groups the whole teaching of the first Three Gospels. Jesus begins by proclaiming the approach of that kingdom, and thus repeats the message of John the Baptist, the last representative of the old covenant. On comparing one passage with another, we find the synoptical writers using the phrase, "kingdom of God," in three different senses: first, it denotes the company of those who profess to serve God; then that of those who truly serve Him; and finally

it describes the spiritual blessings, present or to come, which belong to those who are redeemed. The Head of this kingdom is the Father, whose special love for His faithful children may be guessed from the blessings which He bestows even upon the evil and unthankful.

The great quality of the kingdom of God is the righteousness which those who enter it must exemplify. The parable of the Pharisee and the publican shows that Jesus condemns the ideal of righteousness held by the rabbis of His day. But did He limit Himself to a rejection of the traditions of the scribes, and go back to the rites and precepts of the Old Testament? Some passages in the Gospels seem to answer this question in the affirmative, others in the negative. In truth Jesus followed a slow and gradual method of evolution—He laid down principles, and disseminated ideas, and left them to develop and to clothe themselves in new forms.

Certain theologians affirm that the doctrine of the mediation of the Son, which is developed by St. Paul and St. John, is unknown to the synoptical writers; according to them, man gains true righteousness simply by his own exertions. Still, it must be noticed that in them Jesus calls Himself *the* Son of man, a synonym for the Messiah and for the representative of humanity; that He allows His apostles to call Him the Son of God, and calls God His Father in a special sense. Further, He speaks of accomplishing the Law, and of salvation being given only to those whom He has "known." He pardons sin and gives His life a ransom for many. It is only fair to add that other passages seem to teach that the sinner can go to God of himself. These two theories, equally authentic, are found alternately in the synoptic Gospels, and are reconciled in the teaching of the Fourth Gospel.

Who are the members of the kingdom thus founded? The natural man cannot enter it. According to Jesus, all men are sinners, and when He speaks of "righteous" He is ironical. The author of sin is a wicked and treacherous being, who takes advantage of evil desires in the heart of man to lead him into sin. A complete change is needed in the case of every one who desires to become "a son of the kingdom;" for this to be brought about, God must pardon, and man must know and accept the Divine Word. The gospel of the kingdom is the royal proclamation of Divine forgiveness. But there are among men many inattentive or prejudiced hearers. As to the sinner who hears the message, he returns to himself, realizes his wretchedness, goes to the Father in penitence and faith, and is reconciled with Him. Each one should undergo this transformation; and those who have undergone it are associated together, and form the Church, which is charged with the duty of extending the kingdom of God, until it is consummated by the return of the Lord.

The eschatology of the synoptic Gospels is not altogether clear. That which is certain is that the righteous will rise again and will enjoy everlasting happiness, and that the unfaithful members of the kingdom, and the enemies of God, will be delivered over to perdition. Nothing is said of the state of the soul between death and the last judgment. The synoptic Gospels speak only of the resurrection of the just, and yet the scene described in Matt. xxv. seems to imply a general resurrection. The parables of the tares and of the net restrict judgment to the professed members of the kingdom, while in Matt. xxv. it is extended to all nations. Neither the angels nor the Son Himself knows the day of judgment. The practical character of the Saviour's teaching is very apparent in connexion with this subject: "Since ye know neither the day nor the hour of the coming of the Son of man, watch."

The Fourth Gospel lays stress upon the *Person* of Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God. M. Bovon maintains the close correspondence on all essential points between the Fourth Gospel and the first three. "Far from contradiction of each

other, they lend each other mutual help: the synoptic Gospels are crowned and completed by the Fourth Gospel, and the Fourth Gospel rests upon the synoptical narrative, without which it would be a building without a foundation."

The distinctive characteristic of the God of the Fourth Gospel, according to our author, consists in the mysterious relation between the Father and the Son. This relation is unique and special. Christ represents God, and manifests Him. He receives life and communicates it to man. Some passages seem to imply His equality with God, while His title of Son marks His subordination. The doctrine of a Mediator, of which the synoptical Gospels give a vague sketch, is here affirmed openly and developed with precision. The statements of Jesus as to His pre-existence are thus explained by M. Bovon: "At the culminating point of His personal activity Christ feels Himself carried away by such a current of life, that for Him, the Representative upon earth of the God of heaven, time and space cease to exist, and without losing His individuality He then identifies Himself with the Sovereign Being. In other words, just as other men have behind them a line of ancestors to whom they owe their temperaments and dispositions, so He, the only begotten Son, draws from God alone His strength and His life."

In spite of differences of form and modes of thought, the narratives of the synoptic Gospels and that of St. John are essentially in harmony. "We can describe the diversity of the two, and their relations to each other, by saying that if in the one we find statements concerning the *work* of Christ, and in the other statements concerning His *Person*, both Person and work remain for ever inseparable, since the foundation of the kingdom of God is only possible by the Divine and miraculous intervention of the Saviour. In order to free fallen humanity from sin, it was necessary for Christ to have standing-ground outside it; in order to effect union between God and man, it was necessary that He should be in a unique sense the God-Man. Thus are explained the apparent contradictions of these narratives; and as for divergences of detail, they only serve to show the incomparable riches of that Gospel which, coming down from heaven to earth as the message of God, answers truly to all the needs of man, because it is intelligible to all, and touches the hearts of all."

THE RELIGIOUS VALUE OF CERTAIN PARTS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By L. FAVEZ (*Revue de Théologie*).—The question as to what use can be made in religious teaching of the early narratives in the Book of Genesis, was raised some time ago in this review. These narratives, as was then said, contain pure and elevated teaching for believers. Yet, on the other hand, as they must have been transmitted orally from generation to generation long before they were committed to writing, they cannot be considered as exact statements of historical facts. How can we avoid disturbing the confidence of young minds in the Divine revelation, without doing violence to the rights of truth?

Many will say that the difficulty here pointed out does not necessarily arise in teaching children Biblical knowledge. It is sufficient to tell the narrative as it stands, and to point out the inferences which may be drawn from it, without raising the question of its authenticity, or speaking of "popular traditions, myths, or legends," or without attempting to give a naturalistic explanation of a miracle recorded. Our pupils, they say, do not start questions of this kind; they do not see the difficulties, they believe in miracles; and therefore to broach to them the questions raised by criticism would be to overthrow their faith, sow unbelief in their minds, and merely perplex them. Such discussions are quite above their understanding. It is evident that this method of simply telling the stories should be employed in the case of young

children; the incident elaborated in all its details will impress upon them the lesson which it is intended to convey; thus the story of the chastisements inflicted on Pharaoh, the passage of the Red Sea, the water flowing from the smitten rock, will convince them of the severity and the power and the goodness of God, and that is sufficient.

But is it not necessary to go a step further in the case of those who are a little older? Are we sure that further explanations are unnecessary? May not a doubt spring up in their minds as to whether such and such an extraordinary event happened exactly as described? Or are not such doubts sure to be suggested to them by others? If they hear ridicule cast upon certain events recorded in the Bible, would it not be well if they were in a position to reply to scoffers, and to save themselves from overthrow?

How, then, shall we begin? It would be easy to set out from the fact that revelation has a religious purpose—that its object is to bring man to God, to enlighten, change, and save him, and not to teach him truths which he can discover by the use of observation and reason. Consequently, we are not to expect to find the sacred writers infallible in matters belonging to this latter class. Their knowledge of natural science, astronomy, and geography is simply in accordance with that of their contemporaries; their accuracy in chronology and history, especially in events long previous to their own time, is dependent on the sources from which they draw. Their purpose being to impart religious and moral teaching, fictitious narratives may be utilized, as Jesus made use of parables, as well as duly accredited history.

These principles being laid down, suitable examples may be chosen of narratives which teach religious truth, but are not to be taken literally. Thus the wrestling of Jacob with God, which is related in Genesis as an actual struggle, cannot be interpreted literally. God is a Spirit, and not flesh and blood. The allusion to the incident by Hosea gives the true interpretation of it. Jacob overcomes by his prayers and tears. (Hos. xii. 4, 5). In like manner, the answer to the request of Moses to see God's glory (Exod. xxxiii. 17–23) is an allegorical statement of the fact that man cannot see God Himself, but knows Him only in an indirect manner by His works, the manifestations of His power and goodness. The narrative of the opening of the eyes of Elisha's servant, and his seeing chariots and horses of fire round about his master (2 Kings vi. 14–17), is a myth or legend illustrating in a concrete fashion the idea that God, though invisible, is ever near His servants to protect them.

In the case of the early chapters in Genesis, and especially of the story of creation, the above principles are applicable. Many attempts have been made to reconcile the first chapter of the Bible with the results of modern scientific research. But all have been in vain; the sacred text has been tortured and made to say the opposite of what it actually does say, and through all the forced reconciliation discord breaks out again. But why need we concern ourselves, one might say to his pupil, with the harmony or discord of the two, since the Bible is not a handbook of geology, but is given to lead us to God, and to create in our hearts love to Him—since, as Cardinal Baronius said, its purpose is not to teach us how the heavens are constructed, but how to go to heaven? What matter if it speaks of six days of creation where scientists demand millions of years, or if in other parts it is not in harmony with the teaching of science? —the essential lessons which the narrative of the Creation contains are not affected thereby; it still teaches that there is but one God, that He is Sovereign Ruler, and that He is distinct from His work, which He called into existence by an act of His free-will, and for a purpose of love.

The narratives of Paradise and the Fall are so evidently allegorical in their

character, that there is little danger of injury being done to the faith, even of the young, by pointing out the fact. In like manner, with regard to the Flood, we may say—It is impossible to get at the primitive fact; stories of sudden inundations of the kind are common in the early traditions of other nations than the Hebrew; but the Biblical narrative differs from others of the kind by revealing to us a holy God, who chastises and creates anew a world sunk in corruption.

In short, our purpose in teaching the young the narratives in the Old Testament should be to impress upon them the moral and religious lessons which the writers desired to convey. Men taught of God wrote these narratives, and, whether allegorical or more or less historical, they are none the less fitted to teach, to reprove, and to correct, so that the man of God may be throughly furnished unto every good work.

CURRENT SCANDINAVIAN THOUGHT.

WHAT POSITION SHOULD WE CHRISTIANS TAKE UP WITH REFERENCE TO THE MODERN CRITICISM OF THE OLD TESTAMENT? By Bishop H. V. STHYR (Danish *Theologisk Tidsskrift*, Bd. x. Hefte 2).—"If our choice lies between the Word of the Lord and the utterances of the newer criticism, which are we to believe and follow?" Such is the question put by Otto J. C. Ottesen, parish priest of Jungshoved, at the close of an address on our Lord's references to the Old Testament, and especially to the Pentateuch. The address is essentially conservative in tendency, and I know that it will find an echo among a large portion of the clergy. I therefore deem it to be my duty to make my own position clear with regard to this question. And first of all, I would say that if the matter really stood as Hr. Ottesen puts it, there could be no doubt as to what the choice would be. But to my thinking, the question is not correctly stated, because the irreconcilable opposition in which he places the utterances of the Lord to critical inquiry simply results from the fact that he reads more into the Lord's words than they really contain. Such a direct antithesis could only be established if it were proved that the Lord had said that the Books of Moses, in the form in which they lay before Him, and now lie before us, were written by Moses, and were preserved unaltered down through the ages; and if He had expressed Himself in a similar manner with regard to our other Old Testament writings. But the Lord never expressed Himself in such a manner. Just as little as our Lord had it in mind to be our Teacher in history, geography, or natural science, just as little would He in any other department of knowledge give utterance to categorical judgments which, with the authority of revelation, should settle questions that in the nature of things must be subjects of scientific investigation. And this holds equally good of the science of Old Testament introduction. It is quite true that the Lord on various occasions uttered words which for all His followers must have significance, even with respect to the solution of divers critical questions; but He never uttered a word as to when the Old Testament writings assumed the form in which they lay before Him.

To make my meaning clearer, I will say that when the Lord, in Matt. xxii. 43, expressly quotes the first verse of Ps. cx. as a word of David, for me it is a settled matter that we are indebted to David for that verse of the psalm, and no matter what strong reasons were advanced by criticism to prove the contrary, I would continue to be convinced that it was wrong. But from this to draw the conclusion that David is the author of all the psalms that go under his name would be a hasty judgment. I might, however, conceive it to be possible to adduce reasons which might make it a

probable supposition that the hundred and tenth psalm, in its present form, is not all through the work of David, but at some time had undergone a reconstruction. And similarly, when the Lord repeatedly names Moses as the one by whom this or that commandment was given, or when He speaks of the Book of Moses, then it is for me a settled matter that Moses has really left behind him a book; and I do not attach the slightest weight to the reasons whereby various critics try to maintain that Moses did nothing of the sort. But on the other hand, I concede, without reservation, that the Lord's utterances on this point could not be used as evidence that our five Books of Moses, in their present form, date from Moses, without having in the course of time undergone any alteration.

I may be allowed to use a comparison drawn from the tradition of the Church. After the light which, for instance, the labours of Caspari have now thrown upon the Apostles' Creed, I think that it may be said that there is every reason for believing that it really proceeds from the apostles, in the sense that its original nucleus proceeds from them. Or, perhaps, one would prefer to say that the original nucleus are the Lord's own words in Matt. xxviii. 19. But, on the other hand, it is an undoubted fact that the Creed has been recited in many different forms at different times, and in different Churches; and it is equally certain that the form in which it is now repeated by us is not word for word the same as that in which it was first heard. And yet no one who knows what Christian truth is will deny that it is one and the same faith which is confessed under all these forms. In like manner, the same holds good, according to my thinking, of the Holy Scriptures of the Old Testament. It would be absurd to assume that the Church for the first time, in the fourth or fifth century, should have obtained a Confession of Faith and Baptism. And just as absurd would it be to assume that the Jews for the first time, at the close of the period of the kings, or even not until after the Exile, should have obtained a "Book of the Law." That they had such a book already in the time of Moses is a reasonable and natural thing to assume, and it receives confirmation for us by the sayings of Jesus. But our faith in God's revelation by no means makes it necessary for us to assume that this Law-book has been preserved unaltered through the ages. It may have had many different forms; it may have undergone many different revisions and reconstructions; or, if you will, it may consist of different pieces skilfully dovetailed into each other. And yet the spiritual contents—that which made it a book of revelation to God's people under the old covenant—may have remained the same. And as surely as we believe in God's government of His people, it must have remained the same under all its shifting forms, but appearing in richer and fuller form, the more God's revelation advanced in the course of centuries. This is most clearly apparent with respect to the Messianic prophecies. The utterances of Isaiah and the later prophets about Christ are much fuller of meaning than the short promises regarding Him in the Books of Moses; but the substance of the one is essentially the same as that of the other.

It is to be hoped that it will be readily understood that from this standpoint I can with perfect ease of mind let the critics do their work, feeling that I cannot in any way be affected by it in my faith. On the contrary, I am convinced that it will yet turn out with the critical work upon the Old Testament as it did with that upon the New. The fierce attacks made by New Testament criticism have, the further the work advanced, betrayed their spuriousness; whilst the learned industry which the work demanded has resulted in the casting of a much clearer light over the genesis of our New Testament writings, and thereby over the history of New Testament times, than was enjoyed by earlier generations.

Precisely similar results may be expected as regards critical work upon the Old

Testament, whatever present appearances may be; and we should therefore not allow ourselves to be tempted to overthrow the work, or to kill it by silence, either from displeasure at theories which annoy us, or from anxiety as to the injurious effect such theories may have upon the unstable, remembering that such attempts will very speedily have a result entirely the reverse of that which is intended. Nay, let the critics do their work, and let us wish them success in it; but let us receive the fruits they would fain bring to us with caution; and, when they come to us with representations that would turn topsy-turvy the scriptural history that we have inherited from our fathers, let us test the evidences upon which they base their assertions, and let us not be contented with their own assurances that what they bring before us are the results of conscientious and careful inquiries.

To return, in conclusion, to Pastor Ottesen's address, I shall now take the liberty of giving my own opinion as to the answer which should be given to his closing question. It is this: Wheresoever we make use of the Old Testament—whether it be in reading it for our own instruction, or in working at it critically with a view to its interpretation, or in practical work in the service of the Church—we shall continue to do our best to read and use it in the spirit and in the way which Jesus and His apostles by their example have taught us, without allowing ourselves to be in any degree disturbed or influenced by the unfinished work of criticism. We shall read it as God's Word, but bearing in mind that it is the Word of God under the old covenant, and can only be rightly understood when it is looked at in the light of the new covenant. And we shall, in our reading of the New Testament, and in our efforts at its accurate interpretation, carefully take into account how Jesus and His apostles understood and used the Old Testament, both when they directly quoted its words and when they simply alluded to them. In so doing we shall find the best and most trustworthy reason for the manner in which we should understand and use it—a reason which will not only lead us far from the old soulless theory of verbal inspiration, but also from the modern denial of revelation. And in our practical work in the service of the Church we shall use the Old Testament just as we have hitherto used it—use its words in our sermons, and use the old Bible story in the instruction of the young quite in the same spirit as heretofore.

As a matter of course, we must be prepared to find this mode of action made the subject of many attacks, and of much derision; but to this we must just submit. It usually happens, in the history of the Church, that after a period of awakening there comes a period of unbelief and falling away. Some of us have had the great good fortune to live at a time when the old Christian faith has had an opportunity of unfolding its eternal power of rejuvenescence. But now it would appear as if a recoil were at hand, and a time in which rationalism may flourish anew. This rationalism makes its appearance in various quarters, but it seems at present specially to have directed itself to the Old Testament, with the view of thereby undermining the New. Naturally, it will give itself the appearance of being something entirely new, of opening wholly unknown paths for intellectual activity; but we, who know that there is only one discipline that leads to salvation, cannot shut our eyes to the fact that it is the same old pride of intellect that is appearing in a new guise, and which betrays its real character by the supercilious tone in which it speaks. All the same, we shall take care not to forget that even times of rationalism are in God the Father's hand, and serve to further His plans. We shall consequently in no way reject or condemn the work of Old Testament criticism as if it were wholly and utterly unbelief and impiety. On the contrary, we shall follow its researches as well as we may, and make use of such of its results as we can recognize to be true; but we shall, at the same time, by no means

abandon ourselves to a new authority by blindly bowing to every utterance that comes to us with a demand to be recognized as the certain outcome of scientific research. We shall prefer to test the grounds upon which these supposed sure results are founded, so that we may be in a position to distinguish between what will really prove to be truth, and what, upon closer scrutiny, will turn out to be loose and unauthenticated conjectures. In a word, we shall take up no hostile attitude towards criticism; we shall only reserve to ourselves our right of counter-criticism in that we demand that everything that one would have us believe shall be proved to our satisfaction, and not with high-sounding declarations that such things are so, but by evidences that are to us both clear and intelligible.

SERMON THOUGHT.

A COFFIN IN EGYPT.

"They embalmed him, and he was put in a coffin in Egypt."—GEN. l. 26.

I. First, it was A SILENT REMINDER OF MORTALITY. Egyptian consciousness was much occupied with death. The land was peopled with tombs. But the corpse of Joseph was perhaps not laid in one of these, but remained housed somewhere in sight, as it were, of all Israel. Many a passer-by would pause for a moment, and think that here was the end of dignity second only to Pharaoh's. Yes, but let us remember that while that silent sarcophagus enforced the old, old lesson to the successive generations that looked on it and little heeded its stern, sad teaching of mortality, it had other brighter truths to tell: "I die, but God will surely visit you." No man is necessary. Israel can survive the death of the strongest and wisest. God lives, though a hundred Josephs die. It is pure gain to lose human helpers, if thereby we become more fully conscious of our need of a Divine arm and heart, and more truly feel that we have these for our all-sufficient stay. Nor are these thoughts all the message of that "coffin in Egypt." In the first verses of the next book—that of Exodus—there is a remarkable juxtaposition of ideas, when we read that "Joseph died, and all his brethren, and all that generation." But was that the end of Israel? By no means; for the narrative goes on immediately to say, linking the two things together by a simple "and," that "the children of Israel were fruitful, and increased abundantly, and multiplied and waxed exceeding mighty." So life springs side by side with death. There are cradles as well as graves. Leaves drop and new leaves come. Thus through the ages the pathetic alternation goes on. Penelope's web is ever being woven and run down and rewoven again. Joseph dies; Israel grows. So the wholesome lesson of mortality is stripped of much of its sadness, and retains all its pathos, solemnity, and power to purify the heart.

II. Again, that "coffin in Egypt" WAS A HERALD OF HOPE. The reason for Joseph's dying injunction, that his body should be preserved after the Egyptian fashion, and laid where it could be lifted and carried away when the long-expected deliverance was effected, was the dying patriarch's firm confidence that, though he died, he had still somehow a share in God's faithful promise. He had lived, trusting in God's bare promise, and as he lived, he died. Thus, through slow-creeping centuries, this silent preacher said, "Hope on, though the vision tarry; wait for it, for it will surely come. God is faithful, and will perform His word." There was much to make hope faint. We have a better herald of hope than a mummy-case and a pyramid built round it. We have an empty grave and an occupied throne, by which

to nourish our confidence in immortality, and our estimate of the insignificance of death. Our Joseph does not say, "I die, but God will surely visit you," but He gives us the wonderful assurance of identification with Himself, and consequent participation in His glory: "Because I live, ye shall live also." There are many ways in which the apostle's great saying that "we are saved by hope" approves itself as true. Whatever leads us to grasp the future rather than the present, even if it is but an earthly future, and to live by hope rather than by fruition, even if it is but a short-reaching hope, lifts us in the scale of being, ennobles, dignifies, and in some respects purifies us. If such hope has any solidity in it, it will certainly detach us from the order of things in which we dwell. The world is always tempting us to "forget the imperial palace" whither we go. The Israelites must have been swayed by many inducements to settle down for good and all in the low levels of fertile Goshen, and to think themselves better off there than if going out on a perilous enterprise, to win no richer pastures than they already possessed. Among the many truths which almost need to be rediscovered by their professed believers, that of the rest that remains for the people of God is one. For the test of believing a truth is its influence on conduct; and no one can affirm that the conduct of the average Christian of our times bears marks of being deeply influenced by that future, or by the hope of winning it.

III. Further, that "coffin in Egypt" was A PREACHER OF PATIENCE. As we have seen, three centuries at least, probably a somewhat longer period, passed between the time when Joseph's corpse was laid in it, and the night when it was lifted out of it by the departing Israelites. No doubt hope deferred had made many a heart sick. "If the vision tarry, wait for it." Surely we need the same lesson. It is hard for us to acquiesce in the slow march of the Divine purposes. Life is short, and desire would fain see the ripe harvests reaped before death seals our eyes. But since a Christian man's hope is consolidated into certainty, and, when it is set on God, can not only say, "I trust that it will be" so-and-so, but "I know that it shall," it may well be content to be patient for the fulfilment, "as the husbandman waiteth for the precious fruit of the earth, and hath long patience for it." Much of the slowness of that progress of Christianity is due to the faithlessness and sloth of professing Christians. But it still remains true that God lifts His foot slowly, and plants it firmly, in His march through the world.

IV. Finally, that "coffin in Egypt" was A PLEDGE OF POSSESSION. It lay long among the Israelites to uphold fainting faith, and at last was carried up before their host, and reverently guarded during forty years' wanderings, till it was deposited in the cave at Machpelah, beside the tombs of the fathers of the nation. There is no nobler example of victorious faith, which prolonged confident expectation beyond the insignificant accident of death, than Joseph's dying "commandment concerning his bones." His confidence, indeed, grasped a far lower blessing than ours should reach out to clasp. It was evoked by less clear and full promises and pledges than we have. The average Christian of to-day may well be sent to school to Joseph on his death-bed.—A. MACLAREN, D.D., in *The Quiver*.

THE INEQUALITIES OF LIFE.

"Yet ye say, The way of the Lord is not equal. Hear now, O house of Israel; Is not My way equal? are not your ways unequal?"—EZEK. xviii. 25.

IF we had to find an immediate and direct answer to this question, "Is not My way equal?" we should be disposed to say, "Decidedly not." God's ways in the treatment

of men do not seem to be equal. From the beginning to the end of life there seems to be inequality, not equality.

Consider, first of all, how men are born. Birth is something so entirely removed from the region of personal responsibility, that no one of us is to be held accountable for anything belonging to it. I have positively no responsibility for being born. That responsibility is back of me, in the keeping of God and His laws, and the parentage through which, as a gateway, I came into the world. And the same is true of every one of us. Yet how much depends on being well born! Some thinking men have said that half the battle of life is won or lost according as an individual is well or ill born. The two ideas of heredity and environment are continually brought to the front in all our modern thinking. A good heredity must be a good thing. A good environment cannot be undesirable. But what a good heredity is, and what a good environment is, admits of much inquiry. We know that children reproduce the features and characteristics of some ancestry, yet seldom is the copy so close to the original as not to leave room for a strong play of individuality. The race of man is a unity consistent with endless variety. The idea of being born well is one that has come more assertively into biographical literature of late than ever before. The transmission of soul seems to be of more importance than the transmission of body. But while to be born well physically is most desirable, yet to be born well mentally and temperamentally is more desirable still. Now, when we examine into the facts of life, how very many people seem to be anything but well born! God's ways do not seem equal in this respect. Certainly not on the surface. There are thousands of children born from vicious parents. Very little chance do these seem to have to be good men and women. Compare their heredity with that which belongs to some of our friends here present, in whose ancestry has been no known criminal of any kind, no unvirtuous man, no impious woman. When we make such comparison, it does not seem as if God's ways are equal.

Take a step forward, and again ask the question when nurture begins to tell. The word "education" covers a very much larger area of life than we ordinarily assign it. We associate the schoolroom with education; but there is more education given in the home, and probably more in the street, than in the place to which the word "schoolroom" is ordinarily applied. The home in which we live, the company we keep, the books we read for fun and not as tasks, all are contributory to education. The word "environment" comes in here. In regard to that, "God's ways do not seem equal. I think of the surroundings of many a young life. Think how poor a place the home is. The opportunities of a pure and wise education which come to some, contrasted with the vicious ignorance and coarse immoralities by which others are surrounded, do not enable us easily to find an affirmative answer to this question, "Are not My ways equal? saith the Lord."

Once more,—the child is born and schooled; educated, as we say, by all through which he has passed in these impressionable years of youth. And now the time comes for sailing out on the ocean of enterprise. One young man finds his boat ready built and ready manned and abundantly victualled, and he has only to step aboard and sail off. A second casts about hither and thither, applying to one and another to take him aboard, and let him scrub decks or do anything, and almost loses heart before he can get any kind of start in life. Things do not seem equal here, any more than in the other stages of life to which our attention has been turned. If only we could have, say men, equality of opportunity, we should not care for other forms of inequality which men are not accountable for, and which belong to the general order of things. But the competitions of life are made more fierce and cruel than they need

be. The laws of society are, "To him that hath shall be given." The talk about equality is only froth and slime on the tongues of politicians. Equality of opportunity does not exist.

And so we might investigate further, and wherever we looked we should find the same evidences of inequality and of God's ways being, as they appear to us, unequal. So far, we take the facts of life as they present themselves to us at the first glance.

Yet the more carefully we look into these facts, and the longer we dwell upon them, the more copiously will they supply us with something suggestive of the necessity of caution in dealing with them. We begin to think in this way: "Let me not be too rash in my affirmatives. This is not God's *perfect* world. This is very far from an ideal condition of society. It is a society disturbed by sin. Men have persistently transgressed God's laws. That changes society itself. I cannot judge of the kingdom of God from what I see in society, every member of which is under condemnation as belonging to a sinful race. So I must be careful in forming my judgments. There are modifications and compensations discernible even now." First of all, it does not do to assume that happiness and unhappiness are in the ratio of external possession or non-possession. There are limitations within which happiness and health dwell, and they are very soon reached. The man who has enough for all the legitimate uses of life is not at a disadvantage. He has no *real* wants. The *artificial* wants of society have nothing to do with the physical and mental necessities of life. Health, intelligence, aspiration, all that is wholesome and good, do not depend upon anything artificial. The disposition in our day, even among Christianized people, to make too much of externals needs to be studiously guarded against when we are speaking of equality and inequality. Has it not come to be one of the commonplaces of existence that poverty is not always a curse, and wealth is not always a blessing? When a child is born into the midst of the surroundings supplied by a luxurious home, he is at a considerable disadvantage in some ways. You say he need not trouble about his future so far as it consists in the providing for the necessaries and the comforts of life. Now, as Christian men and women, I ask you whether you really think this condition, which tends to put to sleep the mental and moral faculties and powers, is one of advantage? I say, then, that that condition in life most favourable to the development of mental and moral character, in which consists the robustness of true manhood, is the most enviable position; and in so saying I expect to carry your assent. Now, if some of these comfortable conditions are not as favourable to the putting forth of energy or the developing of strength of character as are the other less coveted conditions, immediately the question of equality becomes a little harder to answer. I say the more we investigate the facts of life the less disposed are we to say that all inequalities are of the nature of injustice. Often and often the rich man's son becomes indolent and ineffective, a mere lazy loafer on life's highway, through want of that stimulus which comes naturally to the son of the poor man.

It would be interesting to investigate that region more thoroughly. We must leave it for another remark bearing upon the answer we shall give to the question, "Are not My ways equal? saith the Lord." The idea of responsibility comes in here. It becomes us ever to remember the words, "To whom much is given, of him much will be required;" and, "To whom they commit much, of him will they ask the more." These are words not only full of warning, but full of light. There are people in this world who have started in the race of life handicapped from the very first. They have been badly born, badly nurtured, badly circumstanced. Shall God require of these what in justice He must require of many of ourselves? By no means. It

were injustice, cruelty indeed! And so we read, "There are many first which shall be last, and many last which shall be first." "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" asked the grand old patriarch; and we all in our spirit feel that when that eternal righteousness is revealed, the aspect of Providence will not look as it does now. Evolution talks of the survival of the fittest; but the fittest to survive in a very bad state of society may not be the purest and best. Sometimes the successful men of this world are successful because they can adapt themselves to evil conditions; while the less successful have stood sternly in resistance to the evil state of things. The fittest have survived, not the best. The gospel is needed to complete creation. In the march of the myriads over this earth's checkered history, some are trodden underfoot, lost out from the ranks; but then it does not seem so cruel when we remember Him who has told us that He came to seek and to save that which was lost; when we recall how this Jesus Christ put Himself on the side of all, in His day, who were at a disadvantage—the publicans and sinners. When we recall these facts, we feel sure that God Himself is very strongly on the side of all who in this world have suffered disadvantage and loss through no fault of their own. We cannot see now that the ways of the Lord are equal, but we feel a kind of certainty that the disadvantages, the want of opportunity, the sore trials and difficulties, the temptations so terrible which have come to multitudes in this world through no fault of their own, shall not for ever be reckoned against them. The gospel of Jesus Christ is a gospel for all, but it is especially a gospel for the weary and heavy-laden, for the man who has been badly born, for the man who has been handicapped in the race of life, for the man whose chance has been of the poorest. There is a future, and it is not far off. There Lazarus gets his chance, and Dives learns the lesson he refused to learn here and now.—REUBEN THOMAS, D.D., in *The Outlook.*

SUNDAY IN CHURCH.

BY REV. CANON HUTCHINGS, M.A.

FIRST SUNDAY IN LENT.—EVENING SECOND LESSON.

"I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service."—ROM. xii. 1.

1. These words come suitably on the First Sunday in Lent, when we have just begun the solemn yearly Fast. Of the antiquity of this observance there can be no question, though its exact duration at first is not so certain. Yet the fact that Moses and Elias, and our Lord Himself, fasted forty days provides scriptural precedents, which evidently at a very early date settled the matter. St. Leo goes so far as to claim apostolic authority for the Quadragesimal Fast.

2. St. Paul, as his wont is, turns, towards the close of this Epistle, from doctrinal to practical subjects. The text is an inference, "I beseech you *therefore*." The exact link of connexion may be with the closing verses of the previous chapter, or with the end of the eighth chapter, the chapters about God's dealings with the Jews being regarded as an interruption of the argument (Benson). At any rate, the doctrine that we are in union with the Living Christ is the ground of this bodily self-oblation.

3. Note the *tone* of St. Paul's admonition—its earnestness and tenderness. He does not order, but "beseech" them; and as "brethren;" and as an act of thankfulness for "the mercies of God," to offer their bodies to Him.

Let us first look at the different estimates of the human body, which have been taken; and then, at the features of this sacrifice.

I. Different estimates of the body. These may be divided into three, viz. materialist, spiritualist, and Christian. 1. The materialist view of the body in the long run must be, that its purpose is sensual gratification. He does not admit the existence of the force which controls passion—free-will. What is liberty? According to the materialist, "an illusion, everything is predestined" (P. Didon). If passion and circumstances have no barrier, the result is sensuality. If Epicurus was noted for his moderation, it was only that the springs of pleasure might not be too soon dried up. Self-interest is very rarely any match for passion, especially when it is handicapped with the dreary doctrine of fatalism. The sins of impurity which the Corinthians had practised in the days of heathenism, and into which some of them relapsed after they had become converts to the faith (2 Cor. xii. 21); the terrible degradation to which man descended when the idea of God had been blotted out of his mind (Rom. i.),—are evidences of the estimate of the purpose of the body which materialism leads to, viz. that it was, to use St. Chrysostom's words, "formed for the purpose, to live licentiously, commit fornication, and for excess." 2. The spiritualist view is altogether opposite to this. The body is regarded as the great obstacle to the soul's progress. Undue stress is laid on the words, "The corruptible body presseth down the soul," etc. (Wisd. ix. 15). Death is looked upon as "a providential interposition" (Ellicott), whereby the soul is set free from its encumbrances, passes into the sphere of light, and realizes "all the highest tendencies of its being." But as the author already quoted observes, this view lands us in the great difficulty, why the soul was ever encased in this "encumbering" flesh, and, moreover, evidently savours of dualistic error. 3. The Christian refuses to regard the body as the whole of man, as the materalist does; and does not limit its existence to the interval between birth and death, as the spiritualist does. It is not the prison-house or merely the temporary garment of the soul; for in man, matter and spirit unite. Christianity takes a higher conception of the body; it is "for the Lord" (1 Cor. vi. 13). "That it might follow Christ as the Head, and that the Lord might rule over it" (St. Chrysostom). It is viewed as an integral part of man, and death as the dismemberment of his being. The soul has not its subsistence in the body, but in itself; and so, is apparently unlike the soul of the brute. So far Christianity goes with the spiritualist, as to admit that bodily appetites do often become a hindrance to the soul's progress; but, on the other hand, their subdual will further that progress, and when the corruptible body becomes a "spiritual body," it will aid and complete and express the soul's energies. Without the body, the being of man would be incomplete. Further, this ministry of the body, according to the text, has its beginning now, "I beseech you," etc.

II. Characteristics of this sacrifice. 1. When we speak of mortification at this season, the expression is commonly viewed in a negative sense. Such a sense is quite right. St. Paul says, "Mortify therefore your members which are upon the earth" (Col. iii. 5), and St. Chrysostom tersely remarks, "Fast because thou hast sinned, and fast that thou mayest not sin." Of course, fasting is an expression of sorrow for the past, and an act of prudence—to weaken the enemy—with regard to the future. 2. But the text soars higher than this—the body is to be a sacrifice presented to God. Its mortification has this end in view, and mortification then becomes joyous. To deny the appetites, to kill vicious tendencies, to do what you hate, and to cease to do what you love, would be a dismal business, if all this self-discipline were not illumined by a glorious purpose. The soul is, so to speak, a priest, and the body a victim, to be presented to God, because of His "mercies;"

the "impulsive motive" (Liddon) is thanksgiving. 3. A "living sacrifice." Not an actual "mactation," but a mystical one through union with Christ crucified (Gal. v. 24), and "living" because in union with His life (Eph. v. 30). Mortification has, therefore, its positive side, to be traced in its purpose, which is to liberate certain spiritual forces within us, whereby alone either soul or body can become acceptable to God. 4. "Holy." Nothing that is sinful can be offered as a sacrifice to God. Christ's sacrifice, as a ground of its acceptableness, was sinless; so the body must be "holy," and that it can only be when it is the temple of the Holy Ghost—it is "living" through the Incarnate Life, and "holy" through the sanctification of the Spirit. The Apostle's teaching at Rom. viii. 10 is no contradiction to the present sanctification and vitalizing of the body. When he says, "The body is dead, because of sin," what he means is, the body is destined to die because of original sin. It must pay that debt before it can know the power of the resurrection; but the beginning of the transformation takes place now, as a preparation for the physical change. 5. When the sacrifice of the body is presented with these characteristics, it is "acceptable to God," and our "reasonable service." (1) The word translated "reasonable" (λογικὴν) is only used once again in the New Testament, where it is translated "of the Word"—"the sincere milk of the Word" (1 Pet. ii. 2, A.V.), and there are not wanting commentators who would render the present passage "the worship of the Word." There can be no doubt that the liturgical use of the phrase arose from such a literal interpretation. In this way, the oblation of the body would be especially connected with the offering of Christ in the Eucharist, as it is in the English Liturgy, with evident reference to our text, the priest is directed to say, "And here we offer and present unto Thee, O Lord, ourselves, our souls and bodies, to be a reasonable, holy, and lively sacrifice unto Thee" (Prayer of Oblation in "The Communion"). (2) But generally the word is rendered "reasonable," or rational, or spiritual, meaning that, though the offering was material, the spiritual effort made the act a true cult of Almighty God, and not like the offerings of Jews and heathen, oftentimes only formal and external. (3) Again, the word has been explained that it is a service in accordance with reason; (4) or again, that the mortification of the body must be within reason, and not carried to undue lengths, practised, that is, with discretion. Of these, the second seems the most natural interpretation, and it has the authority of the A.V., R.V., and Vulgate.

III. Lessons. 1. To remember the dignity of the body. 2. To bear in mind, especially at this season, that mortification is not the gloomy thing which it is often said to be; that its purposes are not merely the eradication and avoidance of evil, but the letting loose of spiritual powers which can now quicken the body and make it an acceptable oblation, and prepare it for the resurrection. 3. To meet temptation in the strength of these convictions,—that the body as well as the soul is in unison with Christ; and that the body as well as the soul is the temple of the Spirit. Let us, then, train the body as well as the soul for its destiny, by guarding it against sin, and by making it take its share in sacrificial worship.

SECOND SUNDAY IN LENT.—EVENING FIRST LESSON.

"And he said, Let me go, for the day breaketh. And he said, I will not let thee go, except thou bless me."—Gen. xxxii. 26.

1. The life of man is one of conflict. He is ever contending with one or other of the three foes of the soul—the world, the flesh, and the devil. We were signed with the Cross in Baptism, "in token that hereafter" we should "not be ashamed to

confess the faith of Christ crucified, and manfully to fight under His banner, against sin, the world, and the devil."

2. But the text reminds us of another conflict—conflict with God. This is more mysterious, less looked for. Not a sinful conflict, such as Gamaliel alluded to, a resistance of the Divine will, a fighting "against God" (Acts v. 39), but a "good fight," such as our Lord describes when He says, "The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence," is gotten by force. It is a struggle to obtain Divine gifts.

Let us first contemplate the struggle which is recorded in this evening's First Lesson; and secondly, note its typical significancy.

I. The struggle. 1. The Patriarch's condition must first occupy our thoughts. He was in a state of depression. He describes the time as "the day of my distress" (Gen. xxxv. 3). Depression arises from a variety of causes; in this case it doubtless owed its origin to the memories of the past. The sins had been committed long ago, but he was suffering acutely from their consequences. He was "greatly afraid and distressed," as he was preparing to meet the brother against whom he had sinned. It was Jacob's "dark hour." Then he was alone. 2. Solitude intensified the situation. "Left alone" in the night. Amid silence, darkness, isolation, conscience works; as the mind, unoccupied with surrounding objects, becomes retrospective. Joseph's brethren were filled with compunction when confined in the Egyptian prison, and confessed that they were guilty concerning their brother (Gen. xlii. 21), long years after their crime. Jacob, in this state of depression, anxiety, solitude, became aware of the approach of some mysterious visitant with whom he grappled till dawn. 3. *With* whom did he wrestle? There are several answers to this question. The literal interpretation, that it was "a man," some fellow-wayfarer, need only be mentioned to be rejected. There are those, Origen among them, who have thought that this assailant was an evil spirit, as St. Paul tells us that we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against "wicked spirits" (Eph. vi. 12); but the Patriarch would not have sought a blessing from such, or have exclaimed that he had seen the face of God. Again, a subjective interpretation has been attempted—Jacob was wrestling with his own conscience; but it is evident from the narrative that he was struggling with a visible and palpable combatant. Whilst the opinion that it was the Son of God, is one which has the support of the ante-Nicene Fathers. In consequence of the Arian abuse of this view of the "Theophanies," St. Augustine made it clear that the angel of the Lord was a created person, in whom God dwelt, and through whom He revealed Himself. Jacob, then, wrestled with an angel, but the angel was the representative of God. 4. The struggle was not a mere physical trial of strength, but also a spiritual conflict. The Prophet Hosea provides a picture of Jacob as a penitent, weeping for sin and seeking pardon; and he appears to attribute his victory over the angel to his tears and prayers (Hos. xii. 4). It was a crisis in the spiritual history of the Patriarch, an epoch of transformation—the supplanter became the victor. Jacob was taught the lesson that spiritual blessings were not to be gained by deceit and fraud, but by conflict and endurance. He struggled until the breaking of the day, the dawn of a higher life in his soul. The penance for his sin of a great many years' banishment and hardship was at an end. He won the blessing, and though clouds of sorrow darkened his earthly pilgrimage almost to its close, the death-bed scene, the words of benediction and prophecy to the gathered family, as well as rebuke, the faith in God's purpose, which the desire to be buried in Canaan expressed,—all bear witness to the fact that the spiritual elevation which he attained in that night of struggle was more than retained till the end—till the eternal day was breaking.

II. Its typical significancy. 1. Jacob, in this event, is a type of Christ in His

Agony; the points of resemblance are too many to escape notice. We find the same painful emotions in both—fear, sadness, and anguish of spirit—Jacob, for his own sins; Christ, for ours. Again, both were alone. Christ, Isaiah had prophesied, had to tread the wine-press alone (Isa. lxiii. 3). He was withdrawn a stone's cast even from the three disciples who entered Gethsemane with Him. Both were engaged in some mysterious struggle in the night. Both prayed with strong crying and tears (Hos. xii. 4; Luke xxii. 44; Heb. v. 7), and to both the hour of weakness became the hour of victory. Our Lord "was crucified through weakness, yet He liveth by the power of God" (2 Cor. xiii. 4). Jacob became Israel, a prince who prevailed; and Christ became, by dying, the Prince of Life. 2. Jacob, in this event, is a type of the Christian. The Christian has a struggle to pass through. Christ in His Agony was not only atoning for sin, but was purchasing grace for all His members. His struggle is reiterated in them, so that through Him they may be "more than conquerors." Our struggle is not only in the resistance of evil powers, but in bringing our will into conformity with the Will of God. And there are crises of this inner wrestling, as with Jacob. Seasons of penitence are often times of trial and temptation. Circumstances of life accentuate the struggle. Who knows not the hour of fear, of anguish, of compunction, of desolation; and the contrariety between our desires and the Providence of God for us? Jacob points to our resource, "I will not let Thee go, except Thou bless me." The seeming reluctance on the side of God to hear the prayer, has for its purpose the exercise of the faculties of the soul by the intensity of supplication. Prayer has not merely for its end the gift or blessing which is sought, but the wrestling with God develops the power of the inner life, as bodily struggle strengthens the limbs and muscles. The virtues grow through being exercised—the enlargement of desire, the practice of patience, the yearning of hope, the sense of weakness and need, the deepening of contrition, the joy of conquest. The lengthened struggle transforms the character, so that when the blessing is vouchsafed, the recipient has the capacities for appreciating and retaining it.

III. Lessons. 1. To realize this struggle with God, in the process of will-surrender, is no unusual experience in the spiritual life: "His ways are past finding out" (Rom. xi. 33). His dealings with man are unsearchable. The struggle is in the dark. But the Patriarch had the conviction that it was one which would be, if he endured, fraught with blessing. 2. To keep the eye upon the Mystery of Gethsemane, when it is hard to say, "Not my will, but Thine be done." 3. To have recourse to prayer in all trials and conflicts, but let it be *persevering* prayer, not merely spasmodic supplication. There is intensity and persistence in supplication, manifested both in the type and the Antitype. Our Lord prayed three times, using "the same words," St. Matthew says (Matt. xxvi. 44); and St. Luke, that He prayed with such intensity that "His sweat was as it were great drops of blood falling down to the ground" (Luke xxii. 44). 4. Prayer is not waste, even if it does not gain the desired answer. The act of prayer, if it is accompanied with the right dispositions, has always an effect upon the suppliant—a transforming effect, a putting off of the earthy, and a putting on of the heavenly.

THIRD SUNDAY IN LENT.—EVENING SECOND LESSON.

"So run, that ye may obtain."—1 Cor. ix. 24.

1. It has often been remarked that St. Paul betrays in his writings very little appreciation of the loveliness of nature. Its beauty does not seem to have attracted him or to have appealed to his heart. He loved human life. His attention was centred upon it. His earliest impressions—those which are also deepest, were of

town life, with its activities, its varied interests, its thronged streets and marts. In his travels by land and by sea he is bent upon reaching this place and that, so that he might win souls to Christ, and is so absorbed with his purpose that he has no time nor inclination to gaze at and admire irresponsive nature. Thus, when he wants a metaphor, he naturally turns to scenes of human activity.

2. In this Lesson, athletic exercises are used by him to point some important spiritual lessons. The Isthmian games stirred an enthusiasm which, even in these days of sports, we can but faintly understand. St. Paul was fetching a simile from events of which every one knew, and which myriads went to witness. The foot-race was especially popular, and the competition for the prize the keenest. St. Paul, therefore, refers to it again and again in his Epistles and in the Acts (Acts xiii. 25; xx. 24; 2 Thess. iii. 1; 2 Tim. iv. 7, 8; Rom. ix. 16; Gal. ii. 2; v. 7; Phil. ii. 16; iii. 12–14, etc.).

The Apostle here especially alludes to the training, the running, and the prize, as pictures of the Christian life.

I. The training. 1. There is no chance of success without vigorous preparation for the struggle. Some of us may have had experience of this in earlier life. There are rules which had to be observed for development of muscle and diminution of weight. The Christian course is very unlike that which it is sometimes described to be, by those whose motto is, "Only believe." According to the Apostle's account of it, it is a hard tussle, stress, strain. The athlete underwent a discipline of preparation, long before the time of contest arrived. 2. He had to be "temperate in all things." Is it necessary to ask what is meant by "temperance" in the New Testament? We have in one way exaggerated its meaning, and in another narrowed it. It means in the text self-control, and self-control not only in the matter of drink, but "in all things." There were rules of diet with regard to food as well as other things, to be kept by the Greek youth in preparation for the stadium. The Christian likewise must hold himself in hand, and observe moderation in all things—in his words as well as in his refreshments. 3. But St. Paul uses stronger language presently, when speaking of his own self-discipline, he says, "I keep under my body (ὑπωπιάζω), and bring it into subjection." The Greek word means "to blacken with blows," and so, to subdue the flesh with hardship and affliction, and further to render it the subservient slave of the spirit—as we are taught daily at this season to pray "that our flesh may be subdued to the spirit," so that "we may ever obey Thy godly motions in righteousness and true holiness" (Collect for Lent).

II. The running. 1. There is a difference between the athlete's training and the Christian's. The former is only a process of preparation; the latter continues throughout the course. The restraint of the appetites, the subdual of the passions, is with the Christian a lifelong work. In three respects the Christian ought to be like the runner. 2. Both should maintain an onward posture. The heathen looked back, the Christian looks forward. There are two ways, says a writer, of regarding man's day. According to one, it begins with the morning and ends with night; according to the other, it begins with evening and ends with morning. The former describes man's natural life: "Man goeth forth to his work and to his labour until the evening" (Ps. civ. 23); but in his spiritual life "the evening and the morning" is the order—it is a passage out of darkness into light—a light which grows brighter and brighter until the perfect day (Prov. iv. 18). The life of the just is one of progress, as the first quivering ray of dawn expands at last into the glorious noontide. 3. The runner and the Christian should be alike in the intensity of their efforts. There is nothing to be done without pains. Nothing could be more contrary to a life of sloth or of apathy than

the earnestness of the runner. St. Paul graphically describes himself as a runner who is "reaching forth to those things which are before," and "pressing," he says, "towards the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus." St. Chrysostom observes, "Before we arrive, we strive to obtain. For he reacheth forth who endeavours to outstrip his feet, though running with the rest of his body, stretching himself forward, and reaching out his hands, that he may accomplish somewhat more of the course." The Christian's life must be one of effort—effort to resist sin; effort to fulfil duty; effort to maintain the spirit of devotion. 4. The glow of enthusiasm animates both runner and Christian. By enthusiasm is not meant excitement or necessarily emotion. The deepest inward fervour may underlie the calmest outward demeanour. The cold, calculating temperament may denounce enthusiasm as a disordered state of the imagination, but "the great heroes of the world have been men capable of being lifted up by" it. The Christian and the athlete alike are prompted by enthusiastic eagerness to attain their respective ends.

III. The prize. 1. Here the Apostle draws a contrast: "Now they do it to obtain a corruptible crown; but we an incorruptible." What is the successful runner's reward? It is corruptible. That is the distinction upon which the Apostle fastens. The same strikes St. Peter; he distinguishes the "crown of glory" (1 Pet. v. 4) from the garland of laurel, for it "fadeth not away." We must not, however, suppose that to win such a wreath was all that the runner had in view. He thought of the applause which would greet him in the moment of victory, and of the honour which would attach to his name and be handed down to his descendants, if he succeeded. Still, it was all fleeting, all temporal. 2. St. Paul reminds the Corinthians that the crown for which Christians are contending is "incorruptible;" it lasts for ever, and never loses its freshness. But both were "crowns"—crowns of victory. There is another word for "crown" when it is the diadem of royalty. Heaven is a prize: "So run, that ye may obtain." "The crown of life" is the symbol of joy and brightness, of glory and immortality. The garland of ivy or parsley, myrtle or pine, which encircled the brow of the successful combatant, is unlike the crown of glory, because it fades away; but like it, because it is the reward of arduous, persevering effort; otherwise St. Paul would not have instituted such a comparison.

IV. Lessons. 1. The need of temperance and mortification, if we are to obtain the prize of our high calling. 2. To take a serious view of life as a grand opportunity afforded us by God, in which to secure everlasting blessedness. 3. To examine ourselves, whether we have the onward posture, the energetic purpose, the enthusiastic spirit. 4. Finally, to attempt to realize the infinite difference between any rewards of the world, which are "corruptible," and that "exceeding great reward" which abideth for ever, and which shall be given to all who, having laid aside sin, have through God's grace "run with patience the race that is set before" them (Heb. xii. 1).

FOURTH SUNDAY IN LENT.—EVENING FIRST LESSON.

"Now therefore be not grieved nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither: for God did send me before you to preserve life."—Gen. xlv. 5.

1. The story of Joseph is one which possesses an imperishable charm. Though so far removed from us in time, in place, in circumstance, it comes to us every time we hear it with freshness and applicability. It is a picture of human affections and human passions, which the chasm of ages does not alter. It teaches, too, by that powerful method of teaching—by contrast, as we see Joseph's virtues shine out upon the dark background of his brethren's vices.

2. It is, however, on account of its typical value that the Church has probably appointed the history of Joseph to be read during Lent. In him we have "the reflection of Christ's history—the envy, betrayal, rejection, imprisonment, elevation, are all figures of Christ's Sufferings and Exaltation. Joseph was "sent before" to preserve life, and the true Joseph dispenses to a hungering world the "Bread of life."

3. It is not, however, in relation to the Passion of Christ that I am now going to deal with Joseph's history. The words of the text contain a revelation of his character; and, of its ruling principle.

I. JOSEPH'S CHARACTER. 1. He was *trustworthy*. He was always the same. There must have been plenty of inducements, when we remember the kind of men he must have constantly associated with in his home, their deceitfulness and unprincipled conduct—to swerve from true rectitude. His conduct was of a piece—at home, in the prison, at Pharaoh's right hand. We are told, for instance, that the keeper of the prison committed all to Joseph's hand (Gen. xxxix. 22). There was no self-seeking, but a diligent and faithful fulfilment of duty, with no ulterior aim. 2. He was *affectionate*, and able to make himself beloved even by strangers. The tenderness of his heart is manifested during his interviews with his brethren. They had forgotten him, but he knew them. Often in the midst of his humiliation and greatness had his heart turned to the humble home in Canaan. His love was almost Christlike in its forgivingness. When we think of their cruelty to the boy of seventeen and to their old father, their villainy was enough to feed a lifelong resentment; but no, here are the accents of forgivingness: "Be not grieved nor angry with yourselves that ye sold me hither," etc. Never did the flower of charity flourish under bleaker skies, except when the true Joseph cried, "Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do." 3. He was *noble*. There is a kind of affectionateness which goes with weakness of character, which is only in reality reflected self-love. Joseph, had he only consulted his own feelings, would at once have made himself known to his brethren; but his brethren must be tested. It is necessary for their transformation that their conscience should be awakened, and so it was in the dungeon, when they confessed, "We are verily guilty concerning our brother," the cruel, envious, treacherous men were brought to book. The process which Joseph devised with regard to his brethren, not from a mere desire to punish, or from any abstract sense of justice, but for the sake of their moral reformation, that they should taste a little of his sufferings—was not without effect. We see in the picture the cost to himself: "He turned himself about from them, and wept" (Gen. xlii. 24).

II. THE RULING PRINCIPLE. 1. The recognition of Providence: "God did send me before you to preserve life." This elemental truth of religion was his guide, whatever happens "happens through the permission of God." Aquinas quotes, in answer to the objections against Providence extending to *all* things, "Wisdom reacheth from one end to another mightily, and sweetly (χρηστῶς, LXX.) doth she order all things" (Wisd. viii. 1). Some deny the doctrine of Divine Providence altogether; others would confine it to incorruptible things; others to generals, and exclude particulars; others suppose that chance or necessity rules certain things, and that actions which are the spontaneous outcome of a man's free-will are beyond the reach of Providence, and so the evils which we suffer through the misconduct of others have no relation to the Divine purposes. But Joseph had no such defective grasp of the great truth in question. 2. He saw that *all* things, good and evil, came within the sweep of Divine government; and that, though evil was only permitted by God, and the malice of sin which God hates was to be attributed to the doers of it, yet He overrules it to the ultimate furtherance of good. He saw that free-will did not withdraw

human actions from Divine Providence, but that God directed their consequences without invading man's freedom or impairing his responsibility; and so, as he looked back upon the terrible crimes of his brethren, and his own bitter sufferings, he read it all in the light of the Divine counsels, and saw that God had sent him before them "to preserve life." 3. There is a caution necessary, whilst dwelling upon this subject. We must not do evil that good may come. It may be said of Joseph's brethren, the deed was bad, the end was good; so it was, but it did not lessen their sin. Joseph distinctly separates their evil conduct from God's overruling purpose, of which they knew nothing. "Ye," he says, "thought evil against me; but God meant it unto good" (Gen. l. 20). Only as the evils reached him, they were to him expressions of the Divine Will. "If Joseph had not so learnt the mystery of the Divine Will, he would have ordered his brethren to be slain, and would not have loaded them with so many acts of kindness (Drexelius).

III. Lessons. 1. To see all things as coming from God, some by permission only, others by command, but all charged with a Divine purpose. 2. To try to lift ourselves above the thought of the malice which our enemies may have had against us, to that of the "good" which may be brought about through the injuries under which we may be suffering. 3. To pray for an increase of the love of God, seeing that He exercises His Providence in a peculiar way on behalf of those who, like Joseph, are His faithful servants; for "all things work together for good to them that love God" (Rom. viii. 28).

FIFTH SUNDAY IN LENT.—EVENING SECOND LESSON.

"In whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them." —2 Cor. iv. 4.

1. There are different ways of accounting for the fact that when the "gospel of Christ" is presented to them, one person receives it and another rejects it. One answer is, that one can receive it and the other cannot—it is a matter of election. That is the Calvinist's reply. This seems to me to contradict the words of St. Paul in the next chapter, that Christ "died for all," and that God "will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth" (1 Tim. ii. 4).

2. Another reply turns upon the state of mind and heart of the individual. In the parable of the sower, we are taught to look for the fault in the soil. It is necessary that not only God should will for man, but also that he should will for himself to be saved. It depends, therefore, upon the human will. The inquiry which Christ put to the impotent man, "Do you will [or, 'wish' (θέλεις)] to be made whole?" implies this, and our Lord's account of His rejection of the Jews, whom He would have gathered as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, "but" they "would not" (Matt. xxiii. 37).

3. But the Apostle looks elsewhere to account for the rejection of the gospel of Christ—not to Divine election or human depravity in itself, but to the subtle influence of a power working against Christ, which reinforces the bad tendencies of man's nature. Text.

I. The name given to this power. "The god of this world." 1. There are at least three interpretations to this title. One, that by it the Apostle is referring to the true God, and that the blindness in question is judicial. God is sometimes said to do what He permits, as in the case of the hardening of Pharaoh's heart (so Isa. xliv. 18). But this can hardly be here accepted. The designation, "God of this world,"

or rather "of this age," does not seem to be here used in a good sense, but of the wicked world (1 Cor. ii. 6; Gal. i. 4; Mark iv. 19). 2. Again, some have thought that the expression should be taken as the personification of riches, that riches become the "god" of the avaricious man; and so the words would be in line with those of Christ, "Ye cannot serve God and mammon" (Matt. vi. 24). This, though perfectly true in itself, for avarice is a blinding vice, seems to have no connexion with the context. 3. By "the god of this world" it appears that the devil is meant, not, of course, in any demiurgic sense, but as the one who rules in the hearts of the wicked. The expression is only a little stronger than that of our Lord's—the "prince of this world," or St. Paul's "rulers of the darkness of this world," or "world-rulers of this darkness" (Eph. vi. 12, R.V.), especially when we bear in mind how the term "god" is sometimes used in Scripture of creatures and idols (Ps. xcvi. 5; Exod. xviii. 11; John x. 35; 1 Cor. viii. 5). St. Paul, in plain words, points to the influence of the devil, as an evil being, thwarting the work of Christ. 4. From this name we are led to conceive of the personality and power of the spirit of evil, and on "Passion Sunday" the remembrance of this truth is pressed upon us by the commemoration of Christ's redemptive work, upon which we are now preparing to meditate. Passion Sunday seems to lay the doctrinal foundations, whilst Palm Sunday begins the narrative of Christ's Sufferings. The Bible most plainly sets before us Christ's Death as a deliverance "out of the hand of the enemy;" so much so, that it was commonly thought, from the days of St. Irenæus to those of St. Anselm, that the ransom was paid to Satan. When this error was discarded, the Passion was still regarded as a redemptive act, wherein "the strong man armed" was dispossessed by the "Stronger than he" (Luke xi. 20, 21). Our Lord Himself, in the midst of the struggle, revealed that He was contending against something more than flesh and blood: this, He says, "is your hour, and the power of darkness" (Luke xxii. 53). He had already announced to His disciples the impending Satanic onset: "The prince of this world cometh," etc. (John xiv. 30).

II. The action of this power. 1. Satan is the tempter. He appears in Holy Scripture as the tempter both of the first Adam and the Second. Christ now and then unveiled his movements, *e.g.* when He turned to St. Peter and warned him, "Simon, Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat" (Luke xxii. 31). Such language cannot be diluted to mean that Simon's evil passions would get the better of him, nor is it consistent with our belief that Christ is the Son of God, that he should "accommodate" His utterances to the notions of the day, if they were not true; nor again, is the continual reference to Satan's *personal* action in the New Testament consistent with the idea that all that is meant is some evil influence or abstract principle. Evil in itself can have no existence, except when it is found in the rational creature, any more than disease can exist where there is no organism upon which it can prey. Whilst, on the one hand, we have to avoid the error that there are two gods, one good and one evil; on the other, we must deal fairly with the letter of Scripture, and recognize the personality of the fallen archangel who is at war against the Seed of the woman now as at the first—

> "I battle it against him, as I battled
> In highest heaven:
> All, all will I dispute!"

Such is not only the view of poetry, but the teaching of revelation. 2. But Satan is not only the tempter to draw away those who are Christ's, but the hinderer of the spread of the gospel of Christ: he "hath blinded the minds of them which believe

not." In the parable of the sower, we read of the devil coming to take away the seed sown—"the word out of their hearts" (Luke viii. 12). So St. Paul speaks of Satan hindering him in his mission work (1 Thess. ii. 18). St. Peter describes him as the "adversary"—the one who takes the opposite side to every good work. 3. The text reminds us that his powers, however great, have limits. He can only blind those who *will* to be blinded—those "which believe not." Man is not the sport of any power, spiritual or fleshly, unless he wills to be under its control. Satan cannot enter into the heart unless we open its gates (Eph. iv. 27). 4. The purpose of Satanic action is to keep out the light of the gospel of Christ, lest it should dawn upon the mind. Note the grandeur of the description—lest "the light of the glorious gospel of Christ," or "the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ" (R.V.), should shine unto them. To blind the mind as to the truths of Christianity, which emanate like so many rays from the Person of Christ, is represented in the text as Satan's work in "them that are lost."

III. Lessons. 1. To be convinced of the mysterious power of the spirit of evil, and his ceaseless antagonism to Christ and His work. 2. To be watchful against temptation. 3. Not to be surprised at hindrances in any soul or place, where the Name of Christ is being made known. 4. Especially to note the close alliance in the text between the blinding effects of Satan's influence and the spirit of unbelief. 5. To fight under Christ's banner against this foe of God and man, and so not to be overcome of evil, but to "overcome evil with good" (Rom. xii. 21).

SUNDAY IN SCHOOL.

THE RAISING OF LAZARUS.

John xi. 30–45.

The striking thing about this whole story is the Personality of Jesus. That stands forth from first to last as the one great salient fact. His is the principal Figure. It is not merely that He raised Lazarus from the dead. Other men wrought similar miracles—Elijah and Elisha, Peter and Paul. But they did it by virtue of a power temporarily delegated to them. He did it by virtue of His oneness with the Father. With Him the power to work miracles was always present. And as the cause is greater than the effect, He is greater than the miracles He wrought. How will a man vested with such mighty power demean Himself? What relations will He sustain with His fellow-men? What will such a one have to say about matters of common duty, about the problems and perplexities of life? Let us see.

He was beyond Jordan, in the region of Perræa, two days distant from Jerusalem, when the message reached Him that Lazarus was sick. He had been driven there by the hostility of the Jews. His life was not safe in Jerusalem. Yet here was a call of sympathy and friendship bidding Him to return. What should He do? "Let us go into Judæa again." Greatly surprised, His disciples say unto Him, "Rabbi, the Jews were but now seeking to stone Thee; and goest Thou thither again?" Their caution was natural and praiseworthy, yet it made the wisdom and courage of Jesus stand forth more clearly. It gave Him also an opportunity of teaching them concerning their future ministry. "Jesus answered, Are there not twelve hours in the day? If a man walk in the day, he stumbleth not, because he seeth the light of this world. But if a man walk in the night, he stumbleth, because the light is not in him." In

other words, there was no danger to be apprehended, because His hour had not come. No one can shorten by a single moment the appointed measure of his days.

Another point of great interest in this story, as throwing light upon the Personality of Jesus, is the interview with Mary, who "fell down at His feet, saying unto Him. Lord, if Thou hadst been here, my brother had not died." "When Jesus therefore saw her weeping, and the Jews also weeping which came with her, He groaned in the spirit, and was troubled." Why did He thus groan? Was it merely because of His sympathy with these sorrowing sisters? No. He groaned because of the ignorance and unbelief of these mourners concerning the meaning of death; because they thought of God as far away instead of near at hand; and of Lazarus as having perished, instead of enjoying a more abundant life than he ever knew before. He groaned in the spirit because of His boundless pity for these bewildered minds and saddened hearts, who would be calmed and steadied and uplifted if only they could see, as He did, that death, instead of separating us from God, gives us closer access to Him, and lifts us out of the realm of darkness into light, and from the sphere of faith to that of sight.

Let us consider now those sublime words which He addressed to Martha. She was the first of the two sisters to meet Him—the first to say, "Lord, if Thou hadst been here, my brother had not died." In neither case was this a rebuke. It could not have been, if she knew that her brother had died at or before the time that Jesus heard he was sick. It expresses deep regret, but it implies profound faith on the part of these sisters. "Jesus saith unto her, Thy brother shall rise again." She regards this as a refusal of her (implied) request, and says, "I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day." Yet how far away it seemed, and what little comfort it brought to her sorrowing heart! At the last day! That were but little short of never. But Jesus has something for her which is infinitely more comforting than that He draws her thought back from that far-off event by saying, "I am the Resurrection, and the Life: he that believeth in Me, though he die, yet shall he live"—nay, "whosoever liveth and believeth on Me shall never die."

This statement of Jesus, "I am the Resurrection, and the Life," contains two great truths. First, that resurrection and life are not blessings laid up for us in a remote future. They are present blessings, to be enjoyed and gloried in every day. Second, they are secured by union with Christ. United to Him by faith, our life is continuous. It goes on without a break. Death is only an incident—not by any means a catastrophe, oftentimes the beginning of a better and larger fellowship. Christ lost no interest in His disciples by being separated from them. As another has said, "Christ does not think of immortality as we do. With Him, the thought of immortality is involved in and absorbed by the idea of life. Life is a present thing, and its continuance a matter of course; an expansion of the nature now which necessarily carries with it the idea of permanence. Eternal life He defines, not as a future continuance to be measured by ages, but as a present life to be measured by its depth. It is the quality, not the length of life, that He looks at.

And so we come back to the point from which we started—that the striking thing about this whole story of the resurrection of Lazarus is the Personality of Jesus. His is the principal Figure, not only in that little company of sorrowing friends and disciples, but the principal Figure of history, the Resurrection, and the Life. To be united to Him is to live indeed. They who are His are one another's for time and for eternity.—SAMUEL C. BUSHNELL.

THE RICH YOUNG RULER.

MARK x. 17–27.

JESUS was not many years the elder of the two youths who met on the highway as the messengers of their respective kingdoms. One represented human life crowned with spiritual beauty, and holding the sceptre of the skies; the other wore a golden wreath, and bore the symbol of earthly sway. It was a question of precedence. The son of the patrician and the synagogue gave way before the Child of Mary and the manger. We have a study in the gain and loss of kingdoms.

I. THE RIVAL INHERITANCES. It is not difficult to imagine that many noble minds in Christ's time were weary of the routine of treadmill legalism. *Ennui* would drive them to seek some sensations higher than those of sensuous pleasure. "What shall I do, that I may inherit eternal life?" This could not have been a frequent phrase on the lips of the *élite* lads of this period. Here was a free idea beginning to pervade the atmosphere of the community. It corresponds somewhat to a movement which is taking place in France at present in a revolt from the materialism and realism of the age. The New Mysticism it is called. It would not be strange if the young ruler of the Jewish synagogue had made this noble speech with a confused sense of a semi-civil and religious state to be realized among men. He wanted to do and be a sharer in something higher than the social conventionalities and duties of the heir of a patrician estate. The young man put his inquiry about the better life in commercial phrase. He wanted to know how he could inherit this patrimony also. Probably he had secured his wealth by descent, and he surmised that he might secure a double inheritance in the same manner. Just here is a peril in the very beginning of the rich young man's career. He receives that which has cost him nothing. There is no sharp spur on the start to rouse to noble effort. The young man knew the Decalogue, but he had not been trained either as to the administration of his money or as to the conditions of eternal life. The material mass in hand will outweigh the spiritual paradise in the bush, unless there has been some earnest teaching and trading goods for God in early days. It was evident that the coils of wealth had their rings welded around the heart of this inquirer. He knew values, but he had no standard by which to measure eternal life.

II. THE APPLICATION OF A FAR-REACHING TEST. At first it seemed as though the obedient youth was going to get a victory. He fulfilled the first conditions. The preliminary examination passed off well. This, however, only left more apparent and serious the things lacking. The platform of the commandments could not be raised high enough to reach to eternal life. We build up our little staging a few feet into the air out of our virtues, and Christ commends this so far; but it really does not take us any perceptible way toward eternal life. Incompleted buildings are often ruins as well as those which have been swept down by the storm. Covetousness had become a cancer in the life of this young ruler, and Christ cut clear around the outer roots of the cyst. Many pleasant people in our churches and Sunday schools are ready to respond to appeals for help and service, but it is well understood that certain things are to be left in abeyance. A frank confession of discipleship, or sacrifice of a harmful habit, is not secured. Jesus asked that the critical subject of controversy in the heart be decided. This was not some artificial test, but one which would affect the whole nature. Peace of mind does not follow till some adjustment of these matters is effected in the soul. We shall find that there are vital things in character which the Saviour always calls for, whether at the start or later on in the journey of life. There was a

double test required. Not only the possession must be parted with, but the inquirer was to follow Christ. There is no room to doubt that Jesus intended a literal fulfilment of the command to part with his possessions in the case of the young man. They may have been wrongfully acquired, and in a way that carried a tainting influence in the blood of their inheritors. But more than all was the purpose to rouse the man, to seal his soul to the highest love of which it was capable. With us all the same requirement may be exemplified in many ways. It was the gold trust which Christ would fain break in men's hearts. It was the gold rust which He would remove from the spirit which aspired to eternal life; the gold lust which He replaced with the throbbing love for Himself.

III. Loved, but lacking. From this example of sacrifice for eternal life the young man turned away sorrowfully. He preferred his money to the friendship of the Man of sorrows. It was not only the ruler who was sorrowful; Christ was so also. Men are yet loved who are lacking. They may even be loved and lost.—William R. Campbell.

ZACCHÆUS THE PUBLICAN.

Luke xix. 1–10.

I. The earnest seeker after truth. Such was Zacchæus. He was determined to see the One of whom he had heard so much. There was more than curiosity in his eagerness. He was a Jew, yet despised by his race. He was rich and in high official position, but was unsatisfied. His shortness of stature was his lack. He was a small man looking for great things. Against ridicule and annoyances he persisted in his purpose. The earnestness of the man is manifest in the recognition given him by Christ. No mere curiosity-seeker would have been greeted as was he. No unearnest man would have been saluted by the Master as His host for the day. Christ would not cast His presence upon those who mocked. The Divine choice does not always fall upon the sons of Anak.

II. The discernment of Christ. One cannot read the life of Christ without observing His knowledge of those He met. He surprised Nathanael by His knowledge of him, but the same characteristic was always manifest. It was more than a fortuitous meeting that has given us the history of the woman of Samaria at Jacob's well. He read the hearts of those who knew it not. Zacchæus was measured in Jesus' glance. He was a son of Abraham, but the sons of Abraham hated him. He had been a cheating official, but above all his wrong-doings Christ saw the desire for something better. The quick glance took in the importance of this desire to become a better man. The love of Christ was manifested in His going to the publican's house. Because of such a condescension the hatred shown the tax-gatherer was turned against Christ. The Redeemer was taking upon Himself the sins of Zacchæus. He was bearing the reproaches of such a sinner. The Saviour was in his house. He had made the sinner's case His own. It must have been a strange delight to have the great Teacher for a Guest. All Jericho was moved; much more so Zacchæus. The King was at the table, yet His glory was not fully revealed.

III. The murmuring multitudes. They hated Zacchæus, and they complained of Christ. This incident reveals a universal characteristic of society; no one can possibly live apart from others and beyond their judgment. The more seclusive the individual, the more emphatic the expressions of judgment among the multitudes. Great characters must always be lonely, but the tens of thousands will not let such alone. It is impossible to conceive a more lonely character than Christ in all history.

No one understood either Him or His mission. His plainest words were often distorted. It was thus the crowds of Jericho greeted Him as He passed through their town. The moment He called Zacchæus their murmurings began. They condemned Him for the deed of love and mercy. This same characteristic is shown towards individuals among men. The multitudes are the self-appointed jury for every one, passing upon every act. No one escapes. It is therefore no wonder that Jesus and Zacchæus were each made to feel the indignation of their judgment. The crowd outside were finding fault while within all was peace. Old things in that house had passed away; all things had become new. We do not read or infer that Zacchæus gave up his office of tax-collector, but he became a new man.

IV. THE PRACTICAL FRUITS OF THE NEW LIFE. The salvation that had come to the house of Zacchæus was proven in its fruits. The cost of his repentance was heavier than most men would have paid. Men will do what their hearts prompt. Genuine piety will produce generous conduct. The heart open to the love of God will despise false dealings with its fellow-men. New motives had come to Zacchæus. The companionship with the Son of God had wrought a marvellous change. Ill-gotten gains do not grow sacred by the keeping. Zacchæus, the new man, had the power to undo a portion of his former deeds, and his action was taken. There are things that cannot be undone. Hurtful insinuations cannot be recalled. Has the nineteenth century improved upon his methods? In the complex lessons of this event one more prominent than the rest is evident; namely, salvation belongs to the life. Zacchæus was what he did, because he acted from the heart. We cannot divorce faith in God from its necessary fruits among men.—DAVID O. MEARS.

PURITY OF LIFE.

ROM. xiii. 8–14.

WE are accustomed to think of St. Paul as the doctrinal teacher of Christianity. The scheme of "justification by faith" has in this Epistle its statement, explanation, and proof. Beneath the intellectual movement a warm heart beats, occasionally showing itself in some loving, practical word, which cannot wait for utterance till the close of his argument. In this passage the fact is made plain that love has a rightful twofold exercise. It is cherished toward others and toward self. Religion is commonly set forth as summed up in the modern word "altruism," or otherism. Service of self is suspected as wholly evil. Failure to discriminate between a reasonable and wrong self-regard results in serious rejection of Christian truth. Scholar, artist, merchant, must be impelled by the motive of self-advancement. The apostle here dwells on the *thy* and the *us*, and the debt we owe each. Obedient, then, to its letter and spirit, when regarding our neighbour (vers. 8–10) we should seek—

I. HIS BODILY WELFARE. The sixth commandment surely had need to be given if life were to be valued. Men at the first were very close to savagery. It has always been easy for one to slay his fellow. To exhort a Christian to respect another's life seems quite like insult. Of course, he does! But this means more than refraining from violence towards him. It involves keeping him well and strong. It stands for the hospital, the improved dwelling-house, the best sanitary conditions, generous and wholesome supplies of food, leisure for relaxation. The distinction between a blow with a club and one by an uncharitable act is not great if thereby one perishes.

II. HIS MORAL WELFARE. The sin of unchastity was most glaring in the social life of the empire when these admonitions were given. The sanctity of marriage was

almost unknown. Ethical maxims abounded, but they were words only. With the greatest difficulty, the historian tells us, could ancient Rome maintain the order of Six Vestal Virgins. But the early Church was conspicuous for its purity, in spite of sad lapses among its members. By this very virtue it won speedy victories. The immaculate life of its Founder was a constant inspiration and example.

III. His material welfare. "Thou shalt not steal;" "Thou shalt not covet" —rules familiar from our earliest childhood. Do they still need to be repeated? Turning now to consider what is due on the part of love toward self, we are taught (vers. 11–14) that we owe to it: 1. Diligence. Love for self, furthermore, will lead one to exercise toward it: 2. Denial. That seems like contradiction. It is not. Indulgence is often the worst enemy body or soul can have. It belongs to the nobility of the town of Vanity Fair, where Christian came near losing his life.—De Witt Clark.

THE BOOK CRITIC.

PERSONALITY, HUMAN AND DIVINE: being the Bampton Lectures for the Year 1894. By J. R. Illingworth, M.A. Macmillan and Co. 1894.

Mr. Illingworth's work is an interesting, able, and timely contribution to the discussion of a subject which is by no means unlikely to attract considerable attention in the near future. One of the most pleasing features of the book is its easy and clear style; this, indeed, may induce some readers, not otherwise eager, to peruse and, one would hope, to ponder its pages. Another prominent feature is to be found in the distinct plan which the author carries out. No one lecture can be taken altogether apart from the others; the final conclusions are deduced from the facts presented in the course of the argument as a whole, and are enforced by the cumulative influence of the varied incidental evidences. Without delaying to notice its central place in man's experience, Mr. Illingworth at once proceeds to delineate the gradual growth of the recognition of human personality, and points out that this method is essential to his scheme. "Our reason for dwelling on this process, by which man has gradually arrived at the knowledge of his own personality, its range, its limits and its scope, is twofold. In the first place, it is a needful prelude to the description of personality itself. Personality cannot be exhaustively analyzed, and cannot, therefore, be accurately defined. It can only be described from observation. And in describing anything which has a history, that history must be taken into account as constituting part of the full meaning of the thing. And in the second place, the appeal to history is especially necessitated by the character of the inquiry which we have in hand, since the fact that human personality has been a thing of slow development, and its conscious recognition of itself slower still, must have an important bearing upon the inference from the nature of man to the nature of God" (p. 23). Then follows a "description" of the varied aspects of human personality—intellect, will, feeling. The plan of the work presents a real weakness at this point. The omission of anything like an adequate consideration of human personality as the one operative power in experience greatly reduces the force of the later application of it to history.

Having considered man's nature, the Bampton Lecturer then proceeds to analyze the development of the recognition of Divine Personality. In the course of this inquiry, several points are excellently made. The place accorded to the Hebrew prophets is noteworthy; Mr. Illingworth exhibits far less bias here than is customary

with the adherents of his theological school. The attempt to reduce Judaism to the level of a one-sided and ultimately pessimistic religious manifestation is conspicuous by its absence, and the recognition of the essentially personal nature of the Hebrew Deity effectually excludes that false notion of "aloofness" so often attributed to the Jewish view by the speculative theologians who follow Hegel. "The Hebrew prophets, from Moses onwards, with their superior hold upon morality, which is the very nerve of personality, purified their popular religion, but without losing themselves in abstractions; and it is a mere travesty of criticism to speak of their God as an impersonal tendency" (pp. 65, 66). The only chapter in the book which can in any sense be termed belated is the fourth, where the conception of Deity is subjected to analysis. Too much attention is bestowed upon the old quasi-proofs, and, perhaps, the "moral" proof is too sharply separated from the ontological. Having thus cleared the ground, Mr. Illingworth brings his conceptions of human and Divine personality to a unity, and, in a remarkable essay, contends that this unity must be ethical. God and man can communicate with one another only so far as both are persons. In this manner the conclusion is reached that man's personality is itself "supernatural," as truly as the "Divine Person in whom alone it finds its home" (p. 137).

So far the inquiry has been mainly theoretical, although naturally trenching upon many practical considerations. In the three closing lectures Mr. Illingworth goes on to apply his results. He first gleans the prehistoric period of religion, and finds in it, with most justly balanced judgment, nothing positively contradictory of his premisses, little or no basis for a theory of religion involving such contradictions, and some few corroborating circumstances, as, for example, the universal mystic tendency (cf. p. 163). A transition then takes place to the great historical religions. Here, once more, the candour and sober judgment of the lecturer appear. His acceptance of modern results, and his altogether true reading of their implications for Christian theology are pleasing features. A disproportionately large place is accorded to the Old Testament, but the writer had limits to observe, and his analysis of the lessons of pre-Christian religion (cf. p. 169, *et seq.*) may be taken as fair compensation. To this point the tendency of the argument as a whole has been to concentrate attention upon the expectation of a revelation. God and man being alike personal, man could not but anticipate a direct communication from Deity, and this the history of religion seems to prove. Accordingly, in the closing lecture, all the premonitions are marshalled to indicate conclusively that "the line of thought which we have been pursuing leads us on to the Incarnation, as the adequate and final revelation of the personality of God" (p. 192), and that "the actual Trinity of God explains the potential trinity of man; and our anthropomorphic language follows from our theomorphic minds" (p. 214).

Within the limits of theology, which is entitled to assume the Personality of God, Mr. Illingworth's contention is entirely valid on the whole, and largely in contributory detail. It might have been rendered valid for human experience taken in its entirety by a further analysis of the nature and operation of man's personality as the ultimate principle in life. But, even restricted as it is, Mr. Illingworth must be thanked for furnishing a powerful auxiliary to this more fundamental view. His book ought to attract wide notice and appreciation. Those who may happen to disagree with it will find it stimulating, and, for those who concur, its tone and method cannot but be instructive, not merely in the scholastic sense of imparting information, but as embodying an example which they might follow with much advantage.

R. M. Wenley.

ORTHODOXY AND HETERODOXY: A MISCELLANY. By WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD, D.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1893.

ORTHODOXY, according to Dr. Shedd, is to be found in the dogmatic systems of ancient, mediæval, and modern Christianity, *i.e.* in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, and the Augsburg, Heidelberg, and Westminster Confessions, which are derived from unadulterated revelation. The author is, I believe, a Calvinist; and it is somewhat strange to hear him speak in these terms of Creeds, some of which most people would think dealt hardly with some cherished beliefs of his sect. But he is a fair and liberal-minded controversialist, and has much to say that all Christians, however opposed to him theoretically, may ponder and profit by. Far from wishing to unite all denominations of Protestants into one communion, he considers such a fusion inexpedient and impossible, and prefers that all should firmly hold the truths of their sect, without compromise or confusion. His words are addressed partly to ministers and candidates for the ministry, and partly to "the really orthodox in all denominations;" and he adds, at the close of the volume, four political articles, which have special reference to the state of things in the United States. There is much good advice in these chapters. He recognizes the dominant spirit of the present age, and sets himself resolutely and skilfully to oppose it. No half-measures suit him; strong views, definite statements—in fact, dogmatism—are necessary, and timid, apathetic believers really betray the principles which they profess to uphold. The theologian must hold his brief from inspired sources, and be independent of human science and opinion; he must rise superior to the secular and sceptical spirit of the age, and seek truth, not from the philosopher or the "belle-lettrist," but from the Word of God itself. This needs courage, confidence in an Almighty Person, no mere energy or force, but a holy and intelligent Author and Governor, who Himself supplies the grace which the individual needs. The sole work of ministers is to teach revealed truth, by which they glorify God in the highest possible degree, and honour Him in the most acceptable way. But there must be no compromise, no equalizing of all religions, as was proposed by the Convention at the Chicago Exhibition. Christianity is unique, and must be preached and practised as the only system divinely ordained to unite man with God. Fundamental truth, held by all, may have different expressions and different effects, but must be shown in words and character, whether in the pulpit or the daily walk. Men are too commonly averse from doctrinal preaching; they dislike plain, unvarnished statements, and are too indolent to attend to a carefully reasoned deliverance; but such preaching is absolutely necessary, especially in these days of ignorance and pseudo-science. Lax theology ends in lax morality. What Dr. Shedd calls *boned preaching* that is, with all the strength and reality removed, will never save souls. Preachers of this character may achieve a certain notoriety, but they lose personal piety, and produce no piety in their hearers. Popularity is no criterion of truth, and, if examined, is often found to be overrated.

Turning to infidelity, our author has much to say that is worthy of notice. He remarks upon the credulity of infidelity—an apparent anomaly, but proved by innumerable examples. The disbelievers in Divine revelation are notoriously the dupes of pretenders to occult powers. They who put no faith in the miracles of the Bible are ready to credit any demonstrations of a spiritualistic medium. Another set of infidels scoffingly demand a sign from heaven; as Professor Tyndall, when he wished to test the efficacy of prayer in the case of the patients in two hospitals. Such requisitions imply that God shall perform a miracle of a certain nature whenever it is demanded. They are like Satan's temptation of Christ, "Cast Thyself down." Such

additional proof of the truth of Christianity is not to be expected, and is asked only by unbelief or irreverence. Infidelity is ever hasty in deducing inferences from ill-ascertained or misunderstood facts. The Stone Age is supposed to antedate all history, sacred or profane; yet the American Indian was still using flint for arrow- and spear-heads when the United States were first settled; and it is now generally acknowledged that the Western Continent was not peopled till the Eastern was overstocked. But there are certain assumptions current among unbelievers, which, though oft refuted and in themselves futile, are constantly revived and paraded in lectures and periodicals. The effrontery of such assertions is paralleled by their absurdity. Are Hegel and Strauss to be considered as infallible, while Christ and His apostles are condemned as deceivers or deceived? The sceptic, led away by his antagonism to revealed truth, loses his moral sense, and becomes obtuse to the highest principles of action, and easily falls a prey to dishonour and sensuality. If he believes not in Scripture, nor in the reality of another world, what has he by which to govern his life? What is his standard? What is his rule? It is probable that the deductive physics of modern naturalists, in contradistinction to the inductive of the elder philosophers, is favourable to infidelity. The deification of secondary occasional causes inclines to the obscuration and practical denial of the First Cause.

Discussing the treatment of the Bible at the hands of infidels or destructive critics, Dr. Shedd justly ridicules the apocryphal Gospels of Strauss and Renan; he strongly upholds the historical and traditional view of the nature of the Old Testament, in opposition to the rationalistic or pseudo-critical. Its various books are to be regarded, not as Hebrew literature, the actual product of the national mind, but as Divine revelation made to a small number of Hebrews in order that they might teach their own people, and the world through them, true religion. The early portion of the Bible is original and independent, not constructed out of traditionary accounts found in the myths and archives of ancient nations, but handed down to Moses through the patriarchs, and by him, under Divine guidance, combined into a history of primæval man. The Old Testament is not an evolution of the Hebrew mind, but the expression of the Divine mind; and the attempt to rid both the Testaments of unpalatable facts and doctrines by the assertion of spuriousness, interpolation, later origin, and so on, is uncritical and opposed to the treatment universally accorded to secular writings. The doctrines of the Bible are indissolubly connected with the narratives thereof; to deny the credibility of the latter is to impugn the authority of the former. The historical view of the Scriptures has much more to recommend it than the fragmentary theory which is modern and conjectural and uncertain. Any opinion which denies the authenticity and genuineness of a Biblical writing nullifies its inspiration. Higher criticism, judiciously applied, determining an author's text by internal considerations, establishes truth; but it ought to be used in conjunction with that criticism which takes into account external evidence. The union of these two methods is the only safe way of arriving at a correct conclusion. Any other process produces a fluctuating result which can satisfy no independent thinker. A large party in Germany repudiates the doctrine of the Incarnation as taught in the Creeds (like our irreconcilables in the London School Board), supporting their heresy by asserting that the clause, "conceived by the Holy Ghost, and born of the Virgin Mary," is a later interpolation, and does not belong to the earliest gospel preaching. To such lengths is profane criticism prepared to go.

On the subject of the observance of "the sabbath," Dr. Shedd opines that there is nothing obligatory in it unless it be a day of worship; all other considerations of rest, refreshment, recreation, are evasions of the commandment, and to be repudiated.

He denounces the bigotry of liberalism, and "orthodox disbelief," where the disbeliever professes to be a member of an Evangelical Church, while secretly denying some fundamental truth. Such a truth our author considers the doctrine of endless punishment to be, and he has a chapter on this subject, which is well reasoned and forcible. But he deprecates what he calls *hellphobia*—a panic, servile fear, which torments while it does not help to deliver from peril, and encourages no effort for salvation. As to the state of the departed, people have no right to assert that the wicked are at rest. The Bible affirms the contrary, and warns against vice by the terrible threat of endless punishment. All religion, natural and revealed, teaches justice and purity; but men do not obey the teaching, and are responsible for the transgression. Christianity alone regenerates, inclines men to obey, and gives strength for this purpose. It is the atonement of Christ that enables us to ask for pardon, and obtain spiritual power. Belief therein is the preliminary requisite for all other graces; we must come *to* Christ by faith before we can come *after* Him by obedience. The vicarious atonement is the root of all true philosophy; God's inexpressible good will towards men is the only abiding source of good will among men. The doctrine of immortality, held firmly and practically, teaches us that the other life is more real and desirable. Consciousness accompanies both; and the sense of peace with God and acceptance with Him gives that rest which no mere reasoning can supply. Religion, to be useful, must be thorough. A little religion is a dangerous thing, full of perils speculative and practical; and the modern busy plodder cannot be deeply pious; he has neither taste nor time for study, prayer, and meditation. To become religious he must reform his habits, retrench his business, and be satisfied with competence, without seeking so graspingly for wealth.

The above is a summary of the theological portion of Dr. Shedd's work, and offers a view of a conservative American's tenets on disputed points, which many will be glad to see, and by which all may profit, whether they thoroughly agree with the author or not.

W. J. Deane.

SANITARY CODE OF THE PENTATEUCH. By Rev. C. G. H. Gillespie, A.K.C., A.C.P. No. XXI. of *By-paths of Bible Knowledge.* Religious Tract Society.

A learned, instructive, and timely little book. It shows very clearly that many provisions of the Mosaic Law which look at the first glance like vexatious restrictions of individual liberty, were in reality admirably adapted to promote personal and national welfare; and that some of them wonderfully foreshadow conclusions of modern science. Critics of the so-called advanced school will, of course, reject many of Mr. Gillespie's suggestions. They will, for instance, try to account for the selection of unclean animals on the assumption of totemism on the part of the ancestors of the Israelites. Be that as it may (and it really matters very little what were the customs of the remote forefathers of the chosen people, supposing that we could ascertain them), the practical wisdom of many of the rules in the Pentateuch about food, clothing, the diagnosis and prevention of disease, is beyond doubt. The book contains much curious lore gathered from rabbinic and Arabic sources of varying value. The anecdote about the punishment of a breach of promise by the bite of a weasel is rather incorrectly ascribed to the Talmud. It is given only by mediæval authorities in explanation of a saying in the Talmud, which, by-the-by, it does not really explain.

W. Taylor Smith.

THE THINKER.

THE SURVEY OF THOUGHT.

FRESH LIGHT ON FAMILIAR TEXTS.—The protracted and somewhat unprofitable controversy about the statements of the newly discovered Syriac Version of the Gospels concerning the paternity of Jesus, which has figured so largely in the *Academy* and elsewhere, has diverted attention in some measure from the manifold significance of this curious and indisputably precious monument of early Christian piety and scholarship, especially from the recently issued English translation. The whole contents of the manuscript (in so far as they have been deciphered), together with an admirable introduction by the discoverer, is now accessible to the English public in a convenient form; but there is reason to fear that the treasure thus placed within general reach will pass unnoticed by many even of those for whom it is chiefly designed, unless the fact of its publication is made more prominent than has hitherto been done. The volume is in reality one of the most remarkable contributions to the study of the Gospels made in the course of the present generation. Not, indeed, that it clears up mysteries; for it suggests more questions than it answers. Although it may be reasonably expected in the long run to contribute to the solution of the synoptic problem; for the time it adds to the complication. Its exact value, and particularly its relation to the Curetonian and the mysterious D, can only be settled with confidence after prolonged study by those experienced in this department of research. It is not premature, however, to point out some of the many peculiar readings of this notable Sinaitic palimpsest, not a few of which are not absolutely fresh, but have attracted little attention because they were so weakly attested. Among these peculiar readings are several new settings of often-quoted texts; for example the following: (1) The Lord's promise of His presence is given in the negative form: "There are not two or three gathered together in My name, and I not amongst them" (Matt. xviii. 20). So also D. (2) The requirement of unlimited forgiveness is stated even more emphatically than in the Received Text: "Not until seven, but until seventy times seven seven" (Matt. xviii. 22). This reading is supported by the Peshitta and the Curetonian. (3) The Lord's rebuke of Martha is without the words which have furnished a text for so many sermons, "but one thing is needful" (Luke x. 41). It is still a rebuke,

but is much gentler than in the Received Text. (4) The birth of water and the Spirit, in John iii. 5, appears with the order reversed: "the Spirit and water." Still, it is not safe to lay stress on this, as the usual order is found in ver. 8, where (with the Curetonian) the words "of water" are prefixed to the words "of the Spirit." (5) Spiritual sowing is declared to be immediately followed by reaping: "And the reaper straightway receiveth wages" (John iv. 36). So also D and the Curetonian. (6) Instead of "Even so the Son also quickeneth whom He will" (John v. 21), we read, as in the Curetonian, "Even so the Son also quickeneth those who believe in Him." (7) The memorable utterance at Bethany, "I am the Resurrection, and the Life" (John xi. 25), is cut down to "I am the Resurrection." (8) Our Lord's claim to be "the Way, and the Truth, and the Life" (John xiv. 6), is made more emphatic by the repetition of the pronoun, "I, I am the Way, and the Truth, and the Life." (9) The peace bequeathed by Christ is described as His own peace: "Peace I leave with you, My own peace I give unto you" (John xiv. 27).

Variations in the Parables.—Several of the parables, as recorded in this ancient version, exhibit interesting peculiarities. (1) The fishes taken out of the drag-net which were preserved are described as *very* good fishes (Matt. xiii. 48). (2) The ten virgins went forth to meet "the bridegroom *and bride*"—a reading found in D, *c*, and the Diatessaron as edited by Ciasca (Matt. xxv. 1). (3) The good Samaritan left the inn "at the dawn of day" (Luke x. 35). (4) The prodigal son "lived wastefully with harlots" (Luke xv. 13). (5) The fatted calf killed for the returned prodigal is spoken of by the elder brother as "*that* fatted calf" (Luke xv. 30). (6) The rich man is *cast into* Hades (or Sheol) (Luke xvi. 23). (7) The unjust judge is afraid lest the injured widow should "come and *take hold of him*" (Luke xviii. 5). (8) The man who asks for bread at midnight introduces his venturesome plea with the words, "*my* friend" (Luke xi. 5). (9) The Lazarus of the parable is described as "a poor man" (Luke xvi. 20). (10) The most remarkable variations are found in the context of the parable about the two sons, preserved by Matthew only. The answer of the chief priests and elders to the question, "Whether of these twain did the will of his father?" runs as in B, D, "the last" (Matt. xxi. 31). In the latter part of the next verse the negative is omitted (with D), so that we read, "And ye, when ye saw it, at last repented yourselves, that ye might believe on Him." In other words, the chief priests and elders are represented as going into the kingdom of God, but after the publicans and harlots.

Curiosities of Early Gospel Tradition.—Not less interesting are the numerous additions and variations scattered through the narrative portions. The following are a few out of many: (1) Herod Antipas is said to have done many things which he heard from the Baptist: "And

many things that he heard from him he did, and heard him gladly" (Mark vi. 20). (2) The Syro-Phœnician woman is described as a widow (Mark viii. 26). (3) When Jesus set a child before His contentious disciples, He looked at it whilst He addressed them: "And He took a certain child, and set him in the midst of them, and looked at him and said to them" (Mark ix. 36, 37). (4) The rich ruler is said to have accosted Jesus whilst the latter was on a journey, not as "He was going forth unto the way" (Mark x. 17). (5) Blind Bartimæus (or "Bar-Timai," as the Syriac gives the name) "took up his garment" when he rose and went to Jesus—"a more natural act," remarks Mrs. Lewis, "to those who have watched Eastern habits, than 'casting it away'" (Mark x. 50). (6) The lunatic child healed immediately after the Transfiguration was delivered by Jesus to his father (Mark ix. 27). (7) Mary the sister of Lazarus "went *eagerly* to Jesus when she had received His message" (John xi. 29). (8) At the feast in the house of Simon, Mary poured the ointment on the Lord's head before anointing His feet (John xii. 3). (9) The disciple who put the question in the upper room, "Lord, what is come to pass that Thou wilt manifest Thyself to us, and not to the world?" is said to have been not Judas, but Thomas (John xv. 22). (10) The party which arrested Jesus in the garden included some of the chief priests and Pharisees (John xviii. 3). (11) Peter accompanied one of his denials with the words, "Let me alone" (Luke xxii. 58). (12) The whole account of the mockery by Herod is omitted. The hearing is described as follows: "Then he questioned with Him in cunning words, but Jesus returned him no answer" (Luke xxiii. 9). (13) The soldiers are said to have mocked the crucified Jesus with the words, "Hail to Thee!" (Luke xxiii. 37). (14) The crown of thorns was worn on the cross (Luke xxiii. 37). (15) When Peter and John had seen the empty grave, they both believed (John xx. 8). (16) Mary Magdalene *ran towards* the risen Lord, that she might touch Him (John xx. 16). (17) After the second miraculous draught of fishes, Peter swam to the shore (John xxi. 17).

BIBLICAL THOUGHT.

HEBREW STUDIES.

By Rev. Joseph Edkins, D.D., Shanghai.

In our day there are those who deny that evil is evil, and there are those who claim that evil is good. There are those who look on any savage you may find on an island in the ocean as a specimen of primitive humanity. But, in fact, evil was always evil, and God was always the uncompromising Foe of moral evil. The modern savage is deteriorated by isolation, and needs to be restored. The early ages of the world ought to be rescued from the hands of an unbelieving criticism. Man ought to be

shown to have been from the first under the guardianship and instruction of God. God has never left Himself without a witness in any region of the world; but it is specially in Asia that facts accumulate, showing that God has always been the Friend of good.

There ought to be no chasm between active Christianity and high scholarship in the study of our sacred books. Yet there is such a chasm at present in England. Bible-distributors have no real sympathy with the higher criticism. Revival preachers have no faith in any views of the Christian religion which hide the supernatural element in the Bible. There never was a time when the Divine presence was more impressively felt in Christian assemblies than it now is. There ought, therefore, to be no chasm between faith and scholarship. The Christianity of the present day says, "We speak that we do know. We testify that we have seen." Faith in the Divinity of the Christian religion is confirmed in our time by overwhelming evidence from personal experience. Looking at critical questions from the standpoint of the convinced Christian, it can be no advantage to any school of criticism that it tends to eliminate from the Bible the supernatural. Feeling that Christianity is all it professes to be, the only remedy for the sorrows of mankind, the best gift of Divine love to our race, it is a necessity that we should not blindly accept the new criticism, but examine it carefully from all accessible points. It may not be so strong as it seems.

A more thorough scholarship in Hebrew is much needed in order to make such researches as will throw more light upon the development of the Hebrew language. The Pentateuch, after all that has been said, is really written in archaic Hebrew, but it does not follow that Hebrew was not in the age of Abraham and Moses a complex and polished form of speech, the fruit of the clash of races and languages in the long period before Abraham. On this the higher critics have nothing to say, because their attention is too exclusively fixed upon the post-Mosaic age. The great need in Hebrew studies at the present time is a careful weighing of the facts which concern the gradual growth of the grammar and vocabulary during the time when the biliteral roots were slowly becoming triliteral, and the verb paradigm was gradually assuming its present Biblical form. It is essential to accustom the eye to look well into the primitive shape of words and grammatical forms, and to refer them to their approximate dates. If we have not done this, how can we be prepared to estimate correctly the archaic features of the Pentateuch? In the Hebrew of that book the pronoun *hu*, "he," has not yet been subdivided into masculine and feminine. *Hi* for our "she" was not yet known to Pentateuchal authorship. *Naġar* meant then a boy or a girl. In later Hebrew the feminine was *naġarah*. Neither accident nor fraud could have caused these peculiarities to find their place in the books of Moses. The higher criticism does not study Hebrew as a slow development. But we greatly need this. The effect of a careful study of the growth of Hebrew words

and forms out of the older linguistic systems from which they sprang will be most beneficial. If this be undertaken, the true character of archaic Hebrew, such as we have it in the Pentateuch, will come out into clear outlines. The neglect of comparative studies has been unfortunate. The Semitic languages have been dissociated from their natural relationship to the language systems in the bosom of which they grew up, and it has been quietly taken for granted that the Semitic languages have no radical connexion with the Indo-European system, or with the older systems in Eastern Asia. Gesenius was firmly convinced of the unity of the Semitic and European vocabularies. He was undoubtedly right. This natural connexion becomes very clear if the student spreads out the formation of the language systems over the long period of time which was necessarily required to form their paradigms and systems of derivation. The connexion is closer than Gesenius thought it to be. He did not know, for instance, that the upgrowth of the feminine derivative suffixes to nouns is a feature limited to Tibetan, Egyptian, Semitic, and Aryan speech. Probably then it was communicated from Egypt to the Semites, and so to the Indo-Europeans. The Lithuanian theory of the Ursprache needs to be so modified as to admit of this borrowing. So also I can find no reason for doubting that the letter *h* in Semitic languages is formed from an old *t*, not only at the end of words, but wherever it occurs. If Gesenius had known this law, he would have been able to point out many more equivalents in European languages to common Hebrew words.

Our own English comparative philology is better at present than the German, because of Melville Bell's discoveries of the real nature of the vowels and consonants. What is now pressingly required is that we should use the light afforded to explain, for example, the reason for the law by which *h* is formed from *t* or *s* in Celtic, Greek, and Semitic speech. The contact of *t* and *s* with the gum and palate was discontinued, and left the sound *h*. The nations possessing this peculiarity are or were in close contiguity of frontier, and this usually means joint occupation of territory. It becomes necessary now not to avoid the comparison of old roots, but to compare more thoroughly than ever before, and to do so under the light of the most modern philological principles. The question of the antiquity of the Pentateuch can never be settled by literary conjectures. We find that too many words of importance in later Hebrew are wanting in the Pentateuch to allow us to accept the theory of a post-Solomonic origin to the Pentateuch. Tablets are mentioned in the Pentateuch, but not rolls. We have there the *luahh*, the tables on which the Decalogue was inscribed, and the *sepher*, also a tablet. The Book of the Covenant, Book of Jasher, etc., would be made up of several of the *sepher* placed together. But there is no allusion to lambskins till Ps. xl. and the prophets. Writing on lambskin was an intermediate invention. "Fasting," in the Pentateuch, is the affliction of the soul. The two substantives *tsum* and *tagannith* are neither of them found in the Pentateuch. "Circumcise the foreskin of

your hearts" is a Pentateuch expression, which does not occur afterwards. The impressive phrase, "gathered to his fathers," on occasion of the death of patriarchs, is not used after the Pentateuch. In the Pentateuch, *lehhem panim* was the shewbread. Later the phrase was *lehhem hammegareketh.* In the Pentateuch "kingdom" is *melaka.* Later the vowel *a* is changed for *u* in such forms as *meluka,* found in Samuel. The Accadian word "great house," *hekal* (הֵיכָל), is first used in Samuel for the tabernacle, and never before. Having such facts before us, it is impossible to be contented with the results of the higher criticism. We are compelled to place the Pentateuch before Samuel's days. We must account for the peculiarities appealed to in the higher criticism as caused by the fact that many amanuenses were employed by Moses.

In my work, *The Evolution of the Hebrew Language,* published by Kegan Paul and Co., I have shown that the rich poetry of the Semite people, and that intellectual activity that led them to invent the Phœnician alphabet, came from the position they occupied between the two great civilizations. This position may also be appealed to to explain how it was that, in the days of Abraham and Moses, so great a completeness in words and grammar is exhibited in Genesis and in the other books of Moses. Taking this view, the language of Genesis is that spoken in Palestine in B.C. 1800 and later. Genesis really consists of a collection of genealogies gradually increased during the time of the patriarchs whose lives are recorded in the book. This gives us a space of thirteen centuries before the Captivity. There was a golden age before Samuel. The introduction of the word *hecal* in Samuel marks a new age. At that time the old word *shibboleth,* "ears of corn," used in the history of Joseph, had become *sibboleth* among the Ephraimites on the west of Jordan. A change in the writing implements at this time leads to the mention of the king's scribe; there was a new activity in the keeping of family registers. But these registers ceased to begin with the words, "these are the generations of." In this circumstance we see a clear mark of distinction between the ancient genealogies we have in Genesis and those of the mediæval period such as we find in the Chronicles.

A new school of Hebrew study, conducted on the lines I advocate, would be fruitful in the best results. It can scarcely be expected, however, that those critics who have made Genesis a book of legends will heartily assist in founding such a new school, nor is it, perhaps, likely that those writers who develop Hebrew literature from a few poems, and deny that any prose was written in the days of Moses, will abandon their method in criticism. So much the more necessary is it that a new school should be founded which will never let go the idea of gradual evolution such as we find existing in all the natural sciences.

In regard to the mode in which Hebrew literature grew up, the real ought to precede the imaginative, and not the imaginative the real. The first Hebrews, like the other occupants of Palestine, lived in the midst

of a high civilization. Writing was in constant use, and every family of distinction had its genealogy. Here was the beginning of the literature of the Hebrew people. A dry chronicle preceded an imaginative native history. Poetic inspiration came under the influence of religious enthusiasm. The poet's work was occasional. The historian's work was constant. This, then, is the true account of the growth of the Pentateuch. As in cuneiform writing, bricks were employed, and rolls of parchment were not yet in use. The Phœnician alphabet was invented probably before the time of Moses, and, as Rev. C. J. Ball is engaged in proving, rather from Babylonian than Egyptian sources.

Beside the other archaic features already referred to in the Pentateuch, there is the remarkable absence of "Jehovah" in proper names, except in those of the mother of Moses and that of his successor, the leader of the children of Israel when they conquered the promised land. This shows that the Pentateuch is substantially a book dating from before the days of Samuel. After that time, fathers, when naming their sons, very commonly did as Zacharias is in Luke recorded to have done—named them not without the use of the word "Jehovah." If the customs alluded to in the Pentateuch are old, the book is old also. If it were really a much more modern compilation than Jewish and Christian tradition has hitherto made it, some at least of the usages it records would betray a modern date.

If the Pentateuch is as old as Church tradition has uniformly made it, the Phœnician alphabet is also as old as that. We ought, then, narrowly to consider what the order of the letters tells us. The fifth letter let us accustom ourselves to regard as the first *t* in the alphabet, but usually sounded as *h*. *Z* and *l* are transformed *d*. So also is *r*. Sonant letters are older than surds. Else why should *b*, *g*, *d*, come first? *Ayin* is a second *g*, and *kuph* a second *k*. The reason why *t* and *sh* were added at the end of the alphabet was that they were needed last, being each of them subdivisions from consonants which already had signs in use. As in the Greek alphabet, so in the Hebrew, supplemental consonants were added later, when the want of additions was felt. *Shin* is a subdivision from *samech*, as *sin* is from *shin*.

Evolution existed here and also in the whole of the grammatical forms common in Semitic speech. Developed from older linguistic systems, each form holds its place in the general scheme, which the philology of the future will elaborate, of the progress of language from the beginning. Semitic speech was evolved in part from Tartar speech, in part from Tibetan, and in part from Egyptian. Its peculiar features were acquired during a time of joint occupation of territory with nations of these stocks.

There is really no sufficient ground for the present dislocation which separates cultivated thought on Semitic subjects from the views held by ordinary Biblical students. Let the doctrine of isolation in philology

be abandoned. Allow the light of the evolutionary philosophy to shine upon Hebrew and Arabic verb-forms. Find where a change of vowel, to represent a change in tense, first appears in language. The answer must be, "In Tibet." Where was the feminine termination first made different from the masculine? The answer must be, "In Tibet." There the principle is limited, while in Arabia, Greece, Egypt, and other countries it is greatly expanded. It is therefore necessary that Hebrew students should give attention to Egyptian, Tibetan, Mongolian, and Chinese grammar, otherwise they are at a disadvantage. Is the study of these languages practicable? It is so to Old Testament students who continue their reading in philology after they leave college. The acquisition of information on one language helps in the acquisition of another. The object in view is most fascinating. Taking our start from the New Testament and the Jewish uniform tradition, we hold to the fact of Divine revelation made at sundry times and in divers manners from the time of Adam downwards. God is the same always, but He has made Himself known by various instrumentalities. Satan existed from the creation of man, but he is not mentioned by name in the Pentateuch. The future life was known to Adam, but was taught in a monstrously incredible manner in Egypt and Mesopotamia. Abraham must have known it, because he lived in both these countries at different periods. Persia knew the doctrine too, but received it first from the early revelation of primæval times. In this way, by conducting Hebrew studies in a truly evolutionary method, we can successfully bridge the chasm which divides Semitic scholarship from practical living faith in the Scriptures in our day. This necessary work is left to be done by preachers and students who have time and leisure. Writers of Christian sermons for current delivery in churches may well derive stimulus from the study of ancient sacrifices and other forms of worship, for instance, in China and pre-Zoroastrian Persia.

A very wide field, and a most attractive and fascinating one, is open for those who have historical and philological tastes combined with a warm and living faith in God, the Revealer and Redeemer.

THE ATONEMENT MONEY.

By Rev. Ph. J. Hoedemaker, D.D.

The hold which "modern criticism of the Old Testament" has of late years taken on the minds of an ever-increasing number of scholars is partly owing to the fact that the history, especially the religious history, of Israel during the periods of the Judges and of the earlier Kings mainly moves on the line of a merely natural development, and not on that of a supernatural revelation.

The views held by critics belonging to the school just indicated are,

or seem to be, supported by the silence of the historical books, save Chronicles, and of the writings of the earlier prophets on the subject of various institutions, rites, and enactments mentioned in or enjoined by the Law of Moses. They are further strengthened by the positive indications in these same documents, that such injunctions, if made, have failed to determine the practice of the very men who could be expected to have been acquainted with them, and who certainly would not have been the last to obey them.

Many theologians and not a few laymen, especially of the younger generation, who had no difficulty in believing in the possibility of miracles in the abstract, and who considered themselves to be sound on the subject of the Divinity and the atonement of Christ, have been won over to the position of the critics here referred to, with regard to the origin of the Pentateuch, the age of the tabernacle, and the date of the priests' code, by considerations like the above.

It is true the advocates of what critics are accustomed to call "the traditional view" have produced many arguments on their side of the question that seem to be equally decisive, since it is not possible to accept the theory of the critics, plausible as it is, without conceding that the documents, which contain so much material that is quite inexplicable from the new theory, have been intentionally falsified.

But the advocates of the Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch appeal to a different set of facts found in the very same documents on which the critics rely for their principal proofs, and consequently have no power to convince their opponents.

Without determining the relative force of the arguments advanced by the parties here spoken of, it is safe to say that both are unable to explain, from their own point of view, the facts that are advanced by their opponents. If, on the one hand, the hypothesis is to be rejected which attributes fraud to the sacred historians; on the other hand, it must be acknowledged that it is hardly possible that imperative injunctions such as the Law of Moses contains should have been so persistently ignored or violated by the very men who ought to have been the first to observe them.

This is the point I wish to make clear. If we look at it in the light of recent controversies, it will, however, be seen that there is a supposition lying behind the discussion, which ought to have been challenged by those who maintain the Mosaic origin of the laws in the Pentateuch. It is the supposition that these laws were meant to be observed by the Israelites under the circumstances in which they were placed after entering the promised land. Is not this true as a matter of course? Far from it. It is a great mistake, as can be shown both from the Pentateuch and from subsequent history. The supposition here referred to ignores the main element by which the religion of Israel is distinguished from all other religions, *i.e. the covenant relation in which Israel*

stood to Jehovah. It is the very nature of a covenant that it is conditional. This condition not being complied with, the covenant is abrogated. And where there is a change of covenant, there is a change of law (Heb. vii. 12).

We read, in the Book of Exodus, that the Lord commanded Moses to erect a tabernacle in the wilderness, according to the "pattern showed to him on the mount" (Heb. viii. 5). May I inquire—What was the nature and the end of this structure? Critics speak a good deal about "the one altar" which, they think, if the traditional view is right, ought to have superseded all other altars, such as the patriarchs used to erect in the neighbourhood of their tents. Was the tabernacle to provide Israel with a place of worship, and more particularly of sacrifice, to the exclusion of all other places? This, surely, was not its primary object. "Let them make Me a sanctuary," the Lord said, "that I may dwell among them" (Exod. xxv. 8). Hence the tabernacle was to provide Jehovah, or "the angel of the Lord" through whom God deigned to manifest Himself to His people, with a dwelling-place on earth. Why? In order to furnish the means by which the communion could henceforth be kept up between God, Israel's King, and His appointed minister on behalf of the people. "And there," namely, at the mercy-seat mentioned in the previous verse (ver. 21), "I will meet thee, and I will commune with thee" (ver. 22).

The ultimate end of this tabernacle, which may be called "the palace of the great King," "the tent of Israel's Leader, the Lord of hosts," is, however, to make it possible for His people to approach God to the extent and in the manner appointed. "There will I meet with the children of Israel" (Exod. xxix. 43).

A digression is here necessary, in order to illustrate the meaning and the importance of this central tent. It is so constructed that the most holy God can dwell in the midst of an unholy nation. We read in Lev. xxvi. 11, 12, "I will set My tabernacle among you, and My soul shall not abhor you, and I will be your God, and ye shall be My people." Without entering into particulars, I may say that all the ceremonies connected with the service in this tent, all the enactments made now and afterwards with reference to this service, are inseparable from the object just stated. The tabernacle is to be "sanctified by God's glory" (Exod. xxix. 43). The chief act of worship in this tabernacle is the service of adoration (Exod. xxx. 1–9). But the ground on which the communion rests is the perpetual sacrifice (Exod. xxix. 38–42), and both this adoration and this sacrifice are maintained through the mediation of the Levitical priests (Exod. xxviii. 1, ff.). Hence the tabernacle cannot be considered separately, apart from the camp of which it forms the centre.

All adults from twenty years and above (Exod. xxx. 14) are "numbered," or drafted into the host of the Lord, and ranged in the way prescribed in the first chapters of the Book of Numbers, along the four sides of the tabernacle, which is not an isolated building, erected in order

to contain an altar, or the ark, but includes the whole camp, which is considered to some extent a holy place, sanctified by the presence of the Lord, as may be proved from a great number of circumstances.

That this is the true scriptural view of the tabernacle may be shown from two facts, which are mutually dependent on each other.

1. Every Israelite who was enrolled amongst "the numbered" paid half a shekel towards the sanctuary. "The rich shall not give more, and the poor shall not give less" (ver. 15). For what purpose? It was "an offering unto the Lord, to make atonement for the soul." It was furthermore "appointed for the service of the tabernacle *of the congregation;* that it may be a memorial unto the Lord" (ver. 16).

This makes the matter clear. For an unholy people to be brought nigh to God, means death. Its only hope of safety, under these circumstances, lay in the service of the atonement kept up in the tabernacle. The half-shekel was given to procure an interest in it. It was an act of faith, a confession of unworthiness to be "numbered" amongst the people of God, apart from the means of grace. Hence it was "a ransom for the soul, that there might be no plague among them" (ver. 12).

2. The Levites were to come into the place of the firstborn, the natural and originally the legitimate priesthood. These Levites were "to do service for the children of Israel in the tabernacle of the congregation, and to make atonement for the children of Israel: *that there may be no plague among the children of Israel, when they come nigh unto the sanctuary*" (Numb. viii. 18, 19). That this was no idle threat the terrible fate that awaited the firstborn who sided with "the congregation of Korah" shows to a certainty. And that the same threat holds good in the case of those who numbered the people, whilst the service at the tabernacle was suspended, may be proved from the history of David.

Returning from my long but necessary digression, I now come to the principal point in this discussion. God entered into a covenant relation, undertaking to dwell amongst His covenanted people in the manner indicated. But this supposes a condition to be fulfilled on the part of the people. In what terms is this condition contained? The answer to this question is given in Exod. xxxiv. 9, 10. Moses prays, "Let my Lord, I pray Thee, go amongst us, . . . and take us for His inheritance;" and the Lord answers, "Observe thou that which I command thee this day: *take heed to thyself, lest thou make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land whither thou goest*" (ver. 11). This was after the sin of the molten calf, and it was a condition different from that proposed in Exod. xix. 5, ff.; xx. 1, ff., namely, the ground of perfect obedience.

I cannot now stop to explain this. It would require a separate article. But for the present purpose it is quite sufficient to say that, before the Sinaitic covenant was finally ratified, its terms were changed or rather reduced to the single demand. "Make no covenant with the Canaanites."

There is only one inquiry to be made after this explanation. Has Israel fulfilled the condition imposed? The very opposite of this. Has the Lord, then, continued to dwell in the midst of His people? Certainly not. He has openly and solemnly taken His leave, on "the day of Bochim" (Judg. i. 1, ff.). Was the covenant then changed? Certainly. Just before his death, Joshua made another covenant with the nation on a purely natural basis. There is not a word in this whole chapter (Josh. xxiv. 1, ff.) which would lead us to suppose that there was such a thing as a tabernacle, with its prescribed forms of worship. He puts the alternative in this manner: "Choose ye this day whom ye will serve; whether the gods which your fathers served, or the gods of the Amorites;" adding on his own part, "But as for me and my house, we will serve the Lord" (Josh. xxiv. 16). And when the people answered with one accord, "The Lord our God will we serve," he, viz. Joshua, "made a covenant with the people" to that effect (vers. 25, 26). This happened after the facts recorded in Judg. i. and ii. 1–8. What is the meaning of all this? That the history of Israel no longer moved on the higher plane on which the promise recorded in Exod. xxxiv. 10 put it. Then God said, "Behold I make a covenant; before all thy people I will do marvels," etc. Now Israel is left to its natural development, bating the acts of grace, which are so many wonderful deliverances from its enemies. Furthermore, that the tabernacle lost its significance, and the priesthood its influence. Religion was put on the footing of the patriarchal modes of worship. The only question is whether Israel will fall still deeper and turn to idols. This is the teaching of the Books of Kings, more especially the history of Jeroboam, Elijah, and Elisha. Instead of finding this state of things inexplicable, the only thing to be wondered at is that the Law, the tabernacle, the ark, should have occupied the place which the history of Eli, Abiathar, David, prove them to have held.

But there is the story of David's attempt to number the people to prove that the ceremonial law had been suspended. There were many data which led David to suppose that the present abnormal state of things was to make way for one more in consonance with the ideal partially realized during the march in the wilderness. Jebus, the stronghold of the Canaanites, had fallen into his hands. The ark had been brought up to the holy city. Nay, the Lord of hosts had made His presence felt with his army at Baal-perazim (2 Sam. v. 17, ff.). It is true he was not allowed to build "the house of the Lord" (2 Sam. vii. 1, ff.). But this *was* to be built. The covenant was to be again in force. Why should not the people be brought into the old covenant relation? He numbered them. He anticipated. He attempted to realize the grand idea—God dwelling in the midst of His people. Then came the plague. And after the plague the new revelation of grace on Moriah, where the altar was built (1 Chron. xxi. 16, 17), the indication of "a new covenant, founded on better promises."

EXPOSITORY THOUGHT.

SOME PROMINENT DIFFICULTIES IN THE GOSPELS.

VI. *HADES AND GEHENNA.*

By Rev. Professor A. Roberts, D.D.

Speculations as to the future destiny of man are always of absorbing interest. This has been felt in every age and in every land. The poets and philosophers of Greece and Rome had much to say upon the subject. Homer, for instance, in many passages gives expression to his views respecting the unseen world. These are in his case invariably of a gloomy and repulsive character. Existence in the under-world of Homer is, in fact, hardly worth the name. Thus Agamemnon is (*Od.*, xi. 393) described in these words (Pope's version)—

> "His substance vanished, and his strength decayed,
> Now all Atrides is an empty shade."

And soon afterwards (489) Achilles is represented as saying to Ulysses, who had found access to the world of shades, and there endeavoured to comfort the once mighty son of Peleus—

> "Rather would I be a hireling to drudge in the fields all day,
> With a landless master, who sparely would feed me and niggardly pay,
> Than over the host of the dead which have perished a sceptre to sway."
> (Trans. by *Avia.*)

Among the Romans, again, Lucretius makes use of similar language, and speaks (*De Rer. Nat.*, i. 123) of the denizens of the nether world as having neither souls nor bodies, but being only "quædam simulacra modis pallentia miris." It is true that Virgil, in the famous sixth book of the *Æneid*, ascribes far greater substantiality than Homer or others to the invisible world, but even he lays himself open to the censure of Mr. Gladstone (*Homeric Studies*, iii. 515), that "his Inferno has no consistent or veracious relation to any idea of the future or unseen state actually operative among mankind."

But, as possessed of a Divine revelation, we are far more happily situated in conceiving of the future than were the most gifted men of the ancient heathen world. John Foster has well said, on this point (*Life and Correspondence*, ii. 113), "It is a delightful thing to be assured, on the authority of revelation, of the perfect consciousness, the intensely awakened faculties, and all the capacities and causes of the felicity of the faithful in that mysterious, separate state; and on the same evidence, together with every other rational probability, to be confident of the reunion of those who have loved one another and their Lord on earth." No doubt, as the same great thinker frequently remarks, revelation itself has left much obscurity on many points connected with the state which immediately follows after death. Writing soon after his wife's decease,

he says, "The deep interest of the subject has led me to think more, and to read a little more, concerning that mysterious *Hades.* How strange that revelation itself has kept it so completely veiled! Many things in that economy probably could not be made intelligible to us in this our grossly material condition; but there are many questions which could be distinctly and intelligibly answered." It is most interesting to know the kind of questions to which such a man desiderated answers on this subject; and I quote the following suggestive passage bearing upon the point. "If," he says (ii. 194), "we might be allowed to imagine such an exception to a general law as a brief visit from a departed friend, with permission of making to us some disclosures of the unseen economy, an earnest inquisitiveness, heretofore indulged in vain, might prompt such inquiries as the following:—

"*Where* is it—in what realm of the creation—and have you an abode fixed to one locality? Do you exist as an absolutely unembodied spirit; or have you some material vehicle, and, if so, of what nature? In what manner was it at your entrance *verified* to you that you were in another world; and with what emotion? Was an angel the conductor? How does the strange phenomenon, *death,* appear to you, now that you *look back* upon it? What thought or feeling have you respecting your deserted body? What is your mode of perceiving external existence; and to what extent does that perception reach? Do you retain a vivid and comprehensive remembrance of the world and the life which you have quitted? Are you associated with the friends who preceded you in death? What is the manner of intercommunication? What are specifically your employments? What account do you take of *time?* What new manner of manifestation of the Divine Presence? Is there *a personal* manifestation of Jesus Christ? Have you a sense, a faculty, to perceive angels, as personal objects, analogously to what we should here call a visible appearance? Are you admitted to any personal knowledge of the wise and good of ancient times? Is there an assignment into *classes?* Do the newly arrived acquire immediately an adaptation to the amazing change?" etc.

Foster continues, in a strain of the highest originality, to ask a number of other most pertinent and interesting questions of his supposed visitant; but the above must suffice as specimens. The writer was well aware that his inquiries could never be answered in this world; and he ends with the striking remark that, while the silence maintained in Scripture regarding them must be for the best, still, "as a depraved race we are placed under *a punitive* dispensation—a part of which is that many things which would be for our good, even our spiritual good, are withheld." Be that as it may, we ought to be thankful even for that partial knowledge of the future which has been graciously conveyed to us, and seek to turn it to the best account. It is our evident duty to "search the Scriptures" on this, as on other subjects, and by meditation on all that is suggested

to us by the use of terms such as *Hades* and *Gehenna*, to strive to act in accordance with the admonition of the poet Young, when he bids us—

> "Walk thoughtful on the silent solemn shore
> Of that vast ocean we must sail so soon."

The Greek term *Hades* has been generally, and, I believe, correctly, regarded as derived from *α* privative, and *ἰδεῖν*, "to see," so that it naturally came to denote "the invisible world." Some have objected to this derivation on the ground that, while the old Homeric form is *Ἀΐδης*, the word is aspirated in Attic, and appears as *Ἅιδης* or *Ἅδης*. But many analogous forms might be cited. Thus the word *ἡγεμών*, "a leader," is admitted by all to be derived from *ἄγω*, "to lead," in spite of the aspirate, and so *ἅλυσις*, "a chain," is compounded of *α* privative, and *λύω*, "to loose;" with numerous other examples.[1]

Hades is regularly employed in the Septuagint as the representative of the Hebrew term *Sheol*, i.e. the "nether world," or "region of the dead." This rendering is accepted as correct in the New Testament at Acts ii. 27. But while the generic meaning of the terms *Sheol* and *Hades* is that which has been stated, both admit of having their import modified, according to the connexion in which they occur. Among the sixty-four times in which *Sheol* occurs in the Old Testament, while the word, for the most part, refers to the under-world, it is sometimes used, as at Ps. xlvi. 15, to denote "the grave," or again, as at Ps. cxvi. 3, to describe "deadly pain." But, however modified by the context, *Sheol*, as well as *Hades*, is always used in close union with the idea of *death;* and both terms properly denote, as I have said, that impenetrable region into which all souls pass immediately on departing from this world.

Let us now look at the expression *Gehenna*. Every one knows the derivation of this word. It is compounded of two Hebrew terms, meaning "the vale of Hinnom." This valley lay to the south-east of Jerusalem (Josh. xv. 8), and was originally noted for its beauty and fruitfulness. But, as Stanley remarks (*Sinai and Palestine*, p. 172), "what Milton truly calls 'the pleasant valley of Hinnom,' has through its late associations given its name to the place of the future[2] torment." It was in it that the idolatrous Israelites caused their children to pass through the fire to Moloch (2 Chron. xxviii. 3; xxxiii. 6); and for this reason it was made a place of abomination by good King Josiah (2 Kings xxiii. 10). The once pleasant dale had thus become connected with the most horrible associations; and, in course of time, it was turned into the great cesspool of Jerusalem. All sorts of refuse were allowed to accumulate in it, and the bodies of vile criminals were also thrown into it without any rites of sepulture. Worms, of course, bred among the

[1] As a converse example, I may give *ὄψον*, "boiled meat," from *ἕψω*, "to boil." The aspirate seems to have been little regarded in derivation.

[2] See afterwards how this expression must be understood.

vast mass of putrefying matter thus collected, and fires were kept constantly burning to destroy the pestilential malaria there engendered. Hence it became a fitting emblem for the place of punishment into which the wicked are ushered immediately after death; and there is an undoubted reference to its leading features when we read (Mark ix. 48) respecting the abode of those who have died unsaved—"where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched."

What, let us now ask, is the difference of meaning between the two terms which have just engaged our consideration? It has been quite common among Biblical scholars in this country and in America, while regarding Hades as the region occupied by the departed till the day of judgment, to interpret "Gehenna" as denoting that eternal hell into which the condemned shall ultimately be cast. Thus says Dean Alford, on Matt. v. 22, "ἡ γέεννα τοῦ πυρός was used to signify the place of everlasting punishment." In like manner, Moses Stuart thus expresses himself, in his dissertation on the meaning of the word: "That the word 'Gehenna' was common among the Jews is evinced by its frequency in the oldest Rabbinical writings. It was employed by them, as all confess, in order to designate *hell*, the infernal region, the world of woe. In no other sense can it in any way be made out that it is employed in the New Testament."[1]

But this is a gross, though, of course, unintentional misrepresentation. It is now firmly maintained by those who have inquired most carefully into the matter, that the ancient rabbis never used the term "Gehenna" to connote an everlasting hell. They refer it only to the intermediate state, and often speak of it as coming to an end. Thus says one, discriminating between the destiny of the righteous and the wicked after death, "Illi descendunt in Paradisum, hi vero descendunt in Gehennam." And says the Targumist Jonathan, on 1 Sam. ii. 8, 9, "The ungodly will be judged in Gehenna, to show that there is none in whom is the virtue of innocence *against the day of judgment*."[2]

Accordingly, the best authorities are now agreed as to the meaning which should be assigned to the terms *Hades* and *Gehenna* in the New Testament. Güder expresses himself as follows (Herzog's *Encyklop.*, v. 496): "We are to understand by 'Hades' the place and state (*Ort und Zustand*) into which mankind pass at death;" and he adds that "Hades in the New Testament is an eschatological idea of a very general and comprehensive character, corresponding to our German expression, *Jenseits*," i.e. *beyond*. Wabnitz, again, in his article *Enfer*, in Lichtenberger's

[1] It is much to be regretted that the Revised Version has sanctioned this view of the meaning of Gehenna. Such a rendering as "hell of fire" at Matt. v. 25 is as misleading as it is inexcusable at the present day. (See what follows above.) I agree with those who think that γέεννα ought simply to have been transliterated into English, as has been done in the case of ᾅδης.

[2] Quoted by Cox, *Salvator Mundi*, p. 73, where see many similar references.

Encyclopédie, says of Hades, as consisting of two divisions: "L'une des régions était appelée le *paradis*—le séjour des morts pieux. La région pour les impies, au contraire, était appelée la *gehenne*." Synonymous terms are also believed to occur in the New Testament for the state both of happiness and woe in the unseen world. With Paradise there may be classed the expressions, "Abraham's bosom" (Luke xvi. 22) and "present with the Lord" (2 Cor. v. 8); while for Gehenna there may stand "prison" (1 Pet. iii. 19) and "the abyss" (Rev. xx. 1). The following *conspectus*, then, enables us to see at a glance what is suggested to us in the New Testament as to the state both of the righteous and the wicked between death and the resurrection:—

HADES—*the world of the departed.*

Abode of the righteous.	*Abode of the wicked.*
Paradise.	Gehenna.
Abraham's bosom.	In prison.
With Christ.	The abyss.

Before proceeding to consider what seems to be taught us by the various expressions thus used in connexion with the invisible world, there is a preliminary question which requires to be settled. We have to ask, "Is the human soul entirely severed from materialism at death?" The language commonly made use of on the subject would lead us to believe that such is the case. We are constantly told of "disembodied spirits," and are left to conclude that the departed are purely incorporeal—souls with nothing pertaining to them of the nature of body. But it humbly appears to me that this is a mistake. For it is clearly implied in all that is said about Hades, that it is *a place* as well as a state. Such expressions as "Paradise" and "prison" plainly involve the idea of locality. And, that being so, let the following language of a former acute thinker be carefully weighed: "Without question," says Isaac Taylor (*Physical Theory of Another Life*, p. 21), "we must affirm that body is the necessary means of bringing mind into relation with space and extension, and so of giving it *place*. Very plainly, a disembodied spirit, or, we should rather say, an unembodied spirit, or sheer mind, is *nowhere*. Place is a relation belonging to extension; and extension is a property of matter; but that which is wholly abstracted from matter, and in speaking of which we deny that it has any property in common therewith, can in itself be subject to none of its conditions: and we might as well say of a pure spirit that it is hard, heavy, or red, or that it is a cubic foot in dimensions, as say that it is *here* or *there*." That is, I believe, the utterance of all sound philosophy.

But let us now inquire whether Scripture contains any teaching on this subject. I think that it does so, beyond the mere inferences which may be drawn from the language used respecting Hades. St. Paul, in 2 Cor. v. 3, is seen shrinking from the very thought of being "found

naked." And though he has generally been regarded as referring in this passage to the resurrection-body, yet it is clear that his repugnance to the conception of a "naked" spirit—a soul without any material envelopment—is as applicable to the day of death as to the day of judgment. I am inclined to hold that a careful examination of the passage leads to the conclusion that the state immediately following dissolution in this world was now distinctly before the mind of the apostle. No doubt, in the first verse of the chapter, he is thinking chiefly of the mansion awaiting the righteous in eternity. Yet even then, his thoughts are not exclusively fixed upon the distant future; he is thinking also of the present. He wishes to suggest what happens at the moment of departure from this world. "If," he says, "the earthly house of our tabernacle be dissolved, we *have* (ἔχομεν) a building of God." And, while first allowing prominence to the consummation of bliss to be attained only after the resurrection, by speaking of the future home of the righteous as being "eternal in the heavens," he appears in the next verse to pass directly to the thought of the intermediate state. For, let it be observed that, while in ver. 1 he speaks of "a building *in* the heavens," in ver. 2 he tells of "a habitation *from* heaven," and surely a marked difference of meaning must be intended. "From heaven," it is said (ἐξ οὐρανοῦ), and, as Bengel remarks, "Itaque hoc domicilium non est cœlum ipsum." What, then, can it be except that material covering in which the souls of the righteous are infolded at the moment of dissolution? We cannot tell of what nature it may be, but we seem clearly warranted, or rather required, on grounds both of reason and Scripture, to conceive of its existence.[1]

This view appears to me to detract much from the horror which is naturally inspired by the thought of death. And it also enables us to form some intelligible idea of the invisible world. We can understand how acts analogous to seeing, hearing, speaking, etc., should be ascribed to the inhabitants of Hades. Both the righteous and the wicked in that abode of the departed are possessed of material frames according to their respective characters; and hence the language implying corporeity of some kind so often made use of in Scripture regarding them.

But now let us inquire what is suggested to us by the various descriptive phrases made use of by the sacred writers in connexion with the invisible world.

First of all, there is the term "Paradise." This at once impresses our minds with the *beauty and attractiveness* of that abode into which the righteous are ushered immediately after death. We think of the earthly Eden into which our first parents were placed, where there was (as Milton says)—

[1] Compare Delitzsch's *Biblical Psychology*, p. 499, ff. The author maintains that all departed spirits possess what he calls a "phenomenal corporeity," and so far supports what has been said above. But I cannot quite agree with his exegesis of 2 Cor. v. 1–4.

> "To all delight of human sense exposed
> In narrow room, nature's whole wealth; yea, more,
> A heaven on earth; for blissful Paradise
> Of God the garden was."

And it is no presumption on the strength of this term to conceive of the utmost outward loveliness as characterizing that Paradise which Christ declares to await His people when they are called to leave this world for another.

Next, there is the expression "Abraham's bosom." This phrase points specially to *social enjoyment.* Abraham is singled out as representative of all the faithful, with whom it will then be the privilege of the righteous to hold communion. And how great must be the happiness springing from this source! Congenial fellowship is one of the highest delights which can be possessed on earth. And it will be richly enjoyed in that world which opens to the soul of the believer at death. The best of all ages will then welcome him to their society; and, in communion with them, he will experience the deepest and truest satisfaction.

Best of all, there is the blessed assurance of being then "with Christ." St. Paul writes (2 Cor. v. 8), "We are of good courage, I say, and are willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be at home with the Lord." This will be the means of furnishing the highest *spiritual joy.* In the immediate presence of Christ, the believer's most earnest aspirations will be gratified. His own soul will then reflect the holy image of his Saviour, as the pearly drop of dew reflects the brightness of the sun. He will then look upon the Author of his salvation, not, as on earth, by means of a weak and wavering faith, but with a direct intuition of His glory. Often in this world had he comforted himself, like the psalmist, by the thought, "As for me, I shall behold Thy face in righteousness: I shall be satisfied when I awake with Thy likeness;" and then shall the hope embodied in these words receive a rich and blessed fulfilment.

Thus, as a sentient, social, and spiritual being, the true Christian will find all the elements necessary to his contentment, when he enters the invisible world. His happiness will, of course, not be complete till after the resurrection, but during the intermediate state he will have a blissful prelibation of the glory and joy which await him throughout eternity.

How gloomy is the contrast which we find to all this, when we seek to conceive of the state of the wicked suggested to us by such terms as *Gehenna,* the *prison,* and the *abyss!* All, however, that I shall here presume to say, is, "It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God." I affirm nothing as to what may or may not take place throughout the endless ages of eternity. No one can, in fact, form any conception of never-ending existence. We may heap millions on myriads of years or ages, and still we shall have made not the faintest approach to the idea of eternity. It becomes us, therefore, to be cautious in what we assert as to the possibilities which the innumerable æons that lie before

us may evolve. Perhaps I may venture to say that the longer the subject is considered, the more does reason shrink from the thought of an eternal dualism—evil struggling against good for ever and ever. And I may add that Scripture, in its most detailed description of the invisible world, seems to whisper hope to us as we contemplate the dark half of Hades—that terrible Gehenna. It is obvious, in our Lord's parable recorded by St. Luke (xvi. 19–31), that a decided improvement is represented as having already taken place in the character of the rich man. From being careless, he has become thoughtful; from being callous, he has become sympathetic; from being wholly sensual, he has attained to some degree of spirituality. And if these are spoken of as the blessed effects of punishment in *his* case, we may humbly hope that, in the succession of unnumbered ages, the same results will take place with respect to others, so that at last there shall be a rejoicing because sinless universe, and "God shall be all in all."

JOHN THE BAPTIST'S QUESTION TO OUR LORD.

By Rev. Robert Stewart, Senior Minister, St. Mark's Parish, Glasgow.

The practice of putting questions to public men is not a modern one, for it is as old as the time of Christ. In the Gospels we find numerous examples of questions that were put to Jesus, and no doubt these are only specimens of many others that were asked but have not been recorded. Some of these questions were asked by His own disciples, some by the Scribes and Pharisees, and some by individuals who came to Jesus to ask Him to solve a difficulty that pressed heavily upon them. These questions range over a wide variety of subjects. Some of them relate to different aspects of the kingdom of God, such as when it was to come, and who was to be the greatest in it. Others bear upon His Messiahship, and whether He were the Messiah who was to come. Others refer to His innovations in regard to fasting, in regard to the traditions of the elders, and in regard to sabbath observance. The man of a speculative turn of mind, the man of a superstitious spirit, and the man anxious to know what he should do to inherit eternal life,—they all came to Christ, and put their several questions to get light and guidance. These questions and the answers they called forth throw more or less light upon the religious condition of Judæa at the advent of our Lord. One of the earliest of these questions, if not the very first that was put to Christ, was the one asked by John the Baptist, as reported by Matthew (xi. 2, 3). "Now when John had heard in the prison the works of Christ, he sent two of his disciples, and said unto Him, Art Thou He that should come, or do we look for another?"

John had been cast into prison, and while lying there reports had

been brought to him about the works of Christ which so astonished him as to raise doubts in his mind as to whether Christ were really the Messiah. A man of John's temperament could not rest in a state of uncertainty, and so he sent two of his disciples to ask, "Art Thou He that should come, or do we look for another?" This was a remarkable question to come from John the Baptist. He was the last man in the world from whom such a message could have been expected. It was only a short time previous to this that he had spoken of Jesus as so great and good that he was not worthy to loose the latchet of His shoe. He had also represented Him as coming, with a fan in His hand, to gather the wheat into His garner, and to burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire. Further, he had pointed out Jesus as "the Lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world," and that while He would increase, John himself would decrease. And yet soon after bearing this remarkable testimony about Christ, he sends this doubting question, "Art Thou He that should come, or do we look for another?" What was the cause of this change of attitude towards Jesus on the part of His forerunner? It was owing, we are told, to what John had heard in prison concerning the works of Christ. It is clear from this that the works of Christ were not what John had expected, and that they were not realizing the Baptist's ideal of the Messiah. This, along with other statements in the Gospels, seems to show that the kingdom of God which John had been preaching was not quite the same as that which Jesus was proclaiming. John was a religious radical, a root-and-branch man with an axe in his hand, whose mission was to destroy. His aim was a complete reformation of the religious life of Judæa, which at the time was characterized by hollowness and formality. Among the crowds that gathered around him on the banks of the Jordan were Pharisees and Sadducees, and on seeing them he denounced them as a generation of vipers. To the publicans who asked what they should do, he said they should exact no more than they were entitled to do. To the soldiers who made the same request, he said they were to abstain from violence, to accuse no one falsely, and to be content with their wages. The axe was now laid at the root of the tree, and every tree that brought not forth good fruit was to be hewn down and cast into the fire. The moral condition of Judæa was so corrupt that a mere tinkering would never satisfy such an ardent reformer. A slow and gradual reformation was a method with which a man like John had no sympathy. His ideal kingdom was one from which all the hypocritical and dishonest, all the discontented and immoral, should be excluded, and nothing tries an enthusiastic reformer more than a policy which prevents or even retards the realization of his ideal. But the reports brought to him about the sayings and doings of Jesus, led him to think He was pursuing this policy; for He was teaching that the tares and the wheat should be allowed to grow up together till the harvest. It is easy to understand how John heard this with surprise and impatience, and how, under the

influence of such feelings, he sent his disciples to ask, "Art Thou He that should come, or do we look for another?"

This view of the work and character of John throws light upon a remarkable statement of Jesus concerning the Baptist, which has been a puzzle to many a learned man. I refer to the well-known saying, "Among them that are born of women there hath not risen a greater than John the Baptist: notwithstanding he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he." To say that the humblest member of the kingdom of heaven is greater than such an eminent man as John, seems nothing short of a paradox. John had a good deal of heroic virtue in his nature. He had the courage of his opinions, and he had no respect of persons when duty called him to reprove vice, for he denounced wickedness in high places, though at the risk of his life. The result of his fearless honesty was that he was cast into prison and cruelly put to death. But with all his sterling excellence, John was far from being a perfect man. There were weak points in his character, and they were such as unfitted him to appreciate the aim and method of Christ. He was an austere and solitary man, and therefore defective on the social side of his character. He lacked sympathy and love, and had not the patience necessary to wait for the slow and gradual development of true and faithful work in the cause of humanity. Men of this type of character are better fitted for levelling down than for building up. They fail to understand that many can be won by love who cannot be driven by force. John lacked the tenderness of Him who never brake the bruised reed, and never quenched the smoking flax. John would never have reasoned with the unbelieving Thomas as Jesus did. He would have regarded him as a heretic, and would have dealt with him as heretics have always been dealt with by the Church. While Jesus, by His sweet reasonableness, overcame the apostle's doubt, John would have silenced him by the wrath to come. Again, John would never have forgiven Peter for denying him as Jesus did, but would have plucked him up as a tare to be cast into the fire to be burned. But Jesus, in His own Divine way, not only forgave Peter, but restored him, and made him a powerful agent in building up His Church. On the other hand, John would have commended the two disciples who asked permission to bring down fire from heaven to consume the Samaritans, whereas Jesus rebuked them, and said unto them, they did not know the spirit they were of, for the Son of man was not come to destroy men's lives, but to save them. Work done in John's way is short-lived and doomed to failure, whereas work done in Christ's way is permanent and destined to succeed, as is proved by the history of the Church in all ages and countries. Hence the seeming paradox of Christ is true, that the least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John the Baptist, great and eminent though he was.

The view now set forth is confirmed by the answer of Christ to the doubting questions of John, namely, "Go and show John again those things

which ye do hear and see. The blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the dead are raised, and the poor have the gospel preached unto them." The spirit and substance of this answer can hardly be mistaken. "Go and show John that the works you have seen are full of love and sympathy for the sinful and sorrowful sons of man. Many who were so blinded that they could not see the truth, have had their eyes opened so that they now see it, and are rejoicing in it. Men who were deaf to the words of wisdom are now giving heed to them. Men who were dead to the concerns of their souls are now alive to them. Men who were neglected because they were poor are now receiving sympathetic attention." What more Godlike works than these can be conceived? What more could the Messiah do to justify His being called "the Desire of the nations"?

Christ ends His answer by saying, "Blessed is he, whosoever shall not be offended in Me!" That is to say, "Blessed is he who sees nothing to object to in these works, merely because they are not in accordance with his ideal, and still more blessed is he who not only sees nothing objectionable in them, but finds them more beneficent than he expected." What effect the answer of Christ had upon John, we are not informed, but it is to be hoped it removed his doubts and brought him into a sounder state of mind. It is a blessed thing to receive truth from whatever quarter it comes, and even though it runs counter to our preconceived notions. But John the Baptist lacked this open-mindedness, for when he heard of the beneficent works of Christ, instead of rejoicing in them, he looked upon them with such disfavour as to doubt whether Jesus were really the Messiah who was to come. We need not be surprised that the Pharisees should have been so offended at the teachings and doings of Christ, when we see a man like John being in doubt as to the Messiahship of Jesus because of the works He was doing. There are many people who are as much offended at every new thought or new movement as John was offended at the works of Jesus, because they were not in accordance with his idea. It is well to guard against this attitude of mind, which is so great a hindrance to the reception of truth. If we cannot see eye to eye with others in non-essentials, let us at least give them credit for being as honest as we are, and as anxious to know the truth as we are. Let us have that charity which sees something good everywhere, believing all things, and hoping all things for the best. Let us pray for the same mind as Paul when he wrote those noble words, "Some indeed preach Christ even of envy and strife; and some even of good will. . . . What then? Notwithstanding, every way, whether in pretence, or in truth, Christ is preached; and I therein do rejoice, yea, and will rejoice."

HARPAGMOS: PHILIPPIANS II. 6: A CRITICISM AND A DEFENCE.

By Professor John Massie, M.A.

This perplexing word, and the difficult Christological passage in which it is one of the keys to the position, have been a battle-ground for interpreters since the earliest days of exegetical warfare. Now and then, indeed, as some one interpretation has gained the upper hand, there has been peace for a while, but over and over again has the battle been renewed. In England one particular view has of late years become so prevalent as to be adopted without apparent hesitation in the Revised Version; but in 1887 it was vigorously assailed in the *Expositor*, and the assault was repeated elsewhere by the same theologian in 1890, and once more in 1892. Perhaps the persistency of this attack, and the absence (so far as I know) of any corresponding defence, may be allowed to justify an attempt to ascertain how this battle of interpreters is faring, and how far any one of the interpretations is tending to hold the field.

The student who would fain make up his mind on this subject finds himself face to face with four main explanations—

(A) "Thought it not *robbery* [i.e. usurpation] to be equal with God."

(B) "Deemed not equality with God an *object of grasping*."

(C) "Counted it not a *prize* to be on an equality with God."

(D) "Deemed not His equality with God a *means of enriching Himself*."

(A) is the rendering of most of the Latin Fathers and of the Authorized Version. (B) dates from Arius, the heresiarch of the third and fourth centuries, and is adopted by Weiss and Pfleiderer and Lipsius, among others, though the Christological tendencies are not the same in all. (C) is the rendering of Bishop Ellicott and Bishop Lightfoot, and (as the latter alleges) of the Greek Fathers; and was accepted by the Revisers of 1881. (D) is the choice of Meyer, and, with slight modifications, is the choice of Franke, in his Meyer rewritten, as also of Hofmann and of Cremer.

(A) This may be quickly dismissed: it is no longer upheld by any representative critic. The translation of ἁρπαγμὸς in the Old Latin, followed by the Vulgate, was *rapina;* and, though this word is in itself ambiguous, hovering between the abstract and the concrete, between *plundering* and *plunder*, and was perhaps selected because of this very ambiguity, yet its more usual abstract force[1] had its influence upon Tertullian and subsequently upon Augustine, and then, after A.D. 400, upon every Latin Father. Finally, it determined every modern version except that of Luther, whose rendering, *Hielt er es nicht für einen Raub,*

[1] The Syriac rendering is also ambiguous, with a tendency to the abstract as the more usual force.

with its *Raub* instead of *Rauben*, points to concreteness: "He held it not as a piece of plunder." But, as Lightfoot demonstrated, *robbery* dislocates the argument. The writer's aim is to display the self-abnegation of Christ; but to say (and that in the emphatic part of the passage) that "He deemed it not robbery (but justice) to be equal with God," is to give a sample of Christ's assumption and His sense of the rightness of that assumption. Moreover, if ἀλλὰ is to have its proper sense, the succeeding clause is a *non sequitur:* "(Thought it not usurpation to be equal with God), *but, on the contrary,* emptied Himself." Chrysostom perceived how the argument limped, and offered a crutch as follows: "Being in the form of God, He did not consider that He was plundering when He claimed equality with God. He did not therefore look upon His Divine prerogatives as a booty of which He feared to be deprived, and which therefore it was necessary to guard jealously. He reigned not as a tyrant, but as a lawful sovereign. He could, therefore, divest Himself of the outward splendours of His rank without fear."[1] But this attempt at explanation detracts from the self-abnegation, and so far weakens the argument by diverting the aim of the passage at an important point. Can we imagine Paul, while seeking to impress upon the Philippians Christ's self-denial, allowing himself to say emphatically that Christ had no fear of real loss; that He knew He was perfectly safe in His inalienable right, and therefore could surrender without any apprehension of losing for ever? Besides, we have again the inconsequent ἀλλὰ, "He knew He was safe, *but, on the contrary,* He emptied Himself." Where is the contrast between His sense of security and His self-humiliation? Furthermore, Chrysostom, in this interpretation, mixes two ideas, *plundering* and *holding fast* the plunder. In order to help out the former he has annexed the latter; and has then gratuitously introduced, as a link, a third idea—the needlessness of holding fast what is not plunder, but a lawful possession; a link which has no place in the chain of the thought.

There are two other objections applicable alike to (A) and to Chrysostom's laborious modification of it. (1) It cannot be overlooked that the aorists ἡγήσατο, "He thought," and ἐκένωσεν, "He emptied," hint strongly at a parallelism of historical moments which militates against ἡγήσατο being altogether suitable to Christ's *eternal, continuous* sense of the justice or inalienableness of His equality, and rather points to the moment of the *thinking* as closely preceding, if not identical with, the moment of the *emptying.* (2) There is something harsh in describing a *state* of equality as an *act* of robbery. Such a solecism cannot, in this case, be successfully palliated either on the ground that the *state* here is the *result* of the *act,* or on the ground that the *state* is the *basis and condition* of the *act.*[2] For the interpretation (A) does not contemplate, on the one hand, that Christ had at any set time *seized* the equality, or might

[1] Lightfoot's abridgment of Chrysostom's explanation (*Philippians*, p. 134, 1st edit.).
[2] See p. 322.

have thought of seizing it; or, on the other hand, that Christ might have used the equality as a means of seizing something beyond. The second and third of these ideas belong to other interpretations.

All these objections have presented such a combination of force that modern critics have abandoned the position.

(B) This interpretation—"deemed not equality with God an object of grasping"—appears to have been initiated by Arius, in accordance with his doctrine that Christ was Θεός τις ἐλάττων, "a lesser deity," being only the "firstborn of all creation," and never, either before or after His earthly state, possessed or claimed equality with God. To this interpretation Pfleiderer, among others, now adheres. "The heavenly Christ," he writes,[1] "was so far from wishing to usurp like a robber, that is to say, in selfish arrogance, the dignity of supreme Lordship and equal sovereignty with God"—"the absolute, perfect, sovereign majesty which belongs to God alone and to no other"—that He, on the contrary, never thought of doing so, but did the opposite to this: He emptied Himself (instead of coveting that which was greater and higher) of that which He justly possessed (namely, of the μορφὴ Θεοῦ)." Weiss adopts the same interpretation, considering, however, that the equality was the *destiny* of Christ, something to which, in His pre-existent state, He had not attained, namely, a position towards the world which was to be realized in the Divine honour and devotion paid to Him, and which Christ might have used His Divine form of manifestation ("consisting of supersensual light substance") to lay hold of from the world.[2] But He obtained it according to the Divine will, not as a ἁρπαγμός, by way of wilful usurpation, but as a Divine reward of voluntary self-resignation and self-humiliation.

There are some who would demur, *in limine*, to this interpretation, on the ground that ἁρπαγμὸς cannot, in harmony with its termination, mean an *object* at all, but only an *act;* while others, conceding the sense *res rapta*, an object *seized*, refuse to the word the sense *res rapienda*, an object *possible* or *proper to be seized*. The question of the lexical use of ἁρπαγμὸς will be most conveniently left till we come to the next interpretation. For myself, I am not prepared to lay stress upon either of these objections to the view of Pfleiderer and Weiss, and I think we can do without them. What strikes me as far more unsatisfactory than the supposed straining of the termination of the word itself is the want of clearness and simplicity in the antithesis of the passage. Christ is thought of as not grasping at the essence, *but* resigning the form. Far more direct is the antithesis that He did not retain His Divine glory, but emptied Himself of it. Paul's design is to teach unselfishness and renunciation; and his method is least complex if we read him as pointing out, not that Christ refrained from regarding something He had not (and, according to Weiss, was not as yet to have; according to Pfleiderer, never could have) as an object of grasping; but that He regarded even the

[1] Cf. *Paulinism*, i. 149 (Engl. trans.). [2] Cf. *Biblical Theology*, ii. 100, ff. (Engl. trans.).

Divine glory which He had as something not to be kept, but to be surrendered for the good of man. Counting others to have higher claims upon Him than He Himself had,[1] looking not at His own things, but at the things of others,[2] He (in the words of Paul elsewhere[3] when he again appeals to Christ's act of self-sacrifice as the motive to Christian altruism), "*though He was rich*, yet for [others'] sakes *became poor*, that [others] through His poverty might become rich." And what could possess Paul to think of the "form of God, as a coign of vantage for grasping at the "equality"? And where would this idea, supposing it was really Paul's, come in the argument? Where is the suggestion that the Philippians, being in a position of antecedent advantage, were not to use what they already had as a stepping-stone from which to snatch at what they could never reach, and had no right to; or what was indeed their destiny, but a destiny to be attained, not by snatching at it, but by "self-resignation and self-humiliation"? And if the idea has no argumentative niche in the exhortation to the Philippians, it is in itself repugnant when associated, even hypothetically, with Christ. We need not be troubled because, in what Paul has here to say as to the Philippians, there is no exact parallel to Christ's subsequent exaltation. It is the most natural thing in the world for the apostle not to leave Christ in His low estate, but to rise exultingly from the humiliation to the glorification. For the moment the vision of the Philippian Church fades before the vision of the exalted Christ; and Paul simply completes the story with words that not only serve the purpose of narrative, but rush out from his heart in an uncontrollable stream of thanksgiving, praise and adoration.

For all these reasons I venture to think that this interpretation, as well as the former, must be decisively rejected.

(C) With this rendering—"counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God"—the argument proceeds quite logically and without a hitch: "Though He was in the form of God, He did not [in contemplation of His redeeming work, and at the historic moment of entering upon it] count it a prize"—that is, a possession, like a piece of spoil, too precious to be given up—"to be on an equality with God; but, on the contrary, He emptied Himself," that is, let the form, the equality, go. In this view of ἁρπαγμὸς the connotation of *seizing* is in the background; the prominent idea is that of a cherished possession *clutched tightly* because too valuable to lose.

But this interpretation is at variance with that of Meyer and Franke, Hofmann and Cremer; and their view has of late been urgently and repeatedly pressed in England by Dr. Agar Beet, not only in the pages of the *Expositor*, but subsequently in his Commentary on the *Philippians*,

[1] Cf. the ἡγούμενοι of ver. 3 with the ἡγήσατο of ver. 6. Of course, the above is only an application of ver. 3, not an interpretation of it.

[2] Cf. ver. 4: Σκοπεῖν means quite as often *to take an interest in what one has* as *to aim at what one has not.*

[3] 2 Cor. viii. 9.

and last of all in the *Expository Times.*[1] The chief exceptions taken are these. (1) The termination -μος most naturally suggests an active rendering, and ἁρπαγμός, in the only place where it occurs in non-Christian Greek, demands such a rendering. (2) Why should Paul have gone out of his way to choose the very rare word ἁρπαγμός, which suggests a meaning he did not intend, when the common word ἅρπαγμα would have expressed the passive meaning, *prize*, without any ambiguity? (3) Ἁρπάζω and its derivatives always imply, not the holding fast something *already in one's hand*, but the acquiring something *not before possessed;* and this implication cannot be accepted in regard to Christ's equality with God. (4) The "holding fast" implies a strong hand, somewhere, threatening to take away; and for such a hand, Dr. Beet fairly contends, we look in vain. (5) The exposition implies that the Son did not refuse to give up His equality—an idea which Dr. Beet deems inconceivable.

It is unnecessary to say that all these objections, more particularly when adopted or advanced by a theologian like Dr. Beet, are worthy of careful consideration. I will take them one by one.

(1) It is true that the termination -μος has naturally and usually an active signification. But plenty of instances can be found, in all kinds of Greek, where this termination, like many other terminations, is used without precision. Thus θεσμὸς is not an *enacting*, but a *thing enacted*, a *law;* χρησμὸς is not the *giving of an oracle*, but the *oracle given;* ἁγιασμὸς (which Meyer himself, on Rom. vi. 19, affirms to be, in the New Testament, not the *act of sanctifying*, but always the state, *sanctifiedness*, that is, the *result* of the act) is found in the LXX. (2 Macc. ii. 17) in parallelism with ἱεράτευμα, "priesthood," being therefore not an *act of consecrating*, but apparently *something consecrated*, and in the passage in question is confidently rendered *sanctuary* by Huther (on 1 Pet. i. 2), Cremer, and E. A. Sophocles in his Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine periods. The verse runs thus: "God, that delivered all His people, and gave them an heritage, and the kingdom, and the priesthood, and the sanctuary." Again, in Amos ii. 11, the same word is placed side by side with *prophets*, and appears to mean a *sanctified body of men:* "I took of your sons for prophets (εἰς προφητὰς), and of your young men εἰς ἁγιασμόν," where the Hebrew is, "for Nazirites." In Patristic Greek, moreover, it stands for *sacrament:* Basil of Cæsarea uses it for the Lord's Supper, the sanctified bread and wine; and in the *Euchologion* (the Service-book of the Eastern Church, including, in its earliest form, the Liturgies of Chrysostom and Basil) the baptismal water is called ἁγιασμός, not as consecrating, but as consecrated, because, according to Chrysostom, Christ, in His baptism, had "consecrated the nature of water."[2] To take two further examples. In the New Testament, θερισμὸς represents not

[1] *Expositor*, 3rd series, vol. v. pp. 115, ff.; *Epistles to the Philippians, Colossians, and Philemon*, pp. 64, ff.; *Expository Times*, vol. iii. pp. 307, f.

[2] *Homily on the Baptism of Christ*, quoted in Suicer's *Thesaurus*, under ἁγιασμός.

only the *act of reaping*, as in Matt. xiii. 30—"at the season of the reaping I will say to the reapers"—but likewise the *thing reaped*, the *corn to be reaped*, the *harvest*, as in Matt. ix. 38, "The harvest is plenteous;" and in Rev. xiv. 15, "The harvest is over-ripe." Finally, the opponents of the interpretation with which I am now dealing quote πορισμὸς in 1 Tim. vi. 5 as an exact parallel to ἁρπαγμὸς here. Franke says, "formell und inhaltlich ihre genaueste Parallele" ("in form and in content its most exact parallel"). And the Revisers have changed the old rendering, "supposing that *gain* is godliness," into "supposing that godliness is a *way of gain*"—"way of gain" being not exactly concrete, but only half-way to the concrete. Dr. Beet says, "The men in question thought that piety and making gain went together." But how was it that the Revisers did not translate the πορισμὸς μέγας of the next verse, "a great *way of* gain"—instead of "great *gain*"—"Godliness with contentment is great gain"? Simply because it was most natural to take this second πορισμὸς as concrete; it has the epithet *great*, and it is followed by concrete parallels: "For we brought *nothing* into the world, for neither can we carry *anything* out; but having *food* and *covering* we shall be therewith content." And hence it may, after all, be better to say, "The men in question thought that piety and *gain* went together:" this is a coupling quite as intelligible as that suggested by Dr. Beet. We find also that πορισμὸς is used in a concrete, passive sense in Wisd. xiv. 2, "Desire of *gains* (πορισμῶν) devised [the ship];" where "desire of *acts* of gaining," or "desire of *ways* of gaining," seems much less natural, as representing ὄρεξις πορισμῶν, than simply and directly, the "desire of gains," "desire of the things to be gained" *by means of* the ship. Otherwise the result is the somewhat vapid idea, "desire of the ship devised the ship." So much for the "exact parallel" in πορισμὸς to the ἁρπαγμὸς of our passage. The parallel lines may run exactly the other, that is, the passive, way.

These instances, selected from the "heap," will, I think, suffice to prevent undue influence on the part of the argument derived from the usual force of the termination. As to the word ἁρπαγμὸς itself, Meyer roundly asserts that the rejection of the passive sense is "simply linguistically demanded." Why? Because it is "quite incapable of proof," "evidence of empirical usage is wanting." But, while the "argument from silence" is always doubtful, in this case it is dangerous; for, as Meyer himself admits, ἁρπαγμὸς is found only once in classical Greek (where Plutarch uses it for the Cretan kidnapping of children); and a single instance is practically nothing to argue from. Moreover, Meyer has, on this particular point, been deserted by his followers. Pfleiderer, for example, once upon a time, as he says, "adopted Meyer's explanation, principally on the supposed ground that ἁρπαγμὸς could only be taken as equivalent to *actio rapiendi*, not to *res rapienda*. But the possibility of taking ἁρπαγμὸς as equivalent to ἅρπαγμα is established

beyond doubt by many analogies; and thus the necessity of this explanation disappears."[1] Franke, though still accepting Meyer's interpretation, concedes that, as many other words in -μος have both an abstract and a concrete sense, it would be idle to deny such a double sense to ἁρπαγμός, especially as (*a*) ἁρπαγή[2] is similarly used; (*b*) practically all the Greek interpreters take ἁρπαγμὸς here as equivalent to ἅρπαγμα, Theodore of Mopsuestia appealing, it would seem, to common usage; (*c*) no variant reading, ἅρπαγμα, is to be found, in spite of the persistent tendency towards the passive interpretation; (*d*) in two passages out of the three quoted by Lightfoot from the later Greek,[3] where alone the word ἁρπαγμὸς appears, the writers use the word as identical with ἅρπαγμα, and in these two ἁρπαγμὸν ποιεῖσθαι occurs, ποιεῖσθαι being synonymous with the ἡγεῖσθαι of our text. Dr. Beet admits the passive usage as "apparently" obtaining in the third passage also, though Franke has tried (unsuccessfully, as I cannot help thinking) to blunt the edge in this case, and Meyer in all the cases. Probably enough has now been said to prevent us from looking with too much suspicion on Lightfoot's acceptance of the passive sense.

But (2) if Paul really intended the passive sense, why did he choose the rare and ambiguous word ἁρπαγμὸς instead of the common and unmistakable word ἅρπαγμα? This objection looks plausible, but is not so plausible when examined.

Dr. Beet, in his earliest discussion of this subject, the article in the *Expositor*, speaks of ἅρπαγμα as "less uncommon." In his *Commentary*, later on, he calls it "common." In the *Expositor* and in the *Commentary* ἁρπαγμὸς is described as "rare;" in the *Expository Times* (latest of all), as "very rare." Thus the contrast between the rarity of ἁρπαγμὸς and the prevalence of ἅρπαγμα has become more rather than less striking as time has elapsed. But the fact is that, if ἁρπαγμὸς is rare, scarcely less rare is ἅρπαγμα, so far as Greek literature generally is concerned. In Liddell and Scott's *Lexicon* both words are dismissed with two lines each, and in the *Lexicon* of E. A. Sophocles ἅρπαγμα has barely two lines, while ἁρπαγμὸς has fourteen, though some of these are, of course, due to the notableness of the word. Meyer and Dr. Beet record the fact that the only classical author using ἁρπαγμὸς, and he only once, is Plutarch. Curiously enough, Plutarch is also the only classical author quoted by Liddell and Scott as using ἅρπαγμα, and again only once, as Wyttenbach's *Lexicon Plutarcheum* likewise attests. The *Thesaurus* of Stephanus gives two instances of ἅρπαγμα in earlier Greek, the one classical, from Æschines, the other not exactly classical, from Lycophron, the Alexandrian poet at the court of Ptolemy Philadelphus, in the third century B.C. It is also

[1] *Paulinism*, i. 148, note 1.

[2] This word E. A. Sophocles makes identical with ἁρπαγμός, and it is an equivalent of ἅρπαγμα in the LXX. and in classical Greek.

[3] See his notes on the passage, *Philippians*, p. 109, 1st edit.

used once in Josephus. To compare more generally the usage of the two words,—while, outside the LXX. and the references in Christian Greek to the present passage, ἁρπαγμὸς occurs three, or at most, four times, ἅρπαγμα (as far as I can ascertain from indexes, lexicons, commentaries, and Wetstein's list of parallels in his note on the verse) occurs only some dozen times, four of these being in Heliodorus, an erotic writer, and afterwards a bishop, at the end of the fourth century A.D. I shall be reminded, of course, that in the LXX., probably Paul's chief Greek book, ἅρπαγμα occurs seventeen times, and ἁρπαγμὸς never. It is noticeable, however, just in passing, that ten of these instances lie in Ezekiel, a book which Paul never quotes, and two more in books which he quotes only once, and then not from the LXX. It is noticeable, also, that if ἁρπαγμὸς does not appear in the LXX., ἅρπαγμα is equally absent from the New Testament. But the question, after all, is not so much a question of ἁρπαγμὸς and ἅρπαγμα by themselves, and employed quite literally, but of these words with ἡγεῖσθαι (or some synonymous verb), and employed idiomatically, and so, in a degree, metaphorically, with some such sense as E. A. Sophocles assigns to the phrase, ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγεῖσθαί τι, "to avail one's self of a thing," or (as Lightfoot prefers to put it) "to welcome eagerly," "to prize highly." Of this idiomatic usage there are, as far as I can ascertain, three examples with ἁρπαγμὸς and seven with ἅρπαγμα, three of these latter occurring in Heliodorus; and in the LXX. there is not a single example with ἅρπαγμα, this word being always there used quite literally. Paul, therefore, had no LXX. precedent for ἅρπαγμα coupled idiomatically with ἡγεῖσθαι or any equivalent verb. Whether he had or had not met with ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγεῖσθαι, we simply do not know. But it will be seen, I think, from the number of extant examples of the words and, still more decisively, of the phrases, that the respective numbers hardly justify the contrast between "very rare" and "common;" and, under all these circumstances, two or three instances of ἁρπαγμὸς used with ἡγεῖσθαι or ποιεῖσθαι, in "apparently" (as Dr. Beet admits) the same sense as ἅρπαγμα, may prepare us for inclining towards the opinion that it was currently a matter of indifference whether ἁρπαγμὸς or ἅρπαγμα was employed. At any rate, the Greek Fathers seem to have been alive to no difficulty in the way of taking ἁρπαγμὸς for ἅρπαγμα. One of them, Isidore of Pelusium, actually substitutes ἅρπαγμα in his comment, as it were accidentally, without making any remark. Besides, as was said before, there is no suggestion anywhere of a various reading ἅρπαγμα for ἁρπαγμὸς, as though, to a Greek ear, ἁρπαγμὸς had been unsuitable to the interpretation the Greek Fathers preferred. This *argumentum e silentio* is at least suggestive of contentment.[1]

[1] Since completing the above investigations, I have been favoured with a communication from Dr. Karl Krumbacher, of Munich, the eminent authority on Byzantine Greek, which tends to confirm my impressions. Premising that he has not made a special study of the

But (3) Lightfoot's exposition is confronted with the objection that the verb ἁρπάζω and its derivatives always imply the *grasping* of something *not in the hands before*, and that the notion cannot be applied to Christ and His equality with God. Now, in the first place, verbs do not keep a tight hold upon their derivatives; the derivatives often outrun them. If it were not so, how would δόξα ever have come to mean "glory" and "brightness;" or ἀνάθεμα, a "curse;" or πνεῦμα, a "spirit;" or σχῆμα, "outward appearance;" or φάντασμα, an "unreality"? Even so, it is quite conceivable and according to precedent that ἅρπαγμα and ἁρπαγμὸς should have, in some cases, outrun the notion of *acquirement* and reached that of *cherished possession*, whether the thing had been previously in the hands or not. Chrysostom might be accused of pointing out the way to such an extension of meaning when, in his erroneous comment on our passage, he writes, "Whatsoever a man has seized, he *holds it fast* always (διαπαντὸς αὐτὸ κατέχει)."[1] And, in truth, the Greek Fathers seem to have had no scruple in ignoring this connotation of acquirement. Origen[2] explains our phrase by instancing the "condescension even unto death for the godless, and the emptying of Himself;" an explanation implying that Origen connected ἁρπαγμὸς simply with what Christ already *possessed*, without thinking of previous *acquirement*. The same appears to be true of his antithesis (preserved for us only in the Latin translation) between *rapina* and *seipsum humiliavit* in the comment, "Verily Jesus thought it not a *rapina* that He was equal with God, and not once but often He humiliated Himself for all men."[3] Still more clearly is acquirement ignored when (also in the Latin translation) we find him saying, "Nor does He deem it a *rapina* that He is equal with God, that is, He does not count it *something of great value for Himself* (*sibi magni aliquid deputat*) that He Himself, indeed, is equal with God and one with the Father;"[4] and again, "Christ, not pleasing Himself, nor thinking it a *rapina* that He was equal with God, *emptied Himself*."[5] I do not deny that it is *possible* to impose upon ἁρπαγμὸς and *rapina* in these citations the sense of *capture* (making use of the links which Chrysostom's explanation supplies), or the sense which Dr. Beet so strenuously advocates, and which we have yet formally to consider, *a means of grasping at material good;* but I do affirm that it is simpler and less tortuous to interpret the words of a *cherished possession* which Christ surrendered. And so also with the references in other

words in question, he ventures to doubt, *a priori*, that ἅρπαγμα ποιεῖσθαι is much more common than ἁρπαγμὸν ποιεῖσθαι. He considers that the passages in Sophocles' *Lexicon* show at once that ἁρπαγμὸς cannot in the least be described as a "rare and ambiguous word;" and he calls my attention specially to the great extension in the identification (*Bedeutungsvermischung*) of the forms in -μος and -μα in mediæval and modern Greek, as shown by the list on pp. 178, 180 of the *Einleitung in die Neugriechische Grammatik*, by Professor Hatzidakis, of the University of Athens—a list which is not by any means exhaustive.

[1] *In Epist. ad Philipp.*, Hom. viii. (*vulgo* vii.).
[2] *In Joann.*, vi. § 37.
[3] *In Matth. comm. ser.* (iii. p. 916c).
[4] *In Rom.*, v. § 2.
[5] *In Rom.*, x. § 7.

Fathers quoted by Lightfoot. Eusebius, for instance, cites the Lyons letter, when it applies our passage to the persecuted as imitators of Christ, because they insisted on disclaiming the glory of witness-ship, though it was already theirs. The idea of the *acquirement* of the glory is out of view, as is evident from the fact that, as ὑπάρχων is used of Christ "*being* in the form of God," so likewise ἐν τοιαύτῃ δόξῃ ὑπάρχοντες is the phrase employed of the persecuted "*being* in such glory" (that is, as witnesses).[1] No doubt these men had *attained* to the honour; but the strong verb ὑπάρχω lays emphasis on the *condition* and ignores the *attainment*, obviously to bring their case into parallelism with that of Christ in the verse of *Philippians*. Eusebius suggests that his own view is similar, when he represents the result of Christ's determination by the words, ἐγενήθη πένης, "He became poor."[2] Theodore of Mopsuestia falls into line with Origen and Eusebius when he says (in the Latin translation), "Non *magnam reputavit* illam quæ ad Deum est æqualitatem et elatus *in sua permansit dignitate*, sed magis pro aliorum utilitate præelegit humiliora," etc., "He did not *esteem as of-great-value* that equality with God, and [so] *abide exalted in His dignity*, but rather, for the good of others, preferred a humbler estate."[3] Theodoret, also, when he writes, "Having His equality with the Father, He did not esteem this a great thing (μέγα)," must surely be thinking of ἁρπαγμὸν simply as something of great value which Christ gave up. Similarly and more decisively, Cyril of Alexandria takes the same side, "For the Saviour and Lord of all, although He had a partner's right (μετὸν) to be seen in form and equality in every respect with the Father, and to sit proudly in the seat of the Godhead, deemed it not a ἁρπαγμός."[4] Where would be the force of "although" and "a right" if ἁρπαγμὸς meant not simply a *cherished possession*, but emphatically an *acquired* possession?

I have purposely selected these instances from Lightfoot's "long list" for translation and comment, because Dr. Beet has said that "not one" in the "long list" "confirms the exposition" which Lightfoot quotes them to support. This is a startling accusation to make against an exegete of Lightfoot's acknowledged scholarship and intellectual perspicacity; and I venture to think that it has not borne the brunt of examination. And if Lightfoot's contention be established, then what the Greek Fathers could quietly accept, it is not very surprising that Paul should have quietly written, ignoring for the moment the notion of acquirement in ἁρπαγμός, partly, it may be, in conformity with a common usage; partly, as seems probable, because the word offered a vivid representation of a treasure too precious to be let go.

This explanation will apply equally to objection (4)—that the idea of *holding fast* implies a strong hand somewhere, threatening to take away. For neither does this linguistic difficulty seem to have presented itself to the Greek Fathers; and Chrysostom most plainly ignores the

[1] *Hist. Eccl.*, v. 2. [2] *Ecl. Proph.*, iii. 4. [3] *Op.*, vi. p. 488. [4] *Ibid.*, vi. p. 195.

notion of any such threatening hand in this case. He is content to put it thus: "Whatever a man has seized, this he dare not let go, fearing lest it be *lost*, lest it *fall away* (μὴ ἀπόληται, μὴ ἐκπέσῃ)." And even when he says, later on, in accordance with his mistaken interpretation, "Christ did not fear that any one would deprive Him of His nature or of His rank," he is stating the matter quite negatively and indefinitely, just as Lightfoot might paraphrase his own rendering, "Christ did not count His equality with God a prize to be held fast, too good to *lose* or to be *deprived of*." In fact, exactly as the idea of historical acquirement can be ignored in ἁρπαγμός, so also can the idea of a definitely conceived "strong hand threatening to take away." This opinion is confirmed by the use of the word in Euseb., *Comm. in Luc.* vi., quoted by Lightfoot, "And Peter counted his death on the cross a prize on account of the hopes of salvation;" as also in the passage from the *Catena Possini* on Mark x. 42 (Christ's warning to His disciples against envy and ambition), "[He corrects them] by showing that honour is not a prize, for such a [thought] is of the Gentiles." In neither of these cases is the strong hand visible, threatening to take away.

Objection (5)—that Christ never surrendered His equality with God, and could never have conceived such a surrender possible—will be most conveniently considered in conjunction with (D), the fourth interpretation, which Dr. Beet accepts.

(D) This interpretation, adopted by Meyer, and supported, with slight modifications, by Franke, Hofmann and Cremer, and formerly, but no longer, by Pfleiderer, strives to retain the active sense of ἁρπαγμός. Meyer himself exhibits the verbal notion naked and unadorned, "Not as *robbing* did He consider the being equal with God;" and explains it thus: "He did not place it under the point of view of making booty, as if it was, with respect to its exertion of activity, to consist in His seizing what did not belong to Him." This booty, unmentioned by Paul, is, according to the same commentator, "power and dominion, riches, pleasure, worldly glory." Cremer, agreeing in the main with Meyer, renders the passage, "considered His equality with God not identical with the behaviour of a ἅρπαξ"—leaving, like Hofmann, the object of grasping undefined. Franke modifies the active verbal notion, the *doing* (which he feels to be awkward as identified with the *being*), into a *means* of doing, that is, a *means of grasping* (which is a mixture of the abstract and the concrete, and is not active, but only quasi-active[1]); and he makes the booty the recognition of Christ as Divine, the homage and Lordship which afterwards became His by the gift of the Father, at the close of the period of self-humiliation. Dr. Beet seeks to get over the same difficulty of *state* being identified with *activity*, by making the state the "basis and condition of the activity," so that "the two are coincident and in our thought identical." And then he adds, "Had Christ looked upon the Divine

[1] A phrase of Dr. Gwynn's, in his article on the subject, in the *Speaker's Bible: Philippians.*

powers He possessed in virtue of His equality with God as a means of taking for Himself the good things of earth, to His thought equality with God and high-handed seizure would have been coincident, and might have been spoken of as identical." He quotes, in justification of His quasi-active loop-hole, the "good example and close parallel," *godliness is gaining*, of 1 Tim. vi. 5, with which passage I have already dealt.[1] To what was said above I have only this now to add: in 1 Tim. vi. 5 the *object* of the gaining is unmistakable (if, indeed, the πορισμὸς be really *gaining*, and not *gain*); but in Phil. ii. 6 (if Dr. Beet's explanation be correct) the object of the grasping has to be evoked from the reader's consciousness. And hence the differences of opinion or phraseology among those who hold this interpretation, Meyer himself offering "power, riches, pleasure, worldly glory;" Dr. Beet being content to say, "material good;" Franke rising to the higher level of the recognition as Divine, the homage and Lordship which come into view in ver. 9, and which might conceivably have been a most unselfish desire on the part of Christ for the purpose of man's speedier redemption,—in fact, in New Testament eschatology, such is to be Christ's *rôle* at the last, when by His final manifestation even His enemies are to be put under His feet. On these differences I do not wish to lay much stress; nevertheless, they suggest that this solution of ἁρπαγμὸς has its difficulties too, even for its advocates.

But a more serious objection to this interpretation lies in the fact that it does not furnish a very clear antithesis to the ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε, "emptied Himself." With due deference to Dr. Beet, *grasping* is not the "exact opposite" of *emptying*: it is rather what we may call the remoter opposite. The exact and immediate opposite of *emptying* is *keeping full*. When a pocket is already full, we may either empty it or hold it tight and so keep it full; to fill it, by grasping something, is a process that comes after the emptying. And this *keeping full* and *emptying* is Lightfoot's antithesis, suggested by ἀλλὰ (*but, on the contrary*): "He counted not His equality with God a thing to keep, but emptied Himself." Dr. Beet's interpretation requires the complex idea that Christ *kept* His equality with God, in the sense of His Godhead, and *might* have kept the μορφή, or outward "presentation" of it, using at the same time the retained equality to grasp for Himself material good; but that, instead of so keeping the μορφή, He emptied Himself of it, and refrained from thus using the retained equality. Accordingly, while the "equality" is the means of grasping mentioned in the text, the "form," the outward "presentation" of the equality, is the practical means. Hence we arrive at the following reading of the passage: "Being in the form of God [the outward presentation of the equality], He did not regard the equality [itself] as a means of grasping [material good], but emptied Himself [of the outward presentation of the equality, retaining the

[1] See p. 317.

equality itself: He thus retained the essential means, but emptied Himself of what would have been the outward means in the world of men]." Is not all this, at the best, a little elaborate for Paul, when he is simply endeavouring to stir up the spirit of unselfishness in the Philippians by the example of Christ's condescension? And then, as to the antithesis, we have (1) in *grasping*, not the simplest and most natural opposite of *emptying;* and (2) a verbal phrase ("regarded not His equality as a means of grasping"), affirmed to be the "exact opposite" of the *emptying* phrase, and yet containing as its object the *equality* with which the *emptying* has nothing to do.

Further, it may not be fanciful to point out, as a minor objection to Dr. Beet's distinction between *form* and *equality*, that the phrase, "equality with God," occupies the weakest position in the clause, the strongest being occupied by ἁρπαγμόν. We may fairly infer, therefore, that the *equality* is not a new point, but only another way of representing the thought, "in the form of God." The adverbial nature of ἴσα is in harmony with this view. Ἴσα Θεῷ is not "equal with God," but "in an equal manner with God:" it is rather the side of *form* than the side of *essence* that is *specially prominent* in this expression, as in the other; ἴσα being preferred to ἴσος in order (as Lightfoot suggests) to represent the equality as of attributes rather than of persons.

But Beet's strenuous objection to Lightfoot's exposition on the ground of its implication that "Christ did lay aside His equality with God," deserves some further consideration. He says, "This I cannot admit. . . . Even after He had emptied Himself, and had laid aside for a time and for our salvation the form of God in which He had previously revealed His glory, and *while working as a carpenter at Nazareth*, the Son was as truly 'equal to God' as He will be when pronouncing judgment at the great assize. *For the work in which He was then engaged was truly Divine.*"[1] On this passage I would venture to remark that Dr. Beet has, in more than one respect, confused the issue. First of all, he has, so to say, changed the *venue* of the equality. The precise question is whether Christ, in His humiliation, had the same equality with God as He had *before* that humiliation, not *after* it. Secondly, what is the "work" to which Dr. Beet refers in the last sentence? Is it His work *as a carpenter* which was truly Divine, and which therefore proved His equality? This is what the sentence, in its context, seems to mean, but surely cannot mean. Thirdly, Dr. Beet confuses *work* and *person*. A work may be truly Divine, but the worker need not be. Fourthly, he confuses *Divinity* and *Deity*. A person may be Divine, but is not therefore equal with God. Dr. Beet's argument might be used to deify a good man doing God's work in the world—to deify Christ, though He had been nothing more than a missionary to the heathen or a worker in the "East End" of Jerusalem. We must carefully distinguish between θεῖος and θεός,

[1] *Expository Times*, vol. iii. p. 307, f. The italics are mine.

between quality and essence. We ourselves may become "partakers in the Divine Nature[1] (θείας φύσεως)," but are not thereby equal with God: θειότης may be ours but not θεότης, *divinitas* but not *deitas*, *Göttlichkeit* but not *Gottheit*.

But, further, Dr. Beet's objection to Christ's surrender of equality seems to be inconsistent with the true meaning of μορφή. He himself, indeed, defines it to be a "mode of self-presentation." "Christ's mode of self-presentation was the Father's mode of self-presentation," and this is "practically" the δόξα, "the outshining of the splendour of His invisible essence."[2] Elsewhere he speaks of the "Father and the bright ones of heaven seeing in the Son an expression corresponding to the essence of God."[3] And he regards this *expression* as separable from the essence, so that the "form of God" might be laid aside while the Godhead remained. But Lightfoot, in his article on μορφὴ and σχῆμα (both of which, it will be remembered, are present in our passage) has shown good reason for maintaining that μορφὴ when contrasted with σχῆμα is the *specific character* as opposed to the mere sensible appearance, the intrinsic and essential as opposed to the outward and accidental, nay, sometimes the invisible as opposed to the visible; for he quotes, among other illustrations, one from Justin Martyr, where "he appears to contrast the visible σχήματα of demons with the insensible, immaterial μορφὴ of God." If this view be correct—and even Fritzsche, who questioned it, appears to fall in with it for the μορφὴ δούλου, which he explains as the "complete form or nature of a servant," as opposed to σχῆμα δούλου, the "external form"—then God and His μορφὴ are in thought and act inseparable; the μορφὴ is not a σχῆμα which can be put on and off, leaving the essence unaffected. Consequently, Christ, in emptying Himself of the "form," emptied Himself of the "specific character;" and must He not therein and thereby have emptied Himself, in some sense, however unintelligible to us, of the "equality" likewise? The "form," necessary to a complete Godhead, could hardly be surrendered without something of the intrinsic and essential going along with it. And Paul's ἐκένωσε points distinctly, not to the extrinsic laid aside (or "stripped off," as even Lightfoot says, somewhat misleadingly), not to any temporary abstention from the use of powers while equality is retained; but to some real "emptying" of the intrinsic, though what it was precisely we cannot pretend to say. All that we believe and must uphold is that, according to Paul, a real sovereign God became a real subject servant; the "specific character" of God, of Deity, but not of Divinity or "Divine nature," was given up, and the "specific character" of a servant took its place. This is how we would interpret for ourselves Dr. Beet's own words, "He laid aside . . . *whatever was inconsistent* with the 'form of a servant' and with His assumption of the 'likeness of men;'"[4] and again, "He accepted the limitations of a

[1] 2 Pet. i. 4. [2] *Expositor*, *l. c.*, p. 122. [3] *Commentary on Philippians*, p. 63.
[4] *Expositor*, p. 122.

pure human spirit," and "became the medium of the operation of the Holy Spirit;"[1] and once more, "He laid aside, in some sense, the operation of [His Divine] powers,"[2] "He renounced for a time the full exercise of His Divine powers."[3]

Do not phrases like these really surrender the whole question? If Christ, "by an influence upon Himself,"[4] laid aside the operation of His powers, this laying aside must have had some genuine effect; in other words, the human nature must have had some genuine effect upon the Divine, even as the Divine had a genuine effect upon the human. If the physical powers were limited, then, even though the ethical powers remained in full exercise, Christ was a diminished God; and could a diminished God be "equal with God"? Can a God be also half a God?

The only reasonable position appears to be the free admission that, in some way "inscrutable to us"[5] as mere men, the surrender of the "form" involved the surrender of the equality; and that, for all practical purposes, the two terms *μορφὴ Θεοῦ* and *τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ* are equivalent. If this be so, Dr. Beet's argument based on the retention of the equality is of no avail against Lightfoot's interpretation of *ἁρπαγμὸς* as "cherished possession."

Finally, the interpretation of Meyer, as elaborated by Dr. Beet, forces a very strange illustration into Paul's thought. In order to urge the Philippians to unselfishness, Paul is made to conceive the possibility of Christ having regarded his Deity as a means of "taking for Himself *as a man*" earthly good.[6] If His equality and His "form" had thus been retained, in what sense would He have been a "man"? And would earthly good have been an object of desire to Him? Would it not, in fact, have been His already? The illustration seems far-fetched for the object in view, and in itself contradictory.

This, then, I take to be the sum of the whole matter. On the one side stands a verbal difficulty, which Meyer and his followers seem to have exaggerated, and to satisfy which they have hit upon an interpretation unknown to all early commentators, and not a little complex and strained, necessitating at the same time a certain maiming of the *μορφὴ* in *μορφὴ Θεοῦ* and a semi-Docetistic interpretation of the *μορφὴ* in the *μορφὴ δούλου*. On the other side, with a truer conception of the *μορφή*, stands a simplicity of sequence and antithesis which the merits of the verbal difficulty are hardly strong enough to resist, and in which some at any rate of those early commentators familiar with the requirements of the Greek tongue seem to have quietly acquiesced. Under these circumstances, is it too bold a prophecy that, with some slight modifications in the presentment of it, Lightfoot's interpretation, as accepted by the Revised Version, will continue to hold the field?

[1] *Commentary*, p. 69. [2] *Expositor*, p. 123. [3] *Commentary*, p. 69.
[4] *Ibid.* [5] *Ibid.* [6] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT.

THE LOGIC OF CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY.

No. III.

By R. M. Wenley, M.A., D.Sc.

III.

In approaching the Ritschlians, a preliminary warning must be issued. Their standpoint is, on the whole, so foreign to the modes of thought with which the majority of us are familiar, that a special difficulty accompanies the statement of a theory already sufficiently complex and, as one might perhaps add, shifting. "It is a system which cannot be classified under any definite species, which overturns the officially recognized divisions."[1] I can only premise that I shall attempt to be as fair as human weakness permits.

To grasp the general basis of this latter-day theological phenomenon, one cannot do better than take note of the historical tendencies that have produced it. For this, like other conspicuous movements, is the expression of a want. The constructive systems of the post-Kantian period, more especially Hegel's, resulted, as we have seen, in an extraordinary theological activity. In theology proper, as distinguished from Old or New Testament criticism, this took form in the restatement of dogma. As the philosophical interest predominated, the tendency was to bring theology into line with speculative theory. The "picture-thinking" of religion, as the contention ran, stood in need of reproduction under the strictly notional framework of philosophy. In consequence, dogmas, if not altered entirely, were at least transformed in meaning, and, after a time, it appeared to many that the old landmarks had been removed. A feeling of uncertainty and distrust began to assert itself. When this condition obtains, it usually happens that men cast about for a cause on which to throw blame. In this case, accusation would *primâ facie* have been laid at the door of speculative theory. But just when Ritschl's thought was in movement, events so conspired that speculative theory was inevitably debited with the charge. The lean years of Hegelianism were beginning; positive science, in access of triumph, was on the point of generating, not simply an exclusively empirical treatment of things, but a naturalistic explanation of the entire universe. Let alone air and earth and sea, the theory of the Absolute was in process of discredit even in its own peculiar realms of morals and religion. Metaphysic seemed to have failed all round at the very moment when science appeared to have become altogether successful in its new and unscientific *rôle* of an ultimate theory. In these circumstances, the position evidently could not be

[1] P. Lobstein, *La Notion de la Pré-existence du Fils de Dieu*, p. 129.

secured for theology by any alliance with the much-bethumped system-mongers. And, as a result, Ritschl was one of the first to take up the now well-worn watchword, "Back to Kant."

Catch-phrases are a little apt to be misleading. I suppose we must all go back to Kant, and keep going back to him, oftener, perhaps, than we should care to acknowledge, if we are to grasp the methods and problems of modern philosophy. But the phrase, in its present historical connexion, came to imply rather a return to those portions of Kant that best consorted with the private opinions of the pilgrim. Accordingly, the Ritschlian point of departure is a view that is not necessarily that of Kant, but for which, at the same time, Kant furnishes a certain defence. To put the matter very summarily: In his criticism of the theoretical or rational faculty Kant answers the question—How is science possible? And he shows that mind must supply certain constitutive factors to our perception of the general conditions of phenomena—to wit, time and space. It must, further, furnish categories capable of ordering sensations so that we may obtain knowledge of relations between particular phenomena. Science is possible because it exists, and reason enters of necessity into all its varied aspects. But, on this analysis, metaphysic does not exist. For, the self, the universe, and God are not phenomena; they are ideas of reason. They cannot be made objects of thought, and so no certain knowledge of them in themselves can be obtained. Thus man is seen to live a twofold life. As a thinking being, he can know phenomena, but not ultimate realities. As a moral being, he does not deal with phenomena, but cannot help arriving at a conviction that God, freedom, and immortality constitute conspicuous realities in his experience—they are the mighty practical persuasions. To be rid of metaphysic, and to conserve an inviolable sphere for theology, Ritschl and his followers laid hold upon this sharp distinction, and, it must be said, the majority of them have been prone to emphasize it. The certainties of science have nothing to do with the objects of theology, and the objects of theology hold no commerce with the certainties of science. I leave you the entire material world to dispose of as you please, says the Ritschlian to the Darwinian; at the same time, I warn you that the methods by which alone you can hold your kingdom are void of application in my own realm of moral and religious truth. Or, to use Ritschl's own words, "The contention has gradually become prevalent that religion and the theoretic knowledge of the world are distinct functions of the spirit, which, where they are applied to the same objects, do not even partially coincide, but go *in toto* asunder from each other."[1] Religion, to put it otherwise, necessarily implies a teleological conception of the world; science, a causal one. And, as each of these doctrines has its separate sphere, neither conflicts with the other. Theology, therefore, to secure its own results, must carefully abstain from any such incursion into the region of theoretical inquiry as metaphysical

[1] *Rechtfertigung und V.*, 3rd edit., vol. iii. p. 185.

discussion inevitably involves. Philosophy is tabooed because it is no more than another kind of science—a pseudo-science.

To this point, I do not think that any one with a general appreciation of the concluding portion of the *Critique of Pure Reason* need have difficulty in grasping the position. But it must be confessed that the next step puzzles sorely. Ritschl and the majority of his school are not pure Neo-Kantians of the Lange type; Lotze has entered as a new and disturbing element. Here the difficulty of fairly estimating the standpoint becomes serious. Nor is the necessity for overcoming it merely imaginary. For Ritschl himself has said, "Each theologian is under compulsion or obligation as a scientific man to proceed according to a definite theory of knowledge, of which he must be conscious himself, and the legitimacy of which he must prove." [1] If this be so, one must frankly say that the adherents of the master afford but little aid. Two of the most prominent, Herrmann and Kaftan, differ from each other, the former being a more or less orthodox Neo-Kantian, the latter leaning more or less towards Lotze, while neither agrees with his chief. In these circumstances, the fairest course is to look at Ritschl's own view, and inquire whether it contains elements that account for these later divergences. Indeed, one is bound to this course, because it is impossible to perceive how Kant's theory and Lotze's are capable of unification.

Having accepted the negative results of the Kantian criticism, with their separation of the theoretical and practical, of the intellectual and the moral spheres, Ritschl went on to supplement these conclusions by adding a positive theory of knowledge. In this connexion we have the most express statement of his indebtedness to his Göttingen friend and colleague, Lotze. He says summarily that there are three varieties of epistemological theory—Plato's, Kant's, and Lotze's. He sharply criticizes the first, finds considerable fault with the second, and declares, in so many words, his adhesion to the third.[2]

What, then, is Lotze's epistemology? It is a theory which, in opposition to absolute idealism, reposes upon the conviction that reality is immensely richer than thought, and which, consequently, takes shape largely in showing the poverty of thought. Thought is limited to the exercise of a purely formal function, and, accordingly, one must protest alike against the scientific man and the philosopher when they attempt to explain everything by its means. It exercises this function upon receipt of data. When these data are referable to the senses, the objects of the so-called outer world are cogitated; when they are referable to intuition, the ideal objects of art, of morals, of religion, come within ken. But, despite a predominating critical and analytic tendency, Lotze could not rest satisfied with this account of the conditions of subjective thought, and immediately passed over into metaphysic proper. He pointed out that, as space is a subjective form in which *we* place objects, all things,

[1] *Theol. und Meta.*, p. 40. [2] Cf. *Rechtfertigung und V.*, 2nd edit., vol. iii. pp. 19, *seq.*

thus regarded, are phenomenal; they appear in spatial relations to us; they *are not so existent actually*, as far as we can know. What, then, are they? If our sensations be the occasion of phenomena that are not in any way like real things, what is a real thing? This problem implies the abolition of the thing-in-itself, and takes us beyond the Kantian position. Lotze's reply is—Although by thought we can never know that which "lies behind" a thing and gives it reality, yet we cannot help believing that the persistence of things is capable of explanation. Now, the only known fact of experience that persists through the varied changes of action and reaction, is the self. Accordingly, by analogy we attribute the nature of the self to every object. We conclude that things must be soul-like, otherwise they would not possess the permanent value in our experience which they certainly have. While for reason the world is no more than phenomenal, for faith it is a system of self-like beings. It has, that is, a value over and above all that we can learn about it by reflection. In other words, although asserting that we cannot know reality, Lotze proceeds to dogmatize concerning it, because, otherwise, he could not, on his own terms, enter the sphere of metaphysic at all. He thus sets himself upon a see-saw between a thought that deals in phenomena and a faith that declares itself to be possessed of ultimate truth. Ritschl's theology had to face the difficulty of connecting the Kantian separation between reason and religion with the Lotzian co-operation between logic and life.

While, in his early thought, Ritschl was occupied with the Kantian division between religious practice and metaphysical theory,[1] he came later to feel the need of attaching some kind of ultimate value to the objects of religion.[2] So he seized upon Lotze's doctrine, and especially upon its "judgment of worth." Just as for Lotze an object must possess a self-like being on account of its place in experience, so for Ritschl, God, Christ, and the kingdom of God, irrespectively of their real nature—about which, indeed, we know nothing—so win upon us that we attach absolute value to them. As with Lotze, so with Ritschl, these "things" are held experientially to be of worth because they fill a certain place in life. To this point Ritschl goes with Lotze. But, remaining true to his Neo-Kantianism, and being, as I am inclined to believe, almost destitute of metaphysical interest, he ignores Lotze's further conclusion. He does not clearly perceive that, for his colleague, things are no more than phenomena, and that, in so far as they are valuable, they must be lifted up to the same level as the objects of religion, so to speak. Accordingly, he seeks both to eat his cake and have it. He throws all the discredit of phenomenality upon metaphysic from his Neo-Kantian standpoint, and he attributes all the credit of operative value for us to theological objects from his Lotzian position. Nevertheless, he does not apprehend that,

[1] Cf. *Rechtfertigung und V.*, 1st edit., vol. i. p. 410.
[2] Cf. *Ibid.*, 2nd edit., vol. iii. p. 20.

according to the latter, the objects of metaphysic are on a level with the objects of religion; both are of worth in experience for the same reasons. So at one moment he is engaged in widening the gulf between theology and metaphysic, at another in aggrandizing theology, or rather in rehabilitating its subject-matter, by a method which heals this separation entirely. He conserves an inviolable realm for theology by that strange critical idealism which extrudes metaphysics; while he peoples this region by aid of a critical realism that is nothing if not metaphysical. I am not now concerned with the validity of either view in itself. But I desire to call your attention to the fact that the great difficulty of understanding Ritschl lies here. For, while he alleges that theology has one task, and metaphysic another, he at the same time proceeds to delineate the work of the former by means of a plan which abolishes this assumed difference of aim. With Lotze, the phenomenal, which Ritschl relegates to metaphysic, has no existence except in our representation; therefore things, in so far as they contribute estimable elements to our experience, must be explained by the same value-judgments as the objects of religion. To this indigestible philosophical appetizer may be traced the varied results of the theological meal alike with Ritschl himself and the members of his school. *De gustibus non est disputandum.* Or, to put it in another way, when staking out the theological field, Ritschl is entirely with Kant; when formulating and analyzing theological doctrines, he is entirely with Lotze. So in the school itself, when the theological interest predominates, as with Herrmann, Kant is the great authority; when philosophical theory attracts, as with Kaftan, Lotze's thought is the more conspicuous.

Ritschl thus bases his theology upon two main theorems. The first, derived from a partial adoption of Kantian criticism, creates a cleavage between metaphysical, or scientific, and theological interests. Theology has nothing to do with origins or with ultimate nature. These are left to metaphysics and science, and, indeed, must be so far deceptive inquiries, because man can know only the phenomenal. The second, taken from Lotze, lays stress on the principle that, in our experience, ideal matters must be judged strictly in relation to ourselves. That is, they contribute to experience in so far as they impress us with an irresistible conviction of their own value; and this is capable of estimate. In theology we ask—What is the worth of God, or of Christ, or of the other objects of religious experience? we are by no means concerned with what they actually are in themselves. These being the presuppositions, what, now, are the results?

Before proceeding to a brief statement of definite doctrines, it ought to be remarked that the Ritschlian method, both in its negative and positive aspects, has much originality. The critical achievement consists chiefly in an attack upon prevalent views by way of a new interpretation of theological history. The early period of Christianity, as the argument

runs, was characterized by contamination of the pure and original teaching of Christ. A "fatal combination" thus took place between Christian religion and Greek philosophy and ethics. The aspiration, which is so plainly the mark of man's religious life, suffered eclipse, because theories of the world in its origin and import came to command the largest share of theological attention. So, at a later time, writers like Anselm and Thomas Aquinas framed scholastic systems, instead of formulating religious dogmatics. After the Reformation the same movement continued, with the difference that one authority—the Bible—took the place of another—the Latin Church. Towards the close of last century, Kant and his rationalistic followers proved that the dogmas of Catholicism and Protestantism equally *could* not be fundamentally true, because reason was so constituted as to be incapable of arriving at knowledge of reality. It therefore became necessary either to dispense with religion or to regard it from an entirely new standpoint. The positive work of the Ritschlian method was to provide the latter. Seeing that all speculative theology—even if the speculative admixture be very slight—inevitably falls into the error of becoming a variant of natural religion, and thus discredits revelation, the objective as well as the subjective content of Christianity must be derived from revelation. This alone will safeguard the conviction that we have of the value of our religious judgments. We are certain that they possess authority because we perceive them to be inspired; if they were not direct from God, they would not so affect us. Accordingly, "one walks on the path of Ritschl if, while independent of him in details, he is directed by him to the task of forming a system of Christian doctrine starting from the principle that we are to think of God ὡς περὶ Χριστοῦ, that God's historical self-revelation is the beginning, not the concluding point of dogmatic reflection."[1] Faith compels us, as it were, and we hold that the "impression" derives its power and vividness from God's direct intervention. "Our certainty of God," Herrmann says, "is rooted in the simple fact that in Jesus we meet with a man who must hold His own against the world. For he who experiences such a compulsion through the image of Jesus that he must concede to Him this dignity, receives therewith, at the same time, the thought of a Power over all things, which is not otherwise moved than through the disposition from which the life-work of Jesus has proceeded. God gives Himself to us to be recognized as this power which is with Jesus. But then we are compelled to say that the existence of Jesus in our world is that fact through which God so touches us that He opens up intercourse with us."[2] But what are we told of God and of Christ?

1. *The doctrine of God.* According to the epistemological principles of Ritschl, it is impossible for man to know God as He actually exists. Notwithstanding the contempt for natural theology and for absolutism,

[1] Kattenbusch, *Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl*, p. 81.
[2] *Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott*, pp. 26, 27.

this theory presents a certain parallelism to Spinoza's. The absolute substance, as you may remember, appears to man under the modes of thought and extension. It may originate millions of manifestations in addition to these; but man, on account of his defective experiential machinery, cannot apprehend more than the two. So, with Ritschl, God may have a being of His own, a nature special to Himself. But man's knowledge is conditioned in such a way that he is confined to moral judgment in his recognition of Deity. Kant had completed the final destruction of the so-called proofs of the being of God, and had shown that divine authority must be sought within—in the practical reason. That is to say, God is known, not as He exists, but as we apprehend His subjective relation to ourselves. Now, His determination of Himself in our ethical experience is love. "Either He is thus thought, or He is not thought at all." Ritschl's doctrine on this point appears to have undergone certain important changes. But these are connected, not so much with the central tenet of the teaching as with the sphere in which it holds valid. At first our theologian strove to go beyond Kant, by showing that, just as theology must recognize the validity of science within its own realm, so science must be forward to accord similar authority to theology. The idea of God, derived from moral judgment, has as much authority in experience as the idea of gravitation, derived from scientific research. Dogmatic theology finds its task in effecting the recognition of this proposition. This is another way of saying that each of the two great departments of experience embodies results of equal worth for man's life taken as a whole. One series of investigations enables us to maintain ourselves in the world, another puts us in a position to conserve ourselves as against the world. At a later period, however, Ritschl resiles from this conception, and falls back upon the pure Neo-Kantian teaching. Following the only legitimate line along which his epistemological principles lead, he abandons the notion of forcing reason, on its theoretic side, to recognize the validity of the God-conception.[1] It is a "judgment of worth," a "helping idea" in the moral region, elsewhere it cannot be shown to possess application, and therefore is void of demonstrable validity. "God," accordingly, is the expression which we use when we state the *formal* shape attributed by us to "the will of love" which we spontaneously recognize as the content of Divinity in our subjective moral life. For a Deity whose garment is the universe we substitute one who is a "limiting conception" of the inner man. God thus exists only when He is recognized as an ethical starting-point. He need have no Personality, nor need He possess any attribute save love, which is the standard of value whereby the ethical creature, man, appraises Him. Love is God, and aught else is a formal addition made by us to this norm to which, by our own nature, we must refer moral and religious origins. Deity, accordingly, comes to be the subjective hypothesis due to finite

[1] Comp. *Rechtfertigung und V.*, vol. iii. p. 192 (1st edit.) with vol. iii. p. 214 (3rd edit.).

spiritual nature, just as "thinghood" is *the* objective judgment incident to finite intellectual nature.

2. *The value of the documents.* This may be dismissed with comparative brevity, because here the Ritschlian view is not so distinctive. In fact, the younger members of the school, just like their speculative opponents, accept the results of historical criticism and follow its methods. Ritschl's own originality in this department lay mainly in the importance which he accorded to the Old Testament writers. Christianity having been debased by pagan philosophy, one must look to Judaism for its purest spiritual ally. Christ set free the true spirit of the Jewish religion, and so the books of the New Testament which best preserve Jewish ideas, and exclude other admixture, are likely to be the most valuable. The idea of God developed in the religion of the Jews formed the matrix of Christianity; hence the immense importance to theology of a proper appreciation of Old Testament conceptions.[1] With regard to the New Testament documents, Ritschl and his followers, though accepting the results of modern criticism, make special deductions of their own. The New Testament writings, and especially the synoptic Gospels, constitute the Christian's point of departure. But whereas for the speculative theologians the historical record is valuable only on account of the idea which it encloses, for the Ritschlians it is the picture, not simply of a special, but of the single, revelation. The synoptic Gospels and their companion books are not, indeed, to be regarded as an external authority imposing Christianity upon man. Nevertheless, they furnish the sole account of a life whose supernatural character, once recognized by the inner man, possesses the unique power of originating true religion. That is, the documents are in themselves without authority for faith, and so religion remains untouched by historical criticism. But, on the other hand, they delineate a career which so wins upon man's moral consciousness that he cannot help recognizing in it the single revelation of God. If he do not reach this stage, he has not even begun to be a Christian. For, as Herrmann says, "There lie in each man the conditions of being able to find in the tradition of Jesus in the New Testament the picture of a man who through the power of his personal life holds us above the abyss."[2] The realization of these conditions is consequent upon loving appreciation of the New Testament story. Hence the value of the New Testament writings is that they afford the occasion of the moral judgment which is the ultimate guarantee of the supernatural character of Christianity. "The doubt whether the image of Jesus which works on us in the Gospel belongs to myth and not to history is forthwith excluded. . . . Through a judgment resting on grounds

[1] Schulz's admirable work, *Old Testament Theology*, is probably the best result of this portion of Ritschl's teaching.

[2] See Herrmann's contribution to the recent Creed controversy in No. 50 of *Die Christliche Welt*.

of historical investigation, we cannot reach higher than probability. But to Christian faith it is certain that Jesus has lived as the man who, with his message of a kingdom of God, has opened to men the possibility of an eternal life, and who at the same time was conscious that the existence of his Person in its life and death will realize this kingdom for all who do not pass him by." [1]

3. *The doctrine of Christ and of the cardinal tenets of the Christian faith.* The doctrine of Christ that follows logically from these premisses is not difficult to perceive. At the outset, Christ's life becomes of absolute value as soon as, by an inner judgment, man recognizes in Him the sole bearer of the Divine revelation. The content of this judgment is that Christ alone satisfies the yearning for God—for the power that is able to lift man above the world. The Divinity of Christ is, therefore, a consequence of His having so laid hold upon the sinner that the transforming influence cannot otherwise be explained. It is judged by the Christian to be the essential implication of the operation of Christ's Spirit in him; and so, likewise, of all the other attributes of the Divine Son. Those alone who are already aroused can appreciate this. "The man seeking God sees in Christ the miraculous fact of His personal life actual in history." The historical Christ, as apprehended by the Christian—by the man whom He has apprehended, as the old theology said—is the only Son of God, the only instrument of God's will, the only Founder of the kingdon of God. These doctrines our moral judgment, once excited, compels us to accept, and so morality passes over into religion, and, at the same time, provides a sphere in which science and criticism, metaphysic and mysticism, are incapable equally of constructive or destructive results. For, from the irresistible moral impression of Christ's Person, which is the norm, man goes on to fill out his work and his attributes in an inviolable realm and after an incontrovertible manner.

Plainly, then, the old view of the cardinal tenets of the Christian faith must be revised. The atonement, for example, is no longer to be regarded as a legal satisfaction offered in full on behalf of mankind. Christ's suffering to death rather forms part of the witness to His faithfulness. To do the will of God He accepted this trial, and its very magnitude testifies to the perfection of His revelation. And if these pangs were but "an accidental accompaniment of His positive faithfulness in the calling that had been appointed to Him," [2] it is easy to see that no great stress need be laid on such similar details as the miraculous birth, the mystic baptism, the transfiguration, or the resurrection.[3] Having, by a judgment of value, recognized that Christ is God, the really important matter is to pass on to the understanding of all that He accomplished for the manifestation of the Divine nature in its relation to men.

[1] *Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott*, pp. 92, 93.

[2] *Rechtfertigung und V.*, vol. iii. p. 416.

[3] Cf. Harnack's *Dogmengeschichte*, vol. i. pp. 74, *seq.*; Wendt's *Die Lehre Jesu*, vol. ii. p. 543.

Now, Christ's chief mission was the revelation and establishment of the kingdom of God. "In the volitional activity that was peculiar to Christ, the essential will of God as love was made manifest or revealed, in that the kingdom of God, which was Christ's final purpose, is identical with the final purpose of God."[1] In relation to this work all Christ's other attributes gradually make themselves apparent to the eye of faith. For "spiritual activity alone constitutes the reality of a moral personality."[2] Man knows nothing of a pre-existent or exalted Christ, but only of the temporal career of the Son of God. And this career is Divine because it, and nothing but it, set forth the loving nature of God, and the outpouring of His purpose in the organization of the kingdom. The true Christian life cannot be realized except in effort on behalf of this society, and so moral judgment is transformed into religious worship. Recognition of Christ necessarily issues in this devotion of self to His ends. The desire is to achieve the kingdom now, because the motive force presented by the special revelation of Christ cannot find outlet save in resolve to work for an invisible spiritual community. In pursuing this aim man gains a mastery over nature, because he recognizes his own unity, in love, with the Deity whose realm he serves, and thus he is redeemed. For redemption is not a mystical process wrought out in the sinner by Christ. There is no original sin to be removed, but rather an ignorance of the import of God's nature and of Christ's mission. When these have been fully appreciated, man redeems himself by an inner act of the religious consciousness that results in his self-identification with the Divine ends revealed by our Lord. Sin is a subjective experience precipitating recognition of failure to conform to God's will. The revelation of Christ, in the shape of the kingdom of God, provides a means whereby sin may be actively overcome, and peace made, not with a Judge, but with a loving Father in heaven, who desires that the ends of His children should be identical with His own. These are the positive channels for the realization of the living conviction which Harnack, during the controversy on the Apostles' Creed, summarized as follows: "The question who and what Jesus is, when the Church tradition concerning him is shaken at any point, can be settled only in the way and with the means of historical investigation; but the conviction that this historical Jesus is the Redeemer and Lord follows, not from historical knowledge, but from the knowledge of sin and of God when Jesus Christ is announced to it."

(*To be concluded.*)

[1] *Rechtfertigung und V.*, vol. iii. p. 421.
[2] Ritschl, *Theol. und Meta.*, p. 30.

CURRENT AMERICAN THOUGHT.

WHENCE IS SIN? By Rev. WILLIAM E. FISCHER, A.M. (*The Lutheran Quarterly*).—The confessors say that man could not sin without God, just because man cannot exist without God. But they are scripturally careful in saying that, though God is man's Creator and Preserver and Sustainer, He could not and did not cause him to fall from his original holiness. That God cannot be the Cause of sin is a truth that reason, conscience, and the Bible alike testify to. The fact that men have been busy through all the centuries in efforts to account for the existence and reason of sin is proof that the human mind is slow to involve God in the moral disaster of the race.

The Manichæan error is that sin is a necessary property of matter. But as God created and preserves all nature, God is virtually made responsible for sin, if it is a property of matter. Quenstedt says, "God is in no manner the efficient Cause of sin, neither in part nor in whole, neither directly nor indirectly, neither accidentally nor really (*per se, per accidens*), whether in the form of Adam's transgression or in that of any other sin. God is not, neither can He be called, the Author or Cause of sin." God is not the Cause of sin (1) physically and *per se*, because thus the evil or sin has no cause; (2) not morally, by commanding, persuading, or approving, because He does not desire sin, but hates it; nor (3) by way of accident, because nothing happens to God by chance or fortuitously. According to the Pelagian view, man was open to influences which might fix his character, making it either good or bad. This view makes man an imperfect piece of God's handiwork. What he is to become is wholly dependent upon his own actions.

The Augsburg Confession says, "The cause of sin must be sought in the depraved will of the wicked, namely, of the devil and wicked men, which, when destitute of Divine aid, turns itself away from God." God has clothed the will with power to choose between motives. That power the will perverts. That will is "good" naturally, but in its exercise man suffers it to run in the way of disobedience. God simply permits it to yield.

The theory of the pre-existence of souls maintains that sin existed before man was created. Before the soul was embodied, it fell. What Adam did was therefore only a disclosure of that which took place before the world was made. The necessity theory would account for the Fall on the ground of an eternal decree. The Fall was the necessary development of a plan God from all eternity had fixed upon. God withdrew His support from man in order to his fall.

What is sin? Adam sinned in the exercise of his God-given liberty. His sin lay in perverting a will that was "good." His sin was the perversion of a good will. The will is a self-determining free agent. The will of man is now depraved. By the Fall the will has lost its true, original, and natural power. It cannot now move on the line of personal liberty in true holiness. It has an evil bias. As a faculty, man still possesses will. Actual sin comes as man allows his perverted will to lead him.

The necessity of the Fall is also made to lie in man's peculiar relation to his surroundings. He was, in a sense, part of the world. Hence, it is maintained, he had a certain sympathy for whatever appealed to his senses. But man was made in God's image also. He was made conscious of God's higher right. God commanded him. When, therefore, he found the forbidden fruit pleasant, and to be desired as a thing good in itself, and to be enjoyed against the expressed will of God, he sinned. Sympathy with nature did not make sin a necessity. Subordinating the will of God to the natural,—this was sin. Such is the power of the will, that it can choose against

God's will, and contrary to its own original purpose. Guilt lies in the contrary action of the will. The way up to this contrary action lay along the way of a cherished desire to partake of the forbidden fruit. The cherished desire was the danger-signal that went unheeded. The will now, though depraved, conditions all action. A man's will is his state. Man *acts* as he *wills*, and *is* as he *acts*. The will being perverted, the character is debased. Man is not pushed down, but, under the impulse of an unaided, perverted will, he *goes down*. He chooses evil.

How can sin consist with God's perfect holiness, his omniscience and omnipotence? The reply is that sin was not in the Divine plan of creation. God foresaw sin as a possibility. God hates sin; but He could not prevent sin without destroying His creature—man. To destroy man's will would be to destroy him who wills; for to will presupposes conscious intelligence, personality. This view of the case relieves God of arbitrariness in relation to man as His creature, and leaves man as God made him, *free* to do the right or wrong, yet clothed with sufficient power to remain true and pure. God magnifies His Name in the recovery of man from the wilfulness wherein lies the essence of sin.

THE LATEST PHASE OF HISTORICAL RATIONALISM. By B. B. WARFIELD, D.D., LL.D. (*The Presbyterian Quarterly*).—What is ominous in the present-day drift of religious thought is the sustained effort that is being made to break down two principles, viz. the principle of a systematized body of doctrines to be believed, and the principle of an external authority as the basis of belief. The "newer religious thinking" sets itself, before everything else, in violent opposition to what it calls "dogma" and "external authority." But indefinite subjectivism, or subjective indifferentism, has no future. It is a disintegrating and destructive force. The assault on positive doctrinal teaching is presented to-day chiefly under the flag of "comprehension." Because of the divisions of the Church of Christ, it is proposed to stop thinking, so that we may no longer think differently. We find the seeds of this movement towards "comprehension" in the most unlikely places. But on this pathway there is no goal except the ultimate naturalization of Christianity, and that means the perishing of distinctive Christianity out of the earth. Dr. Pusey calls attention to the fact that the rationalists of Germany were the descendants, not of the unbelievers of former controversies, but of the "defenders" of Christianity.

Along with the attack on distinctive truth goes necessarily an accompanying attack on "external authority in religion." For if there be an "external authority," that which it teaches is true for all. It begins by rejecting the authority of the Bible for minor matters only. The next step is to reject its authority for everything except "matters of faith and practice." Then comes unwillingness to bow to all its doctrinal deliverances and ethical precepts. Then the whole Bible is set aside as *authority*, with the remark, as concerning the New Testament, that in the apostolic age men depended each on the Spirit in his own heart, and no one dreamed of making the New Testament the authoritative Word of God, while it was only in the later second century that the canon was formed, and "external authority" took the place of "internal authority." This we call rationalism. And it is only another form of this rationalism, when it would fain believe that what it appeals to within the human breast is not the unaided spirit of man, but the Holy Ghost in the heart. This differs from technical rationalism only in a matter of temperature. In thus rejecting the Bible, men virtually reject Christ, who appealed to the Bible as authoritative. Christ's knowledge is treated as limited; and even in matters of religion He accommodated Himself, in the form at least of His teachings, to the times in which He lived. The attitude of mind which

is thus outlined constitutes the most dangerous, because the most fundamental, of heresies. It is for this tendency of thought that the powerful movement known in Germany as Ritschlism practically stands.

"Rationalism" never is the direct product of unbelief. It is the indirect product of unbelief among men who would fain hold their Christian profession in the face of an onset of unbelief which they feel too weak to withstand. Rationalism is, therefore, always a movement within the Christian Church; and its adherents are characterized by an attempt to save what they hold to be the essence of Christianity by clearing it from what they deem to be accretions, or by surrendering what they feel to be no longer defensible features of its current representations.

Ritschlism is an attempt to clear theology of all "metaphysical" elements. Otherwise expressed, this means that nothing will be admitted to belong to Christianity except facts of experience; the elaboration of these facts into "dogmas" contains "metaphysical" elements. The effort is to save the essence of Christianity from all possible danger from the speculative side. The means taken to effect this is to yield the whole sphere of "metaphysical" thought to the enemy. The result is the destruction of the whole system of Christian doctrine. The Ritschlite contention ultimates in an "undogmatic Christianity." Theology, we are told, is killing religion. But the history of Christianity is the history of doctrine. Ritschlite rationalism must, therefore, deal with an historical problem, as well as with a speculative and a practical one. What is it to do with an historical Christianity which is a decidedly doctrinal Christianity? It can only explain the rise and development of doctrine as a series of accretions from without, overlying and concealing Christianity. Harnack represents all Christian doctrine as the product of Greek thought on Christian ground. The simple gospel of Christ was the gospel of love. On the basis of this gospel the ancient world built up the Catholic Church, but in doing so it built itself bankrupt. In what we call Church theology we are looking only at the product of heathen thinking on the basis of the gospel. The kernel of the gospel is simple subjective faith in God as Father, revealed to us as such by Jesus Christ.

Dr. McGiffert explains the transformation of the primitive into the Catholic Church, and thinks it was practically complete before the end of the second century of the Church's life. He deals mainly with the *change of spirit* which constitutes the essence of the transformation. The spirit of the primitive Church was "the spirit of religious individualism, based upon the felt presence of the Holy Ghost." Every Christian had, in the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in him, a personal source of inspiration at his disposal, to which he could turn in every time of need. There was, therefore, no occasion for an authority for Christian teaching external to the individual's own spirit; and there had arisen no conception as yet of a "rule of faith" or of a "New Testament canon." The only authority that was recognized was the Holy Spirit, and He was supposed to speak to every believer as truly as He spoke to an apostle. There was no instituted Church, and no external bond of Christian unity. Every Christian enjoyed immediate contact with God through the Spirit.

The change of spirit which marks the rise of the Catholic Church took place in the second century. It was the result of the secularization of the Church, and of the effort of the Church to avoid such secularization. Among the heathen brought into the Church in the second century, gradually more and more men of education were included. Among these were some philosophical spirits of a Platonizing tendency, who brought into the Church with them a habit of speculation. Their speculative theories they represented as Christianity, and they appealed to the authority of the apostles in their favour; and thus arose the first theologizing in the Christian Church.

The Gnostics were the first Creed-builders within the limits of the Church, and the first inventors of the idea of apostolic authority and of an apostolic canon. It was in conflict with them that the Church gradually developed the full conception of authority which gave us finally the full-fledged Catholic Church. The steps by which this transformation was made were three: first, the recognition of the teaching of the apostles as the exclusive standard and norm of the Christian truth; second, the confinement to a specific office of the power to determine what is the teaching of the apostles; and third, the designation of a specific institution (viz. the Catholic Church) as the sole channel of Divine grace.

No transformations of the Church have taken place since this great transformation. The Reformation was but an attempt. It was a revival of the primitive spirit of individuality, and a rejection of external authority, but it retained the Catholic conception of an apostolic Scripture canon, and so retained the essential Catholic idea of an "external authority."

Regarding Dr. McGiffert as fairly and sufficiently stating the position of modern historical rationalism, Dr. Warfield proceeds to combat his representations in detail. The treatment is too elaborate to be effectively summarized; but the question that needs to be discussed is effectively stated thus: "Are we prepared to surrender the whole body of Christian doctrine as being no part of essential Christianity, but the undivine growth of ages of human development?" Dr. Warfield's conclusion is thus given: "We cannot have two supreme standards. Either the Holy Spirit in the heart is the norm of truth, and the deliverances of the apostles must be subjected to what we consider His deliverances (and then we have mysticism cooling down to rationalism); or else the apostolic revelation is the norm of truth, and the fancied deliverances of the Spirit in our heart must be subjected to the apostolic declarations (and then we have Protestantism)."

THE UNWRITTEN LAW OF GOD. By TALBOT W. CHAMBERS, D.D. (*The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*).—Besides the rule of duty revealed in the living oracles of God, there is a law written on the heart of man. This is antecedent to all training and instruction, and springs out of the constitution of our nature. It may be confused, or ill-understood, or habitually disobeyed, but still it is there, engraven on the conscience of man by the finger of God. There is something in man which censures and annoys him when he does wrong, however much he may be inclined to that wrong. Certainly he never planted this principle of opposition in his own soul. The existence of this law is expressly taught in Scripture (see Rom. ii. 14, 15). The heathen have, in their own nature, a rule of duty and a sense of obligation. The doctrine of Scripture is confirmed by consciousness and by experience. Every man feels that he is a responsible being. He has the sense of right and wrong, not simply in regard to outward actions, but also in respect to secret thoughts and motives. He cannot ascribe his convictions to education. They spring up anterior to all influences from without because they lie at the very core of his being. The testimony of experience is identical and constant for all men. It does not belong to one period or to one nation, but prevails among all, and for all time. It is a characteristic of the race. Wherever there are men, there is the sense of moral obligation, the knowledge of right and wrong, wholly independent of any civil enactments.

The common objection to this view is that men have differed, and do differ, widely in their moral judgments, the same acts being in one country or in one age denounced as crimes, and yet in another land or time commended as virtues. But this diversity, so far from impairing the supremacy of conscience, confirms it. For why do men form

any judgment at all in the case? Why are they not altogether indifferent? Because there is that within them which compels an opinion, even the universal sense of right and wrong.

To this conception of law as inherent in the nature of man, which the Scriptures teach and all men acknowledge, one may apply Kant's celebrated utterance with far more propriety than he did to his impersonal *categorical imperative*, "Two things there are which, the oftener and the more steadfastly we consider them, fill the mind with an ever-new and ever-rising admiration and reverence—the starry heaven above, and the moral law within." This is the secret of the unwritten law; it is not an impersonal idea, not a mere conception due to man's rational liberty. The law controls because it comes from the Supreme Will. Hence it speaks with authority, discarding all reference to experience or expediency. Hence the fear and shame and self-humiliation which follow upon disobedience to the voice within.

And yet this unwritten law of conscience is not able to control conduct and mould character. In numberless cases it is overborne by passion, or perverted by ignorance, or misled by education, and sometimes is made the minister of evil when men persist in doing wrong under the conviction that it is right. There is need, therefore, for a republication of the law of nature, a fresh assertion of the authority of conscience, and a statute brief and clear enough to guide men in their varied relations. We have just such a compendium of duty in the Ten Words from Sinai.

THE SEVENTH PETITION, OR THE KINGDOM OF DARKNESS. By Rev. J. B. RUST, A.M. (*The Reformed Quarterly Review*).—"And deliver us from evil." This sentence fitly stands at the close of the Lord's Prayer. It expresses in the most comprehensive, yet in the plainest way, the deep and ceaseless yearning which dwells in the heart of every believer for the final deliverance of the sons of God, for a new heaven and a new earth. The problem of evil is to be solved by the deliverance of the just. To the immediate disciples of Jesus the seventh petition had a profoundly comforting significance. They shared with their countrymen the Jewish belief in a kingdom of darkness, whose wicked emissaries exercised a baleful influence upon the visible world. Sonship with God through Christ not only assured them of victory over the temptations and sinfulness of this earthly life, but also over the powers of hell.

The presence and play of two antagonistic forces in the physical universe and in mankind have been recognized, in one form or another, by all religions and in every age of history. Since there is but one step from the belief in evil spirits to the notion that mortals can enter into league with them against the rest of mankind, at a very early period the so-called "black arts" sprang into existence. The human family fell into one of the most deplorable of aberrations when, in infantile ignorance and moral degeneracy, it constructed upon the awful but unrecognized fact of sin, this cruel fabric of superstition, and developed the corrupt oracular mysteries of antiquity, followed by the witchcraft, necromancy, and exorcism of the Middle Ages and modern times. In a single century of the Middle Ages (1550–1650) not less than a hundred thousand lives were sacrificed at the hands of fanatical avengers for the imaginary crime of witchcraft.

The current notions of Jewish witchcraft do not seem to be well founded. Both Philo and Josephus understood a witch to be a poisoner, or one who by secret and unlawful drugs or philtra, sought to injure the senses or the lives of men. Maimonides declares that a sorcerer was one who divined by using some kind of drugs or philtra. The Bible undoubtedly contains a system of demonology, and teaches the

existence of a world of darkness. There is, however, plainly a gradual growth of belief in evil agencies and familiars, both among Jews and Gentiles.

The Old Testament has two words which are translated "devils" (Deut. xxxii. 17; Ps. cvi. 37). The former applies to goats, and to men wearing hairy robes, the inhabitants of trackless wastes, and perhaps, in popular story, goat-like denizens of the forest, similar to the Greek satyrs. The latter is rendered δαιμόνια in the Septuagint. Parkhurst says, "It is not improbable that the Christians borrowed their goat-like pictures of the devil with a tail, horns, and cloven feet from the heathenish representations of Pan the terrible."

When our Lord appeared on earth there existed an elaborate system of black art among the Jews, which, in its incantations, mystic rites, and exorcisms, was scarcely distinguishable from the commonly despised practices of heathen nations. In the New Testament we find clear teachings concerning the kingdom of darkness. Our Lord not only recognized and declared its existence, but made known all that men need to know about it in order to escape the enthrallment of superstition and the imprisonment of hell. But it is a flagrant error to place the instances of possession mentioned in the New Testament in the same category with the fanatical belief in witchcraft as it was developed anew during the Middle Ages, and to ascribe both to ignorance of scientific truth. Christ taught the existence of a kingdom of darkness, and the exercise of its influence through the medium of this world. But He came to destroy it by supplanting it in the hearts of men.

The seventh petition of the Lord's Prayer is a prayer for deliverance from the power of darkness as exercised by the world. Christ treated the power of evil in two ways. Now He objectified, again He subjectified it. Certain manifestations of wickedness He ascribed directly to Satan. At other times the sinful or sinning individual was himself identified with the evil one. He conceived of the kingdom of darkness as exercising its soul-destroying power through the instrumentality of man himself. Therefore just to the degree in which the heart becomes involved in, or allows itself to be controlled by, sin, does it pass under the dominion of Satan. The seventh petition, therefore, warns every follower of Christ against all those malignant and destructive tendencies in human nature which subjectify themselves in the individual, and objectify themselves in the world of men at large. Every human being realizes the existence of subtle powers somehow woven into his soul, which press him away from the path of holiness, justice, love, and truth.

The seventh petition is a prayer for deliverance from the power of darkness as exercised by Satan. It cannot be denied that the existence of evil agencies outside of the race of man is distinctly declared in the New Testament. How far did Jesus sanction the popular faith? The peculiar malady called "possession" manifested itself in the form of an epidemic, and it is allied to religious melancholia rather than to lunacy. Our Lord taught that Satan and the kingdom of darkness affect the human soul through the channel of conscious personality and the agency of the world. Hence there is a measure of identity between the element of evil in the natural man, and the influences of moral darkness external to him, inasmuch as they both belong to the same realm. The deeper men fall into moral enslavement and decrepitude, the nearer do they approach the border-line of that awful spiritual prison from which there is no escape. The will may display absolute paralysis, just as the reason may exhibit ungovernable defectiveness. And yet such disturbances cannot always be attributed to physical causes.

The writer gives some remarkable instances of double consciousness. Evidently the "possession" of our Lord's time was a disease of the moral nature, caused by an

absolute enslavement of conscience and will, resulting from an overpowering manifestation of the destructive agency of the evil one, through the channel of human personality.

THE TESTIMONY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT TO THE BIBLE. By JOHN DE WITT (*The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*).—Both the Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches hold and teach that the Bible embodies a supernatural revelation. But the Protestant holds that this revelation is given directly to mankind; the Roman Catholic, that it is given to the Church for mankind,—the Church authenticates it to man by her testimony, and interprets it for man by her celestial wisdom. Out of this difference in their respective doctrines of the rule of faith emerges a profound difference in the religious life of the two great divisions of Western Christendom. Ask an intelligent Roman Catholic the ground of his conviction that the truths of the Bible are the Word of God, and he will reply, "It is because the Church authenticates these teachings by her testimony." Ask the Protestant Christian why he has this conviction, and he will tell you that the Bible is its own witness to him; that since he has become a Christian it reveals itself as truth to his heart and conscience. And if, going further back, he shall explain this new experience, he will tell you that, in the last analysis, it is the inward testimony of the Holy Spirit.

The proposition this writer expounds and defends is that the Holy Spirit, the indwelling God, working in and with the Scriptures on the heart and life of the Christian, testifies to the individual Christian that the Bible is the Word of God. There is an *à priori* probability, and a strong presumption, that God will accompany a revelation of His will with evidence sufficient to make its acceptance obligatory; and that, to the person who does accept it, He will increase the evidence to a degree that will constitute it a Divine certification. In Scripture, the statements which assure the disciple of the new verification of the Word are closely associated with the Holy Spirit, the indwelling God. He is represented in them as a Teacher, a Witness, a Comforter, a Guide, who, in all His work in the disciple, will confirm the disciple both in his acceptance of the truth, and in his assurance of his own blessed relation to it. Such statements are the assurance of Jesus that when He shall have gone away, God as the Witness to His own revelation will not have gone. God the Holy Spirit will, to the disciple's spirit, bear spiritual and convincing testimony to the revealed truth and will of God.

But what does the Bible mean by the expression, "the Spirit witnessing with our spirits"? In testifying to the truth, the Infinite and Divine Spirit comes into immediate contact with the finite and human spirit; the two beings are in direct communion, the one testifying, the other persuaded and assured by the testimony. But we know absolutely nothing of the methods by which one spirit influences another, without the employment of the senses. We may not think that the Spirit testifies to the Bible by communicating to the Christian a proposition such as "The Bible is the Word of God." Men have, indeed, claimed that they received from God supernatural audible or visible communications; but this is not the Protestant doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit.

The inward witness is not the mere emerging into consciousness of the feeling and assurance that the Bible is the Word of God. This view has been held. The Holy Spirit, working in an ineffable manner upon our hearts, directly and without means, causes that without hesitation we assent to the truths of the Bible; the Spirit thus produces an assurance above all human judgment, an assurance utterly unrelated to human reasoning, and needing for its maintenance no further arguments and testimonies.

John Owen, in criticizing this theory, says, "This hath not the proper nature of a *testimony*. A Divine work it may be, a Divine testimony it is not."

The teaching of Scripture and of the Church is that the testimony of the Holy Spirit to the Bible is the saving work of the Spirit in individual men, in association with the Bible itself. The Holy Spirit, when applying the benefits of Christ's redemption, saving men from the dominion of sin, works by and with the Word of God; and produces a supernatural experience not only congruous to the Word, but inexplicable and impossible unless the Bible be God's Word. The Holy Spirit, the indwelling God, by and with the Word, creates an experience conformed to the Word, and so, honouring and confirming it, testifies that it is the Word of God. The testimony of the Spirit to the Bible is the testimony of the distinctively Christian experience to Christianity.

Then the greatest duty of the Church is to seek by prayer and every means in its possession the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. This is the profoundest need of our time, as indeed of all time.

The testimony of the Spirit, revealed in Christian experience, is no test of the canonicity of Bible books, nor of the inspiration of books. It is the Bible's truth and supreme authority that is authenticated. The question needing consideration, since the indwelling Spirit produces the distinctively Christian experience, is this—Has Christian experience a place among the evidences of Christianity? The apologetic value of the testimony of the Spirit to the Christian himself is absolute. For the testimony of the Spirit is a work. It is the transformation of probable knowledge into real knowledge by experiment or experience. The Christian himself, in his life of prayer, of lofty spiritual aspiration, of purity, etc., is the most convincing evidence of Christianity that the Church can offer to the world to-day.

THE INERTNESS OF SOCIETY. By Professor MATTHIAS H. RICHARDS, D.D. (*The Lutheran Quarterly*).—A common property of inanimate objects is their inertness: they are possessed of no initiative energy. In the drama of existence all the parts they play are passive ones. The seeming force they have at times is but the logical consequence of their having no force. The law of gravitation is but the creative energy continued, and nothing at all like the volition of a sentient being. Spirit alone has initiative energy.

The value of this inertness of material things, in our dealings with external and inanimate matter, is exceedingly great. They stay where we put them, they move as we impart motion to them, they halt as we block up their pathway. Inertness is, in its relation to our wants and wishes, a force, a power, and is rightly named *vis inertiæ*.

There is in human society an attribute that stands palpably over against this inertness of nature, as its counterpart, endowed with corresponding functions of office, working out the same good purpose and beneficent end for mankind. It is the bond that unites the generations, ensures the stability of the race, promotes the onward march of the ages; gives good hope, while it threatens formidable obstacles, to reform and all betterment. It is the constitutional quality. The inertness of human society is no exact equivalent, in its operativeness, of the inertness of matter; for human society is a spiritual, a psychic unity, not a mere physical one. The subject-matter being thus a different one, the operation of this creative energy will be to produce a varying product, while yet essentially the same. And we cannot overlook the fact that man shares, by gift, the power of initiating energy. Thus he overcomes, modifies, accelerates, reinforces, by individual action, this inertness of the great unit of

society of which he is a part. He is both active and passive; and the resultant is the combination of his inertness and his energy.

In these days men are praised overmuch for that which is new, for initiating energy rather than for conserving or maintaining it. Valuable as modern additions to human knowledge may have been, must we not subtract from their actual worth the momentum which society has lost because of this application of initiative energy in the new direction? We have gained most certainly, but not without considerable cost. All energies are very leaky. All machinery will wear out as well as rust out. If you supersede it by new, you have lost only its residue of service, and not its original value. Something of this sort is true also as to the momentum of human society. The energy of beliefs, the vitality of institutions, slows down, unless reinforced, into superstition and unmeaningness. That same energy which is required to reinforce might be used to give new direction, and the actual loss would be only the unexpended part of the social momentum.

After making all allowances, and noting all manner of conditions, it remains that what we call our civilization is an inheritance of the past, far more largely than the original invention of the present. We owe much more of what we are to the momentum due to the inertness of society than we do to the initiative energies which combat it, and to which we are so prone to give all the honour and the glory. This is true on the material side of our civilization, but on other sides also. Our present comfortable attitude in the mitigation of fierce passions, in refined feelings, in more accurate thought, in clearer spiritual vision, is a superstructure that rose slowly upon the foundations of the past. Had not human society kept steadily and inertly onward, instead of breaking off and making interminably new beginnings, we should not have attained to any of these things. Society's inertness is the condition of its entrance into the inheritance so richly left it; and this very inertness is the source of its momentum, its stability, its progress. Even when men pass new laws and make new constitutions, they keep on living a long while under the old ones. We acknowledge the force of habit in the individual, and national institutions are simply concurrent individual habits made all the more forceful because it requires greater energy to do and to be different from others than to mind and to do the same things.

Social inertness, however, will grow less as educated intelligence is more generally diffused throughout a people. It will be confined to fewer things and more essential matters, and in these it will grow stronger and stronger, as it should. It will be reinforced by the initiative energy of an individual persuasion arrived at by an independent investigation which has confirmed the old truth; and there is no greater force than this. But outside of these essential truths thus held with more intense persistence there will be tolerance, greater desire for personal freedom, less shock at finding others differing with us or from us. Intelligence is cosmopolitan, and expectant of differences; it realizes in its own more finely developed being that this is natural. Unless it runs into puny sentimentalism, it does not offer itself as a convert to the views of others, but it is willing to believe that others may be in earnest also, and respects them for it.

Common Errors as to the Relations of Science and Faith. By George Macloskie (*The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*).—In view of the relative independence of the testimony for religious and scientific doctrines, all that should be expected is a *general harmony*; and to press for excessive conformity is dangerous. In fact, no sound method of homologizing the Bible and natural science has been discovered; nor was it ever possible in the formative stages of science to effect their harmony. We

must carefully keep our interpretations of Scripture untainted by our scientific ideals, and we must keep our science clear of theological glosses.

Neither reason nor Holy Scripture gives us any warranty for restraining scientific researches or speculations; and any attempt to restrain them proves our ignorance of the laws of investigation, and is a usurpation of the rights of human thought. Men have used wrong methods, and arrived at valuable results. Scientific inquirers claim the right to go wrong, to use wrong methods, if these appear the best, and not to be challenged as for a moral delinquency. The investigator may be astray in his views of nature, may be biassed in his mode of drawing inferences, may be ignorant of the religious tendency of his opinions. But his erroneous assumptions may be a necessary step in his progress, and we must let him follow out his own plans.

The right to investigate and to speculate carries with it the right to publish the speculations at any stage, and however crude. It rarely happens that one man can see all the bearings of the facts or theories on which his mind is occupied; and a single investigator rarely completes a subject of his research. It is by the publication of his ideas that others are able to confirm or confute him. The constant appeal to verifications is characteristic of scientific theory. What is called the higher criticism in literature is weak in this respect, at least as to its positive side of emendations, and distributing fragments to hypothetical authors. Out of several possible theories about the origin of a book, the tests for determining which is the right view are rarely available; and the scientific method is to regard hypotheses as only hypothetical until we can verify them by tangible evidence.

The enemies as well as the friends of religion are sometimes inclined to regard every novel scientific doctrine as necessarily atheistical. Some hail the new dogma as a weapon of destruction; others denounce it as perilous; and both parties appeal to each other for confirmation of the opinion that the new dogma and the old faith cannot coexist.

A very foolish and sinful practice is that of taking flings at the departments of science that are subjects of popular suspicion. A learned professor recently assailed geology on the heavy charge that within the last century the geologists have changed their views two hundred times. But the fact of many changes redounds to the credit of science, if these changes, though limping and often stumbling, are on the whole progressive. A living science is always undergoing change, just as the living body is in a continual flux; by many tentative efforts after light and truth, often with steps backwards, the research goes into new fields. A perfect science, no longer changing, is dead—useful, perhaps, to guide Chinese artisans in its applications, but unworthy of further research.

If any man can prove that evolution is false, he will find a ready hearing in scientific circles. But the trend of testimony goes strongly in the opposite direction; and men are rendering a poor service to religion who attempt to get up an issue between it and evolution. Worthy men, too, often prejudice youth against Christianity by making its defence rest on their misapprehensions; and many arguments offered to shield theology from new scientific theories will, when examined, be found to be the revival of the exploded theories of Cuvier and his followers.

It is wrong to denounce scientific work because of the infidelity of some of its disciples. Science is not God's way of saving men from sin, and it welcomes to its realm believers and unbelievers. The error of the "*evil tendency*" objection would merit a long discussion. Men brand unwelcome doctrines as having an evil tendency when they see no direct answer to them. We cannot satisfactorily estimate tendencies. If the evidence is sufficient, we may receive the doctrine, and leave the tendency to take care of itself.

It is sometimes an error to condemn a book because you do not accept its conclusions. If it shows honest research, it may be valuable and deserving of honour, though the author failed in the last stage.

A mischievous error bears on the relation of Divine providence to physical causation. Able men have supposed that the less science you find in things, the more Divinity belongs to them. Some have seemed to think that Providence is less providential, and miracles less miraculous, if natural causation enters in any degree. We cannot explain how the Divine Being operates upon nature.

It is a mistake to assume that the conflict between science and faith is only mischievous. Christianity owes to science the overthrow of superstitions, and greatly improved conceptions of the works of God, also new confirmations of Scripture, and refutations of once dominant idolatries.

CURRENT GERMAN THOUGHT.

THE PATRIARCHS OF ISRAEL HISTORICAL. By Dr. O. ZÖCKLER, Greifswald (*Bew. d. Glaubens*, 1894, February).—H. Schultz leaves it undecided to what extent the name and life of Abraham are historically trustworthy (*Old Testament Theology*). Professor J. Meinhold of Bonn, in a recent pamphlet (*Wider den Kleinglauben*), rejects such half measures, asserting that "for an historical sketch of the beginnings of Israel's history and religion, the patriarchal times and what we are told of them fall altogether aside;" that "the patriarchs are nothing but ideal figures, their relation to Yahveh is simply a reflection of the fellowship between Yahveh and His people in the best age—about B.C. 800;" that "Abraham the father of the faithful, Israel the striver with God, etc., are really the children of Israel's phantasy under the influence of the prophetic spirit;" in short, that the historical worth of the patriarchal history has no religious importance, and that it is a sign of little faith to think so. He says, "It is out of place to draw a picture of the development of Israel's early history, taken mainly from a source which, even according to Delitzsch, belongs to about B.C. 900–800, and so a thousand years distant from the things related. (According to Gen. xiv., Abram must be placed about B.C. 2270–2250.) What should we say of an historian who took as the basis of a description of Charlemagne's days a narrative of the present century, without knowing or using any sources of those days? It is still more out of place to take the historical course from a mosaic of the most diverse and contradictory works, and present this as a history of the kingdom of God, as Köhler does (*Lehrb. d. bibl. Gesch.*)."

1. These sentences contain some things that are incorrect in fact, and some that are one-sided and misleading, *e.g.* the assertion of an interval of more than a thousand years between the time of Abraham and that of the oldest Pentateuch-source (B.C. 2250–900 or 800). To put back Abraham to the twenty-third century B.C. is to contradict all indications of time in Genesis and the following books. The same is true of the assertion that nearly a thousand years may have passed between Abraham and the Exodus, which is put just after Rameses II., and therefore into the second half of the fourteenth century B.C. (cf. Exod. xii. 40 with Gen. xxv. 7; xxxv. 28; xlvi. 28; l. 28, ff.). And Gen. xiv. contains nothing, rightly considered, obliging us to put back Abraham's date several centuries beyond the usually received time. That *Chedorlaomer* is a genuine Elamite compound (*Kudur* and *lagamar*), that a royal race of Kudurides reigned in Elam, that one of these may be placed about B.C. 2250, are

established facts. But nothing justifies G. Smith's attempt to identify the latter with the Biblical one, and nothing forbids our seeing in the last a later member of that dynasty, and a contemporary of Abraham, whose age cannot be pushed back far beyond B.C. 2000. The supposition of a space of fourteen or fifteen hundred years between Abraham and the Yahvist writer is therefore an act of uncritical violence.

Thus the comparison of the proceeding of a modern historian dealing with Charlemagne's days in the way stated loses much of its force. The Yahvist source is unduly depreciated. Older documents, written accounts of Israel's early history, were undoubtedly known to and used by the Yahvist and the other writers of the Law. The comparative fewness of the express references to the earlier documents (Numb. xxi. 14; Josh. x. 13; cf. 2 Sam. i. 18) is explained by the simplicity of the oldest Hebrew writers, in contrast with the later books like the Chronicles. Of indirect references there are not a few. And in these obvious enough remains of a tradition reaching to pre-Mosaic, even pre-Abrahamic days (cf. Gen. xiv. and xx.; the histories of Joseph and the Exodus; the triumphal song, Exod. xv.; the Decalogue and the following laws, Exod. xx.–xxiii.; different sections in Numbers, etc.), lies our warrant for decisively rejecting the notion that the history of the patriarchs sprang from the phantasy of prophetic authors in post-Solomonic days.

The strong condemnation of the method of A. Köhler and other writers of the positive school is utterly misleading. No doubt we have in the Pentateuch and other Old Testament books many accounts agreeing and differing more or less among themselves. But Meinhold's language about a "mosaic of the most diverse and contradictory works" involves gross exaggeration. What else can a student of ancient history do but draw out the kernel of the fact lying behind the narratives according to the rules of historical research? Köhler is quite right in rejecting the modern demand for an "exact and trustworthy separation of the several sources of the Old Testament historical books, with definite statements as to their age, purpose, and historical value." He acts as a genuine historian when he would limit the account of the nature of the histories of the Old Testament first of all "to gathering from it only that which was finally accepted in the Old Testament Church itself on the basis of various accounts as the current view of its historical course."

2. An equally erroneous assumption is the assertion that we have only oral tradition for everything pre-Mosaic. No modern scientific critic, Meinhold says, would venture to assume written accounts before Moses. "Between Moses and Abraham yawns a gulf of at least four hundred years—a space of time far too great, admitting all that is said about the fixity of oral tradition, to excite even a spark of confidence." But Dillmann, who can scarcely be called "unscientific," makes his oldest "Israelite book of legend and history" (B = E of other critics), while drawing chiefly from the broad stream of legend, also in part use written documents. More still than this Elohistic document, Dillmann makes his Yahvistic document C (alias I), along with oral, use also written accounts. Several of these pieces, especially some referring to Abraham's intercourse with Canaanite princes, etc., on account of their archaic language and remarkably exact geographical and historical statements, he uses as "valuable contributions" to a description of the patriarch and his times, remarking that they are drawn, not merely from old tradition, but also "from early written sources." This position of Dillmann, as well as of Strack, König, Lotz, etc., is ignored in the bold assertion of traditional sources only for pre-Mosaic days. Without the addition of written material, no competent judge of the subject can find an explanation. We by no means undervalue the traditions of pre-Mosaic and post-Mosaic days preserved in the God-fearing families of Israel; we regard it as a great

exaggeration to speak of the greatness of the interval between Abraham and Moses as extinguishing every spark of confidence in the fixity of tradition covering this space. To a naturalistic point of view, which knows no essential distinction between the people of revelation and surrounding nations, this may seem impossible; but there is no need to dwell on this point.

3. Our author himself concedes that Abraham's history, if true, assumes a comparatively high civilization and considerable population in Canaan. He refers to the state of things in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and India. "Even Canaan, the bridge from Egypt to Syria and Babylon, was then in great prosperity. The land was well populated, cities existed. A line of kings forms a confederacy." We admit this nascent civilization of Abraham's days, but we draw from it an opposite conclusion to Meinhold's. He seeks to show that Abraham, along with his retinue, formed a nomadic tribe, without any trace of higher culture, and that therefore these nomadic ancestors of Israel could not have dwelt in Canaan, with its settled population and regular cultivation. From intimations in the text (Gen. xiii. 7; xiv. 18, ff.; xxiii.) we gather with certainty that the idea of the patriarch dwelling with his flocks and servants in a sparsely peopled land given up to pasture is untenable. A nomadic multitude might exist on Palestinian soil, but it must have taken steps to have an understanding with the settled population of the land. And therefore it must have been more than a wandering horde, and its leader must have been more than a wild Bedouin chief. The incidents of Abraham's life (the purchase of the Machpelah field, his transactions with the kings of Salem and Sodom) suppose a certain degree of culture. Thus the existence of some literary skill is conceivable. The reference of all that is contained in Gen. xii.–l. to mere oral tradition has the analogies of the contemporary documents of the Euphrates, the Nile, and the Orontes against it. Why the supposition that pre-Mosaic Israel shared in the literary capacity of the neighbouring kingdoms, is untenable, we do not understand.

4. Professor Meinhold thinks to prove his case by the collective meaning of names like Ishmael, Edom, Jacob, as well as by the religious use to which the later prophets put the patriarchal history. "If we must take Edom collectively, why not his brother Jacob also? . . . What comes forth as the result of a long historical development is often represented as a Divine goal from the first. . . . The 'Yahveh of Sinai' precludes our taking the patriarchs historically. The conquest of Canaan was effected gradually and unintentionally. . . . It is instructive and strange that Abraham finds no mention in the pre-Exilic prophets (Micah vii. 20 and Ps. lxiii. 16 are post-Exilic)." The theory is that Israel owes its existence as a nation to Moses, who established the worship of "Yahveh of Sinai." It was a fiction of later prophecy to see an ancestor in Abraham, and to make him the real founder of the Yahveh religion. The affinity of this theory to Baur's respecting the New Testament is obvious. "Tendency" here and "tendency" there! It is overlooked that many of the patriarchal names are not collective—Lot, Sarah, Eliezer, Rebecca, Laban, etc. In Exod. iii. the descent of Moses from the Abrahamic stock is expressly emphasized. The assertion that pre-Exilic prophecy knows nothing of Abraham is not proved. It is by no means generally accepted that the passages in Micah and Isaiah are post-Exilic. Isa. li. 1, f., is not referred to at all. And that post-Exilic references have no bearing on the historicity of the patriarchs is not yet proved. We quote Dillmann again, "Why should the early legends of this nation, which was the first to quit mythological paths, be judged more unfavourably than those of other nations, in whose epic matter we acknowledge a remnant of historical recollections? . . . The least which we must concede is that in the family histories of the early legends

obscure recollections of natural migrations form the background; these urged their way from the Euphrates territory through Canaan and the deserts to Egypt, and led to the forming of new Hebrew tribes in those parts. The temporary abode of the fathers in Canaan cannot be explained as mere invention in order to justify the later conquest of the land or the adoption of sacred Canaanite practices; such ends could be reached in other more effectual ways."

Professor Meinhold thus takes radical measures with the patriarchal history, going far beyond critics like Strack, Kittel, König, Dillmann, who agree in many respects with the new critical school. Ranke held the historical character of Abraham.

"There is another way of investigating ancient historical facts than the one advocated here. That the handing down of such facts in various diverging accounts obliges us to resort to the theory of fiction is no sound historical principle. We have legendary stories of the early kings of Athens and Rome, of Cyrus, of Constantine and his attitude to Christianity: must, therefore, their historical existence be given up? Were Athens and Rome republics from the first? Did the founding of a Persian empire never take place? Is Constantine's acceptance of Christianity simple fable? Or, seeing that we have different accounts of their doctrines, did Pythagoras and Socrates, a Basilides, a Montanus, a Mani, never live and work? Let some one convince us that the existence of these persons is to be erased from history because of certain criticism of sources, and we will then sacrifice Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. When Loman's method with the Gospels and Epistles is generally accepted and proved to be truly scientific, then and not till then we shall let go our 'little faith' and adopt the strong faith, for which there are no pre-Mosaic patriarchs of Israel."

THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS. By Dr. KÜHN, Sondershausen (*Neue kirchl. Zeitschr.*, 1895, No. 2).—It has always been matter of regret to me that in days like ours, when so much good work has been done in the way of historical research and combination, there should be so much vacillation respecting Paul's letter to the Churches of Galatia, both as to the locality of the receivers and the time of writing; whereas, if one compares it with the other letters of the apostle and the Acts, in order to come to a deliberate decision, both questions are decided by the letter itself. Nor is it quite indifferent whether the letter was addressed to certain Churches of the obscure district bearing the name of the inhabitants who had once invaded it, and which the apostle founded on his mission journey, so to speak, incidentally, because he fell sick and could go no further, or to the Churches of his first founding work in the heathen world, which he calls Galatia, because they lay in the Roman province Galatia.

For, if the latter was the case, such a founding, as the first province of his mission toil, may be placed beside the founding work of his second journey, which he called Macedonia after the imperial province, and that of the third journey, which he called Achaia in the same way. Just as little indifferent is it whether the letter was written in that period of toil, when he was able on one of his different journeys to visit and confirm the Churches in peril, or at a time when he could no longer do this, such as the time of his imprisonment at Cæsarea, for in that case he could only entrust his rebukes, like the maternal change of his tones, to his letter. Thus there are before us two questions. First, are those addressed the Churches founded on his first journey, and called Galatia after the imperial province; or are they Churches founded in a time of sickness in the small territory named after the immigrant Galatians? Secondly, was the letter written after the second or even third journey of the apostle, but still in the

time of his freedom, or in the first time of his imprisonment? I will consider this last question first, and show that only the latter view is right.

In his letter (ii. 9, 10) the apostle says that at the apostolic council the last condition of agreement with the older apostles was that they (the apostles of the Gentiles) should remember the poor (in the mother Church of Jerusalem), and adds, "which I also was forward to do." This promise was only kept by the great collection, which the apostle planned and executed on so great a scale that its carrying out covers two years; and he himself, accompanied by representatives from all the four provinces of his toil, hands it over to the Church at Jerusalem, giving thus a speaking proof of his labour, and also completing his work on his old field. Therefore the letter, which assumes the collection to be already made and handed over, must have been written after the Roman Epistle, and after his last journey to Jerusalem, thus in the period of his imprisonment at Cæsarea; for in the Roman Epistle the journey is still future, and the handing over of the collection is stated to be its end (Rom. xv. 25, 26). That the Galatian Epistle must be put near the Roman one in time, nay, after it, is evident also from the main doctrine of the two, and the form in which it is stated. The righteousness of God is first mentioned in the second Corinthian Epistle, but is expounded nowhere else as it is in the Roman and Galatian Epistles, and indeed, in a very similar or corresponding way. Abraham's example is found in both, and the inference that the promise was to come through faith, not through the Law; just so that Abraham is the father of all who have his faith. Just so the proof that, being justified by faith, we are free from the Law, has much that is analogous in both, although here peculiar details occur. Finally, the doctrine of the conflict in the believer is common to both Epistles, appearing in the Romans as a strife between the Law in the heart and the law in the members, and in the Galatians as a strife between flesh and spirit.

All this shows that the two Epistles were written near together in time. But that the Galatian Epistle is the later one may be inferred from the fact that different expositions given in the Romans are given in Galatians in summary form—nay, occasionally almost in such technical terms as "righteousness of God" has already become, Compare, *e.g.*, Gal. ii. 6, 7 with Rom. iv. There the summary form, they who are of faith are Abraham's children; here the long exposition, from which such statements as the last one must be inferred. Compare further, as to the significance of the Law, the technical expression of Galatians, "The Law is our pædagogue unto Christ" (Gal. iii. 24), with the unexplained sentences of the Romans: "The Law only produces wrath" (Rom. iv. 15); "The Law came in by the way, that sin might be multiplied" (Rom. v. 20); and the longer statement of this position (Rom. vii. 7, 8). Further compare, as to the inward conflict in man, the summary statement in Galatians (v. 17, 18), "The flesh lusts against the Spirit," etc., with the long exposition of the Romans going into the depths of the subject (Rom. vii. 14–27; viii. 1–11). We come, therefore, here also to the same result—the Galatian Epistle was written shortly after the Roman one, and so during the apostle's imprisonment in Cæsarea.

The answer to our second question is already indicated in the answer to the first. Since the great collection, which Paul instituted as a finish to his mission toil in his old field, was made through the four provinces of his mission toil, and was handed over in company with representatives of all four, and these are named by the apostle himself after the imperial provinces, it follows that the one which he calls Galatia must be the mission-province which he traversed on his first journey. All this can be confirmed by the apostle's own words. In Rom. xv. 25, 26 he says that he is about to leave his previous field of mission toil, but will first bring a collection from it as a

thank-offering to the mother Church at Jerusalem. Here, indeed, he only names two of his provinces—Macedonia and Achaia; but we learn from 1 Cor. xvi. 1 that the collection was also made in Galatia, so that we may infer that what he here writes of representatives to be chosen was also arranged for Galatia. But only when by Galatia we understand the province Galatia, and consequently the Churches of the first founding, do we get these, namely, Gaius and Timotheus of Derbe (Acts xx. 4). From the companions named here we see also that the province of Asia was represented, for Tychicus and Trophimus are mentioned as its representatives. That he does not mention Asia in 1 Cor. xvi. 1, but only says that the Corinthians were to make it as he had ordained in Galatia, is probably explained by the fact that he himself remained in Asia and personally superintended the making of the collection. The importance he placed on this collection, and on its being a general one from the whole of his mission field, we gather from the passage named, and especially from the second Corinthian Epistle, where two chapters are devoted to it, and the necessity is insisted on of choosing representatives to bring so great a sum (2 Cor. viii. 20). That Luke does not mention this collection in the Acts, although he names the representatives who bring it as accompanying the apostle on his journey to Jerusalem (Acts xx. 4), and he himself, along with Titus, must have been one of the representatives for Achaia, may be explained by supposing that, when Luke wrote his history, Paul was not yet put to death, but was still imprisoned in Rome, and that Luke would not compromise him in the eyes of suspicious and hostile judges by stating that he had made so great a collection through four Roman provinces and brought it to Jerusalem.

A second weighty reason to show that the Galatian Epistle was directed to the Churches of the first mission-journey is the very passage usually quoted against it, Gal. iv. 13, "You know that by reason of sickness I preached the gospel to you the first time." It is said that the apostle, on one of the two journeys in which the Acts mentions the Galatian country, and under which, undoubtedly, the small territory peopled by the Galatians is to be understood, was forced by sickness to make a halt on his journey, and thus founded these Churches. Against this it is to be said, first, that the Acts says nothing at all of such a sickness and such founding, or even so much as hints it. Again, it is not true that under "Galatian country" it could not have understood the Roman province of Galatia. From A.D. 36 a portion of Phrygia was incorporated in the Roman province of Galatia, while a portion remained under the name of Phrygia. It is thus plain that the road which Paul would have to take in journeying to Asia (Ephesus, Acts xvi. 6)—Asia, the centre of his second mission-activity, which he then selected and was prevented undertaking by the Holy Ghost—went through Galatian territory and Phrygia, going through the scene of his first labour and coming to Phrygia (Acts xvi. 6). That the two are here inverted arises from the fact that here there is a reference to ver. 4, and so a recapitulation takes place. The inversion of the order is due to this back reference. On the other hand, in the second passage it is said quite correctly and in due order—he went through, in order, the Galatian country and Phrygia, *i.e.* his first-founded Churches and Phrygia (Acts xviii. 23, 24), and came to Ephesus (Acts xix. 1). Thus in Luke nothing is to be understood by the Galatian country but the Roman province of Galatia, and according to him the Churches of Galatia can be no others than those founded on his first journey. Therefore it is quite wrong to refer the misfortune of the apostle mentioned in Gal. iv. 13 to any sickness not mentioned in the Acts; it refers to the stoning told in Acts xiv. 19, which befell the apostle after he had preached in the Pisidian Antioch, Iconium, Lystra, and Derbe. It is also a strange and quite incredible idea that because the apostle fell sick on his journey, and could not reach his destined end, he

lingered in the small territory peopled by Galatians, preached and founded several Churches. On the other hand, it is quite supposable that the apostle was compelled by the misfortune he suffered to proceed no further, but to return and preach to the Churches to which he had already preached; or, as he says, "Because of infirmity of the flesh we preached to you," as related in Acts xiv. 20–26. Thus also all the other words in that passage gain meaning and force. The apostle was stoned and lay as dead; but he raised himself again when his disciples came round him. He was therefore stunned—a stone must have struck his head, perhaps his face. Thus he now goes back, compelled by this infirmity of the flesh, to those to whom he had already preached, and not without success, and preached with bandaged head and swollen face. To any other hearers this would have been a temptation, but not to them: "Your temptation in my flesh ye despised not." On the contrary, they received him as a messenger of God, as Christ Himself, and, if it had been possible, would have given their own eye for his swollen eye (Gal. iv. 15).

It is no less mistaken to make the objection that in the address of 1 Peter, "to the elect strangers in Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithynia," Galatia cannot be the Roman province, but must be the small territory named after the Galatians. For the Epistle is plainly addressed to the whole of Christendom within the limits of the present Asia Minor, as far as it had been won by the labours of Paul and of others since. But if this is so, the Christians, who were the fruit of the apostle's first missionary toil, must be addressed, and this can only have been done under the name "Galatia."

All the phrases and the intense tone of the Galatian Epistle best agree with the supposition that it was written during the apostle's imprisonment at Cæsarea. When the apostle begins with the words, "I wonder that you are so soon turned away from Him that called you," the "so soon" evidently means, "after I have been snatched from the scene of my labours." When he says (Gal. iv. 20), "I would that I could now be with you," the suggestion is, "but I cannot, for I am in prison." When he says (Gal. v. 11), "If I yet preach circumcision," the explanation is, "If I, after having been the Gentile apostle, would yet join therewith the preaching of the necessity of circumcision," and we then understand, "Why am I yet persecuted?" alluding to the fact that he is persecuted and imprisoned, which he would escape if he had been willing to preach circumcision. When, finally, he says (Gal. vi. 17), "Henceforth let no man trouble me; for I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus," by the marks are to be understood the weals and scars he received on his arrest by the riotous Jews (Acts xxi. 32).

Thus there can be no doubt that the Galatian Epistle was written by the apostle from his prison in Cæsarea to the Churches which he founded on his first missionary journey, and which he calls Galatia, after the Roman imperial province of the name.

PRESENT RELIGIOUS TENDENCIES. By Dr. VON BUCHRUCKER, Münich (*Neue kirchl. Zeitschr.*, 1895, No. 1).—Wherever we look we see a decided gravitation to the natural and human, to the spirit of art and culture, the inevitable consequence of the loudly expressed desire to render Christianity acceptable to the cultured of the day, to reconcile Christianity and culture. In such an effort, culture, of course, states the conditions and the demands; and the study is to see what angles can be taken from Christianity and what teeth broken. The effort of "liberal" theology in all its phases is undeniably to strip Christianity of its original, supernatural character, to which the epithet "naive" is applied. It is not always easy to detect this purpose, since language is given, among other things, to conceal thought. But the mixture of religious and

worldly phraseology, the clothing of sacred events in the feverish, extravagant style of modern literature, gives a key to the reader.

We have great days behind us, days carrying in themselves a world of elevating impulses; they are small days to which these have given place. Decay meets us in every sphere, giving us most concern in the religious sphere. But it will be for our good if it makes clear to us the problems which have to be solved, if the Church and theology are to keep their eternal bases.

Our life and thought has its root in another world, not in the bare region of religious and moral ideals. It is the eternal world, where God is seen face to face, whose atmosphere is God's outstreaming glory, whence the Son of God came when He laid aside the glory which He had before the founding of the world, and whither He returned after He had completed the purification of our sins on the cross. There our life is hid with Christ in God; there is our spirit's home. Every presentation of Christianity, however dazzling, which bears an earthly character, does not correspond to its nature. This is far from the thought that Christianity is not enjoyed, and has nothing to do in this world. Such a perversion of our standpoint can only arise from the desire to set up an opponent to win an easy triumph over. He that has the Son *has* life, and what he receives after death is merely the expanding of this possession to its full glory. What I possess as a Christian cannot differ in essence from what awaits me hereafter. But, on the other hand, our Christian state would be incomplete, and therefore insufficient, if the completion were wanting in the next world. Therefore the eschatology which we are told in these days to give up is to us an essential part of our faith, because our roots are in the eternal world. "When shall I come to behold Thy face?" This remains the ground-tone of the heart that is one with Christ. From this world of eternity we understand the miracles and prophecies, at which modern theology, which would limit Christianity to earthly experiences, takes such offence; they are nothing but rays from that world of holy harmony shining into this shattered existence of earth, giving us the earnest of the reconciliation one day of these two estranged forms of existence. "Miracle always remains miracle"—so said a leading professor of liberal theology in his positive days—"and whoever is unwilling to drag down into the realm of daily experience the signs in the kingdom of nature, which God has everywhere given as a guide to His revelations in the realm of spirit, will not speak of a distinction of smaller and greater miracles. But because we do not regard miracle as unnatural and contrary to law, but as the shining of a higher system of nature into a lower one, our spirit's eye rightly strives to penetrate into the miraculous event, and at least to gain glimpses of the higher order." This supernatural world of peace and glory we have as a foundation under us, as a Divine gift in us, as an immovable goal before us. Our first duty is to see that it is filched from us by no power, no cunning of human wisdom, or even put in a false light before us. No ridicule need make us afraid. We remember Matt. xi. 25 and xviii. 3.

This conception of Christianity in its spiritual nature enables us to separate in our thought what does not belong to life in immediate relation to God, and to give it a subordinate place. Here Luther has done us the greatest service. While he rigidly excluded natural reason from the ground of faith, he frankly confessed its high value for all natural knowledge, thus opening a wide field for worldly science and human government. In reference to this, Goethe says, "We know not what we owe to Luther and the Reformation. We are released from the fetters of intellectual torpor; we are enabled through advancing culture to go back to the fountain, and grasp Christianity in its purity. We have courage again to stand with firm feet on God's earth, and to give free scope to our divinely gifted nature." But when modern

science, instead of starting from its rightful principles and keeping within its limits, becomes arrogant, and wages war against Christianity, denying to it the right of existence because of its supernatural character, when natural science in this or that representative takes an hostile attitude, when a destructive philosophy advocates atheism,—it is our duty to draw the sword of the Spirit and defend the treasure committed to us. What Goethe said will always be a witness against those sceptical spirits, "Let intellectual culture advance, let the natural sciences grow in extent and depth, and man's spirit enlarge as it will, he will never get beyond the greatness and moral culture of Christianity, as this shines in the Gospels."

Still more decidedly must we enter on the conflict, when natural reason in the form of criticism would pluck our dear Holy Scripture from us and destroy its authority. We distinguish, indeed, even in Scripture, a spiritual and a natural side, because God has spoken through men, and, instead of suppressing their individuality, has used it in His service. We know that the Bible is no manual of cosmology, astronomy, or the like. Still, everything contained in Scripture stands in some relation to the announcement of saving truth. The theologian comes to Scripture as a Christian, not merely as a critic. "He comes to it with a prepossession grounded in the faith which he shares with Christendom, and expects that it will be justified by his scientific study of it" (Hofmann). But to the evangelical Christian faith in Scripture is directly bound up with his faith in salvation. The Christian is conscious of his fellowship with God in Christ, but also of the fact that this consciousness was produced in him by the ministry of the Church. He knows, further, that the Church could only render this service as it makes Scripture its law, and that his evangelical Church, just because it stands in this relation to Scripture, has rendered him such service. We have to follow carefully the critical movement of the present, to test the truth of everything offered to us, wherever we find a gap in our thinking and searching to supply the need, but at no price to allow Scripture as a whole to be taken from us and our Churches. We hold it wrong first to set up a theory of inspiration and to force Scripture into its limits, but we reject all critical labour which sets itself in opposition to the presuppositions of faith, and gives us at last nothing but hypotheses.

SERMON THOUGHT.

CHRISTIAN BROTHERHOOD.

"Brethren, no new commandment write I unto you, but an old commandment which ye had from the beginning. . . . Again, a new commandment write I unto you, . . . because the darkness is passing away, and the true light already shineth."—1 JOHN ii. 7, 8 (parts), R.V.

IT is scarcely too much of a paradox to say that new knowledge is for the most part a discovery of an old truth. We talk in popular language of the discovery of electricity, but the electric power lurked in those same substances since the world began; we talk with delight—and well we may—of the wonderful discoveries made by the spectroscope, but, after all, those colours were in the sunlight, those elements in the starlight, long before. "No new law I work," the steam-engine, the electric current, the light, seem to say as they pass on their rapid flight, but "an old law which ye had from the beginning." And yet as we watch them at work, it is a new one. The steam-engine is changing the course of commerce and the face of society; the electric current puts a girdle round the world; it is a new law we have discovered; it is a new power that is set free; our ignorance, our darkness, is passing away, and the true light is beginning

to shine. Can we wonder, then, that, when we turn from the physical to the moral world, the same truth holds good? Jesus Christ stands as the Proclaimer of a truth which was going to revolutionize the world, but still He can say, "No new commandment give I unto you, but an old commandment which ye had from the beginning." It was lurking there deep down among you all; it was running quietly among the roots of your philosophy; it was buried at the bottom of your hearts. And yet it was new. There was a new force in the world when Christ had lived and died and risen—a new force which kept throwing up hospitals, crushing out vice, modifying and at last suppressing the calamity of slavery. But our paradox carries us further than this. It is not only true that new knowledge is often only a discovery of old truth, but it is also true that progress in the world's life is only made by the rediscovery of old knowledge. What are we doing in sculpture, except trying to discover how to reach the perfect outline of the Greeks? So also in the moral and religious sphere. What have all the great Christian movements been, except reproclamations of forgotten truths; the Wesleyan movement was but the reproclamation of the necessity of conversion.

What, then, is the upshot of all this? First, that we should expect to find God's final Word for the world no new one; we should expect to find His great revelation something which focussed into a new force the scattered rays of old truth. And, secondly, we should expect to find that, in course of time, from human frailty, fragments even of this great revelation should be forgotten, and that, consequently, welling forward, as it were, from its central depths, would have from time to time to shine the forgotten truth.

I. Now, the great commandment, ever old and ever new, is THE LAW OF LOVE. The central truth of the gospel is that we are children of one Father, brothers and sisters to one another. There is no doubt about that. So there is no dispute about the law, there is no doubt that, according to the central revelation of Christianity, "he that loveth hath fulfilled the law." All we have to ask are three questions: 1. Is this law verified by a study of history? 2. Is it true to human nature? 3. Does it work? 1. And, first, is it verified by a study of history? Is it true that the Christian law of brotherhood gathers together and focusses scattered rays of old truth? Professor Drummond has lately shown us what a libel it is on nature to detect in it no force of unselfishness working in nature from the start. He has shown us that the struggle for the life of others has always been at least as strong as the struggle for life; and one has only to remember the kindliness of a Socrates or of a Buddha, the self-sacrifice of many a wife and many a leader in ancient story, the noble words of a Plato, to acknowledge that the great law was always there written on the human heart, struggling to realize itself, and that when Jesus came He was fulfilling the aspirations of the Gentiles as much as the prophecies of the Jews by His Epiphany declaration, "I am the Root and Offspring of David, and the Bright and Morning Star." And yet what misunderstandings there are about this? In dealing with sceptics it is often found that if a saying of our Lord's can be shown to distantly resemble the saying of some philosopher centuries ago, it is supposed that a damaging blow has been dealt to His uniqueness and originality. Why! on the contrary, we glory in it. We trace in it the action of the Incarnate Word before He is Incarnate; we see Him immanent in the world from the beginning, teaching, controlling, guiding; and if one thing more than another could be discovered to send home this teaching of brotherhood into our hearts, it is to find that it is no new commandment He gave us when He came in the flesh, but an old one He had given us from the beginning. 2. But, secondly, then, is it true to human nature? "Christianity recognizes and emphasizes man's true

personality; his individual will, thought, conscience, spirit. It stamps this as the 'image of God' in man. Not afraid of the shallow taunt of selfishness, it tells man plainly that his own personality is a treasure committed to his charge, and that he simply fulfils a law of his being in educating it to perfection, and, therefore, to happiness in this world and the world beyond the grave." In other words, we are called by Christianity to self-sacrifice, but we must have a self to sacrifice. A question was asked the other day, after an address to some Oxford undergraduates, which goes to the root of the matter. Was it wrong to educate a taste for art? Was it wrong to go to Venice in the vacation? or to buy a beautiful picture for one's room? Putting aside all obvious cautions about extravagance or over-indulgence of taste, or cases where, on account of the present distress, it becomes right to waive our rights,—as a broad principle, is self-development a duty or a sin? And we may surely venture most emphatically to answer that it is a duty; that balanced duly by the other influences, the instinct of self-development must have its place; that it is a short-sighted policy, looked at from the point of view of the human race, to crush individuality; that mind and powers developed will have more to give, not less, in the days to come. But does this contradict or interfere with the law of love? Not for a moment, if we remember whose we are and whom we serve. Developed or undeveloped, trained or untrained, we are not our own. "As every man hath received the gift [whether money, or brains, or education, or influence], even so minister the same one to another as good stewards of the manifold grace of God." 3. But, thirdly, is it practicable? does the law work? and is it a relief to turn away from general principles to reporting of the thing in action? Now, to take only one illustration, in obedience to the law of brotherhood, a certain number of these sons of the Universities of Cambridge and Oxford come each year to live in the centre of East London; they do it simply and naturally; they do it without money and without price; their labour is a labour of love. What is the effect? Does it destroy self? By God's blessing, it helps to destroy selfishness, not self; it develops self; it transfigures self. Has it any effect on their belief in God? "Is the old gospel true after all?" we ask ourselves; "or have we lost it among the maze of modern speculations?" And here again we may speak with no uncertain voice. It gives a man back his faith; it gives a man back his belief in God; the darkness passes away, and the true light begins to shine; and he finds, by practical experience, the truth of the old saying, "He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" And if it ennobles self, and clears the vision of God, what has it to say to man? It wins man; man is unable to resist it; it draws man with the cords of man, with bands of love, it makes him believe in a brotherhood of which he has heard but never seen before; he stops and looks and listens: this is a music he can understand. Impractical! useless! unworkable! This old commandment, ever old and ever new, if only we have patience, is the key to the conversion of the world.

II. And this brings us to the second thing we might expect to find. We saw that we might expect to find from time to time forgotten depths of even a final revelation welling forward into the light of day. So weak is human nature, so small its capacity to hold infinite truth, that it has from time to time to relearn piecemeal "the faith once delivered to the saints." Just as clouds keep gathering round the sun, and then are dispersed, so the darkness of prejudice and selfishness keeps gathering round the Sun of revelation; again and again that darkness has to be dispersed, and the true light again and again to shine. Now, as we look out upon the world, it is perfectly certain that something has begun to shine which was not there before. Ask people who have been abroad for fifteen or twenty years, and then come back to England,

and who have revisited Cambridge or Oxford, or their old schools, and they will tell you that they are perfectly astonished at what they see. But these things are but symptoms of an inner change. What is the meaning of it? It fronts us; it judges us; it is a fact. And the question is this—Is it to be sneered down as a passing whim of boys and undergraduates? or is it part of the life of God? Or, again, take the movement in the Church from which has sprung the Christian Social Union. To judge from some recent correspondence, there seems an idea that the Christian Social Union is a band of Socialists arrogating to themselves the Christian name. Nothing can be further from the truth. They are a band of Christians gathered into a union to help one another to put into practice in their social life the elementary principles of love and brotherhood. They are quite aware that it is no new commandment they are trying to fulfil, but an old one they have had from the beginning. What is the meaning, then, again I ask, of this new spirit pervading the Church of which this is an outcome, and which is touching thousands who either know nothing of or do not care to join the Christian Social Union? Is it a passing sentiment? or is it part of the life of God? And in upholding that it is part of the life of God which has again found its way through the mists of human selfishness, we may take our stand on three grounds. 1. First, it was time for it to come. What we have to learn now is how to use our freedom, and we learn this, not by looking forward, but by looking back. It, too, was there for us all the time in the life of Christ. "No new commandment" stands written in the story to-day, "but an old commandment which we had from the beginning." 2. Secondly, it is too strong to be a whim. The true diamond and the diamond of paste are like enough to look at; but you can cut with the one and not with the other. This diamond cuts. It is no passing feeling of weak sentimentality; it is at the back of the best work doing in the Church. 3. And thirdly, the colour of the light bears witness to its source. We all may mistake many things at times and many colours, but when we see it in action there is no mistaking the white light of love.

And so, in conclusion, we have to ask ourselves what is to be our own attitude towards this brightening and ever brightening light. And surely, then, at any rate, not an attitude of simple opposition. But secondly, the very words of Gamaliel show us that we cannot stop there; if it is of God, and we as Christians are fellow-workers with God, then God expects us—He must expect us—to help it on. If this new commandment is really a word which we heard from the beginning, then it will be one of "the words we have heard, which," we are told, "will judge us at the last day." How to help it on stands between a man and his own conscience, but help it on in some way we must; "for he that is not with Me is against Me, and he that gathereth not with Me, scattereth." And notice, such a conclusion is quite independent of varying views upon the social problem. And so, if we are wise, we shall let this heightening revelation flood and flush our own lives; it is one thing to stand in a dark cave and admire the sunrise, it is another to stand in the glory of it as it pours down on the snow-slope, and gather in great heartfuls of its heat. Let not the great rush of the spirit of brotherhood leave any one of us behind!—Rev. A. F. Winnington-Ingram, M.A., in the *Church Times.*

STRAINED PIETY.

"Be not righteous overmuch."—Eccles. vii. 16.

With commentators this is a much controverted text; it may, however, fairly be taken as a warning against strained piety. Not that a man can ever be too righteous, but he may strive after a righteousness that is false and injurious. The other sentence

in this passage may help us to understand what the sacred writer meant by "overmuch" righteousness: "Neither make thyself overwise." Some people are known as being "too clever—too clever by half." We all know what this means; we know such people. Men cannot be too wise, too gifted, too skilful; but they can be too clever—too clever by half. So goodness sometimes finds a similarly false, irritating, and dangerous expression. It has in it a superfluity that makes it objectionable and injurious. It may be thought that this excess in piety, excess in any direction, is rare, and hardly calls for express consideration. But this is a mistake. It is a common thing for religion to run wild; for goodness to be pushed on wrong lines; for it to be strained, arbitrary, inharmonious, and exaggerated. Let me give a few illustrations of what I mean by strained piety.

I. It sometimes reveals itself in DOCTRINAL FASTIDIOUSNESS. Paul writes to Timothy, "Hold fast the form of sound words, which thou hast heard of me, in faith and love which is in Christ Jesus." Hold fast the form, the pattern. The religion of Christ finds expression in the definite, the concrete, the intelligible. But some of us are not content until we have etherealized the great articles of our faith, made our creed vague, intangible, and generally such as it is not possible for a man to utter. De Quincey said of Coleridge, touching the poet's endless refinements and transcendentalisms, "He wants better bread than can be made with wheat." That is rather a common failure in our day, and especially with men of a certain temper. They refine and sublimate their creed until they nearly lose hold of the substantial saving verity. The doctrine of the Incarnation is attenuated until Christ becomes a mere Phantom. In a sense we are obliged to rationalize our creed, penetrate its real meaning, apprehend its reasonableness and consistency; but let us beware lest we hunger because we want better bread than can be made with wheat. The religion of Christ is a religion of history, fact, form, letter, and we must take care how we sky it. The chemist, clever man that he is, can volatilize the diamond; but volatilized diamonds have lost their reality, their beauty, their worth. A precious creed can be rarefied in a similar fashion, and with a similar result. We may strain after pure, metaphysical, absolute truth until we destroy ourselves. The most mystical of the apostles kept fast hold of the definite, the corporeal, the historical: "That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the Word of life." Come down from the thin air, recite the Apostles' Creed, sing the Te Deum. Touch the rock. Be not wise overmuch.

II. It reveals itself in MORBID INTROSPECTIVENESS. There is, of course, such a thing as a just introspection, that a man looks closely into his own heart and life. It is, indeed, a solemn duty that we should examine ourselves in the sight of God. And yet this duty is often misconceived and pressed to false issues. Men sometimes get morbid about the state of their health. For example, there are the people who are always weighing themselves. Their feelings go up or down with their weight; they are the sport of their gravity. We all feel that such solicitude is a mistake; it is the sign of a morbid, miserable condition. But good people are, not rarely, victims of a similar morbidity: jealous about their religious state, curious about obscure symptoms, always with beating heart putting themselves into the balances of the sanctuary. This habit may prove most hurtful. Instead of such excessive solicitude being conducive to safety, it is altogether full of peril. It makes men morally weak and craven; it destroys their peace; it robs their life of brightness. Beware of pushing a quiet self-supervision into unhealthy brooding. Why shouldest thou destroy thyself?

III. It reveals itself in AN EXACTING CONSCIENTIOUSNESS. On the supreme

importance of conscientiousness we are all agreed, but it s easy to push this conscientiousness into scrupulousness. Many Christian people are fertile of ingenious, gratuitous, embarrassing, exasperating distinctions and exclusions. It was said of Grote that "he suffered from a pampered conscience." Many good people do. A fastidious moral sense. It is a legal maxim that "the law concerneth not itself with trifles," and the court is specially impatient of "frivolous and vexatious" charges. But some of us are evermore arraigning ourselves at the bar of conscience about arbitrary, frivolous, vexatious things. It is a great mistake. But it will be said, "There is no special necessity to rebuke extreme nicety of conscience, little need in this callous world to do this; a conscience much exercised about trifles is at least awake and sensitive and faithful." But really, solicitude about trifles is the sign of a defective conscience. Christ shows that the conscience of the Pharisee, exercised by infinite detail and casuistry, was essentially lacking in sensibility and faithfulness. A true and noble conscience is tender, quick, incisive, imperative; but it is also large, majestic, generous, as is the eternal law of which it is the organ. We cannot pretend to go through life with a conscience akin to those delicate balances which are sensitive to a pencil-mark; if we attempt such painful minuteness, we are likely to be incapable of doing justice to the weightier matters of the law.

IV. This strained piety not rarely reveals itself in THE INORDINATE CULTURE OF SOME SPECIAL VIRTUE. For some reason or other a man conceives a special affection for a particular excellence; it engrosses his attention; it shines in his eye with unique splendour. But this extreme love for any one virtue may easily become a snare. A literary botanist says, "Most of the faults of flowers are only exaggerations of some right tendency." May not the same be said about the faults of some Christians? They have strained after a particular virtue until it has imparted to their character disproportion and disagreeableness. Here is the man of conscientiousness. Righteousness is the cardinal virtue in his eyes; and, indeed, his eyes are so full of the great virtue that he can see little else. In the end he pushes justice to the point of injustice. We need to take a wider view, to cultivate justly and impartially every grace of the Christian character. We want comprehensiveness, fulness, balance, harmony. Aiming at the larger ideal, we shall be saved from extravagance, angularity, and littleness.

V. It reveals itself in STRIVING AFTER IMPRACTICABLE STANDARDS OF CHARACTER. We cannot have too lofty an ideal of character; but we may easily have pretentious, spurious ideals on which the soul may waste its precious energies. It is a fine characteristic of Christianity that it is so sane, reasonable, practical, humane; it never forgets our nature and situation, our relations and duty. But many think to transcend the goodness of Christianity; they are dreaming of loftier types of character, of sublimer principles, of more illustrious lives than Christianity knows. *Positivism* gives us an illustration of this. It has long been an objection to Christianity that it enjoined a morality so superfine that it was practically inaccessible. *Now* the Positive philosophy declares that the great principle of Christian ethics is low and selfish. Christianity says, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself;" but the new morality says, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour and ignore thyself." Christianity is discredited by a supposed nobler ideal. *Monasticism* affords an illustration of this straining. *Protestantism* has also its false strivings. Some Evangelical Christians have very arbitrary and bizarre notions of holiness. They deny themselves in things that God has not denied them, and pique themselves on virtues of which the New Testament knows nothing. They are too bright and good. The superior people of the Churches, they look superciliously upon ordinary disciples. But this straining after higher ideals than those of Christianity is utterly false and deeply hurtful. Speaking of the monks who fell into

frightful immoralities, Charles Kingsley says, "Aiming to be more than men, they became less than men." It is ever the case. Fanciful ideals exhaust us, distort us, destroy us. What sweet, bright, fragrant flowers God has made to spring on the earth —cowslips in the meadow, daffodils by the pools, primroses in the woods, myrtles, wall-flowers, lavenders, pinks, roses to bloom in the garden, an infinite wealth of colour and sweetness and virtue! But in these days we are tired of God's flowers, and with a strange wantonness we have taken to dyeing them for ourselves: the world is running after queer blossoms that our fathers knew not—yellow asters, green carnations, blue dahlias, red lilacs. And in the moral world we are guilty of similar freaks. "Learn of Me," says the Master. Yes; let us go back to Him who was without excess or defect. Nothing is more wonderful about our Lord than His perfect naturalness, His absolute balance, His reality, reasonableness, artlessness, completeness. With all His mighty enthusiasm He never oversteps the modesty of nature.—REV. W. L. WATKINSON, in the *Wesleyan Magazine.*

PAUL GATHERING STICKS.

"And when Paul had gathered a bundle of sticks, and laid them on the fire, there came a viper out of the heat, and fastened on his hand."—ACTS xxviii. 3.

A FIRE is a thing that comes so near to us, and combines itself so closely with our life, that we enjoy it best when we work for it in some way; so that our fuel shall warm us twice—once in the obtaining of it, and again in the burning. And that is the reason why people at a picnic in the open air love to light a fire, and to help in gathering materials for it. Paul had the same feeling. He did not allow the natives to do all the work; he wanted to help them. But he made one mistake which threatened to be very serious; for Paul was not infallible in his ordinary life, and only when he was writing or acting under the direct inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Among the sticks which he gathered there was one that looked exactly like the others. You have heard of the curious thing in nature called mimicry, by means of which creatures resemble the places where they are found or the objects near them, or put on the appearance of each other. This disguise is given to creatures for two purposes—it conceals the destroyer from its prey, and it enables the innocent creature to get its food in safety. The viper which Paul took up had this power of mimicry.

There are two great lessons in connexion with this remarkable incident which I wish to bring before you. The first is that the Apostle Paul did not think it beneath his dignity to gather sticks for a fire. You do not usually think of him engaged in such a homely occupation. He had no false shame, no foolish pride to overcome. He felt that, however lowly the labour, it was labour in the Lord, for the good of his fellow-creatures. He thought only of being useful, as he had been all through the voyage that had ended so disastrously. Your religion is the same as that of the Apostle Paul; and as it taught him, so should it teach you to cherish a spirit of disengagedness and unselfishness, a readiness for any kind of work, however common, by which you can do good. We read of the noble Bishop Patteson, that while he was burdened with the care of all the Churches in Polynesia, he was ever ready to do the humblest work with his own hands—to help as a mason and joiner to build a mission station, to row himself backwards and forwards among the islands, and to cook his own food when it was necessary. The other lesson which you learn from the experience of Paul on this occasion is that God will protect you while you are serving Him and your fellow-creatures. The path of duty has its own dangers, like the path of pleasure. You

may be misunderstood, evil spoken of, your very kindness turned against you. You may create enemies by your good work, and sharper than a serpent's tooth may be the ingratitude that you may meet with in your best-meant and kindest services. The frozen viper you have warmed and cherished into life in your bosom may sting you. But He who protected Paul from the fang of the viper that came out of his benevolent work will protect you from the viper that may come out of your flame of love and zeal for others. If you have faith such as Paul possessed, you will be kept safe, as he was, from any real harm. No serpent coming out of your work of faith and labour of love will truly hurt you. The deadly things you touch and cannot help touching in the fulfilment of the duties and in the performance of the kind acts of life, will be robbed of their venom. Physicians tell you that when you are in perfect health, the infection of the epidemic disease around you will not be communicated to you—you will be proof against the myriads of deadly microbes that are lying in wait to assail any weak or wounded surface, by the vigorous exercise of a healthy life. And it is in the same way only that you can be kept safe from spiritual evil. The full active tide of spiritual life in your soul will repel the poison of the disease.—REV. H. MACMILLAN, D.D., LL.D., in the *Quiver*.

SUNDAY IN CHURCH.

BY REV. CANON HUTCHINGS, M.A.

SUNDAY NEXT BEFORE EASTER.—EVENING SECOND LESSON.

"And when He was come near, He beheld the city, and wept over it."—LUKE xix. 41.

1. This is Palm Sunday, the day on which the Church celebrates our Lord's Triumphal Entry into Jerusalem. He willed to be acknowledged as the Messiah, as a prelude to His sufferings. By means of this lowly procession He fulfilled the prophecy, "Behold, thy King cometh unto thee: He is just, and having salvation; lowly, and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt the foal of an ass" (Zech. ix. 9). This was the day of final visitation to the Jews, "a decisive and irrevocable turning-point," when the Lord "came unto His own," giving them an unmistakable sign by His mode of approach, and yet—they rejected Him.

2. It is not to the procession or its import that the text invites our attention, but to an incident on the road to Jerusalem. "As they approached the shoulder of the hill, where the road bends downward to the north, the sparse vegetation of the eastern slope changed, as in a moment, to the rich green of gardens and trees, and Jerusalem in its glory rose before them. It is hard for us now to imagine the splendour of the view. The City of God, seated on her hills, shone at the moment in the morning sun" (Geikie). But as Christ "beheld" the doomed city, He "wept over it."

Let us contemplate this touching occurrence. What do these tears of Jesus teach us about Himself? And what lessons may we draw from them?

I. WHAT DO THESE TEARS OF JESUS TEACH US ABOUT HIMSELF? 1. That He is true Man. He took our nature, not only our nature, but our "infirmities" (Matt. viii. 17). He did not assume human nature as the first Adam possessed it in Eden, but with some of the shadows of the Fall upon it. This scene shows us how Christ could be afflicted with intense sadness. Sorrow was a marked result of the Fall (Gen. iii. 16, 17). Christ was the "Man of sorrows" (Isa. liii. 1). He took our "defects" both of body and soul, except sin and such defects as were inconsistent with His sinlessness and personal perfection. In this picture He appears to be overpowered

with sorrow; but it was a voluntary sorrow. 2. Twice it is recorded in the Gospels that Jesus "wept"—here, and at the grave of Lazarus. Besides these occasions may be added the tears of infancy, and those spoken of in the Epistle to the Hebrews (v. 7). Here the expression implies audible weeping, lamentation (ἔκλαυσεν); Christ was affected with deep emotion. The aposiopesis in His exclamation, "If thou hadst known," etc.! is evidence of this. 3. Further, it was when "He beheld" the city this torrent of grief was occasioned. Man is affected by that which he sees. Whatever may be the knowledge which he already possesses, the actual realization through the senses of the object brings home vividly to his consciousness the trouble or bereavement. The sound of a name or the sight of a grave brings tears; so the sight of Jerusalem in all its glory and beauty touched the heart of Jesus Christ. The eye, in conjunction with the imagination, actualizes that which belonged before to the domain of thought. 4. And then, the city was Jerusalem. This called out the love of patriotism. Christianity has been accused of repugnance to the patriotic spirit, because it is apt to be absorbed with higher interests; but such a relation is only accidental. Christianity does not blot out love of country. Christ could look with eye undimmed with tears, and utter the words, "And thou, Capernaum, which art exalted unto heaven, shalt be brought down to hell" (Matt. xi. 23); but over Jerusalem He wept. 5. Christ was not only Man, but the Messiah; and Jerusalem was not only the capital, but the Holy City,—there was the temple, there was the centre of the Church of God, "over all rested the spell of a history of two thousand years." God's revelation to man was linked with this sacred spot—it was to be "the joy of the whole earth." Christ was to the Jews the Messiah who had been expected for generations, and longed for, who was to work out the Divine purpose of their history and to deliver them; but God's people knew not the time of their visitation, and therefore the sight of their city caused Jesus to weep.

II. The tears reveal Christ's knowledge of the future. 1. If our Lord were only man, with man's ignorance of the future, this weeping would be altogether out of keeping with the circumstances. Not only was there no apparent cause for this grief, but it was at variance with the shouts of joy and the acclamations of "Hosanna!" which the multitude poured forth as they went before and followed Christ on the road to Jerusalem, with the palm branches. To weep at the grave of a friend, to catch the infection of grief from the sobbing relatives, has in it nothing surprising; but to weep aloud at the time of such a demonstration is something which needs to be accounted for. 2. We are not at a loss to know the cause of this behaviour. Christ knew that He was standing where the Roman legions would be gathered to besiege the city, and He foretold with an accuracy of detail what in another generation would be verified. As He beheld the city, His thoughts were afar off: He saw the enemy encamped against it, the sufferings of the inhabitants, their terrible deaths, and the overthrow of the last remnants of its buildings; He saw further how Israel "to this day" would not know "the things which belong unto its peace, and the upturned, scattered stones of its dispersion are crying out in testimony against it" (Edersheim). 3. If the tears are witnesses to Christ's Humanity, the cause of the tears points to His Divinity. I do not say it proves it. Such knowledge may be accounted for by the possession of the prophetic gift; but the cause of those sufferings, because the Jews knew not Christ's visitation, certainly demands a belief in Him as a Divine Visitor, the rejection of whom was to be attended with such irrevocable consequences. He could read the future by innate knowledge, for He was "the Only Begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth" (John i. 14).

III. Lessons. 1. These tears of Jesus teach us the hatefulness of sin. It was

not only the temporal sufferings of the Jews, but the sins which caused them, which filled the heart of Christ with sorrow—their blindness in rejecting Him. 2. No scene in the Gospels more clearly reveals the freedom of the will of man to resist grace. "How often would I have gathered thee," etc.! is the lament of Christ over His own people; "and ye would not (οὐκ ἠθελήσατε)" (Matt. xxiii. 37). Our Lord would not force the human will. Let us realize that everything depends upon recognizing and yielding to the Divine visitation. 3. To beware of the blinding effect of prejudice. The Jews would not believe in the condescension of God, and so misread the prophecies which related to Divine humiliation and suffering. "They wanted not to see" how prophecies of majesty and lowliness could be blended. Though their rejection of Christ is attributed to a misuse of their understanding, at root it was their will which was at fault. Openness of mind to the reception of Divine truth is one lesson to be drawn from this narrative—to pray for a humble and teachable spirit, the seeing eye and the hearing ear, in order to accept Divine truth and to recognize Divine visitations. The Jews, says Dr. Pusey, "are but mirrors of ourselves. To see, then, the causes of their blindness may help us to see ourselves." 4. If the tears of Jesus over Jerusalem teach us the heinousness of sin, the accountability of the human will, the danger of religious prejudice,—they teach us eloquently the love of God for sinners; as the Jews themselves rightly concluded Christ's love for Lazarus, by the tears which He shed at his grave.

EASTER DAY.—EVENING SECOND LESSON.

"But Mary stood without at the sepulchre weeping."—JOHN xx. 11.

1. What a picture! The darkest hour is said to be that before the dawn. "It was yet dark" when Mary Magdalene reached the sepulchre; and it was dark within her soul. She knew not how soon the dawn of "the Sun of Righteousness" would dispel the clouds of sorrow; she "stood without at the sepulchre weeping."

2. Was it wrong to weep? Some tears are sinful—tears of passion and rebellion against God's will, but not tears of sorrow. There is a Beatitude for the mourner, "Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted." St. Mary Magdalene had the gift of tears, and as she stooped down to look into the sepulchre she sobbed aloud.

3. St. John singles out Mary Magdalene as the chief feature of the Easter morning. St. Matthew, on the other hand, blends the appearance of the Risen Christ to the Magdalene with that vouchsafed to the other women. But it is evidently a separate manifestation which St. John, who often supplies what is omitted by the Synoptists, records. The seeming discrepancies between the accounts of the different Evangelists may be referred to the different experiences and standpoints of the various witnesses. When several persons have seen the same event, their relation of it will be found to be divergent; especially is this the case when the event is one of arresting moment. St. John preserves for us what he himself had witnessed. St. Peter and St. John are the two disciples who are concerned with the movements of St. Mary Magdalene in the early morning of the Resurrection; accordingly, St. John it is who relates this first and separate appearance of Christ to the Magdalene; while St. Mark, who was "interpres et sectator Petri," alludes to the same occurrence (Mark xvi. 9). Christ appeared unto witnesses chosen before of God, and the first of these, according to St. Peter, was Mary Magdalene.

Let us, first, muse upon the dispositions of the recipient of this wonderful favour; and then, contemplate the manner of our Lord's appearing.

I. THE DISPOSITIONS OF ST. MARY MAGDALENE. They are like branches of a tree, or rays of light from the sun—they all spring from one root or come from one central light; but we can examine them apart. 1. She came *early* to the sepulchre. The exact time is matter of dispute. St. John says, "when it was yet dark;" St. Luke, when it was "very early;" St. Mark, "at the rising of the sun;" and St. Matthew, "as it began to dawn." These notes of time may be a little puzzling, but the main point stands out clearly enough. St. John's account is that the sun had not risen. St. Mary Magdalene must have reached the sepulchre first alone, outstripping others, whilst "it was yet dark;" and then, whilst at the sepulchre, the quivering rays of dawn might have begun to streak the darkness; or the words may apply to the time when she was on the road, especially if she came from Bethany, and not from the upper room—a walk of some distance. In her case the words were literally fulfilled, "They that seek Me early shall find Me" (Prov. viii. 17). "Early" is "diligently" in R.V. The Vulgate has, *qui mane vigilant ad me.* To seek earnestly is to seek betimes. This going forth to the sepulchre before or at daybreak shows the eagerness and the courage of this woman. 2. She stood at the sepulchre, "weeping." There is no Stoicism in Christianity. It is natural to weep over those we have lost. Joseph wept over Jacob his father (Gen. l. 1); the children of Israel wept at the death of Moses (Deut. xxxiv. 8); David over Saul and Jonathan (2 Sam. i. 17); Mary and Martha at the grave of their brother (John xi. 31); and "devout men" made great lamentation at the burial of St. Stephen. Sin is unnatural, therefore Christianity condemns it; but sorrow is now natural to us, and commended by God (Eccles. vii. 1–4). It is the evidence of love. The word for "mourn" in the Beatitudes is used, primarily, for the tender sorrow of bereavement. But it is inconceivable that this weeping of St. Mary Magdalene was only natural; some element of faith must be mingled with her grief. The One who could give her pardon for sin, and whom now she styles with a name of honour and reverence as "Lord," whom she had gazed upon for a while at the foot of the cross, where nature bore such witness to His greatness that the centurion cried out, "Truly this Man was the Son of God!" must have been something more to her mind and heart than a "dear departed friend." He was her Saviour, and her tears were partly tears of contrition, though her faith was defective. She sought Christ, then, as a penitent. 3. She came with sweet spices and ointment, which she had bought and prepared (Mark xvi. 1; Luke xxiii. 56). Nicodemus had brought a "hundred pounds" of myrrh and aloes, and Joseph of Arimathæa fine linen to wrap the sacred body with the spices; but she must give what she has kept and prepared for His burial. She manifested her affection by these costly preparations. St. Bernard characterizes the three anointings as those of "compunction," "devotion," and "piety;" and this last, he says, was intended, not for the head or for the feet of Christ, but "for the whole body." But, he goes on to remark, it was not to be used on the dead body, but on the living; for Christ's living Body is His Church, and it was anointed and cheered by the tidings of His Resurrection (*Serm. De Diversis*, xc.). 4. "But Mary stood without at the sepulchre." That was perseverance: "but." Mary, for her conduct in this respect, is contrasted with that of the disciples who went away "to their own homes." No virtue is more important; for it is not only a virtue in itself, but it is requisite for the formation and preservation of all other virtues. The fear of the Jews, which caused Apostles to meet with barred and bolted doors, might have been enough to cause this woman, having paid a visit to the sepulchre, now quickly to retire; but she remained. All these dispositions—of earnestness, sorrow, liberality, steadfastness—come from one root, love: "She loved much."

II. THE APPEARANCE. 1. The fact that Christ appeared first to a woman "out of whom He had cast seven devils" will remain till the end of time a striking evidence of His love for repentant sinners, whether the last verses of St. Mark's Gospel are deemed canonical or "deutero-canonical." The appearance to St. Mary Magdalene, the penitent, does not stand alone; for our Lord appeared first, amongst men, to St. Peter, the penitent apostle, and this choice was a token of the *sameness* of Christ's character before and after the Resurrection. 2. The appearance was *gradual*. There was a vision of angels first. They were "sitting" where the head and feet of Christ's body had been, like cherubim over the mercy-seat. They accosted her and questioned her as to the cause of her tears. This must have prepared her soul for a grander visitation. All is still. The angels make no reply. "The watchmen that go about the city found me, to whom I said, Saw ye him whom my soul loveth?" (Song of Sol. iii. 3). There is a pause, when she hears a sound behind her, and so turns round; or it may be, as Giotto paints the scene, that some glance of the angels, or gesture on their part, induced her to look round, when she saw Him whom she was seeking, but did not recognize Him. She thought it was "the gardener," either because her eyes were dim with tears, or her mind too preoccupied, or the light not clear. Then, by the loving utterance of her name, she discerned the voice—that by which we are so often identified, when all things else have changed—and flung herself at His feet, crying out, "Rabboni!" It was "a manifestation through love" (Westcott).

III. LESSONS. 1. Let us imitate St. Mary Magdalene, who came early to the sepulchre, seeking a manifestation of Christ in our early Easter Communions. 2. Emulate her earnestness, penitence, generosity, and endurance. 3. Let the remembrance of our Lord's love for penitent sinners be our consolation. 4. The angels in the sepulchre are symbols of "prevenient" grace, response to which ever prepares the way for the Divine voice and unveiling.

FIRST SUNDAY AFTER EASTER.—EVENING SECOND LESSON.

"Then saith He to Thomas, Reach hither thy finger, and behold My hands; and reach hither thy hand, and thrust it into My side: and be not faithless, but believing. And Thomas answered and said unto Him, My Lord and my God!"—JOHN xx. 27, 28.

1. Easter Day is the Church's greatest Festival, and, to-day being what is commonly called "Low Sunday," we strike the octave note of joy and thanksgiving. Its greatness arises from the evidential value of the truth which it proclaims—the Resurrection of Christ. The "scientific" theologian holds that the doctrines of the Trinity, of original sin, and of the Incarnation are greater mysteries in themselves; but because the whole faith rests upon the *fact* of the Resurrection, Easter is the highest Feast.

2. That the Resurrection is the keystone of the arch of Christian doctrine may be seen from the place which it occupies in the Apostolic discourses of St. Peter and St. Paul, to be found in the Book of the Acts (*e.g.* Acts ii. 24; iii. 15; iv. 10; v. 31; x. 40, etc.), and by its selection by our Lord as "the sign" whereby He should be known (John ii. 19; Matt. xii. 39, 40).

3. Hence the importance of the various testimonies which have been vouchsafed to us—the "infallible proofs," as they are called in the New Testament—whereby we know that He was "alive after His Passion" (Acts i. 3). Amongst these none is more cogent than that of St. Thomas. It is for this reason, as well as because of the date of its occurrence—a week after Easter Day—that the Church has selected the account of Christ's appearance to him as the Second Lesson to-night.

Let us consider, first, the doubt of Thomas; then, the remedy.

I. THE DOUBT OF THOMAS. 1. Is doubt "a disease"? The lines of the poet naturally occur to us, which run—

> "There lives more faith in honest doubt,
> Believe me, than in half the Creeds."

That there is such a thing as "honest" doubt must, of course, be admitted; and that the condition of an earnest seeker after truth, though still in a fog, is preferable to that of a listless and inoperative acceptance of traditional beliefs, also cannot be denied. But that doubt of revealed truth is either a disease or a grave misfortune is evidently the teaching of Holy Scripture and of the Church. The position given to faith by our Lord makes all doubt respecting Divine truth a serious matter. 2. Let us attempt an analysis of the unbelief of the disciple. We find one element of it in his *disposition*. He seems to be despondent by nature. His words, "Let us also go, that we may die with Him" (John xi. 16), have a trace of this. The melancholic temperament ever sees difficulties in the way, or regards joyous tidings as "too good to be true." Further, Satan's activity, now keenly stirred by events, had doubtless something to do with the state of Christ's disciple. He was Satan's forlorn hope, the last dark spot which faith had not illumined. Then the providence of God was overruling the perverseness of Thomas, "for the more confirmation of the faith." God "suffered him to be doubtful." It is strange that all the Apostles, after our Lord's frequent declarations that He would rise again, had no belief in nor expectancy of the event. But Thomas held out against evidence after the fact. This posture of the disciples, and notably of Thomas, gives additional force to their testimony, because they believed in Christ's Resurrection, without any prepossession of mind in favour of it, or previous realization of the idea, and in his case with the very opposite, a set determination not to accept it. 3. The doubt of Thomas is aggravated by the circumstances. It was in spite of rich and varied evidence. Our Lord had appeared to St. Mary Magdalene, the holy women, St. Peter, the two disciples on the road to Emmaus, and to the assembled Apostles; yet Thomas could not accept their statements. His doubt had a moral source; it is marked with prejudice and obstinacy. The very terms upon which alone he would give in to the truth—a marvellous demand: "Except I shall see," etc.—show his fixity of will in his private opinion, which he was determined nothing short of the evidences of his own senses, sight and touch, should break down.

II. THE REMEDY. "And after eight days again His disciples were within, and Thomas with them: then came Jesus, the doors being shut, and stood in the midst, and said, Peace be unto you. Then saith He to Thomas, Reach hither thy finger," etc. 1. Attention has been called to the significance of this pause in Christ's manifestations —"after eight days," etc. It would seem as if He intended to give the disciples time to reflect upon and to put together the profusion of visitations which were bestowed upon Easter Day. It takes time to assimilate spiritual blessings. 2. It may be that time and grace had done something for Thomas. At any rate, whilst he was absent from the assembly of the disciples on Easter night, now Thomas was "with them." It almost seems as if they had some presentiment that another visit would now be granted to them. 3. "Then came Jesus, the doors being shut," etc. The remedy was compound. When our Lord repeated the demand of Thomas in so many words, He revealed His omniscience. It was the unveiling of this attribute which had such an effect upon the woman of Samaria (John iv. 29), and upon Nathanael (John i. 50). Then, there was the evidence of His love. He had come after the sheep which He had

lost—the one sheep. The manifestation was for the sake of the faithless disciple. 4. Besides the evidences of Godhead, there were the sacred wounds of the Passion to prove the identity of His Manhood. In Christ's invitation, "Reach hither thy finger," etc., whether the test was accepted or not, there was the offer and the presentation to view of the scars which were permitted to remain in His Risen Body. It was no phantasm, but a real body, though changed and endued with new powers. Our Lord Himself showed that He was corporeal in a true sense, and offered Himself to be handled, so that there might be no ground for Docetic error (Luke xxiv. 36–43). 5. Now the whole truth flashed upon the mind and heart of St. Thomas, and he answered and said, "My Lord and my God!"—a perfect confession of faith. Much has been written with the view of minimizing this utterance. Some have tried to resolve it into an ejaculation to the Father; others into an exclamation, in violation of the Third Commandment; others that St. Thomas said in a moment of excitement more than he meant. All such attempts only bear witness to the value of St. Thomas's utterance as a clear expression of belief in the Divine Personality and in the Human Nature of Christ, whilst the "my" showed that it was a faith ensouled with love.

III. Lessons. 1. We must learn to disabuse our minds of the idea that doubt is a sign of "intellectual vigour." Doubt, though it is sometimes "honest," has often a moral origin, and those who are tempted by it should examine themselves on such matters as vanity, impurity, neglect of prayer, etc. 2. We may bless God for the doubt of St. Thomas, which has had the effect of setting many minds at rest upon the fundamental mystery of the Resurrection. As St. Leo the Great said, "Dubitatum est ab illo, ne dubitetur a nobis." 3. From the remedy we learn the Divine knowledge and love which Christ exhibited in this manifestation, reminding us of the individuality of God's care and forbearance. 4. Finally, it was the sacred wounds which convinced the erring disciple; and it is devotion to the Passion still which aids us, as it did him, to realize the power of the Resurrection.

SECOND SUNDAY AFTER EASTER.—EVENING FIRST LESSON.

"And Moses made a serpent of brass, and put it upon a pole, and it came to pass, that if a serpent had bitten any man, when he beheld the serpent of brass, he lived."—Numb. xxi. 9.

1. The whole journey of the children of Israel from Egypt to the Promised Land was typical. St. Paul says that the things which happened were of a typical nature (1 Cor. x. 11, τυπικῶς). They were intended at the time to set forth the truths of the gospel. They had, that is, a "temporal" as well as future purpose. They taught at the time, though darkly. They were calculated to set the Israelites thinking about a deeper disease and its cure. Type is the shadow cast back upon the page of the Old Testament by the mysteries of Christ. The resemblance is not accidental, any more than the outline of a silhouette is, of the profile of a person. It is found too frequently, both on a large and small scale, to be attributed to chance.

2. At any rate, in the present instance, we have not to depend upon the inventiveness of commentators; our Lord Himself appropriates the type (John iii. 14, 15). I do not mean by this remark to favour the narrow canon of modern literalists, who will not allow that any part of Israelite history, or of the Bible generally, has a typical significancy unless it is so interpreted in the New Testament. St. Paul's statement, that "all these things" happened typically, is hardly consistent with so arbitrary a rule, which, if carried out to its logical consequences, might deprive us of much of the parabolic teaching in the Gospels. But, on the other hand, when our Lord gives

His imprimatur to the typical value of an occurrence in the Old Testament, it invests that occurrence with special significance, lifting it into light, and concentrating attention upon it.

We will first regard the type; and secondly, the Antitype.

I. THE TYPE. 1. The circumstances. The Israelites appear to have come back, after nearly forty years of wandering, to nearly the same spot where they had been when God gave them the punishment of not seeing the land (Numb. xiv. 23). The new generation was now full of hope and expectancy, ready to enter the Promised Land, when fresh difficulties arose, and they were at once "much discouraged because of the way;" for they had to traverse "a great and terrible wilderness, wherein were fiery serpents and scorpions and drought" (Deut. viii. 15). They sinned by tempting God, and murmuring against Moses (1 Cor. x. 9, 10). And the Lord allowed the poisonous serpents to bite them, so that "much people died." 2. Here is one out of many instances where sin brings temporal consequences. These serpents, called "fiery," either because of their colour or on account of the inflammation which the bite produced, were God's instruments for punishing the people. The children of Israel were grievously disappointed at having to make this painful and wearisome detour, and so they yielded to the sin of their forefathers, and, like them, endured chastisement. 3. The results of the chastisement. First, it led them to see their sin. God's judgments are not merely punitive, but corrective and reformative, for "whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth" (Heb. xii. 6). The illuminative effect of chastisement, as to our spiritual state, is one of the Divine purposes—it brings us to book. Then they not only saw their sins, but they confessed them, and said, "We have sinned:" that was a humbling acknowledgment.

> "Oh, power of guilt! how Conscience can upbraid!
> It forces her not only to reveal,
> But to repeat what she would most conceal."

Thirdly, they besought Moses to pray for them. What a change of feeling this discloses! They had reviled Moses, but now they turn to him for help, confiding in the power of intercessory prayer to remove the evils from which they were suffering. And Moses, betraying no resentment for their ungrateful behaviour, at once forgivingly accedes to their request. 4. The answer of God. Moses was to make a fiery serpent, set it upon a pole, and then, whosoever had been bitten, by looking upon it should live. These directions were not a little remarkable. The making or elevation of an image to be gazed upon, in order to obtain a cure from disease, seems to conflict with what God forbids in the Old Testament (Lev. xxvi. 1). If in the Christian Church images and pictures are not forbidden, but only the worship of them; in the Old Testament, when God had assumed no visible form, the Second Commandment was stringently prohibitive, though the cherubim in the tabernacle were permitted as an exception to the rule. Moreover, too, that the figure should be that of a serpent, which is usually the symbol of evil, seems a strange thing. The Jews cannot unravel the mystery. Before this symbol "tradition has stood dumb" (Edersheim). The explanation that the children of Israel "lifted up their eyes, not merely to the serpent, but rather to their Father in heaven," is nc answer to the question why this symbol was chosen and permitted. The author of the Book of Wisdom also affirms that they were healed, not by the thing which they saw, "but by Thee that art the Saviour of all;" yet he speaks of the uplifted serpent as "a sign of salvation." This, of course, is the true account, and sweeps aside the absurd naturalistic interpretations which have been attempted. They believed what God promised, and gazed upon the material symbol in obedience to His command—when each one looked at "the serpent of brass, he lived."

II. The Antitype. 1. The serpent's bite is a figure of sin. It was under the form of a serpent Eve was tempted (Gen. iii. 1), and under the same the evil spirit is depicted in the Book of the Revelation (Rev. xii. 9). The virus of sin entered through the Fall into human nature. "God created all things, that they might have their being: and the generations of the world, according to His will, were healthful; and there was no poison of destruction in them" (Wisd. i. 14). Personal sins aggravated the evil, which spread throughout humanity, causing spiritual and physical death through the forfeiture of that which hindered it—the gift of righteousness. No natural remedy could be found, no antidote. 2. The uplifted serpent is a figure of the Divine remedy. The serpent is, as we have seen, the symbol of evil; but the serpent which Moses uplifted was not a real serpent, but the image of one. So Christ, "who knew no sin," became a sin offering for us. Although He was sinless, He was made "in the likeness of sinful flesh" (Rom. viii. 3). The serpent, as the symbol of evil, is represented by our Lord bearing upon the cross the sin of the world—as the Prophet says, "The Lord hath laid upon Him the iniquities of us all" (Isa. liii. 6). As the Representative of the human race, He suffered, the Just for the unjust, to bring us to God; and, by His death He brought back the supernatural life to a dying world. 3. The manner of the cure is a figure of the application of Christ's work to us. The repentance of the Israelites, their acknowledgment of sin, their faith, their obedient use of the divinely ordered means, all have a counterpart in the kingdom of grace. Our Lord's words sum up the teaching of the type, "As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up." This is the only adequate explanation of the material symbol. As the serpent was lifted up upon a pole, so Christ "bore our sins in His own body on the tree" (1 Pet. ii. 24). "I," He said, "if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto Me" (John xii. 32). Though the Ascension is also described as a "lifting up" by St. Peter (Acts ii. 33; v. 31), here the elevation has evident reference to the Cross, because that is a Meritorious Mystery—it is the tree of life, the leaves of which were "for the healing of the nations" (Rev. xxii. 1).

III. Lessons. 1. We see the deadliness of sin, its virulence and incurableness by natural means. 2. That the judgments of God are intended to work in us true repentance, and to lead us to the Divine Remedy—Christ "crucified." 3. That a living faith, and an obedient use of the means which Christ has devised, are necessary for appropriating those gifts of healing which upon the Cross He has purchased for us.

SUNDAY IN SCHOOL.

THE TRIUMPHAL ENTRY.

Mark xi. 1–11.

There is something fascinating about a procession. It stops everything else. We run to the window at the first note from its band. And there is instruction for one of thoughtful mind in studying a procession, in scanning faces and determining motive and temper. But of all the processions that ever formed on earth, the most significant, save one, is this which swarmed ino Jerusalem on the first day of Passover week. Our Lord allowed this demonstration. He encouraged it. He started it. It was by His order that the ass was brought for Him to ride. This homage was necessary. His Kingship must be acknowledged. From of old it had been declared that the Messiah should be a King; of David's line; heir to David's throne; so to rule Israel, and

through Israel the world. Whatever else was to be said of the Messiah, this was to be declared: that he should be a King—a King of kings. And Christ would not come to the end of His mission on earth without asserting once and for ever His royal office. Such public displays of homage to Christ are to be maintained. It is still Christ's way to spread His kingdom by a quiet, humble, and persuasive ministry of His gospel. But the mighty works of our Lord entitle Him to the triumph of a world's acclaim.

But as the throng advances, and we get sight of the Figure seated on the ass, what a contrast there is between the appearance of the King and His attendants! They are wild with joy. He is serious, thoughtful, heavy-hearted. The tears are in His eyes; and as He sees the Holy City they begin to fall. The crowd goes jauntily on before; but the King is weeping. Why this difference? It is because of their different thoughts of the coming kingdom. He could only grieve at the light thoughts which so skimmed the surface of his Kingship. "Peace! peace!" they cried; but they forgot the things that belong to peace. The roots of their troubles they would leave to sprout again. They felt the sting and smart of poverty, but they had small concern over their rebellions; no deep shame at their vices, no humble prayer for pardon and help. They were beside themselves at the prospect of a revolution and a new nation. And there was need enough of change, and it should come; but it must come, not by force, or law, or miracle, but by new hearts. So what could the King do but ride in tears after such heedless and mistaken enthusiasts?

It will be well for us to remember that grieving face as we lift the cry of the kingdom to-day. The vision it presents is splendid. The heart bounds at the thought of the world so redeemed and harmonized. But what do we mean, except seek? The crowd in the working men's hall may cheer the name of Christ. But to what shall He lead them? To better wages alone; to an overturn of present conditions; to stop trusts and to tax millionaires? The conditions are bad. But where are the real causes of such conditions? And what is the deepest need? There is a crowd in the Church also, bowing at Christ's name, and praying for His kingdom and for His blessing on human affairs. And they, too, may forget the things that belong unto peace. The worshippers' eyes grow wet at the portrayal of Messiah's kingdom, spreading, transforming, redeeming the whole world, till His will shall be done on earth as in heaven. But withal, where is the resolute purpose to bestir themselves to clear away the evil in them and around, that they may prepare the way of the Lord?

He rides on, and they that follow pass with the same jubilant rush. But the memory of His face makes their hosannas sound hollow, almost heartless. Our excitement cools, and we realize that not so fast or lightly is the King to reach His throne. There is another and more fateful procession yet to form. He who rides into the city in such meek glory must yet be led out of it, bearing His cross. For not in royal Jerusalem, but on Golgotha, is He to be lifted up to draw the world to Himself. The palace He is to enter is the heart that opens to receive Him. The sway He is to exercise comes not with outward place or force of rule, but by an inner spirit to animate and govern. And the path to such dominion leads through conflict, sacrifice, and humbling death. It looked otherwise. The hour was auspicious. Conditions were ripe for a sudden revolution. The multitude was confident and eager. But, after all, the kingdom comes not by the way of the triumphal entry, but by the way of the cross. And yet we catch at such popular and tumultuous movements in our times, as if expecting that resolutions and cheers were all that were needed. A changed order, a juster law, a wiser device, attend the coming kingdom; they all declare it and have place, but they do not bring the kingdom. They have

not the power to recreate. It will not be by a happy hit, by a popular vote, or by stampeding sin, that the kingdoms of this world will become the kingdom of our God and of His Christ. Still it must be by conflict, suffering, sacrifice, under the banner of the cross.

They have all gone by, down the slope and up again into the city. If we follow to see the end, we shall find the King in the temple. For the Church, not the palace or the capitol, is to be the seat of His rule. Is the entry, then, a failure? Yes, if you judge by observation; but the kingdom of heaven cometh not so.—WILLIAM E. STRONG.

THE WICKED HUSBANDMEN.

MARK xii. 1–42.

GOETHE once said, "What would remain to me if this art of appropriation were derogatory to genius? Every one of my writings has been furnished to me by a thousand different persons, a thousand things; wise and foolish have brought me, without suspecting it, the offering of their thoughts, faculties, and experience. My work is an aggregation of beings taken from the whole of nature; it bears the name of Goethe." He was giving an individual expression to a universal truth. No man originates. Every nation, every Church, every individual, is first of all a recipient; afterwards, if at all, a giver. Others have provided the vineyard, others have planted the hedges thereof and dug the ditches, others have built the towers for defence; and humanity has assumed the vineyard provided, and with the assumption has also taken on strong and binding obligations. It is fundamental, it is essential to any conception of the position of souls in life, that this primary fact be recognized—that no man makes his own vineyard; that he receives it; that it is the gift of God.

But the difficulty meets us here. Every one accepts the primary, fundamental fact. No soul really believes that it comes to life of its own motion and at its own charges. But, having come to life, having entered upon the vineyard, the distinction between occupancy and ownership is frequently lost. I remember to have read a quaint story with relation to a coachman, who had been in the employ of his master for more than two score years. One day, in a fit of impatience, his master discharged him, and the coachman, looking into his face, said, "I won't go; for if you don't know when you have a good coachman, I know when I have a good place." He had come through years of service to a sense of proprietorship, and fancied that holding a position for years gave him in some sense a quit-claim to it. He confused the idea of occupancy and ownership. He was not the first, nor will he be the last, to do so.

Turn to literature, and let immortal Shakespeare read us the lesson. The story of Lady Macbeth is known to every one; that queenly woman whose soul was fired with an ambition which, holy in the beginning, became so unholy toward the end; who absolutely forgot the distinction between occupancy and ownership, and was willing that anything should happen to her of turpitude and baseness, if only the ambition of her soul should be gratified, and she, though with red hand and foul heart, find her way to the throne and sit there as queen. You can recall those words of Mrs. Jameson with relation to Lady Macbeth: "The power of religion alone could have controlled such a mind; but it is the misery of a very proud, strong, and gifted spirit without the sense of religion, that, instead of looking upward to find a superior, looks round and sees all things as subject to itself." That was Lady Macbeth's great fault. She confused the idea of occupancy with the idea of ownership. She believed that she was her own, and that the sway of her mighty ambition might

carry her anywhither, so be the purpose to which she had set her soul might be accomplished. The pity of it is that, in confusing these things which are so essentially different, the human soul is driven to every resort in order to cover its retreat from nobility and from rectitude. Misery everywhere overtakes the careless soul which believes that the great mission of life is to use it simply for selfish pleasure, which becomes so thoroughly lost in this delusion, that it sees no difference between what it possesses for time and what are after all its absolute, its actual effects.

We shall not, however, have arrived at the depth of this truth that we are considering, unless we remind ourselves of the compassion of the Owner; for "one day with the Lord is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day." There is absolutely no comparison between the strength of the husbandmen and the strength of the owner of the vineyard. The owner was supreme in power, the husbandmen held but a relative position; and it would have been within the province of that owner, upon the first outrage, to have swiftly punished those wicked men, and to have given his vineyard into the hands of those who would have been loyal to the keeping of his interests. But not so. The processes of God are not usually swift. God plies the soul everywhere with increasing motives.

Is not this true with nations? For generation after generation a nation may deny the Law of God, and confuse the ideas of occupancy and ownership, and yet the hand of God tarries, the avenging God visits not the nation with calamity. Is not this illustrated in the evolution of the Church of God? Do you not see that "one day is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day," in the manipulations of God with His Church? Take, for example, Israel. The principle which holds with nations, the principle which holds with Churches like the Jews, is the principle which holds in your life and in my own. As we tread the paths of our existence, thinking that we are owners and not occupants, God plies our souls increasingly with stronger motives, if so be that He may open our eyes to the light and turn our wayward footsteps into the strait and narrow path that leadeth unto Him.

The final truth to which you and I must give our attention is the truth of the ultimate persistence of the kingdom of God through the vindication of the authority of God. We have strange ideas of judgment. The idea of the average Christian with relation to judgment is purely spectacular, mechanical. It is not so! Read the conclusion of this parable; turn to one of the other Gospels, and read the suggestive words of Christ, "He that falleth on this stone shall be broken to pieces: but on whomsoever it shall fall, it will scatter him as dust." It means that if you, mistaking occupancy for ownership, deliberately and wilfully hurl yourself against the Rock of Ages, and deny the influence of the providence of God over your life, that by that very reason your life shall come into judgment of itself and be broken, because there is no power in the ignoble things to which you have allied yourself to lift that soul into everlasting habitations, or to give your soul those visions beatific which are the inspiration of those who have heard and seen and are following in the footsteps of God. And so the question comes with a great significance to your life and mine—What is the regnant principle upon which I am living? Have I confused the idea of occupancy with the idea of ownership? What is your relationship with God to-day?

That is the deep meaning of that parable of judgment. It means that there is a difference between an authority which is assumed and an authority which is actual. It means that there is a kingdom of God which is bound to triumph, and that you and I can only have fellowship and part in that majestic triumph as we distinguish between our position as occupant upon the one hand, and the duties which we owe to the Owner upon the other.—NEHEMIAH BOYNTON.

WATCHFULNESS.

MATT. xxiv. 42–51.

THE Scripture before us opens a wide range of suggestion, and we have the right to apply this injunction of our Lord to the duty of the Christian with respect to the evils of intemperance.

I. But the interest we are to take in moral reforms is to be particular and direct, and our WATCHFULNESS IS TO BE DIRECTED TOWARD OUR ENEMY. For this evil of intemperance is a concrete thing. It is maintained by an organized force of men interested in promoting it. The enemy is thoroughly organized for the struggle. They care not for age, sex, condition, political parties, or moral sense. Their only watchword is, "Protection of our interests." We are taught also that large outlays of money are needed to carry on this work. The liquor men pour out their money freely. Why should the Christian withhold his? Go forward! Prayer against this evil is well, but God expects us to answer our own prayer by strenuous action, self-sacrifice, and generous giving.

II. Again, WATCHFULNESS MEANS THAT WE SHALL FIGHT THIS EVIL WITH LAW. The progress of temperance legislation will necessarily be slow, for law is only crystallized by public sentiment. There is nothing in law enabling it to enforce itself. But law reinforced by public sentiment is a strong instrument against crime. Law cannot make intemperate men temperate. Law cannot take away the thirst for alcohol. But law can make the manufacture of intoxicants a crime. Law can annihilate a murderous business. Law can prevent the transportation of rum to Africa. Law can prevent the opening of saloons in our towns and cities. The Christian citizen should endeavour to have the most strenuous law passed that can be enforced. But the passage of sound law depends on the sentiment of the community where the law has jurisdiction.

III. Hence it is necessary that WATCHFULNESS SHALL PROVIDE SUITABLE INSTRUCTION OF THE YOUNG. The present temperance reform may not be able to reclaim and save the hundreds of thousands of drunkards now reeling to their graves, but it may so educate the rising generation that there will be fewer and fewer drinkers in the future. Throw the search-light of truth upon this whole dark, loathsome business, and we shall see a healthier, nobler, wiser race coming forward to do the world's work.

IV. The watchfulness required of us by our Master demands that WE SHALL APPLY THE REMEDY OF THE GOSPEL TO ALL FORMS OF UNRIGHTEOUSNESS. The gospel is a mighty power unto salvation. Let us faithfully use it among all men, no matter how hard their hearts or how vile their lives.—EDWARD SAMPSON TEAD.

THE LORD'S SUPPER.

MARK xiv. 12–26.

MARATHON might shape the future of human civilization; Calvary determined man's eternal destiny. Next His victory over death, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ is the most significant and sublime fact in history. It is that stupendous event which is commemorated in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. While every incident in this feast is richly suggestive of truth and comfort, a few of the main events fix themselves in our minds.

I. "As they were eating, He took bread, and when He had blessed, He brake it, and gave to them, and said, Take ye: this is My body. And He took a cup, and when He had given thanks, He gave to them: and they all drank of it. And He said

unto them, This is My blood of the covenant, which is shed for many." In these words He makes plain the central fact in His death. It was a death for others, and that they might have pardon for sin. In the emblems given the disciples He reveals Himself as their Redeemer, and in the words, "shed for many," as the Redeemer of mankind. The bread points to Him as our Life, the cup to Him as our Pardon, and the two as inseparable to complete redemption and salvation of men in Him. In His death Christ is distinct from all others. To every believing heart the Lord's Supper brings *assurance*. It is evidence that Christ has given Himself for us. "While we were yet weak, in due season Christ died for the ungodly." But in giving Himself *for* us Christ gave Himself *to* us. He is not alone the price which ransoms, but the ransom which enriches the redeemed captive. He does not alone strike the shackles from our hands and the fetters from our feet, saying, "Be free," but adds, "Take, eat," and so makes us rich for evermore. He puts Himself at our disposal. "Take, take!" We may take all of the Christ.

II. This brings to us the lesson of FELLOWSHIP. By this truth in the emblems of the sacrament believers in Jesus are brought into union with Him and into fellowship with each other. We wall each other out by artificial distinctions. We spurn the caste system of Brahmanism, yet too much of it lingers in our blood. This table is the meeting-place of the universe. Here all men are made brothers. Here there is neither black nor white, bond nor free. We are one with the bruised Christ, and by way of His cross are made one with men.

III. The sacrifice breathing from the broken bread and outpoured wine must ever be ELOQUENT AS THE PATTERN OF CHRISTIAN LIFE. The Christian life is a daily sacrifice. Not in any joyless, bitter sense, but in a glad triumphant way we too are to give ourselves to the world. Too much of our theology and far too much of life is never tested by these emblems of His sacrifice. We sit at His table with no colouring of self-sacrifice in our actual theology. We take from His hand the emblems of His suffering with no semblance of His spirit in daily living. Am I living for His glory? Are the purposes of His heart the purposes of mine? Are these emblems of His sacrifice fit symbols of the spirit reigning in my breast? Before you taste this bread or drink this cup, know to what you are dead and to what you are alive; for "if we say that we have fellowship with Him, and walk in the darkness, we lie, and do not the truth."

IV. There is in this sacrament, too, THE SPLENDOUR OF PROPHECY. "Verily I say unto you, I will drink no more of the fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new in the kingdom of God." For Him earthly rites are no more. He passes beyond them now, and beyond the sufferings and limitations of the earthly life. Some day He will come again. His sacrifice leads to victory. In no other way could He have overcome the world and finished His work. The wheels of His chariot move slowly along the rough road and impeded highways of human hearts. Yet every valley shall be exalted, every hill be made low, and every knee shall bow before Him as King of kings and Lord of lords. We champion no dying cause; we celebrate no lifeless Christ; we eat of no empty feast. Whatever comes to Christ is shared by Christ's disciple. When He sits on His throne, we too shall be enthroned, and in the growing glory of His eternal kingship we shall find our glory.

V. "And when they had sung a hymn, they went out upon the Mount of Olives." And in that song the voice of Jesus must have joined, though it was for Him the moment of gathering death-shade and the hour of His loneliness. Somehow, after all, there is in Christian life no permanent power in sacrifice to darken the chambers of the believer's heart. It is possible for us to cheat ourselves and view sacrifice for

Christ as the gateway into mourning. But from that broken bread and outpoured wine Jesus turned amid the echoes of the Hebrew Hallel. He means it to be so for us. The emblems on His table lift us up to heights of thanksgiving. Here sacrifices are transformed; nay, here we see them as they are, the gateways into the joy of the Lord.

VI. Mark and the others are silent, henceforth, regarding the place of the Lord's Supper in the history of the early Church. We can imagine what that was. What it has been in the history of the Christian Church we know. For almost two thousand years men have partaken of it in every land and under every variety of circumstance. What changes await men we do not know; but in the uplifting and inspiring power in these emblems of Divine love suffering for men there can be no change, save that from glory to glory; for He who speaks through them to the soul is the eternal and changeless Christ, the Son of God, the Redeemer of men.—JOHN E. TUTTLE.

THE BOOK CRITIC.

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO NEW TESTAMENT GREEK. By S. G. GREEN, D.D. *Present Day Primers.* Religious Tract Society.

MANY who are not at present prepared to take in hand so large a work as Dr. Green's *Handbook*, may be tempted by this neat little volume of only 128 pages. It is well adapted for beginners. The outlines of the grammar are given, inclusive of syntax, and also a graduated series of exercises, the examples in which are taken mostly from the Gospel of Luke and the Epistle to the Philippians, with vocabularies. Those desirous of reading the New Testament in the original cannot now complain of neglect on the part of scholars. The treatment of the subject is clear as well as simple. The future perfect, however, which does not occur in some manuscripts, need scarcely have been mentioned. W. TAYLOR SMITH.

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS, NEW TESTAMENT AND POST-APOSTOLIC. By Rev. JAMES MACGREGOR, D.D. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

THIS is the third and last of a series of works called *The Apologetic Series*, intended to set forth the view that "the proof of Christianity is constituted by the whole historical appearance of this religion among mankind." It consists of an introduction dealing with names and things—the words "apology," "apologize," etc.—and two books. The former book discusses apologetics in New Testament history: (1) in the earthly ministry of Christ; (2) in the apostolic ministry. The latter book, which occupies nearly two-thirds of the volume, refers to "apologetics in its two post-apostolic periods:" (1) primitive apologetics, which gathered mainly round "the substantive revelation of the living God and Saviour in Christ;" (2) modern apologetics (from the sixteenth century down to the present time), which have been occupied principally with "the scriptural record of the alleged revelation." There are two appendices, one of which gives some reminiscences of the struggle in Scotland that resulted in the condemnation of the late Professor Robertson Smith, and illustrative notes. The work is learned and suggestive beyond the average, but it is at times painfully discursive. Part of it might have more fitly had a place in a work entitled, *Studies in*

Christian Apologetics. The writer is an ardent controversialist, and sometimes cannot help taking part in the fray which he professes to describe. Judicial calmness is absent from many of his pages. It seems very difficult, if not impossible, for him to be throughout fair to opponents. For example, Biblical scholars who claim to be distinctively scientific, and above all things historical, are said to be apparently unacquainted with the monumental history which illustrates the Bible. This is going too far, as is shown by Wellhausen's latest work. The most distinguished advanced critics take note of hieroglyphic and cuneiform evidence. Dr. MacGregor's style is fresh and vivid, but often inelegant. The Biblical references have not been revised with sufficient care. There are four false references in two pages (10, 11). The mention of Wellhausen as deceased must surely be a slip. Was Professor Robertson Smith intended? Yet, in spite of considerable defects, the book has solid worth. It will be prized by those who love masculine thinking, and strong, clear reasoning.

W. TAYLOR SMITH.

ST. PAUL'S CONCEPTION OF CHRISTIANITY. By A. B. BRUCE, Professor of New Testament Exegesis in the Free Church College, Glasgow, author of *The Kingdom of God*, etc. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1894.

THIS is a really great book. It is instinct with life, and quickens its readers. To say that it will add to its author's fame may seem high praise; but such is the fact. It extends the area within which his mastery, a mastery which comes only with spiritual affinity, is displayed. And it is doubly welcome to find one of Dr. Bruce's fearless candour doing none the less justice to the great apostle, that he has already shown his supreme devotion to the specific forms of the Master's own teaching. We can only hope that some others may profit by such an example. The fact is, that an exponent of the Pauline gospel runs a great risk of exposing his own spiritual limitations. The real nerve of Paul's thought lies deep in experience; and, unless the depths of the reader's spirit, too, have been broken up, he is nearly sure to give us a jejune exposition. Now, Professor Bruce thoroughly understands the "spirit" amid the "letter," as St. Paul would himself have demanded. There is a poetic largeness about his readings, which bring out the sweet reasonableness of the apostle's inmost thought. In a word, we have here the best, the most truly religious, and therefore the most faithful interpretation of the Pauline attitude and system that is at present available. A reviewer's one difficulty is to select from the wealth of materials, and to avoid rendering what he selects "prosy" in the act of rehearsal.

The method underlying the work is at once its strength and its weakness. It builds on the four great controversial, but uncontroverted, Epistles, to the formal neglect of the rest; though at times one is let feel the influence of these latter in the background. The weakness of this is its incompleteness, and the absence of perfect assurance as to the perspective of the parts treated, central as these are, in relation to Paul's ripened thought as a whole. On the other hand, there is a gain not only in scientific or apologetic strength, but also in the greater clearness of statement in that Paul has been forced into definition by antithesis. This latter feature, no doubt, has its own drawbacks; but Dr. Bruce is fully alive to them, as also to a constant implicit reference to Paul's own old ideas and experience, and he manages to extract *distinctive* Paulinism with great skill and fairness from the field thus chosen. He gives, too, an important hostage to objective truthfulness, by prefixing to his topical handling of these Epistles a very thorough and lucid account of the movement of thought in each. To the ordinary reader this, along with the analysis of the

Primer Epistles (the *Thessalonians*), may even prove the most instructive part of the book. And yet, after all is said, we find it hard to believe that our author has been wise in thus omitting at least *Philippians*—now as good as "admitted," and so necessary to a more concrete idea of Paul's Christology—and even *Colossians*, for which as a whole *Philemon* has proved so steadfast a sheet-anchor. No doubt the more metaphysical cast of the Christology in *Colossians* presents a real problem; but then we need all the more the light which our author, as much as any one, is able to shed thereon.

Chapters i. and ii. are a sort of introduction to the whole, and most valuable they are. The former discusses with great power the vexed question whether there was a growth in St. Paul's theology between the epoch of his conversion and the clear emergence of the *distinctive* Pauline gospel with the Galatian, Corinthian, and Roman Epistles—taken in this order. The answer given is a decided negative. Dr. Bruce believes that when Paul emerged from his Arabian retirement he possessed, deeply graven on his soul, all the essential points of what he called "my gospel." In this connexion he makes excellent use of Gal. ii. 14–21, whose substance goes back to a period prior to the Thessalonian Epistles which have been taken as evidence of a *primitive Paulinism* that lacked the distinctive notes of Paulinism proper. Having shown that this is, further, most unlikely in face of Paul's own account of his attitude as early as the time of the Jerusalem conference (Gal. ii. 1, ff.; cf. i. 16), he shows also that the *naïveté* and elementary nature of the Epistles in question simply proves that Paul was a judicious missionary, who considered his converts' "immediate needs and capacities," when he "had no occasion to guard them against errors and misconceptions." They are what they are, "not because Paulinism was yet unborn, but because its author kept it in its proper place. St. Paul distinguished between religion and theology, between faith and knowledge" (cf. 1 Cor. iii. 1, 2 for the principle in a different connexion). Our author then proceeds to show that the great "points" of Paulinism are really involved in what Paul wrote to Thessalonica; for the piety there implied really rests on faith and grace, and has no tinge of the legalism which later served to accentuate the formulation of the gospel of the grace of God. Thus we are enabled to "know what so great a master reckoned essential," to see that he was not wedded to the letter even of his own gospel, and ourselves learn to-day to recognize true religion amid very imperfectly Pauline theology.

"Much depends on the way in which we conceive the conversion" of the apostle, "and what it involved." This is the thought lying behind chapter ii., on "St. Paul's Religious History," which lays great stress on the *præparatio evangelica* enacted in Saul of Tarsus and "seen through the mist" in Rom. vii. 7, ff.; with the result that the conversion which follows "means almost everything characteristic in Pauline Christianity." But we cannot stay to indicate how finely this is worked out by our author. Suffice it here to say, by anticipation, that it is the vivid perception of the originality of Paul's genius, as evinced in this crisis and its antecedents, that makes him so incredulous of the "patchwork" theory of the Pauline theology, when analyzed by Pfleiderer and others into its supposed constituents, Rabbinic and Hellenist (pp. 133, 217, 268). There is, however, one exegetical lapse which, unlike its very few comrades in this model of sure-footed exegesis, does affect the argument a little, and recurs from time to time. It first occurs on p. 30: "From the day that the eye of Saul's conscience lighted on the words, 'Thou shalt not *covet*,' his Judaism was doomed. It might last for a while . . . but the heart was taken out of it." Admirably said! But then he continues, "This is the import of the other autobiographical hint in Rom. vii., 'When the commandment came, sin revived, and I died'"

—as if this referred to a "discovery" in adult years that the feeling *per se* was sin. Here we demur, and point to the words immediately preceding, "I was alive χωρὶς νόμου once on a time," as seeming to show that the stage prior to the coming of the commandment was that of "innocent childhood," ere he became a "son of the Law" at all. For even a *slight* consciousness of Law serves to bring sin to life (Rom. v. 13).

One of the most valuable features of this book is the clear way in which its author distinguishes the essential *religious intuitions* and the *theological formulations* of the apostle, the latter being more relative in character. Especially is this the case with the forms which his convictions assumed when challenged—the *apologetic* aspects of his system (p. 46). These distinctions are consistently applied throughout the work, with the most helpful results. Indeed, the topics are grouped in accordance therewith, and as follows: I. Soteriological, or religious ideas proper, viz. Sin, Righteousness of God, the Death of Christ, Adoption. II. Apologetic, viz. (1) The Safeguarding of Ethical Interests ("The Moral Energy of Faith," "The Holy Spirit," and "The Flesh as Basis of Sin"); (2) The True Function of the Law; (3) The (forfeited) Election of Israel. But where, it will be asked, is Christ Himself in all this? Everywhere, in effect. But, as far as His Person goes, He cannot properly be treated as a mere part of the soteriological system; though He, rather than the fact of sin, might be made its base. The method actually pursued best preserves, in spite of drawbacks, the true psychological order. Christology is thus reserved for separate and co-ordinate treatment in a chapter very excellent in its way, though imperfect by reason of the limited materials employed. But the discussion of Rom. ix. 5 is too sketchy to yield a conclusive result where one might have been expected.

Three supplemental chapters close the exposition. The first of these is devoted to "The Christian Life," and is full of fresh interest. It is urged, perhaps with over-emphasis, that St. Paul conceives the beginning of this life as a new *creation* rather than a new *birth*—Christ's own metaphor, in which Dr. Bruce welcomes the recognition of a certain latent germ in the natural man, needing only the Divine fertilization to issue in a new moral person. But surely the reference to immature Christians as "babes," in 1 Cor. iii. 1 (cf. Gal. iv. 19), implies this vital aspect also; and the same passage, properly understood as referring to *moral* defect (ver. 3 against p. 355), goes far, by its contrast of νήπιοι and πνευματικοί (otherwise τέλειοι, Phil. iii. 15; 1 Cor. ii. 6; cf. Phil. ii. 12), to qualify the companion statement that the apostle was far behind his Master in the recognition of the necessary stages of "blade, ear, full corn in the ear" (Mark iv. 28, whose reference to the individual may fairly be doubted). The chapter on "The Church" is very sound, and shows quite unusual insight into the genius of primitive Church life; while that on "The Last Things" is at once frank, where historical frankness is much needed, and deeply reverent in its reserve of tone.

Standing outside the organism of the book is a "Supplementary Note," one of many tokens reminding us how closely in touch with the living mind of to-day our author is. Its theme is momentous, being "The Teaching of St. Paul compared with the Teaching of our Lord in the Synoptic Gospels." It contains the substance of a recent article by Wendt, along with some qualifying remarks, particularly as regards the significance of the Cross. Not to go into detail, we may simply observe that, in our opinion, Dr. Bruce has already foregone, in this connexion (p. 288), the use of a principle to which he in some respects does full justice; we mean that *faith-mysticism* which establishes a subjective identity between the Crucified and those whose trust is in Him. And this is not the sole point on which, had space allowed, we should have felt bound to challenge a judgment of the distinguished author's. We are not

quite satisfied with his exposition of the Divine Fatherhood (in the Gospels, as in the Epistles, p. 188), of the flesh and its relation to the body, of redemption by Christ's *self-humiliation* (suggestive as this is as a factor), or even of the cardinal position assigned to Rom. ix.–xi. as prompting the apostle to write.

But such reserves in no way detract from our appreciation of Professor Bruce's general attitude and method, and of his deeply Evangelic conception of Christianity. He has set forth a powerful apologia for Faith, in the Pauline sense, as the true way not only of justification, but also of sanctification, and has nobly vindicated, after all friendly *caveats*, the imperative duty of evangelism. Most unhesitatingly, therefore, do we venture to commend this earnest book, so full of the very aroma of Paul's spirit, to the serious study of all Christian men. VERNON BARTLET.

STUDIES IN THEOLOGY: LECTURES DELIVERED IN CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY. By the Rev. JAMES DENNEY, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1894.

DR. DENNEY, who has for some years been regarded as one of the most distinguished members of the group of younger theologians in the Free Church of Scotland, is to be heartily congratulated on this book. Pervaded by a note of personal conviction, marked by accurate scholarship and reflective insight, the work is alive from beginning to end. The lectures are intended to be a contribution to dogmatics, in the proper sense of the term. As such they deal with problems, not merely interesting in themselves, but necessarily connected with questions that have acquired great importance in the arena of modern thought as a whole. Or, to be more explicit, they contain philosophical, and what may be called broadly human, elements. The dogmatic discussions do not exist simply for themselves; they are not exhibitions of barren subtlety and dull learning; far rather they come into contact at every point with the gravest problems of the spiritual life, as these are now understood. Dr. Denney's overmastering religious affinity, his matured conviction, and his reverence, which knowledge has served only to deepen, combine to render the book stimulating, refreshing, helpful. Moreover, he strikes at the right place, and, as I think, attacks the real problems in the right spirit entirely, often in the right direction too.

The scope of the work is best indicated, perhaps, by the titles of the lectures. They are: I. The Idea of Theology; II. The Witness of Jesus to Himself; III. The Apostolic Doctrine of Christ; IV. Man and Sin; V. The Work of Christ in Relation to Sin—the New Testament Doctrine of Atonement; VI. Inadequate Doctrines of Atonement; VII. Christ in His Exaltation; VIII. The Church and the Kingdom of God; IX. Holy Scripture; X. Eschatology.

The standpoint adopted is not that of the traditional orthodoxy (cf. for example, p. 69); nor yet is it that of the equally traditional heterodoxy (cf. Lecture IX.). It is best indicated by the word "calmness." For Dr. Denney looks out upon the field as from a watch-tower, and describes what presents itself. He takes advantage of past controversies, and has no fear in handling them. The key-note of his treatment is struck very early in the book. "*All* that man knows—of God and of the world—must be capable of being constructed into a coherent intellectual whole. All that any one of us knows as a Christian, or as a student of science, physical, historical, anthropological, archæological, must be capable of such a construction; and our doctrine of God, instead of being defiantly indifferent here, must involve the principles on which this construction shall proceed. We deceive ourselves, and try to evade the difficulties of the task which is laid on us, when we deny the essential relation in

which theology must stand to all the contents and problems of our mind and life" (p. 4). But Dr. Denney's calmness reposes on a strong foundation of conviction. Unscathed, he surveys the expanse, not only of theology, but of modern thought (cf. Lecture IV.). His certainty of his own fiducial basis protects him. The nature of his conviction is admirably illustrated in Lecture III., and, indeed, throughout the book. This instance must suffice: Christ "became obedient unto death, His death being the climax of His obedience to the Father; but it cannot be granted that His vocation was ethical in a sense which simply identifies it with the vocation of any other man. His vocation was not only ethical, but unique. As a recent English theologian has put it, 'There were certain functions which He performed which cannot be explained out of His character as ideal man.' Supreme among these functions is that of bearing sin" (p. 135). The insight that accompanies this conviction finds frequent illustration, as, for example, in the finely sustained passage on pp. 105–107. Here and there, too, there are excellent practical touches (cf. pp. 198, 199). The strongly anti-Ritschlian tone never becomes too dogmatic, and a pleasing tendency to recognize the good in an opponent is displayed.

Of course, as Dr. Denney himself says, it is impossible for us to go with him in every word. I am unable to follow him in essential portions of his extremely substitutional doctrine of atonement; and the authority he adduces from Scripture is not invariably satisfactory. There are also points in his presentation of the exalted Christ that afford matter for much contention; and the same may be said of his estimate of the value of some New Testament documents—the Fourth Gospel, for instance. There is a provincialism, almost a parochialism, in a book so dispassionate, on p. 249. In the phrase, "Established Church of Scotland," either the first word or the two last may be regarded as unnecessary. As further editions are almost certain to be called for, the need of an index ought to be seriously pressed.

The work is one which ought to be in the hands of all preachers and thinkers on religious problems. It is to be marked as well as to be read. R. M. WENLEY.

THE HOLY SPIRIT, THE PARACLETE. A STUDY OF THE WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT IN MAN. By Rev. JOHN ROBSON, D.D., Aberdeen. Edinburgh and London: Oliphant, Anderson, and Ferrier. 1894.

THE questions which, coming before him in his ministerial experience, Dr. Robson had set himself to solve are such as these: Were the apostles born of the Spirit before the effusion at Pentecost? How can we reconcile the inspiration of the Bible with the imperfections of the writers' lives? How is it that converted men often do so little Christian work, while a blessing seems sometimes to rest on the labours of the unconverted? Such problems, he discerned, could be satisfactorily solved only by the consideration of the work of the Spirit in Christ, which is the key to His work in man. Of course, the book, being thus restricted in scope, is not intended to be a complete treatment of the great subject of the Third Person of the Holy Trinity, but within his own limits the writer states his views systematically and perspicuously. He commences by explaining the word "Paraclete," as applied to Christ and to the Holy Ghost—to the former by the Apostle John, and to the latter by Christ Himself. The author is a little hazy in his definition of Παράκλητος, which he translates "One who is called along with another," taking παρὰ to mean "along with," instead of "alongside of." His rendering suits σύγκλητος exactly; while *Paraclete* signifies, as he afterwards notes, "One called to another's aid," the Latin *Advocatus*. But surely the gloss, "One

that is called along with the *clete* to aid him," is either erroneous or clumsily expressed, implying, as it seems to do, three parties to the transaction. Our author has an uncomfortable mode of rendering Greek words into equivalents which are not English; thus, besides the term *clete*, we have the *katable*, i.e. the foundation of the world, and so on. Such words are unintelligible to one who cannot read the original, and unnecessary for those who know Greek. We may note, in passing, that the English word "Comforter" did not originally signify "Consoler" in our modern sense; it meant "Strengthener," "Supporter." Thus the ancient English version of Isa. xli. 7 runs, "And he comfortide hym with nails, that it shulde not be moved." It is usually considered that, when applied to Christ, the term is used for Advocate, and, when applied to the Holy Spirit, involves the ideas of instruction, witness, reminding. By regarding the Paraclete as One called to help us, Dr. Robson combines the double conception. We are called to be saints; Jesus Christ helps us to become so by teaching and example and by making continual intercession for us with the Father; the Spirit helps us to believe, enables us to obey; the two Paracletes satisfy the need of a revelation, and the need of will and power. It must never be forgotten that "the Holy Ghost is not a mere influence, a mere power, a mere enthusiasm, but a Person exerting an influence, wielding a power, awakening an enthusiasm—whom we must meet as a Person, deal with as a Person, trust as a Person." This point, the Personality of the Holy Spirit, is briefly but clearly argued. We are then led to consider His work in creation in co-operation with the Word, where the expressions in Genesis lead to the belief in successive creative acts, and that the world has not arrived at its present condition by the sole working of forces which have been in operation from the beginning.

Into the controversy which this opinion invites Dr. Robson does not enter with any fulness, his limits not allowing him to descant on this fruitful subject. He has a very interesting chapter on the work of the Holy Spirit in Christ, considered as the norm of His work in man. It is needful to know the dealing of the Spirit with the perfect Man in order to understand His work with the sinful man. Regarding Christ's human nature, we may say the Holy Spirit came into contact with Him specially at His birth and His baptism. He was born of the Spirit; we must be born again, or from above (ἄνωθεν). In Christ the natural and the new birth coincided—they were one and the same; in man, as born into the world, the spiritual element is wanting and must be supplied from without by an "act somewhat of the nature of a baptism." And Christ's physical, mental, and spiritual growth progressed as ours ought to do. For thirty years He lived the life of a perfect Man; and then He entered on His great prophetic work, being inaugurated and, so to speak, furnished for it by baptism and the power of the Holy Ghost; and this power henceforth was with Him, guided all His subsequent career, enabled Him to perform the supreme act of sacrifice, and to rise from the dead, and to commission the apostles to carry on His work. For man to enter the kingdom of God, and to be preserved therein, he must be born of water and the Spirit, introduced by baptism to the means of grace enjoyed under the gospel economy, such as the reading and preaching of the Word, "the sacrament of the Supper," and all modes by which men are brought to the knowledge of Jesus. Thus in the new birth the Spirit works through the Word; and without the co-operation of the two Paracletes the birth is imperfect and unfruitful. Dr. Robson is careful to distinguish regeneration from conversion, the infusion of grace into the soul from the conscious exercise of grace. All need the new birth; all do not need conversion. The latter may be repeated; the former cannot. At the same time, the author does not connect the new birth invariably with the rite of baptism. In his view it may take place at any time in a man's life, the requisite condition being that the Spirit meet the

Word in his heart. When the man is convicted practically of sin, righteousness, and judgment, he is born anew, the spiritual life is begun in him, it becomes a constituent element of his nature. This teaching, of course, nullifies the absolute necessity of the sacrament of baptism for the production of the new birth. The case of Cornelius and his friends, I would contend, must not be pushed, as if before baptism he and they had received the supreme and highest gift. Speaking with tongues was not the highest gift of the Spirit; it was bestowed then for a temporary and didactic purpose, to show to prejudiced persons that Gentiles were capable of admission into the kingdom of God. The Holy Spirit had already commenced His work in the heart of these Gentiles; but they could not be incorporated into Christ without the rite of baptism. St. Paul's conversion and subsequent baptism may be regarded as teaching the same lesson.

On disputed points such as the above, Dr. Robson writes quietly, yet decisively, stating his opinion without entering into controversy—speaking rather as if no other view were possible. The method has its advantage, and in many quarters carries with it no inconsiderable weight. He sums up the truth regarding the doctrine of the baptism of the Spirit thus: "In Jesus Christ and in His disciples it is something different from the birth of the Spirit. In the birth the Holy Spirit communicates His nature to those whom He begets, conferring a spotless nature in the case of Jesus; conferring a new nature in the case of sinful men, and transforming their character. In the baptism the Holy Spirit comes as a Guest, a Helper, a Lord, to help and to rule those with whom He abides. The birth begets in us a life which needs, like all life, to be nourished and developed with its appropriate food and exercise—the food of the Word, the exercise of service and of prayer; and while these are maintained, we may hope that this new life will ever become stronger. The baptism brings us a Friend and a Helper, who nourishes the life He has begotten, who calls to service and gives us strength for it; but it is also in His sovereign power to withdraw and leave our life to struggle on in its own strength." We may compare this statement with the Catholic doctrine of baptism, with its subsequent catechetical training, followed by Confirmation, which imparts the Spirit with His sevenfold gifts. The prayerful study of Scripture leads, by different paths, to the same practical truths.

Dr. Robson devotes a chapter to the conditions necessary for receiving the baptism of the Spirit, which he considers to be three—*faith*, as one of the parts of the new birth, recognized and cherished; *obedience* to all Christ's commands, not only to His moral law, but also to the ordinances which He enjoined; and *prayer*, after the example of Christ and His apostles, especially importunate and united prayer. On the awful subject of "the eternal sin," we have some solemn and well-considered words. Its nature and its consequences we may see exemplified in the case of the Jews, who wilfully resisted the Holy Spirit in the face of conclusive evidence and conviction of conscience, and who were punished by the ruin of their temple and city, the loss of their country, and their destruction as a nation. In the case of individuals it is the nature of the sin that makes it unpardonable; for it hinders the Spirit's work in us, and renders vain the finished work of Christ; "it mars the work of the Triune God for our redemption." The Holy Spirit strives to convict the soul of sin, and to lead it to accept the forgiveness offered in Christ. When He is resisted, certain consequences must follow. A hardening of the heart is certain to ensue; prolonged resistance drives away the Spirit, and sin is committed without repugnance; and punishment must fall on the transgressor. There is no longer anything in him to draw him to Christ; all Christ's work in him is vain; he has no wish or power to accept forgiveness; he has lost them to all eternity. This terrible sin can be committed only by those who live

within the sound of the gospel, and have had some experience of the workings of the Holy Spirit. And it must not be forgotten that weakness of will, want of due care, satisfied declension of spiritual life, may be the beginnings of that downward stage that ends in the eternal sin. The solemn utterances in Heb. vi. 4–6 and x. 26 seem to teach no less than this.

The final chapter of this interesting and instructive volume is composed of a short discussion of the inspiration of the Bible, especially as an illustration of the work of the Spirit. In the Divine element in the Bible we observe the work of each of the Paracletes—Jesus Christ revealing, the Holy Spirit inspiring. "Revelation is the making known of God's purpose; inspiration is the power which enables men to apprehend and declare that purpose." The latter definition does not apply specially and solely to the writers of the Bible; their inspiration was particularly bestowed to enable them to record the revelation which they had received. Thus the evangelists were called and empowered to select and narrate certain portions of the work of Christ, the facts and teaching which were necessary to be made known for the salvation of the world. And in the other historical books of the Bible the Holy Spirit taught the writers to set down the progress of the kingdom of God, and such facts as were needed for the instruction and guidance of the Church. In the Epistles we have the views which the authors were inspired to elicit from their knowledge of the mind of Christ; and in the didactic and prophetical books of the Old Testament we find the Spirit directing the authors in their declaration of the dealings of God and His purposes in the world. To such details alone is inspiration confined; it has nothing to do with questions of science and history, with which man's natural faculties are capable of dealing.

This book will be received with differing feelings, according to the predilections of the reader, but all will agree that Dr. Robson has treated a momentous subject with skill, lucidity, and reverence, and has added to our theology a work of permanent utility.

W. J. Deane.

THE THINKER.

THE SURVEY OF THOUGHT.

A JEWISH "LIFE OF CHRIST."—The growing interest of Jews in Christianity is strikingly shown by the appearance of a popular sketch of the life, activity, and death of Jesus of Nazareth, by a distinguished Rabbi; and it is even more significant that the pamphlet has speedily reached a second edition. The author is Dr. J. Hamburger, of Strelitz, who is well known to scholars through his useful, though very defective, *Biblical and Talmudic Dictionary*. The book is dedicated to "the friends of truth;" and professes to be entirely free from dogmatic tendency. Nevertheless, it is most unfair as well as gravely inaccurate. The Gospels are said to belong to a later time, and to represent traditions which had passed down from generation to generation. The Gospel of John is described as completely under the influence of the Alexandrian philosophy. On the other hand, use is made of some utterly worthless legends. Jesus was born in the year 7 or 8 before the commencement of the Christian era—a date supplied by Keim—and was put to death at the age of thirty-three, in the year A.D. 35. It is difficult to know what to make of these astounding statements. The reader is at first tempted to regard 35 as a misprint for 25; but that can hardly be, because Pontius Pilate, whom Dr. Hamburger makes largely responsible for the Crucifixion, did not begin to govern until 26 or 27. Anyhow, our Rabbi has been guilty of gross carelessness. Some of the references to the Gospels are not less open to censure. Nathanael's confession, "Thou art the Son of God!" is turned into a question, "Art Thou the Son of God?" Our Lord's declaration before Caiaphas, that He was "the Son of the Blessed," is completely ignored. The disciples are stated to have helped their Master in the cleansing of the temple. The strange idea which has found favour with some recent writers, that Jesus was an Essene, is presented as a fact. A bit of Pharisaism of exactly the same sort as that so often mentioned in the Gospels peeps out in the bitter description of the followers of Jesus as consisting of "the low, dissatisfied popular classes, on whom the members of the higher and better classes were accustomed to look down with a certain measure of contempt." The miracles are not denied, but are dismissed with the briefest possible reference; and it seems to be implied that they did not differ materially from those wrought, or said to be wrought, by

others who posed as the Messiah. The blame of our Lord's death is thrown partly on the Sadducean priesthood, who are strongly denounced, and partly (as hinted above) on Pilate, whose reluctance to condemn Jesus is passed over in silence. It is energetically denied that the Sanhedrin was responsible. The modern Jews, it would seem, are beginning to be ashamed of the tragedy which ended on Golgotha; and would fain shift the responsibility off their nation. And then the story abruptly closes. Not even the belief in the Resurrection is mentioned. How, then, does Dr. Hamburger account for the place of Christianity in the world to-day? How is it that even he and his co-religionists find themselves compelled to date "before" and "after" the traditional birth-year of Jesus of Nazareth? The little book plainly indicates movement in Jewish circles which may be tending in the direction of Christianity; but it also bears painful testimony to the continued blindness of the leaders of Israel to "the things which concern their peace."

THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.—If Professor Holtzmann of Giessen is right, most of the generally accepted dates of New Testament history are wrong. The Lord's ministry is said to have begun in 28, and to have lasted only one year, the Passion therefore falling in the spring of 29. The Apostle Paul was converted late in the following summer, so that the first persecution of the Christians in Jerusalem, the spread of the gospel among the Hellenists, the work and martyrdom of Stephen, and the rise of a Christian community in Damascus, must have all taken place in a period which cannot have exceeded five months. Most will find this "a hard saying," but our confident guide cheerfully assures us that this assumption "presents no difficulty whatever." The Council in Jerusalem was held in 46, and was speedily followed by Paul's first missionary journey. The second was entered upon in the following year, and it is suggested that the Epistle to the Galatians may have been written during its course, that is, about ten years before the time to which it is usually assigned. It is admitted, however, that it may have been composed during the sojourn in Corinth, a little later. If so, Galatians and Thessalonians, which have so little in common, must date from the same stage of the apostle's development—another assumption which most will regard as very improbable. The First Epistle to the Corinthians was despatched from Ephesus during the apostle's stay there from 49 to 52. The Second to the Corinthians and Romans are put in the latter year. In the same year also Paul was arrested in Jerusalem. He was sent to Rome in 55, arriving there in the spring of 56. He remained there in free custody until 58, "and then disappears from history." This extraordinary scheme rests in a large measure on two assumptions: (1) that Festus became Procurator of Judæa in 55; (2) that the evidence of the Fourth Gospel about the duration of the ministry is unreliable. It need hardly be observed that both these assumptions are extremely precarious. The

chronological value of the Apostle John's statements cannot be dismissed in a sentence or two; and Professor Schürer's argument for 60 to 62 as the period of the administration of Festus stands unshaken. Professor Holtzmann is learned and ingenious, like most German professors; but, like many of them, he must be followed with the greatest caution. It is a pity that these venturesome speculations (for such they really are) have place in a handbook for theological students. Professor Schürer's well-known work is far safer than this *Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte*, but, unfortunately, the latter is attractively small, whilst the former is a book of formidable size.

THE DAY OF THE LAST SUPPER.—If, with many distinguished scholars, we put the Last Supper on Nisan 13th, we are confronted with the difficult question—Why was that day chosen? For what reason did the Lord select the evening before that on which the Paschal meal was usually eaten? A novel solution of this perplexing problem has been propounded by Jechiel Lichtenstein, a converted Moldavian Jew, who was for many years closely associated with the late Dr. Franz Delitzsch, to whom he rendered valuable aid in the translation of the New Testament into Hebrew. It is found in a *Commentary on Matthew* in Hebrew, a few specimens of which, translated into German, have just been issued by the Institutum Judaicum of Leipsic. It is very strange and strangely put, for Herr Lichtenstein's thought and expression are saturated with Rabbinic lore; but it well deserves to be widely known among Christian students. The following is a summary of the principal points. In the Mishnah (*Rosh-ha-shanah*, II. i.) we read, "The heretics made confusion." This is explained to mean that they produced false evidence about the appearance of the new moon, on the sight of which, according to ancient Jewish practice, the beginning of the month depended, and thus effected that the first day of the Passover should fall on a sabbath. Now, these "heretics" (the Sadducees) were in the ascendant at the time of the Passion, both in the Sanhedrin and among the people. So, owing to their influence, the great majority regarded the Saturday as the first day of the feast, and the Friday as the Ereb Pesach, or "day of preparation." A minority, however, were not taken in by Sadducean trickery, but considered Friday as the first day, and consequently ate the Paschal meal on the Thursday. The man in whose house the Last Supper took place was one of these intelligent few, and was therefore selected by the Lord, who, on this occasion, chose the 13th of Nisan, in order that He might both keep the Passover, and yet die on the cross at the very time when the Paschal lambs were slain in the temple. "It is evident that God so wonderfully ordered circumstances in that year that the Lord could at the same time keep an actual legal Passover with His disciples, and yet actually be offered up on the Ereb Pesach as the true Paschal Lamb" (1 Cor. v. 7; John xix. 36). This singular explanation, which its author reverently ascribes to Divine

guidance—"God has enlightened my eyes so as to lift the veil hitherto spread over these questions"—is obviously beset with not a few difficulties, but it is, at any rate, quite as probable as Gentile efforts.

PAUL'S BIRTHPLACE.—An interesting volume issued recently from the pen of Pastor Schneller of Cologne, under the title of *Apostelfahrten*, gives some curious details drawn from personal observation concerning the present condition of Paul's Cilician home and the country round. Tarsus, it seems, although no longer one of the world's notable cities, is still a busy place. Its narrow dirty streets are crowded with asses, carts drawn by oxen, laden camels, and people of half a dozen nationalities. Conspicuous among the latter are peasants clad in all the colours of the rainbow, and each armed with a huge sickle. These are reapers in quest of employment. Weaving is still one of the industries of Tarsus. Herr Schneller gives a graphic account of his visit to a little workshop in a narrow street. The weaver, who was an old man wearing a red cap, sat before a loom of primitive construction, such as Paul may have worked at. His yarn hung over his head. His shoes and a jug of water stood on the floor beside him. Under the loom was a depression in the ground, in which the feet were busy whilst the hands attended to the shuttle. The flocks which supplied the material used in the apostle's handicraft are still to be found in the uplands. "When I was travelling over the Taurus," observes our author, "I was often astonished by the numerous herds, partly consisting of valuable Angora goats, and partly of mohair sheep, which find nourishment on these rude mountains." The Apostle Paul is still held in high honour by some of the natives, who are nominally Mohammedans. He is their principal saint. To him they pray with more fervour and affection than to any other; and the trees which cover what is believed by them to be his grave are always hung with thousands of bits of cloth. These singular people, who are regarded as heretical by orthodox Moslems, are called Nusseiri. The young people of Tarsus are said to be exceptionally well-mannered. Herr Schneller was never assailed by them with that terrible word, which is such a potent engine of persecution in most Eastern towns and cities—*backshish!*

THE DIATESSARON OF TATIAN.—In an erudite and able article in the *Nineteenth Century*, Mr. W. R. Cassels deals with the question of the apologetic value of the recently discovered works attributed to Tatian, in settling the question of the date of the Fourth Gospel. As is well known, Tatian is said to have made a Harmony of the Four Gospels, probably some time about A.D. 175-180. Until recently, the argument has mainly turned upon the inference drawn from the name *Diatessaron*, given to this Harmony, that, if based upon four Gospels, these could be no other than those which have been accepted by the Church—an inference which has been steadily rejected by a majority of the greatest independent critics,

beginning with Baur, who affirmed that in no case could the Fourth Gospel have formed part of the *Diatessaron.* A new phase of the debate has now been entered upon by the discovery of two important works. The first of these is the Armenian translation of a commentary said to be that which Ephraem Syrus wrote upon the *Diatessaron.* The second is an Arabic version of a Syriac Harmony, affirmed to be the *Diatessaron* of Tatian itself, published with a Latin translation of the text by Ciasca, in 1888. These contain a Harmony of the Four Gospels. Mr. Cassels, however, points out that there has been undue haste on the part of apologists in believing that we have thus recovered the famous Harmony of the second century. The works in question do not correspond with the little that is known of the characteristics of the *Diatessaron,* and the identification rests upon the notes affixed to them by transcribers, concerning the accuracy of whose information we know nothing. Ephraem Syrus, or the writer of the commentary, whoever he may be, never himself calls the work upon which he is commenting the *Diatessaron,* but sometimes *Scriptura,* and occasionally *Evangelium;* while the Arabic version above referred to belongs to a date nine centuries after Tatian's time, and no evidence exists beyond the notes of the scribe for identifying the original with the work of that Father. "This being the case," Mr. Cassels says, "it is evident that the wish is very much father to the thought of those who accept the Arabic *Diatessaron* as the Harmony said to have been compiled by Tatian. Considering the difficulty or impossibility of identifying any anonymous Gospel Harmony amongst others, possibly or probably made to a great extent on similar lines, after a great lapse of time, it may seem equally rash to affirm or deny any claim of this kind which may be set up, but at least the Scotch verdict, 'not proven,' may unhesitatingly be brought in concerning this Arabic *Diatessaron,* which has only in its favour the notes in the Borgian manuscript, and against it that it does not clearly bear the only marks by which we know the original to have been distinguished."

Early Anabaptism.—In these days, when so much is spoken and written on Christian Socialism, and when so many speak of the desirability of reconstructing society on New Testament principles, the study of a movement like Anabaptism should be one full of interest. A strongly sympathetic estimate of it is contained in an article by Mr. Richard Heath, in the *Contemporary Review.* He does full justice to the religious principles which inspired the movement, and shows clearly how it came about that both Protestant Reformers and their Roman Catholic opponents were equally opposed to the new sect. "In the crisis caused by the decay of mediæval institutions, Anabaptism arose, asserting that Christendom must be renewed in the spirit of its Founder, and according to His commands. It was not the outcome of a mere spirit of sectarianism, nor was it at all local or national, but was as world-wide in its aims and

sympathies as Christianity itself. Anabaptism was as much a social and political movement as a moral and religious one. It started with the doctrine that the Divine was in all men, not produced there by the sacramental efficacy of baptism, or through an act of faith, but by the will of God, who, in creating man, breathed into him a breath of the Divine life. The conviction that Christ, the Light of the world, was in every man, led the Anabaptist into a position of antagonism to the world, such as might rather have been expected from the doctrine of Luther and Zwingli than from a doctrine instinct with the idea of universal love. Yet it soon developed an opposition to the world infinitely more irreconcilable than was the case with the Lutheran and Zwinglian Reformers. A conviction, born of the conscience and testified to by the prophets of every religion at every period, assured them that such opposition was the only course left to the man who would be true to the Divine light within. The Anabaptist was a man or woman who could see no way out of this difficulty. He was forced to go on, though he knew that to do so was to go straight out of the world. How often did he long to turn into port from the deep sea upon which he had drifted! but this was not possible without making the compromise which meant death to his soul." To those whose minds were set upon the establishment of the kingdom of heaven upon earth, the Reformation seemed but the substitution of one worldly and corrupt Church for another. Luther himself regarded the then existing Christendom as the Apocalyptic "Babylon;" the Anabaptists, in their uncompromising attitude towards society as then constituted, agreed with him in the use of the term, but applied it also to the Lutheran and Zwinglian Churches. This position finally led them to the great struggle at Münster. "Anabaptism," says the writer, "notwithstanding the great calamity at Münster, had laid hold of the heart of 'the common man.' It was his religion, expressing his hopes and aspirations, and giving him a field for the education of all his powers. Every baptized man and woman might become an apostle, and hundreds travelled over Europe in all directions, ardent missionaries of Anabaptism. Arrested, thrown into prison, executed, nothing stopped their ardour; others soon arose to supply their place. This religion is not yet dead. Along the routes whereon its first missionaries scattered the seed, it still lies waiting for a new spring."

BIBLICAL THOUGHT.

THE LIFE OF JESUS PRIOR TO HIS PUBLIC MINISTRY.

By Professor F. Godet, D.D.

If in this paper we study the development of our Lord from a strictly human point of view, none must suppose that our intention is to attack the fact of His Divine pre-existence. This fact, which was so clearly

revealed by the testimony of Jesus Himself and by the teaching of His apostles, is, for us, as undeniable as that of His real humanity.

But Jesus did not Himself become conscious of this sublime fact until the testimony of God was given at His baptism: "Thou art My well-beloved Son." In that hour was His true relation with the Father fully revealed to Him; thenceforward He knew Himself as "the Word made flesh," and He was able, when He prayed, to say, "Thou lovedst Me before the foundation of the world."

His development may rightly, therefore, be studied, up to that period of His life, from a purely human point of view. A truly human childhood and youth had been impossibilities if the deep mystery which formed the background of His earthly existence had been unveiled to Him sooner. It could not then have been said of Him that "He was made like unto His brethren, yet without sin."

No portion of the human life is more delicate than childhood. It is, therefore, a task of the utmost difficulty to retrace, in a correct and faithful manner, the various stages by which the purest, the most sensitive, the most delicate Being that ever lived gradually developed from childhood to youth, and from youth to manhood. Many unskilful hands have attempted to touch this subject. The authors of the Gospels known as the Apocrypha, those writings which for centuries have edified believers in the Churches of the East, laid hold of it; but they were far from imitating the discretion of our Biblical writers. Giving full scope to the flights of their imagination, they enlarged most injudiciously upon that period of the life of our Lord over which our Gospels cast but a dim and discreet *demi-jour*. Enveloping the humble apparition of the Child in a flood of marvellous light, they pictured Him making an ostentatious display of His supernatural power and knowledge; they described Him delighting to embarrass His schoolmaster by His ludicrous questions, giving His companions the most astonishing proofs of His Divine superiority, and going so far even as to inflict severe punishment upon any who failed to show Him all the respect to which He considered Himself entitled.

On the other hand, in the second century of the Church, there rose up a doctor who, in the interest of the glory of our Lord, thought it advisable to cast off even the incomplete outline supplied by our evangelical narratives. Marcion, who came from Asia Minor about the year 140, affirmed that the Man Jesus had suddenly appeared at Capernaum without having passed through the phases of infancy and youth. In the Gospel which he compiled expressly for the use of his Churches, and which he based on that of Luke, omitting many circumstances, however, he taught, says Tertullian, "that, in the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius, Jesus had descended from heaven at Capernaum, a city of Galilee."

Whilst the authors of the Apocryphal Gospels supplied the

deficiencies of the apostolical narratives by their ridiculous inventions, Marcion denied the truth of the few facts related by them. He was evidently shocked by the humbly human aspect of the childhood of Jesus, such as it is retraced in our Gospels. He was unable to conceive this grand truth, that all truly Divine work has a small beginning, and that its growth is necessarily gradual and slow. But is there aught more unpretending than the method by which the grandest of all phenomena, that of life, has been introduced upon earth in the form of a minute and contemptible mollusc? And what of that feeble stem which breaks through the sod, and will soon become the lily of the field, whose magnificent corolla was declared to have been unequalled by the royal apparel of Solomon? Isaiah had obtained a more accurate conception than Marcion of the Divine method, when, ages before the advent of Christ, He thus described this event: "He shall grow up as a tender plant, and as a root out of a dry ground: He hath no form nor comeliness."

It was during the thirty years of obscurity and silence spent in Nazareth that Jesus prepared Himself for the two years of public activity by which He renewed the face of the world, and reconciled heaven with earth and earth with heaven.

What occurred during that period, the longest but least known, of the life of our Lord? The information we are given on this point is comprised in two or three expressions. We are told in Luke ii. 40 that "the Child grew, and waxed strong in spirit, filled [literally, 'becoming filled'] with wisdom: and the grace of God was upon Him." These few words are perfectly descriptive of the whole of His boyhood. The same evangelist, in ch. ii. 52, adds, "And Jesus increased in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and man." Of the Saviour's boyhood, only one incident is recorded, that of His first journey to Jerusalem, when He was twelve years old, and of His sitting in the temple amongst the doctors. This scene closes with the following words: "And He went down with them, and came to Nazareth, and was subject unto them." We find another significant expression in the narrative which Matthew and Mark have left us of the visit of Jesus to Nazareth in the course of His ministry (Matt. xiii. 55; Mark vi. 3). The people of the town, having heard Him in the synagogue, said to one another, "Is not this the *Carpenter?*" (Mark); "the *carpenter's Son?*" (Matthew); "is not His mother called Mary, and His brethren James and Joses, and Simon and Judas? And His sisters, are they not all with us?" It would seem, therefore, that Jesus had learned His father's trade, and had worked with him for a certain time, in the midst of His numerous brothers and sisters. One who has spent many years of his life in Palestine has recently expressed his opinion that the Greek work which is usually rendered by "carpenter" really signifies "builder."[1] In fact, this is even at the present day the occupation

[1] M. L. Schneller, formerly Pastor at Bethlehem, now at Cologne, in his charming work, *Kennst du das Land.*

of a large proportion of the inhabitants of Bethlehem, who go about from place to place, exercising their profession. In this higher business Joseph, the adopted father of Jesus, would have been engaged, and later on Jesus Himself; this would account for the removal of Joseph, when he settled at Nazareth. But one of the Fathers of the second century, Justyn, who was perfectly versed in the Greek of that period, understood this expression otherwise when he pictured Jesus manufacturing ploughs and yokes, and teaching justice by the construction of these symbols of peace. Let us note one other expression of St. Luke, when he narrates the first visit of Jesus to Nazareth at the beginning of His ministry (ch. iv. 16): "And He came to Nazareth, where He had been brought up: and, *as His custom was*, He went into the synagogue on the sabbath day." These words, "as His custom was," are an indication that, during those long and silent years spent at Nazareth, He regularly took part in the worship of the synagogue. Apart from the reading of the Holy Scriptures, the words which He heard there were, doubtless, far from satisfying His young heart. This, however, did not deter Him from joining assiduously in this worship, which had probably been established on the return of Judah from captivity. If I mistake not, these few isolated facts are all the light which the New Testament throws upon that period of our Lord's earthly career which is the subject of these pages. What more we would know must be sought in the study of the life and character of Jesus from the moment when He emerged from His obscurity. As we behold what He became, we shall, perhaps, obtain a more or less accurate conception of *how* this point was reached. The comparison between the starting-point and the final stage will enlighten us as regards the path that lay between these two extremes.

Where was the starting-point? St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Hebrews (ii. 17), tells us that He was "made like unto His brethren, that He might be a merciful and faithful High Priest;" and in the fourteenth verse of the same chapter, he continues, assimilating the Child Jesus with all other human children, "Since then the children are sharers in flesh and blood, He also Himself in like manner partook of the same." If the soul of a child is as a white, unsullied page, such then also was that of the Infant Jesus; with this difference, however, that very soon after the birth of the human child, a stain appears upon the white page of his soul, a stain which gradually increases—the stain of sin; whilst from the soul of Jesus, by reason of His exceptional origin, the principle of sin was altogether absent. Save on this one point, we are authorized by the Scriptures in considering the Boy Jesus as cast in the same mould as all the other children of men.

The human being comprises three elements—the body, the soul, the spirit.[1] The *soul*, the breath of life, which is the principle of individual existence, the centre of personality; the *body*, the organ through which the soul communicates with the outside world, receiving sensible impressions

[1] 1 Thess. v. 23.

from it, and imprinting upon external objects the stamp of its will; finally, the *spirit*, the organ through which the soul is able to communicate with the higher and Divine world, causing the latter to descend into the terrestrial world, or, rather, raising the earthly to the level of the heavenly. The soul, therefore, is the medium through which the spirit and the body, and by them heaven and earth, are brought into mutual contact. And the perfect health of the human person will consist in the correct relation between these three elements. This relation may be thus expressed: to the soul pertains the government of the body; but, that it may fulfil this task, the soul, in its turn, must allow itself to be led by the spirit, which, communicating with the Divine Spirit, derives from Him the strength which it imparts to the soul, and by which the soul is able to govern the body. Such is the divinely ordained organization of the human being.

But, alas! where is this normal condition of things realized? The element which predominates in the child, often in the youth, and as frequently in the man, is the body—the body, that most valuable of servants, but worst of masters. In order that it might obtain the upper hand, the soul should be supported by the spirit; but, in our fallen state, the spirit having ceased to maintain a living relation with the Divine Spirit and the higher world, it slumbers and fails to strengthen the soul against the attacks of the body, in consequence of which the body, in most cases, becomes the master, and the soul the servant.

The Child Jesus was not subjected to this abnormal relation. He came into the world with a body like to our own, but to which the soul never yielded obedience; for the Holy Ghost, to whom He owed His existence, maintained His spirit, and, through it, His soul, to the required standard. That is what St. Luke means to say when he describes Jesus growing in *stature*,—this refers to the body; in *wisdom*,—this to the soul; and in *favour* with God and man,—this to the Spirit of God strengthening the spirit of the Child, so that in His case the normal relation was altogether undisturbed.

If we compare this starting-point of the Child Jesus with the close of His career, which our Gospels have rendered so familiar to us, we shall have an idea of the way which led from this beginning to this end, in the threefold direction in which the human being usually develops—the intellect, the heart, the will, or, in other words, knowledge, sentiment, action. Let us endeavour to analyze the progress of Jesus in these three domains.

In the first place, as regards *knowledge*. Knowledge is the process by which that which is not essentially self appears within us in the shape of a more or less distinct image or idea. The soul of Jesus, bare of knowledge at the outset, like that of any other babe, little by little became filled—that is the expression used by St. Luke—with the images of the persons and things by which He was surrounded. Gradually Jesus became acquainted

with the world, with His parents, with His dwelling; He learned to know His mother's loving smile, His father's strong arms, His brothers and sisters, born some time after Him. With them He learned to speak the language through which, later on, He would communicate with His people. Very soon He became familiar with the narrow and uneven streets of Nazareth, and then with the graceful slopes upon which the little town is built. One day He succeeded, with the help of His father, perhaps, in reaching the summit of the verdant hill which overhangs the peaceful vale, and upon which the small Mohammedan building called Wely Ismaël has been erected. From this point the view extends westward to the promontory of Carmel; northward to the snowy heights of Hermon, the Mont Blanc of Palestine. On the east, far in the distance, stretches the valley of the Jordan, with the mountains of Gilead in the background; and close by rises the rounded and woody summit of Mount Tabor. On the south the eye rests upon the vast Plain of Esdraelon, and the hills of Gilboa and Lesser Hermon. At this marvellous sight the idea of the wide, wide world doubtless arose in the astonished mind of the Child. But amidst all these earthly surroundings, the persons with whom He was daily brought into contact undoubtedly became the objects of peculiar attention on His part. Here was His mother, whose solicitude and tender care awakened in His mind the idea of self-giving, self-sacrificing love. Here also was His father, whose assiduous toil, carried on from day to day in the court of their small dwelling, impressed Him with the notion of benevolent and helpful strength. A passing word, uttered in after-days by Jesus Himself, reveals the impression which His father's life had made upon Him: "If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children," etc. The loving care of His father evidently dwelt in His memory. Here, again, were His brothers and sisters, whose various dispositions gave Him an insight into the infinite variety among the members that compose the great human family, and taught Him to seek the method of action best calculated to suit the turn of mind of each particular individual.

At the age of six, every Jewish child entered upon his school-life, and for the next four years had no other reading-book than the Scriptures. It is possible that the duty of teaching the children to read and write devolved upon the keeper of the synagogue. From ten to fifteen, they were instructed in the traditional Law by which God had regulated the life of the Jews, and then the most promising pupils were admitted into the higher class, that in which the theology of the Bible was taught, the Book of Leviticus being taken first, then the other Books of the Pentateuch, and, finally, the Prophets and the Hagiographa. It does not appear that Jesus followed this last course. St. John tells us that it was said of Him, "How knoweth this Man letters, having never learned?" From His early childhood the Boy Jesus was, it may therefore be assumed, associated with His father in his manual labours. Among the Jews it was customary for every man, were he even destined for the priestly career, to

learn a trade, and be capable of earning his livelihood. It was usually said of a man who did not teach his son some manual occupation, that he was teaching him to become a thief.

About this time occurred the only recorded incident of that stage of the life of Jesus. This account gives us an insight into the profound religious sentiment which had developed in the Child, doubtless fostered by intimate intercourse with His mother and by His daily prayers. At the age of thirteen, every Jewish boy became subject to legal discipline; from that time he was called "a son of the Law." When Jesus had accomplished His twelfth year, His parents took Him for the first time to Jerusalem, for the celebration of the most solemn of Jewish festivals—the Passover. Who can tell the emotions of His young heart, so fresh and pure in its piety, when, in company with all the children of Nazareth who travelled together in a band, He quitted the narrow valley, crossed the vast Plain of Esdraelon, where the mighty battles which He had read of in the Scriptures had been fought; when He beheld the glorious hill upon which Samaria, its "crown of pride," was built; when He passed at the foot of the famed mounts of Ebal and Gerizim; and when, from the summit of the Scopus, He cast His first glance upon the holy city, and saw the glittering walls of the temple; then, finally, when, a quarter of an hour later, He entered by the gate of Damascus, and, as the psalmist says, "His feet were standing in thy gates, O Jerusalem"?[1] Shortly afterwards the court of the temple opened to receive Him, and the holy building itself stood before His enraptured eyes. From the emotion which seizes upon the traveller, even at the present day, when he beholds the terrace upon which stood the ancient temple, now replaced by the Mosque of Omar, we may form an idea of the feelings of the Divine Child at that supreme moment. And who can describe the emotions that filled His soul when, for the first time, He partook of the Paschal meal, eating the unleavened bread, which recalled the hurried departure from Egypt, and the lamb, memorial of the great deliverance? We are in ignorance as regards the circumstance which separated Him—certainly without any fault of His—from His parents. But what we can, in a measure, conceive, is the keen and profound interest with which He listened, in one of the porches, or in the synagogue adjoining the temple, to a discussion between the rabbis upon some point of the Law. All were permitted to take part in it; it was a free conversation, questions being asked and answered, and there was no reason why an intelligent boy of the age of Jesus should not put some question full of meaning to these learned doctors, who, in their turn, would reply by another interrogation. The Gospel narrative refers to a conversation of this kind, and not to an exposition made by the Child. But it is not the discussion which invests with importance this incident; it is the answer of the Boy to His mother when, with Joseph, she found Him in this position, on the third day after their separation.

[1] Ps. cxxii. 2.

We wonder what had become of the Child when He had found Himself alone in the midst of the crowd in that large city, where all was strange to Him; yes, all save the temple, the house of the Lord, which, in this hour of separation from His earthly parents, appeared to Him as the house of His heavenly Father. We are reminded of the Patriarch Jacob, fleeing alone from his home, and benighted in the solitary region of Bethel; hitherto he had known Jehovah as the God of his grandfather Abraham, and the God of his father Isaac; there he learnt to know Him as *his* God, the God of Jacob. Thus, no doubt, did the Boy Jesus, left alone in the courts of the temple, learn to know, more intimately than before, the God of His father and mother as *His* God, *His* Father. And it was under the impression of this experience that, on the morrow, in answer to the reproachful words of Mary, spontaneously gushed from His lips the expression which astonished her as well as Joseph, and shows that this was the first time He had made use of it: "Must I not be about *My Father's* business?" It cannot be assumed that this Youth of twelve had the consciousness of His eternal relationship with God, and that this expression, "My Father," was fraught with as deep meaning as it was later on—as, for instance, in the baptismal formula, "In the Name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." Words of sublime beauty may occasionally burst from the simple depths of a childish heart, sudden flashes of light which only in after-time will resolve themselves into a serene and permanent radiance. All that passed during that night of solitude between the Child and His God was concentrated in the expression which remained a mystery to His parents—"My Father." But it is not only the word "Father" which makes this expression so remarkable—it is the word "My;" for this word gives to the consciousness, here expressed by the Child, of His filial relationship with God, a peculiar and, as it were, exceptional significance. Jesus appears to have already felt that this filial bond, of which He has become conscious, exists, in so intense a degree, for His heart alone. What can have awakened in Him the consciousness of such a difference between Himself and the rest of mankind? Ah! He had, no doubt, long before this time, become aware of the fact that those who surrounded Him did not live in the same close intimacy with God as He Himself did. Long before this time He had been struck by a painful fact, a fact which separated Him from the other children of His age, from His brothers and sisters—sin. It may be that He discovered a trace of it in the reproach conveyed in the question of Mary herself, "Why hast Thou thus dealt with us?" and by which she meant to cast upon Him the blame of the separation which had taken place. And so, the more sensible He became of His filial union with the Father, the more did He observe the absence of this perfect union with God in all with whom He held daily intercourse, and the more did He grow conscious of the isolation in which He lived amongst His fellow-men. This impression is probably involved in His reply, "Wist ye not that I must be in My

Father's house?"—not only in the place where My Father dwells, but in the place where His affairs are looked after, where His interests are attended to? Even now, in the distance, a mission dawns before His gaze—a mission which shall consist in an entire consecration of Himself to the cause of God, in the midst of a world separated from Him. In this childish soul a light has shone, soon to be veiled by clouds. In humble submission to His parents, St. Luke tells us, He returned with them to Nazareth—but with what new-found treasure! The glory of the chosen people, of His people, had appeared to Him at Jerusalem. In the worship of the temple He had seen the pledge of the holy calling of Israel, of that nation distinguished amongst all others as a nation of priests and prophets. The residence of Jehovah in Israel had become a tangible fact for Him. In this young heart, open to all noble impressions, the national and religious emotions had been stirred at the same time. This short sojourn in the holy city had made of the Child a thorough Israelite. And the eighteen years which were about to follow in the monotonous and essentially human life at Nazareth would make of Him a thorough Man.

At the first glance, this return to the small Galilæan village may appear to us as a sort of exile. Did it produce such an impression upon the heart of Jesus, notwithstanding His docility? But this step was ordained by Divine wisdom, in order that Jesus might be preserved from the evil influences of Pharisaical piety, as well as from the chilling sophistry of Rabbinical science. On the other hand, here would be an opportunity for Him of making ample provision of observations from nature and of experiences from human life, of probing all the wounds of the human heart and scrutinizing its gloomiest recesses.

One of the features of Christ's teaching was the ease and skill with which, in His parables, He made use of illustrations borrowed from earthly things and human relations in order to depict heavenly things and Divine relations. If during His ministry He thus taught by parables, it was because, in the seclusion and obscurity of His life at Nazareth, everything He had seen and heard had been for Him a parable. Nothing had escaped His observation, and His exalted mind had translated all things into the language of a higher world. Nature and human life had been for Him like picture-books, by means of which His Divine Master had taught Him the wisdom which He was destined to display in the future. Every object was in His sight the reflection of some Divine truth: the birds of the air finding their provision; the lilies of the field arrayed more magnificently than Solomon in his glory; the grain of mustard seed at first imperceptible, then gradually developing into the branched and leafy tree; the various kinds of soil in the same field; the transformation wrought in a mass of meal by a small quantity of leaven; the difference in the taste of old wine which is sweeter, and new wine which is more sparkling and sharper; the danger of putting the latter in old bottles; the violence of the torrents which, rushing furiously from the mountain

tops, sweep away the buildings erected on their slopes, and which have no solid foundations; the benevolence with which heaven fertilizes, by the rays of its sun and the moisture of its rains, alike the fields of the just and those of the unjust; the folds in which at night the flocks are gathered; the shepherd exploring hill and dale in quest of the wandering sheep; the hen cackling after her brood, and calling her chickens to their refuge underneath her wings; everything, even the minutest details of daily life—the way in which old garments should not be mended, the market price of small birds, the three measures of meal which the housewife bakes at one time; all these insignificant acts of everyday life were suggestive of higher thoughts to His noble mind; for Him nothing was trivial or indifferent, but everything became transfigured.

But the conduct of those who surrounded Him was the subject of His most serious observations and the occasion for His most important lessons: the merchant who, without hesitation, hazards his entire fortune in the purchase of the jewel, the sale of which will make him doubly rich; the peasant who, interpreting the signs of the sky, foretells the weather of the morrow; the man who is brought before the tribunal by his neighbour, and who, seeing that the hour of judgment is drawing nigh, hastens to settle his dispute amicably, by appealing to the good will of the adverse party; that other man who, unable himself to look after his property, entrusts it to a banker, who pays him the interest; the custom among the wealthy farmers of keeping a fatted calf in their stalls, ready for a festival; the games of the children in the market-place . . . in this human domain also everything had been observed, remembered, lived, and translated by Him into a language unknown before. Thus did He acquire that treasure which He afterwards so delicately compared to a well-furnished store, from which the householder brings forth on every occasion things new and old for the instruction of his children (Matt. xiii. 52).

Alas! there were other than good things to be witnessed in this domain; well, too, did He know those jealous neighbours who, under cover of night, would creep into the fields of their enemy and sow tares amongst the wheat, and those unfaithful stewards who played vile tricks upon their masters; He had watched the inattentive husbandman whose eyes kept turning in every direction, instead of being fixed upon the furrow he was ploughing; He had seen the selfish security of the wealthy man whose sole thought was to heap up for himself the produce of his rich harvests. The vanity of the guests who tried to get the best places at festivals, and of the devotees who were anxious to occupy the first seats in the synagogues; the power of Mammon, even over men who were unwilling to give up the service of God; the covetous glance which betrayed the adulterous thought; the hypocrisy which marred the Pharisaical prayer, fasting, and almsgiving; the pride of the priests and rabbis who designated the common people as men of earth, as if they had been themselves men of heaven;—none of these had escaped His notice. He had discovered those various

valves through which escapes the mephitic air accumulated in the depths of the miserable human heart, of that abyss whence proceed, as He Himself said, "the things that defile the man; evil thoughts, fornications, thefts, murders, adulteries, covetings, wickednesses, deceit, lasciviousness, an evil eye, railing, pride, foolishness" (Mark vii. 21, 22). He had obtained a clear perception of all these hateful manifestations of the old man which dwells in every human heart, and He had suffered cruelly from their contact. His eye, armed with the simplicity of the dove, had pierced through the intricacies of falsehood, through the vain and selfish calculations beneath which this polluted world is fain to veil itself. The fact that He Himself was exempt from sin caused Him to discern it with greater perspicacity wherever it met His view; the evil which no longer appals us, so familiar and natural has it grown, galled and stung Him to the quick.

Thus, on the one hand, the bond of filial communion with God grew day by day closer in the depths of His heart; and, on the other hand, He became every day more keenly alive to the painful fact that the world in the midst of which He moved, lived in a state of separation from and often of hostility towards God. He discovered sin and the love of self in all the daily actions of those to whom He was attached by His earthly position. And as he pondered more and more deeply upon the contrast, which, on this capital point, existed between Himself and them, this question would inevitably arise again and again in His mind, "What do I here in the midst of this sinful humanity, like a solitary healthy being in a colony of lepers? Am I called to be their nurse, or perhaps their physician?"

The ideal which, at this point, would present itself to His mind, found additional support in the history of Israel which He knew from the Scriptures. He had many a time listened to the reading of the sacred books in the synagogue, perhaps had been permitted to make occasional use of the copy kept for that purpose; moreover, He had undoubtedly learned much in His conversations with His adopted father. How often, as they strolled upon the hills that surround the hamlet, and from which the view extends to the various parts of the Holy Land, had Joseph told the Child of Abraham pitching his tents beneath the oaks at Mamre; of Abraham leading Isaac up to the altar of Moriah; of youthful Jacob lying solitary and lone in the Plain of Shechem, and of the wonderful ladder that rose from his head up to the throne of God in heaven; of Moses in the wilderness suddenly placed in presence of the burning bush, whence the voice of Jehovah strikes upon his astonished ears; of the Red Sea dividing its waters beneath his extended rod, and opening a way for the hosts of Israel; of the brazen serpent, the sight of which healed the dying who in faith looked up at that symbol of mercy; of David, the mighty king, His ancestor, watching the flocks in the fields of Bethlehem, striking down the Philistine giant, and establishing the Hebrew monarchy; of Elijah, at whose prayer the heavens were closed and reopened; of

Jerusalem, destroyed by the Babylonian conqueror in consequence of her rebellions against Jehovah, then afterwards rebuilt by Zorobabel! Could the final end of such a history as this indeed be the total decay which had now overtaken the holy nation under the sceptre of Herod and the Roman rule? Did not the prophets affirm that such a thing would not come to pass? Did they not hold out the hope of a Divine Messenger who would consummate so many wonders by a work still greater? Did they not describe the triumph which at some future time would be achieved over sin and death by a Servant of Jehovah, a descendant of David?

Who could fathom the thoughts which filled the soul of Him who was daily acquiring a more distinct consciousness of His exceptional position, as well as of the great future to which the whole of this wondrous Jewish past was but the prelude?

As I climbed the hill-top of Wely Ismaël, I pictured to myself Jesus, when, having attained manhood, He wended His way up that same slope absorbed in these lofty thoughts. Here, thought I, is perhaps the spot where for the first time the sublime ideal laid its grasp upon His mind—the overthrow of the kingdom of Satan upon earth, the restoration of the throne of the true, living, and holy God, the extirpation of sin, the triumph over death, the substitution of the reign of life to its awful dominion! But that He might devote Himself to this task, something more was required than the enthusiasm which the thought of it awakened: the Divine call must be heard. Jesus may have had a presentiment that this call was not far distant, but in humility He waited. It came at last by the voice of the Baptist, whose words shook the whole nation; then very soon after by the voice of God Himself addressing Him personally.

After speaking of Jesus as growing in wisdom, Luke adds, "and in favour with God and man." If the word "wisdom" implies intellect and knowledge, that of "favour" refers to sentiment and will. In the case of Jesus, progress in knowledge never for one moment interfered with the development of feeling and of activity. In Him was to be found no fruitless accumulation of ideas, no purely intellectual effort of the mind; this duality of heart and thought, which causes man so much suffering, was utterly unknown to the Being who, at every moment of His existence, was His own complete self.

The deepest feeling of the *heart* of Jesus—we discover this in the study of the records of His public ministry—was love, the desire of working for the glory of His Father and the welfare of men, His brethren. This love was a truly *human* feeling, for it continually increased both in extent and in intensity. At first it was limited to the narrow circle of His family connexions; then it extended to the children who were His playmates and schoolfellows; as a youth, at the age when the heart opens to the noble sentiment of patriotism, His fellow-citizens in the small city, afterwards the multitudes with whom He joined in the religious and national festivals at Jerusalem, became the objects of His intense interest.

When He reached manhood, and His moral horizon widened still further, His compassion spread to all the human family; then, indeed, He attained the full stature of the Son of man. Mankind at large became His family, the object of His sympathy and tenderness.

At the same time, His love grew in intensity. Its glow was in no wise diminished by the vastness of its object; on the contrary, it incessantly developed from the tender cares of an affectionate childhood into the complete self-giving, self-sacrificing love of a pure manhood. The Gospels are silent as regards the daily services He rendered in His home, His delicate attentions towards His parents, His patience, His forbearance when His rights were overlooked, His frequent forgiveness of brothers and sisters, His intercessions for them especially when He saw them guilty of sin—in a word, His constant forgetfulness of self in these various relationships. But an incident which marked the close of His career gives a clue as to what the beginning of it must have been. On the last evening of His life, seeing that not one of His disciples thought of rendering His brethren and Himself, the Master, the service of washing their feet, He took the basin and the cloth, and Himself accomplished the servile duty. This fact is the symbol of the whole of His life, the revelation of the innermost tendency of His heart—to serve, and to serve in order to save.

For many years this love was prevented from displaying itself otherwise than in a very unassuming manner, and by slight sacrifices. Toiling in His father's workshop, the young artisan joined heartily in his labours, performing the services of which His youth permitted. But soon Joseph disappeared from the scene—when, we know not. Upon the eldest son from that time devolved the maintenance of the family. This was the practical task which God placed before the youthful Jesus, that the power of love which was developing in Him might not be wasted in vain aspirations. *The Son of the carpenter*, as Matthew tells us, then became *the Carpenter*, as Mark calls Him. A very humble task was this, no doubt; but in this workshop, where He had worked with His father, and where, following his example, He continued to toil, was being prepared, as in a living parable, the most sublime work which earth has ever witnessed—a human being working in unison with a Father greater than He, in a workshop far superior to the earthly one, for a cause to which no other can be compared. To this Jesus Himself refers in these words uttered later on, and which appear to contain an allusion to His former position: "The Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He seeth the Father do: for what things soever He doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise. For the Father loveth the Son, and showeth Him all things that Himself doeth."[1] The Father with whom He wrought, when He spoke thus, was God; the common workshop was the universe; the common cause, the spiritual resurrection of mankind.

The energetic development of the *will* kept pace with the growth of

[1] John v. 19, 20.

love in the heart of Jesus. This will, deeply rooted in the sense of love for God and men, could, in short, be nothing but the uninterrupted will of good. In the first place, in His relationship with God, by frequent communion with Him through meditation and prayer, by the immediate acceptance of every duty pointed out by Him, by constant zeal for His glory. Then in His relations with His fellow-men, by compassion towards the suffering, by intercession for sinners, by the forgiveness of wrongs and offences. Finally, in His relation with Himself, by the severe discipline which He exercised over the impulses of His heart, over His words and actions, by the unmurmuring abnegation of the most legitimate satisfactions of which God required the sacrifice, and by the eager acceptance of the most unmerited sorrows which it pleased God to impose upon Him.

But are there any authenticated facts of the youth of Jesus from which we may safely assume that He possessed such virtues? It goes without saying that the authenticated facts are only to be found in the recorded portion of His life. But from these we may reasonably draw retrospective conclusions as regards the character of Jesus before He entered upon His public career. At the beginning of His ministry, Jesus spent whole nights in prayer: would He have done so if prayer had not hitherto been the very soul of His life? From the first, He bids His hearers love their enemies, bless those who curse them, give up their coat to any who would deprive them of their cloak, give to those from whom they can expect no return. In what book had He learned this life of patience and charity, if not in the book of His own heart? He enjoins upon His followers the duty of plucking out their eye, of cutting off hand or foot, if these organs, excellent in themselves, should threaten to lead them into sin. Could He have spoken thus had He not had behind Him a life of self-sacrifice and abnegation of all the joys which it had pleased God to impose upon Him as a preparation for His special mission; a life of obedient suffering which the divinely appointed task demanded; in one word, a previous life during which self had been kept in constant check? Was there ever a being better fitted than Jesus to taste all the sweets of pure domestic bliss, had not the presentiment of a different and loftier mission induced Him to forego such earthly blessedness? How tenderly would He have cherished children all His own—He who pressed so affectionately in His arms little ones that were strangers to Him, and that He never again would set eyes upon! He who, upon the cross, far from wrapping Himself in His personal anguish, provided for the future of His mother and for the consolation of His bosom friend, cannot but have displayed the greatest tenderness in the family circle: how deep, then, would have been His solicitude for those who might have been attached to Him by the closest of earthly ties! But a mighty thought governed His whole heart—that to which He assigned the foremost place in the model of prayer which He gave to His Church: "Father, hallowed be Thy Name; Thy kingdom come." This holy thought is the secret of His

submission and sacrifice; it excluded all earthly thoughts and desires. This inner vision, faithfully entertained by prayer, was a constant curb upon the sentiments which the outer vision might have awakened.

A great artist, Wagner, who possessed the sense of the beautiful in the highest degree, but in whom the sense of the holy was not lacking either, once said to a friend with whom he was intimately conversing upon Him whom he called "the Great Lonely One," "There have been saints, both men and women; but all have reached to this state of holiness by Divine grace, by an illumination, an experience, an inward change. Jesus, on the contrary, has from the beginning been free from all sin, without a shadow of passion, a nature divinely pure, but which does not strike us as being inconsistent with our humanity, and whose sorrows excite our deepest compassion. He is a unique, an incomparable apparition. All others need a saviour; *He* is the Saviour." Incomparable, in truth, was this apparition, a spectacle never before witnessed by heaven, an unexpected relief for earth; an apparition which, for the first time, perfectly revealed to angels and men what God's purpose had been when He had created man.

Yes, in Jesus we see human childhood in all the charm of its innocence and modesty; human youth in all its purity, gentleness, grace, and spirit. In Him, once at least has been realized the great human ideal—*progress in absolute good.* His presence here below has been the introduction to the reconciliation between Heaven and fallen humanity; Heaven recognizing in Him the Man worthy of the Creator, and humanity offering in Him the fruit worthy of God.

One of the wisest and holiest of the Fathers, Irenæus, observed that the Son of God took upon Himself our humanity from its earliest beginning, in order that He might pass through the various phases of the human life, and thus, in His Person, sanctify its different stages. A new humanity appeared in Jesus Christ, the true Man united to God in close union, the second Adam substituting Himself to our blighted and corrupt humanity. "For their sakes," says Jesus, "I sanctify Myself, that they also might be sanctified through the truth." The ideal was attained in Him that it might be reached by every man through Him. He became the new Adam, that from Him might spring a race like unto Himself. His holiness is the treasury where all men, at every age, in childhood, youth, and manhood, may and should seek their own, in order that they may become such as God meant they should be when He gave them life.[1]

THE FOURTH GOSPEL, FROM A JEWISH POINT OF VIEW.

By Rev. F. H. Woods, B.D.

It is always interesting to learn what is thought of our religion by earnest men of other creeds. For this reason Mr. C. G. Montefiore's article in the *Jewish Quarterly* for last October possesses an interest far higher than that

[1] Translated by Ph. G. Adair.

ordinarily attaching to a magazine article. It is impossible for an open-minded Christian to read it without very real pleasure. It is so absolutely honest, so thoroughly in earnest, and at the same time so free from religious bitterness. He candidly and gratefully acknowledges the large debt which the civilized world, the Jews included, owes to Christianity. This, considering the treatment which the Jews have received for centuries at the hand of Christians, and are even yet receiving in some parts of Europe, is singularly gracious. And it suggests the question whether on their side Christians do not too often entirely forget the immense obligations which Christianity is under to Judaism. We surely owe some respect—I would almost call it reverence—for a people whose distinguishing feature has been justly described as a genius for religion, and whose religious faith, according to Christ Himself, contained the germs of our own.

It may be urged, in answer to this, that the Jews have shown themselves in past history to be heartless, rapacious, irreligious in practical life. There is, no doubt, some truth in such a statement, but also much exaggeration. The wealth so often accumulated by the Jews is the result quite as much of traditional habits of industry and thrift, as of any peculiar selfishness or greed. After all, we should not like Christianity to be judged by the cruelties of the Inquisition, or, what is still more to the point, modern tricks of trade.

It must not, however, be supposed that Mr. Montefiore in any way attempts to belittle the points of difference between the modern Jewish and the Christian standpoints. On the contrary, he states as frankly what he rejects as what he accepts of Christian doctrine. The special subject of his article is the religious value of St. John's, or, as he for obvious reasons prefers to call it, the Fourth Gospel. He speaks with a temperate but most genuine enthusiasm of the fascination which this book has had upon himself. The analysis of this fascination is, in some respects, the most interesting part of his article. That the book should have such a power over a Christian is natural enough. It makes him feel that by union with Christ he is drawn into the inner sanctuary of Divine love. But then the distinctively Christian doctrines are the very essence of the book. Acceptance of Christ as the Incarnate Word is the necessary condition of this spiritual life. The book has no word of comfort for the outsider. "He that believeth on the Son hath eternal life, but he that believeth [obeyeth] not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him."

How, then, can the Fourth Gospel have any attraction for an outsider? But it certainly has it as a fact; and Mr. Montefiore attributes it to three causes. (1) The exquisite simplicity of style. It is the work of one who is both a genius and an artist. (2) The spiritual character of the book. (3) Its mysticism. These all appeal in different degrees to cultured and religious minds, quite apart from any fixed belief they may

or may not have in the doctrines on which the whole depends. Indeed, Mr. Montefiore finds in this very attraction, in spite of the religious value of the whole book, a certain element of danger. The mere "tickling" of the spiritual faculty is apt to prove, so he tells us, too satisfying to the religious instinct, and in this case it tends to gloss over doctrines which would otherwise be repulsive.

It is not of Christian doctrines as such that Mr. Montefiore treats, but as they are presented, or seem to him to be presented, in the Fourth Gospel.

1. The dogma which he most especially controverts is the double dualism—God and the devil, the children of God and the children of the devil. According to the evangelist's view, as he understands it, religion and morality too only operate within a limited sphere. Those who believe in the Son of God receive, even in this world, the gift of eternal life. These the Father loves, and they love the Son of God, and are bidden to love one another. The very stress laid on the light and the love which reign within this sphere makes us forget its limits. Without all is death and darkness. There was no life before Christ came. The Light was there, but "the darkness apprehended it not." It was only when the Logos took flesh that real life in God became possible. Even then it was only possible by faith in the Son of God. It is the believers only that the Father loves. On all others His wrath abideth. They are sinners and incapable of moral worth, the children of the devil. On the other hand, according to the teaching of the First Epistle ascribed to St. John, the children of God cannot commit sin, or at any rate their sins are venial.[1] Emphatically as they are called upon to love one another, they are not bound to love any outside the company of believers. It is true that there is a universalism of a certain kind in this evangelist. He insists as emphatically as St. Paul that salvation is not confined to the Jews, but in doing so he introduces a new form of religious narrowness far worse than that of the ancient Jew. To believe that his nation alone was under God's favour and protection was in a Jew a pardonable error of patriotism. To confine God's grace to those who believe in Jesus, as the evangelist does, is contrary to the best teaching both of the Old Testament prophets and of Jesus Himself, as we find the latter reported in the synoptics. There is a vast difference between saying that Jesus came to call sinners to repentance, and such statements as, "I manifested Thy Name unto the men whom Thou gavest Me out of the world; Thine they were, and Thou gavest them to Me;" and "I pray not for the world, but for those whom Thou hast given Me."

2. A second objection is connected not so much with doctrine as with religious ethics. It is, in fact, an answer to the question—What is the true relation between faith and morality? Christians, or at any rate St. Paul and the fourth evangelist, put faith first. A man believes on

[1] See 1 John iii. 6, 9; v. 16–18.

Jesus Christ, and the works follow of necessity. It is true that in one passage of the Gospel the opposite view seems expressed: "If any willeth to do His will, He shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God, or whether I speak from Myself."[1] And this is confirmed in the Epistle: "If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar: for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, cannot love God whom he hath not seen."[2] But these are the exceptional utterances of the truer and nobler religious instinct.

3. The third objection which Mr. Montefiore makes, deals with the doctrine of the Incarnation, and of necessity with that also of the Trinity, as taught in the Fourth Gospel. He readily admits that some distinctions in phraseology, and even in thought, in considering the different aspects or phases of God, have a certain relative necessity. Especially was this so in an age which connected matter with evil, and sought to bridge over the gap between it and God. Such different phases are expressed in the later books of the Old Testament, and still more definitely in the works of Philo, by the terms "Word" and "Spirit." But to ascribe personality to any of these phases, and to say of one of them that He loved God, and God loved Him, and that He took flesh, is an offence against the unity of God. Mr. Montefiore puts the matter tersely when he says that it is the second part of the Athanasian Creed rather than the first that the modern Jew has reason to object to.

Any one who has read so far without having read the article in question would probably form a very unfair estimate of its value and of its spirit. He would think that it was merely a courteously worded polemic against the Christian faith. It is, in fact, nothing of the sort. It is an admirable review from an outsider of St. John's Gospel. Admirable for two reasons: (1) because the writer has so much sympathy with his subject; and (2) because he puts forward his own views with such lucidity. The reader of the article is far more struck with these than with the differences in point of doctrine which I have described, and differences of exegesis to which I wish presently to call attention. As he reads, his feelings are something of this sort: "Here is a clear-headed thinker bringing himself to look dispassionately upon perhaps the most sacred of all Christian books, and pronouncing a judgment in many respects like what I have been unconsciously forming. What, then, is the real difference between his theology and mine? If I could examine both thoroughly, and understand both thoroughly, might I not find that, even though in my judgment he is not expressing the whole of what I believe to be true, he is doing me a real service by emphasizing certain sides or phases of truth?" Certainly, from the tone of his article, we may say that Mr. Montefiore would claim to do no more. It is with these reservations and in this spirit that I will make a few remarks on each of the heads enumerated above.

1. (1) If it is meant that the Fourth Gospel limits the sphere of grace

[1] John vii. 17. [2] 1 John iv. 20.

to a select number of predestined Christians, it is certainly difficult to reconcile such a view with many passages in the book. That which strikes one at once is John iii. 16, "For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on Him should not perish, but have eternal life. For God sent not His Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world should be saved through Him." This passage seems to say that the whole kosmos, whether redeemed or not, was the object of God's love, and that the only limit to the operation of that love lay in man's wilful rejection of it. The expression, "God's wrath," is in any case difficult to understand; but with the passage just quoted in view, it seems that we are bound to limit it to those who wilfully reject Christ.[1]

Even in the High-Priestly prayer, which, beautiful as it is, seems at first sight to lend itself to a Calvinistic interpretation, there appears on closer examination a gradual widening of the spiritual sphere. First we have presented the Father, and the Son receiving all glory and power over all flesh from the Father; then we see the Son giving the gift of eternal life to a few selected from the world by the Father. These are not taken out of the world, but left in it and sanctified by the truth. But after this the thought expands rapidly. Not only these, but those "who believe by their word" are now the subject of Christ's prayer. This expansion proceeds until at last the world itself *believes* and *knows* that Christ was sent from God.[2] It is needless to say that with this writer belief and knowledge thus co-ordinated must imply something more than a mere forced intellectual assent. They imply a spiritual change—that very change which this evangelist connects so closely with eternal life. If asked how this can be reconciled with the words, "I pray not for the world" (in ver. 9), I can only very humbly suggest that to our Lord's consciousness the future spiritual history of the world in its different stages is gradually unfolding itself, and that this early verse has reference to a time when the world with which the Church had to do was a hostile persecuting power, not yet capable, as a whole, of the spiritualizing influences of the gospel. This world would hate them, but even so they are not called upon to hate the world.

As to the supposed sinlessness of Christians, we must, I think, admit the very great difficulty of explaining such passages as 1 John iii. 6; v. 18; but it is only fair, on the other side, to give full weight to such a passage as 1 John i. 8, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." These words were evidently addressed to believers, and clearly show that the writer did not regard sinlessness as the normal condition of his family of love.

(2) If, on the other hand, Mr. Montefiore means by this objection that *all* grace is given on the condition of faith, or a willing acceptance of certain doctrines, it must be conceded that this, at any rate, gives to

[1] As especially in ch. iii. 36. [2] John xvii., especially 1, 2, 15, 17, 21, 23.

the systematic teaching of Christianity a certain consistency. There has, therefore, been a tendency to press it, even where it seems to many to conflict with God's perfect justice and perfect love. On these latter grounds many, on the other hand, have gone far to reject it or to modify it. The doctrines of prevenient grace and uncovenanted mercies are more or less successful attempts to express, in the language of technical theology, what the instincts of religious faith make necessary in one form or another.

If, then, in the Fourth Gospel, faith is made the absolute condition of spiritual life under all circumstances, without any reservations whatever, we should have to admit that Christians, as a rule, have in practice receded from the extreme ground occupied in this book. But in connexion with this subject there is one point which deserves notice. In spite of ch. v. 29, Mr. Montefiore does not understand the Fourth Gospel to teach the everlasting punishment of the faithless, except in the negative sense that they will for ever have no part in the eternal life of the believers. There is a vast difference between saying that those who have never believed, because they have never had an opportunity of believing, will be annihilated, and that they will suffer endless torments. The first may seem difficult to reconcile with Omnipotent love, the second seems to many absolutely to contradict it.

The difficulty of the whole subject of faith, as the necessary precursor of eternal life, seems very much to depend upon this—whether faith in Christ is regarded as an arbitrary condition or as a life-giving force. It is easy to understand a doctor saying, "To live a healthy life, you must take nourishing food, breathe pure air, and so on." But if he were to tell us to perform certain rites which could have no natural connexion with physical health, we should regard him as the victim of some superstitious mania. In the same way, if faith in Christ is calculated to promote spiritual health, there is nothing surprising in its being the condition of spiritual life. There is a vast difference between the ὑγιαίνουσα διδασκαλία of the Pastoral Epistles, and "sound doctrine" as frequently understood.

It cannot, of course, be seriously contended that there are not morally good men without faith. But it is very difficult to say how far their goodness is anything more than the result of training and habits which depend ultimately upon the religious faith of others, or of a faith which they once possessed themselves. It is also true that Christian faith is indubitably a cause of goodness, and that if Christianity died out the tone of morality would degenerate.

2. Both these last two facts Mr. Montefiore admits with that candour so prominent throughout his article; but he will not admit that, as an ethical principle, faith should come first, and morality follow as its necessary consequence. He would reverse this order, and say, "A man should do good, and this will itself *probably* quicken his faith in God;"

"If any man willeth to do His will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God." What in the Fourth Gospel, according to Mr. Montefiore, is a by-thought, contradicting the general tenor of the book, is with him the foundation-stone of his religious ethics.

But it may be reasonably doubted whether either this verse or that quoted for the same purpose from the Epistle have been adequately explained by him. It is no doubt a truth, and a very important truth, that "faith without works" is dead; but that is but another way of saying that it needs an active exercise in works to become knowledge; for knowledge clearly implies a higher degree of spiritual experience than faith. "Now we believe, not because of thy speaking"—that would have been faith merely; "for we have heard for ourselves, and know that this is indeed the Saviour of the world"—that is knowledge.[1] The passage, then, on which Mr. Montefiore lays so much stress does not appear to be really inconsistent with the general teaching of the evangelist.

The passage from the Epistle[2] is capable of two explanations. It may mean that it is impossible for man to love God without *first* loving his brother. This is the way in which Mr. Montefiore understands it. But it may, at least, equally well mean that love for man is the test of love for God, which is the emotional side of faith. According to this view, religious faith comes first in time, but it cannot continue, or have any real vitality, without works of human love. If this be the right explanation, St. John's words accord very closely with the πίστις δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη of St. Paul.[3]

But even if we cannot accept Mr. Montefiore's view as a principle of Christian ethics, we may at least thank him for insisting on a side of Christian truth too often forgotten. In its old forms the theological world has long ago sickened of the controversy regarding faith and works. The practical teacher no longer asks whether we are justified by faith or by works, or by both conjointly. He feels certain that both have their necessary place in the spiritual life. If the spiritual man who is to be saved is necessarily to have both, it matters very little which is technically to be regarded as the condition of salvation. But Mr. Montefiore treats of an altogether higher aspect of the subject. The question which he seeks to answer is not, "What must I do to be saved?" but, "What must I do to follow out the laws of my spiritual being?" To both questions the Christian teacher would usually answer, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ;" but Mr. Montefiore would object, "Such an answer is not practical, even if otherwise right. Faith is to a very large extent beyond our control. I would rather say—Work for others out of the pure instinct of human love. This will set your religious feelings aglow, and in working for man you will get to love and know God." In other words, faith is with him the outcome of morality.

Now, imperfect as such a statement is, is there not a great measure

[1] John iv. 42. [2] 1 John iv. 20. [3] Gal. v. 6.

of truth in it? Something like it is exemplified to a remarkable degree in cases of what are commonly called "religious difficulty." A young man, we will say, who has been seriously and religiously brought up, finds at a certain age that old familiar truths are losing their grip. In his trouble he seeks counsel, let us suppose, from his spiritual adviser, or some religious friend. If ignorant of human nature, the latter may lend him a copy of Butler's *Analogy*, or Paley's *Evidences*, or perhaps some work of the Christian Evidence Society, and the result is only too likely to be to loosen still more completely his hold on religious truth. But if he is a sensible man, he will probably say something of this kind: "Don't vex yourself about religious questions now; for a while leave them alone. It may be right even not to pray, or at least to pray very little; but, whatever you do, live up to what you know to be true and noble and unselfish." And we may again conjecture what the result is likely to be. The active religious life will probably give renewed health to a faith which was starving on cold abstractions. Of course, it might be argued, from the Christian point of view, that such a case does not really illustrate Mr. Montefiore's view. The doubts and difficulties may be in reality the signs of a growing faith, or an incipient desire to believe, which is itself the beginning of faith, or, more probably still, the honest wish to make the things of faith as real as the things of sight; so that even here, strictly speaking, faith comes first. But in any case, the real value of Mr. Montefiore's contention is that he insists so strongly and persuasively on the power of active loving work in stimulating religious faith. With this we can heartily agree.

3. But, after all, the more important question at issue has not so much to do with the character, or even the effects, of faith, as with its subject-matter. It is belief in the specific doctrine of the Incarnation of the Son of God which in the Fourth Gospel is made the condition of spiritual life. To this Mr. Montefiore strongly objects. And it clearly lies with the Christian to prove, or at any rate give reasonable grounds for holding, that faith in Jesus Christ has of itself quite a unique religious value. Now the Christian position might, I suppose, be expressed somewhat in this way: "We believe the Incarnation of the Word or Son of God to be the objective means of effecting a unique life-giving grace, which is appropriated subjectively through faith, and that especially, though by no means exclusively, in connexion with the sacraments. We believe, moreover, that the communication of this Divine power has been the chief factor in that human progress which has admittedly been the result of Christianity. If asked, however, why faith in Christ should have this effect, we must admit that we can only partly explain it. But we can at least say this, that our reverence for an absolutely unique man—intelligible because human, adorable because felt to be so much more than human—draws our thoughts and feelings through Him to God. The love of Christ, which is inseparable from faith, constrains, inspires

us, impels us." It is such feelings as these which makes St. John's Gospel so attractive to a Christian.

Mr. Montefiore does not, of course, admit this or anything approaching to it. What we have been taught to regard—should I not rather say, have felt to be?—the unique means for drawing us to God, he would have to be a barrier between ourselves and God. And even then, much as we dissent from this view, I think that we must admit that his objection does represent a possible and real danger. There have been instances in which the worship of Christ, even of His material nature, has been substituted for the worship of God. The Adoration of the Five Wounds and the Sacred Heart are cases in point. And we might give examples, though of a more spiritual kind, of the same general tendency in a very opposite school of religious opinion.

It is easy to see that Mr. Montefiore's aversion to the doctrine of the Incarnation, as usually understood by Christian Churchmen, is closely connected with what I should be inclined to call, not a rejection of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, but rather a different manner of conceiving it. Most Christian thinkers would probably consider that he has not made enough of what we generally call, rather unhappily, the distinction of *Persons* in the Godhead. At the same time, without attempting anything like a discussion of such a subtle question, I would ask whether it is not true that a very large number, perhaps even a majority, of Christians have not practically formed a more or less definitely Trithiestic conception of the Trinity, whereas others, as I said above, practically put the worship of Christ in the place of that of God? In a doctrine that so transcends human thought it seems almost inevitable that, for the ordinary purposes of religious faith, the human mind should rest upon a more or less one-sided and imperfect presentment of what we believe to be revealed truth. I should be inclined, then, to say that, though Mr. Montefiore's view of the Holy Trinity expresses only one side of the whole truth, it has its value. It is a protest against the very real danger of sacrificing the great doctrine of the unity of God. "Hear, O Israel, Jehovah our God is one Jehovah." To the Jew these most sacred words, repeated every morning and evening, are the weapon most constantly employed against Christianity. It is surely most important that the Christian should feel that he recognizes their truth, not only in theory, but in reality, as much as the Jew himself. Now, it is certainly difficult to see how this doctrine can be reconciled with certain crude and exaggerated presentations of the doctrine of the Atonement, once common among more than one body of Christians. These are often objected to on moral grounds, as suggesting an unworthy conception of the Father, but on purely theological grounds they seem equally indefensible. They imply a distinction of personality so great that the unity seems almost inconceivable. The conception of the Godhead in *Paradise Lost* is only saved from Tritheism by its obvious Arianism.

To return once more to the Fourth Gospel. Mr. Montefiore objects specially to such a sentence as, "The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into His hand."[1] But is it not possible that this and similar passages receive their true explanation in connexion with the Incarnation? This is, of course, not the same thing as saying that the Father loved Christ only as man, or only when man. If, as most Christian teachers now think, the Incarnation was not an accident contingent upon the fall of man, but part of the Divine plan from all eternity for the elevation of the human race, the love of the Father for the Son must have been in any case eternal, even though it included the whole Being of the Incarnate Son of God.

The difference, then, on such a point is one of exegesis rather than of theology. And, speaking more generally, the differences between Jews and Christians seem on examination less than they at first appear. Perhaps, by a patient sifting of opinions on both sides, they will prove even smaller still. Meanwhile, without for one moment wishing to minimize the differences which at present seem to remain, we may rejoice in having so clear a thinker and so dispassionate an inquirer on our side with respect to many sacred truths which it is fatal for a Christian to overlook or underrate.

EXPOSITORY THOUGHT.

JOEL: THE SUMMONS TO REPENTANCE.

By Rev. Professor G. G. Cameron, D.D.

Joel follows the description of the locust-invasion with an appeal to repentance and prayer (cf. ch. i. 13, 14; and ch. ii. 12–17). On the assumption that the land was actually overspread with locusts, that is the only course open to a true prophet, actively employed in prophetic service. Locusts are God's creatures, under His control. If they have invaded His land, the land of His habitation, the invasion, according to prophetic teaching, must have the permission and fulfil the purpose of Jehovah. In other words, this calamity, which has proved so severe and widespread as to deprive the people of the means of presenting the daily offerings in the temple, can be nothing else than a judgment of God for the sin of the people whom He has put in possession of His land. The judgment can be removed only by propitiating Jehovah and regaining His favour. That, in turn, requires unfeigned penitence and humble supplication on the part of the people; hence the prophet's urgent and repeated call to repentance and prayer.

This appeal brings the prophet, in the discharge of his prophetic duty, into close personal touch with his countrymen, among whom he

[1] John iii. 35.

lives. A connexion of this kind, between the message of the prophet and the circumstances of those to whom he speaks, has been strongly and properly insisted on in recent discussions on Old Testament prophecy. In some cases it is the main factor, and supplies almost the only evidence available for determining the date of the prophecy. And (leaving room for possible cases of an exceptional character) such a connexion seems necessary in order to an intelligent conception of prophecy as a message from God to the living persons to whom the prophet is sent.

But if the locusts are not real, how is this connexion to be established? It cannot be established. What effect would an appeal be likely to have on men whose consciences needed quickening, if that appeal was founded on a locust-invasion, unparalleled in the extent of its destructiveness, while not a single locust was visible, nor a trace of locust-devastation was to be met with in all the land? If the locusts are figurative or apocalyptic, this prophet does not speak to his contemporaries. He sits in his study, like a monk or hermit in his cell, brooding over the past history of the Church, and endeavouring to forecast the future. The fruit of his meditations we have in this prophecy—this twofold call to repentance with the rest. And so this earnest summons, pressed and repeated, with details almost as striking as those in the description of the locust-invasion, becomes a mere ideal appeal, intended to influence nobody in particular; to apply to the circumstances of some distant age, when the prophet and the order to which he belongs shall have long passed away from the field of active service. That there are *predictions* in these Old Testament prophetical books which, when first uttered, were intended to have their fulfilment in the future, the writer, for one, does not doubt. That the words of this appeal are to be thus projected into the future, and the application and fulfilment of the prophecy to be looked for when the prophet's contemporaries and numerous succeeding generations have passed away, is scarcely credible. The language employed, the details which light up the situation (apart altogether from the question regarding the locusts), are entirely opposed to such a view. Of course, if the locusts are real, the prophet's appeal is an earnest effort to deal with present circumstances so as to win back the favour of Jehovah, and secure the withdrawal of the judgment. This is the natural explanation of the words, and it maintains the usual connexion between the prophetic message and the circumstances of the Church to which it is addressed.

But if this is a real appeal to the prophet's contemporaries, with a view to the removal of a judgment lying heavily on the land for the sin of the people, the question naturally arises, "What was the sin for which this punishment was inflicted?" An examination of the text supplies no answer. The prophet does not seem to have any particular sin in view. In ch. i. 5 he speaks of drunkards, "drinkers of [sweet] wine," apparently as the chief or first sufferers from the locusts, with whose destruction of the vines the prophet introduces his description of their ravages. That is the

only statement which can be said to point to a particular sin; and, in the connexion in which it is found, it is doubtful whether the prophet means to formulate a specific charge. This, undoubtedly, is a striking feature of the prophecy. In this respect, how unlike Joel is to Amos, the first of the prophets whose message to the Church has come down to us in written form, about whose historical period there is no dispute! Amos finds specific sins—enough and to spare—to press home on the heart and conscience of the Church; and, from the days of Amos to the capture of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar, no prophet could be said to lack material of this kind, whether he laboured in the northern or in the southern kingdom. What Joel appears to be specially concerned about is the suspension of the daily offerings in the temple. The materials necessary for the offerings are wanting through the ravages of the locusts. "Lament, ye priests: howl, ye ministers of the altar: . . . for the meal offering and the drink offering is withholden from the house of your God" (ch. i. 13). "Rend your heart, and not your garments, and turn unto the Lord your God. . . . Who knoweth whether He will not turn and repent, and leave a blessing behind Him; even a meal offering and a drink offering unto the Lord your God?" (ch. ii. 13, 14). To the prophet, the devastation by the locusts is the work of God. It is really Jehovah that has deprived His people of the means of continuing the daily offerings. And the immediate duty of the people is to kneel before Him, in order to ascertain the special cause of offence, and, as humble penitents, to supplicate forgiveness and the restoration of the Divine favour. Hence the earnest and repeated appeal which the prophet addresses to the Church —the details (as in the account of the locust-invasion) being such as to render it all but incredible that the appeal is ideal—and not addressed to the prophet's contemporaries, in connexion with existing circumstances (cf. ch. i. 13, 14; ii. 12–17).

An urgent personal appeal of this kind, without the denunciation of any special sin, constitutes one of the most striking features of this short prophecy, and supplies a strong argument of a practical kind in favour of an early date. If we may judge from the Old Testament prophetical books that have come down to us, there is scarcely a suitable place for Joel between Amos and the captivity of Judah. This will probably be generally admitted, but the admission by no means settles the question of the date. Not a few scholars hold that the book belongs to the post-Exilic period, and a date not earlier than B.C. 445, when Nehemiah rebuilt the wall of Jerusalem, as proposed by Merx,[1] has been favourably regarded by some. Fortunately, it is in our power to arrive at a fairly correct estimate of the state of religious life in Jerusalem at that period. The writers of the Books of Ezra, Nehemiah, and Malachi present a picture of the condition of the Church at that time almost as melancholy as any contained in the pre-Exilic books. Jewish wives are divorced, in order

[1] Merx, *Die Proph. des Joel* (1879), pp. 30, 31.

that their places may be filled with women from the idolatrous tribes round about Judæa. Heathen influences creep in and spread, threatening a fresh ruin to the Jewish community, less than a hundred years after the return from Babylon. How powerful foreign influence had become, appears from a statement in Nehemiah to the effect that a generation was growing up in Jerusalem incapable of using the Jewish language. "In those days also saw I the Jews that had married women of Ashdod, of Ammon, and of Moab; and their children spake half in the speech of Ashdod, and could not speak in the Jews' language, but according to the language of each people" (Neh. xiii. 23, 24). Nehemiah's action in the circumstances can be explained only on the ground that a crisis had arisen which required treatment of a drastic kind. "And I contended with them, and reviled them, and smote certain of them, and plucked off their hair, and made them swear by God, saying, Ye shall not give your daughters unto their sons, nor take their daughters for your sons, or for yourselves" (Neh. xiii. 25).

From these verses it would be comparatively easy to forecast the general state of religious life with which Nehemiah had to deal; but any estimate thus formed would come far short of the account given by the contemporary prophet Malachi. To him the question of divorce and of heathen marriages appears as grave and full of danger as to Nehemiah (cf. Mal. ii. 10–16). Hypocrisy, profanity, superstition, and impurity; oppression of the poor, the widow, the orphan, and the stranger; indifference to the claims of Jehovah, if not positive contempt for His Person and His Law; a self-satisfied scepticism, which argues Jehovah off the field of human activity, and claims the good things of life for those who ran the round of self-indulgence without restraint; a sense of self-superiority which meets with well-feigned surprise alike earnest entreaty and indignant denunciation on the part of the prophet; these (in addition to the shameful practice of divorce) are prominent features of the life of those to whom Malachi addressed his searching words. And, if we may judge by his book, it does not appear that his efforts were crowned with great success.

Now, if the date proposed by Merx is accepted, Joel belongs to the same period of Jewish history as Malachi. We have not found any special sin denounced by Joel, but he makes a fuller and more searching appeal for repentance than Malachi does. And (a very important consideration) he appears to have reached a success which there is little ground in the text for ascribing to Malachi (cf. Joel ii. 18, 19*a*, the correct rendering of which, if we retain the Massoretic Text, is given in the Revised Version, "Then was the Lord jealous for His land, and had pity on His people. And the Lord answered and said unto His people," etc.). The restoration of the Divine favour, with the promise of blessing which follows the words just quoted, presupposes the penitence of the people, in other words, the successful issue of the prophet's mission. This seems to be

the natural explanation of the text. Accordingly, this is what we have: About the time when, in Jerusalem, Nehemiah was seizing Jews by the hair, and uttering maledictions against them to their face, for their heathenish conduct which threatened the Church with a fresh ruin; and Malachi was denouncing the priests for the insults which they hurled against Jehovah, with the blind, maimed, diseased victims which they counted good enough for His altar, and threatening the sophists and sceptics, who took Jehovah into their hands and defied Him to His teeth, with a judgment than which none more dreadful ever passed a prophet's lips;—Joel was quietly discharging his prophetic duties in his chamber, as if there was not a sin to denounce or a danger against which to warn the Church. Apparently, he has nothing to do with the immoralities and profanities that drive Nehemiah almost to despair, and draw from Malachi, as his last word—the last word of the Old Testament prophecy—the threat that, unless there is repentance and obedience, the curse will fall on Judah, as it fell on the Amorites at the time of the Exodus from Egypt. It appears that Joel is inspired for a kind of work quite different from that usually assigned to the Old Testament prophets. He is possessed of marked literary ability. The depth of his spiritual feelings and the sincerity of his religious convictions are beyond dispute. We are fain to believe that a man gifted as he was would have made some impression even on a generation such as Nehemiah and Malachi had to deal with. In any case, the co-operation of such a man would have strengthened and encouraged Malachi. Nearly a century before, Zechariah and Haggai had stood side by side in the discharge of their prophetic duties in behalf of the Church (cf. Ezra v. 1). Prophetic effort was as urgently needed in the latter half of the fifth century as in the last quarter of the sixth. But Joel was not to help Malachi in the public service of the time. He was withdrawn from the sight of the life which his prophetic contemporary was striving to improve and purify. The noise of the conflict outside did not penetrate within the walls of his retreat. His mission was to brood over the past history of the Church, and, in the light of the past, with its promises and failures, to read off the secrets of the future, and record them for the generations to come. On an imaginary basis borrowed from the past, he constructed a prediction regarding the last times and the last things of all.

When this explanation of the prophecy has been given, the text remains to be construed. According to the text (if we have the text), the prophet pleaded for repentance in order that the Divine judgment might be stayed, and the Divine favour restored. The judgment was removed; the Divine blessing was renewed to the Church. The inference is that the people had repented. Now, that is the practical result for which every prophet laboured among his contemporaries. And when the prophetic purpose and the issue prayed for and wrought for are exhibited in the proper relation, as they are in this short book, it will require

stronger arguments than those yet advanced in support of the apocalyptic explanation to make us willing to cast adrift the principle, strenuously contended for and very generally accepted in these days, that the prophet speaks directly to his contemporaries, and has in view the condition and circumstances of the Church in his own time.

If this principle be applied to Joel, it is very difficult to imagine any reasonable ground for assigning the book to the period of Malachi. And, indeed, when due weight is given to the fact that no mention is made of any of the sins which were all too common from the eighth century downwards, and to the apparent readiness of the people to yield to the prophet's warnings, based though these were on a species of calamity with which they were, in all probability, familiarly acquainted,—it may not appear easy to find a more suitable date for this prophecy than that suggested more than sixty years ago by Credner, viz. the early part of the reign of Joash of Judah. At that time, through the reforming zeal of Jehoiada, the worship of Jehovah was comparatively pure. Religious life was raised to a high level. And we may reasonably believe that the heart of the Church would readily respond to the earnest and affectionate appeals of a man like Joel.

ST. PAUL'S VIEW OF THE GREEK GODS.

By Professor John Massie, M.A.

Dr. Beyschlag's recent *brochure* (noticed some time ago in The Thinker) upon St. Paul's view of the Greek gods, contains (according to a summary[1] of it by Dr. Marcus Dods, in the March number of the *Expositor*) two theses: (1) that the apostle did not believe the Greek gods to be demons (*i.e.* evil spirits); (2) that in the *locus classicus*, 1 Cor. x. 14–22, "no reference to demons as real beings is admissible."

The first thesis, the main one, may be regarded as extremely probable, though not, perhaps, for all the reasons Dr. Beyschlag alleges. Paul certainly seems to deny "to the idols all reality beyond the sensible appearance." We can hardly see any other view than this in 1 Cor. viii. 4, whether we render οὐδὲν εἴδωλον ἐν κόσμῳ, "an idol is nothing in the world" (where ἐν κόσμῳ is vapid), or "there is no idol in the world," *i.e.* there is nothing in the world that really represents a superhuman being The same view appears in ch. x. 19, "What say I, then? that a thing sacrificed to an idol is something? or that an idol is something?" and again in ch. viii. 7, "Not in all is the (needful) knowledge; but some, through their long association with the idol even to this hour (when they are Christians) eat (the food) as offered to an idol," *i.e.* to some real superhuman being. There is, indeed, just room for the supposition that Paul is denying only *deity* to these idol-gods (see ch. viii. 4, "No [being] is

[1] The quotations given below are from this summary.

God save one [Being]"); but it is more probable that he is denying all reality. "Zeus, Herè, Apollon,—they exist only in the fancy, and their images represent nothing." This he would not have said if he had believed them to be evil spirits. But the second thesis, the subordinate one, that in ch. x. 20, 21 ("They sacrifice to demons," and so on), "no reference to demons as real beings is admissible," appears to be more than doubtful.

The objections telling against this thesis are based (1) on the text and context in ch. x. and ch. viii.; (2) on the historical use of *δαιμόνιον*; (3) on Paul's angelology and demonology as related to the Jewish views of the time.

1. *The text and context.* The crucial word in ch. x. is *δαιμόνιον*; in ch. viii. *εἴδωλον*. *Δαιμόνιον* does not appear at all in ch. viii.; *εἴδωλον* appears but once in ch. x., where Paul, in harmony with ch. viii. 4, asserts its "nothingness" (ver. 19). The provinces of the two words must not be allowed to encroach upon one another. We cannot, therefore, argue from the nothingness of the *idol* in Paul's opinion to the nothingness of the *δαιμόνιον*, as if *δαιμόνιον* were only another word here for a non-existent god. On the contrary, Paul seems to be at pains to differentiate the idol-gods and the *δαιμόνια*. In ch. x. 19–21, after denying that an *εἴδωλον* represents a reality, and, therefore, that the meat offered in sacrifice has any reality as an offering to an idol, he goes on, apparently, to specify where the reality lies. "What say I, then? that a thing sacrificed to an idol is something? or that an idol is something? [No], but [what I do say, is this—] that the things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons (*δαιμόνια*), and not to God [behold the contrast!]; and I would not that ye should become fellows with the demons. Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of demons. [It is morally impossible.] Ye cannot partake of the table of the Lord and of the table of demons. Or do we [go the length of] provoking the Lord to jealousy?" The antitheses of this passage urgently constrain us to admit that Paul is looking upon the demons as real. "There is nothing in the idol, but there is something in the demon. With the idols ye cannot be partakers, except in your imaginations. With the demons ye come into contact, into fellowship, at the idol-feasts, whether ye imagine it or not, and ye run all the risks of this communion." The evidence is, on the whole, against Paul's identification of the idol-gods and the *δαιμόνια*. Satan is, indeed, called by Paul (2 Cor. iv. 4) the *θεὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου*, "the god of this age;" but Paul never says or hints that the idol-god *par excellence* of the heathen is Satan, nor does he ever say or hint that Satan is "nothing." What he seems to imply is that, just as (2 Cor. iv. 4) "the god of this age hath blinded the minds of the unbelieving," so the demons, his ministers, use idolatry for delusive and destructive purposes. The idol-worship, therefore, empty of reality absolutely and in itself, is abundant in fearful reality relatively and

behind itself. The idols are but marionettes: Satan and his evil spirits pull the strings. And the lust and licence accompanying the idol-festivities were, for Paul, sufficient testimony that what he said was true. On these grounds (1 Cor. x. 7–14) he exhorts the Corinthian Christians to avoid such public celebrations, though the meat that has been offered may, *in itself*, be eaten quite innocently (1 Cor. x. 25, 26) at home or at a friend's house (after purchase at the meat-market), or even in an idol-precinct (ch. viii. 10)—an extreme case, however, mentioned in another context, and solely in regard to its injurious effect upon a more scrupulous Christian spectator outside the precinct—except by one, or in the presence of one who cannot get rid of the notion that the eater compromises himself with a real divinity (1 Cor. viii. 7).

So far, then, as the text and context are concerned, they appear to conflict with the contention that the δαιμόνια of 1 Cor. x. are as non-existent as the εἴδωλα.

2. *The historical use of* δαιμόνιον. Dr. Beyschlag, says Dr. Dods, "paves the way" for his interpretation "by observing that Paul nowhere else uses δαιμόνια of evil spirits or fallen angels." This is a fact, as it is also a fact that he uses δαιμόνια nowhere else at all, in any sense whatever, unless we make bold to count 1 Tim. iv. 1 as his, and then we have a clear case against Dr. Beyschlag,—"Some shall fall away from the faith, giving heed to seducing *spirits*, and doctrines of demons (δαιμονίων);" where it would be as unreasonable to ignore the belief in evil-spirit activity as it would be in dealing with Eph. ii. 2, "The prince of the power of the air, of the spirit that now worketh in the sons of disobedience." This sense of evil spirit is the ordinary sense of δαιμόνιον and δαίμων in the New Testament. It is true that the "strange δαιμόνια" of Acts xvii. 18, and the compounds δεισιδαιμονεστέρους of Acts xvii. 22, and δεισιδαιμονίας of Acts xxv. 19, do not come under this category. But the first and last of these exceptions are in the utterances of heathens (Athenian philosophers in the one case, and Festus in the other); and the second occurs in the report of a speech in which Paul was striving to make himself intelligible to a heathen audience. Yet even in these passages a depreciatory sense is latent. The "strange δαιμόνια" are evidently not ranked with the acknowledged θεοί; in δεισιδαιμονία Festus has no desire to be very respectful to the Jews; and probably Hatch was right in arguing from the current meaning of δεισιδαίμων and δεισιδαιμονία in Philo, Josephus, Plutarch, and Marcus Aurelius, that these words ought probably to be interpreted in the Acts in the "superstitious" sense.[1] This depreciatory colouring is not without precedent in the earlier and more classical usage of δαίμων and δαιμόνιον. In Euripides, *Io*, 1374, we read, "The gifts of the god (θεοῦ) are kind, but those of the demon (δαίμονος) are grievous." And Plato, besides suggesting that demons (δαίμονες) are bastards of the gods (*Apology*, p. 27), and affirming (*Symposium*, p. 202)

[1] Hatch, *Essays in Biblical Greek*, p. 45.

that πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον is a kind of cross between the divine and the mortal, uses δαίμων in the *Lysis* (p. 223) of an evil apparition.[1] Plutarch, who wrote in and after New Testament times, goes further. To him (*De Defectu Oraculorum*, chs. 13, 14) the demons were underlings of the gods, varying in virtue and in humours like men; and to the bad demons (δαίμονες φαῦλοι) he attributed all that was barbarous and cruel, as, for instance, the heathen practice of human sacrifice.

When, therefore, the Septuagint Version uses δαιμόνια (as Dr. Beyschlag admits) of "evil intermediary" beings (in other words, "evil spirits"), it followed a usage of profane Greek, as well as a tendency of the Jews of that period to accept what would help them to understand the existence of evil. The Septuagint, however, extends the name δαιμόνια to include *all* the gods of the heathen: Ps. xcv. 5 (LXX.), "All the gods (θεοὶ) of the nations are demons (δαιμόνια);" and Deut. xxxii. 17 (cp. Baruch iv. 7, 35), the passage Paul quotes in 1 Cor. x. 20, "They sacrificed to demons, and not to God (δαιμονίοις καὶ οὐ Θεῷ)." Dr. Beyschlag compares the LXX. translation here unfavourably with the "original Hebrew text," and the "later Jewish tradition" unfavourably with the "Old Testament." "Although the prophets," he says, "spoke with contempt of the idols as nonentities, yet, where this high superiority was not maintained, the heathen were spoken of as worshipping demons. And thus where the original Hebrew text speaks of worshipping idols or 'nothings,' the LXX. translates by δαιμόνια." Paul, he affirms, preferred "the Old Testament to the later Jewish tradition," and by δαιμόνια in 1 Cor. x. (comp. θεοὶ in 1 Cor. viii. 5) means simply "gods," and therefore "nonentities," "nothings," "things without existence."

In the opinion of Dr. Beyschlag, then, δαιμόνια is, for the LXX., a mistranslation, and Paul quotes the word from Deut. xxxii. 17 in a sense different from the evil-spirit sense of the LXX., using δαιμόνια and λεγόμενοι θεοὶ, "so-called gods" (1 Cor. viii. 5), as equivalents, to be truly interpreted by the Hebrew original, *'elilim*, "nothings," in the passage just referred to; an original which Dr. Beyschlag finds reproduced in Paul's οὐδὲν of 1 Cor. viii. 4.

On this position one or two remarks may be made. First of all, the etymology and the meaning of *'elilim* are uncertain. Though (according to the new Gesenius, edited by Drs. Brown, Driver, and Briggs) this word may mean "vain, worthless gods," it is by no means clear that it means "nothings" in the sense of things without existence. These editors say that "possibly it was originally an independent word, meaning 'gods,'" and they suggest its Sabæan descent. Obviously, it will not do to build upon the etymology. So far as use can guide us, "worthlessness" rather than "nothingness" is suggested by Zech. xi. 17, "Woe to the worthless (*'elil*) shepherd that leaveth the flock!" and Job xiii. 4, "Ye

[1] For these four references, compare Principal Edwards's Commentary on 1 *Corinthians*, *in loc.*

are all physicians of no value (*'elil*)." The etymology, therefore, and the use of *'elilim* are very precarious foundations on which to build an "Old Testament tradition" of "non-existence" even for εἴδωλα (which is the Greek rendering of *'elilim* in the parallel to Ps. xcv. 5, 1 Chron. xvi. 26). Still more precarious is it to found on the *nothingness* in *'elilim*, and on the "Old Testament tradition," an interpretation of δαιμόνια for Paul himself. Δαιμόνια occurs only once in the LXX. (Ps. xcv. 5), as a rendering for *'elilim*; in six passages the latter is rendered by χειροποίητα; in three by εἴδωλα; in two by βδελύγματα; and in one by θεοί (Isa. xix. 3, probably by mistake for *'elohim*); and in all these passages where δαιμόνια is absent it is the *images* that are more or less distinctly referred to. Thus δαιμόνια must not be regarded as a rendering in any way familiar; it is, in fact, the rarest of all renderings, and, as was pointed out just now, Paul would have found his own non-existent εἴδωλα for *'elilim* in 1 Chron. xvi. 26, "All the gods of the peoples are *idols*." Nor would he have been tempted to use δαιμόνια of non-existing heathen gods by the other Hebrew words for which in the LXX. it is made the equivalent. *Shed*, wherever it occurs, and once (Ps. xc. 6), where it is confused with *shud*, is translated by δαιμόνιον. And what is *shed?* Its exact nature is uncertain. But, in Assyrian, *shidsi* is a name for subordinate spirits, who are invested with power for good or evil, and whose favour is often requested; while in Aramaic (and constantly in the Peshitto New Testament) *shida* corresponds to δαιμόνιον. *Shedim* is the word in the passage (Deut. xxxii. 17) from which Paul quotes in 1 Cor. x. 20 (δαιμονίοις καὶ οὐ θεῷ); but in the Hebrew there is no "and" or "to:" the phrase runs simply "to *shedim* not God," *i.e.* "to *shedim* (which are) not God"—the divinity of the *shedim* being denied, but not their existence. *Se'irim* is translated by δαιμόνια at Isa. xiii. 21, and *se'irim* are "he-goats," *i.e.* "satyrs;" and δαιμόνια again appears, probably for "desert animals," in a similar context at Isa. xxxiv. 14, where it is not quite certain which Hebrew word it stands for. *Gad*, Isa. lxv. 11, the only passage where *Gad* occurs in the *divinity* sense, is translated by δαιμόνιον, and *Gad* is *Fortune*, a Syrian deity, whose existence is not in question. The only place where the non-existence of δαιμόνια appears to be referred to in the LXX. is at Isa. lxv. 3, "This people . . . sacrifice upon the bricks to the demons which are not (δαιμονίοις ἃ οὐκ ἔστιν);" and here the "which are not" seems to be a mistake of the Greek translator; the Hebrew runs, "*which sit* (among the graves)," and refers to the people and not to the demons at all. And Dr. Beyschlag claims a belief in the non-existence of the δαιμόνια, not for the LXX., but only for the Old Testament tradition.[1]

The history of δαίμων and δαιμόνιον is, in brief, as follows. In Homer there is a certain equivalence between θεὸς and δαίμων; but the

[1] For some of the material in the foregoing paragraph I am indebted to Professor Driver, and also to my colleague, Mr. Gray.

distinction is, nevertheless, very commonly drawn between θεὸς as the *person* and δαίμων as the *power* or *influence* of the person; so that even in Homer δαίμων is not quite on a par with θεός. In post-Homeric Greek this connotation of inferiority in δαίμων becomes more definite, till, from being regarded as links between the divine and the human, the δαίμονες come to share the deficiencies of humanity, and to be attached often to individuals or to families, sometimes as good genii, but much more frequently as bad. The descending scale—inferiority, deterioration, evil mixed with good, evil more frequent than good—finds its lowest depth in sacred literature, where δαίμων (except in four places in the New Testament) has been entirely supplanted by δαιμόνιον, and has become, both in the one form and in the other, almost without exception *evil spirit*, and in the New Testament most generally evil spirit possessing men. It is not easy to be satisfied with the idea that Paul steps aside from this almost invariable sacred usage, justified as it is by parallels in profane Greek, and identifies δαιμόνια and θεοὶ in such a way that "partakers with the demons" simply means "guests of the [non-existent] gods;" especially when we pay regard to the context as considered above.

3. My contention that the δαιμόνια of the passage are real beings and evil spirits is supported by Paul's angelology and demonology in its relation to the Jewish views of the time. Without tarring Paul with the brush of rabbinical or apocalyptic extravagance, we may fairly admit that he was to some extent a man of his day and nation in his conceptions of the spirit-world, especially as many of his phrases on this subject are very dark and mysterious without the side-light thrown upon them by this principle of interpretation.[1] The other notable passage to which Dr. Beyschlag refers—1 Cor. viii. 5, "For though there be so-called gods, whether in heaven or on earth, as there are gods many, and lords many" —appears to me to lose its point if we do not recognize therein Paul's acceptance of the Jewish belief in what Ritschl described as "a class of angels neither definitely good nor definitely bad, who could stand in relative opposition to God." The world was held to be, in some degree at any rate, in the hands of these angels (the "watchers," as the highest of them are called over and over again in the *Book of Henoch*) as *media* of God's government; and that they were called gods and lords is suggested by such Old Testament passages as Ps. lxxxii. 1, "Jehovah judges amidst the gods" (where the LXX. and Peshittô translate by "angels"); Deut. x. 17, "The Lord your God is God of the gods, and Lord of the lords;" and Ps. cxxxvi. 2, 3, "O give thanks unto the God of the gods . . . O give thanks unto the Lord of the lords;" passages which are illustrated by Clement of Alexandria's citation from the *Apocalypse of Zephaniah*, "And the spirit took me up and bore me up to the fifth heaven, and I beheld angels called lords (κυρίους)." The "relative opposition to God," of which Ritschl speaks, rested in a certain independence in the discharge

[1] Compare on this subject Everling, *Die Paulinische Angelologie und Dämonologie.*

of their functions, so that, in some cases, their service was an imperfect representation of God, in other cases an actual misrepresentation of Him, and consequently a veiling rather than a revealing of Him. Thus the transmission of the imperfect and transitory dispensation of the Law is, in Gal. iii. 19, attributed by Paul to angels; and the perplexing passage (Col. ii. 15) where Christ is said to have "stripped off from Himself the principalities and the powers, and made a show of them openly, triumphing over them in [His cross]" (or, as it may be otherwise worded, "exhibited them in their real nature, leading them in His triumphal train"), may possibly find its elucidation in the idea that these ἀρχαὶ and ἐξούσιαι had hidden His personal activity, and even attracted worship to themselves (compare the "worshipping of angels," three verses later). Such an idea makes it easier to understand the passages where it is said that "in the name of Jesus every knee shall bow of things in the heavens" (Phil. ii. 10). and that the Father has "made Him sit at His right hand *in the heavenly places*, far above *all rule and authority and power and dominion*" (Eph. i. 20, 21). Thus the relative independence or opposition becomes at last entire subordination. Consistent with all this is Paul's view that Christ's redemption is requisite for things in heaven as well as things on the earth (Col. i. 20; compare the "thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers" of ver. 16), and that angels will be judged at last (1 Cor. vi. 3); as well as his implication that the angels watching over Christian worship are subject to temptation (1 Cor. xi. 10), and that the "angels" helping to constitute the "world" to which the apostles were "made a spectacle," were, like the "men," a gazing multitude of mixed quality (1 Cor. iv. 9). Last of all, through the misuse of their independence, some had come into an opposition no longer relative, but absolute, and into functions positively pernicious. These may be compared with the "angels that sinned" (2 Pet. ii. 4), the "angels that kept not their own principality, but left their proper habitation" (Jude 6), and Paul's "spiritual powers of wickedness in the heavenly places," "the principalities, the powers, the world-rulers of this darkness" (Eph. vi. 12), with which the Christian had to wrestle. These, and not "flesh and blood," were the great hostile reality in the Christian warfare. The "heavenly places," the places above the earth, the realms of the air, were the places of their habitation, and over them reigned "the prince of the power of the air, of the spirit that now worketh in the sons of disobedience." Now, these places were, in the Jewish view, just the regions inhabited by the δαιμόνια; and "the prince of the power of the air," their ruler, was Satan. (Cf. Matt. ix. 34, "He casteth out the demons by the *prince* of the demons;" Matt. xii. 24. "Beelzebub, the prince of the demons;" Matt. xii. 26, "If *Satan* cast out Satan;" Luke x. 18, "I beheld Satan as lightning fall *from heaven;*" John xii. 31, "Now shall the *prince of this world* be cast out;" cf. Paul's "the god of this age," 2 Cor. iv. 4. And for the air as the habitation of Satan and the demons, compare *Testament of the XII. Patriarchs, Levi*, c. 3.

where Beliar is called "the spirit of the air;" *Ascensio Isaiae*, vii. and x., where the prince of this world and the demons, Sammael and his powers, dwell in the firmament, *i.e.* the air. And it is very much to the point to notice that, when Paul cries out, 2 Cor. vi. 15, 16, "What concord hath Christ with *Beliar?*" he follows it up with, "What agreement hath a temple of God with *idols?*" and is referring apparently, as in 1 Cor. x., to the impure cultus of idol-worship, as prompted and fostered by demonic power.)

When all this evidence has been accorded its due weight, it will be hard to avoid the feeling that Paul shared the belief of his time, at any rate to this extent—that, if the gods of the heathen were not themselves demons, demonic influence was potent in the background of idolatry; and it will take a stronger argument than that derived from Paul's non-use of δαιμόνια elsewhere, to prove that evil spirits were not in his thought in 1 Cor. x. as the abettors of the pollution and excess which stamped the feasts in honour of the idols.

THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT.

THE PRELIMINARIES OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

II. *THE FACULTIES BY WHICH RELIGIOUS TRUTH IS APPREHENDED.*

By Rev. W. S. Swayne, M.A.

It is a very common assumption that whereas the sciences fall under the scope of reason, religious truth is to be apprehended only by faith. It is, moreover, very generally felt, though not perhaps so openly expressed, that whereas reason is certain in its procedure and results, the methods of faith are in the highest degree precarious and uncertain, so that when, as not unfrequently is the case, controversy arises between faith and reason, there can be no question on which side the truth is to be found.

Such a position really implies a complete misapprehension of the province of both reason and faith, and of the faculties by which religious truth is apprehended. Reason is as necessary to the apprehension of religious, as of any other form of truth. But spiritual truth is not and could not be apprehended by reason only. In this respect spiritual truth does not stand alone. It is true of all forms of truth that they can only be grasped when the exercise of reason has been preceded by an act of observation. This becomes immediately obvious when the true nature of reason is considered. Reason is that faculty which draws inferences, either deductively from general principles or inductively from a mass of observed facts. It is the faculty which is dealt with in formal treatises on logic under the title of "The Science or Art of Reasoning." But antecedent to the process of reason must be the process of observation. It is very justly remarked by Mill that it is not the province of logic, but

rather the duty of intellectual education, to teach what to observe and how to observe.

It would hardly be possible to exaggerate the importance to reason of the preliminary act of observation. The men who in every age have contributed most largely to the advance of truth have not been so much correct reasoners as close and accurate observers. A trained faculty of observation is at least as important, therefore, to the inquirer as a logical mind. It is this faculty which supplies the facts with which reason afterwards deals, ascending from facts to principles, and again descending from principles to facts. Apart from such a trained faculty of observation, reason is condemned to tread a weary and unproductive round.

This has been abundantly exemplified by the history of the arts and the sciences. It was the fundamental error of the ancient Greek physical philosophers, that they did not humble themselves to observe nature, but began by forming fanciful hypotheses. One would assume that the primal element was fire; another, water; another, air. The arguments which were based upon such hypotheses, however in themselves reasonable, naturally and inevitably led to nothing—to nothing, at any rate, of any account to the human race. The same fault vitiated the speculation of the few thinkers who gave their attention to natural philosophy during the Middle Ages. The devotion, the intellectual subtilty they displayed deserved success; they did not, however, achieve it, because their feet were not based on the firm ground of careful and accurate observation.

The publication of the *Novum Organum* by our own Francis Bacon was the inauguration of a new and more hopeful epoch. "Go back to Nature," he said; "study her, accumulate facts; do not form baseless hypotheses, but patiently proceed from facts to principles." Man, however great his intellectual supremacy, cannot force his own ideas upon Nature; he is, after all, only *naturæ minister et interpres*, Nature can be only conquered by obeying her.

At the very outset of the *Novum Organum*, Bacon, however, recognizes that there are other facts which are worthy of the observation of intelligent beings besides those of the material universe. Man is able to contemplate himself, to observe the mental, moral, and spiritual processes of his own nature. Whatever *is*, is a fact. The religious beliefs and spiritual aspirations of man's nature are as much facts as the motions of the planets or the growth and structure of a living organism. Thus Bacon begins his *magnum opus* with the statement, "Homo, naturæ minister et interpres, tantum facit et intelligit quantum de naturæ ordine re vel mente observaverit; nec amplius scit, aut potest."

It has been too often forgotten, especially by the aggressively anti-Christian school of scientists, that man is quite as much justified in observing the processes of his own nature (*mente*) as the processes of the external world (*re*), and that it is as unscientific wilfully to ignore the persistent religious faith and aspiration of mankind as it was for

the ecclesiastical authorities of the period to ignore the discoveries of Galileo.

Something more, however, is needed than merely to observe; the really scientific man is he who has a trained faculty of observation, who knows what to observe, and how. Apples had fallen to the ground for countless centuries, until this everyday occurrence caught the eye and arrested the attention of Isaac Newton. Steam had lifted the kettle-lid from the days when man began to be a cooking animal, but it needed a James Watt to deduce the principle of the steam-engine. Other eyes besides those of Columbus saw the eastward-drifting seaweed, but to Columbus the flotsam of the ocean was vocal, while to others it was speechless. Century after century the myriad tribes of earthworms had been fulfilling their wonderful place in the economy of this wonderful world, until the thoughtful eye of Darwin fell on them, and revealed their dignity and importance to the unobservant multitude. So it has ever been. The deductive and constructive reason waits upon the trained power of observation, and is powerless without it.

If we turn from science to art, we find the same principle equally true. The tendency has ever been observable in art to depart from nature and to follow the style or even the peculiarities of some one master mind. All great movements in art have been based upon a return to nature. Ruskin has taught us the importance in art of the shepherd-boy Giotto, who dared to shake himself free from the trammels of an artificial style, and paint what he saw. The whole history of art testifies, not merely to the importance of imagination, manual dexterity, or reason, but to the prior necessity of the trained power of observation. The artist teaches us what to see. He catches, as it were, a smile on the fair face of nature which we should not otherwise have observed, but which we see to be true enough to nature when it is once pointed out to us. So also that master of portrait-painting, Professor Herkomer, is never weary of pointing out that portrait-painting is not merely taking a likeness, or picture-making; it is interpretative. The portrait-painter is not merely *naturæ minister*, but also *interpres*, and all great portraits are a veritable revelation, not only to the world, but sometimes even to the subjects of them. The great artist differs from his lesser brethren, not merely because he has a more perfect control of the *technique* of his art than others, not merely because he has a higher and more perfect sense of beauty, but chiefly because he sees more than other men. Nature delivers up her secrets to him, as in another way she does to the scientific observer.

Men seem to differ from one another quite as much in the power of observation as in the reasoning faculty. Kingsley has taught us this in the parable of "eyes and no eyes." Still more do those whose power of observation is trained differ from those whose observing powers have never been guided and stimulated. The student of architecture passes through a great cathedral, and as his eye falls upon pillar and arch and

moulding, the building delivers up its secrets to him—he can tell its story and enter into the mind of its builders. Similarly, to the geologist the stones and rocks, to the biologist the myriad troops of living organisms, all have their messages. They differ from the multitude as one who can read differs from him who is "no scholar" when a printed page is laid before him. To teach what to observe and how, is, as Mill says, the province of intellectual education.

If all this be applied to religious truth, the province of reason is clear. Here also reason occupies a highly important but strictly subordinate place. It is reason which makes theology into a system, which draws conclusions from premisses, and indicates the relation between parts. But reason must have something to work upon. It must be preceded by an act of observation. So far as religion is a system of belief, the faculty of observation is called faith; so far as religion is a guide of life, a system of ethics, the preliminary faculty of observation is called conscience, or the moral sense.

Faith, then, is no mere credulity; it is a power of vision. It is the faculty by which spiritual facts are apprehended. It is by faith that we see God, that we perceive the existence and the immortality of the soul. It is to the faculty of faith that a revelation, if granted, would naturally appeal. Similarly, it is by conscience that we perceive the dictates of the moral law; it is to conscience that a revelation, so far as it is ethical, addresses itself. As it is with the power of observing the phenomena of the natural world, so it is with faith and conscience. All men possess them in some degree, but in very varying degrees. Here also the difference is enormous between the man who possesses a trained power of observation, and the man whose faculty is untrained. Faculties are developed by use. The man who is accustomed to dwell much upon, to meditate upon, spiritual truths acquires a power of discernment which does not belong to those whose faculties have been otherwise exercised. Darwin acknowledged that, as he devoted himself more and more to natural science, he lost all taste for poetry, and his mind seemed to become simply a machine for grinding out principles from observed facts. In the same way, the spiritual faculty may suffer atrophy if it is not used.

This makes obvious at once the enormous importance of religious education. Religious education is not merely storing the mind with facts, or even the inculcation of right principles, it is the teaching what to observe and how; it is the development of a faculty. If the period of youth be allowed to pass unutilized, the opportunity can never be regained, for it is when the faculties of mind and body are in their natural process of development that they are most easily further developed and stimulated by education.

The same principle also makes it clear how far a man is responsible for his religious belief. No charge has been brought against the Christian

Church with more conviction and pertinacity than the charge of injustice and bigotry because she teaches that, after all due allowance has been made for circumstances, a man is responsible for his faith.

A man's faith not only depends on the circumstances under which he has been brought up, or the definite teaching he has received, but upon the use he has made of the religious faculties of faith and conscience. As with the faculty of scientific observation, so with faith and conscience, men may and do possess them originally in very varying degrees. One man possesses more power of spiritual insight than his neighbour; one man has a more authoritative conscience than another; but all men possess these powers in some degree, and all men are responsible for the use they make of such powers as they possess.

Responsibility begins and ends where the power of will, the faculty of choice, begins and ends. Man is only responsible in so far as he has the power of free-will. It is because a man is free to develop or to refuse to develop the religious instinct, because a man may foster or extinguish the voice of conscience within, that he is responsible for his faith, and for those moral or immoral principles which are to him the rule of life. A man is not responsible if he is influenced by an environment which is inevitable; but he is responsible so far as he chooses his environment. As a matter of fact, the majority of men do, to a very considerable extent, choose their environment. They choose the friends with whom they shall be most intimate; they choose the books they shall read; they choose the thoughts, the ideals, that shall be the secret inhabitants of the inward spirit. In so far as they are thus capable of choosing their familiar surroundings, they are responsible for the influence such surroundings naturally exercise upon them.

That men are not simply influenced by the creed they are taught, by the external influences under which they are reared, is evident from the fact that, while some men rise immensely above the traditional faith they have inherited, others fall equally signally below such a faith. Some of the purest saints have lived in the ages of deepest ecclesiastical degradation, and it is an everyday occurrence to see men and women who have received every advantage, and have been brought up under the holiest influences, fail to respond to those influences, and fall immeasurably below the creed which they still profess.

It is one of the merits of that remarkable but somewhat too brilliant book, *Social Evolution*, by Mr. Benjamin Kidd, that it recognizes fully that the religious experiences of mankind offer a class of facts at least as much deserving the attention of the scientific observer as the facts of natural science. The antagonism between faith and reason, between religion and science, is one of those unhappy domestic dissensions, based upon misunderstanding, which should never have been permitted to occur.

In religion, as in every other department of human inquiry and

human knowledge, the power of observation and the power of reason must work happily and harmoniously together, if results in any degree fruitful or worth achieving are to be arrived at.

It must always be remembered, however, that, as reason needs to be disciplined and trained, so also do faith and conscience. The religious faculties form no exception to the general rule that faculties are ordinarily developed by use, and dwarfed and stunted by disuse. As a master of spiritual wisdom has observed, with equal truth and beauty, "As children learn to walk by walking, and to run by running, so those who are children in the heavenly wisdom must learn to love by loving, and to believe by believing."

So far, then, it has been seen that, in the discovery of religious truth, as in every other direction in which the human mind exercises itself, the primary need is that of a trained faculty of observation, which may supply the facts with which reason, the power of drawing inferences from premisses, will afterwards deal. Reason alone, unless it becomes the handmaiden of observation, can never be really fruitful.

In religion, the trained power of observation is twofold. As dealing with spiritual facts, the Being of God, and the relation of God to man, it is called faith; as dealing with morals, it is called conscience.

Thus faith is really antecedent to reason. It is a power of spiritual perception which supplies facts for reason to deal with. This is one of the senses in which St. Augustine's well-known dictum holds good, *Credo ut intelligam*, "I believe in order that I may understand."

With regard to this statement, Bishop Martensen, in his *Christian Dogmatics*, remarks, "The assertion of Christians, that faith is the mother of knowledge, is substantially confirmed by the analogy of all other spheres of human knowledge; for all human knowledge has its root in an immediate perception of the object. And as it is useless for one who lacks hearing to talk about music, as it is useless for one who has no sense of colour to develop a theory of colour, the same holds true respecting the cognition of sacred things."

This argument might be pressed even further. Really, when we say we perceive a natural object, we only perceive a state of our own mind or of our own sensations; the real existence of a natural object causing such sensations or such successive states of mind is an inference, not a direct perception. If the states of mind which we assume to be caused by a really existent external world are worthy of the calm and dispassionate consideration of reason, so equally are those states of mind caused and effected, not through the avenue of touch, sight, or hearing, but through the avenue of faith, the power of supersensual sight, touch, and hearing. If the existence of God is an inference, so also is the existence of a real external world.

In both cases, the perception and the consequent activity of reason stand in the same relation to one another. In both cases, reason is obliged

to assure itself that the perception is real and not imaginary, that perception and inference have not been confused together; but reason, having once assured itself of the reality of a perception, has no further right to challenge it, but must deal with it as an ultimate fact.

It is now proposed to consider, a little more in detail, the relations which should exist between faith and reason.

At the outset, it should be recognized that the professors of the two faculties have too often an unfortunate and unnecessary jealousy of one another. On one side the term "dogmatist," and on the other side the term "rationalist," is used as a term of reproach. This jealousy would seem to be as ancient as the history of human thought itself. Plato speaks of a long-standing quarrel between poetry and philosophy, between the idealizing faculty and the rationalizing faculty, and this quarrel lasts to the present day. But it is an unfortunate misunderstanding rather than a necessary antagonism, and he does the truest service, both to reason and to faith, who brings them to understand one another.

Misunderstandings would seem in the past most commonly to have arisen between faith and reason from a lack of humility on either side, and from either faculty not being quite sure of the limits of its own province. Faith is the power of spiritual intuition, the power which sees God, and the power also to which God inevitably addresses Himself when He has a Divine word for man. Reason is the critical, the deductive, the constructive faculty. Reason perceives likenesses and differences, it detects agreements and inconsistencies, it draws inferences from premisses, and formulates systems.

Take, for instance, a great theological work—we will suppose the *Summa Theologiæ* of St. Thomas Aquinas, the greatest, perhaps, of all systematic works on theology. We have here a happily combined work of both faith and reason. Faith supplies the facts, partly intuitively received, partly received by revelation; reason brings these facts into relation with one another, indicates how they modify or explain one another, points out the consequences which are legitimately deducible from them, and works the whole into an intelligible and coherent system.

Here there is no controversy between the two, but rather the most intimate and affectionate alliance. The *Summa* is at once a monument of reasonable faith and of sanctified reason. It is when one or other party to the alliance goes outside its own province, forgets the necessary limitations of its field of action, and declines from becoming humility, that hostility and disaster become inevitable.

In this respect neither side has a monopoly of error. It is necessary to warn those who are presumably on the side of faith, that it has not always been reason that has been arrogant and unwise. Faith has in her time been rash and presumptuous, and has had sadly to pay the penalty. She has claimed too much, and, as a consequence, even her legitimate claims

have not been admitted. It is equally necessary to warn the prophets of science that there is an undue exaltation of intellect which is not merely unchristian, but positively irrational.

The primary need, then, on either side, is a certain humility. There is a just and necessary humility of faith. It is necessary for faith to remember that reason also is a God-given faculty—a faculty which God has implanted that it may be fostered, developed, and used to the uttermost. There can, therefore, a Christian is bound to believe, be no final or irreconcilable difference between faith and reason. God Himself is at once the Object of religious faith and the highest reason. All that emanates from Him, therefore, will be essentially reasonable. "If the communication were Divine," says Mr. Gladstone, in *The Impregnable Rock of Holy Scripture*, with regard to the creation-story, "we may be certain that it would on that account be all the more strictly governed by the laws of the reasonable."

Faith, therefore, should gladly recognize that Reason, no less than herself, has a Divine commission. She cannot complain if Reason investigates her teaching, and demands that it should be coherent, consistent, and in contradiction with no fundamental law of the human mind. Reason is the critical, as well as the ratiocinative, faculty. It is bound, if it fulfils its duties, to examine into the authority and truth of Creeds and dogmas. Such testing ought to be gladly welcomed by Faith herself in her own interests. For there is undoubtedly a delusive spiritual insight, and misleading spiritual experiences. It is further possible, inasmuch as even good men are frequently only moderately reasonable, to draw very false inferences from very true experiences, and to build up a thoroughly unsound superstructure on an undoubted basis of fact, whether spiritual or otherwise.

"Prove all things," says St. Paul, "hold fast that which is good;" and this proving can only be accomplished by the sanctified intellect acting as the handmaiden of Faith.

Again, Faith is lacking in due humility when the spiritual consciousness of the individual, rather than the corporate consciousness of the Catholic Church, is made the measure of religious truth. "What," says St. Paul to the Corinthians, "came the Word of God out from you, or came it unto you only?" This tendency is a common one in our own day. Faith is made an absolutely individual thing, not in the sense that every man must believe for himself, which is undoubtedly true; but in the sense that no man is bound to believe more than his narrow upbringing, or limited education, or inherited prejudices, or moral or immoral bias, have left him personally disposed to believe. A faith so irrational, so presumptuous, so lacking in due humility, so little reckoning with the objective and unalterable nature of religious truth, is naturally treated with but scant ceremony by reason, and is put aside as something purely fanciful and subjective and unworthy the consideration of men

who are not concerned with that which is private, personal, and individual, but are consumed with a passion for objective truth, whose rule is—

> "Search on for Truth; thy toil is sweet,
> And sweet the brunt of hopeful strife;
> One vision of her snowy feet
> Is worth the labour of a life."

Again, Faith is lacking in becoming humility when she assumes that reason must give up positions at which it has arrived after due and serious inquiry, merely because they seem to be in conflict with certain conclusions of faith. The classical instance of such a presumptuous mistake on the part of faith is the demand of the Church that Galileo should declare that the earth was immovable, when he had proved that the earth moved round the sun. Perhaps the most humiliating page in the history of faith would be that devoted to record the many conflicts between faith and reason; because it would record how again and again Faith, in incautious pride, has taken up positions which she should never have occupied, and from which she has subsequently been compelled to beat an unwilling and humiliating retreat. The professors of faith need to remember, as much as any body of men in the world, that he who will not be humble must needs be humiliated. It is necessary for Faith at all times to bear in mind that she does but see in a glass dimly. She has not yet the perfect vision of God. Reason may not infrequently be the means, under God, of teaching her more clearly the meaning of the contents of her own Creeds. And if there are instances in which reason can fill no interpretative office, but seems to be in sheer contradiction with some cherished article of faith, even so reason must not be condemned out of hand. The end is not yet. The menaced article of faith must not, indeed, hastily be given up, but the belief and hope may be entertained that a deeper spiritual insight and a more accurate and inquiring reason may yet show a fundamental agreement where there had been superficial inconsistency; and it may legitimately be conjectured that such apparent contradictions are the summons of the Divine Wisdom to seek deeper grounds of agreement.

If, however, Faith is sometimes lacking in due humility, the same charge may more frequently and with greater justice be brought against reason. Reason is too often apt to assume that it is a sole faculty, the only faculty through which the human mind can arrive at truth, and that it is an infinite faculty, adequate to all difficulties and all emergencies, and therefore rightly jealous of mystery; whereas, indeed, its scope is strictly limited, and beyond the expanse of the known and the verified there must ever extend the infinite expanse of the mysterious and unknown. There is a lust of knowledge which is at once irrational and spiritually dangerous, because it neglects to observe the necessary conditions and limitations of human knowledge. On this point Bacon, no feeble champion of the human understanding, has a timely warning. He says, "Through

lust of power the angels fell, through lust of knowledge man falleth, but love admitteth of no excess."

It is necessary, then, for reason with becoming modesty to recognize that faith may and does outstrip reason. Just as often the eye beholds things which reason cannot adequately account for or deal with, so the spiritual eye, the vision of the soul, may discover truths which reason proves incompetent to explain. Reason may and can always demand that Faith should impose upon her nothing which is contrary to the fundamental laws of the human understanding, for that also is Divine; no amount of authority could, for instance, make us believe that, the sides of a triangle being equal, the angles were not also equal; but if faith utters mysteries which travel beyond the confines of that country explored and mapped out by reason, reason has no legitimate ground of complaint. To give an example, it would be an outrage on reason if we were asked to believe that God is Three and One in the same sense; but reason cannot complain if it is a doctrine of the Christian faith that God is One in one sense, and Three in another—One in nature, Threefold in Person. Such an article of faith is indeed a mystery, it goes beyond reason, but does not contradict reason.

Until the human understanding can adequately account for such simple and everyday facts as life and growth, it cannot refuse to admit that the spiritual vision also may bring it acquainted with mysteries which it is unable completely to fathom, that is to say, that faith is a faculty co-ordinate with and frequently superior to itself.

Again, reason is lacking in that modesty which is so necessary to permanent success, when it fails to recognize that, with regard to many of the deepest questions which lie at the basis of all human knowledge, it is not able of itself to do more than affirm that there is a great deal to be said on both sides. It is one of the merits of the philosopher Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, that he has brought out this truth in a most telling and effective form.

In what he has called the *Antinomies of Pure Reason*, he has shown that contrary propositions on the deepest subjects can be maintained with an equal degree of plausibility. Thus he states and proves that "the world has a beginning in time, and also is limited in regard to space;" he immediately afterwards states and proves that "the world has no beginning, and no limit in space, but is, in relation to both space and time, infinite."

Again, he states, and supports the statement with adequate arguments, that "there exists either in or in connexion with the world, either as a part of it or as a cause of it, an absolutely necessary being." Having constructed this position, he proceeds, with an equal degree of complacency. to demolish it, by proving that "an absolutely necessary being does not exist, either in the world or out of it, as its cause."

Kant adduces other antinomies, or contradictions, but these are

sufficient to indicate their nature. He calls them "the brilliant claims of reason, trying to extend its dominion beyond the limits of experience;" and these inevitable contradictions, he declares, "recommend moderation in the pretensions of reason and modesty in its affirmations."

This is, indeed, just the point for which we have been contending, that there is a necessary modesty of reason, which is in itself a proof of the highest reason, and enables reason to work in harmony with faith.

All this has conducted us to the conclusion that there is a very real and considerable moral element in the apprehension of religious truth. *Pectus facit theologum.* As Martin Luther quaintly says, in his *Table Talk*, though we should not be inclined to endorse the first part of his statement, "A jurist may be a rogue, but a theologian must be a man of piety. A jurist has only to deal with the affairs of this temporal world, but a theologian has to deal with things spiritual and eternal, which have been committed to him by God." Admittedly, it is the pure in heart who see God. The sacred vision of faith depends on a man's moral state. Just as ill health will dim the vision of the bodily eye, so if a man is spiritually and morally depraved, the vision of faith is denied to him.

But more than this, modesty, both on the part of faith and of reason, is a necessary condition of the reception of religious truth. "I thank Thee, O Father, that Thou hast hidden these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes." That the mysteries of the kingdom were revealed to the humble was indeed a proof of God's amazing condescension, but the Divine condescension is exercised according to unalterable and inevitable laws. There is an intellectual pride which incapacitates a man for sober judgment, which blinds him to the necessary limits of the human understanding, and makes him impatient of mystery.

Thus in a very real sense a man is responsible for what he believes. He is not, it is true, responsible for his upbringing, for the influences which have been brought to bear upon him from without. The remembrance of this should be a sufficient warning to prevent the pride of orthodoxy from leading us to judge harshly unbelievers or misbelievers. Indeed, we have no right to judge them at all, because we are not in possession of all the facts of the case. But further than this we cannot go. We can never, as Christians, acquiesce in the easy conviction of the world, that all forms of faith are equally valuable and equally true. We can never join in the cry that no man can be held responsible, with justice, for what he believes or cannot believe.

After all, each one of us, in all probability, is as much moulded by his own repeated actions, by his repeated judgments and continued acts of choice, as by the influence of circumstances on him.

So far as a man does not believe because he has never learned to believe by believing, so far as a man does not believe because his vision

is blurred and obscured by the warping mists of worldly or fleshly sin, so far as a man does not believe because his reason is vain-glorious and boastful and can tolerate no rival, to that extent, if there be such a thing as moral responsibility at all, that man is responsible for his unbelief. There is too often an element of perverted will in lack of faith. "Ye *will* not come to Me, that ye might have life," said Jesus Christ sadly to the Jews of Jerusalem. The converse is equally true, just as the perverted will stands in the way of the reception of religious truth, so the holy will not only predisposes to faith, but is able to test the contents of faith. So our Lord declares, "If any man will do God's will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of Myself."

CURRENT AMERICAN THOUGHT.

THE DYNAMICS OF MIND. By HENRY WOOD (*The Arena*).—It has been said that thoughts are things: a more exact statement would be that they are forces. In physical science, the present trend of teaching is distinctly from the former accepted atomic basis, which included the solidity and potency of matter, towards an hypothesis in which energy is regarded as the underlying principle of all phenomena. The atom is no longer the real unit; energy is the primal starting-point. Primal energy takes on one of several qualitative appearances, according to the form of its waves or vibrations. Vibration is now recognized as a universal law. It furnishes an all-comprehensive working hypothesis. "Beginning with an intermolecular rhythm of inconceivable rapidity in all bodies, even those that appear to be solid and at rest, its domain of wave-movements extends through all space, and its impulses are coursing in every conceivable direction. The cosmos may truly be said to be 'all of a quiver.'" The basic medium of these innumerable wavy motions is the universal ether.

The dematerialization, or perhaps what may even be called the spiritualization of physics as a science, is one of the marked modern tendencies. Matter as formerly regarded seems to be consciously melting into mind or spirit. It is no longer inert or dead; it is instinct with life. The theoretical boundary-line between the immaterial and the material is getting very faint, if not actually disappearing. Differentiated forces are being traced back even through the methods of the physicist to the one primal energy—*Infinite Mind.* All profound discernment and analogy lead back to the grand fundamental premise, that behind all manifestations energy is One; that it is an Intelligent Energy, and is therefore Omnipresent Mind. Monism, or the inherent unity of all things, is the growing inspiration of science.

If all energy, in its last analysis, be Intelligent Mind, and vibration the universal method, the human mind or volition, being in and a part of the whole, should form no exception in the working plan of its orderly activities. If God be Spirit, man, His reflection and likeness, must also be spirit. He *is* Mind or Spirit. Man himself is now being more truly interpreted as the highest expression of Divinity. He is a concrete manifestation of the One Mind, finited, but with unlimited possibilities. The dynamic and formative potency of his thought is a recent discovery. Man's mental forces cannot create *de novo*, but they can mould, utilize, and express. Conforming to the Divine plan and chord, it becomes a reflection, or secondary radiator of rhythms which are concordant with the Original.

The statement that man is mind implies that the physical organism is not man, but only his visible index or expression. But prevailing systems of philosophy, science, theology, therapeutics, sociology, and charity, including Darwinian evolution, all proceed upon the general hypothesis that man is intrinsically a *material* being. He has an attenuated quality called a soul, dependent upon fleshly brain-cells. So soon as man recognizes the fact that he is a mental and spiritual dynamo, he will no longer remain a vassal in his own legitimate kingdom.

A dominant vibration in the thought-atmosphere is able to arouse a nation or a continent. Crusades, reformations, revolutions, and reforms furnish numberless illustrations of psychic upheaval and contagion. Through sympathetic vibration a vast number of responsive mental strings are stirred into action. Mind, as a *force*, is no more unintelligible or unthinkable than other vibrations of unseen energy. Thought is, and can be, projected through space both consciously and unconsciously. But how has the world received this transcendent truth, which is transforming in its potency, all-inclusive in its sequences, and Divine in its possibilities? Very much as it would a new *curio* or an ingenious toy.

Regarding the fundamental basis of psycho-dynamics as abundantly proven, the following results should be logically realized. Thoughts being forces, every mind is a creative centre from which rhythms of qualitative energy are going out in all directions. By their impact upon corresponding chords in other minds, these are also swept into active vibration. Every thinker is a battery of positive forces, even though he never utters a word. The soul—which is the man—is a resonant instrument with innumerable tremulous strings of the most delicate quality. Every one's thought-images are being constantly impressed both upon himself and others. The road to mental and physical invigoration lies through the dynamics of formative thought. Our way to elevate other lives is through their creative mental energies. Purposeful thought-ministration, spiritual and pure in quality, accurately and scientifically projected, like an arrow towards a target, will be the great harmonizing and uplifting agency that will transform the world.

THE DEVIL. By CHARLES CARROLL EVERETT (*The New World*).—Almost all peoples have recognized malignant, or at least harmful, spirits. The religious rites of many savages seem designed as a defence against evil rather than as an attempt to win what is good. These early rites are believed to have a certain magical power. If properly performed, the spirits or divinity will be compelled to grant the desire of the worshipper. Professor Roth derives the Sanskrit word for prayer, from which come the terms "Brahman" and "Brahma," from a root meaning "to constrain." Prayer was regarded as a controlling force which the gods could not resist. Above the level of the lowest savage tribes, when a few supernatural beings are regarded as well disposed towards man, the malevolent or harmful spirits still exist by their side. The Vedic hymns show a substratum of demoniacal activity. We find witches and incantations, and to some Vedic singers the air seemed filled with demons. The distinction between spiritual beings friendly or hostile to the worshipper, may be traced in nearly all the historical religions. The line, however, is not one sharply defined. It would be interesting to bring together the negative deities, the supernatural beings that were regarded as hostile to man, in order to compare them with one another, and seek their origin. Even the fair mythology of Greece had a place for these dark forces. But perhaps the Norse religion offers this realm of the negative supernatural under its most awful form. The Midgard serpent, the wolf Fenrir, and all the elements that were to be united in the terrible catastrophe in which the gods should be overthrown,

impress the imagination most strongly. Here, too, we find those intermediate beings (giants) that it is not easy to classify as either good or evil.

When we seek the sources of the belief in malevolent supernatural beings, we find them to be exceedingly various. The idea of death has been fertile in such conceptions. Among the lower peoples, the spirits of the dead were regarded as objects of terror. Forms of evil-disposed beings are created by the nameless dread that is associated with death. Other forms are created by certain natural phenomena. From the diseases and the external forces that work harm arise a multitude of diabolical spirits. The deities connected with the religions of hostile peoples, or with religions that have been outgrown, have often been regarded as devils. Demons are also the product of an unbridled imagination. Given the notion of a hell, and the imagination will take a strange pleasure in peopling it with shapes of its own creation.

The sense of sin, no doubt, gives to the devil his most terrible aspect; but the world of demons was formed before this sense had differentiated itself from that of ceremonial impurity, or ritualistic error or neglect.

All these demons, however, are of a comparatively low order; they are very imperfect specimens of diabolical beings. They have been believed to work harm to men, but from this it does not follow that they were even malignant. Wherever man stands in a negative relation to the supernatural powers, they are regarded by him as more or less diabolical in their nature, although he may veil this feeling under a decorous phraseology. The gods of one religion are sometimes regarded as devils from the point of view of another religion. It is the relation of men to these beings, and not the nature of the beings themselves, that constitutes the difference.

The devil, in the highest sense of the word—that is, the lowest—should be a tempter. He must be malignant as well as harmful; must tempt to sin as well as produce physical harm; must do wrong, not by the way, but for the sake of wrong-doing; must love evil because it is evil, and must hate good because it is good. No being can be imagined as thus consciously and wholly evil who does not stand in the presence of an ideal of holiness which he hates, and against which he makes war. Holiness implies the possession of a conscious ideal of goodness, and the love of it. The divinity representing this ideal must be in a sense supreme. The kingdom of the devil is a hostile realm existing over against the Divine realm. The conditions under which the idea of a devil, in the full sense of the term, could be developed existed in the Mazdean religion, which was profoundly ethical. The highest divinity that it recognized was wholly good. Over against this was placed another being who was wholly evil.

It is now very generally admitted that the Jews received from the Parsees during the captivity in Babylon the questionable gift of the devil. Asmodeus, who figures in the apocryphal Book of Tobit, is none other than the Mazdean demon, Æshma Deva, with hardly a change of name. Before the Captivity, the Jews recognized demons of a certain sort, but they were satyrs that haunted the wilderness. Satan first appears in the Book of Job, which such writers as Davidson, Driver, and Cheyne regard as belonging to the time of the Captivity. The writer may have been influenced by Mazdean ideas. The name Satan, however, has no foreign suggestion. The Satan of Job is still an angel, and is sceptical, not of righteousness in general, but of the righteousness of certain individuals. Satan, the adversary, the one who opposes, is really equivalent to "The Opposition" of the Mazdean books; and he is not properly called "Satan," but "the Satan." We cannot suppose that the Jews could at once admit the idea of an opposition to their God. It would take time for their stern monotheism to relax sufficiently to permit them to conceive even the possibility of this.

The next appearance of Satan is in the Book of Zechariah. Here he appears more diabolical, and is distinctly rebuked, but as he is spoken of as the "angel of the Lord," he has not yet become the real devil. In 1 Chron. xxi. 1 and 2 Sam. xxiv. 16 the development is completed. Satan appears at once as the enemy and the tempter. Though the notion of Satan came to the Jew from without, it came at a time when he was just ready to receive it. He had reached a point where he could no longer ascribe to the Lord some of the acts which before had not seemed foreign to His nature. To the Hebrew his God had been everything. He had been the Source of evil and of good. Now difficulties were felt, and relief was gained by shifting the evil on to a separate being, Satan, and relieving the Deity of everything that seemed unworthy of Him. Jewish and Christian thought did not develop a dualism like that found in the Mazdean religion. The Jewish and Christian devil was not thought of as a creator; he was himself created by God. But the fact that the notion of the devil was gradually evolved has been generally overlooked. And this oversight has introduced a singular confusion into the later thought of him. It has been assumed that the various characteristics he possessed at different times belonged to him permanently and collectively. And so the most contradictory functions have been ascribed to him.

In the New Testament the powers of evil are fully recognized. "The dragon, the old serpent, which is the devil and Satan," has commonly been supposed to be identical with the serpent that tempted Eve. But the serpent of the Book of Revelation bears so striking a resemblance to one of the most terrible of the Mazdean demons, that we can hardly fail to recognize it as primarily the same being. Azhi Dahaka is the "destructive serpent," a three-headed monster that keeps back the water in the clouds until he is overpowered by a divinity favourable to man. This destructive serpent was conquered and chained, and kept thus a prisoner till the time of the last battle, in which he was to be slain. In Revelation the serpent is imprisoned in the bottomless pit, and let loose for a time just before the final consummation. In the Mazdean books, the "serpent is burned in the molten metal;" in Revelation he is "cast into the lake of fire and brimstone."

Milton's devil is not purely devilish; after his fall, he is an archangel fallen. In the general thought of the devil in Christendom, the angelic position which he once occupied has been largely left out of the account. The mediæval devil differs in many respects both from that of the Mazdeans and that of the New Testament. Grimm says, "He is at once of Jewish, Christian, heathen, heretical, elfish, gigantic, and spectral stock." It does not seem possible to trace the source of his limp and his cloven foot. The grotesque form of the mediæval devil fitted him well for the place of buffoon which he sometimes filled in the Mysteries.

The pictured stupidity of the devil, the shrewdness so sharp that it defeats itself, the sight that is without insight, the assumption of omnipotence in one who is a vanishing element in God's universe, may be associated with an inner contradiction that underlies the entire notion of the devil. He seems to be something, yet he is really nothing.

In the struggle with sin there is a certain help in having the power of sin set over against the spirit. To have an enemy to deal with gives point to the struggle and definiteness to the blow.

THE INTERPRETATION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT AS AFFECTED BY MODERN SCHOLARSHIP. By CHARLES RUFUS BROWN, D.D. (*The Biblical World*).—The presentation of improved statements does not involve the falsity of the formulas for which substitution

has been made. Research, for the most part, results in clearer and more discriminating specifications of older truth. We can show our respect for the Fathers, and our appreciation of their services to theology in no way better than by the most searching examination of their positions, with a view to supplementing them at their weak points. We cannot ourselves choose the degree of light that God shall bring to us, nor the particular channel through which the light shall come.

A main effort of scholars has been directed to answering the question—What is the part of man in the joint authorship of the books of the Old Testament? It will be strange if this new interest in the human side of the Bible does not give us an exalted conception of the Divine side of the Bible.

Modern scholars set forth with great plainness the methods of the authors in the composition of the Old Testament books. Ancient historians were in the habit of transcribing their material directly from their sources, and of making such additions of their own as were necessary to weld the extracts together and to adapt the whole to the purpose of the writer. The modern biographical method will illustrate the ancient Hebrew custom. The modern historian shapes the material from his sources in his own way. The Hebrew historian leaves us his work in the form of compilations. "I have compared very carefully certain accounts of Chronicles and the parallels in Samuel and Kings, and, as a result of the examination, I feel that we may say with positiveness: 1. That the author has compiled his account from other documents, taking such extracts as he wished, and that he has transposed a part of his material out of its original connexion. 2. That he has made slight changes in the material from his source or sources, has sometimes added and sometimes omitted words or phrases. 3. That in the adaptation of material to the people of his time he has made changes of emphasis, and in various ways has interpreted the events of the former time in their relation to the usages of his contemporaries."

It is asserted by many Biblical scholars that the evidences of compilation in the Pentateuch are just as numerous and just as weighty as in any of the books of the Old Testament, and that the marks of editorial hands are as plain; and they point out duplicate accounts in which similar material is presented with different phraseology and method of representation. Attempts have been made, with varying success, to extract the portions belonging to each of several alleged sources, and a majority of Old Testament scholars now accept the analysis. The documentary hypothesis for the make-up of the Pentateuch is now generally accepted.

Modern scholars have called particular attention to the timeliness of the messages of God contained in the Old Testament. All the prophetical utterances, oral or written, historical or predictive, were precisely adapted to those to whom they were first given. If so, we may be sure that they were couched in the dialect of their times, and that the writers followed the literary methods and assumptions of their day. And a careful examination of the books of the Bible shows this to be the actual fact. In predictive prophecy, numbers are generally acknowledged to be representative of ideas not numerical. Great confusion is introduced when we attempt to interpret literally many of the passages of Chronicles that contain numbers.

In accordance with this the earlier stories of the Bible are to be interpreted. Traditions received from common ancestors by various peoples kindred to the Hebrews were used by the latter for the inculcation of true ideas of God and man, and the relations of God and man, and the existence of peculiar methods of reckoning and other childish notions, or even verbal inaccuracies, serve but to magnify in our thought the wisdom of Him who has seen fit to make man, with all his peculiarities and all his crudities, the medium of His revelation to the race.

Difficulties have been found in the fact that later writers traced developed institutions directly to Moses; but these writers simply give credit for the development of the Law in the growing life of the people to him who was the honourable founder of the system and author of the code, and they represent Moses with substantial accuracy. It is only in circles insignificantly small that the later form of presentation is called a fabrication.

The partial element in the visions of the prophets must be recognized. The messengers were human, and the wisest, truest, and most inspired men have never had a perfect comprehension of God. And if they could have had, then their transcendent thoughts would not have been understood by their hearers. There is also a conditional element in prophecy, as is explained in Jer. xviii. The warnings of prophets necessarily remain unfulfilled, because of the penitence and reformation of the people. This view of prophecy helps us to understand the truth and the error in the old theory of the double sense. The truth of the double sense lies in the fact that there is always a complete and unconditional idea at the basis of the prophetical utterance, which ultimately is realized. The predictions of Hebrew prophets have not always been fulfilled literally, because they were conditional, and subsequent change of circumstances rendered the fulfilment in exact form impossible. The Divine idea at the basis of these predictions has been fulfilled, or else it awaits its fulfilment.

"We may cherish this one thought—It is, that no position we may take toward the truth of God can prevent its ultimate triumph in unclouded purity. Neither our blind zeal for cherished forms of statement, nor our rash adoption of different forms of statement, can affect the truth itself, which God will bring to light in His own best time. It is well for us now and then anew to pledge ourselves that, in face of difficulties, we will strive to ascertain the message of the Lord, and that we will receive gratefully those elements of knowledge that will surely come to studious and docile minds, and that, with the blessing of God, may lead to a higher life in Him, and a larger activity in His kingdom."

THE SOCIALISM OF MOSES. By THOMAS S. POTWIN (*The Yale Review*).—May the authority of Moses be cited in support of modern social and economic systems? Or was his system so strictly local that it can be of no value in the modern social controversy? Any true idea will be found to have permanent application. The Hebrew Scriptures are full of the idealization of human life; and its social and economic laws are among the most useful features of the Mosaic institution. The Scriptures contain a most definite scheme for property in land, for interest, for rent, for city property as distinguished from rural, for limiting competition, and, indirectly, for the distribution of trades, and for the prevention of pauperism. The principle in relation to the ownership of land is given in the words of Jehovah, "The land is Mine" (Lev. xxv. 23). Nothing like this is said of any other species of property. The land is treated as the people themselves, who were the Lord's freemen, and were not to be sold as bondmen to any. Of the land it is said, "The land shall not be sold for ever" (*i.e.* in permanence).

The whole land of Canaan is said to be given to the *people of Israel*. Not to a king or lord by virtue of conquest, not to an impersonal government, of which it could be cheaply purchased, but to the nation to be divided among individuals. But this is not "common ownership" of land in the sense of modern writers. It was provision for private ownership as fast as it could be occupied and improved. There were no features of community-life about it. Freemen with individual freehold upon the soil were to be the strength of the Hebrew state. The land was inalienable, when

it had once passed to individual ownership. The wealthy could not accumulate large landed estates by purchase or any other means. This was prevented by the Levitical law of jubilee and the Deuteronomic law of release (Lev. xxv. ; Deut. xv.).

The difference between the Mosaic law of usury or interest and modern usages may be noted. No Hebrew was supposed to wish to borrow money except through poverty, *i.e.* to relieve present necessities. Moses had no idea of borrowing money as capital for business. Income was to arise from the fertile fields, or from what could be obtained of foreigners. No Rothschild could ever have arisen in the days of his progenitors by lending to his brethren ; and no poor Hebrew was to run the risk, in seeking to better his condition, of losing all that he had to a neighbour capitalist, as so often occurs in modern times. No such thing as rent was allowed. The anti-usury law forbade "usury of victuals, usury of anything that is lent upon usury." Rent is money for the use of real estate. Instead of rent, the rich man paid an allowance to the man who had become too poor to work his land, and took the fruits, the use of the land for a specified number of years, till the year of release. But the owner had the right of redemption at any time, if he, or his kindred, became able to do so.

When city property passed into the hands of a creditor, it does not appear that the new owner could take rent for it from a Hebrew brother. A species of rent was paid to the Divine owner in the form of tithes.

The sabbatic year was probably regarded as affording opportunity for every youth to acquire, and every man to labour in, a trade. Abstinence from agricultural work gave time for building operations, for manufacture of tools, mechanical repairs, etc. The wild surging of labour from the land to the shop, and from the shop to the destitution of the street, could not occur under Mosaic laws.

How shall we paraphrase this constitution for our modern reformer? It makes improved land the controlling interest, and not capital in money. In modern life the versatility of money makes it the controlling force. As long as there is unimproved land to be divided, it should be free to all for homesteads. No mortgage should hold against a homestead except for its produce, and that for a limited term of years. As soon as this basis is adopted, land controls money, instead of money land. The limited area of the earth's surface is the one fixed factor in determining human conditions. Standing-room must in some way be divided among men. They have a right to say, "We must have an equitable share, according to numbers, of the life-sustaining surface of the globe." But this is very different from the public ownership of land. The Mosaic system gave full play to the enterprise and competition which grew out of individual ownership. The Pilgrim Fathers could not get a fair start until they gave up the common use of land with which they began. Inalienable ownership of land emphasizes individualism in the highest possible degree.

Where land is the dominant element in determining value, interest must largely lose its fixed character. The returns of the earth do and must ever constitute the source and standard of all values. Make rent, and not the ownership of land itself, dependent on natural risks, and the abundance of one year, or decade of years, will balance the deficiency of another.

Real property in crowded centres must be subjected to special laws. In the old time of walled towns, buildings were packed economically. There could be little chance for speculating in city lots anywhere. In Jerusalem, if a man mortgaged his house or his lot, he must pay up within a "full year," or part with the property "in perpetuity." There could not be much unearned increment in that time. They have much to support them who claim that the increase of relative value which arises from mere crowding about the same centre belongs alike to those who by their coming

create that value, and not solely to those who happened to be the first holders of the soil. This increase can be distributed by taxation for the benefit of all, and by limiting the amount transmissible to heirs.

There is no such thing as the abolition of poverty, for poverty and riches are relative terms. Equality, in the sense of a dead level throughout human conditions, is in its very conception an utter contradiction of every law of nature in force in the world. But pauperism, in the sense of chronic, hopeless, helpless poverty, can be abolished. Reference is not intended to that worst form of poverty, viz. poverty of mind and soul, which leaves a man without ability or disposition for personal initiative in taking care of himself. It is the province of mind to prevent the inequality between rich and poor passing the fixed bounds of reason.

The Hebrew lawgiver, properly understood and imputed, points the way to far more wisdom and happiness than the world has yet attained.

THE ORIGINS OF THE HISTORY AND RELIGION OF ISRAEL. By F. MEINHOLD (*The New World*).—The creation of the world is the beginning of the history of salvation, for man is the end and crown of creation. He becomes master of the earth. But the earth may not claim him altogether. God-likeness is given to his imagination to conceive, and this gift is at the same time a command. He must conform himself steadily to the Divine likeness and live therein. Since God is a moral Personality, man can reach this aim only by the path of moral strengthening and perfecting. To this end he is placed in Paradise. Man does not stand the trial; therefore he loses Paradise, but not blessedness. The protevangel (Gen. iii. 15) points to a redemption, and finally to a Redeemer.

Humankind is divided into two families, and God enters into this division. In all the period before Israel repairs to his home in Canaan, God is not made known as Yahweh, but He is yet to them a spiritual Being entirely distinct from all the gods of the heathen, and best designated as Almighty God. Moses is the proper founder of the religion of Israel, which is substantially complete with him; only in minor points could the prophets continue his work. God needed, however, to confirm and protect this true religion in Israel until Christ came, who was to bring salvation to the whole world from Israel.

Such, substantially, is the accepted view of the origins of the world, and of the career of Israel, and of his religion. This writer regards it as completely untenable. He says it rests on the old doctrine of inspiration, which assumes the unity and inerrancy of the Holy Scriptures. All scientific theologians recognize in the Pentateuch a mosaic from three sources at least, none of which is probably older than the year B.C. 1000. If the account given in Genesis of the development of mankind and of Israel is to be finally referred to one source, and, indeed, in the last resort, to the final redactor of all the sources, then one cannot be right in acting as if nothing had been altered in the earlier picture, and as if this corresponded throughout to the historical fact. Kittel, in his *History of the Hebrews*, presents what is common to the various traditional sources as the historical deposit. But we cannot be sure that even this corresponds to the facts; and the "common content" is itself so scanty that we have not acquired anything of much consequence by means of it. This writer asserts that ground is entirely lacking for asserting a residence of the Israelites in Canaan before Moses, and consequently for the patriarchs. Israel he treats as a common name for the most diverse Arabian peoples. Reuben, Levi, Judah, and the rest are not persons, but tribes. "Our conclusion is that, so far as an historical sketch of the beginnings of the religion and history of Israel is concerned, the patriarchal period, and what we

hear of it, falls completely away. We must get rid of the last remnants of such a conception." It may be asserted that to the prophets of the Old Testament the figures and the history of the patriarchal world had no sacred meaning. The main fact in the holy history is to them, and rightly, the Exodus from Egypt. The prophets before the Exile do not mention Abraham. These legends owe their existence to the shaping imagination of the people; they arose under the very powerful influence of the prophetic spirit. For the beginnings of the religion and history of Israel the tradition of Israel gives us nothing. Can we, then, come to any conclusion concerning them, and from what sources?

The most persistent material is found in the things of cultus and religion, and often the most ancient remains are preserved here, and repeatedly by the side of very modern representations. No reformer is a creator out of nothing. Moses took over a line of customs inherited from oldest times, and constructed his system in harmony with the genius of Semitic peoples. The picture of pre-Mosaic Israel the writer thus sketches: Arabia (*i.e.* North-Eastern Africa) is the cradle of the family of nations known by the name of Shem. Thence went out tribes who took possession of Canaan. To the later migrations from the Arabian peninsula belong the Hebrews, who partly settled east of Jordan, partly south, and adopted the culture and speech of Canaan. The families and tribes afterward known by the name of Israel were still nomadic—wandering Arabs, in fact. In the desert and the steppe the only protector is the community, the tribe. The first form of reverence would be reverence for the tribe; and since a childlike people personifies everything, we may assume that the tribe-fathers were considered as proper tribe-gods. The writer elaborately explains how totem-worship, and worship of stones, powers of nature, and animals, was evolved; and then proceeds to explain the precise work and significance of Moses. He does not recognize Moses as a legislator in any fresh or independent sense. He made Yahweh the national God, and the Creator of Israel. Various tribes drew together under the leadership of Yahweh and Moses.

This article is an advanced illustration of what modern criticism is attempting. It leaves an impression on the reader that imagination has much more to do with modern criticism than knowledge. Its principle may be thus expressed: Decide what *must be*, and then boldly declare that *so it is*.

SCOPE AND METHODS OF CHRISTIAN DOGMATICS. By Professor M. S. TERRY, D.D. (*Methodist Review*). — Christian theology is a progressive and improvable science. While its fundamental truths are for ever the same, the apprehension and expression of them vary as the centuries go on. Most authorities now agree in arranging all theological studies under the four categories of exegetical, historical, systematic, and practical theology. Probably comparative theology will soon be another recognized department. This article deals with one of the subdivisions of systematic theology.

What is the name most suitable for that branch of theological study which treats of the doctrines of Christianity? The Germans have the word *Glaubenslehre*, which means *doctrine of faith*, or *system of religious belief*. The technical word "dogmatics" is sufficiently specific to meet the requirements of a defining title. A qualifying word may be added, and we may speak of Biblical dogmatics, ecclesiastical dogmatics, or Christian dogmatics. This last term the writer prefers, because it must acknowledge, as its primary and authoritative source, the original documents of the Christian faith.

The legitimate scope of dogmatics is that range or compass of theological topics which a well-defined system of Christian dogma should attempt to cover. From this field should be excluded metaphysics, apologetics, and ethics, which are not properly

departments of Christian doctrine. It may also be said that ecclesiastical polity has no proper place among the doctrines of revealed religion. No obligatory form of Church government is prescribed in the Holy Scriptures.

A writer on Christian dogmatics is not at liberty to inculcate, as a proper part of his subject, doctrines which have no basis in the records of Divine revelation. But he need not limit his inquiry to subjects which are acknowledged by all to be fundamental or important. Dogmatics may treat many topics of secondary importance, but must confine itself to such doctrines as are believed to have a scriptural foundation.

In scientific method of arranging the several doctrines, modern writers may reasonably be expected to surpass the ancients. Progress in any department of theology is not to be seen in the discovery of new material, but in the formulation and exposition of the great truths which the Church has possessed from the beginning. Dr. Terry briefly reviews the methods of the chief writers on dogmatics from Origen downwards; noticing more especially the work of Turretin and Calixtus; the so-called "Federal Theology," which arranges all the doctrines of Christianity under the two great covenants of nature and of grace; the work of the Wesleyan Richard Watson; of William Burt Pope, of Charles Hodge, of Henry B. Smith, of Dorner, Schleiermacher, August Hahn, J. T. Beck, Lange, Hase, Nitzsch, and others. He notices that most of the systems begin with the doctrine of God and conclude with eschatology. But why should dogmatics always be tied up to the assumptions and assertions which *à priori* modes of thought involve? Some of the dogmatic schemes place the discussion of the doctrine of man before that of God; and of these the work of Professor Friedrich Nitzsch is specially suggestive and worthy of attention.

American divines, and some Germans, seem to be overcome with a passion for the high-sounding words—bibliology, theology, cosmology, angelology, anthropology, hamartiology, Christology, soteriology, pneumatology, ecclesiology, and eschatology. But the best scientific treatment of evangelical doctrine may be compromised by persistent use of these technical terms. It would be well to break away from stereotyped formulas, as well as from *à priori* methods, and construct a system of Christian doctrine from some other point of view. Such a system might begin with the doctrine of man, and present the facts of his natural constitution, his moral and religious nature, and his present sinful state. Then the beginnings and development of spiritual life might be shown as actual experiences, realized and exhibited by innumerable Christian witnesses, and taught among the most positive lessons of the Scriptures.

Two tendencies are at work in the more recent discussions of the doctrines of Divine revelation. One is conspicuously non-Biblical and speculative. Its logical tendency is to carry all questions of doctrine into the realm of theological metaphysics. The opposite tendency has developed into the science of "Biblical theology," and cultivates a habit of minutely analyzing the books of the Bible in search of what it calls the genesis and progress of doctrines. Valuable results have in this direction been obtained; but some writers have magnified the different types of doctrine discernible in the sacred records so as to make them contradictory. The simplest, truest, and soundest system of Christian dogmatics may be constructed by avoiding the extremes of both these tendencies, appropriating what is really valuable in each, and showing that those doctrines which are most surely believed among us are preeminently Biblical.

PSYCHOLOGY *versus* METAPHYSICS. By Chancellor ISAAC CROOK, D.D. (*Methodist Review*).—Of late there has been an estrangement between these two. The former, under the name of the new psychology, very eager and bright, bears itself with an

obtrusive and saucy independence toward the mother science. But a real separation is impossible. Within the realm of psychology, used in the broader sense, there are three departments. 1. Phenomena of mind, or scientific psychology. 2. Laws of mind, called nomology, which belongs to the province of logic, but is not concerned in the antithesis of this discussion. 3. Ontology, or being, inferential and general, in which realm lies the philosophy of spirit. Between the first and the third lies the contrast intended by "Metaphysics *versus* Psychology."

As there can be no physics without metaphysics, and no metaphysics without preceding physics, so there can be no psychics without metapsychics, nor yet any metapsychics without psychics, or soul-facts. As in physics facts precede their philosophy, so in psychology, or soul-science, facts go before their explanation or arrangement. The facts of physics are largely discovered by aid of the theories of metaphysics. Our philosophies organize our expectations, and direct them into the realm where the facts are to be found. So in psychology, no new fact is seized upon in the laboratory but by the foresight and foreordination of the philosophy of psychology already in the field. No matter whether one be materialist or spiritualist, idealist or realist, he reaches his conclusions by, and defends them with, metaphysical measures, and such as originate in the ontological and inferential department, which is metaphysics *par excellence*. On account of this interdependence confusion may easily arise. Metaphysics, having had charge of psychology for a long time, has been something of the traditional stepmother, and her ward has suffered many things. Growing out of this, there has arisen the purpose on the part of science to deliver the child from this thraldom and to adopt it. But if metaphysics has been absurd, has not science also? If metaphysics has soared away into the clouds of mysticism until the child was dizzy, science, which now proposes to care for and train it, has rushed into some jungles which threaten to put the eyes out. If metaphysics has run into the dreamy wilderness of rationalism, science may lead the child off into the frozen regions of agnosticism. If metaphysics has gone into the ethereal world of transcendentalism until the child was well-nigh starved, will not science lead her into the swamps of materialism?

Let there be no foolish strife, no swinging to extremes. Psychology is, indeed, at the early morning of a brighter day, unless it shall swing too far beyond its centre. Professor James, who writes on scientific psychology, almost pathetically says, "We have no science of psychology—only a mass of facts, which await, as did astronomy, some Galileo to come and reduce them to a science." Practically, metaphysics and the new psychology must go together, and there must be increased attention to both. This is more than a matter of pure ideals. It may be tested by an experiment on any well-adjusted college curriculum. The educational value of metaphysical studies may well be illustrated by the giants whom it has nourished.

Which way tends the new education? Material science did good service by rescuing much of our world from the supposed influence of gnomes, demons, gods great and small, good and bad. After that it invaded the stars, and substituted gravitation for supposed angel-forces. Looking manward, it has now put on a cloak and cap, and assumed the name of psychology. It has hunted the soul back of muscle and sensorium; it maps out the human faculties in patches of grey matter; it finds thought to consist in discharges by molecular or chemical action from matter; it cuts and probes, measures and weighs, until the scared soul seems hiding in its cell. This neurology, calling itself psychology, seizes the child, observes, notes, pries, theorizes, discovering how to mould, change, generate, and even regenerate. Recently a brilliant young biologist, of reverent spirit, said in substance, "I believe we have assumed a sharpness

ct Revelation of God, the absolute Channel of salvation, for him th
is absolutely decisive in matters of faith. If, therefore, Jesus, an
stles, represent the history of Israel as a preparation for His coming
ent Scripture as the Word of God, the Christian, on the ground of hi
will be certain that it is so. No presentation of Israel's history wi
which overlooks the fact that that history prepared for the coming of th
which has for its consequence that in Jesus the perfect revelation has no
must be sceptical towards every result of critical investigation which stand
oncilable contradiction with the fact acknowledged by Jesus, that the Ol
ent is God's Word to His Church. Those who hold the inspiration theory o
enteenth century, suppose that the authority of Jesus stamps the seal o
ability on everything contained in the Old Testament—even historical, chrono
details, etc.—and so precludes all criticism. But, in reality, critical investiga
to the origin and contents of the Old Testament is not only not excluded by th
ority of Jesus, but, on the contrary, is made a duty. It is a truism to say tha
is did not come into the world to instruct men in natural knowledge, but solel
order to make sinners children of God. Accordingly, it was not His province t
ch men the course of Israel's history or the human origin of books of Scripture
t to point them to the source from which they can learn Divine revelation. When
hen, like His Jewish contemporaries, He treats Old Testament Scripture as the recor
of God's former revelations, He says nothing about the literary origin of the Ol
Testament, but merely teaches how the Church is to regard it. But if it is suc
a record, and if it is God's will that the present age should learn Divine revelatio
from it, its origin must be due to Divine providence.

The appeal of the inspiration theory of the seventeenth century to 2 Pet. i. 2
and 2 Tim. iii. 16 is a mistake. The first passage does not refer to this subject;
treats, not of the origin of Old Testament Scripture or its several parts, but of th
origin of the predictions of the prophets, and that apart from their written form. Th
latter passage, indeed, supposes that every writing of the Old Testament is inspire
of God. When this phrase is used of anything not of a sensuous or material kind
like wisdom or a dream, it is implied that it owes its existence exclusively to God
invisible influence. When it is used of anything in whose production men wer
obviously active, as in the case of a writing, it is implied that the object in questio
does not originate simply, as might be supposed, in human activity, but owes it
existence also to God's invisible operation. Thus the apostle assumes, in assure
agreement with the primitive Church, that the Old Testament Scriptures, along wit
their unquestioned human origin, have also a Divine origin, and, in the last resor
are to be referred to the Divine will and purpose. In what relation these two facto
stand to each other, the phrase, "inspired of God," says nothing. This can only b
learnt from the facts of the case.

As regards the human side of the Old Testament Scriptures, they nowhere clai
to have originated differently from other writings, not even the prophetic. Wher
these are described in the headings as a vision which the prophet saw—a revelatio
imparted to him, a word of God which came to him—the writing is merely characterize
as to its contents. It contains a reproduction of what came into the prophet
possession, not in a natural way, but by Divine revelation. But in the literar
reproduction of his possession the prophet does not proceed differently from th
speaker or poet. He seeks and chooses the best form according to his individua
character. The proof of this is seen in the difference of style and artistic finish. Sti
more obvious is it that the Old Testament historical writers proceed like ordinar

historians. They collect and arrange material in the same way. They nowhere intimate that they received it by direct Divine revelation; they depend on personal knowledge and tradition. In most cases they had to depend on tradition. In the way in which they used the material thus gained, they show great diversity of manner and great freedom, modifying, revising, or incorporating, according to circumstances. The degree of historical insight and skill depended on the gifts of the different authors. A comparison of Samuel and Kings with Chronicles shows that the differences in this respect were great. The writers never betray any consciousness that they were not as free and independent in their work as other historical writers, or that they were helped by a higher power in an extraordinary way.

An important fact on this question is the absence of written authorities in regard to a great part of the matter. Even supposing that written authorities go back to patriarchal days, which, in view of the age of the Assyrio-Babylonian literature and the Tel-el-Amarna tablets, is not impossible, they are out of the question with respect to passages like Gen. i.-xi. The matter must here have come either from direct revelation or oral tradition.

Those who hold direct revelation as the source regard the author of the Pentateuch as its recipient, and think, on the supposed authority of Jesus, that Moses was the author. But the question of authorship of a Biblical book belongs to the domain of natural knowledge, just as much as the movement of the sun round the earth or of the earth round the sun, respecting which Christ had no mission to speak. The majority of Old Testament historical books—as Judges, Samuel, Kings, Chronicles, Ruth—are anonymous, and yet are inspired of God for Christians. Certainly Jesus calls the Pentateuch the Book of Moses, or briefly Moses; but He does so on the ground of the current usage. He could do this, just as we speak of the Apostles' Creed and Apostolical Constitutions, although we know that neither the one nor the other sprang from the apostles; and He was forced to do so, unless He would be unintelligible to His contemporaries, or go beyond His calling as Saviour. The same applies to the reference to the Book of Daniel in Matt. xxiv. 15. "Who wrote the Pentateuch can only be settled by an historical examination of its contents and form; and it is a weighty consideration that the book itself nowhere claims to have been written as a whole by Moses."

The author of the Pentateuch, whoever he was and whenever he lived, nowhere professes to have received the matter of Gen. i.-xi. by direct revelation. This would contradict the analogy of revelation elsewhere. Revelation never undertakes to teach the history of the past, but always declares God's will to the present, brings God's ways and precepts to its knowledge, and opens before it visions of the future. It occasionally uses history for present instruction, but it always assumes the history to be already known. Both the matter and form of Gen. iii.-xi. at least are opposed to the idea of revelation as the source. The bearing of much of the matter on religious faith is not very obvious; and the many breaks and repetitions suggest human authorship. This want of unity suggests that the author used different existing records, so that if the revelation hypothesis is still to be held, the revelation must have been given to the writers of the different records, which no one is likely to assert. Why should Divine revelation have spoken twice or oftener of the same events, and in such divergent ways?

Adherents of the old inspiration theory suppose that the author of the Pentateuch took the material of Gen. iii.-xi. from a tradition coming down from the date of the events without a break to the author's days. Abraham could not stand in the line of transmission, as he belonged originally to a heathen race. Perhaps the tradition

came directly through Noah or Shem, since Noah was contemporary both with Enoch and Abraham, and Shem with Jacob. But the difficulty in the transmission of lists of dates like Gen. v. and xi. must be remembered; and it is unlikely that the importance of exactness in dates would be felt in early days. Thus we can scarcely doubt that the author of the Pentateuch or the authors of the component parts took the matter of chs. iii.–xi. from oral and inexact traditions, which they used as they were able and needed to do. It may, indeed, seem probable that the material of Gen. i. and ii. was given by direct revelation to Adam, and by him transmitted to posterity. Here again the break in Abraham's case interferes, so that we must suppose a direct revelation to the author of the Pentateuch. But how in this case do we explain the twofold account of creation in these chapters?

And yet, despite the thoroughly human way in which these writings arose, they are regarded and treated by Jesus and the apostles, in agreement with their Israelite contemporaries, as God's Word to His Church, and therefore as inspired. On what grounds Israel ascribed such dignity to them is not said, except in the case of the Torah. No tradition on the point is found in the writings of Talmudic Judaism. Nevertheless, the ground can be found in nothing but their source and contents. The writings of the Old Testament all issued from the Israelitish nation, therefore from the nation to which, from Abraham's days, God limited His special revelations, and in which His Spirit ruled in unique fashion. And they all treat of God's Church, either showing the way in which God, according to Israel's belief, created a people for Himself on earth, or reproducing the words in which God warned His people against religious and moral errors, and sought to lead them to full consecration to Himself, or setting forth the beliefs and feelings by which Israel or the Israelite was animated on the ground of their special relation to God. When these Israelites, to whom their contemporaries ascribed the best insight into the history and religion of Israel, and whose judgment was a law to them and their posterity, declared these writings to the exclusion of others to be holy writings, they gave expression to the conviction that in them the truest account of God's acts and revelations, and the truest picture of the outer and inner life of Israel as God's people, are to be found, and therefore from them the surest information as to God's plan, His commands and promises, is to be obtained. The collection of these writings was, consequently, to them a record of God's previous revelations and their effects. Since, then, the Church of later days, when direct revelation had ceased, felt the need of such a record, that its religious life might be kept in accord with God's former revelations, it must have seemed a providential arrangement that these writings arose and were brought together into one collection. In what way, indeed, God's providence brought about this result is a mystery; we must modestly confess that God's ways are not our ways, and His thoughts are not our thoughts. But such writings must have seemed to later Israel God's Word addressed to it. That Jesus shared this view and acted upon it, proves conclusively that they are God's Word. For, without doubt, it was part of His office to inform His disciples where they would find God's own account of the revelations which He claimed to complete.

If it is objected that Jesus could not declare a collection of writings arising in this way, and therefore not free from inaccuracies, to be God's Word, thus making God Himself the Teacher of error, this arises from misunderstanding the sense in which He acknowledges the Old Testament to be God's Word. The Christian regards the New Testament also as God's Word, and on similar grounds to those on which later Israel so regarded the Old Testament. And yet he confesses that in the New Testament he possesses no account of revelation springing directly from Christ Himself, but only one coming through human means. Although the Holy Spirit at work

in the authors of the New Testament gave them the most perfect knowledge of saving truth, they were yet fallible in the knowledge of natural things. It is undeniable that the Third Gospel rests, not on personal knowledge, but on tradition, although the best, and that the first and second draw a part at least of their material also from tradition. No less is it a fact that the evangelists differ respecting events of secondary importance, or that Luke makes Gamaliel speak of Theudas soon after the Ascension as one belonging to the past, whereas his rising had probably not then taken place, or that, according to Luke's account, Stephen makes Jacob to be buried in Shechem instead of in Hebron. Just as little as the Christian hesitates on this account to honour the New Testament as God's Word, does the Old Testament cease to be God's Word because of similar inaccuracies. We are not to seek Divine instruction in the Old Testament about things which it is not the business of the Old Testament, as Divine revelation, to give instruction about. Nor does Christ's attitude to the Old Testament give any warrant for this. For as He came into the world, not to give instruction respecting the things of natural life, but to complete God's revelation of saving truth, so He sets forth the Old Testament, not as a Divine teacher respecting the things of natural life, but as a Divine record of God's previous revelations, as these were reflected in the consciousness of Israel, God's early Church. And religious truth of this kind is to be learnt not merely from the prophetic writings of the Old Testament and the Psalms, but also from the Old Testament historical books. It is true the historical character of a course of events is not assured merely by its being found in the Old Testament, for this belongs to the natural course of history. Whether, therefore, events took place in one way or another must be ascertained by the laws of historical science. But, on the other hand, the religious meaning of an Old Testament narrative, according to the judgment of post-prophetic Israel, and no less according to the judgment of Jesus, forms a part of that which, in God's providence, is to serve for the instruction of the Church perpetually, and consequently is God's Word to it. Although, therefore, the conception which Israel, according to Gen. i., formed of the rise of the world may contain things at variance with natural science, still in Gen. i. we have the belief of God's people, that the one God created all that is; that He created it by His Word, and so of His free will alone; that He created it according to a well-ordered plan, ascending from general to special; that He created it with a view to man made in His image, and created the earth for man; that in his creation man was meant by God to be the progenitor of a race springing from him; that God's creative work reached its end, and consequently, to use human language, a time of Divine rest followed on a time of Divine work. Although, further, the account of Gen. ii. may be anthropomorphic in form, it contains the religious truth, that by God's creative will man is unique on earth, and is superior to all other earthly beings; that woman is subject to man; that man must submit to God's will under penalty of death. Although many doubts may be raised against the historical character of Gen. iii., it is in any case a testimony that in Israel's belief man's sinful state was not the original and normal one, but one supervening on man's transgression, and that as soon as this abnormal state began, God interposed in chastening mercy. The story of the Flood shows such close affinity with the accounts of other nations in Hither Asia and Europe, and especially with the Sumerian and Babylonian, that a common source must be assumed; and the details of the narrative are so full of difficulty that, apart from the different sources from which the present narrative sprang, it is highly difficult to understand it as a faithful copy of historical events. Yet the account expresses the conviction of Israel, that in certain circumstances God makes men feel His wrath against sin by inexorable judgments, and that at a time when it is least looked for

(Matt. xxiv. 37–39), but that in the midst of judgment God remembers and guards His people. And even were all the narratives respecting God's great deeds during the desert-wanderings unhistorical, we should learn from them what all Israel believed possible of God's power and grace on the ground of its experience.

The more certain, then, the Christian is, that on Christ's authority he must acknowledge the Old Testament as God's Word, the more he will make it the subject of investigation; and the more firmly he is convinced of this, despite the human mode of its origin, the more he will feel compelled by the fact, that the understanding of a writing depends in no small degree on the knowledge of its origin, to draw the study of the historical origin of the Old Testament into the field of his investigation. But especially will historical and critical investigation preserve him from making that which is the subject of natural knowledge the subject of religious faith, or coming in his faith into conflict with historical reality.

Von Hofmann and the Old Testament. By Dr. von Buchrucker, Münich (*Neue kirchl. Zeitschr.*, 1895, No. 3).—Hofmann comes to the Bible, not with the pretensions of science, but simply as a believing Christian. "I know no abstract science; I know only labours directed to God's glory, and others directed to one's own." He took this attitude to Scripture in his *Weissagung u. Erfüllung*, 1841, and kept it to the end. Hauck says of him, "If we divide authors into two classes, those whose scientific development runs parallel with their writings, and those who only begin to write after their system is complete, Hofmann belongs to the latter class. His theology was complete; he had only to expound it, to develop in detail the outlines of which he was sure." And his theology was completed early. Coming to Scripture in this spirit, he finds it characterized by three main features—miraculousness, an Israelitish stamp, unity. Some have accused Hofmann of lowering the idea of inspiration to the level of nature; but it is not so. He says, "As certainly as salvation is no product of natural development in man, but of a history independent of nature and different in kind, so also Scripture as a witness of this salvation has been produced in the latter way. This certainty gives its direction to the expositor's eye when he comes to Scripture. The founder of our Divine fellowship was an Israelite, and His Church issued out of Israel; thus Israel is to us the nation with a religious calling in contrast with the rest of mankind. It is attempted to extend this special character to the whole Semitic race, and appeal is made to the agreement of Assyrio-Babylonian legends with Scripture history. But this agreement goes back to a common original tradition, which only possesses religious value where it has a connexion with the sacred history that points to Christ. But this is only the case in Israel." "The separate history of Israel can only be lowered into a naturally developing branch of the Semitic race by making Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, into so many tribes of a wandering Semitic people, making it live in Egypt in Semitic surroundings, converting the forty years' sojourn in the desert into a simple journey from Egypt to Canaan, and making the Sinaitic legislation grow gradually out of the history of the following centuries." Scripture finds its unity in its character as a record of saving truth. But we also find much in it which is the subject of natural knowledge. We have to distinguish between the two. What belongs to the field of natural knowledge? Everything included in the order of creation. "Holy Scripture is not an errorless text-book of cosmology, anthropology, psychology, etc., and the Bible history is something else than an errorless section of general history." "In Gen. i. the task of the student of nature is quite different from what Scripture gives us there. The account of creation must be understood from its goal—man. Its aim

is to show that the world was made with reference to him, and found its completion in him. The thought ruling the account of creation stands in closest connexion with the Divine purpose finally realized in Christ." Guided by this rule, we avoid the error of comparing the Biblical cosmogony with that of science, or of doing violence to the simple language of Scripture in order to reconcile the two. So the purpose of the genealogy in Gen. x. is not to tell us how many nations there were at first and what they were called, but to trace all back to Noah and his sons: the initial unity of the race is the point. "Holy Scripture is something better than a book without mistake; and the mistakes found in it do no injury to that which distinguishes it from all other literature. On the other hand, we may not say—Scripture is not God's Word, but only contains it, distinguishing between what is Divine truth and therefore God's Word, and what is not religious truth and therefore not God's Word; a mechanical severance implying a psychological impossibility in regard to inspiration." Even that in Scripture which is or was the subject of natural knowledge, and cannot be the subject of direct religious certainty, partakes in that certainty in so far as it belongs to the saving truth made known in Scripture. The expositor therefore keeps his eye free and open to see whether it will stand this test; but he also keeps an open eye for its connexion with saving truth, in order by this means to give it the stamp of final certainty and bring it into the right light to be understood.

Respecting the Old Testament and its interpretation, Hofmann's writings abound in suggestive remarks. He especially insists that its composition and teaching can only be understood in the light of religious teaching and purpose. In the Old Testament, in distinction from the New, we have composite works consisting of portions belonging to different periods, like the Psalms and Proverbs. There are also writings by unknown authors, as the Book of Job, respecting which we can only know the period of composition. In Deut. ii. 10–12, 20–23, there are additions by a later hand. "Especially in Genesis we are told of Elohistic and Jehovistic sections, which are referred to different authors and traditions. But the unity of the narrative forbids the carrying out of so mechanical a separation. On the other hand, it is evident that in the Torah parts springing from different times and different hands are combined. Deut. i. 1, *e.g.*, begins a narrative unlike the preceding and continuing in the Book of Joshua." The following remarks bear on the two historical works, Genesis to 2 Kings, Chronicles including the Book of Ezra, finally the Book of Jonah and Lamentations: "The former great historical work has grown out of the documents before the author, reaching back to the earliest days, and whose oldest part embraces the tradition going back to the beginning of the world and mankind. These documents are arranged in such a way that they reflect the history of what took place between God and man in regard to the future restoration of the order established at the creation, but disturbed by sin. The history closes at the point when it seems as if its purpose had failed, when the only prospect left is that Nebuchadnezzar shall raise the King Jechoniah from prison to kingly honours. The traditions not only form the basis on which everything else proceeds, but also mark out the line on which the historical description will advance. But, on the other hand, the time at which the whole is brought to a conclusion exercises an influence on the execution of the work, and especially fixes the tone in describing what took place after David and Solomon, since he who brought it to completion is himself the historian, although he employs and weaves in present matters. The thought worked out by the author of the other historical work is essentially different. Here the narrative looks back from a restored commonwealth to the past, in which it had its far-reaching roots. Hence here the beginning is a genealogical tracing back of the twelve tribes to the

beginnings of the human race. The narrative, on the other hand, begins with the death of Saul and the monarchy of David, and gives only the history of the kingdom of Judah, which it continues to the point when, after the Exile, the new colony is settled, God's house restored, the religious and legal order renewed, and the national purity of the new commonwealth assured. The selection of the matter, the tone and colour of the narrative, are here different from there, more Judæan than Israelite; the hyperbolical feature of the history, at which offence is taken, as well as the almost trivial description of public worship, has its ground in this." "It is by no means a sign of Levitical narrowness in the author that he passes by the northern kingdom in post-Solomonic days, and that he so fully describes such events as the great Passover celebration under Hezekiah. It is a justifiable historical point of view under which he places the past. The rhetorical character of his narrative is also explained."

The Biblical way of writing history has this in common with the classical, that it approaches the epic more than ours. Persons are introduced as speaking without meaning that they used just these words. "We enjoy the noble talk of Gen. xxiv., but we do not think that Abraham, Eliezer, and Rebekah spoke thus literally. But this is meant to be useful to us as it is embodied in Scripture. Under the influence of God's Spirit it is brought into the form in which it will be useful to us." "In what way the animals were collected in Noah's ark is not ascertainable; we are only told that the animal world surrounding man owed its preservation to him. When we read that the flood rose fifteen ells above the highest mountains, this points to the fact that the vessel floated over the highest mountains. Himalaya and Chimborazo do not come into account. We are merely to learn that where men dwelt the earth was flooded above the mountain-peaks." It is inconceivable how Eve was taken from Adam. The essential thing is that she was created out of him, not side by side with him. The transactions between the woman and the serpent are just as inconceivable. The essential thing is that the incitement came to man from without, and first to the woman. The character of Scripture is that all history is related as transacted between God and mankind, not that we may know the exact course of things, but may estimate the events in their bearing on the salvation realized in Christ. And as this opens different points of view from which the past history of salvation may be regarded, we must always take into consideration the point of view taken in the history, so that we may understand why this and not that is related in one way rather than in another. If, for example, the Torah springs in the main from the time of Moses, this is the point of view from which the past is described. This explains why the deliverance from Egypt, the Law-giving, the desert-wandering, nay, the account how Israel came into Egypt, is told at much greater length than other matters lying between. In an ordinary history much more and very different things would have been related of the sojourn in Egypt.

Prophecies of the future are of two kinds—those receiving fulfilment in the present dispensation, and those which await the future one. The former are couched in terms taken from the immediate present. So in Numb. xxiv. 17; Micah iv. 10; Isa. xi. 11–16. Examples of the latter class are the passages relating to the day and coming of Jehovah (Isa. lxiii. 19; Joel iv. 12; Zech. xiv. 3, 15).

SUNDAY IN CHURCH.

By Rev. Canon Hutchings, M.A.

THIRD SUNDAY AFTER EASTER.—EVENING SECOND LESSON.

"For our exhortation was not of deceit, nor of uncleanness, nor in guile: but as we were allowed of God to be put in trust with the gospel, even so we speak; not as pleasing men, but God, which trieth our hearts."—1 Thess. ii. 3, 4.

1. The Epistle, a portion of which is read for the Second Lesson to-night, is, as is well known, the *first* of St. Paul's Epistles in the order of time; and for this reason a special interest attaches to it, as the first miracle which Christ wrought in Cana, and the first parable which He spoke—that of "the Sower"—have a charm of their own. They are like the first flower in spring, or the first star which gleams at eventide. Of the earliness of the date of this Epistle, about A.D. 53, there is no reasonable doubt. The internal evidence, to be found in the belief that the return of Christ would be during the lifetime of those whom the Apostle addressed, and during his own, points to the earliest days of Christianity, when this conviction was largely entertained. The Apostle in later days seems to "have given up the hope of living to see Christ's Second Coming himself" (Olshausen).

2. Further, it may be noted that this Epistle at once presents to us the method which St. Paul adopted in his missionary labours. He went where there were large masses of people. He turned to cities, as supplying ample scope for his efforts. We find him writing in the capital city of Achaia—Corinth; to the capital city of Macedonia—Thessalonica. He is thus in contact with a large area of human life. He had founded the Church in Thessalonica during his second missionary journey (Acts xvii.), amid much "contention." Thessalonica was a great commercial centre, and its harbour put it in touch with all parts of the world. It is evident that the Apostle stayed there much longer than "three sabbath days," and that his labours met with great success. The first instrument of this success was "the word of hearing," and in the text the Apostle vindicates his preaching from all charges of self-seeking. This subject, it may be thought, is only suitable to be treated in an address *ad clerum*, but it may be applied to a wider sphere.

The text, viewed in this light, may be regarded in its negative and positive aspects. St. Paul first mentions certain false aims in religion; and, secondly, the true aim.

I. False aims in religion. 1. The Apostle mentions several. "Our exhortation was not of deceit, nor of uncleanness, nor in guile." And further on, he disclaims having used "flattering words," or "a cloke of covetousness." First, we must notice the meaning of the term "exhortation." The preaching of the Word may be divided into two kinds, according to the faculties of our being which are chiefly appealed to—the one, the word of teaching (διδασκαλία); the other, the word of exhortation (παράκλησις). By the former the understanding is addressed, and by the latter the affections and conscience (1 Tim. iv. 13). But there are passages where "exhortation" has a wider meaning, as here. Bengel's interpretation of the term in the text is, "totum præconium evangelicum, passionum dulcedine tinctum." "An exhortation" is the preaching of the gospel, so as to win human hearts. 2. Their preaching was "not of deceit," or as it is rendered in the Revised Version, "not of error." Religion can only thrive in the atmosphere of truth. The Apostle was guided by the Spirit of Truth. He did not invent or create the gospel, but

preached that which he "also received," and that which had been revealed to him. That "deposit" of Divine Truth which he had "received" he entrusted to his son Timothy: "O Timothy, keep that which is committed to thy trust," "the form of sound words" (2 Tim. i. 13). The truths of the gospel were matters of certainty, not of opinion, entrusted to the Church for the salvation of mankind. 3. "Nor of uncleanness." There has been a diversity of interpretation here. Some have thought reference is actually made to sins of the flesh, as St. Paul was writing from Corinth, where such sins were far from uncommon; and that he was alluding to the way impurity was mixed up in heathen forms of religion, as, for instance, in the worship of Aphrodite; whilst others prefer to explain the words of moral impurity, especially with regard to motives of gain. Thus the deacons are exhorted not to be "greedy of filthy lucre" (1 Tim. iii. 8), and bishops the same (Titus i. 7). The Apostle himself, it appears, was sometime charged with something of the kind (2 Cor. xi. 8, 9). 4. "Nor in guile." St. Paul had not adulterated the truth, or gilded over that which might be distasteful, so as to allure the Thessalonians as with a bait. He had not, in other words, prophesied "smooth things," nor kept back part of the counsel of God—the part which corrupt nature would most likely rebel against. The Apostle, in thus vindicating his preaching, lays bare false aims which may actuate persons who appear to have a zeal for religion, but who all the time are untrue "in the inward parts;" who are "destitute of the truth, supposing that gain is godliness" (1 Tim. vi. 5); and who, under the mask of piety, are indulging various movements of corrupt nature.

II. The true aim in religion. "So we speak, not as pleasing men, but God, which trieth our hearts." 1. First notice the *aspect* of service which the Apostle here sets before us—that of pleasing God. The thought of avoiding His displeasure is a common one and a right one, but the idea of being able through His grace to "please" Him by what we think, say, and do, is not so much realized. The fact that we can do nothing that is pleasing in His sight *without* grace, has overshadowed the at least important truth, that we can do that which is well-pleasing in His sight *with* grace. Besides this, the Divine Condescension is so marvellous—that the great and holy God should allow us to please Him by our actions—that we find it difficult to realize this aspect of service. Yet this power of pleasing God is again and again affirmed in the New Testament. St. Paul deplores the condition of those who lead a fleshly life because they "cannot please God" (Rom. viii. 8). In this Lesson he says of the Jews they "please not God." In the fifth chapter of this Epistle he reminds the Thessalonians that he has taught them how "to please God." St. John speaks also of doing "the things which are pleasing in" God's "sight" (1 John iii. 22). 2. St. Paul contrasts this view of service with an opposite one—that of seeking to please men; and in the next verse denies that he has used "flattering words." Our Lord contrasts the two aims, and accounts for the latter by want of faith. "How can ye *believe* which receive honour one of another, and seek not the honour that cometh from God only?" (John v. 44). The eye of the soul must have lost sight of the Face of God, for a man to pander to mere human approbation. 3. Observe the concluding words of the text: "God, which trieth our hearts." This leads us to remark that it is not only the outward action, but the inward motive, upon which God looks. He "trieth the hearts," that is, He searcheth into the purity of our aims and intentions. The intention, by the help of Divine grace, lifts the action, whether great or in itself trivial, into the sphere of the Eternal. The Pharisees, who sought the praise of men, *had* their reward; those who acted secretly towards the Father have it in store for the day of revelation (Matt. vi. 1-23). The best actions become

vile, if worked with a sordid end; whilst a cup of water given "in My Name, because ye belong to Christ," shall not lose its reward (Mark ix. 41).

III. Lessons. 1. Examination of conscience as to the "false aims," especially with regard to the fulfilment of religious duties—deceit, self-seeking, guile. 2. To endeavour to grasp as a principle of conduct the possibility of *pleasing* God by our thoughts, words, and actions, if we are living in union with Christ and so "accepted in the Beloved" (Eph. i. 6). 3. To remember that it is the pure aim in the heart, to please and glorify God, which His All-seeing Eye can detect, upon which the moral and spiritual value of an action depends. 4. Further, conscious rectitude of purpose gives strength, confidence, and endurance—qualities which St. Paul had especially manifested in his ministrations at Thessalonica; whilst, on the other hand, mean, selfish, and sordid aims are sources of weakness, distrust, and inconstancy, as may be seen in the behaviour of those who "seek their own, not the things which are Jesus Christ's" (Phil. ii. 21).

FOURTH SUNDAY AFTER EASTER.—EVENING SECOND LESSON.

"This is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners; of whom I am chief."—1 Tim. i. 15.

1. These are well-known words, and will be especially familiar to those who draw near to "the altar of God." In the English Liturgy they form a part of the "comfortable words" which immediately follow the Absolution. This feature of our Service was evidently taken from a foreign and modern source (*The Consultation of Archbishop Hermann*), but it appears to have been the custom to insert detached sentences of Holy Scripture into some primitive Liturgies (Palmer's *Origines Liturg.*). They are described as "comfortable words," as supplying the "scriptural statements upon which the Absolution is grounded" (Procter, *Book of Common Prayer*); or rather, we should say, because they are calculated to deepen the dispositions of the worshippers for the more solemn portion of the Service, called "the Canon," which follows.

2. But familiarity has its dangers. If it may not be said to "breed contempt," it often causes forgetfulness of the real meaning of sacred words which are frequently upon our lips. As it is a good practice to commit texts to the memory, so as to be able to recall them in time of need, as the Psalmist says, "Thy Word have I hid in my heart, that I might not sin against Thee" (Ps. cxix. 11); so it is necessary to enter into the sense, so far as we can, of the texts, lest our use of them should degenerate into that of mere amulets against evil.

3. The text is one of those passages which seem to sum up the contents of the Christian religion. St. Paul was dwelling with gratitude upon the mercy which he himself had experienced at God's hands. It will be observed that in the Pastoral Epistles the attribute of Divine mercy is especially in the Apostle's mind. He begins them not only with the usual salutation, "Grace and peace" be unto you, but he inserts "mercy" between "grace" and "peace." Now, from the remembrance of the "exceeding abundant" grace which was bestowed upon himself, he rises up to the general declaration of the text, "This is a faithful saying," etc.

We may consider the introduction to this saying; the saying itself; and the avowal with which it ends.

I. The introduction. 1. The reason for it. It is intended, it has been thought, to announce that the saying is a quotation from an existing Liturgy, hymn, or tradition. However this may be, it is evident that the saying was one in common use,

whatever might have been its source. As St. Paul is thought to be quoting some primitive Confession of Faith in the first few verses of the fifteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, so here he is repeating some well-worn saying amongst the early Christians. 2. The words are no mere ornament or rhetorical preface; they bear upon the saying itself, and accentuate its importance. This, the Apostle says, is "a faithful" saying—meaning, I suppose, that it is absolutely true and worthy of credit. Faith cannot rest upon mere opinion, or conjecture. It demands Divine, and therefore infallible, truth for its object. 3. Further, it is declared to be "worthy of all acceptation," worthy of all "embracing." This is interpreted in several ways. First, the gospel is able to be received by all persons, and therefore not circumscribed by any original decree which shuts out the majority of mankind from its blessings. It is not only for the "cultured European," but also for the black. Then, again, by "*all* acceptation," some would explain the expression as indicating the eagerness and joy with which the good tidings ought to be embraced; whilst others would have us remember that "all" implies that every faculty which we possess—understanding, will, affections, etc.—must be laid under contribution if we would rightly avail ourselves of the benefits which Christ offers.

II. THE SAYING ITSELF. 1. It is a statement of the doctrine of the Incarnation. It points to the Person of our Lord by those Blessed Names which are familiar to us—His Person and His Office, Jesus, Saviour, Christ the Anointed One. Christianity, as it has been said, is Christ. It cannot be separated from Him, as human systems and discoveries can be separated from their authors. 2. He "came." How can God come, who is Omnipresent (Ps. cxxxix. 7–9)? He "came" by the assumption of our flesh. "The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us." Moreover, the expression seems to remind us that His coming was voluntary, an act of love. 3. He "came into the world." This statement, when read with other declarations of Holy Scripture, may be taken as inferring Christ's pre-existence. It was one and the same Person who existed before and after He had assumed our nature. He is "not two, but one Christ" (Athanasian Creed). 4. The purpose: "to save sinners." This at once shows the insufficiency of the Law to restore fallen man, and the enormity of the evil of sin. Christ came to save sinners "from their sins" (Matt. i. 21); that is, not merely from the punishment due to sin, but from the guilt. He came to restore mankind to soundness of spiritual health, to moral purity, to bring back the sinner into true relation to the Father *now*, and not merely to save him by providing him with happiness in another life. "Salvation," says an American bishop, "is holy character; not intellectual, but spiritual." Out of Christ, he adds, "come all gifts of the Spirit, all sacramental helps, washing, nourishment." He brought into the world sovereign remedies for a disease, which, without the aid of the Divine Physician, had proved incurable; and a healed and transformed humanity is the witness to their efficacy.

III. THE AVOWAL. "Sinners; of whom I am chief." How is this true? 1. Not in an absolute sense, as though Paul was a greater sinner than Judas, Pilate, or Herod; but he is referring to himself as one who had been the chief persecutor of Christ. His memory revives the scene on the road to Damascus, though thirty years have passed since he started on that journey, "breathing out threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord" (Acts ix. 1), and he appears to *himself* the worst of sinners. 2. There are different measures of the relative malice of sin. One outward act of sin may be compared with another, and be in itself *materially* greater; or acts of sin may be viewed in reference to the grace which God has given to the sinner, and the opportunities which have been vouchsafed to him; and so the

Apostle felt the gravity of his offences, because he viewed them from within. He remembered "the pricks" of conscience, the touches of grace, the sight of Stephen: "Thy martyr Stephen" (Acts xxii. 20); he knew that ignorance, if it at all lessened sin, was "vincible," and so culpable; and in this way, when now fully enlightened by the Holy Spirit, he could say truly as to his own consciousness, "I am of sinners 'chief.'" 3. We must not overlook the intense humility of the Apostle whilst we are considering the truth of this avowal. Sin, though blotted out, should be remembered as a ground of lowliness. "My sin," says the Psalmist, "is ever before me." I "am" of sinners the chief. We have no right to change it into I "was." The time-relation disappears, as the sense of his personal unworthiness fills his soul in his intercourse with the Eternal, and he brings the past into the present in his humble avowal.

IV. Lessons. 1. To catch something of that personal love for Christ which glowed in the heart of St. Paul—grateful love—"Let them give thanks whom the Lord hath redeemed," etc. (Ps. cvii. 2, Prayer-book Version). 2. To remember that salvation is not only a negative conception, but positive; not only deliverance from sin and its consequences, but a state of grace and blessedness. Christ does not cover our sins, but cleanses us from them, so that through Him and the Holy Spirit we become just and holy. 3. That salvation is not a single act, but a continuous process. The Lord added to the Apostolic Fold "those that were being saved" (Acts ii. 47, R.V.). Increased victory against sin, and growth in grace, are marks of spiritual soundness. 4. To copy St. Paul's penitence and humility by the acknowledgment of our sinfulness and sins, and by the deepening of repentance for offences long since pardoned and put away.

FIFTH SUNDAY AFTER EASTER.—EVENING FIRST LESSON.

"And I will write on the tables the words that were in the first tables which thou brakest, and thou shalt put them in the ark."—Deut. x. 2.

1. In the next verse it is said that Moses "made an ark of shittim wood" before going up into the mount with the two tables in his hand; whereas, according to the Book of Exodus (xxxvii. 1), Bezaleel is said to have made the ark. Those who seek to trace contradictions in the Scriptures, or variety of authorship, of course, point out this "discrepancy." The obvious remark that one may be said to do what he directs another to do is probably a sufficient reply to this difficulty.

2. It is not, however, with the ark, but with the tables of the Law, we are now concerned. Moses broke the first tables in a moment of indignation, when on coming down from the mount "he saw the calf and the dancing." Now, by prayer and obedience, he obtained again the tables of the testimony. God commanded him to prepare two tables of stone, which he did; and God wrote upon them anew the Ten Commandments, and these tables of the Law were treasured up in the ark (Heb. ix. 4).

3. The delivery of the Law, on the fiftieth day, according to the Jews, after the Exodus—an event celebrated by the Feast of Pentecost—reminds us of the contrast between the circumstances under which the Old and the New Law were promulgated. The thick cloud, the darkness, the thunder, the lightning, filled the Israelites with alarm. How very different are the approaches to God in the New Testament (Heb. xii. 18–24)! But the same Moral Law is binding in both; and it is to this fact, God's condescension in writing a second time the words of the Decalogue, our thoughts are invited in the Lesson.

Let us consider some reasons for keeping the Ten Commandments; and then, how we are to obey them.

I. Reasons for keeping the commandments. 1. They come from God. This may be said of the whole Law, ceremonial and judiciary, as well as moral. But surely there is a difference. Not only were the Ten Commandments promulgated, as a French writer says, "avec éclat," and the people warned to prepare for the solemn event (Exod. xix. 10, 15), but they were given *directly* by God. The first tables were "the work of God, and the writing was the writing of God, graven on the tables." The second tables were the work of man, but the writing was still the writing of God (Exod. xxxiv. 1). They stand above the ceremonial law, as an abridgment of the duties of man, and are of lasting obligation. 2. They agree with the law written in man's heart. They are in full accord with our moral intuitions. The Divine Law was not a brand-new code of ethics; but it was necessary, if man was to attain to a supernatural end. Moreover, man's moral sense was liable to be tampered with and impaired, so as at last to give an uncertain judgment; neither was it able to discern clearly always between good and evil; nor did it reach into the sphere of thought and motive. If man had been entirely dependent upon a written Law, its promulgation would not have been delayed till the time of Moses. It is altogether a mistake to suppose that the Decalogue *made* murder, theft, adultery, and the like sinful. It forbad them because they were sinful. It fixed man's moral intuitions so that they could not be dragged down by human passion and selfishness. It made them clearer and more distinct. It clothed them with a new sanction and authority. It was a positive enactment; but, after all, was only a "republication" of the Law which God had engraven on the heart of man (Rom. ii. 14, 15), the Light which "lighteth every man that cometh into the world" (John i. 9). 3. We find, when we examine the period before the Law was given, a sense of the evil of the actions which it forbids. *E.g.*, "Jacob said, Put away the strange gods that are among you." This is in anticipation of the first commandment. Perhaps the previous observance of the sabbath may be gathered from Exod. xvi. 23. So the sixth commandment was already in force (Gen. ix. 6). Sins against purity were abhorred (Gen. xxxiv. 31; xxxviii. 24), showing that the seventh commandment was no novelty. Joseph's brethren were shocked at being charged with stealing the cup (Gen. xliv. 7). The sin of coveting "thy neighbour's wife" was evidently recognized by Abimelech as "a great sin" with regard to Sarah (Gen. xx. 9). All these statements—and there are others before the giving of the Law—are witnesses to the moral light which God has given to man, irrespective of external guidance or enactment. 4. The moral law did not make sin to be sin, though it added to its malice; but it clearly revealed the amount of human transgression, which was veiled in a mist before. It was like the clinical thermometer which measures the height of the fever, which might have been unknown before. It reveals the temperature of the patient, and so the seriousness or lightness of the case. "By the Law," says the Apostle, "is the knowledge of sin" (Rom. iii. 20). 5. Further, obedience to the moral law of God is necessary for salvation. It is not like the ceremonial Law or judiciary, mostly a matter for the Jew; it is binding at all times. When the rich ruler asked Christ, "What good thing shall I do, that I may have eternal life?" Christ replied, "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments" (Matt. xix. 16, 17). St. Paul declares the same (Rom. xiii. 8, 9). Again, "Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing: but the keeping of the commandments of God" (1 Cor. vii. 19). St. John the same (1 John iii. 22, 24). To sum up this—we are bound to keep the Ten Commandments, because they were directly given us by God; because they are a transcript of our moral nature; and because obedience to the moral law is still, in the Christian covenant, indispensable in order to inherit eternal life.

II. How are we to keep the commandments? 1. With the help of Divin

grace. "The letter," says St. Paul, "killeth;" that is, St. Augustine explains, because we are unable by our unaided natural powers to fulfil it: "but the Spirit giveth life" (2 Cor. iii. 6), because it enables us to keep the Divine Law. Therefore the old Law *by itself* is called "the ministration of death." But this was no fault of the Law, for the Law is "holy, just, and good" (Rom. vii. 12). The Law cast light upon the sinful principle in man, and by his inability to overcome it, aroused the sense of need and longing for a Saviour. Moses gave the Law without the Spirit, says a commentator, but Christ gave both. Whilst on the one hand we realize that we can do nothing without grace; on the other, we must remember that we can do everything with it. 2. We have to keep *all* the commandments. Not nine out of ten. The commandments are not isolated precepts, so that the violation of one does not touch another. They form, if I may say so, an organic body of moral truth, as the Creed an organic body of dogmatic truth. As to disbelieve one article of the Creed breaks the unity of faith, so to disobey one commandment breaks the unity of obedience. "Whosoever shall keep the whole Law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all" (Jas. ii. 10), for he disobeys the Will and Commandment of God, of which the Ten Commandments are the expression. 3. Christians have to read the commandments in the light of "the Sermon on the Mount," and so to see how deeply they cut. They not only touch the outward action, but thought and motive. A negative commandment involves a positive duty; *e.g.* "Thou shalt do no murder" is interpreted by St. John as inferring the necessity for the love of our neighbour (1 John iii. 15, 16); and "Thou shalt not steal," St. Paul would have extended to an affirmation of the duties of honest labour and almsgiving (Eph. iv. 28).

III. Lessons. 1. To seek by meditation upon the Law of God to *know* how much that Law demands of us as Christians. 2. To examine the conscience by the Ten Commandments, so as to discover, by the help of the Holy Spirit, wherein we have broken them—in thought, word, deed, or omission. 3. They are the way of life. "There are two ways, one of life and one of death" (*Didache*), and the former is the path of God's commandments. To those who walk therein it will soon become joyous, if they by prayer and sacraments seek the strength which is necessary for the journey. "Behold, my delight is in Thy commandments; O quicken me in Thy righteousness" (Ps. cxix. 40, Prayer-book Version).

SUNDAY AFTER ASCENSION DAY.—EVENING SECOND LESSON.

"Who being the brightness of His glory, and the express image of His Person, and upholding all things by the word of His power, when He had by Himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high."—Heb. i. 3.

1. This Lesson falls fitly on the Sunday in the octave of the Festival of the Ascension. The "pre-eminence" of Christ, it has been well said, is "the general subject" of the Epistle of which this Lesson forms the first chapter (Vaughan). In the first two chapters Christ's pre-eminence over angels forms the topic; in the next two, His pre-eminence over Moses; and in chs. v.–x., His pre-eminence over Aaron.

2. In this evening's Second Lesson, Christ's pre-eminence over the angels is shown in various ways—His pre-eminence not only as God, but as Man; as, *e.g.*, having a "more excellent name"—"Son;" as having creative and all-sustaining power; as being an Object of worship; as being the Fount of grace to His "fellows;" as exalted to the right hand of the Father.

3. To keep within the limits of the text, there are four points for consideration, all bearing on this pre-eminence—our Lord's relation to the Father; His upholding

action; His cleansing power from moral defilement; and His exaltation to the right hand of God.

I. Our Lord's relation to the Father. 1. I use the word "relation" in its strictly theological sense. There are "four relations" in God, viz. Paternity, Filiation, Spiration, and Procession. The relation of our Lord to the Father is that of "Son." And the "Son" is beautifully described in the text as the "Brightness" of the Father's glory, and "the express Image" of His Person—a description impossible unless Christ is God. 2. The same word (ἀπαύγασμα) for "Brightness" is found in Wisd. vii. 26, "the Brightness of the Everlasting Light." It points to our Lord as the Wisdom, or "Word" of the Father, "the Person in whom all the rays of Divine glory are concentrated" (Vaughan). In the language of our Creed, "Light of Light," an eternal "emanation of the intellect" in the Divine Nature (Aquinas). 3. The "express Image of His Person." The name "Image" is said by the Latin Fathers to belong to the Son of God, as the name "Love" belongs to the Holy Ghost; and they explain it as "perfect similitude." The texts which authorize the term are Col. i. 15 and Heb. i. 3. The possible objection, that "express image" or "exact likeness" need not mean equality, because man is said to be made in the image of God, Aquinas answers. He says that image is of two kinds—natural, as that of a king's son to a king; and in a thing of a different nature, as the image of a king upon a coin: the latter is like that which is impressed on created life, the former that of the Eternal Son, who is the "exact Image" of God's essence—in other words, One with the Father (John x. 30).

II. His upholding action. "Upholding all things by the word of His power." 1. As Christ is Lord of all, because by Him the worlds were made (John i. 3; Eph. iii. 9), so He is over all by the title of conservation. That which God created is preserved in being by Him. 2. The fable of Atlas has an element of Divine teaching in it. The view of the world in Scripture is not that of a vast machine, with so much motive force lodged in it as to keep it going without any Divine "impetus or influx." The Son upholdeth all things, else, says St. Anselm, "they would relapse into the nothingness out of which they were drawn at their creation." St. Paul teaches, "All things were created by Him and for Him, and by Him all things consist" (Col. i. 16, 17). St. Augustine interprets the words, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work" (John v. 17), of a "certain continuation" of the work of creation in upholding and administering all things. 3. In fact, conservation is described as "the continuation of creation," and as much a Divine act. The Arians sought to depreciate it as the office of the Son, as compared with the creative act of the Father; but St. Chrysostom affirms, "It is not less to be able to sustain than to create all things, and that the Son is not merely the 'minister' of the Father, but His equal." The text attributes to our Lord a Divine action, and reminds us, that behind all second causes, the "Unmoved Mover" of all things is at work, and that nothing has the power of preserving itself in being directly, so as not to stand in need of Divine sustentation.

III. His cleansing power from moral defilement. "He had by Himself purged our sins." 1. The Incarnation has intervened. In the two former points we contemplated our Lord as a Divine Person; in the first of these before creation—that antecedent glory which He had with the Father before the world was (John xvii. 5); in the second, after creation, but still when only Divine. Now the same Person has become man, and in man's nature, as man's Representative, has expiated human sin. 2. The author of the Epistle passes *per saltum* to the foot of the Cross. The Cross was a work beyond the powers of angels. By taking human nature, and not the nature of angels, He lifts it above them, through its union with Godhead; and by His Atoning

Suffering He "obtained a more excellent name than they" (ver. 4); "name" standing for "the sum of His attributes, the whole of His revealed nature, character, work" —a description not too comprehensive. 3. Observe the words—"*by Himself* purged our sins." Though omitted by R. V., the words have considerable manuscript authority. They emphasize the idea, already involved in the statement, that this purification was brought about by Christ's wonderful love, that He only could effect it, that He wrought it out by Himself alone.

IV. His exaltation to the right hand of God. 1. This exaltation of the God-Man to the Father's right hand is the thought which is now filling our minds and hearts. It follows upon the previous statement, because this exaltation of man's nature was the reward of previous humiliation and suffering. "Wherefore," that is, because He had humbled Himself to the death of the Cross, God hath "highly exalted Him, and given Him a Name which is above every name" (Phil. ii. 9). It was a Sovereignty acquired, as well as original. 2. The expression is taken from Ps. cx. 1, and is several times quoted, or alluded to, in the New Testament. To sit on the right hand of God denotes the kingly power and honour, into the full exercise and possession of which Christ entered at His Ascension. That which the Psalmist prophesied, the elevation of Joseph typified. 3. To sit on the Father's right hand was consistent with Christ's Divinity, because He shares the glory of the Father; and it was fitting for His Manhood, because of its union with the Divine Person of the Son of God. 4. This Session was for Christ alone. It was His prerogative. Others may be united with Him in His reward (Eph. ii. 6; Rev. iii. 21), but He alone by proper and natural right possesses judiciary power.

V. Lessons. 1. Faith in the central truth of Christianity—the Divinity of Christ, His equality with the Father "as touching His Godhead." 2. To remember that God directs and co-operates with His creatures; that "in Him we live, and move, and have our being;" that He sustains us in being, and preserves our faculties, even when, by the perverse use of our wills, we employ them in sinning against Him; so that God complains, "Thou hast made Me to serve with thy sins" (Isa. xliii. 24)—a terrible but true view of sin. 3. To inquire whether the purifying process from moral defilement is going on in us through the grace which was purchased by the Passion, else faith is in vain. 4. To realize *now* the Living and Ascended Christ, the King at the Father's right hand, and to obey, serve, and worship Him as true and loyal subjects of His Kingdom.

SUNDAY IN SCHOOL.

THE AGONY IN GETHSEMANE.

Mark xiv. 32–42.

We have here the story of a terrible mental and spiritual ordeal.

I. In respect of emotional capacity and susceptibility to pain, Christ was the perfect Type of humanity. He was the ideal Man in the sense that He could not only comprehend and realize in His personality the possibilities of the highest manhood, but that He could also detect and appreciate the dangers which threatened the ideal manhood. With His clear vision He saw just how the race was imperilled, and it was the consciousness of this peril which weighed heavily upon His spirit. With a nature the essence of which was love, He came to the objects of His love and found them one and all voluntarily fettered to the one thing which He hated. It was

at Gethsemane that He entered upon that culminating act of sacrifice which could alone free the race which He loved from its horrible yokefellow.

II. His sorrow in the garden was retrospective as well as prospective. He thought of the past and the future. He thought of the indignities which He had suffered, the hardships which He had endured, in pursuing His journey of love from Bethlehem to Gethsemane.

III. He was suffering because of the sins of the world. In Gethsemane the Holy One was brought face to face with the dark-visaged enemy of the race. He who was without sin was about to pass through that experience which had been made a curse because of sin. He was not merely to pass out of the flesh; He was to taste of death in the sense of its being the wages of sin; that is, "He was emptied to the very uttermost of that glory which He had since the world began. He drank to its deepest dregs the cup of humiliation and bitterness."

IV. We learn from this scene in Gethsemane that sin is no trifle. It is a tremendous blot on the universe, an enormous offence against God and man. However puny man may seem when compared with the other works of the Creator, he exerts a power the effects of which, we believe, are felt to the uttermost bounds of the universe. It is the world's sin that makes the Saviour sore amazed and heavy of heart. Would that Gethsemane and the prostrate Saviour might ever appear to us when we are tempted to indulge in any evil act or thought!—Charles A. Dickinson.

JESUS BEFORE THE HIGH PRIEST.

Mark xiv. 53–64.

In Mark's swift, colourless account we must not fail to note our Lord's marvellous self-surrender, of His own will tasting death for every man. He came to Jerusalem when He might have remained beyond Jordan and escaped the Pharisees, of whose designs against Him He was fully aware. He knew whom He should encounter in the garden.

What utter violation by this mock Sanhedrin of all these legal provisions for fairness and humanity! No accuser appeared, and the judge himself took the office in violation of all propriety. Only hostile witnesses appeared, and they were eagerly brought forward by the judge.

History abounds in instances of persecution of apostles of truth, when wicked men see their selfish interests imperilled. None had compunction or compassion. "There come together with him all the chief priests and the elders and the scribes" (ver. 53). No greater proof is possible of the dark degradation to which even God's chosen people had fallen.

Many the proofs of our Lord's Divinity, but none are more conclusive than His absolute flawlessness of life. He was always outspoken. He met the proud and unscrupulous hierarchy with scathing denunciation. He sympathized with the weak and despised orders of society, and yet no false step, no careless word, could be recalled under the compound microscope of sacerdotal hate and official jealousy and envy. We should put a large interpretation upon such innocence. It was more than a negative quality. In order to it there must have been wisdom without parallel; power and self-reliance; steadfast purpose and work. Against such character and life hate's conspiracies are usually powerless. It would encourage the Lord's armies to think often of the inherent and inevitable embarrassments of falsehood. False witnesses encounter immense obstacles in the simple course of events.

Jesus was silent before His accusing falsifiers, because their words were self-defeating, and because true self-respect scorned to deny reckless and shameless slander. Such silence has an eloquence of its own in its suggestions of conscious rectitude and indifference to gratuitous malice.

Here, again, our lesson puts earth's depravity in dark, impressive contrast with the Divine life; in it, but not of it. While Jesus calmly waits in silence, bound, worn by the garden agony and lonely in the desertion of His few followers, the high priest, in frenzied zeal, forgets his assumed duty as judge and becomes prosecuting accuser. Lacking material for judgment in the testimony of his witnesses, he seeks to entrap Jesus by questions. All this fails. But soon the high priest betrays his thorough knowledge of Jesus' claims to oneness with the Father—claims amply vindicated and evident to anything but wilful and stubborn blindness. The high priest had much light, and he used for his own shame and guilt what might have been his joy and salvation.

In what followed we have an illustration of a frequent feature of high-handed crime. A common passion swayed the whole body. "They all condemned Him to be worthy of death" (ver. 64). This procedure and decision must be ratified by a larger assemblage of the Sanhedrin. It is now three o'clock in the morning. During the delay of some hours for this formal ratification occurred those brutal indignities at the hands of the rough temple police.

Our lesson only introduces Peter. The story of his denial comes later; but in passing we must not omit thought of the grandest of the apostles, with the exception of Paul. He was constrained to follow to the place of trial by a mixture of motives, which we cannot analyze with any certainty or profit; but the sad episode is full of suggestion. A noble apostleship was awaiting him. His headstrong, volcanic nature needed severe humbling and discipline. He was to illustrate in unmistakable clearness and beauty God's infinite compassion and rescuing grace. Peter's example is an emphatic warning against following the Master "afar off"—a course for ever full of peril and discomfort. Half-service, imperfect obedience, are sure to cause unrest and weak irresolution. Then is the tempter's easy opportunity.

The sad story of our lesson is typical of a continued assault upon the Son of God in His representatives, when worldlings become alarmed for selfish interests imperilled by gospel truth and progress. The foreign missionary finds his work challenged and misrepresented and himself persecuted. Swarms of pretexts for opposition are invented with ceaseless frequency. In Christian lands multitudes live by spoliation of the weak, sometimes by legal permission, and they conspire against Christians who antagonize them, however legitimate the means and mode of that opposition. Jesus said truthfully that He came to send not peace, but a sword. Peace will come in final result; but its advent is through conflict and pain.

Enemies of Jesus are, and always will be, tireless. Good men would do well to copy their perseverance, their cohesion under the pressure of depraved ends and measures; but obstacles maliciously thrown in the way of the gospel become sure stepping-stones. Once Jesus was in the hands of the worst of earth; now He sitteth at the right hand of the Father. His followers carry forward His kingdom sustained by the certainty of victory.—S. Lewis B. Speare.

JESUS BEFORE PILATE.

Mark xv. 1–15.

Jesus before Pilate! It is a great experience for Pilate. When Jesus comes before a man, we see what the man is. The light from Jesus' face falling on human nature

brings that nature into visibility, as the sunlight falling on the bud coaxes it into bloom. We never know ourselves until He stands before us. It is Paul's conception of the judgment-day—Jesus and the soul brought face to face. Looking at Pilate in the dazzling light of Jesus' presence, how the Roman procurator shrinks and shrivels! Every time he speaks he dwindles. We never know how small a man is till Jesus stands before him.

The evangelists all felt the pathos and grandeur of the scene, for all of them have told us how Jesus stood before Pilate. Mark's account is briefest of the four, and his sentences, though graphic, are provokingly concise.

The silence of Jesus! To us it is wonderful. We have not yet begun to learn it. It is harder to imitate the silence of Jesus than it is to reproduce His speech. When men speak against us we are eager to speak back. No matter how foolish the accusation, we think it necessary to explain and defend ourselves. A lie starts, and we chase it. If we do not want to kill the liar, we at any rate long to kill the lie. A misrepresentation gets into the air, and we talk ourselves hoarse in trying to dissipate it. To be silent like Jesus requires the self-control of Jesus. He is a great man who at the right time is able to keep still. Curbing the tongue is an art oftener praised than possessed. But silence in the presence of calumny is a mystery to all small souls. Pilate marvels. His marvelling gives us the measure of the man. *He* could not have kept still. He cannot understand how any man when accused can hold his tongue. He asks Jesus for an explanation. Jesus maintains His silence, and Pilate keeps on marvelling. We marvel at the things which lie above our heads.

At this point Luke tells us that Pilate, to get rid of Jesus, hurries Him off to Herod, who sends Him back again. Herod has been chagrined and nonplussed by this same inexplicable silence, and is glad to get rid of a man who when mocked will not reply. Pilate does not know what to do. He insists upon it that he finds no fault in Jesus. He says that Herod has reached the same decision. "Will ye that I release unto you the King of the Jews?" is his eager question; to which the people answer, "Release unto us Barabbas!" Now Barabbas was a disturber of the peace, a robber and a murderer. His unsavoury reputation was known to the Jews far and near; but rather than allow Jesus to escape, they did not hesitate to cry, "Release unto us Barabbas!" It would seem incredible that men should make such choices, did we not ofttimes pursue a course no less unreasonable than this action of the Jewish mob. Two men, one from earth and one from heaven, lie imprisoned in our nature. We know which one is rightful lord. But stirred up by the high priests of Satan, we let Barabbas out and keep the King in prison. Meekness and purity and love—these are no doubt beautiful, but noise and bluster and brute conquests have a fascination too. The gentleness and spirituality and holiness of Jesus claim our admiration; but when it comes to choosing between Jesus and Barabbas, we often choose the lesser man. The bravado and the recklessness and the fleshly force of Barabbas—we take these to ourselves, and allow mercy and purity and reverence to be crucified. Every man who turns away from ideal manhood to gratify his lust or win some new conquest by the use of ungodly means belongs to the Jewish mob which cried at Pilate's court, "Release unto us Barabbas!" Pilate, seeing that the Jews are determined to have Barabbas, asks, "What then shall I do unto Him whom ye call the King of the Jews?" And they cry out, "Crucify Him!" "And Pilate, wishing to content the multitude, released unto them Barabbas, and delivered Jesus, when he had scourged Him, to be crucified."

It is pitiable, this spectacle of a man vacillating between the yell of a crowd and the voice of his conscience, giving way at last to the voice which makes the more

noise. "Wishing to content the multitude"—that has led to a multitude of sins. A man is oftentimes a coward without realizing it. No man knows how great a coward he is until he sits down and thinks, and in solitude takes the measure of himself. "Wishing to content the multitude." Many a politician would be a statesman if he were not so eager to content the multitude.

Pilate's surrender becomes all the more remarkable when we remember how he hated the Jews. Their religion he held in contempt. He looked upon all Jews as a gang of fanatics and bigots. And yet, notwithstanding Pilate's scorn for these Jewish screamers, he surrenders to them. He sits indeed in the ivory chair, but the mob is really the judge. He is the slave of those whom he holds in contempt. A man is the slave of the people until he loves them. Love can withstand unreasonable demands and can chide boldly. Love can stand firm and resist the wildest fury of hate. If necessary, love can lay down its life for the people. We never become masters of men until we love them. But we never can truly love them unless we love God. That was the misfortune of Pilate. He did not know God. He knew Tiberius Cæsar, but he knew nothing of truth.—CHARLES E. JEFFERSON.

JESUS ON THE CROSS.

MARK XV. 22-37.

1. He died. Under all ordinary operation of justice and grace, He should have escaped death. The violent separation of spirit from body was not in the original plan for human existence, nor even after the Fall an inevitable necessity for the passing from flesh and blood into the kingdom of heaven. It is a penalty upon sin. What has death, testimony to sin, doom of sinners, to do with such a One? True Man though He be, the laws of nature cannot interpose, for He is their Master, who for more than one poor brother has turned them aside; then how much more for Himself, their Source! For sinful man to die is normal; for the sinless One, death is an anomaly; for Him who is evidently Lord of life and death, an unsearchable mystery, unless some higher meaning attaches to it. 2. His death was under most humiliating conditions. If, as the Word made flesh, and choosing to enter our race by the lowly gateway of human birth, He chose also to pass out through the shadowed portal by which mankind enters the other world, it should have been with circumstances befitting His character and mission. Since He chose for Himself poverty, we do not look for the embroidered cushions of a Dives or the ivory couch of a king, but let it be at least in the soothing quiet of a home, amid fond farewells; for who ever had friends like His? But He dies worse than neglected. God's own people have rejected Him. The unspeakable cross completes the shame and torture. 3. His death was accompanied by supernatural manifestations. When men die, heedless nature pays no homage. Our hearts break, but the flowers bloom and the birds sing and still the sun shines on. But here the midday sun flees the zenith, the solid earth shivers and is rent. Some vital connexion runs from that cross and Sufferer through the created universe. His death, with all its mysterious accompaniments, requires an explanation as an event apart and alone in the history of man or the eternity of God.

I. THE DEATH OF CHRIST WAS VOLUNTARY. He had power to lay down His life, as we have not. He had long anticipated it. He chose death for Himself, even as He had chosen incarnation, and the incarnation for the sake of the death.

II. IT WAS ACCORDING TO THE DIVINE PLAN. He is "the Lamb slain from before

the foundation of the world." This globe began its circle about the sun with the hollow for the cross marked upon its bosom.

III. It was foretold in the Scriptures of the Old Testament.

IV. What, then, is the explanation? He was faithful unto death, resisting unto blood, striving against sin. His mission and teaching were such that the powers of evil are provoked to desperate war. He or they must be overcome. The poor man, the sick man, the criminal, receive to-day far more attention and enthusiastic devotion than the soldier or the scholar. This also is a fruit of the tree of Calvary. He brought life and immortality to light. "God commendeth His own love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." With nature and history only for teachers, we should never say, "God is love," and could not believe it except at the sacrifice of confidence in His power. The cross brings peace to the guilty conscience.—Charles M. Southgate.

THE BOOK CRITIC.

NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY; OR, HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE TEACHING OF JESUS AND OF PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY ACCORDING TO THE NEW TESTAMENT SOURCES. By Dr. W. Beyschlag, Halle. Translated by Rev. Neil Buchanan. 2 vols. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1895. 18*s*. nett.

The present work is far and away the ablest treatment of the subject that has yet appeared in English. It gives us the result of a life's work in study and teaching on the part of a German scholar of the front rank. In addition to the thoroughness, which we expect in the best Germans, it has the merit of a flowing, luminous style, which does not suffer in the translation. The work has only recently appeared in the original, and its reproduction is no ordinary boon to British theology. On the whole, despite one or two points to be noticed hereafter, its tendency and effect will be in a conservative direction. It is no ordinary satisfaction to meet with a work on the positive side equal in original grasp, in learning and independence, to the many productions, often marked by consummate ability, of the negative school. Beyschlag will, in many respects, supply an antidote to Wendt, Holstein, Pfleiderer, and others.

The work at once suggests comparison with the treatises of Wendt and Weiss—*The Teaching of Jesus*, two vols., and *New Testament Theology*, two vols.—which also come to us from Germany. Of course, Wendt's work is limited to the teaching of Christ. Dr. Beyschlag's three hundred pages devoted to this subject will bear comparison with Wendt's two volumes in acuteness and suggestiveness, while, to our mind, they do more justice to the Divine depth and spirituality of the Lord's teaching. The reader gets no impression of a wish to minimize the range of that teaching in harmony with preconceived views of Christ's nature. Beyschlag's work differs considerably in plan and purpose from Dr. Weiss's, although covering the same extent of ground. The author, in the introduction, has a friendly debate with Dr. Weiss, on the methods of Biblical theology. English readers must be conscious, as Dr. Beyschlag says German ones are, that Dr. Weiss reproduces, as literally as possible, the teachings of the several New Testament writers.[1] This, he holds, is the duty of Biblical theology; to go beyond and attempt interpretation will be to trench on the province of dogmatics. Dr. Beyschlag holds a freer view, maintaining that the Biblical theologian, while leaving out of sight all dogmatic developments, is bound to

[1] The translation of Weiss might have been better.

give his own understanding of Biblical doctrine in its several parts and as a whole. He is not unconscious of the danger mentioned, but thinks that it can be avoided by competent, conscientious students. Undoubtedly, this method is the most interesting and helpful. We get a view of Biblical teaching, as a system, which is impossible on the other method. Weiss's book is much more a book of reference than of reading; indeed, it is "very hard reading." Still, both works are necessary and valuable in their way; the later in no way supersedes the earlier one.

Dr. Beyschlag describes himself as belonging to the "mediating" school of Biblical criticism and theology, and expects no favour either from advanced critics or traditional dogmatists. It is reassuring to find that one who takes this independent position, and who has the ability and the will to exercise his own judgment, is so conservative in regard to the "sources" on which he relies. The Pastoral Epistles, Jude, and 2 Peter are the only books he puts outside the New Testament. These he uses, at the close of his work, to represent the teaching of the sub-apostolic period; the first representing Pauline, and the two others Jewish, Christianity. Wisely, indeed, he keeps the synoptists and the Fourth Gospel apart, giving us the teaching of Jesus first according to the synoptists, and then according to the Gospel of John. Still further, it should be noticed that, in the use of the Fourth Gospel, the author distinguishes between the parts which go back to Christ's own life and "Johannine conceptions according to the Epistles and the Fourth Gospel," recognizing the colouring which Christ's teaching has received in some parts from the apostle's reflection. On questions of authenticity, Dr. Beyschlag gives only the conclusions he has arrived at; the evidence belongs to the subject of New Testament introduction.

On one important question the author occupies a position of peculiar independence. His Christological views are unique and not easy to define. We fear that "mediating" is here equivalent to "hazy." The subject comes up again and again for discussion, in the synoptic Gospels, the Fourth Gospel, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and John's Epistles. The expositions are long and detailed. It is not difficult to say what the author's position is not. He leaves us in no doubt as to his dissatisfaction with, or rejection of, the definitions of the early Creeds. We do not, of course, judge a writer's position by this criterion alone. Still, we generally expect adverse criticism to be accompanied by some attempt at constructive interpretation; this is entirely absent in the present case. At every new discussion the language becomes more obscure and ambiguous. Very much might be quoted which looks in the direction of a merely humanitarian view. And yet this cannot be correct; the entire strain of the exposition forbids it. But the author gives us little help in our efforts to understand what his position is. The author speaks of expressions of Christ "which cannot possibly be harmonized with a consciousness of being Himself God," and of the consciousness of Jesus being "at bottom purely human." Again, we have an elaborate discussion of the passages usually understood as implying or asserting pre-existence, going to show that not a real, but merely ideal, pre-existence is meant (vol. i. 250). The phraseology is explained by the Jewish custom of describing anything unique or excellent as having been from the beginning, or having come down from heaven. Then, on the other hand, what is meant by the "heavenly Man," which is the sum of the Pauline Christology, "a real intermediate Being between God and the world," the ideal man? Christ seems to be made neither God nor creature. But we give up the puzzle. On this subject Dr. Beyschlag loses his usual lucidity, and becomes to us hopelessly obscure. Is not this an indication of an indefensible position? No doubt the publication of these volumes will lead to fuller discussion of Beyschlag's peculiar theory, from which good may be expected.

There is no ambiguity in the author's attitude to the expiatory or forensic aspect of atonement. He rejects it without reserve, not, as with Wendt and Pfleiderer, as intrinsically untenable, but on grounds of exposition. When he essays to prove that Paul's words do not, cannot mean what equally able expositors who, on other grounds, reject the doctrine, maintain they unquestionably do mean, he has a hard task. And as in the former case, the pains spent on the discussion shows his consciousness of the fact.

The result of the entire exposition is to bring out a "great unison in the Biblical doctrine of salvation; a substantial agreement even between Paul and the original apostles, and between Paul and Jesus Himself, in all that is important." This holds good of every section of doctrine, as will be evident to every careful student of the work. Let any one examine the interpretation of the titles "Son of man" and "Son of God" in the synoptists, in John, in Paul, and the Hebrews, and he will be impressed by the deep harmony of the thought—an example of undesigned coincidence of the most remarkable kind. After pointing out both the likeness and the difference between Christ and His disciples in respect to Divine Sonship—theirs being comparative and His absolute, a distinction marked in John by "only begotten," and in the synoptists by "*the* Son"—our author proceeds, "Here, therefore, on the basis of the same idea of a Sonship of God possible to man, and representing man's highest destiny, lies a sublimity and uniqueness of His relation to God, which raises Him above all other sons of men, and gives Him the character of true Divinity, not, however, to the exclusion of His true humanity, but rather to its realization in the highest original sense." Here, again, we often find the double voice already referred to.

The glory of the work, however, is the patient, searching, masterly discussion of every part, great and small, in the several sections of New Testament teaching, the teaching of Christ, the teaching of the first apostles and Church in the Acts, James, 1 Peter, Paul, the continuation of primitive apostolic teaching in the Hebrews, the Apocalypse, and John's Epistles. The whole ground is swept, nothing is overlooked, essential and secondary are rightly placed. What seem to us errors often suggest the direction in which the truth is to be found. The grouping of the material is as able as the detailed discussion. In the teaching of Jesus and the Pauline system especially we are struck with the bold way in which light is thrown on the complicated material by the arrangement adopted. All Paul's teaching is easily brought under the eight heads chosen. The same is true of the other writers. Paul and John have never before been presented, in their unity and divergence, to English students with such completeness as in this great work. The work of the translator has been well done.

J. S. Banks.

CHRISTIANITY AND AGNOSTICISM: Review of some Recent Attacks on the Christian Faith. By Henry Wace, D.D. William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh.

The controversy between Professor Huxley and Dr. Wace attracted a great deal of notice at the time. The origin of it was almost accidental. Dr. Wace had, at the request of a friend, read a paper at the Church Congress in 1888. The subject of the paper was "Agnosticism." Professor Huxley, the inventor of the word, had always regarded it with paternal fondness, and would scarcely allow any one else to use it. At all events, he seemed to think that hardly any one could use it correctly. Dr. Wace had said in that paper, "He may prefer to call himself an agnostic; but his real name

is an older one—he is an infidel, that is to say, an unbeliever." The professor heard of the paper, and read it. No sooner had he read it than his wrath was kindled. He sharpened his pen, and went forth to war. He went forth to shear, and came back shorn. Had not the new word been coined just to get rid of unpleasant associations? Dr. Wace had likened an agnostic to an infidel! If this were allowed, clearly every advantage expected from the use of the new word would disappear. Need we wonder that the fond inventor was angry? To suppose that the professor was angry will account for many things. It will help us to understand why he made so many rash assertions, and why he took up so many untenable positions in one paper, only to abandon them silently in the next.

The course of the controversy, and the issue of it, are fitted to give rise to many reflections. One is that even Professor Huxley, able and accomplished as he is, may write unadvisedly on a subject which he has not mastered. It takes a long time, and strenuous application, to master even one department of New Testament study. A rapid glance at a text-book is not sufficient. Unless we bring to the text-books some previous knowledge of an adequate kind, they will inevitably mislead us. In the study of the New Testament Professor Huxley is an amateur, and we must say his work has no higher value than that of any other tyro. A single utterance, say, of Bishop Westcott on a New Testament topic has more scientific worth than all that Professor Huxley has written. For, in the one case, it is the view of a man who knows; in the other case it is the view of a man who does not know adequately. When Professor Huxley writes on science, we all read with admiration and respect. When, however, he strays out of his own province, we are inclined to say, "Let the shoemaker stick to his last."

Why should theology be the only science on which men think they can speak without any training or preparation? Theology is, no doubt, a subject in which all men ought to be interested. In fact, many men are ready to give an opinion on any theological topic at a moment's notice; but their view has not any abiding value. Nor can we say that Professor Huxley's contributions to theology have any permanent worth. The present controversy will not add to his reputation, either as a man of science or as a fair-minded controversialist. He raised issues in one paper, and evaded them in the next. He is in the position of a man who enters on a controversy regarding subjects on which his information in incomplete and, for the most part, taken from second-hand sources. He manifests imperfect acquaintance even with the authors from whose works he quotes. Again and again he has had to submit to the humiliation of having pointed out to him that the authors he quotes have not said what he has attributed to them, but something very different. Being persecuted in one city, the professor flees to another. At last he finds a refuge in the Middle Ages, and escapes by means of a dissertation on the superstitious habit of mind of the men of that time. He has forgotten to point out the relevancy of his dissertation to the controversy he has in hand.

We need not further refer to various phases of the fight. Professor Huxley has published his contributions to it, and now we have the replies of Dr. Wace. We should have been better pleased had Dr. Wace neglected Professor Huxley altogether, and have given his strength and time to the preparation of an independent treatise on some of the topics controversially discussed here. These articles, no doubt, deserve a more permanent form than they had in the pages of a magazine. Apart from the Huxley articles, there are others which have scientific worth and great critical and historical value. The article on "The Historical Criticism of the New Testament" is both a history of the recent developments of the science, and a sketch of the work which

remains to be done in the immediate future. The article on "The Latest Attack on Christianity" is the finest criticism we have seen on a rather pretentious book, *The Service of Man*, by the late Mr. Cotter Morison. Of quite special interest is the criticism of *Robert Elsmere;* and the article on the *Speaker's Commentary* well deserves the place it has in the volume. JAMES IVERACH.

THE EVOLUTION OF LOVE. By EMORY MILLER, D.D., LL.D. A. C. McLurg and Co., Chicago.

THIS is one of the most remarkable books which have come into our hands in recent years. Its speculative power is great; its range of thought is wonderful; it is luminous in style, and its grasp is firm and tenacious. He discusses with great lucidity some of the most difficult problems in philosophy and theology. If we have any fault to find, it is that Dr. Miller has not given more space to some parts of the exposition. For the subject is difficult; the ideas are unfamiliar to ordinary people; and the reasoning is extremely packed and condensed. Even those trained in philosophy and theology will find some difficulty in following the argument. Dr. Miller ought to have considered the aversion of human nature to sustained toil, and to have done something to lighten the burden. There is no resting-place; with resolute and unfaltering step he presses on to the goal. We fear that only a few will accompany him to the end. Those who persevere will be amply rewarded.

After a brief introduction, Dr. Miller divides his subject into two parts. The first part he names, "The Implications of Being;" and the second, "The Implications of Love." In the first part there are three parts, viz. "Being, as Perceived," "Being, as Conceived," and "Being, as Conditioned." In the second part there are six chapters: "Creation," "The Genesis of Evil," "The Solution of Evil," "Atoning Fact," "The Revelation of Atoning Fact," and "Eschatology." It is not possible, within our limits, to describe the contents, or set forth the course of the argument. We may say, however, that on all the topics enumerated above something is said which deserves the closest study. Specially would we express our admiration of the treatment of the great subject of "Personality," which is more and more recognized to be the greatest question of theology and philosophy. When we shall have solved that problem, we shall have in our hands the key to everything. Dr. Miller has given us a thoughtful contribution towards the solution of the problem. It may be well to let Dr. Miller speak for himself: "When I observe objects which reveal to my experience and reason that they are self-determining, like myself, I am convinced they are persons. Upon such conviction we treat each other as free responsible beings. Hence the responsible qualities which distinguish persons maintain relationship through the whole family of man, and develop all forms of government and law. Though this reasoning is valid in all practical affairs, yet, in deciding what may be directly known, we must be guided by the facts of which we are directly conscious. Confined to these, we can at least affirm our individual being, dependence, and free action—in a word, our individual personality. This selfhood is the first fact which we directly know as objective, or external to God. We know it as objective to God because of our consciousness of perceiving, choosing, purposing, willing."

"Natural law" can be thought of as only the observed order in which God acts. It can give us no insight as to where that action in the world passes from subject to object, or whether it is subjective or totally objective. Natural law is simply a recognition that there is about us an Actor not ourselves who observes a regular order in

His action, observes harmony everywhere. Relative order is relative truth; and love is the content which determines the form of relative truth.

While we admire the metaphysical acumen manifested in the first part, we are even more impressed with the ethical insight and theological power displayed in the second part of his treatise. We regret the lack of space which prevents us from any adequate attempt to do justice to his great argument. Old truths appear in a new setting, which gives them a more profound significance. The doctrine of creation seems to take on a newer meaning; the old, old, perplexing question of the existence of evil, and its meaning, seems to assume a more hopeful aspect. The Atonement, on which so much has been written that one might suppose nothing fresh could be said, seems to attain to a larger fulness in the light of the evolution of love. The doctrine of eschatology obtains a fuller statement. They are the old doctrines in a larger setting. The book deserves the most careful study. JAMES IVERACH.

YR EPISTOLAU BUGEILIOL. Gan y Parch. WILLIAM JAMES, B.A. Manchester.

THIS handbook on the Pastoral Epistles is one of a series published by the General Assembly of the Welsh Presbytêrians, and intended for the use of their Sunday schools. This religious body has a Sunday School Union of its own, the committee of which arranges the year's lessons for the different classes, and appoints gentlemen to write useful lesson-helps on them. The establishing of this Union marks the beginning of a new epoch in the history of Welsh commentaries; already six have been published, and this one of Mr. James's is certainly in all respects equal to, and in some respects in advance of, the best in the series.

It is generally admitted that this way of getting commentaries is not the best to secure good ones; the idea of working to order in some, if not the majority of cases, takes away from the author, and consequently from his work, a good deal of that nobler enthusiasm which never appears except wedded to the highest love. We are glad to find that is not so in this case. The author seems quite in love with his subject, and has spared no labour to make the commentary in every way thorough and complete. It is, in our opinion, the completest yet published in Welsh, and has few equals of its kind even in German, and only one or two in English. All that the pretty advanced reader wants towards getting at what the apostle meant to say is here found most succinctly stated.

The handbook contains the usual introductory matter, an analytical index of the theology of these Epistles, and an analysis of the chapters. Then comes the text (in Welsh) and notes, with an account of the life of Timothy in the note on 1 Tim. i. 2; of Titus, on Titus i. 4; together with introductory notes on Church offices, before 1 Tim. iii.; on widows in their relation to the Church, before 1 Tim. v. 9. A page of errata and ten pages of *index rerum* complete the volume—220 pp. for 1*s.* 6*d.*, a marvel of cheapness.

It is quite evident that the author has thoroughly mastered almost all the literature of his subject; we only miss references to Gloag, Fairbairn, and Plumptre amongst modern English expositors, and Holtzmann, Weiss (in Meyer's 5th edit.), and von Soden among the prominent German onês. Principal Edwards's work on 1 Corinthians is the only work by a Welshman referred to. Does this mean that all that has hitherto been published in Welsh on this subject is obsolescent, if not obsolete? We have not discovered a single instance in which the author does injustice to or misquotes the works of others; and he always seems most anxious to

acknowledge the help they have rendered him—a feature never over-prominent in Welsh commentaries hitherto published. It is quite clear that the author knows his subject well, and throughout gives proof of the most precious gift of condensation, nowhere sacrificing clearness and adequate presentation of all the various topics discussed in this volume. In this respect it can be classed with the best of the Cambridge Bible Series, and it combines the learned conclusions of Ellicott with the wealthy exposition of Fairbairn or Plummer. The critical part could not, from the limits and object of the work, be elaborate, like Ellicott's, for it is intended for the use of Sunday schools; and the exposition is not as full as Fairbairn's, but is all that is wanted to form one's opinion of what the apostle meant to say. We can only wish that it was published also in English, so as to reach a wider class of readers, and fill the gap which yet remains until the Cambridge Press have fulfilled their promise, and which may possibly remain afterwards.

The author accepts the traditional view of the authorship and date of these Epistles, and gives the usual reasons for this view. We only wish he had worked out the argument from the appearance of strange words, and traversed it in detail, as it is found in Holtzmann's commentary; yet we should remember that it would be difficult to do so for the benefit of monoglots, such as this handbook is particularly intended for. We regard his criticism on Bishop Lightfoot's account of the *Gnosticism* as either too sweeping or too unguardedly stated. He says (p. xvi.), "In fact, it is not at all necessary for the bishop to look for such formal proofs of the existence of the Gnostic spirit, whether it came in by way of Essenism or in some other way." Such formal proofs may not be indispensable, but every scrap of evidence is more or less historically necessary.

The summary of the peculiar characteristics of these Epistles is very concise and complete, and the analytical index of their subject-matter is almost a new idea in a commentary. The method of this analysis it is hard to discover; but with a little classifying and elaboration it might easily be expanded into a monograph on the theology of these Epistles—a piece of work which may yet be said to be necessary in our country, and which, perhaps, has not yet been thoroughly and sympathetically done even in Germany.

The lives of Timothy and of Titus, and introductory notes such as those on Church offices and widows, are generally included in the introductions to commentaries. Perhaps the author chose to go from the "beaten path" because he thought that, by putting them in the notes, he would be the more likely to get them read by the average reader. Opinions will differ on this point. The accounts of the lives of Timothy and Titus are very compressed, and will require more than one reading. The notes on Church offices and widows are quite up to date, and contain all that could be put before the average reader. We have never read anything more satisfactory than the note on widows; it is a most fair representation of all that we are certain of with regard to their relation to the early Church, and the problem for further inquiry is clearly stated.

The notes sustain their character of thoroughness from beginning to end; the interest is unflagging; and we are delighted with the comparative method of exposition by which the author brings together all the expressions in these Epistles that bear on the same subject, as well as references to the other Epistles. We cannot be expected to go through them all, and we naturally turn to those verses which bear upon the burning questions of our day. Here we refer to two examples of the author's soberness, fairness, and strict adherence to what is contained in the text. Take the note on ἐν πνεύματι, 1 Tim. iii. 16. Most commentators—even modern ones—though

recognizing the absence of the article before πνεύματι, fail to disabuse their minds of the significance of this fact. They plunge themselves into metaphysical disquisitions anent the union of the Divine and human natures in the Person of Christ, and endeavour to palm their views on Paul. Their eagerness to avoid heresies, praiseworthy in itself, drives them to read their own views into this text rather than get Paul's out of it. With theirs the author's view compares very favourably. He says, "In spirit, *i.e.* in the inner life of His humanity, where reside consciousness and the intellectual and moral faculties, . . . In this spiritual element of his human nature, where man's moral character is proved and formed, He also was proved and found perfect." Again, turn to 2 Tim. iii. 16—a verse about which orthodox commentators are very nervous in their eagerness to guard the "cast-iron" theory of inspiration. The author reads it thus: "Better, *and it* (*i.e.* Scripture) *being*, or *because it is, inspired of God, is also profitable;*" and adds, "Further, the words appear to maintain that the ultimate test of the inspiration of every Scripture is its influence or profitableness towards securing the purposes named." Again, remembering that the author belongs to a religious body whose theology is Calvinistic to the core, the way in which he treats Calvin's exposition of 1 Tim. ii. 4 is another example of his fairness. Thus he says, "Calvin's method of harmonizing what is here said with his doctrine of personal election, viz. by saying that these words mean that God wills that all men should hear the gospel ('unto the *knowledge* of truth'), is not only feeble in itself, but also utterly useless for his purpose." No one, so far as I remember just now, has pointed out so clearly the difference between ἔμαθες and ἐπιστώθης (2 Tim. iii. 14). On ἔμαθες he says, "*Thou hast learnt*, i.e. particularly, learnt out by heart, as a 'child' (ver. 15);" and on ἐπιστώθης, "*Better, thou wert assured of*, i.e. by his experience and reflection as 'man.'"

We should call attention to the new feature in this commentary. The author, in his "advertisement," as he calls it, defines what he is aiming at thus: "Where that was possible, and appeared useful, I have attempted to introduce the monoglot Welshman face to face with the original text, and to help him for the moment, as it were, to read his Bible lesson in the original." In order to accomplish his purpose, the author has not only made the best use of the notes, but also added most valuable footnotes, in which he compares Welsh words with the Greek of which they are translations, and in which, where the same Welsh word is used to translate different Greek ones, he explains the difference between the meanings of the latter; he also makes the best use of Celtic etymology, where that is possible. He makes no claim to any special knowledge of philology; but all his suggestions are backed up by Curtius's *Greek Etymology*. The mere work of turning a Greek lexicon into Welsh would be a boon to the "monoglot Welshman;" but he will find in these footnotes the mature conclusions of one who has studied his grammar, lexicon, and Greek synonyms, etc., to the best advantage. There may be in them nothing new to the scholar, except, perhaps, to the majority, their Celtic etymologies, yet they answer their purpose admirably; they tend to whet the taste of the monoglot for acquiring knowledge of the original language of the New Testament. Space will not allow us to go through these footnotes.

There may be many points of detail in the exposition from which one might, and many do, dissent; yet in every case the exposition given is, in the main, on the right side, and, in the matter of details, should be seriously counted with. If we had to point out what may be considered faults, we should have to turn to the style and orthography of the book, matters, especially the latter, which it is very difficult to have two men to agree upon. The style will be regarded by some as too involved, and

even turgid. It would compare very favourably with Butler's style in English. It does not need a commentary, as was said of one of these handbooks; and the sentences, upon a second reading, will generally be found stiff with thought. Welsh scholars of the new school will certainly object to the use of the verb "sydd" in principal sentences, and the use of "pa un" (in all forms) interrogative for "yr un," relative pronoun.

It might seem strange that we should devote such great space to an eighteenpenny book. But it should be remembered that it will be the most important book of the year in Wales; it will command a sale of about twenty thousand copies; it is a marvel of cheapness, and would, in the Cambridge Series, be sold at three and sixpence at least. Surely some one must be underpaid in the production! Add to these facts, the sterling quality of the work. WILLIAM GLYNNE.

EXPOSITOR'S BIBLE: THE BOOK OF DANIEL. By Ven. Archdeacon FARRAR. Hodder and Stoughton.

THERE are few authors in the religious world who are so popular as Archdeacon Farrar. He has the power of making those who peruse his works see what he describes, and thus appeals to the non-professional reader in a way that few theological writers do or can do. While the luxuriant graces of his style allure the reader, the numerous quotations and references gain his confidence by the assurance thereby afforded that for every statement made there is ample justification. Archdeacon Farrar represents to most a certain free and wholesome evangelicalism, eager to maintain the essentials of gospel teaching, but as to every non-essential matter open to all the freshest results of critical investigation. No one can fail to be moved at once by the eloquence and by the piety of his *Life of Christ*. He has seemed to most religious people the union of the novelist with the scholar, possessing all the graces of style and all the power of description and characterization which we associate with the former, and all the accurate information we associate with the latter. Indeed, he has been a most successful novelist. And if he has given the public no book on the niceties of scholarship, the position which he once occupied of Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and later of a master in Harrow School, guarantees his full and perfect knowledge of all such niceties.

Of course, the studies pursued in Cambridge and Harrow do not guarantee his accurate knowledge of Hebrew. A man might easily be Fellow in Cambridge and master in Harrow and not know anything of Hebrew. A very little study of Archdeacon Farrar's numerous works will soon remove that *caveat*. When he speaks of any official of the Jewish synagogue, or any article of Jewish dress, we find that he always gives the Hebrew name, if not in Hebrew characters, at least transliterated as nearly as possible. No one can study the chapter on "Rabbinic Interpretation" in his *Bampton Lecture* without being impressed with his wide and seemingly profound knowledge of the Talmud.

It is no wonder, then, that the whole religious world learned with interest the fact that Archdeacon Farrar had arranged with Dr. Robertson Nicoll to write the *Commentary on Daniel* in the Expositor's Bible Series. The high level of excellence maintained by that series in previous commentaries was an additional guarantee, if such were needed, that this too would be excellent. The Book of Daniel has occupied the attention of critics for many decades in a way that no other book in Old Testament Scripture has. Readers naturally expected to find in this commentary not only a wide acquaintance with everything that had been written on Daniel, but also a comprehensive and intelligible view of the whole question, self-consistent and in harmony with what is most certainly believed by evangelical people.

We are sorry to say that these hopes have been to a great extent disappointed. That he should maintain the critical date of Daniel was not surprising, as many men whose piety and whose evangelical soundness is indubitable have dated Daniel in the Maccabean period. We need refer to no more than two of those who have been his collaborateurs in the Expositor's Bible—Professors Marcus Dods and George Adam Smith. We do, however, object to what seems to us a bullying tone to those that, like ourselves, are not able to accept the critical position; to the pooh-poohing without examination of such arguments for the traditional position as he does mention, and the absolute neglect of many other arguments. We further scarcely expected to find it laid down almost in terms, with certain saving clauses, perhaps, that whatever the prophet did he did not prophesy in the sense of *foretelling;* that what foretelling was in his message was merely an inconspicuous adjunct to his exhortation. We, for our part, hold that it is incumbent on Archdeacon Farrar to explain the stress laid by our Lord and His apostles on the argument from prophecy. We know Archdeacon Farrar would not accuse his Lord of deceiving the disciples when on the way to Emmaus He upbraided them as slow of heart in not believing "all that the prophets had spoken." It is difficult, on the critical hypothesis of the nature of prophecy, to escape the conclusion that Christianity, as resting so largely on the evidence of prophecy, was founded on falsehood.

Yet, again, whatever the school to which a commentator belongs, the reading public have a right to demand that he be accurate, and we are sorry to say that Archdeacon Farrar is far from accurate. In not a few cases he actually uses blunders which it is difficult to characterize as other than disgraceful as grounds of argument. Thus, p. 10, he wishes to show that Ezekiel could not have referred to the Daniel of the canonical book, as, if the narrative of the first chapter be received, he would be too young to be so honoured. He says—

"Daniel was taken captive in the third year of Jehoiakim (Dan. i. 1), about the year 606. Ignatius says he was twelve years old when he foiled the elders; and the narrative shows he could not have been much older when taken captive. If Ezekiel's prophecy was uttered B.C. 584, Daniel at that time could only have been twenty-two; if it was uttered as late as B.C. 572, Daniel would still have been only thirty-four, and therefore little more than a youth in Jewish eyes."

If we subtract 584 from 606, the result is 22, and that gives the number of years from the time that Daniel was carried captive; but he was, on Archdeacon Farrar's own showing, twelve years old at that time, therefore he was thirty-four at the date in question; so, with the later date, Daniel, on Archdeacon Farrar's own hypothesis, was at that time forty-six, not thirty-four. It seems singular that Archdeacon Farrar should quote from Ignatius in the *long* recension at all, full as it is of falsifications and interpolations; still more singular that he should quote Bishop Lightfoot's note and yet retain his reference in the text. There is a further singularity: in the beginning of the note which Bishop Lightfoot appends to that passage—a part which Archdeacon Farrar does not give—he says, speaking of Daniel, "His age is not given in the narrative, and it is difficult to see whence it could have been derived." Even, however, what he does give of Lightfoot's note shows the valuelessness of the reference. It is incumbent on Archdeacon Farrar to show what in the narrative fixes the age of Daniel to be that precisely which he has predetermined. Elsewhere he rests his argument partly on the meaning of יֶלֶד, *yeled;* but Joseph was called *yeled* when he was *seventeen* years old by his brother Reuben (Gen. xxxvii. 30), and Benjamin is also called *yeled* when he was the father of ten sons (Gen. xliv. 20; comp. xlvi. 21). Further, those that were brought up with Rehoboam were still *yladeem* at his accession, when he, and therefore they, were

over forty years of age. We would point out another blunder in connexion with this reference to Ignatius. In the note, after giving the reference to Ignatius, *Ad Mag.*, 3, the archdeacon adds, "so too in *ps.-Mar. ad Ignat.*, 3," as if there also twelve was the age assigned to Daniel, whereas there is no age assigned to Daniel there at all, though he is referred to; but further down in the passage the age in question is mentioned as that of Solomon when he gave his famous judgment. The reason of the blunder is that the archdeacon has taken the bishop's reference to the *Epistle of Mary to Ignatius*, and mistaken the meaning of it; it is not to give a parallel example of attributing to Daniel the age of twelve when he was carried captive, but to explain his (Lightfoot's) suggestion (which Farrar quotes) that there is a transference from Solomon. Archdeacon Farrar would do well to lay to heart Routh's advice, "Always verify your references."

Sometimes the blunder on which he builds his argument is not his own, but he has borrowed it, with due acknowledgment certainly, but without correcting it. Professor Cornill (*Siebzig Jahrwochen Daniels*, p. 31, note) maintains that by *Gematria* Nebuchadnezzar is identical with Antiochus Epiphanes. *Gematria*, we ought to explain, is a way of estimating the numerical value of a name or a sentence by reckoning together the numerical value of each of the letters, and then asserting its identity with another name or sentence of a similar numerical value. Professor Cornill spreads out the letters of the two names, and appends the numerical value to each; but he assigns the value 70 to ס, the seventeenth letter of the Hebrew alphabet, when it ought to have been 80. This is the value assigned to it by Gesenius, Fürst, and Palmer, and this value it retained in Greek and Syriac, and this value the corresponding letter retains to this day in Arabic. We know that one of the explanations of the transposition of ע and פ in the second, third, and fourth chapters of Lamentations is that it is due to a difference in the order of the alphabet. That explanation is regarded by some to have been exploded by Gesenius. Certainly, by the time the Septuagint Version was made, the order of the letters was the same as now, as proved by the fact that the translators give the letters in the present order over against the verses in those chapters in Lamentations, without attending to the transposition. These are the only cases of transposition. Moreover, we have no sign that *Gematria* ever followed that order, which may have been adopted from some exigence of versification. Neither Cornill nor Farrar appeals to this explanation. Yet Archdeacon Farrar on this blunder builds an argument against the authenticity of Daniel.

We could multiply indefinitely mistakes and blunders either peculiar to Archdeacon Farrar or adopted by him, but we have occupied so much space that we cannot do so without wearying our readers. We should have wished to refer to the numerous self-contradictions of which this commentary is full. It is difficult to account for such a book coming from the pen of Archdeacon Farrar. We say it more in sorrow than in anger—it is utterly unworthy of his reputation. That it is utterly unworthy of the series of which it forms one goes without saying. J. E. H. THOMSON.

THE JOHANNINE THEOLOGY. A STUDY OF THE DOCTRINAL CONTENTS OF THE GOSPEL AND EPISTLES OF THE APOSTLE JOHN. By GEORGE B. STEVENS, PhD., D.D. London: R. D. Dickinson. 1894.

WITHOUT any discussion of the genuineness of the writings ascribed to the Apostle John, taking for granted that the traditional view is correct, and omitting all treatment of the Revelation (as a unique work, requiring separate handling), Dr. Stevens here presents a very complete survey of what he conceives to be the Johannine theology. There are many works bearing on this subject, of which a copious list is

furnished in the present volume, but in our author's opinion they are all "either too limited in scope, or too apologetic or purely practical in aim, to be regarded as works on Biblical theology in any very strict sense." At the same time, he allows that it is vain to seek for a system in the Johannine documents; we have single truths, glimpses of profoundest doctrine, but no completeness of form, and we are left to connect and find the correlation of the *disjecta membra* as best we may. By emphasizing the fundamental ideas upon which the apostle's theology seems to centre, Dr. Stevens has endeavoured with much success to display the unity and simplicity of his teaching. St. John seems to have a tendency to group his thoughts and to arrange his facts round certain great truths, first and foremost of which stands that concerning the Person of his Master and His relation to mankind. "He grounds the work of Christ in His Person." The life of Christ incarnate is, so to speak, the practical revelation of forces and attributes which are essential in His being. St. John himself enunciates his purpose in writing the Gospel: "These are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through His Name;" his design, to show that Jesus is the Son of God, the expected Messiah, and the Author and Giver of spiritual life and light. John is penetrated with the idea that the action of God springs from His Divine nature, that all that God has done in revelation and redemption it was according to His nature to do; the Incarnation is the coming to men of One "who, in His own Person and character, is a transcript of the Divine nature." All the demands of duty, in the apostle's teaching, are derived from the ethical nature of God. Dr. Stevens traces the idea of God in the writings of John. The Old Testament, preparatory and provisional as it was, was a self-revelation of the Word before His personal manifestation. There are many instances where John notes relations between Old Testament prophecy and circumstances in the life of Jesus, using typical parallelism to explain and enforce the references. Many of such passages are discussed critically and skilfully in ch. ii. Before dealing with the subject of the Logos, Dr. Stevens further elucidates John's conception of the nature of God. His idea proceeds on the assertion made to the woman of Samaria, "God is Spirit"—not, God is "a spirit," as in our versions, but taking "spirit" as a generic description of the Divine nature, as we have the analogous expressions, "God is love," "God is light." With regard to the Logos, the fact that the apostle does not explain the term shows that it was current and generally understood. He may have in part derived it from the writings of Philo, but both he and Philo founded themselves upon the Old Testament, where a tendency to personify the active power of God under the term "Word" and His ethical attributes under that of "Wisdom," is unmistakably apparent. The doctrine is not brought forward to solve certain philosophical difficulties, but to present the great truth that the pre-existent Son of God became incarnate in Jesus Christ. This is well discussed in our volume, the signification of the union of the Son with the Father being introduced in orthodox language. Dr. Stevens will not have all readers with him when he affirms that St. John lays no emphasis upon the Christian sacraments. He calls the passage ch. iii. a doubtful reference to Baptism, and sees in ch. vi. only a metaphorical allusion to the propitiatory death of Christ and the appropriation of His saving work. Christ effects man's salvation by "offering Himself as the Object of faith, and by entering into loving fellowship with men"—which is true enough, but does not touch the sacramental question.

The book is one to be closely studied. The author is always lucid, devout, and charitable, and has produced a treatise which throws much light on many vexed questions both in theology and Biblical interpretation. W. J. Deane.

THE THINKER.

THE SURVEY OF THOUGHT.

THE VISION OF NAHUM THE ELKOSHITE.—This little prophetic writing, or rather two chapters of it—for the psalm which extends over the whole of the first chapter with the exception of the first verse, is not included—has furnished material for a learned treatise of a hundred pages. It is the joint work of Dr. Alfred Jeremias, a distinguished German Assyriologist, and Oberst Adolf Billerbeck, a German officer interested in Assyrian research. The text of these chapters is translated and illustrated from monumental sources, and the military aspects of the subject are fully discussed. Three maps are appended, and the letter-press is interspersed with thirty cuts. The result is a book of exceptional value, not only for the study of Nahum, for which it will be indispensable, but also for the right understanding of passages in other prophetic writings as well as of Israelitish and Jewish history, from the time of Elijah to the fall of Jerusalem. The situation of Elkosh, Nahum's home or birthplace, has long been an unsettled question; and Dr. Jeremias, who is responsible for most of the former part of the work, is unable to close the controversy. Neither the Assyrian site which has found favour with some writers, notably the late Dr. Franz Delitzsch, *Alkush*, about two days' journey to the north of the ancient Nineveh, nor the Galilæan site, *El-Kozah*, a little to the east of Rama in Naphtali, can in his judgment be accepted with our present information. The latter, however, is considered less probable than the former. The author inclines, indeed, to the belief that Nahum was born in exile. At any rate, the dogmatic remark of Wellhausen, that Nahum was "in any case a Jew from Judæa," is emphatically rejected. The references to Nineveh are held to imply personal knowledge. The date of composition is not defined, but it is hinted that it may have been after the death of Assurbanipal. The book is a prophecy, not a *vaticinium post eventum*, as some have maintained. Nahum "foresaw the destruction of Nineveh." The quality of these two chapters is rated very high. Nahum was "an enthusiastic patriot and a richly gifted poet." Many of the details are illustrated from Assyrian bas-reliefs and inscriptions; and the faithfulness of the picture sketched by the Hebrew prophet is thus strikingly demonstrated. The following are three examples out of many. (1) Ch. iii. 13, "Behold, thy people in

the midst of thee are women." The full significance of these bitter words comes out when we put by the side of them the substance of an Assyrian curse. "If Mati'ilum of Harran," wrote an Assyrian king, "sin against these enactments . . . his people shall become women." Evidently the weakness of women was a common symbol of excessive feebleness in Western Asia in ancient times. (2) Ch. iii. 15, "There shall the fire devour thee; the sword shall cut thee off." An Assyrian king of Nahum's age regularly couples fire and sword. Again and again we read in his inscriptions, "I struck down that city, I burned it with fire." It is added elsewhere that the excavations in the ruins of Nineveh bear testimony to the action of fire. (3) Ch. iii. 17, "Thy scribes [margin of R.V.] are as the swarms of grasshoppers." The Hebrew word for "scribes" is rendered "tablet-writers," and is identified with the Assyrian *dup-sar-ru*. Now, in the days of Assurbanipal, the king alluded to above as one of Nahum's contemporaries, the tablet-writer was one of the most important persons in the country. This king was a great patron of art and literature, and founded a great library, in which were deposited copies made by his order of books of all sorts. Consequently, scribes were honoured as never before, and we cannot doubt that multitudes eagerly pressed into their ranks. The prophet's comparison, therefore, is in complete harmony with the evidence of Assyrian records. The work as a whole is well calculated to strengthen regard for the Bible. It is only now and then that so solid a contribution to the intelligent and reverent study of Scripture comes from Germany.

THE MAGICIANS OF PHARAOH.—The magicians who aided the Pharaoh in his struggle with Moses are represented as capable of performing very wonderful feats. Their rods, when thrown on the ground, became serpents. Water was turned into blood. Frogs were brought up on the land of Egypt. All this was effected, we read, "by their enchantments" (Exod. vii. 11, 22; viii. 7). These surprising statements are quite in harmony with native testimony. The so-called Westcar Papyrus contains several tales about magic in the valley of the Nile, which were probably written ages before Moses. They have been known to specialists for many years, but have only just been made readily accessible to the English public in a small volume entitled, *Egyptian Tales from the Papyri*, first series, ninth to tenth dynasty, by Professor Flinders Petrie. It is clear from these primitive stories, the oldest literary efforts of their kind known to exist, that the professors of occult sciences in ancient Egypt laid claim in very early times to exactly the same sort of power as that ascribed to them by the writer of Exodus. One of them caught a wicked page by means of a wax crocodile which he had enchanted, saying to it, "When the page comes and bathes in my lake, seize on him." The page came. The image was thrown in the water behind him, and immediately became a living crocodile of great size, which promptly did its maker's bidding. At his command it returned

to the bank, and when he placed his hand upon it, it became again a crocodile of wax. Professor Petrie adds that the idea of the efficacy of a model, which lies at the basis of this story, is still continually met with in Egypt. Another magician discovered a lost jewel at the bottom of a lake, by uttering a magic speech in consequence of which he placed "one part of the waters of the lake on the other." A third, who had attained the ideal Egyptian age of a hundred and ten years, amused a brutal Pharaoh by even more astounding marvels. When asked if it was true, as men said, that he could restore the head that was smitten off, he answered that it was. The Pharaoh then suggested that a prisoner should be brought for the magician to experiment on, but the wise man, who was more humane than his royal master, objected. So a duck was brought to him, "and its head was cut off. And the duck was laid on the west side of the hall, and its head on the east side of the hall. And Dedi (the magician) spake his magic speech. And the duck fluttered along the ground, and its head came likewise; and when it had come part to part, the duck stood and quacked." A goose and an ox were then successively handled in the same manner, with the same result. This master of magic, who was great at eating and drinking as well as at charms and spells—for he consumed five hundred loaves of bread, a side of beef, and one hundred draughts of beer—could not do without his books. When summoned by the Pharaoh, he demanded his youths and his books. The common Oriental salutation, "Peace to thee!" is found in this story; and the way of addressing the Pharaoh, "O king, life, health, wealth!" reminds us of the Biblical formula, "O king, live for ever!" There is a great deal more in the book of interest to Bible-readers, and its attractiveness and usefulness are considerably enhanced by more than twenty well-executed engravings by an artist familiar with Egypt, and assisted by the archæological knowledge of the editor.

History of the Modern Hebrew Character.—This obscure subject is examined at length by a Jewish scholar, Professor Ludwig Blau of Buda Pesth, in an *Introduction to Holy Scripture*, intended primarily for the use of Jewish students. The conclusions coincide in a large degree with those arrived at by Christian scholars. With them, he believes the square character to be of Aramaic origin; and rejects the Talmudic tradition, which ascribes its introduction among the Jews to Ezra. The first appearance of the new writing, he thinks, may fall into the time of the Maccabean rising, at the earliest a few decades before that movement. As the Aramaic language gained ground, the Aramaic way of writing kept pace with it, and imperceptibly stole into literature. It is suggested that it may have been introduced into Biblical manuscripts by expert Aramaic copyists who were not Jews, the religion and nationality of those who copied the Scriptures not being at the time taken into account. This rather startling assertion is accompanied by a reference to a passage

in the *Tosefta*, which seems to show that even long afterwards, Biblical manuscripts written by heathens were admissible if correct. The passage runs as follows: "Books, phylacteries, mezuzoth, are accepted from a Gentile, if only they are correctly written" (*Tosefta*, p. 463 of Zuckermandel's edition). For a considerable period, this application of Aramaic characters to the Hebrew Scriptures will have attracted no attention, so that the two ways of writing existed peacefully side by side. In course of time, the copies written in the square character outnumbered the others, so that it became necessary to decide which should have the preference for copies of the Law. The decision ran in favour of the former. Why? It is suggested that it may have been thought desirable to distinguish the sacred writings from profane documents by the use of a certain set of characters, and that the new ones were selected because the old ones were constantly employed in common life. The latter, however, were not prohibited. There are some dark passages in the Talmud which are interpreted to mean that Biblical manuscripts written in the character originally used by the Jews were not unknown long after the commencement of the Christian era. They were accounted less sacred than those written in the authorized character, but they were not absolutely rejected. Those interested in these difficult questions will appreciate this learned effort to grapple with them by an enlightened student of the Talmud.

Roman Law in the Epistle to the Galatians.—According to Dr. Anton Halmel of Vienna, the famous argument about the relation of the Law of Moses to the promise to Abraham, and the gospel in Gal. iii. 15–20, 29, and iv. 1, 2, rests on Latin juristic terminology. About a dozen expressions are singled out as technical terms of the Roman law of inheritance. The key-word διαθήκη is considered to be the Greek for *testamentum*. The verb ἐπιδιατάσσεσθαι is rendered by *insuper mandare*, and μεσίτης is translated by *mediator*, *persona interposita*. The last does not describe a mediator in the theological sense between man and God, but refers to Moses as standing in time between Abraham and Christ. The second of these proposed identifications is certainly ingenious. If it is accepted, then the Law must be regarded as a codicil, which, according to Roman law, supplied no title of inheritance: *codicillis heres non instituitur*, and *codicillis hereditas neque dari neque adimi potest*. The whole series of parallels, however, is very precarious. The terms admit of explanation without recourse to Roman law. And even if the reference is admitted, it need not have the significance which Dr. Halmel claims for it. He maintains (and this is really the object of the essay) that the apostle can have obtained this acquaintance with Roman juristic terminology only in Italy, and that therefore the Epistle to the Galatians must have been written in Italy, if not in Rome itself. This does not in the least follow. The pamphlet is clever, but not conclusive.

RELIGION AND THE STATE.—The Dean of Ripon contributes to the *Contemporary Review* a very interesting critique of an article by Dr. Clifford, in the March issue of the same periodical, on "Religion and the State." He asserts that the article in question was calculated to afford great pleasure to liberal Churchmen, though he is of opinion that the writer has not carried the principles which he set forth to their logical issue. "The old disparaging estimate of the State," he says, "that which represents it as existing merely for material well-being, and gaining its ends by coercion, is wholly abandoned by Dr. Clifford. The nation is, in his view, a spiritual entity, the embodiment of a spiritual idea. We are no longer to speak of the State as some iron framework which fetters us; the State is the people, or at least an instrument freely organized by them, and plastic under their hands. Similarly, religion is no longer an abstract theory, but becomes concrete in the community. The religion of England is Christian and Biblical, though not dogmatically defined; it is not any denominationalism or undenominationalism, but that which is beyond all these—the spirit which does justly, and loves mercy, and walks humbly with God: 'its chief note is service, the effort to do good—the undoing of the yoke, the letting the oppressed go free, and the proclaiming the acceptable year of the Lord.'" The Dean points out that it is inconsistent with this principle to insist upon a sharp line of distinction being drawn between the Church and the State, and to apply the former of these titles exclusively to the assembly of worshippers. "Dr. Clifford abandons the idea that the nation is a godless entity. Its direction is to be Godward till it becomes a veritable kingdom of God. Yet he maintains that it must never have anything to do with the inner life of the Church, that is, of societies organized for public worship and its adjuncts. These are to be kept in their separate exclusive state in the name, as the Puritans said, of 'the rights of King Jesus.' Are, then, the rights of the King of mankind unrecognized in all other parts of His dominion but that of public worship? We have here, I think, a relic of the old antagonism which we may hope to see disappear. For if the nation, the complete body of Christians, in which the worshipping body is included as a minor circle, grows more and more to represent Christ's Church, and to do its work, on what ground can it be maintained that societies formed exclusively for public worship and Christian teaching, and certain rudimentary acts of beneficence, can justly arrogate to themselves the name of the Church? This is certainly not the Biblical use of the term. The word 'Ecclesia' is taken from the Septuagint, where it is used for the 'congregation' of Israel, that is, for the people as a whole in all their public action. Christ and His apostles, and those to whom they spoke, had thus been accustomed to hear of the Church (Ecclesia) fighting battles (Judg. xxi. 5), or holding national festivals (1 Kings viii. 65), or returning as a nation from Babylon (Ezra ii. 64); and the idea of the Christian Ecclesia must therefore have been that of a Divine society embracing the whole human life,

not of an assembly for worship. It corresponds with the classical use of the word 'Ecclesia,' which meant the whole body of citizens called forth from their homes for public business. The notion that Christ founded a body mainly destined for public worship (of which He hardly ever spoke, as Dr. Clifford allows) is due to the misguided and excessive interest in this department which has unfortunately prevailed. St. Paul's idea of the Church is that of 'the body of Christ, the fulness of Him who filleth all in all;' 'a great house in which there are vessels of all kinds.' How can these descriptions of it be satisfied by what Dr. Clifford calls Churches? Can it be pretended that the congregation of Westbourne Park Chapel or of Canterbury Cathedral expresses the full life of the God who fills all things? These limited bodies do not even profess to do it. They know that they would expose themselves to ridicule if they tried to manage the affairs of mankind, a task in which Hildebrand, with all his resources, failed. Nothing but the whole Christian people, and the national organs which express their will and give effect to it, can in any complete sense fulfil the New Testament idea of the Church within the realm of England."

True and False Notions of Prayer.—In an article in the *Nineteenth Century*, Mr. Norman Pearson endeavours to show that, though it is usually assumed that prayer in the ordinary sense of the term can find no place in any scientific conceptions of the universe, it may yet fill a place in religion from which science has no need, and, perhaps, no power to expel it. He, however, finds it necessary to eliminate many things from the ordinary theological conception of prayer, in order that the practice in question may be brought into conformity with the views of science and philosophy. First of all, everything in the nature of petition for spiritual or physical benefits must be given up. Then, too, anything in the nature of deprecation, and anything like confession of sin, should, he considers, be eliminated from prayer, as resting on a false conception of the nature and attributes of God, and of man's relation to the order of the universe. "If it be asked," he says, "what residue will be left of prayer after these components have been struck out, I turn to Cardinal Manning for an answer. In one of his sermons prayer is described as 'a means of realizing man's personal relation to God.' There is little in this description which could not be accepted by any scientific man who does not altogether deny the existence of a Deity. But, indeed, no science can lawfully forbid man to believe that he, with his past and his future, belongs to a system of existence which is inspired to struggle upwards by 'a power that makes for righteousness.' His relations to such a power would be outraged by petitions for the disturbance of this order, and degraded by the deprecation and self-abasement which can only fitly belong to the worship of the malign. In these relations alone must we seek for the true explanation of man's place in the scheme of nature, and

for trustworthy guidance of his right conduct therein. To him, as the latest and highest product of this scheme, its due progress seems to be specially committed; and consequently, conduct which impedes his own struggle upwards is not only an offence against his own highest interests, but is a sin against the order of the universe. This belief as to the nature of the scheme of existence is no bar to the impulse which so naturally arises in us to commune with the Divine power which is behind and within this scheme. Such communing is surely a means of 'realizing man's personal relation to God,' and may fitly be described as prayer." In other words, prayer is the expression of man's recognition of the Divine power and intelligence manifested in the universe, frank submission to its order, ready acceptance of the burdens of his high part therein, and earnest resolve to play that part well. It may, however, be doubted if prayer, even in this highly attenuated form, would long continue as a practice in any society composed of beings who had no sense of dependence upon a Creator, of personal responsibility for conduct, or of contrition for wrong-doing, and who had no belief that the Being to whom they prayed, or with whom they had communion, could bestow benefits of any kind, physical or spiritual.

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

ALEXANDER COMRIE.[1]

By Rev. J. P. Lilley, M.A.

While spending a holiday in the Highlands of Scotland some years ago, Dr. A. Kuyper of Amsterdam was very much surprised to find that the very name of Alexander Comrie seemed to be quite unknown to his countrymen. In Holland his memory was still very warmly cherished: in Scotland the great work he had done for the Dutch Reformed Church had apparently never been heard of. It was this "inexplicable ignorance," as he plainly called it, that led him to contribute to the *Catholic Presbyterian* of 1892 the three papers on "Alexander Comrie: his Life and Work in Holland," that to most students of Church history form almost the only available source of information on the subject. The short article on Comrie in the *Dictionary of National Biography* is wholly based on Dr. Kuyper's papers.

Now, however, we have a much more complete account of this eminent Scoto-Dutch minister, from Dr. A. G. Honig of Oudshorn, near Leiden. Originally presented in the form of an academic essay read before the Faculty of Theology in the Free University of Amsterdam, the work is now published in handsome octavo form, as a complete review, not

[1] Dr. A. G. Honig. Utrecht: H. Honig.

only of Comrie's ministerial life and work, but also of the part he played as a writer on dogmatic theology and as an ecclesiastical controversialist. A friend and former pupil of Professor Kuyper, Dr. Honig frankly acknowledges his indebtedness to him for the main impulse he received in this study. But he has been enabled to avail himself of sources, Scottish and Dutch, that Dr. Kuyper had never reached, and by the direct use of these, as well as the special study of Comrie's whole writings, he has succeeded in giving what will be for a long time the fullest and most accurate account of his whole career.

After an introduction, dealing with the wonderful way in which the attachment of a large section of the Dutch Reformed Church to the old Calvinism has still been maintained, Dr. Honig devotes the first part of his book to Comrie's "life and work." Here we have a series of interesting facts never before ascertained. Alexander Comrie was born in Perth, on the 16th of December, 1706. His father, Patrick Comrie, was originally a writer to the signet in Edinburgh, but seems to have retired to the Perthshire village that bears his name, retaining, however, a house in Edinburgh and an office in Perth. Patrick Comrie's ancestors had been landowners of high standing in that district ever since the Reformation, and seem also to have been adherents of the evangelical cause. His mother was Rachel Vans, and she too had ancestry yet more notably connected with the cause of the gospel in Scotland. For her great-grandfather was Sir William Gray, of Pittendrum, and her grandfather was the Rev. Andrew Gray, who by his brief ministry left such an impression of ability and piety that his memory and writings are cherished to this day. Other connexions of the family were James Fraser of Brae, and Bishop Gilbert Burnet the historian.

Springing from such a stock, and brought up in the strict family life of the evangelical party in those days, Comrie could hardly fail to imbibe strong evangelical convictions. He seems, indeed, to have cherished these from his earliest youth. How they grew so strong as to sway his character is partly explained by the fact that his father appears to have associated much with the brothers Ralph and Ebenezer Erskine, and Thomas Boston of Ettrick, in his private life, and to have seized frequent opportunities of worshipping with them at the great and solemn communion seasons that then occupied so prominent a place in the religious life of Scotland. So decided was young Comrie in his attachment to the truths of the gospel, that his father had no hesitation in giving him an education preparatory for the ministry. But for some unexplained reason—perhaps some change in the circumstances of the family—he was led to give up this project, and, to the lad's great disappointment, had him engaged to serve his apprenticeship in the office of a large mercantile house in Amsterdam. This was Comrie's first introduction to the country where he was to have his first desire fulfilled, and do so great a work for his Lord.

Dr. Kuyper was able, from private information, to tell the story of Comrie's entrance on the study for the ministry of the Dutch Reformed Church; and this account Dr. Honig reproduces here. In the dusk of one summer evening, a farmer of Woubrugge, a village near Leiden, saw a tall, handsome young man approaching his house. Viewing him at first with some suspicion, he unbolted the upper half of the front door, and asked what his errand might be. The youth replied that he wanted shelter for the night, as he was quite penniless, and help on his way to Leiden next morning. Not without misgivings, the farmer received him into a small bedroom next his own. As he was retiring to rest, the stranger prayed in Dutch so fervently for his host that the listening farmer was fairly melted by the petitions, and next morning acknowledged that this prayer for him had been the turning-point of his spiritual life. The stranger youth was Alexander Comrie, who came to the district to see a deep work of grace going on at that time, but had been shipwrecked, with the loss of all he possessed, in crossing a neighbouring lake. After Comrie had told his history, the first step of the farmer was to introduce him to the two lords of the manor who lived hard by. These friends were in turn so favourably impressed with the ability and character of the young Scotchman, that they opened up his way for resuming his studies for the ministry at Groningen, where in course of time he took the double degree of Master of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy. In grateful recognition of this kindness, Comrie accepted a call to the ministry of the Church in this very village of Woubrugge, then vacant, and, in spite of many calls to other congregations, spent there the whole period of his ministry of nearly forty years.

Dr. Honig has investigated Comrie's whole career at the university, and his subsequent ministry, with the most praiseworthy industry and fidelity. We have not come across any book which reproduces in such detail the work of a divinity student at a foreign university in those times, or gives such an interesting glimpse of the careful way in which all the steps of entrance on the work of the ministry were carried through. By his simple fervent exposition of the truths of Scripture and the gospel, Comrie not only exercised a very powerful influence on the parish where he laboured, but attracted visitors to his church from districts all around. His work was done with entire devotion to the salvation of souls and the utmost self-effacement. So little importance did he attach to the part he himself played in his ministry, that, before he died, he gave orders that no obituary notice of him should be written, and that no inscription should be made on the stone over his grave. He died in Gouda in 1773, mourned by friends over the whole country.

The real secret, however, of the lasting influence which Comrie's name still wields in Holland, lies not so much in the memory of his ministry, as in the numerous writings that came from his pen while he was carrying on his pastoral work at Woubrugge. For the most part

they are original works of Comrie, written in Dutch; but not a few are translations of evangelical writings by prominent ministers in Scotland, which Comrie was anxious to introduce into Holland. Very numerous impressions of these were issued, and they are widely circulated and read in Holland to this day. We are indebted to Dr. Honig for the best account of these we have yet seen. We mention first those that have a strictly theological interest. They are generally signed as "door Alexander Comrie, Scoto-Brittanus, A.L.M., Philosophiæ Doctor en Predikant te Woubrugge."

1. *Dissertatio Philosophica Inauguratis de Moralitatis Fundamento et Natura Virtutis* (the academic dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy). Leiden: 1734.

2. *Het A. B. C. des Geloofs* (a treatise on the different symbolic descriptions of faith, set forth in alphabetic order), 1739. The twentieth large edition was published at Leiden, in 1888.

3. *De Verborgentheit van de Euangelische Heiligmaking* (a translation of W. Marshall's well-known treatise on *The Mystery of Gospel Sanctification*), 1739; new edit., 1846.

4. *Eene Beschouwing van het Verbondt der Genade* (a translation of Boston's *View of the Covenant of Grace*), 1741; new edit., 1868.

5. *De Gelykenis der Tien Maagden* (a translation of Thomas Shepard's work on *The Parable of the Ten Virgins*), latest edit., 1884.

6. *Verhandeling van eenige eigenschappen des Zaligmakenden Geloofs* (a treatise on some properties of saving faith), 1744; 20th edit., 1885.

7. *Sakelyke en Practicale Verklaringe van de Twaalf Kleine Propheten* (textual and practical expositions of the minor prophets: a translation of George Hutcheson of Edinburgh's work), 1748; latest edit., 1892.

8. *Samuel in zyn Leven zeer gelieft, in zyn Doodt betreurt* ("Samuel deeply loved in life and mourned in death:" a funeral sermon in connexion with the death of his friend, Van Schellingerhout).

9. *Verzameling van Leerredenen* (a collection of pulpit addresses in the style of Wilberforce's *Practical View*), 1749; 8th edit., 1887.

10. *Stellige en Praktikale Verklaaringe van den Heidelbergen Catechismus* (doctrinal and practical exposition of the Heidelberg Catechism), 1753; 6th edit., 1879.

About this time (1753) Comrie felt constrained to take part in a theological and ecclesiastical controversy which arose in Holland, and drew the attention of the whole Church. It was caused by the introduction of what were then considered highly rationalistic views on the part of one of their younger ministers, Anthony van der Os, of the Church at Zwolle. This pastor had studied at the feet of such men as Van der Honert, Alberti and Schultens at Leiden, and, regardless of any consequences to which his action might lead, did not hesitate to proclaim in the pulpit the new tenets he had received. These were chiefly a denial

of the eternal generation of the Son of God, of the guilt of Adam's first sin, and of the judicial aspect of justification. Man's justification before God, he held, was the result of individual faith manifesting itself in good works. To a theologian like Comrie, such preaching was tantamount to the abnegation of the whole system of truth won by the conflict of the Reformation, and the later controversies settled by the Synod of Dordrecht; and as one who had been trained even in Scotland (so Dr. Honig says) to abjure the errors of Baxter and of the school of Saumur, he felt it his duty to mingle with his works on practical theology a series of polemical treatises dealing with the positions of Van der Os and his coadjutors along the whole line. It cannot be said that he and his noble fellow-workers succeeded in stemming the tide of rationalism amongst the professors and students of the universities, but there can be no doubt that he carried with him the sympathies of by far the larger portion of the people. It is the descendants of these adherents of Comrie's teaching that, according to Dr. Honig, are the readers of his works, and the most devoted servants in the Christian Churches of Holland at the present day. The books of this second period of Comrie's literary activity may also be briefly mentioned.

11. Continuing the list in the same chronological order, we have the *Examen van het Ontwerp van Tolerantie* (an examination of a proposal of toleration, by which it was intended to unite the doctrine adhered to at the Synod of Dort with that of the Remonstrants), 1753–1759; 3rd edit., 1872.

12. *Aanspraak dan D° Antonius van der Os* (an address to the young minister already mentioned, on his deviations from the truth), 1753.

13. *Beschermer van de Aanspraak aan D° Ant. van der Os* (a defence of the above).

14. *Baniere van wegen de Waarheid Opgeregt tegen den Heer Joan van den Honert* (a banner in defence of the truth, against one of the Leiden professors who took the side of Van der Os), 1753.

15. *Berigt nopens de Waarschuuwinge van de Herr J. J. Schultens* (a reply to attacks made by this Leiden professor on some portions of Comrie's exposition of the Heidelberg Catechism), 1755.

16. Θεομάχια Ἀντεξουσιαστίκη (self-willed strife with God; an exposure of the old Pelagian heresy of free-will), 1756.

17. *De Lasterzugt van Cornelius Nozeman tegen Dooden en Levenden bestraft* (the calumnious attack of C. Nozeman against dead and living chastised: a sharp castigation of a vicious attack on a joint production of Comrie and his friend Holtius), 1756.

18. *De Leere der Waarheit die na de Godzaligheit is* (*The Doctrine of the Truth which is according to Godliness:* a translation of an exposition of the Shorter Catechism, by Isaac Chauncy), 1757; 3rd edit., 1891.

19. *Godt verzoend* (*God reconciled:* a translation of Charnock's treatise on the Atonement), 1757.

20. *Missive megens de Regtvaardigmakinge des Zondaars* (a letter on "The Justification of the Sinner," accompanied by relevant extracts from Dr. John Owen), 1757; 2nd edit., 1851.

21. *De inwonende Zonde in de Gelovigen* (a translation of Owen's treatise on "Indwelling Sin in Believers," with additions by Comrie), 1760.

22. *Brief over de Rechtvaerdigmakinge des Zondaars* (a letter on "The Justification of the Sinner"), 1761; 4th edit., 1889.

23. *Proeve van de Kragt der Godzaligheid* (*Experience of the Power of Godliness*: an edition of the work of the famous divine Gysbert Voetius, with preface and notes by Comrie), 1763.

Our space will not admit of any more detailed account of Comrie's views on the points of doctrine with which his books deal. It must suffice to say that Dr. Honig, himself evidently a well-trained student, regards them as set forth with an amount of acumen and force that entitles Comrie to be ranked as a really accomplished theologian. Certain it is that, as the numerous reprints of his work testify, Comrie, though long since dead, still speaks with power to a very large section of the Church in his adopted country. While the names of his opponents, Van der Os, Van den Honert, and Schultens have long since faded into utter obscurity, the name of Comrie is with very many Dutch Christians still regarded as synonymous with all that is best in personal sanctity, theological truth, and evangelical zeal. The Dutch Church has long seen that if, in the dark days of the persecuted Covenanters in Scotland, they gave welcome refuge to many of our countrymen, in receiving Alexander Comrie at a later date they entertained unawares a veritable messenger of God to the country for generations yet unborn. The present biography is evidently a thank-offering to God for this gift, and on all grounds is worthy of a wide acceptance.

BIBLICAL THOUGHT.

THE OLD TESTAMENT IN KING JAMES'S BIBLE.

No. I.

By Rev. J. C. Carrick, B.D.

The idea of giving to England the great national Bible we now possess did not originate with that prodigy of learning, and most self-sufficient of monarchs, "the most high and mighty Prince James." He only carried that idea out. Fuller tells us that it had been one of Elizabeth's fondest wishes to see this accomplished; but her desire, however, was not granted.

With her usual observancy, she had remarked the gross errors which more or less marred all the popular translations of the day; at least, she had noticed how one varied from, and perhaps even contradicted,

another. In each church, chained to some old grey pillar, lay a copy of the great Bible of Cranmer; and Parker's version, together with the more homely translations of Wycliffe, Tyndale, and Coverdale, were still by no means rare throughout the land. But it was felt that, dear and prized as all these Bibles were, the divergencies between them were very great, and too marked to be any longer passed over in silence. And thus the idea gradually formed itself in the mind of the enterprising queen of having an English Bible prepared which might supersede all others, so that all the nation, from one end of the land to the other, in public and in private, might read and hear the same version, and thus have uniformity. And she gave injunctions that this should be done, though she herself did not live to see the work even commenced.

In pursuance of her wishes, however, James I., in 1604, convened an assembly of doctors to consider the question. In 1608 the work was begun; in 1611 it was completed.

The translators numbered fifty-four, all of them graduates of Oxford and Cambridge; and these carried on their labours at the two university seats and at Westminster simultaneously, meetings being held at regular intervals to compare their versions.[1]

Seven of them, however, died before the work was completed; among them Lively, the only Hebrew scholar at work on the translation. He was, if we are to believe his contemporaries, an excellent Hebraist, and to the cause his loss was simply irreparable. There was, it is true, one other scholar in England who rivalled him in Oriental learning, namely, Hugh Broughton, "who had," as an old writer says, "grete knowledge of Greke and Hebrew;" but him the translators never once called to their aid. Amongst the forty-seven thus remaining, there was not one who could even read a Hebrew Bible. Bellamy tells us—

> "It was well known that there was not a critical Hebrew scholar amongst them; the Hebrew language, so indispensably necessary for the accomplishment of this important work, having been shamefully neglected in our universities. . . . A few lessons, taken from a Jew in term-time, whose business is to Judaize, and not to Christianize, serve to give the characteristics of the Hebrew scholar."

In the same strain, Romaine says—

> "The forty-seven are not acquainted with Hebrew, without which no man should pretend to be a critic upon the writings of the Old Testament. It has some peculiar properties and idioms which no other language has, with which every critic should be acquainted. The Hebrew is fixed in nature, and cannot change. He should be acquainted with the genius of the Hebrew tongue, and with its manner of expressing spiritual things under their appointed images in nature" (*Works*, v. 16).

We must, therefore, bear carefully in mind this fact—that these forty-seven doctors, however learned and however well-meaning, were not Hebrew scholars. They could not read a Hebrew Bible, much less a

[1] See Fuller's *Church History;* A. W. Maclure, *The Translators Revised: a Biographical Memoir of the Authors of the English Version* (New York, 1853).

Hebrew manuscript. In their time, Hebrew scholarship, neglected for ages before, was almost defunct; and it was not until more than half a century later that it revived, under Walton, the author of *Biblia Sacra Polyglotta*, who redeemed the Oriental wisdom alike of Oxford and of England. The fact of the ignorance of these men as to Hebrew is so well known, that it seems hardly necessary to refer to it. Yet, to give the statement greater weight, the writer takes the liberty of adding two extracts from well-known critics on the subject.

In 1780 Kennicott, the famous author of *Vetus Testamentum Hebraicum*, protested against the ignorance of the forty-seven translators as to Hebrew, and the errors which they spread by their translations.[1] He tells us that in his time Oriental studies were just reviving, and that at the time the royal translation was made, they were absolutely defunct. Writing in 1753, in his work on *The State of the Printed Text of the Old Testament*, he says,[2] "Great improvements might now be made, because the Hebrew and Greek languages have been much better cultivated and far better understood since the year 1600."

In 1849 Dr. Nott wrote thus of the translators—

"Though these men were renowned for their piety and learning, yet very few, if any, of them were competent to so important a task. In fact, the Hebrew language may be said only to have been *recovered* with the last century by modern Orientalists, and *from the ignorance of these very* translators of the original language, the Old Testament was taken wholly from the Greek and Latin Versions, viz. the Septuagint and the Vulgate. Being, then, a translation of bad translations, which had passed through numerous copyings, how could it come down to us without errors?" (Nott, *Opera*, p. 134).

The English version of the Old Testament, given by King James's doctors, was, therefore, not a new and original translation from the Hebrew. Bellamy is therefore right when he says that "no translation (excepting, perhaps, Luther's in 1530) from the original Hebrew only has been made for fourteen hundred years."

Since, then, these scholars did not and could not translate from original Hebrew documents, how did they proceed?

1. Taking the last great English Bible—that of Archbishop Parker, known as the "Bishops' Bible"—they simply made a careful revision of it. At that time, and for some years previously, this version was considered, in a way, the standard, and was regarded with reverence by universal England, as the work of this great archbishop and his learned colleagues. Parker's Old Testament, then, lay before the forty-seven doctors, always open, with its great old clasps and yellow, well-worn pages.

And then, sentence by sentence, they compared it with the earlier English translations of Wickliffe, Tyndale, Coverdale, and Cranmer, which were still common among the people and in the churches, and still well loved. The translators themselves acknowledge this when they say, in

[1] Kennicott, Oxon., 1780: Preface to Bible. [2] Kennicott, Oxon., 1753.

their preface, that "the former translations" have been "diligently compared and revised."

King James's Old Testament is, therefore, that of Parker revised and corrected, on a comparison with the four earlier English versions, in the first place.

But let us weigh the critical value of their original materials in the English language, with a view to discovering how near to or far from the original Hebrew they may be.

(1) The earliest English version of the whole Bible was that of Wickliffe, completed in 1384. There is good evidence to show that, for the Old Testament, he simply used the Latin translations current in his day. At the time he lived, Hebrew was wholly unknown to, and even despised by, Christendom, and the purpose the English Reformer had in view was sufficiently answered by a simple and homely rendering of the Latin. Critically, however, his work was only a translation of translations. Of the value of that original translation (the Latin Version) we shall speak afterwards.

(2) In 1530 Tyndale gave to his country an English version of the Pentateuch and of Jonah. Now, Fuller says that he rendered these from the Latin, just as Wickliffe had done before him, "as his friends allowed that he had no skille in Hebrew." And this seems to have been the real state of the case.

On the other hand, some have affirmed that Tyndale possessed "such a knowledge of Greek and Hebrew as was rare in his day." But this may quite well have been the case, and yet his knowledge have been of the most scanty description. When we read that such men as the Venerable Bede, Roger Bacon, and Tyndale were very learned, we must always remember that they had great learning compared only with the ignorance which spread around them. The surrounding darkness made their lights appear brighter than they really were. And thus Tyndale may have had a smattering of Hebrew, and have got a name for learning in this department simply because those around him were totally ignorant of it.

But, granting that he had even some proficiency in the language, he had no access to good Hebrew manuscripts. Every codex of value on which hands could be laid had, before his time, been ruthlessly destroyed.

Some Hebrew Bible may have fallen into his hands—perhaps that of Soncino (1481) or the Brescian (1494); but these Bibles were printed from the latest and, consequently, the worst manuscripts. They were printed, in fact, from the only manuscripts which could then be got, after the wholesale burnings of the Middle Ages. They were, therefore, of the most corrupt and inaccurate description; and hence, if Tyndale made his translation from them, he would only perpetuate their numerous and glaring errors; if from original Hebrew manuscripts (which is highly improbable), they could only be very recent and very corrupt; if from

Latin versions, which was most probably the case, his Old Testament has the critical value simply of those versions from which he took it, which, as we shall see hereafter, was probably very low.[1]

(3) The name of Miles Coverdale, Bishop of Exeter, will always be remembered from the fact that he gave to his native country the first printed English translation of the *whole* Bible, which he did in the year 1535. His work, however, so far as the Old Testament is concerned, was based on previous translations, either English or Latin, and hence, from a critical point of view, it has simply the value of these predecessors.

(4) Cranmer's Bible, called the "Great Bible," published in 1540, was founded on Tyndale's version. The bishop corrected the greater part of it with his own hand, and is said to have compared it with "Greek and Hebrew originals." The "Hebrew originals" were, however, the same Hebrew Bibles which Tyndale may have used, the value of which has already been pronounced. Cranmer's Old Testament was thus Tyndale's English version compared with then corrupt Hebrew texts.[2]

(5) The "Bishops' Bible" (London, 1568) was, for the most part, a revisal of Cranmer's. Only the eight bishops who had to do with the new work are said to have compared their version "with the original." But what was this Hebrew original, and of what value? As I hope to show afterwards, there were no Hebrew texts, either printed or in manuscript, extant at this time, of much scientific value; and if the "original" consulted by them gave them a correct reading, it was simply by chance, for the few Hebrew manuscripts surviving the wreck of centuries were unspeakably bad. Moreover, Hebrew scholarship had not by this time been revived—in fact, it was, as Kennicott has said, defunct; and those men, bishops as they were, who undertook the preparation of a version of the Old Testament from the original, were quite incompetent for the task. Hebrew scholarship was needed, and Hebrew scholarship was wanting. The bishop, however, did the best he could under the circumstances, as Tyndale and Wickliffe had done before him, and he deserves our grateful thanks and warmest praise alike for his zeal and industry; but, viewing his work with our modern light, and testing it by our modern apparatus, it is found to be, scientifically speaking, sadly defective.

All these English translations, then, were used by the forty-seven doctors.[3] Parker's was the basis, and from it our present Old Testament is, for the most part, drawn. Along with it they read the versions of

[1] Reference to "Matthews' Bible" is omitted, as it is simply Tyndale's Bible revised by his friend, John Rogers. Still, this Old Testament was probably before the translators, at any rate during the last reading of the translation.

[2] Reference to the Bible of Richard Taverner, published in the same year as his Great Bible, is also omitted, as it is a reproduction of Matthews' version. I have also omitted any reference to the Genevan and Douay Versions, as the evidence seems to show that these were not even consulted.

[3] Selden says that at the final reading of the revised translation some of the doctors held "in their hands some Bible, either of the learned tongues, or French, Spanish, Italian, etc."

Wickliffe, Tyndale, Coverdale, and Cranmer; they marked the disagreements and inquired into them.[1]

The question must now be asked—When such disagreements occurred, how were they settled? We have seen that they could get no light from Hebrew sources, because the Hebrew Bible, even if free from gross corruption, was to them a sealed book. They therefore consulted other translations, namely, the Latin Vulgate and the Greek Septuagint.

2. The Vulgate used by the forty-seven may have been that of 1462, or the Sixtine edition of 1589, or the Clementine edition of 1592. All these versions were then in circulation. The critical value of the Vulgate must, therefore, be shortly considered.

Prior to St. Jerome's great translation of the whole Bible, there were current many Latin versions of the Old Testament as well as of the New. One of the Fathers says, "Among the Latins there are as many different Bibles as copies of the Bible, for every man has added or subtracted, according to his own caprice, as he saw fit."

Jerome, seeing this, made a translation of the Old Testament, directly from the Hebrew, somewhere between A.D. 390 and 400. Now, we are not aware whether St. Jerome was quite competent for this great work. He is said to have been a good Hebrew scholar, but we do not know that he was. But even granting that he could render Hebrew idioms and figures into corresponding Latin forms of expression with a very considerable amount of discretion, his task was not then over.

Even so early as then, Hebrew manuscripts were in a state of the very utmost corruption, as is testified by many of the Fathers, among whom may be mentioned Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Clemens Romanus, Origen, Eusebius, and Epiphanius. St. Jerome had, therefore, to use a certain amount of critical judgment, which he may or may not have possessed, if his work was to be really valuable. Now, we know that the Fathers, though pious, and in many cases learned, were, excepting Jerome and Origen, no critics. The science of criticism was then almost unknown, and certainly unformed. St. Jerome's translation was therefore, in all probability, not wanting in bad readings, got from inferior manuscripts, or perhaps even from the Septuagint, which he may have consulted. For this great undertaking he was much censured by his contemporaries, who contended that he had disturbed the all but universal reverence for the Septuagint.

In 605 this translation was adopted by Pope Gregory, but with it he incorporated the Old Italic Version. But still these steps did not ensure uniformity of reading throughout the Catholic world. In the ninth

[1] In this essay I refer to the first translation made by the forty-seven, viz. the translation made by the sections of the company. At the final reading of the version, when the text was finally settled, I am aware that various foreign translators were consulted, viz. French, Spanish, Italian; but this was done more as a safeguard than as a means of finding out the true text (see Selden).

century Alcuin, and in the eleventh Lanfranc, made numerous emendations. In the Middle Ages the Latin text was in a state of the greatest corruption—so much so, that we find Roger Bacon remarking that in his day "every reader altered to suit his own whim." In this state the Latin Version continued, till *Stephens* revised it, and made a new text. About the same time *Clarius* submitted to the Tridentine Council a schedule of eighty thousand mistakes, which had crept in in the course of ages. Pope Sixtus V. undertook to be proof-reader, and accordingly, in 1589, a new version of the Vulgate issued from his Vatican, in which "eaque res quo magis incorrupti perficeretur, nostra nos ipsi manu correximus."

In 1592, in the pontificate of Clement VII., a standard copy was issued, and pronounced "perfect." This text has ever since been held to be the standard Latin Vulgate. But we are not told according to what principles his Sixtine version was arrived at. The probability is that a compromise was made amongst all the current versions, and thus general satisfaction was given.

The forty-seven translators used either this "perfect" version, or else that of Stephens, or both. The errors in these versions are, therefore, more or less perpetuated in King James's Old Testament. These errors were due, in the first place, to mistakes on St. Jerome's part, in rendering and in choosing readings; and, in the second place, to the wholesale manipulation of his text ever since his time.

THE MIRACULOUS ELEMENT IN DANIEL.

By Rev. J. E. H. Thomson, B.D.

The real objection to Daniel which influences most of the opponents of its authenticity is not drawn from history or philology; it is really the presence of the miraculous element. We do not speak of the unbeliever who does not admit the possibility of miracle, to whom, therefore, the presence of miracle in a narrative is a note of falsity; but of such men as Dr. Cheyne and Canon Driver, who acknowledge the stupendous miracles of our Lord's incarnation, resurrection, and ascension. We admit that in certain circumstances the presence of miracle in a narrative is an evidence of falsity. The legendary lives of the saints give abundant examples of what we mean.

What criterion, then, may be applied? It seems to us that the Horatian canon really avails here—

> "Nec Deus intersit nisi dignus vindice nodus
> Inciderit."

If we study sacred history, we find that miracles have not been sown broadcast over the narrative; they have gathered round certain centres, which seem to be selected on a principle not unlike that of Horace. If

we pass over the initial miracles of creation as being beyond the sphere of history, and those connected with the patriarchs as possibly involving mythic elements, we find the first group of miracles gathering round the Exodus and the settlement of Palestine. The separation of one race to be Jehovah's heritage—to be the race whence our Lord was to spring—is of such importance as to vindicate Divine intervention. If we neglect the sporadic miracles of the days of the Judges, the next group centres round Elijah and Elisha. The conflict they maintained against Baal-worship was of an importance to humanity which we cannot easily over-estimate. Had the efforts of Jezebel been successful, the worship of the true God would have ceased not only in the northern kingdom, but in Judah also. We need not do more than refer to the splendid burst of miracle which surrounded our Lord's life on earth and the preaching of His apostles. This period, above all, was one that was worthy of Divine manifestations.

Does the narrative in Daniel relate to a period of similarly important crisis in the history of the Jewish nation, and therefore of humanity? We maintain it does.

Notwithstanding the eloquence of the prophets, notwithstanding the marvellous history to which as a nation they could look back, the Israelites, far from being wedded to Jehovism, were prone, on any or no excuse, to go over into idolatry and polytheism. We know that a nation may conserve its religious peculiarities much more easily while it maintains its national separation, than when its national existence has ceased and it is scattered among an alien people. If the Jews were prone to idolatry on account of the example of the nations around them, much more would they be prone to it when they were dwelling among idolaters. That this view is correct is proved by the history of the captives of the ten tribes. After the prophetic revolution under Jehu, the northern kingdom was not given to heathenism. The northern Israelites walked in the way of Jeroboam the son of Nebat; they worshipped in the high places, but it was Jehovah, not Baal or Molech, that they worshipped; yet when they were carried away captive, they became merged in the mass of idolaters around them. And it is not to be wondered at. Although to the prophets Jehovah was God of the whole earth, to the mass of the nation He was the national God of Israel, as Chemosh was the god of Moab, and Molech the god of Ammon. When, then, they were carried away captive, it seemed demonstrative proof that the gods of Assyria were mightier than the God of Israel.

It would have seemed more natural that the people of Judah, that were prone, even in their own land, to turn aside to foreign gods, should, in a trial precisely similar to that to which the northern tribes had been exposed, and before which they fell, fall as they fell, only sooner and more easily. Had they thus fallen, true religion had been lost to the world. Was not this a crisis worthy of Divine interposition? Had Judah not

remained true to their God, humanly speaking, the Divine Incarnation would have been impossible; the world would yet have been in its sin and misery, without hope of retrieval. We have thus shown that the circumstances were such as demanded miracle. The circumstances were those that, had merely the natural laws that regulate human development been at work, disaster to the moral progress of mankind would have ensued. The remedy must be sought beyond the laws of nature.

We may approach this subject from the opposite point. The fact that the Jews who left their own land prone to worship the gods of the nations, came back from dwelling among triumphant idolaters fanatic monotheists, is a phenomenon that calls for explanation. Several explanations have been advanced, all more or less inadequate. Some have maintained that this result was due to the purifying effect of affliction. This affliction might be variously explained by those enduring it according to their inclinations. Those prone to the worship of idols might have asserted that the captivity of the people was a punishment for not, from the first, worshipping the gods of Babylon. Affliction so tremendous as the Jewish nation had to endure might well be interpreted to mean that something was wrong, but at the same time no indication could be drawn from it to show more than probably what it was that was amiss. The fact that the people of Jehovah had been carried away captive by the people of Merodach would have seemed to imply that the wrong lay in the worship of Jehovah.

It may be suggested that political reasons may have weighed with them. Cyrus was a monotheist—so it is argued—and the Jews, to gain his favour, might emphasize their monotheism. But, in the first place, it is doubtful if Cyrus were a monotheist; in the next place, on this hypothesis, the Jews would have to be known as monotheists ere they could gain the favour of Cyrus, and have therefore maintained their monotheism through circumstances fitted to make them heathens during all the long period that elapsed between the capture of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar and the rise of Cyrus. This is in reality to restate the problem, not to solve it. The difficulty is to explain how this whole nation—not merely those that returned to their own land, but those also that remained in Babylon—were fanatic monotheists.

The answer that is most generally given is, in brief—the prophets. It is alleged that their exhortations in Babylon kept the people true to Jehovah, and further, that as the fact that the captivity of Judah had been foretold as the penalty of abandoning Jehovah, this captivity would be a perpetual evidence of the truth of the prophecies, and as the prophets were pre-eminently the ministers of Jehovah, they would be ready to point to this in proof of their mission and of the greatness of their God. But would all the eloquence, even of the deutero-Isaiah, have been equal to the task of keeping back from idolatry a people bent on it? We must bear in mind that these prophecies, which form the second portion of

Isaiah, would never be spoken, but would be passed on, written on scraps of papyrus or impressed on clay tablets, from hand to hand among a people the majority of whom could read only imperfectly the language of their fathers. Nothing so chills the fire of eloquence as to be spelt out. Ezekiel complains, in the beginning of this period of captivity, that his words were only listened to as very pleasant songs by one that had a pleasant voice. What power, then, would words written and read have? It is clear that the mere presence of the prophets among the captives was not sufficient to explain their ultimate monotheism after being so prone to polytheism.

More might seem possible to be said for the view that the fulfilment of the denunciations of the prophets was the cause of the whole nation so enthusiastically accepting the prophetic theology. There were prophets of Baal and prophets of Marduk as well as prophets of Jehovah. The prophets of Baal would denounce the anger of Baal on Judah, because Josiah destroyed the temples and broke to pieces the images of Baal. Josiah was slain at Megiddo, his son and his grandson carried captive to Babylon. The worshippers of Baal might have the appearance of reason on their side if they deduced the rightfulness of Baal-worship, and the cognate worship of the host of heaven. The prophets and soothsayers that accompanied the Babylonian king might have yet a clearer show of reason on their side for claiming the captivity of Judah as a proof that resistance to the Chaldeans, the worshippers of Marduk and of the Babylonian pantheon, was resistance to the true gods.

What criterion was there that enabled the Jews to decide for Jehovah against these gods of the heathen? Nearly three centuries before the time we are considering, Elijah declared, in his controversy with the prophets of Baal, "The God that answereth by fire, let Him be God"—the God that shows by miracle His presence and His power, He is to be worshipped. This canon of judgment was accepted at once by the assembled people. "All the people answered and said, It is well spoken." The power of working miracles seemed to that age and race to be the only test by which the truth or falsity of those rival claimants for worship could be demonstrated. When we find them converted from being prone to Baal-worship, and the worship of all manner of heathen deities, to be fanatic worshippers of Jehovah as the only true and universal God, must we not posit the occurrence of miracle somewhere in the period intervening between the carrying away to Babylon and the return from it, and miracle of such a kind as shall demonstrate the reality of Jehovah's power as over the deities of Babylon?

We would only refer in passing to the fact that the prophets that spoke in the name of the Lord sometimes proclaimed contradictory messages. Hananiah broke the yoke from the neck of Jeremiah in the name of the Lord, and declared that "in two full years" the yoke of

the King of Babylon would be broken "from the neck of all nations." The event proved him to be a false prophet. There were many other prophets equally false, equally speaking in the name of the Lord. It might easily have been asserted that the fulfilment of the solitary prophecies of Jeremiah and Ezekiel was due, not to Jehovah, but to the power of the deities of the conquering heathen. Miracle only could decide the question.

Now, we shall only rapidly glance at the miracles in Daniel, and see if they fulfil the requirements of the position. The first miracle is the recalling interpretation of the forgotten dream of Nebuchadnezzar. The failure of the magicians and soothsayers to do what was required was published by the king's decree to destroy the wise men of Babylon, and so the fact of the success of the Jew Daniel, by the favour of Jehovah his God, was made all the more emphatic. Nebuchadnezzar, heathen as he was, acknowledged that Jehovah had a right to be reckoned *Elah-eloheen*, a God of gods, as a Revealer of secrets.

Marduk or Merodach was the god whom above all others Nebuchadnezzar worshipped; to him he attributed his conquests, and to him in all likelihood he erected the statue in Dura. He, among other attributes, was the god of fire. When the three Hebrew youths refused to worship the golden image, they defied the great god of the Babylonian empire. When they were cast into the furnace of fire, heated seven times hotter than it was wont to be heated, they were delivered over directly into the power of Marduk. When, then, after their public disavowal of the worship of Marduk, they were delivered and maintained safe even in Marduk's own element, while his servants, who were eager against these gainsayers of his godhead, were burnt up, it was demonstrative evidence that Jehovah was not only a god who could reveal secrets, but was greater of power and might than even Marduk. Of course, Nebuchadnezzar, heathen as he was, limited this defensive power only to the special subjects of this God, yet orders all disrespect to be shunned on pain of terrible punishment.

We may pass over Nebuchadnezzar's second dream, as this seems to have been a matter that did not necessarily come much to public knowledge. [Note: In the Septuagint Version there is nothing said of calling all the wise men to make known the interpretation of the dream. Daniel alone is called, as chief of the wise men of Babylon.] We come then to Daniel's reading the inscription on the wall of Belshazzar's banqueting-hall. We know that there had been a religious revolution, and that Nabonadius, the father of Belshazzar, was disliked by the priests for some reason. Both father and son were idolaters, but seemed to go in for a form of heathenism which the priests called heresy. Conspiracy was at work sapping their power; their overthrow might be attributed to the power of the Babylonian deities whose legitimate worship they had despised. The mysterious inscription and Daniel's interpretation

of it proved that the gods of Babylon had nothing to do with the matter.[1]

Another form of heathenism had to be encountered when the Persians became masters of Babylon—the deification actual or practical of the sovereign. This was met by Daniel's deliverance from the den of lions.

We have endeavoured above to show, first, that the period of Daniel —that of the residence of the Jews in Babylon—was one of critical importance in the religious history of the Jews, and therefore of humanity, and one in which, arguing from analogy, we might expect miracle; second, the moral change in the attitude of the Jews can only be explained on the supposition that there had been miracles during this period; third, that the miracles related in the Book of Daniel were miracles of the kind which the circumstances demanded to produce the result.

THE PILLAR APOSTLES AND THE GOSPELS.

No. II.

By Rev. Prof. R. J. Knowling, M.A., King's College, London.

It is commonly said that the Epistle of St. James contains more references to our Lord's teaching than any other Epistle of the New Testament. The crucial question is—From what sources were these references derived? It can scarcely be denied that they are exactly the kind of references which St. James, the Lord's brother, would be likely to make, if he was really the author of the Epistle which bears his name. James the Just was of all men the most likely to regard Christianity as the perfect law of liberty, and to lay stress upon practical Christian conduct. When he was first led to faith in Jesus, as the glorified Messiah, by the great miracle of the Resurrection, he might well feel that his new Christian life was no rude contrast to his former state, and that all he had in Christ was only the perfecting of what he had before. In the Sermon on the Mount the moral life of the kingdom, which Christ proclaimed, was most clearly revealed, and the teaching of St. James, which presupposes the same Divine kingdom (ii. 5),[2] was closely modelled upon that Sermon, although it would be no more fair to say that his Epistle is mere morality than to make a similar affirmation with regard to the Sermon on the Mount. We may trace the likeness between the Epistle of St. James and our Lord's Sermon, not only in points of detail, but in their general form, in their language and figurative style, in the

[1] The Septuagint differs here from the Masoretic recension, and does not say that on the night of his feast "was Belshazzar, King of the Chaldeans, slain," but, "and the interpretation came upon Belshazzar the king, and the kingdom was taken from the Chaldeans and given to the Medes and the Persians," leaving thus the date of the fulfilment indefinite.

[2] Beyschlag, *Neutestamentliche Theologie*, i. 344 (1891), rightly emphasizes this fundamental conception as common to St. James and the commencement of our Lord's teaching.

abundance of images derived from nature and mankind; not only in their moral precepts, but also in their dogmatic import.[1] St. James, no less than St. Matthew, represents the sufferings of the disciples as borne for the sake and for the Name of Christ; St. James, no less than St. Matthew, recognizes in Christ the Lord and the Judge.

Critics who relegate the Epistle to the second century, are forced to account for these points of contact by supposing that the unknown author had before him written Gospels.[2] Thus Weizsäcker, although acknowledging the striking similarity between the Epistle of St. James and the Sermon on the Mount, concludes that we cannot argue from this to the early date of the Epistle, *i.e.* to a time when men lived in the immediate freshness of our Lord's words.[2] He accordingly seeks to lessen the force of the likeness between St. James and St. Matthew by arguing that the former repeatedly quotes from passages which did not belong to the original form of St. Matthew's Gospel, and that in other places reference is made to those portions of our Gospels which undoubtedly belong to a later date.[3] But amongst these instances Weizsäcker does not attempt to include any of the references in the Epistle to the Sermon on the Mount as given by St. Matthew. If, moreover, we examine the instances upon which Weizsäcker argues his case, there is no apparent reason why Jas. v. 7 should be regarded as a parallel to Mark iv. 26. The exhortation to patient waiting was a very natural one for a man living in a country like Palestine, where the husbandman waited for the early and latter rain; and a much closer likeness to St. James's figurative language may be found in a book with which he was evidently acquainted—Ecclus. vi. 19. Or, again, when Weizsäcker compares what our Lord says of the rich fool in Luke xii. 18 with Jas. iv. 14, there is no reason whatever to suppose that the writer of the Epistle has in view the parable in St. Luke's Gospel; his words are easily accounted for by an acquaintance with Old Testament language and similes.[4]

But, on the other hand, the view that St. James gives us reminiscences of our Lord's teaching, in the Sermon on the Mount and elsewhere,

[1] For a full and excellent list of these resemblances, see especially Schmid, *Biblische Theologie des N. T.*, p. 378 (1886), 5th edit.

[2] So Von Soden, in his essay (p. 135) contained in the volume dedicated to Weizsäcker on his seventieth birthday (1892), maintains that these references in St. James to the Gospels only show acquaintance with the material of the synoptists, and that what he calls "the Synoptical Lexicon" is interwoven into his Epistle by the writer. But if he could have produced a stronger case, he would hardly have quoted in support of it such a phrase as ὑπὸ λαίλαπος ἐλαυνόμενοι (Jas. iii. 4), and compared it with Mark iv. 37; vi. 48; Luke viii. 23. As a matter of fact, the phrase does not occur in St. James at all, but in 2 Pet. ii. 17, and such imagery would have been very naturally employed by Peter and James, acquainted as they were with the fierce and sudden storms of the Galilean lake, without any reference whatever to the passages cited from the Gospels.

[3] *Das apostolische Zeitalter*, p. 379.

[4] See, *e.g.*, Beyschlag, *Der Brief des Jacobus*, pp. 204, 205, in Meyer's *Kommentar*, 5th edit.

out of the fulness of a faithful memory,[1] and that he does so in a way which would be very natural to one who might have been actually a hearer of our Lord's Galilean teaching, commends itself very decidedly not only to those who without hesitation accept St. James as the author of the Epistle in question, but also to Reuss[2] and Renan.[3]

But we are by no means confined to the synoptic Gospels in the similarity which the Epistle of St. James reveals to our Lord's teaching, and it is only necessary to remind our readers of the debt which we owe to P. Ewald for the fulness with which he has traced the points of connexion between this Epistle and the Fourth Gospel.[4] It may seem, perhaps, to some minds that P. Ewald has overstated his case in claiming references in this one short Epistle to portions of St. John's Gospel, differing so widely as the conversation of our Lord with Nicodemus and the High-priestly Prayer. But if the pillar apostles were so closely associated in the early Church in Jerusalem, as St. Paul's statement (Gal. ii. 9) undoubtedly affirms, such intimacy precludes any surprise at the acquaintance of St. James with what P. Ewald calls the Johannean tradition. Moreover, for St. James no less than for St. John, Christianity is the communication of a new and Divine principle of life. "The word of truth" (i. 18) of which St. James speaks, has a creative and begetting power (v. 21); it is engrafted in us, and united with our life. It may be said that there is a danger of pressing this "mystical element," as Beyschlag calls it, too far, although, as Beyschlag himself admits, in such an expression as λόγος ἔμφυτος, we have a reminiscence of our Lord's parable of the sower, and we must not forget that Christ is Himself the Sower of the seed. If St. James is not as explicit as St. John in his doctrine of the new birth or of the Word, yet "the Word of truth," which is the instrument of regeneration, and which, grafted in our hearts, has the power of saving our souls, plainly anticipates the declaration of St. Paul, "The

[1] There is another passage in the New Testament wherein we find an utterance of St. James (Acts xi. 13–17), in which he evidently gives us a reminiscence of more than one familiar prophecy, and quotes quite freely as much as suits his immediate purpose.

[2] Reuss, after stating his conviction that these reminiscences are not drawn from any written source, adds, "Évidemment l'auteur a vécu dans un milieu où des souvenirs de ce genre ont pu conserver toute leur fraicheur primitive, si l'on n'aime mieux y voir la preuve de ce bu'ils n'avaient pas même besoin de passer par le canal de la tradition pour arriver jusqu'à lui" (*Les Épîtres Catholiques*, pp. 111, 112); and compare his similar conclusion in his *Geschichte der heiligen Schriften N. T.*, p. 219, 6th edit.

[3] "When," says Renan, "James speaks of humility, of patience, of pity, of the exaltation of the humble, of the joy which underlies tears, he seems to have retained in memory the very words of Jesus" (*L'Antechrist*, p. 54, 3rd edit.). So again he speaks of "this little writing of James, as thoroughly impregnated with a kind of evangelical perfume; as giving us sometimes a direct echo of the words of Jesus; as still retaining all the vividness of the life in Galilee" (*ubi supra*, p. 62).

[4] *Das Hauptproblem der Evangelienfrage*, pp. 58–68 (1890). Amongst the *Agrapha*, which Resch finds in this Epistle (*Agrapha*, p. 130; and *Aussercanonische Parallelltexte*, p. 80, 1893), it is doubtful whether more than one, viz. i. 12, can be reckoned as an "unwritten" saying of Jesus.

Spirit of life which is in Christ Jesus hath made us free from the law of sin and death," and is in perfect harmony with the teaching of St. John, nay, of the Lord Himself, as He tells the Jews that the Word of truth frees men from the bondage of sin, and that it is His Word, the Word of the Son, which makes them free indeed (John viii. 31, 36).

It is sometimes alleged that this Epistle of St. James is essentially the teaching of Christ, and that on this account it contains so little about Christ. But whilst the Christology of St. James has been called "poor" when compared with other books of the New Testament, we cannot too carefully bear in mind how much the author not only says, but implies.

Nothing is more unreasonable than to affirm, with Holtzmann, that in this Epistle, as in the Sermon on the Mount, the Son of God is concealed in the Prophet of Israel. For whilst in the Sermon Christ claims to be much more than a Prophet, when He claims to be greater than Moses (Matt. v. 21), and announces Himself as the future Judge of mankind, so too in this Epistle: He is the Judge, whose advent must be expected in patience, and who even now standeth at the door;[1] Elijah, the great prophet of the Old Testament, second only to Moses, is "a man of like passions with us" (v. 17): Jesus is "the Lord of glory" (ii. 1), and St. James is content to describe himself as "the slave" of the Lord Jesus Christ, who has a claim upon him equal to that of God (i. 1). Nor is this Lordship of the Messiah only a future rule in a kingdom of the future, but exercised here and now over the bodies and souls of men,[2] and a new spiritual life is communicated by His word of truth. The faith of St. James is not abstract or theoretical; it is centred in a Divine Person, in whose presence there is neither rich nor poor; since for St. James, no less than for St. Paul, He is their Lord and ours.

Herein consists the real answer to the objection that the author so rarely mentions Jesus by name, as if the value of his Christian convictions were a question of arithmetic.[3] He is not mentioned more frequently, because He is everywhere presupposed as present.

So, too, in the consideration of another popular objection, that St. James makes such scanty references to the life of Jesus, we should

[1] Colani, *J. C. et les Idées Mess.*, p. 155, found the most striking proof of the impression made by Jesus in the fact that Paul, a Pharisee, could see in Him, within twenty-five years of His crucifixion, the future Judge of mankind. But there is reason to believe that within even a less period of time, James, a Hebrew of the Hebrews, had ascribed to Jesus the same awful and Divine office.

[2] See P. Ewald, *ubi supra*, p. 67; and Dr. Salmon's *Introduction to the New Testament*, p. 466, 5th edit.

[3] Reuss, *Les Épîtres Catholiques*, p. 110. Nösgen, in a very recent article, *Die apostolische Verkündigung und die Geschichte Jesu* (*Neue Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1895), has pointed out how much the references in St. James, and in the other Epistles of the New Testament, to the Gospels, are evidently based upon practical motives, and introduced for practical purposes; but he also shows how full these references are, and how much they presuppose, when we consider the epistolary character of the writings in question.

not forget how much his Epistle presupposes. For him, in spite of all his stern unbending Judaism, Jesus of Nazareth has become "the Christ." Surely such an acknowledgment carries with it an acquaintance with the facts upon which that claim was based. If it be urged that the writer ignores the great fact of the Resurrection, upon which the proof of Jesus to Messiahship rested, we can only reply that such a phrase as that in which he describes Jesus, and the Divine attribute with which that phrase invests Him (ii. 1), involves a belief in the Resurrection, as also in the Ascension.[1] Even if there is no allusion to any of our Lord's miracles,[2] the Epistle was undoubtedly written at a time when miraculous powers were still working in the Church, and those powers are the result of the Divine energy of Christ, and are successfully maintained in obedience to the commands of Christ. It must be admitted that the Epistle contains no direct allusion to the atoning work of the Saviour,[3] but its practical standpoint may help us to account for this, especially when we remember that for St. James "salvation was a new life coming from God, and brought about by the Christian word of truth." The very form of expression, "the Lord of glory," and the emphasis thus laid upon the thought of the glorified Lord, seems to carry with it a conscious contrast to the life of humiliation and rejection which the Saviour led on earth,[4] just as St. Paul thinks of Him, even as hanging upon the cross, by the same significant title (1 Cor. ii. 8).[5]

Men have sometimes contrasted the conversion of St. James with that of St. Paul—the sudden change of the latter from the side of the Pharisees to that of the Christians, with the quiet passage of the former from the service of the old covenant to that of the new. But in each case there was hostility and unbelief, and in each case there was a conversion. As in the case of St. Paul, so too in that of St. James, we are bound to ask ourselves what mere human influence could have transformed the unbeliever into the bondservant of Jesus, and the stern and rigid Israelite into a follower of the despised Nazarene. "Take upon you the yoke of the Law," said the Rabbis, "and you will be free from the yoke of the world;" but here was a man trained in the observance of all legal

[1] We may well ask if it is probable that a forger, wishing to pass himself off as James, the Lord's brother, would have omitted any reference to the Resurrection, especially when we remember that St. Paul most probably connects this James with the Resurrection (1 Cor. xv. 7), and that the *Gospel according to the Hebrews* claims to give us a lengthy account of Christ's appearance to him after He had risen.

[2] See, however, the remarks of H. Ewald, *Jacobos Rundschreiben*, p. 200; and of Beyschlag, *Der Brief des Jacobus*, p. 130 (5th edit.), on Jas. ii. 19; and compare the similar references in Dean Plumptre's *Christ and Christendom*, p. 352; and Professor Mayor's *Epistle of St. James*, p. 94.

[3] In spite of the words of St. Augustine, *Sermo ad Catechumenos*, 10 (Heurtley), it is very improbable that Jas. v. 11 contains any reference to the death of Christ.

[4] Nösgen, *Geschichte der Neutestamentlichen Offenbarung*, p. 95 (1893).

[5] On the force of the title Κύριος τῆς δόξης, see Schmid, *ubi supra*, pp. 354, 500, 510, especially.

righteousness, who had found a freedom from the bondage of the world and sin in listening to the voice of a fellow-man, belonging to no religious sect, boasting of no training in the schools, brought up with him, it may be, in the same country home, "Take My yoke upon you, and learn of Me; for I am meek and lowly of heart: and ye shall find rest for your souls."

EXPOSITORY THOUGHT.

OUR LORD'S TEACHING ON PRAYER.

By Rev. Professor W. Garden Blaikie, D.D., LL.D.

There is no subject connected with the spiritual life on which our Lord's teaching was more full, more varied, or more emphatic than prayer. It held a first place both in His life and His lessons. He stamped it as an exercise of the highest value, a duty of supreme importance, and a privilege infinitely blessed. Both at the beginning of His ministry and at its close He indicated the great increase of power which prayer was to acquire in future ages through Himself: "Hereafter ye shall see heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man;" "Hitherto ye have asked nothing in My Name: ask, and ye shall receive, that your joy may be full." His teaching on prayer is not clouded by the slightest doubt as to its efficacy. No metaphysical or other arguments are necessary to show that prayer avails. There are conditions, no doubt, to its efficacy, but these are within reach of every earnest and honest man. It will be useful, we think, to take a comprehensive view of what our Lord has taught us on prayer, both to clear away the feeling of doubt and distrust that lurks in many hearts regarding it, and to stimulate those who have no theoretical difficulties to greater earnestness in connexion with it.

There are no fewer than four forms in which our Lord has given us lessons on prayer. 1. His own practice. 2. Direct commands and exhortations. 3. Parables illustrating the duty and its efficacy. 4. The great pattern prayer.

1. In many passages of the Gospels we are taught that prayer was an habitual exercise of our Lord. "He withdrew Himself into the wilderness, and prayed" (Luke v. 16); "He went up into a mountain to pray, and continued all night in prayer to God" (Luke vi. 12; see also Luke ix. 28; Matt. xiv. 23, etc.). The question naturally arises—For what purpose did our Lord pray? If He was God as well as man, what need could He have for prayer? To this some have answered that He prayed as an example to us. But if that had been all, it could have been no example. It would have been prayer in quite different circumstances from ours—prayer without personal needs, without the sense of dependence,

without the consciousness of emptiness and helplessness. Who could imagine that the prayer in Gethsemane was nothing more than an object-lesson to us? We are to remember that when He took upon Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of man, Jesus emptied Himself, and became dependent on the Father for all that was needed for the due control of His spirit, for the constant exercise of holy and loving affections, and for the fulfilment of the mighty work given Him to do. In one thing only He could not feel as we do, and He could not pray as we do. "He did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth." But it ought to be a great encouragement to us to pray, that, apart from the sense of personal sin, Jesus was familiar with the whole round of experience that shows our feebleness, and creates in us the feeling of dependence. All that would make us impatient, distrustful, averse to exertion, disposed to ease, procrastinating, Jesus had experience of; but it had no such effect upon Him. This was due partly to the fulness of the Spirit in Him, but partly also to His habit of prayer. As naturally as hunger and thirst impel us to eat and drink, so naturally the sense of need impelled Him to pray. And prayer brought Him not only strength, but refreshment and joy. Like the bird buffeted by the storm that seeks a sheltered nook to recruit its strength and trim its plumage, Jesus, wearied by the tumult of the world, would often retire to the secret place of the Most High, and find restoratives there that enabled Him to return to the world full of peace, love, and joy. Prayer to him was anything but a burden; it was loving fellowship with a loving Father.

Besides the passages that indicate the general habit of Christ, we find in His life many specific instances of prayer. Several of these were essentially, if not formally, thanksgivings. Thus, on the return of the seventy (Luke x. 21), "In that hour Jesus rejoiced in spirit, and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes." At the raising of Lazarus (John xi. 21), "Father, I thank Thee that Thou hast heard Me." At the institution of the Eucharist (Luke xxii. 19), "He took bread, and gave thanks, and brake it." This shows how conspicuous thankfulness was in our Lord's heart, and what a contrast He showed to that complaining temper which is so common in many who profess to be His followers. Constant attention to calls for thankfulness is one of the most valuable habits and helps of the spiritual life. It brings sunshine to our hearts; it increases confidence in the love and kindness of God; it encourages expectation of further blessing. St. Paul understood this well when he wrote, "In everything by prayer and supplication *with thanksgiving*, let your requests be made known unto God."

The instances we have of direct supplication by Christ fall into two divisions—His prayers for others, and His prayers for Himself. His prayers for others embraced His own followers, and some who were outside.

For His own servants He prayed, in the intercessory prayer (1) that they might be kept through God's Name; (2) that they might be one, as He and His Father were one; (3) that they might be kept from the evil in the world; (4) that they might be sanctified through God's truth; (5) that those who should believe on Him through their word might be one; and (6) that at last they should all be with Him, where He was, to behold His glory. What hints we have here for ministers praying for their people! For some who were outside He offered that wonderful prayer, "Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do." In all these cases, the things asked were spiritual blessings; and the lesson for us is obvious—that in our prayers the spiritual should prevail over the temporal. But the temporal is not excluded, as the Lord's Prayer shows.

With reference to Himself, the most important and instructive of all His prayers was that in Gethsemane. It is the prayer of One on whom a load is descending too fearful to be borne, and who instinctively cries for deliverance with an earnestness that touches the most callous. And He cries again and again, though always qualifying His petition with the condition, "if it be possible." But earnest and repeated though it is, His cry is not fulfilled. It is actually declined, but declined with an implied provision which is really better than the thing asked for. He gets a view of God's will that strengthens Him to endure. He is enabled to accept that will as better than His own. "Nevertheless not My will, but Thine, be done." His soul returns unto its rest, and becomes tranquil and content. And the great lesson for us is, that the spirit that enables us to trust God is better than any specific deliverance or mercy which we may have been impelled to pray for, whether for ourselves or for others.

In connexion with His work we have the prayer in John xii. 28, "Father, glorify Thy Name." And in the intercessory prayer He asks, for the present time, "Glorify Thy Son, that Thy Son also may glorify Thee;" and for the future, "Glorify Thou Me with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was." And on the cross we have His wail over the eclipse, "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" And the calm surrender of His spirit to God when the sun again shone out, "Father, into Thy hands I commend My spirit."

2. The direct commands and exhortations of our Lord to prayer are numerous. The fullest and most striking is the passage in the Sermon on the Mount, beginning, "Ask, and it shall be given you." It would seem that this whole passage is founded on an analogy between what usually happens among men, and what, under similar circumstances, may be expected to take place on the part of God. There are three steps or stages in the analogy. First, even where no special relation exists between the parties, it is a usual experience that if you ask you get, if you seek you find, if you knock it is opened to you. "Every one that asketh receiveth," etc. If, in a strange town, I ask of one who knows the way to such and such a house, I receive the information; if I seek the house, I

find it; if I knock, the door is opened. May we not expect the same in our dealings with God? The second case, noted by Luke alone (xi. 5), is when the parties are related as friends. This, however, is referred to only to show that there are considerations even stronger than friendship that will induce a man to do what a friend desires. The third case is when the parties are related as father to son. The certainty that a father will comply with the reasonable requests of his son is so great that our Lord represents the opposite as moral impossibility. "What man is there among you, whom if his son ask bread, will he give him a stone? if he ask a fish, will he give him a serpent?" And to this it is added in Luke, to make the statement more emphatic and telling, "If he ask an egg, will he for an egg give him a scorpion?" And then comes that *à fortiori* conclusion which in all ages has given such encouragement to praying men, "If ye then that are evil know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father that is in heaven give good things [in Luke, 'His Holy Spirit'] to them that ask Him?"

It was not without a purpose that our Lord made the fatherhood of man so prominent in His illustration, and the Fatherhood of God in His conclusion. For one of the great ends of prayer is to encourage and exercise the filial spirit on the part of man toward God. It might well be asked—If God knows what each of His children needs, and if He has all the disposition and ability to bestow it, what is the need of prayer? It cannot be needed to give God information; "for your Father knoweth what things ye have need of before you ask Him." Neither can it be needed to move God's pity, or any similar affection; for He is full of compassion, "very pitiful, and of tender mercy." Nor can it have the effect of causing a change of purpose; for He is "the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness nor shadow of turning." But God deems it right that in prayer His children should show their sense of dependence on Him, and their full trust in His Fatherly love; He deems it right that they should come to Him, not in the craven, terrified spirit of slaves, but in the calm, confiding spirit of children; and it is this spirit that is rewarded with the blessing. It is not the mere act of prayer that God rewards, but rather the spirit of prayer; that spirit of trust that gratifies a parent's heart; the spirit of which we have so beautiful an example in the memorable words, "The Lord is my Shepherd; I shall not want." If this be the right view of prayer, we may see how monstrous the proposal was, some years ago, to try whether prayer was of avail by praying for one section of a hospital and not the rest, and watching whether there were more recoveries in the part prayed for. Such prayer could not possibly be effectual, because it could not possibly be the prayer of children confiding in the love and tenderness of their heavenly Father.

Other instances of prayer enjoined by Christ are, "Pray that your flight be not in the winter, neither on the sabbath day;" "Pray that ye enter not into temptation;" "Pray ye the Lord of the harvest to send

forth labourers into His harvest." The first is prayer for a temporal blessing; the second for a spiritual; and the third for a spiritual blessing outside ourselves, a blessing for the whole world, whose interests we should never forget when we bend the knee before God.

The exhortation to prayer, and the assurance of its efficacy in the farewell discourse (John xiv. 13, 14 and xvi. 23–27), demand special notice. "In that day, ye shall ask Me nothing. Verily, verily, I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in My Name, He will give it you. Hitherto ye have asked nothing in My Name: ask, and ye shall receive, that your joy may be full." [The margin of the Revised Version brings out a distinction between ἐρωτήσετε ("asking questions") and αἰτήσητε ("asking gifts") in ver. 23.] The point, however, on which our Lord lays stress is the value of the plea that has now become available for His disciples, in their having His Name to pray in. When appealed to on the ground of what His Son has done, alike for the salvation of men and the honour of God, the Father cannot but have profound regard to the request. And this is a consideration that ought to colour the whole structure and spirit of our prayers. In approaching God, we do so in the Name of Christ; we ought ever to show that we do so as sinners whose sins while unpardoned shut us out from His presence, but for whom our gracious Saviour has opened the door. There is a tendency on the part of some at the present day to ask blessings of God on the general ground of His goodness, and without regard to the fact that our sins have forfeited all claim to that goodness. Such prayers can have little avail. It is the prayer of sinners approaching God through a Mediator—in other words, prayer in the Name of Jesus—that God delights to hear and to honour. When such importance is attached to prayer in the Name of Christ, it is an insult to Him to approach God in any other name or by any other mediator. And as for prayer offered to saints, angels, or the Virgin, it is wholly opposed to our Lord's view of prayer as the dealing of children with their Father. The practice of the apostles and early Christians shows that in certain circumstances we may address ourselves in prayer to other members of the Godhead; but undoubtedly the rule is to bow the knee to the Father, and offer prayer through the Son and in reliance on the inward help of the Holy Spirit.

3. Parables illustrating the duty and the efficacy of prayer. Three such will readily occur to all: that of the friend wishing to borrow three loaves (Luke xi. 5–8); that of the unjust judge and the widow (Luke xviii. 1–8); and that of the Pharisee and the publican (Luke xviii. 9–14). It is remarkable that it is Luke who tells us most both of our Lord's example and His lessons in prayer. The first two parables are designed to teach the value of importunity, or rather unweariedness in prayer. Obviously, however, the analogy between God and man in this respect is not complete. So far as God is concerned, He does not hear us for our much speaking, and repetitions in themselves are vain. Then, again, it were

blasphemous to suppose that God would answer prayer in order to get rid of wearisome suppliants. The reason why importunity is encouraged is simply that it serves as a test of sincerity and earnestness. It was for this reason our Lord dealt so strangely with the Syrophenician woman; for when her faith proved itself strong enough to bear the test, her reward was complete: "O woman, great is thy faith; be it unto thee even as thou wilt."

The parable of the Pharisee and the publican is not designed so much to enforce the duty, as to illustrate the spirit, of prayer. The Pharisee knows nothing of the self-abasement of a sinful heart, has no consciousness of unworthiness, and dwells complacently on his virtues, which though in some measure due to God, reflect great credit on himself, and place him in a much higher category than the wretched publican at his side. The publican's frame of mind is precisely the opposite. His sin is for ever before him. It so fills his vision that he can think of nothing else. No vestige of a plea can he derive from anything that he is or has done; he must be a debtor, pure and simple, to the mercy of God. "The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit; a broken and a contrite heart, O God, Thou wilt not despise." Nothing is more fragrant than genuine contrition: "Blessed are they that mourn." That very much of what is most vital in our Lord's teaching, both on prayer and the Christian life generally, is contained in this parable, the Church has felt instinctively and profoundly in every age.

4. The great pattern prayer. To enlarge on the Lord's Prayer would obviously be impossible at the very close of a paper. We remark, however, the obvious illustration which its opening word affords of the filial attitude and spirit in which we ought to draw near to God—"Our Father, which art in heaven." We note likewise the relative place of the two great subjects of supplication, God's glory and man's good, just as in the angels' song, "Glory to God in the highest" goes before "peace on earth, good will to man." Further, we observe the combination of the temporal and the spiritual in the part that bears on the good of man, "Give us this day our daily [or, our necessary] bread"—a single petition without variation or amplification; whereas the petitions that deal with man as a sinner are more in number and fuller in scope, "Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors; and lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil." But what most impresses us in the structure of the whole prayer is its wonderful combination of brevity and comprehensiveness, and of simplicity and profundity. What a genius it must have been, if we may use such a phrase, that in six short lines gave the Church a prayer which in every age and every country of the world has been found to express, in the simplest possible language, the profoundest desires of every exercised heart! Let any intelligent and spiritual man try to sound the depths of these petitions, he will find it impossible. However much matter he may think of them as containing, he gets glimpses of

untold applications beyond, and he has the profound conviction that nothing more than the fulfilment of these petitions is needed to turn earth into heaven, to bring to pass the glory of the latter day.

Such are the chief forms in which our Lord has given us lessons on the subject of prayer. Still the question may be raised—Did He teach nothing more? Did He lay down no conditions of acceptable and prevailing prayer? Did He not recognize the fact that prayer is not always effectual? Certainly He recognized this fact most emphatically in one class of cases—prayers that are offered too late, after the door is shut, and the cry, "Lord, Lord, open unto us," meet with no other response than "I know you not." But other conditions, if not expressly stated, are implied in His teaching on the efficacy of prayer. There must be a measure of spiritual sympathy with Jesus Himself, arising from the study of His words. "If ye abide in Me, and My words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you" (John xv. 7). Our wills must be brought into some sort of harmony with His will. We must in some measure be able to apprehend what the things are which the Lord deems most suitable for us, most essential for our welfare. This is substantially the purport of St. John's teaching (1 John iv. 22): "Whatsoever we ask we receive of Him, because we keep His commandments, and do those things which are pleasing in His sight." So also (1 John v. 14), "This is the confidence we have in Him, that if we ask anything according to His will, He heareth us." Moreover, we must draw near in the filial spirit, placing trust in the wisdom, the faithfulness, and the love of our Father. We are to set a value, too, on union in prayer; the union even of two hearts longing for some good thing affords a presumption that He is willing to grant it. "If two of you shall agree on earth, as touching anything that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of My Father which is in heaven."

Thus we get an important bird's-eye view of our Lord's teaching concerning prayer. Unlike some other subjects of deep importance which were reserved for the apostles to expound fully, prayer was dealt with copiously by our Lord Himself. It was one of the subjects which had the benefit of His personal exposition, and which therefore demand on our part the more earnest consideration. What He taught has been substantially the doctrine of the Church in all her more enlightened and healthy periods. Prayer is not a mere form, a string of sacred words devoutly uttered. It is not a talisman, unlocking the doors of the Divine storehouse by a magical key. It is not a mere spiritual gymnastic suggesting holy thoughts to the soul, and bringing it into an elevated frame, although that is included in its benefits when it is real prayer. Essentially, it is the communing of the spirit of man with the Spirit of God; it is the simple asking of little children what they need from their Father; it is the utterance of souls enlightened to apprehend in the main what is best for them, and what God is willing to grant; and it

breathes the atmosphere of contrition, reverence, trust, and love, because it is guided by the sense of grievous sin on the part of man, and most generous mercy on the part of God.

THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT.

THE LOGIC OF CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY.

No. IV.

By R. M. Wenley, M.A., D.Sc.

No matter how deep and fundamental our disagreement with the Ritschlian doctrines may be, they are facts which merit attention. Many able men adhere to them, many others find a refuge in them. Or, to be brief, they are possessed of significance and authority. In the first place, there seems to be little doubt that the Ritschlian theology has met a certain need. Agnostic, it yet shows a path round agnosticism; empirical, it yet supplies a defence against empiricism; historical in method, it nevertheless refuses the evidence of history; socialistic, it yet furnishes the individual with a species of mission; rationalistic, it nevertheless is supremely fiducial. No wonder, then, that many, smitten by the varied ailments of modern culture, should fly to it, and find satisfaction for the religious instinct uncrossed by any conflict with history or criticism, with the sciences or with metaphysic. The specific advantages are but particular cases of these. For, once more, the Ritschlian insistence upon the Jewish element in Christianity and upon the Hebrew ideals which Christ fulfilled, has a certain timeliness—it chimes in with the higher criticism. This, even although the tendency be to see a breach of ordinary historical development in the apparition of Christ. For, notwithstanding the embargo laid upon inquiry into God's moral government of the universe, Judaistic conceptions, rather than Hellenic, are taken as the tests of New Testament trustworthiness. No doubt these notions have been purified by a recent view of the ideals immanent in Judaism. The fact remains that the direction in which Ritschl points is the quarter where an important truth lies. Further, the doctrine of the kingdom of God bears many fruitful lessons. "The precious idea of the kingdom of God is not a dream of the imagination, an illusion; it is a Divine force; it reveals itself in the Church, it seizes hold upon us, it penetrates us, it gives the will a decisive impulse towards the most elevated ideal, towards eternal life."[1] In this organism man can find rest in activity, self-realization in social effort, salvation for himself with others, a visible crown of Christ's work in an invisible community to which all Christians belong. Yet again, the unique kind of Christ's mission receives recognition. His Spirit is a source of authoritative

[1] Thikötter, *Darstellung der Theol. A. Ritschls*, p. 58.

impressions in every age. It seems to furnish the one positive fact to which, be social and intellectual changes what they may, sinful man can cling in full assurance of safety. The affectionate warmth that inspires the Ritschlian teaching on this point, the religious halo that surrounds the shadowy figure of the Master, the enthusiasm with which His origination and realization of the kingdom of God are treated,—all these serve to attract and to generate new hope in an era sick of a speculation barren in belief, and doubtful of itself in all spheres. Finally, the implied protest against intellectualism pleases many, who feel their own mental shortcomings, and flatters more, who have neither the desire nor the leisure to reflect on religion. The evidences of Christianity appear to be brought back once again to the level of the average man. "That ideals exist which authoritatively appeal to the instincts of the human soul; that these ideals were, historically, in their fulness introduced by Jesus Christ; that He claimed to be the channel through whom God could permanently speak to the world, and act upon it in grace; that, in point of fact, it is through faith in Christ, and in the God of Christ, that men are led to the fulfilment of the human ideal—such are the evidences of Christianity. They afford no complete logical proof. God did not mean that they should. Intellectual proof would fall outside the region of the Spirit and of conscience."[1] For these reasons, among others, the adaptability of Ritschlianism and its exaltation of Christ have appealed to men of widely differing endowments. Clamant questions have, in some instances, been stayed for the moment. Whether the demands themselves were altogether reasonable, and whether satisfaction thus achieved can prove altogether final, are other questions, both of which I should incline to answer strongly in the negative.

The plain fact is that the Ritschlian position does not stand critical examination. No doubt its imposing outlines and its systematic plan might easily lead one to judge otherwise. Nevertheless, the foundation is essentially insecure. To begin with, the principle of construction bears many traces of being no more than a reaction against prevalent ideas. The theory might be termed both eclectic and non-eclectic. But, although piecing together bits culled from his predecessors, Ritschl was led to do so by his antagonism to certain contemporary tendencies. Absolute idealism had been far too confident, and had, as he believed, proved a great failure in theology. While blank materialism was in much the same case. The act of knowledge that referred ultimate reality to spirit, like that which referred it to matter, stood self-condemned. And, by an extreme reaction, the method proposed was to bring knowledge to its senses, as it were, by showing that it could not know anything ultimately. It had too long been a mischievous disturber of the peace, too long an arrant impostor, and needed incarceration. Theories, whether psychic or materialistic, had professed to explain everything. So, by a common

[1] Mackintosh, *Essays towards a New Theology*, p. 99.

enough swing of the pendulum, the new theory was to be fundamentally incapable of explaining anything. Ritschl does not differ from Hegel on the importance of religion, but he holds, contrary to his *quondam* guide, that the objects of religion lie beyond the range of human knowledge. So, to castigate an arrogant intellectualism and yet retain a spiritual universe, the separation between philosophy and theology was proposed.

On this arrangement, theology is to have a sphere peculiar to itself and above knowledge, while metaphysic is to be content with the illusions of knowledge. This reminds one of the family tree said to have belonged to an ancient Irish house. The document covered several large sheets of parchment, and conspicuously lettered about the middle of the third was the striking annotation, "About this time the world was created." The independence of theology is analogous to that of the remoter scions of this sept. The objects discussed by theology and by metaphysics are to all intents identical. Both by their very nature concern themselves with the Absolute and its implications. The Ritschlian value-judgments, if not pure inventions by isolated individuals, depend upon judgments of reality. It is impossible to frame even an elementary conception of a theological object, not to mention a system, wholly without reference to its existence. It must, at least, be an object of thought. But thought has been condemned already, and man finds himself in the extraordinary position of being able, by means of sentiment, to attach absolute value to things from which his thinking is debarred. This is no mere subjective idealism, in which experience fashions itself "within" and leaves "without" well alone. On the contrary, man's inner nature has been riven asunder. In the interest of some vaguely defined faculty, negatively known to us as different from thought, thought has been snubbed. The *impasse* thus reached may be overcome, but only in one of two ways. Either absolute scepticism must ensue, wherein experience is clearly seen to yield no valid conclusions; or an equally absolute dogmatism, wherein thought, having swallowed the snub, retires, so to speak, in favour of the unknown, and confident, sentiment, or faith, or elaborative feeling, or whatever it may be. The former alternative is self-contradictory; the latter is merely absurd. The Ritschlian procedure is illogical, because it accepts neither, supposing that somehow experience may be divided into hermetically sealed compartments. From Monday to Saturday, knowledge dances among its phenomena, which it knows are not knowledge; on Sunday, the other power moons among its realities, which cannot fail to impress it, but which may or may not exist. The knower of the lawful days doubts and cannot dream; the dreamer of the sabbath believes, and can never know. There is no possible appeal from Philip sober to Philip drunk. For this classical gentleman is now so constituted that he cannot but be always drunk and always sober at one and the same time. When he meets a policeman, he knows, because the officer is a phenomenon; when he sees the originals of the gargoyle, he is impressed,—they are among the mighty

mayhaps. And the curious thing is that the policeman and the devils may be present together, but never to the same psychological power. Philip can think the one; the others he can feel, or accept, or something equally vague, but can by no means think. This is a late form of a very old fallacy, namely, that experiences are possible into which the element of thought, of mental recognition, does not enter. Now, while it is true that certain intuitions may be difficult to explain, they would never be known to us unless they were known. The element now of feeling, anon of will, may indeed predominate here or there. Yet the element of thought cannot be cast out. In the same way, thought cannot evict the other elements. Even a psychological description, which the Ritschlian view seems in some respects to favour, is in essentials a testimony to the ubiquity of the metaphysical faculty. And it is among the most curious delusions of modern culture that mysticism can be evaporated by the intervention of indefinable perceptions which never rise to the level of thought, or rather are supposed to remain always above it. The very statement that the perception occurs is itself an abstraction from thought. Condemn the one, and you condemn the other. Experience is not so unlike Hudibras' horse.

> "For Hudibras wore but one spur,
> As wisely knowing, could he stir
> To active trot one side of 's horse,
> The other would not hang on worse."

To be able even to say that metaphysic has one sphere and theology another, it is necessary to *know* something of the larger area from which both are carved. There is no possible co-operation in human experience between an isolated knowledge and an equally isolated faith. If they could be supposed to run along parallel lines, they would only confuse or, as is most probable, condemn each other; indeed, neither could have any other office.

The Ritschlian doctrines furnish an excellent object-lesson enforcing this conclusion. God impresses man overwhelmingly, and Christ is God's revelation enforcing this impression. But we are forbidden to ask *why* God thus strikes home, or *how* His revelation is a possibility. With what result? Deity is at once reduced to the level of a mere means in the human career. Man earnestly desires to free himself from the world. The *conception* of God aids him to realize this desire. He perceives that Deity can help to liberate him, and Deity is adopted, not as such, but as a useful stepping-stone. He may be cast aside when the end has been brought within measurable realization. Such a god is no more God than any similar helping idea. Nay, further, on the Ritschlian principles, He is not even a source of power. For the assumption is that nothing is known of Him; there is no attachment of reality, yet He is treated for the moment as if He were real. Thought knows Him not, yet faith perceives that He is of value as a notion analyzed out of experience. Metaphysic supplies

nothing real, yet a metaphysical object is endued with the highest value in relation to what the individual does know—the progressive whole of his own life. A contingent universal, if such a phrase be permissible, suddenly comes to receive authority over all. The theory is so self-contradictory as to be practically incapable of definite statement. Thus, theology, so far from being vindicated, actually becomes impossible. In extruding apologetics, the Ritschlians unwittingly turn themselves out of house and home. For, if God be a bare limiting conception, of whose reality nothing is known; if Christ be a man in whom this conception was uniquely vivid; if the historical evidence of the Biblical books be immaterial; and if all religious ideas be but striking feelings asseverated by this or that person, how is a science of Christianity possible? Personal religion affords no sufficient basis for a theology, yet no other is offered. The universe is not God's; it is but man's representation. Faith is flouted in the very delineation of the manner in which alone it is held capable of justification. Man is asked to *believe* in a God and a Christ, after his belief in the being of the one, and in the historically Divine nature of the other, has been laughed to scorn. What need to say that "if the religious consciousness hold that for truth which is not truth-in-itself, it is the prey of a delusion"? Even the attenuated Christian truth of the Ritschlians, with its eviscerated Christ, its pliant view of sin, its comfortable Deity, and its secluding Agnosticism, cannot maintain itself. As has been well said, "We cannot shirk the intricate further problems of Christianity. If the thing could be done; if Christian mankind could speculate as far as Ritschl does, and then desist from speculation at his word of command—Ritschl's theology might, I conceive, be a Christian theology. He does not refuse tribute to Christ, but argues that the question of offering this special personal tribute of worship to Christ does not legitimately arise. Such a thinker is a Christian *manqué*."[1] To answer the supreme question of Christian theology—Who is the Person who redeems the world? we must know the terms of the process. What is redemption? what is the world to be redeemed? who is the Redeemer? and how is He able to save?

IV.

Theology is a standing witness to the need which man inevitably feels of finding a harmony between the complex elements of his experience. A philosophical construction of the world will always remain a desideratum for such a being. This is the link which brings religion into connexion with speculative theory. If there is to be any rational unity, the two cannot but react on one another. In the past, as the Ritschlians argue, Greek philosophy may have led Christian theology astray. But it is absurd to suppose that the single method of expelling this error is to

[1] Mackintosh, *Essays towards a New Theology*, p. 141.

throw philosophy over. The question rather is—Can theology, accepting the metaphysical first principles which all spiritual inquiry involves, so react upon philosophy as to produce a less inadequate solution of difficulties? Does the fact of sin, for example, enable the theologian to help the philosopher to a fuller understanding of the Divine nature? The latter approaches Deity cosmologically, as it were; the former, anthropologically. Does the organic interconnexion of the two accounts lead further towards truth? Assuredly. For "at the beginning of all greater religious movements, we are in presence of the Absolute in its creative power; and the ultimate cause lies beyond the range of historical inquiry."[1] Yet, as theology points out, man is the medium of this creative power, and so a specific direction is given to the extra-historical speculation. In return for the critical service rendered by metaphysic, theology can throw a flood of light on several dark places. There are three regions, at least, where, amid contemporary controversies, theology proper could both assist and correct philosophical speculation. The questions of the Personality of God, of the creative or originating power which marks the Divinity of Christ, and of the relation of man to sin, and through this to universal evil, press heavy at the present juncture. In connexion with the first, it is valuable to emphasize the religious apprehension of God, with its implication of personality, in order that the problem may be viewed from another side than that of intellect, with its condemnation of personality as a phenomenon of the finite. As respects the second, theology calls attention to the important truth that the value of Christianity does not lie in its affinity for natural religion, but far rather in its distinctive extension of all natural religion, so called. Prior to Christ, more or less mutilated ideals had been operative. But when, to a metaphysical view of the nature of the universe and of man's experience, there was added what the Divinity of Christ brought—the origination and practical embodiment of the highest moral ideal—then God's nature was known in its essential implications. Thirdly, the doctrine of the Incarnation provides a clue for the treatment of the problem of evil. The world and the things thereof are to be employed, not cast aside as hindrances. Because they exist, and because man relates himself to them constantly, they must be capable of subserving moral purposes, of leading to religious ends.

The state of inquiry now precludes us from arriving at any other result. To-day theology is more closely connected with philosophy than ever. Both attack the same problems, although they do not seek for solutions of identical sweep. And, at the present time, when speculative theory would do well to reconsider the theistic and the Christological questions, a reverent and thorough theology could furnish well-nigh incalculable assistance. It would be in a position to insist upon full consideration of some very perplexing problems which metaphysic, its interests being more secular, might perhaps tend to dismiss too lightly.

[1] Weizsäcker, *The Apostolic Age*, vol. i. p. 6 (Engl. trans.).

For the moment it may seem, to abstract thinkers and theologians alike, that systematic presentation of the being of Deity and of His revelation is at a discount. But the latter and, as I earnestly believe, the former, have only to remain faithful to their science. It deals in

"Those thoughts that wander through eternity,"

and so must be the subject of constantly renewed interest from age to age, of an interest to which man gives himself up, because he is ever trying, however feebly, to read what is deepest, truest, most subtle yet most enthralling, in his own complex nature.

THE INSPIRATION AND PRESERVATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES.

By Rev. E. Elmer Harding, M.A.

"The Church of England," said the late Bishop Lightfoot, at the Durham Diocesan Conference in 1889, "is nowhere directly or indirectly committed to the position that the sun goes round the earth; or that this world has only existed for six or seven thousand years; or that the days of creation are days of twenty-four hours each; or that the scriptural genealogies must always be accepted as strict and continuous records of the descent from father to son; or that the sacred books were written in every case by those whose names they bear; or that there is nowhere allegory, which men have commonly mistaken for history. On these and similar points our Church has been silent; though individuals, even men of high authority, have written hastily and incautiously."

These wise and weighty words of the late and much-lamented Bishop of Durham, Joseph Barber Lightfoot, remind one of some words written more than a hundred and fifty years ago by another Bishop of Durham, Joseph Butler, when Rector of Stanhope. To these I shall have occasion presently to refer.

The object of this paper is to distinguish between inspiration and preservation of Holy Scripture, and so to assign to the latter the errors and displacements of books or chapters which are not infrequently ascribed to the former.

Two subjects are here mentioned: (1) inspiration; (2) preservation of Holy Scripture.

1. *Inspiration.* No subject can be more important, in view of the difficulties of belief which are felt by a vast number of thoughtful and inquiring men and women at the present time.

There are three questions, I submit, which force themselves upon the minds of thoughtful persons from time to time.

(1) What am I to believe?

(2) What am I to do?

(3) May I pray?

Faith, morals or duty, and prayer, sum up the three greatest questions that we can put to ourselves. The answer of the Church to these questions is that the Apostles' Creed is the sufficient summary of what we are to believe; the ten commandments are the summary of what we are to do; the Lord's Prayer is the pattern and model of all our prayers and devotions.

In discussing inspiration—one of the difficulties of belief—it may help us all if we clear our minds on the first of the three questions which I have mentioned as being of supreme importance. What am I, as a member of the Church of England, bound to believe? The answer to that question is contained in (1) the Office for the Ministration of Baptism, where the person to be baptized is asked, "Dost thou believe in God," etc.? "Wilt thou be baptized in this faith?" The faith in which we are baptized is contained in the Apostles' Creed. Then (2) in the Church Catechism we acknowledge ourselves bound to believe all the articles of the Christian faith, *i.e.* the Apostles' Creed. Then (3) when a sick person desires the ministrations of the Church to prepare him to meet God in death, his pastor is authorized to use these words to him: "I require you to examine yourself both toward God and man, therefore I shall rehearse to you the articles of our faith, that you may know whether you do believe as a Christian man should, or no." The articles of faith, be it noted, which are rehearsed to the sick man, are the articles of the Apostles' Creed, and nothing else. A man is not asked to express his faith in any particular theory of the inspiration of the Bible, or to explain his "views" about the atonement, or miracles, or prophecy. He is simply asked if he believes steadfastly all the articles of the Apostles' Creed. The importance of this cannot be over-estimated. "Many of the sharpest attacks of unbelief," says Prebendary Row, in his *Bampton Lectures* for 1878, on "Christian Evidences in Relation to Modern Thought," "derive their chief strength from the idea that Christianity is pledged to the truth of certain theories of inspiration, which the Church has never held. On one point," he adds, "I can speak with something like authority, namely, as to the effect they produce on the unbelief of the working classes of this country. I have during the last six years (1877) been present at discussions at which I have heard not less than one hundred addresses made by unbelievers who belong to this class of society, on points which they consider to involve the truth of Christianity. Taking these objections as a whole, I feel convinced that two-thirds at least of them owe their entire plausibility to their identification of that particular form of inspiration which is usually designated as verbal or mechanical with a Divine revelation. To this theory they believe Christianity to be pledged, and, consequently, that every objection which can be urged against the Old Testament on the ground that (1) its statements or its language are not scientifically correct; or (2) that its moral teaching is imperfect; or (3) that it attributes to God the passions

of humanity; or (4) against the New Testament on the ground that discrepancies exist in the Gospels which are difficult to reconcile; in a word, that everything in the Bible which is at variance with *mechanical verbal accuracy* is fatal to its claim to be considered a revelation from God."

If this testimony (and it is no mean testimony) be true, *i.e.* if two-thirds of the objections against Christianity are built upon the supposition that the Church forces upon us all belief in verbal mechanical inspiration, then the importance of the subject we are considering cannot be over-estimated. So far from being a matter for clergy only, or for the quiet of our studies, it is a matter that should receive the attention of all thoughtful laymen, who can either directly or indirectly bring their influence to bear upon the working classes of the country. It cannot be too often or too clearly repeated that there is no reference to the Bible in the Apostles' Creed, and that no theory of inspiration is binding upon us as an article of faith. The sixth article of the Church of England should be constantly remembered in this connexion, not only for what it does say, but for what it does *not* say. "Holy Scripture *containeth* all things necessary to salvation: so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article of the Faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation." One of the things that is not read therein, and certainly cannot be proved thereby, is the mechanical theory of inspiration, *which is the parent of two-thirds of our modern unbelief.*

Hear the present Bishop of Durham, the greatest living authority on the history of the Bible: "The purely organic (that is, mechanical) theory of inspiration rests on no scriptural authority, and, if we except a few ambiguous metaphors, is supported by no historical testimony. It is at variance with the whole form and fashion of the Bible, and it is destructive of all that is holiest in man and highest in religion." It is not theologians who have imposed upon men burdens too grievous to be borne. It was the well-known American secularist, Colonel Robert Ingersoll, who said, "It will not do to say that it is not verbally inspired. If the words are not inspired, what is?" But "what right," says Archdeacon Wilson, "has he to put into the mouths of Christians a definition of inspiration which is so utterly unsubstantiated by Scripture and by historical testimony, repudiated by the greatest living theologians, and by the vast majority if not the whole of the educated Christian ministers in the world?" We believe in the Holy Ghost. Therefore we believe the *fact* of inspiration. We believe that the Holy Ghost "spake by the prophets," and that what He spake contains all things necessary to salvation. We believe that the Bible is Divine. We know that it is also human. And this fact cannot exclude the possibility of human error. If, then, we assume, says Prebendary Row, "that inspiration was not a general but a functional endowment, and consequently limited to subjects in which religion is directly involved, and that in those which stand

outside it the writers of the different books in the Bible were left to the free use of their ordinary faculties,—a large number of the objections which are popularly urged against revelation from the standpoint of physical science and modern criticism would become simply nugatory."

2. *The preservation of the Scriptures.* I have dwelt at some length upon the first of the two topics suggested by our subject, because it seems to me that it will help us the better to understand the second. The preservation of the Scriptures is distinct from their inspiration. Inspiration secures absolute truth on all necessary subjects. Preservation may imply errors of various kinds, and the displacement of books or of chapters of individual books. But such errors and displacements, which the close and critical study of the Bible brings to light, do not in the least degree weaken the authority of Holy Scripture. On this subject it is well to remember the weighty words of Bishop Butler, in Part II. ch. iii. of the *Analogy*—written more than a hundred and fifty years ago—in which he clearly distinguishes between what is essential and what is not essential to the defence of Christianity. He is speaking of the preservation and inspiration of Holy Scripture. It would have helped the cause of Christianity in our days, and entirely have cut the ground from under the feet of those who spend their energies in attacking Christianity, if Bishop Butler's words had been remembered and employed in the defence of the faith. "The whole question concerning the truth of Christianity is whether it be a real revelation, not whether it be attended with every circumstance that we should have looked for; and concerning the authority of Scripture, whether it be what it claims to be, not whether it be a book of such sort, and so promulged, as weak men are apt to fancy a book containing a Divine revelation should. And therefore neither (1) obscurity, nor (2) seeming inaccuracy of stile (*sic*), nor (3) various readings, nor (4) early disputes about the authors of particular parts, nor (5) any other things of the like kind, though they had been much more considerable in degree than they are, could overthrow the authority of the Scriptures; unless the prophets, apostles, or our Lord, had promised that the book containing the Divine revelation should be secure from these things." And again in the same chapter he writes, "And as it is owned the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet understood, so if it ever comes to be understood, before the restitution of all things, and without miraculous interpositions; it must be in the same way as natural knowledge is come at—*by the continuance and progress of learning and of liberty; and by particular persons attending to, comparing, and pursuing intimations scattered up and down it, which are overlooked and disregarded by the generality of the world.* For this is the way in which all improvements are made: by thoughtful men's tracing on obscure hints, as it were dropped us by nature accidentally, or which seem to come into our minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible that a book which has been so long in the possession of mankind should contain many truths as yet

undiscovered. For possibly it might be intended that events as they come to pass should open and ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture."

In this remarkable manner Bishop Butler anticipated, more than a hundred and fifty years ago, most of the difficulties which are being raised to-day against the authority of Holy Scripture. I venture to think that if he had been living amongst us to-day, he would have been the first to rejoice at the "progress of learning and of liberty;" he would have been the first to tell us that the inspiration and authority of Holy Scripture are in no way weakened by errors connected with its preservation, or by the displacements of books, or chapters, or verses. He would have taught us to distinguish between preservation which admits the possibility of errors in non-essentials, and inspiration which precludes the possibility of errors in essentials. He would have taught us to rely more on the voice of the Church. He would have rejoiced, I think, at the deeper and wider and more intelligent study of the Word of God which now prevails. He would have been thankful to see the helps to the study of the Bible increasing yearly. He would have forwarded the work of true Biblical criticism with fearlessness, with judgment, and with reverence. For the work of criticism is not merely negative; it is positive and constructive as well. It is the work of the critic not only to find faults, but also to detect beauties and truths unsuspected and undiscovered before. It is the work of the critic to ascertain facts, to examine facts, to weigh and to judge each book which is contained in the "Divine library" which we call the Bible. It is his place to arrange, so far as he can, the chronological order of the books and of the chapters or sections of each book; to connect psalms with the lives of psalmists or the experience of the nation; to link prophecies to the events of contemporaneous history which called them forth; and to place Epistles in due relation to the lives of apostles or apostolic men who wrote them. It is his work and his privilege to exercise a God-given faculty of judgment—crisis—and to aid in making the complications and intricacies of this most complicated library which we call the Bible as clear and intelligible to those who have little leisure for study, as they can possibly be made. Thus it is the work of the critic to detect, and, as far as possible, to correct, the errors which have crept into the Bible in the course of its transmission from age to age, and translation into the various languages of men. And when the work of the critic is ended, if ever it will be ended ("before the restitution of all things," as Bishop Butler would say), then, and not till then, shall we be able to gauge to the full the nature and extent of inspiration. For the only true mode of arriving at any theory of inspiration is, not by assuming what inspiration must have been, but by inquiring what it actually has been; or, in other words, as Prebendary Row puts it, "*by a rigid induction of the facts and phenomena of the Bible.*"

This demand for *facts* is one of the most hopeful signs of the times. When people demand to know all the facts about the Bible, the history and preservation of its actual text, the work of the scribes and men of the great synagogue of the time of Ezra and Nehemiah, the work of the compilers of the Talmud, the work of the Massoretes,—then we may be quite sure that the ignorant attacks against its inspiration, which are based for the most part on misconception or preconceived opinions, will give place to a rational discrimination between the essential parts of the Bible which convey moral and spiritual truths necessary to salvation, and the non-essential parts, historical, geographical, or scientific, which are liable to human error and imperfection.

I have confined myself to general principles. The actual history of the preservation of the manuscripts of the Bible can now be purchased for a mere trifle. Dr. Paterson Smyth, in his *Old Documents and the New Bible*, and *How we got our Bible*, and *How God inspired the Bible*, has made a large amount of important information available to all. He has popularized the labours of Bishop Westcott in his learned article on the Canon and his book on the *History of the Canon of the New Testament.*

"Every ray of knowledge," says Bishop Lightfoot, in his *Ordination Addresses*, "from whatever source it comes, which throws light on the book of books, will be welcomed. It is knowledge which is required. Mere empty talk, mere repetition of stereotyped phrases, mere purposeless rambling about the pages of the Bible, will not satisfy the present eagerness of men on all sides after Biblical knowledge."

"If any one likes to talk of *verbal* inspiration," says Frederick Denison Maurice, in his *Theological Essays*, "if that phrase conveys some substantial meaning to his mind, by all means let him keep it. He cannot go further than I should in calling for a laborious and reverent attention to the very words of Scripture, and in denouncing the unreasonable notion that thoughts and words can be separated, that the life which is in one must not penetrate the other. If any one likes to speak of *plenary* inspiration, I would not complain. I object to the inspiration which people talk of for being too empty, not for being too full. These forms of speech are pretty toys for those who have leisure to play with them. But they do not belong to business. They are not for those who are struggling with life and death. Such persons want, not a plenary inspiration, or a verbal inspiration, but a book of life; and they will know that they have such when you have courage to tell them that there is a Spirit with them who will guide them into the truth of it."

I append a scheme for the study of the subject, for which I am largely indebted to the Rev. Prebendary Southwell, M.A., Principal of Lichfield Theological College:—

I. The History of the Growth of the Canon.

1. Ryle on the *Canon of the Old Testament.*
2. Buhl on the *Text and Canon of the Old Testament.*

3. Westcott on the *Canon of the New Testament.*
4. Westcott on the *Bible in the Church.*
5. Paterson Smyth, *Old Documents and the New Bible.*
6. Paterson Smyth, *How we got our Bible.*

II. Modern Theories as to the Nature and Extent of Inspiration.
1. Lee, *Inspiration*, ch. 1 and Appendix C.
2. Farrar, *Bible Educator*, vol. i. art. 2.
3. Wilson, *Why Men do not believe the Bible.*
4. Gore, *Lux Mundi:* "The Holy Spirit and Inspiration."
5. Row, *Bampton Lectures*, viii., "Popular Theories of Inspiration : their Relation to Scientific Thought."
6. Vaughan, *Epistle to the Hebrews:* Appendix on "Inspiration."
7. Sanday, *Bampton Lectures* for 1893 : "Inspiration."

III. The Traditional Teaching of the Church.
1. Lee on *Inspiration*, chs. 1, 2, 4, 6, 8.
2. Newman, *Tracts for the Times*, 85, lecture 3.
3. Westcott, *Introduction to the Study of the Gospels:* introductory chapter on "Inspiration;" Appendix on "The Primitive Doctrine of Inspiration."
4. Sadler, *Emmanuel*, ch. 7, "Inspiration of Holy Scripture."
5. Magee, *The Gospel and the Age.*
6. Robertson, *Sermons*, vol. iv. No. 28.
7. Maurice, *Theological Essays*, xiii., "Inspiration."

SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT.

MAN'S DESTINY.[1]

By Rev. D. Gath Whitley.

Why is it that the advocates of the theory which derives man from some apelike creature *will* persist, when they set forth their evolutionary suppositions, in ignoring the evidence which is brought against their theory from so many quarters? When it is admitted that at present no creature exists which connects man with the apes; when it is confessed that man could not have descended from any ape now living; when it is admitted that the oldest men geology reveals to us are no more like apes than are the men of the present day; when it is conceded that no fossil ape or apelike creature has been found which could have been the progenitor of man; and, lastly, when it is admitted that no intermediate links between men and apes have been discovered, in all those geological formations in which, if the theory be true, they ought to have been found in great numbers;—then we are compelled to declare that it is quite useless to proclaim to the world the conquests of evolution, and to set forth confidently that man has descended from some apelike ancestors, of which, unfortunately, not the slightest trace can anywhere be found.

[1] By John Fiske.

The greatest questions that man can ask are, "What am I?" "Whence came I?" and, "Whither am I going?" and of these the last is the most important. Darwinian evolutionists constantly endeavour to find a reply to the great question relating to man's future, and they continually set forth their views on the destiny of man. But it is the future of the *race*, and not of the *individual*, to which they refer. They talk of a coming time of peace and happiness, in which war shall not exist, crime shall almost disappear, and science shall reign supreme. The individual, however, answers, "But what is to become of *me?* Am I as a *self-conscious* individual to have a *self-conscious* existence in the future, or to disappear like the collapse of a bubble on the surface of the ocean?" Until evolution can answer this question, it can bring no real encouragement to man, and can inspire no hope to remove the burden of sorrow or the load of fear and disappointment.

Mr. Fiske writes as a Darwinian evolutionist, and sets forth his views on the course of human development in the past at some length. His style is charming, but his arguments are not convincing. He commences by comparing the Darwinian theory of evolution with the Copernican theory in astronomy, and declares that both are equally established by facts, and are equally harmonious with Christianity. To our mind, however, the parallel is utterly fallacious. The Copernican theory can be *demonstrated*, and is held by *all* astronomers. The Darwinian theory *cannot be demonstrated*, and is at best but a plausible hypothesis, while at the same time it is *not held* by all men of science. The Copernican theory, moreover, does not in any way affect the nature of man, his original sin, and the immortality of the soul; but a materialistic setting forth of Darwinism very seriously interferes with these great foundation truths. It is difficult, then, to see how the Copernican and Darwinian theories are in any way parallel. Mr. Fiske gives us a picture of the earliest men, which is exceedingly gloomy and uninviting. He says of these earliest members of the human family, "In respect of belligerency the earliest men were doubtless no better than brutes. They were simply the most crafty and formidable among brutes" (p. 77). Of the struggle for existence among primitive men, he says, "That struggle meant everlasting slaughter, and the fiercest races of fighters would be just the ones to survive and perpetuate their kind. . . . That moral sense which makes it seem wicked to steal and murder was scarcely more developed in them than in tigers and wolves" (p. 78). For this gloomy picture there is no evidence. The oldest men revealed to us by geology are those of the post-glacial period, and they were of a high mental type. They reverently buried their dead, and—as is shown by the discoveries at Solutré—they treated their aged relatives with reverence and affection, and they also believed in the immortality of the soul. There was no need whatever for universal warfare and "everlasting slaughter," for, as the earliest men lived on great continents, the weaker members simply moved away to

great distances from their stronger neighbours. Moreover, in whatever geological period we place the first men, there was an abundant supply of food—fish, flesh, and fowl—for all their needs. If man appeared on earth in the Pleistocene period, then at that time game and fish literally *swarmed* on the earth, and man's needs for food could be easily supplied. If, again, we select the Pliocene period (as Mr. Fiske seems inclined to do) as the era of man's appearance, then we find food equally plentiful. In fact, so far from the earliest times being a period of "everlasting slaughter" and endless fighting, they must have been times of peace.

As (according to Mr. Fiske) the moral sense did not exist in the earliest men, it will be interesting to know how he considers that this faculty was acquired by man. He tells us that "rudimentary moral sentiments are discernible in the highest members of the mammalian orders" (p. 67); but this is a statement which, of course, is nothing but a mere assertion, and which cannot be proved; and we learn from him also that the family state originated the germs of conscience and the ideas of duty, which, therefore, must exist in the higher animals. It would be interesting to discover where the evidence exists which is supposed to show that primitive man had no moral sense. It does not exist in the world *at present*, since the lowest savages have a strong moral sense, and they also possess a perfect capacity for mastering and practising the teachings of the loftiest and purest morality. Nor can such evidence be produced from the *past*, for the oldest men (of the Palæolithic period) were reverent, devout, and affectionate. We presume that the statement that primitive man had no moral nature is merely made *because evolution requires that it should be made*, which is unfortunate for evolution, as the evidence is so strongly against the statement. Mr. Fiske makes another most extraordinary statement on this portion of the subject when he says, "In moral development the Australian, whose language contains no words for justice and benevolence, is less remote from dogs and baboons than from a Howard or a Garrison" (p. 72). This statement is perfectly amazing. The Australian *possesses a capacity* for embracing the sublimest Christian truths; and he does so through the teachings of Christian missionaries, and he practises those teachings in a life which is often as upright as the life of Europeans, whilst dogs and baboons *possess no such capacity whatever*. Precisely the same thing may be replied to the statement that intellectually the lowest savages are nearer to animals than they are to highly civilized men; for here again it is evident that the savage *possesses a capacity* by which he can acquire and develop the inventions of civilization, while the brute has no such capacity. This constitutes the intellectual chasm between man and the apes. We ought to be informed *when* the first beings worthy to be called men appeared, and on this question Mr. Fiske says, "The pyramids of Egypt seem things of yesterday when we think of the cave-men of Western Europe in the glacial period, who scratched pictures of mammoths on pieces of reindeer

antler with a bit of pointed flint. Yet during an entire geologic æon before these cave-men appeared on the scene, "a being erect upon two legs," if we may quote from Serjeant Buzfuz, "and wearing the outward semblance of a man and not of a monster, wandered hither and thither over the face of the earth" (p. 55). If in this paragraph the words "glacial period" are taken in a *limited* sense, so that the glacial period is looked on as merely a subdivision of the Pleistocene era, then the "geologic æon" before the glacial period will be the pre-glacial era, in which no traces whatever of man or of manlike creatures can anywhere be discovered. If, however, we understand by the glacial era the *whole* of the Pleistocene epoch, then the geologic æon before it, to which Mr. Fiske refers, will be the Pliocene period. In this geologic æon traces of man are indeed found, but they are traces of *real* men, who are as truly men as the ordinary savage races now existing. If these Pliocene relics of man, on the other hand, are not genuine (as is probable), then there are no traces of man or of manlike creatures in the Pliocene period. It is thus always the same, wherever we turn in geology, no evidence can be produced in favour of the ape origin of man.

Mr. Fiske writes a chapter on "The Improvableness of Man," and he declares that this improvableness is "the most essential feature" of man (p. 71). But degradation and decay are features of equal power in human history, and it can be proved that existing savages have sunk into their present condition by degradation from a higher state which their ancestors enjoyed in former times. An ingenious theorist, by stringing together all the instances of decay and degradation which exist at present, and which have occurred in the past, could frame a very plausible theory to show that the human race is rapidly sinking into a melancholy condition of degradation and decay, and that it will ultimately become extinct. Psychical variations, our author informs us, have played the greatest part in the development of man; but until we know what these psychical variations are, and how they were brought about, we are unable to discuss them. We are, indeed, told by Mr. Fiske that the end of the working of natural selection in man will be the throwing off of the brute inheritance. "Theology," he informs us, "has had much to say about original sin. This original sin is neither more nor less than the brute inheritance which every man carries with him, and the process of evolution is an advance toward true salvation" (p. 103). Here we have indeed a startling and novel theory of original sin; and how it is to be harmonized with the Christian doctrine of man's original purity and subsequent fall, and how it is also to be harmonized with the teachings of conscience which declare that this original sin is a *fault* in man, we cannot for a moment comprehend. And yet this throwing off of the brute inheritance is called, by Mr. Fiske, pure Christianity, because it sets forth St. Paul's conception of the two men warring within him! The Christian doctrine is that man's evil nature originated through his transgression, that man was

perfectly unable to deliver himself by any natural processes of progress or evolution, and that the incarnation of the Son of God was necessary before man could be raised from the moral degradation into which he had sunk. How these teachings can be harmonized with the modern evolutionary view of man's incessant upward progress both mentally and morally, we are quite unable to determine. Like all evolutionists, Mr. Fiske looks forward to a glorious time in the future when warfare shall cease, when crime shall not exist, and when disease shall be curbed. But in this bright future sorrow must be present, bereavement will inflict its wounds, and moral irregularities will continue to make men miserable. The Christian, indeed, believes in a coming happy era; but it is to be brought about, not by merely unaided human progress, but by Divine intervention through the return of the Son of God.

Mr. Fiske believes that there is nothing in the progress of modern science to negative the belief in the immortality of the soul. In this we heartily agree with him, but we wish that he had told us what science has to say in favour of this belief. Many persons find a belief in human immortality very hard to reconcile with an acceptance of a *materialistic* theory of evolution, and it would be well if they could receive some scientific assistance in their difficulties. The questions of the destiny and origin of man can never be decided by a mere study of natural history and comparative anatomy, and the only available light that can be thrown on these tremendous problems—apart from revelation—must come from mental and moral philosophy.

CURRENT AMERICAN THOUGHT.

THE SOCIAL ETHICS OF JESUS. By Professor JOHN S. SEWALL, D.D. (*The Bibliotheca Sacra*).—Was Jesus a Social Reformer? Was the renovation of society the special object of His mission? Did He come to regenerate the individual, or to rectify the community? He came to the disturbed conditions of society in Palestine of the Roman period. He appeared to be eminently qualified for correcting social evils; and yet He did not work along these lines.

Jesus did not enter upon the *rôle* of the statesman or of the political economist. We look in vain for legislation. He enacts no code. He leads no party. We look in vain for any system of associated charities, or any great organized philanthropy bearing His name, and spreading through all lands in memory of His pity and love. The Master never interfered with the constitution of things as He found them in vogue in His day. Such terms as "communism," "chartism," "landlordism," "nationalization of land," "anti-monopoly," "competition," "co-operation," and the like, are foreign to His dialect.

Whatever was His errand, Jesus evidently did not set up as a Social Agitator. It was no part of His plan to storm the social problem by direct assault. He was not operating down among the details. He was arranging a campaign of great forces under which the details would work themselves out in good time. His whole attention was

concentrated upon the founding of a spiritual kingdom. This was not to be some kind of ghostly Utopia, but a present practical union of renovated hearts and lives. The one aim of the kingdom is to produce right character. Therefore it works upon persons, one by one. It plies the soul with motives. Its aim is the purification of the heart and the rectification of the life.

As if to show the world some external symbol of these inner transformations, Jesus applies His power here and there to some of the ravages of sin. Miracles of mercy radiate from His Divine Person. The forces of His kingdom, beginning with the spiritual, would reach out into the physical and secular, would pervade and sweeten every province of life, and would repair the damages that come by sin. Set up the kingdom, and in time it would carry all other good with it. In founding a spiritual empire Jesus set in motion causes which start with the individual, and through the individual reach out into society. So far as Christianity transforms an atom, that atom helps to transform the mass of which it is a unit. And thus is gradually progressing the moral disinfection of the world, and the moral integration of humanity.

He taught the universal Fatherhood of God, and the universal brotherhood of man. Every man is neighbour to every other man. A man is a man, and therefore all men are his fellows. For the law of this fraternity Jesus adopted the golden rule. Nothing could be more unlike the codes by which men have usually been governed. The golden rule says, "If a man is a brother, treat him as a brother." Admit the golden rule, and there is an end of slavery, of fraud, of ruinous competition, etc. Put society under the golden rule, and every man is bound to consider not his own rights and interests alone, but the welfare of the rest of the world. Jesus made of this rule something more than a command. He carried it up into the region of motive. He elevated it into a principle and a sentiment. And He widened out the precept till it should include not the neighbour only, but also the enemy. The Master at a stroke dispels our sophistries, and shows us that our discords and brawls with one another are so petty, so low, so inhuman, that they do not and cannot annul the real unity of the race. Here lies the explanation of the difficult precepts about non-resistance. What Jesus is aiming at is to get lodged in the human heart the great idea of mutual forbearance. And to make an impression sufficiently vivid, He sets forth examples which are too paradoxical to mislead, and yet startling enough to compel the attention of the world. He shows therein His purpose to get the *lex talionis* out of human history, and to substitute for it the law of kindness.

In Christ's kingdom the golden rule rises into the Christian law of service. Not self-aggrandizement, not self-exaltation, not place and position, and power to lord it over one's fellow-subjects—these are not the prizes of the kingdom; but that self-devotion which shall inspire one to spend and be spent for his fellow-men. This is the humility that shall be exalted. Why are men placed in high station? Not for the rank and emoluments, but for the enlarged opportunities of service.

How did Jesus intend His disciples should work out these principles and apply them to the successive conditions that might arise? His method was that of spiritual evolution; the method of the leaven. Implant certain forces in the mind, and let them work. Magnetize the human will, and of its own accord it will point to the pole. The unit of society is the family. Jesus draws up no code of ethics for the family. If the family conforms to the principles of the kingdom, He knows that all these special lines of the common life will go of themselves. To the rich His message is one of admonition—always earnest, sometimes sharp and stern. He looks upon them as living on a wrong theory, and as in grave spiritual danger. In the main our Lord's ministrations were to the poor, the working classes, the wage-earners.

He aims to lift the poor up on the high level of simple content where He abides Himself.

The hopes and plans of Jesus were centred on the individual rather than on a system. He did not project some great sociological fabric. His ideal is love—an ideal for society as for the individual. Let that Divine sentiment become the ruling nstinct of the mind, and the man is moulded in the fashion of Jesus; and his life is lived along His lines. The sunshine of Christianity will yet melt away the inhuman conditions of society. Brotherhood and mutual service of love will yet triumph.

THE HISTORICAL METHOD OF INTERPRETATION. By Rev. JAMES BRAND, D.D. (*The Bibliotheca Sacra*).—When St. Peter visited Cornelius at Cæsarea, a great step was taken in the historical development of Christian doctrine. The apostle himself received such an enlargement of his ideas of the character of God and the scope of Christianity as made him a different man for the rest of his life. It put the apostle, and it ought to put all men in every age, into an attitude of readiness to welcome new truth. He learned that the gospel, as applied to human life, is full of *surprises;* that we are constantly to expect new developments of truth, new and larger interpretations of truth, and new applications of truth to life, as the history of the world unrolls. There is such a thing as *progress of doctrine.* God interprets His own Word by His providences. Therefore the *historical method* of interpretation is the only true one.

We may find some marked changes and enlargements of idea in the treatment of revelation.

1. Christian men now, in their interpretation of Scripture, appeal to reason more than in former ages. In past generations a statement found in the Bible was accepted literally, chiefly because it was in the Bible. Now statements are received because they commend themselves to enlightened reason and the moral sense of man. Texts and doctrines are alike subjected to criticism, and the Bible as a whole is defended because it is reasonable. The critical judgment, enlightened by the Spirit of God, and broadened by scholarly investigation and the unfolding of history, has now a supreme place in the work of interpretation. This is no disparagement of the mission of the Holy Spirit in leading men "into all truth." For the Spirit's field of operation is not words, but *minds.*

2. Under this principle we are getting rid of the old excitement about the relation of religion to science which has tormented the Church for fifteen hundred years. Theologians have, for a time at least, fought nearly every great, new discovery of scientific research as if it were an enemy of religion. Ex-President Andrew D. White wisely says, "In all modern history, interference with science, in the supposed interests of religion, no matter how conscientious, has resulted in evil both to science and religion. And all untrammelled scientific investigation, no matter how dangerous to religion some of its stages may have seemed for a time to be, has invariably resulted in the highest good of religion and science." Christianity and science are divinely intended to live and develop together. They help each other. We are all learning to interpret according to the historical development of the race and age in which we live. In learning this lesson, there is no better book to study than the Book of Acts. We find that it is not only the record of the acts of the apostles, but pre-eminently the record of the growth of apostolical conceptions of Divine truth—the book of the enlargement of the apostles' ideas, the broadening of their thought, the gradual correction of their false conceptions of the Christian scheme.

The historical interpretation of Scripture may be looked upon, is looked upon by some, as only a dangerous tendency toward the liberalism of a shallow age, or as the

Athenian passion for "some new thing." But such fear is groundless, provided always that the new ideas are not only broader, but higher. Narrowness is not necessarily deep. There is no help for humanity in mere orthodox conservatism, unless it has also the element of breadth and progress in its application to the expanding wants of the world.

We all need to study the Bible according to the progressive and historical method. We need to stand, as the apostle did, with open mind, ready to correct or enlarge our views as the advancement of Christ's kingdom may demand. We, too, must expect the Bible to be full of *surprises*, full of unlooked-for greatness of capacity of adaptation to the ever-growing and changing conditions of mankind. We may find, by this method of interpretation, the true conception of our duty to the heathen. The possibility that some in every nation may be saved, does not remove the need of the Bible and the preaching of the living Christ.

This historical method of interpreting the Bible, which keeps it always in touch with Christian experience, and makes it the leader of Christian thought in every age and stage of culture, ought to remove all anxiety as to the result of historical criticism of the Bible itself. The more criticism the better. The more study of the Bible from every quarter, the more God's plan is being carried out, and the more invincible will be the confidence that "the Word of our God shall stand for ever."

THEORIES OF INSPIRATION. By Rev. M. A. WILLCOX, D.D. (*The Biblical World*). —The universe is an arena of wrestling antitheses. It is a complex of contrasts, a mighty fabric of oppositions. The task of thought, in such a universe, must consist largely in the effort to discover those higher principles of unity, in which its varied oppositions are harmonized, its wrestling antitheses reconciled. In theology, the effort of human thought is to harmonize the antitheses of religion, and especially to discover the reconciliation in its doctrines of its fundamental and pervading antithesis of the Divine and the human.

What is the measure of co-operation respectively of the Divine and the human in *inspiration?* This author only proposes to give the materials for dealing with this question by presenting a *résumé* of the principal types or classes of theories which have been proposed by theological thinkers.

The first class of theories may be designated nullifying or destructive theories, since they, in effect, annul or abrogate a proper inspiration by confusing it, or substituting for it something else diverse from it.

(1) The theory which describes inspiration as the subjective effect merely of revelation. This merges inspiration in revelation, as its sufficient causal antecedent, and deprives it of any immediately supernatural character or function of its own. The mind of the recipient is left to itself, to struggle, unaided, with the heavenly vision. The supernatural agency is viewed as occupied simply with the disclosure of truth, and not as directly influencing its appropriation by the recipient, or its subsequent reproduction for others.

(2) The theory which confuses inspiration with intuition. This theory supposes the phenomena of inspiration to be accounted for by that natural elevation of the faculties which we call *genius*. Inspiration is a high order of religious intuition. But the true conception of inspiration is not that of a mediated discovery of truth, but that of an illumination and impulse immediately communicated by the Divine mind. This theory explains inspiration by abrogating it.

(3) The theory of gracious inspiration. This confuses inspiration proper with the ordinary indwelling of the Spirit in believers, by which they are guided into the

apprehension of such religious truth as will enable them to exhibit the fruits of practical piety. But it seems necessary to distinguish between an activity of the Divine Spirit which merely helps receptivity, and such an activity as imparts new truth, and makes original communications to the mind.

The second class of theories emphasizes the *Divine* element in inspiration, and affirms *inerrancy* of the sacred writings. (1) The theory of dictation. The subject may have been in an ecstasy, trance, or swoon. He is always the passive vehicle of the *words* of inspiration. This theory expresses probably the rabbinical, the Alexandrian, the patristic, and the scholastic views of inspiration. (2) The theory of infallible guidance. This is sometimes called plenary, and sometimes dynamic. The mind of prophet and apostle is represented as exercising a spontaneous co-operation with the Divine, but not such as to allow any human imperfection to mar the sacred writings—not such as to jeopardize, in any instance, the ultimate selection of the divinely approved words. There is no difference in result between this theory and the preceding one of dictation.

The third class of theories places greater emphasis on the *human* element in inspiration, and admits unimportant errors in the sacred writings. This class may be called "conceptual," because the contention is that inspiration relates essentially to the *concept*, and not to the *words*; to the material, and not to the form. The natural powers of the mind are aided, indeed, and stimulated in their efforts to grasp and reproduce the substance of revelation, but the sacred writers are not limited in their forms of expression. (1) The theory of ethical and religious inspiration. Such other materials as the Scriptures contain may exhibit signs of human imperfection, but relatively to their great end of imparting ethical and religious truth, they are without error. (2) The theory of inspiration of the mysteries of religion. It is regarded as confined to things which are not discoverable by human reason, such as the nature of God, the Incarnation, the Resurrection, and the future life. (3) A theory which may be designated the Christ-theory, and is characterized by a peculiar pre-eminence ascribed to the *personal* teaching of our Lord. It is difficult to avoid regarding this theory as semi-rationalistic. It is, however, urged that it is both simpler in method and truer to the facts, to admit at once that absolute authority can attach alone to the *personal* teaching of our Lord.

THE CHURCH AND THE SCIENCES. By His Eminence I. Card. GIBBONS (*The Catholic University Bulletin*).—This article is written to explain the aim, methods, and achievements of the American Catholic University, but we need only take from it such points and suggestions as may be of general interest, and may set before our readers lines of thought that may be somewhat unusual to them.

The primary scope of the university is to encourage research, to impart knowledge, and prepare youth for the practical duties of life, and for the proper discharge of their obligations as citizens, in a country where intellectual worth is so highly esteemed. It is also to be the truest expression of the relations which subsist between the Church and science. There can be no question of *establishing* such relations; they are implied in the very nature of things. They spring from the inviolable unity which binds together God's revelation and nature's teaching in the completeness of truth. Faith presupposes reason. Theology, the science of faith, supposes philosophy, in which reason puts forth its ultimate findings. Divinity studies are more fruitful when, as in the scholastic system, they are interwoven with sound philosophical principles. The speculative order, in fact, is in a large measure parallel with the practical order. Supernatural virtue implies natural morality.

The Church values science for its own sake. Bearing in his intelligence the image of his Maker, it is by the use of his intelligence that man must glorify God. The more highly man's mind is developed, the better is our knowledge of the Supreme Mind whence all understanding proceeds. The more thoroughly the secrets of nature are mastered, the deeper must be our reverence for Him by whose unfailing design all laws and all elements are moved to "one far-off Divine event." Every advance, therefore, of real science, being a new evidence of man's intelligence, and affording a new insight into the marvels of creation, is a cause of rejoicing for the Church. Mgr. de Harlez says, "It is not enough that we should be *au courant* in scientific matters, . . . we must be *masters* of science." Our duty is (1) to take the lead in the scientific movement, and aid in the promotion of science by original investigations; (2) to keep a watchful eye upon systems and theories that spring up daily, and by prudent criticism sift hypothesis from certainty, and established fact from erroneous deduction.

It is necessary to do away with the mistaken idea that Catholics are not free to pursue scientific research. There is in many candid minds a lurking suspicion that we are kept in constant fear of running up against a barrier of some sort—of being checked, so to speak, by theological inhibitions. And if by this is meant that the Church is ever vigilant for the preservation and purity of faith, we not only admit that such is the case, but we insist, moreover, that this is the only course which an institution founded by Christ to spread His doctrine could consistently follow. But we deny that, in her solicitude for the faith once delivered to the saints, the Church interferes with the legitimate action of science. A conclusion which, though apparently based upon fact, runs counter to dogmatic truth, is not the verdict of science itself. It is but the finding of certain scientists, who go out of their proper sphere into that of speculation on matters beyond their reach.

No well-informed person will mistake the views of theologians for formal definitions. The Church is slow to decide where the learned disagree. She acts with great reserve in regard to scientific opinions. And experience proves that in doing so she is wise. In many cases of hypothesis in a single century learned men are not in accord. And what is received as irrefragable theory in one generation is shattered sometimes by a single discovery in the next. Why should the Church commit herself, by approval or by censure, to any phase of this fluctuation?

Far from neglecting scientific advance, the Church sets a higher value upon it than do those who are swept to and fro by every new current of opinion. She makes more allowance for real progress than those who are now its loudest champions, but who, when their little span is done, will be quoted as historical memories of a scarcely enlightened past. We should make the best use of our freedom to further the interests of science, and thereby honour the Church, and help her to glorify the Father of lights.

THE GOD OF ZOROASTER. By L. H. MILLS (*The New World*).—On the face of a mountain called Behistun or Behistân, not far from the city of Kermanshah, on the old Median boundary, there are inscriptions in the cuneiform character which describe the splendid victories of Darius the Great. Similar inscriptions of Darius, Xerxes, and Artaxerxes the Third are to be found on the ruins of Persepolis, Murghâb, Khorkor, and Susa, as also on Mount Alvand near Hamadan. They are in a later dialect of the so-called Zend-Avesta language; and in them we find expressions of religious fervour quite as marked as in the religious writings of any other nation. Every advantage is traced to the "grace" or "will" of Auramazda; but certain

clan-gods are also mentioned. Here we have the religious devotion of those monarchs who did so much for Israel, presented in the letters of stone which they ordered to be cut. Besides the stones, we have the book preserved in its mysterious book-life, from manuscript to manuscript, and from oral recital to recital. The venerated words, for the most part fixed in metre, were imbedded in the race-life of the tribes. Long before the old could die, and while the young matured, the middle-aged were there; the race-life of the priests was one abiding generation, and in it the Avesta lived, lasting as the rock, which itself yields slowly to the weather. Time has worn the book, but it lives on in noble fragments as the Bible of a remnant—small indeed in numbers, but in character perhaps the first of Asia.

Notwithstanding a difference in tone between the hewn-out sentences and the paper codex, we have in both the same gracious God, and the same fervent faith in Him; and this was substantially the religion of those Persian monarchs whose names are so familiar in our Bible. What were the special considerations which induced the friendly attitude of Cyrus and the Persian government toward the Jews? It may have been largely political; but in view of the unparalleled exclusiveness of Jewish religious feeling, some additional reason must be sought. A reason exists which is so certain as to fact, and of such convincing force as an argument, that it will answer all our questions as to this friendship. Not only were the religious principles of the two creeds, the Persian and the Jewish, originally very similar when examined in the light of criticism, but the positive fact that there was also a large interchange of customs and ideas stares us in the face. That there was a third partner in the coterie of mutual influence cannot destroy the undoubted fact that Israel accepted an entire tendency from those supreme defenders who re-established its nationality. Pharisaism in its very name has been identified with Farseeism, which is but another sound for Parseeism. The entire mass of hagiology, demonology, and perhaps of minute ceremonial distinction between clean and unclean, came in upon the Jews from the Persian theology; and with them came a strong assertion of those doctrines of resurrection, immortality, and Paradise on the one side, and of Satan, judgment, and hell on the other, which slowly drove the old Sadducean simplicity to its extinction. Here, then, in all human probability, we have, in great part, the explanation of the kindly patronage on the one side, and of the confidence on the other.

While the Indians, Greeks, and Romans had their "Sky-father" (*dyaus pitar*, *Zeus pater*, Jupiter), and the Hebrews had their *Elohim*, the ancient Iranians called their God *Ahura*. The word is an extended *a'hu*, meaning the "Life-having One," or the "Life-giving One." Their second name for the deity was "Mazda," the "Great Creator," or perhaps the "Wise One." This name was a theology in itself, especially when "lords many and gods many" were regarded as sharing the creative function.

As we consider his further attributes, we come upon a singularly interesting delineation; we have a logical unfolding of characteristics, the like of which, for depth of religious and, indeed, philosophic conception, no pre-Exilic Jew shows us. First after his being, *Ahu*, we have his good thought, which meant his wisdom (or sanity), but could not exclude his benevolence. Then came his law, the regulating faculty, his order; then his sovereign power, without which both his benevolence and plan would be in vain; then his activity, the ready mind (carrying each purpose into effect). Following this were the results: his wholeness or weal (Haurvatât), and deathlessness (Ameretatât). Such are the attributes of deity according to the Iranian Creed, as following upon his being, *Ahu*, and his creative activity, *Mazda*. But we find these abstracts addressed as persons, and besought to come at the call of the devout worshipper. No doubt these subsequently came to be regarded as divinities,

guardians of the so-called elements. Vohu Manah, the chief of them all, designates the saint filled with the good mind. The god of Zoroaster, as revealed in these strange hymns, was a creator with his attributes.

A THEORY OF TELEPATHY, AND THE LIGHT IT THROWS UPON THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY. By T. E. ALLEN (*The Arena*).—What takes place when a telepathic message is transmitted from one mind to another? Certain facts are known which furnish a starting-point. (1) Heat, light, sound, electricity, and other forces are undulations, vibrations, or waves in the ether or in air. (2) These vibrations are causes of mental states. (3) *Vice versâ*, mental states are causes of vibrations. Every real object of thought in the phenomenal world must be either a substance, or a modification, operation, or quality of a substance. Thought is now regarded as a force; it is *vibration* of a substance;—but of what substance? Two theories of life hold possession of the majority of minds—the materialistic and the spiritualistic theories. The phenomena of *experimental* telepathy do not help us to decide between these theories. In other words, they do not show us whether the real mechanism of thought consists in the vibration of molecules of ordinary matter in the brain, or in the vibration of another substance existing in definite correlation with and conditioned by such molecules.

What is the bearing of this theory upon the problem of immortality, which always and everywhere presses upon so many minds for solution? The best proof of immortality, perhaps the only conclusive one possible, must be sought in that domain preempted by the so-called "supernaturalism" of the great religions of the world, and by modern spiritualism and some of the "occultists" of our day, a domain now being invaded slowly but surely by the workers of the psychical research movement, whose aim is to fly the standard of science over this great borderland, and to annex it to our present possessions of cultivated and fruitful territory. "It is just over the boundary, into what is for so many a *terra incognita*, that we must pass in order to carry the argument forward. Of the two basic affirmations of modern spiritualism, *spirit-communion* involves the truth of *immortality*. Can it also be said that a belief in immortality should carry with it, logically, a belief in spirit-communion? There is a chain of reasoning connecting the two that is worthy of consideration."

Thought is, probably, the vibration of a substance. If man is immortal, all the analogies of nature are against the supposition that a vital spark leaps from the old body into a new and invisible one; but they all favour the view that there is a real, substantial, though invisible, part of man that at death shakes off or emerges from the shell of clay. Then man is launched into spirit-life with a body as real to himself as our material envelopes are to each one of us. The individuality persists. Therefore consciousness persists. The persistence of consciousness depends upon the incoming of new impressions through the sensitive channels which connect us with the universe. Immortality requires that the spirit should be able to modify and to be modified by its environment. But, as other spirits like itself must be part of its environment, spirits can act upon each other; they must live in a communion which can scarcely be less complete than that which we now enjoy. And since they can act upon each other, it is very reasonable to suppose that they can communicate with mortals, who really are spirits. Communion of spirits depends on the faculties belonging to spirits, and need not be hindered by material environment. The phenomena of telepathy force us to admit that we have here to deal with a kind of communion where the body is not an insurmountable barrier, and in which, since no specific telepathic organ is known to exist, it is probable that the brain alone, or the

nervous system, is concerned. Thus, with the help of telepathy, the argument that makes spirit-communion a logical consequence of a belief in immortality is a strong one; and the firmer a person's belief in the one, the more he is committed to concede the necessary truth of the other.

The Churches have never truly digested the great doctrine of the immortality of the soul. They have accepted it as a dogma. They have not deliberately set themselves the task of finding out what things must be true in order to make immortality possible, and what other things must or probably do follow—spirit-communion, for example. The attitude of the Churches to-day towards the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is susceptible of but two interpretations. It furnishes a case, upon the one hand, of arrested intellectual development; or, upon the other, of cowardice growing out of the fear of consequences, if too much were to be conceded to psychical science or to spiritualism.

It is most desirable that the world should be aroused to the tremendous importance of psychical phenomena.

MODERN THEOSOPHY IN ITS RELATION TO HINDUISM AND BUDDHISM. By MERWIN MARIE SNELL (*The Biblical World*).—The word *theosophy* properly means the theory or practice of the acquisition of knowledge or wisdom from a Divine, as opposed to a human, source: it is thus the correlative of *theopathy*, the perception of the Divine, by feeling; and of *theurgy*, or action by Divine power. The term may also be applied to any system which makes a directly infused Divine knowledge its basis, such as Neo-Platonism, and the philosophies of Paracelsus and Jacob Boehme.

It is now popularly associated with Madame Blavatsky. The chief text-books of the society she founded in 1875 are her *Isis Unveiled* and *Secret Doctrine*. The society professes as its objects the promotion of human brotherhood, the investigation of the occult powers and forces of nature, and the study of Oriental literatures; but it has a distinct system, and this has crystallized more and more. It holds that the fundamental source of religious knowledge is not reason, objective revelation, or historic tradition, but an interior illumination, or rather direct spiritual vision, resulting from oneness with the Divine universal spirit. Practically, however, it surrenders this principle by its implicit acceptance of the authority of an alleged society of "Mahâtmas," supposed to be men of an extraordinary degree of interior development, who have their corporate head-quarters in the highlands of Thibet. The disciples of the new theosophy are expected to believe implicitly this secret tradition of absolute religious, philosophical, historical, and scientific truth, supposed to have been handed down from the earliest progenitors of the race, and their predecessors of other races and worlds.

This peculiar sect is interesting to students of religions on account of the relation which its tenets have to those of the great Oriental religions. The system first became known to the general public as "Esoteric Buddhism." Blavatsky says, "The Buddha gave to the world only the outward, material form of his philosophy, and kept its soul for his elect." She identifies the system too with "Pre-Vedic Brâhmanism." Like most of the great Oriental systems, it recognizes the universality of law. It denies the objective existence of the universe, considering it to be an illusory manifestation of the attributes of the "Abstract Being," who is also the "Absolute Negation." Immense periods of manifestation and non-manifestation succeed each other to all eternity. All those things which we consider lifeless, soulless, and mindless are the manifestations of life and soul and mind. Through vast septenary cycles the universe, the solar system, the planetary system, the earth itself, the various orders of existence

upon it, and the successive races and populations of men, are developed into the highest degree of complexity and materiality, out of which they gradually return again, in a process of involution by which evolution is succeeded, into the undifferentiated unity of Parabrahm. All takes place according to inflexible laws, chief among which is the law of *karma*, or moral causality, according to which every action entails inevitably its appropriate consequences, good or evil. The spiritual monad climbs up through the mineral, vegetable, and animal planes into the human; and its duty and privilege is to become a god, and to finally merge itself again into the Divine, universal Being from which it came. This theory of reincarnation in subjection to the law of karma is the central feature in popular theosophical teaching.

The sevenfold constitution of the universe is illustrated in man himself, who is composed of a gross body, vitality, subtle body, animal body, human soul, spiritual soul, and spirit. The spirit (*âtma*) is the spark of absolute being within us, and is identical with Parabrahm. *Buddhi*, the spiritual soul united with âtma, constitutes the Dhyan Chohan, the god within us. *Manas*, the human soul, is divisible, and at death is often torn asunder in the conflict which ensues between our higher and lower principles. The animal soul, or body of desires, is cast off, like the body with its vitality, at or soon after death.

In the intervals between its incarnations, the soul—that is, in this case, âtma, buddhi, and the superior part of manas—passes to other worlds corresponding to the heavens and hells of the exoteric religions. After a period of sometimes vast extent, the force of karma draws back the individual to earth, and to such a body and such an environment as its past actions and affinities make most appropriate to it. By extinguishing desire, and culturing our higher principles, we may obtain Nirvâna.

This brief outline of the theosophical system is intended to prepare the way for the comparison with the venerable Oriental faiths which is to be given in a succeeding article.

True Occultism; its Place and Use. By Margaret B. Peeke (*The Arena*).—There are no mistakes in Nature's workings. A law immutable and eternal holds all things in a Divine grasp, working out a plan that dates back to creation's morning, and forward through eternities yet to come. Years must widen into centuries, and centuries into ages, before the mind of man can be large enough to scan the grand *motif* of creation and man's evolution, breathed from the heart of God, and running like a diapason through His works. The circle of immensity cannot be measured by a finite mind, and it can be approximately known only where, entering into higher realms of vibratory action, the creature senses kinship with his Creator.

The race has been slowly ripening, unfolding latent possibilities, and climbing up the steep ascent from lower physical conditions, till the height is reached where man stands complete in rational endowment, alas! to find this height is not finality; for he sees a realm now open to his mental vision that must be known by other powers than those of intellect. The race must bide its time, and grow from childhood's feeble sense to manhood's strength before it could have the power to understand those higher laws that ever work for good. So every form of worship, every vision of God, every creed and religion, and all the senseless discords of the ages over sects and isms, have had their place and use. Through them the race has found a wider range of vision, and, clinging to the good that formed the base of each, the march has never ceased to lead man upward.

To-day the world has entered upon a new age. A new rate of vibrations is established, gaining individual centres here and there soon to be recognized by all.

Material success and intellectual power must give place to the higher thought of spiritual supremacy, as heretofore the age of barbarism was swept away by civilization. Never before could occult knowledge have taken hold of human mind. Fear was the keeper of the door, and fear takes various forms.

True occultism deals with Nature's unseen forces, and the powers in man to govern them. Occult philosophy teaches, first of all, that man must *be*. The doing is of secondary import. Only as he *is*, can he rightly *do*. The hidden wisdom of the Sphinx and Isis is the same. *Is-is* (Isis), *Be-Be*, "I *am* that I am," sums up the secret of all life; and when one knows this law, the powers long hidden in his being will arise and crown him king. There must be a universal supremacy to be enjoyed by the human race that has not been attained, and we ask, "When shall these things be?" The answer comes, "When he has attained, through evolutionary development, his innermost and highest condition, where all mental and spiritual processes are as familiar to him, theoretically and practically, as are the physical and mental operations of body and mind to-day. Then, and then only, can he attain that truly subjective state that allies him at once to the Over-soul of the universe, and will enable him to do, by occult law and natural processes, what has hitherto been relegated to the realm of the marvellous, the mysterious, and the miraculous.

The definitions of occultism are many. Occult means "hidden." Occultism deals with forces of Nature not generally known, and teaches man how to control and use them. Occultism is the knowledge that enables a man to produce visible results from invisible causes. Occultism is the key that unlocks Nature's secrets, by dealing with magnetic law, odyllic force, and the laws of vibration. Occultism has for its object universality as opposed to individuality. From these definitions it is easily seen why this subject has come to the front at this time, and what its mission may be as a prominent factor of reform in all lines of human life—individual, social, political, scientific, and religious. *Self* has been the disintegrating element in all the associations of men; hence self must give place to God, and the race must begin to *be*, instead of believing; faith must give place to knowledge. There are but two facts—God and the soul. To know these is the purpose of all occult training. As the Guani of Ceylon said to Mr. Carpenter, "Knowing about God is not knowing God." This interior knowledge is a growth. Thought, desire, will, are trained constantly, until all life is guided by an intuition that never mistakes; and all action is from a centre, not of self, but of the Christ-spirit.

There are three primal steps to be taken before a human being can hope to realize unusual powers. First, the hushing of the objective mind, or control of the sense-realm. Second, banishing from the mind consciousness of sex. Third, training of the will. If these three steps are taken, the individual is at once carried out of the old world of self and sense and sex into a new kingdom, where higher laws are working with invincible power. Then is opened the door of the temple where God is the Light, and the temple is man's soul. To those who have the inner eyes opened, who know the kingdom within, men and women, as such, do not exist. They are *souls* on the march of progression, sometimes clothed in the body of a man, sometimes in that of a woman, as the need may be better to learn the lesson; but eventually to come to that state where "man was made in the image of God," not separated, but two in one, as the Adam Kadman, the archetypal man who exists as the ideal of creation.

Whatever question arises in national or social problems, we must look to one of two remedies for the final cure. Either legislative morality must *force* obedience to higher and better laws, or the race must be educated to a higher development. There

is but one source of strength, one energy of purpose, one *Will;* and this is found in the same Source that created worlds by a breath, and upholds the universe by His thought. When mankind has learned the lesson that it is only alive when united to the One, only strong when a part of the One, only possessed of a will when the finite will is absorbed in the One, then and then only will the old dream of Rosicrucians and transcendentalists be verified in reality, and man emerge from the realm of sense and reason into the higher plane of intuition. A new race is now about to make its appearance, as belonging essentially to the new age of progress; and as each preceding race is supposed to have brought forth a new sense, we are not surprised that we must look to the new race for the wonderful and subtle sense of intuition. It will belong to all children of that race as naturally as the physical senses belong to the child of to-day.

THE MESSIANIC IDEA IN THE PROPHETS. By TALBOT W. CHAMBERS (*The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*).—When St. Peter said to Cornelius concerning Christ, "To Him give all the prophets witness," we need not assume him to have meant that every individual prophet makes specific mention of the Redeemer; it suffices to understand him as saying that this was the general drift of the prophetic teaching, the tenor of the entire Old Testament as a prospective revelation.

I. What were the prophets, and what was the message they bore? The Jewish prophets were distinctly different from the persons bearing the same name in connexion with other ancient religions. These were really soothsayers, or persons who, in a state of ecstasy, had a power of divination. The Hebrew prophets prophesied when in the full power of all their faculties. They were the organs of the Divine communication. There was a guild or school of prophets in the time of Samuel and Elijah; but its trained teachers, and the development of the true prophetic power, was never in any case the result of its culture. The sole business of the prophets was to deliver faithfully the message committed to them; but in the delivery they used their natural powers, and the style to which they had been accustomed. They might be teachers in the more general sense; they were prophets only as they became organs of Divine inspiration. Yet, so far from being mere mechanical instruments of the inspiring Spirit, they were stirred by fear and hope, and were filled with sorrow or joy according to the purport of their message.

II. As to the ends which the prophets pursued, we are to distinguish between their immediate and their ultimate aim. Their immediate aim was to meet the wants of the people of their time. Owing to the wayward character of the nation, the prophets were mainly called to the office of rebuke. In times of luxury and self-indulgence, when social wrongs abounded, the prophets lifted up their voice like a trumpet, and delivered the message with which they had been entrusted. They refused to bow down before any human greatness.

The Apostle Paul traces the immorality of the heathen to their impiety. The same conviction was cherished by the ancient messengers of Jehovah. Hence they insisted from first to last upon the unity, the spirituality, and the exclusive sovereignty of the Divine nature. Hence their merciless attacks upon every form of false worship, and the vehemence, the sarcasm, the ridicule with which they assailed idolatry, the bowing down to stocks and stones. It may also be noted that the ethical teaching of the prophets still abides for our instruction, performing the office ascribed by the great critic of antiquity to the tragic muse—that of purifying the heart by terror and pity, because it holds forth the goodness and severity of God.

The ultimate aim of the prophets was to prepare for, and aid in establishing, the

kingdom of God upon earth; that is, the appearance of a new life which, working from within outwards, would in the end transform everything human—all family and social ties, all industry and commerce, all art and literature, all government and relations among peoples—till the kingdom of this world is become the kingdom of our Lord and of His Christ. This supreme end the prophets accomplished in various ways. (1) By foretelling the doom of existing earthly empires. These stood in the way of the kingdom of God. They frequently imperilled the existence of its nucleus, as that was found in the covenant people. They represented all that was opposed to its most dominant characteristics. They were incarnations of brute force, or of wealth, or of worldly wisdom, and were alike debased in religion and corrupt in morals. The certain destruction of this world's kingdoms, built on the foundation of force and fraud, was a pledge of the triumph of the kingdom of God, founded on truth and righteousness. (2) Another way was by foretelling the universal spread of the true religion. Long before the classic peoples had even reached the idea of universal history, the Hebrew prophets proclaimed with trumpet-tongue the destined universality of the true religion. (3) Another way was setting forth the spiritual blessings to come. An instance, as illustration, is the striking prediction of Joel—quoted by St. Peter on the Day of Pentecost—of the outpouring of the Spirit on all flesh, without distinction of age, or rank, or sex. (4) The chief method, however, was setting forth a Person by whose agency the great change was to be effected. Nowhere do we find in any one place a full delineation of the character and work of the Messiah, or Anointed One; but at different times, and by different persons, and in different ways, particular traits are stated and emphasized as required by the situation. The prophets spoke and wrote as the exigencies of their times required; but a wisdom higher than their own guided each separate announcement, so that all were found to cohere in a distinct and well-defined Personality. This Person united in Himself all three of the great offices that existed among the covenant people—the prophetic, the priestly, and the kingly. This writer summarizes the prophecies that relate to Messiah (noticing, in passing, the fact that in the Biblical Apocrypha no mention is made of the Messiah), and shows how all have been fulfilled.

It is clear that the early apostles and evangelists viewed the correspondence between the Old Testament and the New, not as a series of undesigned coincidences, or as a result of happy conjecture or wonderful foresight of what was to come, but as showing that each was part and parcel of one entire self-revelation of God, extending through centuries; the former portion foreshadowing the latter, and thus constituting a volume which has, and can have, no parallel in the literature of the world.

As to the uses of the prophecy, it may be said that the first one is apologetical. The external evidences of Christianity are, as they have been for ages, miracles and prophecy. Of the latter, the case of the Messiah is the most conspicuous; because the correspondence between prediction and fulfilment is so exact, and because the circumstances are such as to show beyond doubt that there was a Divine foresight of the future.

Of late, serious objection has been made to the validity of the argument drawn from prophecy. It is maintained that the prophet was limited by the horizon of his own time, and could never see further than the point to which the present, viewed in the light of the Divine purpose, carries the future in its bosom. But such views seem, to this writer, entirely arbitrary and unreasonable. Once admit the reality of Divine revelation, and all such limitations are seen to be needless; and, moreover, the express statements of prophecy cannot be accounted for on this view.

Another use of prophecy is its encouragement of a rational optimism. Every

true Christian is an optimist. Not because he believes in the natural perfectibility of his race, or has some new patent for the reorganization of society, or imagines the existence of some blind law operating in this direction, but because the past is a secure pledge of the future.

CURRENT CANADIAN THOUGHT.

THE FUTURE OF APOLOGETICS. By WILLIAM DEWAR, B.A. (*Knox College Monthly*).—Professor T. M. Lindsay says, "With the advance of theology, apologetics gives place to speculative theology, which shows the various relations in which each particular dogma stands to all other dogmas, whether theological or other." This is so true that the future of apologetics has become an interesting problem. In defining apologetics, we must remember the distinction between a preliminary and a final definition. The preliminary definition of any science is simply a clear statement of its problem; it is the student's working definition, which all can accept. The final definition of any science is the answer to its problem; it involves a worked-out theory, which satisfies the mind of all. For the student, the preliminary definition is always indispensable, as furnishing both his starting-point and his guide. Provisional definitions give the various standpoints already reached by his predecessors. The common working definition of apologetics is "the vindication of the right of theology to exist as a science." Theology is conceived as a division of science, and not as a division of philosophy, in recognition of the well-known distinction between speculative and empirical methods. There is a speculative theology, just as there is a speculative psychology and a speculative physics; but scientific theology is the study which has produced the current apologetics.

The first definition of theology was "the science of God or of Divine things." This was the conception floating in the Greek mind, and fixed by Aristotle. Hooker calls theology "the science of Divine things." Apologetics is equivalent to theism, or the demonstration of the existence and character of God transcending nature and man. The next definition was "the science of revelation." God cannot be known except through His manifestations; and, accordingly, theological thought directed its attention to God's revelations of Himself. The Christian theologian saw in the life of Jesus a revelation of God far transcending all other revelations. And because this revelation is preserved in the Bible, theology virtually became the science of the Bible. Then the leading problem of apologetics became the fact of a supernatural revelation in the history of the Hebrew nation.

But the theological mind could not rest in this second definition. To-day the comparative study of religions has explained the true significance of the Christian revelation, and at the same time has altered our conception of theology. The Bible is a special revelation of God, because it is a record of an inspired life by inspired man. All Divine inspiration is revelation, because it is a record of a new Spirit in man; and this presence of the Holy Spirit is religion. The science of revelation is the science of religion; and in this new definition we have reached the theological standpoint of to-day. The leading problem of apologetics is, accordingly, no longer the defence of revelation, but a defence of religion. The modern apologetic seeks to establish the reality of religion as a part of universal experience, the supremacy of Christianity as the highest development of religion, and its supernaturalism as the life of Christ, the Son of God, through whom all men may become true sons of God. The Divine Person of Jesus is, consequently, the great problem of Christian apologetics.

The task of apologetics has been to defend the conception of a God transcending nature and mind, a God known through a revelation transcending both the external world and the common mind of humanity, a revelation found in the religious history of mankind. This transcendence in every case means transcendence over nature and mind, and is equivalent to the accepted idea of the supernatural. The definition of apologetics, therefore, may be enlarged into "a defence of the supernatural."

Has apologetics been successful in its attempt to defend the reality of the supernatural, and thus to secure the facts claimed by theology? If supernaturalism means transcendence over nature and mind, there need be no hesitation in asserting the triumph of apologetics. The argument that the God immanent in nature and in man must also transcend both is unanswerable. There is certainly more in this universe than the material world and human intelligence. (The reader will see that this author does not clearly mark the important distinction between the "super*natural*" and the "super*human*."—ED. THINKER.)

Has the right of theology to exist as a science been fully vindicated? With a distinct body of facts and a scientific method, it is undoubtedly a thorough science; but apologetics has yet to defend its results in the general conflict of the sciences. Theology has been repeatedly at war with both natural and mental sciences, and needs an extension of its apologetic. All the sciences alike find their ultimate vindication in philosophy. The final apologetic of modern theology, therefore, is a philosophy of religion. The current apologetics is unequal to the task of reconciling one scientific truth with another. Sooner or later, for the theological student, apologetics must give place to speculative theology. The problem which theology, as one of the sciences, offers to philosophy is the exhibition of its truth in organic relation to all other truth, the determination of its position in the whole truth; and in the solution of this problem, philosophy must treat theology by the same method that it treats psychology and the physical sciences. The theological problem for philosophy is, therefore, twofold—the criticism of the underlying conceptions of theology, which as an abstract science it may assume; and the interpretation of its scientific results in the light of the ultimate principle of reality discovered by such criticism.

Religion is the spiritual life of man; revelation is the presence of the Holy Spirit in human history; and the God revealed is the Eternal Spirit. The theological problem of philosophy is the criticism of this category, "Spirit," as the thought of God. Theology offers "spirit" as the true conception of the absolute, or the deepest thought of the universe; and it offers this category as far higher than mind or material force. The truth of the conception must be exhibited by that invincible dialectic of pure thought which advances from the barest abstraction steadily up to the highest notion. The advance of spirit upon mind has never yet been followed out. To "mind" there always clings the subjective; it is only in "spirit" that we reach the absolute. The dialectic of "spirit" is the pressing philosophical problem of our time.

SPINOZA AS A BIBLICAL CRITIC. By JAS. E. LE ROSSIGNOL, M.D. (*The Canadian Methodist Review*).—Many of the principles and conclusions of recent Biblical critics were anticipated two hundred years ago by the Jewish philosopher, Baruch de Spinoza. His *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, published in 1670, marks the beginning of a new epoch in the history of modern religious thought. The *Tractatus* may be considered as in a sense a compromise between the orthodox theology of the time and Spinoza's own pantheistic religion and philosophy. The English deists were his disciples and legitimate successors. Astruc, Voltaire, and the encyclopædists pursued the same

rationalistic method in France. The Tübingen school of Baur and Strauss, and still more recently the school of Kuenen, Wellhausen, and Dillmann, have carried on their investigations to a great extent along lines laid down by Spinoza.

1. Spinoza maintains his right, as a scholar, to investigate and study the Bible just as he would any other book. The fundamental principle of Biblical criticism must be that the Bible must explain itself. No philosophical or scientific theories may be allowed to interpret the Bible. Internal criticism alone can be admitted. The interpreter must possess a thorough knowledge of the Hebrew language, and be able to distinguish the peculiar style of each author.

2. Spinoza regards the Bible as containing a revelation. Prophecy or revelation is the certain knowledge of a thing revealed by God to men. A prophet is the person who explains God's revelation to those who have no certain knowledge of revealed things, and who must therefore receive them on faith. The prophet has two ways of learning about Divine things. The first is by the natural light of reason. But he also receives a revelation that goes beyond the bounds of reason, and is therefore supernatural, or, more properly, superhuman, for in the strictest sense nothing is supernatural. How did the prophets receive this revelation? The Jews are in the habit of referring everything to God, making Him the Author of their own thoughts, words, and actions. The expression, "Spirit of the Lord," is loosely used. We must closely observe the language of the prophet to see whether he distinctly claims to speak by revelation from God, or whether he merely expresses his own thoughts in the customary religious phraseology of the Hebrew people. With regard to all the later prophets, we have to do entirely with revelations made to them through their own power of imagination. Only to Christ have the counsels of God been revealed without word or sign, for superhuman wisdom dwelt in Him. When a revelation was from God, the prophet received at the same time a sign of its Divine origin. The final source of certainty is the confidence that pious souls have of the religious and moral truth they apprehend, and which they firmly believe comes from God. This is not a mathematical but a moral certainty.

The Divine revelation varied according to the character and temperament of the different prophets. The prophetic revelation accommodated itself also to the preconceived opinions of the prophets. They declared the moral and religious truth they had received, but gave it a setting of their own. We have, therefore, no reason to expect the prophets to be perfectly accurate historians, profound philosophers, or exact scientists. They were none of these things, and the Bible is not, therefore, a final authority on any of these subjects. Signs and miracles were used to convince the people. They were valuable at the time, but are of little value to us. Miracles seem wonderful to us because we do not know all the possibilities of nature. Many of the miracles related in the Bible may even now be explained by natural causes; and if we knew more about the laws of nature and the circumstances of the rest, no doubt similar explanations could be given.

3. The various books of the Bible were, in most cases, not written by the authors whose names they bear. Spinoza shows how untrustworthy are the names now associated with the various books, and advocates the post-Exilic origin of many of them.

4. In showing that the Bible contains many errors in history, science, and even prophecy, Spinoza says he does a service to true religion by endeavouring to do away with superstitious worship of the letter, and manifesting the true Divine teaching of Holy Writ. Before the time of the Maccabees there was no known and authorized canon of the sacred books. If we therefore claim infallibility for the canonical books,

we must first claim it for the Pharisees who made the canon. "The eternal word and covenant of God is not any book, or collection of books, but true religion in the hearts of men. The soul of man is the image of God, and God reveals Himself directly to the souls that He has made. Anything is holy and Divine that is the means of this Divine revelation. To the godless nothing is holy. To the truly pious everything is holy, and the Bible more than any other book, because it contains the highest moral and religious truth. We may be morally certain that the Bible is thus inspired of God, and infallible in its religious teachings, because we know the prophets to have been good men who earnestly directed their minds toward God and Divine truth, and were not afraid to proclaim it to the people. When, therefore, the Bible teaches us—what never could have been discovered by the unaided light of reason—that our eternal salvation depends on our obedience to God's will, we ought reverently to accept its teaching, and order our lives in conformity to it. Jesus Christ was the divinest of men, and the Eternal Son of God, and through faith in Him—that is, through imitation of His life—we also attain unto eternal life."

This summary of Spinoza's teaching shows the necessity for the criticism of the critics, and also for that careful detailed study of Scripture which leaves no fact out of account in its interpretation.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EARTHLY LIFE OF JESUS. By Rev. WILLIAM FARQUHARSON, B.A. (*Knox College Monthly*).—This article deals with only one point—How are we to understand the Kenosis? Two views are considered. 1. While it was indeed the Divine Son that emptied Himself, that emptying must apply only to the use and manifestation of the Divine attributes, not to their possession. This is the doctrinal standpoint of the Reformed theologians generally. But how are we to understand this impoverishment as related to the conscious life of Jesus of Nazareth? If Jesus was conscious even in infancy of the possession of all the attributes of Deity, a real human development was impossible. If we think of Him as possessed of a double consciousness, one Divine and infinite, the other limited and finite, then the question comes—How is this double consciousness to be reconciled with the unity of His Personality? We seem to be shut up to the conception of a double personality. But to theologians a person is not a self-conscious ego, but merely an hypostasis—"the centre of unity for characteristics which distinguish one individual from another." The question thus wanders from the realm of consciousness to the metaphysical problem of real being. With our Lord, the question of absorbing interest to humanity is not that regarding the hypostatic union of the natures, but that regarding His conscious relation to the Divine attributes, which, on the one hand, shall give room for the possibility of His humanity, and, on the other hand, shall vindicate the claim that His words on earth have validity, as the ultimate authority both for doctrine and practice. Are we, then, to think of every form of knowledge and experience from both the Divine and human natures as meeting in the one conscious life, even as in human nature every avenue both in mind and body leads directly to the conscious mind? Or do the two lines flow along in one channel, with one thought and will entirely separate from another thought and will? This latter would certainly imply a double consciousness and a double will.

2. A theory, started by Zinzendorf, and now much favoured, not content with limiting the Kenosis to the "use and manifestation," boldly asserts that it likewise must refer to the *possession* of the Divine attributes. The dominant idea of the Kenotic system is that, "in order to make the Incarnation in its actual historical form possible, the eternal pre-existent Logos reduced Himself to the rank and measure

of humanity." The Divine nature was not merely veiled by human flesh from the world's gaze, but His powers were so surrendered as no longer to be available in their absolute form for Himself. This theory seems to offer a reasonable explanation for the genuine development of Christ's earthly life, and indicates the possibility of what has been termed the growth of the Messianic consciousness. But we have to face the difficulty of forming the link of identification of the pre-existent Logos by the newly developed consciousness of Jesus.

According to one form of the Kenotic theory, the Logos laid aside those Divine attributes which have been termed relative or physical. According to another theory, the Divine attributes were merely metamorphosed so that they appeared in a time-form. In either case, the Logos is so stripped of everything that marks out this individuality, that for a long period He is not even conscious of His own existence. But in this supposition, how is the knowledge of a real pre-existence ever to be reached? The Kenotic theories, in so far as at any stage they allow a real place to the Divine nature, are ultimately loaded with all the difficulties attending the Reformed doctrine, and with the peculiar difficulties belonging to their own besides. Just as patristic theology sought to bridge the gulf by minimizing the human side of the nature of our Lord, so a Kenotic theology, following an equally fatal method, would bridge the chasm by paring away the Divine side.

While thus theory after theory proves unsatisfactory, there stands this rock amidst the shifting sands of time, this grand fundamental truth that the one Christ is God and Man.

(Will not the Kenosis have to be studied from a somewhat different point of view? This writer can only see the God in Jesus as the *Logos*. Help may come from realizing God as a *Spirit*, and, as a Spirit, coming into relation with man, the spirit. Then the Divine in man can be thought of as accepting, and working through, human limitations; and what is true of man may be seen as true, in the highest senses, of the "Man Christ Jesus."—Ed. Thinker.)

CURRENT GERMAN THOUGHT.

The Lord's Supper. By Professor Kattenbusch, Giessen (*Christl. Welt*, 1895, Nos. 14, 15).—1. *Its permanence.* The theologians who do not admit that Paul's testimony in 1 Cor. xi. 24, "Do this in remembrance of Me," proves Christ's use of the words, also hold that it is matter of indifference whether Christ instituted the ordinance and intended it to be perpetual or not, as the Church has been rightly guided in its observance. The Spirit who was to teach the disciples many things inwardly moved them to establish a commemorative act. But, apart from the fatal injury which this view inflicts on Paul's authority, is it really matter of indifference whether the Lord uttered these words or instituted the ordinance? I cannot concede this. There is something singularly impressive in the words coming from Christ's lips. We feel ourselves bound to the service, if these words are genuine, and here duty quickly passes into joy: the Lord thought of us all, the near and the far, the early and the late. We can understand how many have come to feel that the Lord's countenance is no longer turned to them in the Holy Supper as formerly. How gracious the words, "This do in remembrance of Me," are, they never realized until science required them to give up the words.

But are not the words really doubtful? Only Paul relates them. Matthew

(xxvi. 26, ff.) and Mark (xiv. 22, ff.) have nothing of the kind. Luke xxii. 19 supplies the same words, at least in regard to the bread. But it is conceded by the most judicious inquirers that here a later interpolation is possible; in any case, there is reason to suppose that Luke leans only on Paul, and is not an independent witness. Are we not really justified in leaving it an open question whether the Lord ordained the repeating of the act or not? I so far concede the right of this view, that I do not accuse those who hold it of indifference or presumption. Only I do not think that they are right.

Paul is, without doubt, the oldest witness on the subject. The Gospels were written considerably later; the Gospel of Mark is perhaps twenty years later. Paul so speaks as to prove that he has well considered his words. "I received from the Lord." Certainly he *might* err. He was not himself present at the Supper. Perhaps the reminiscence handed on to him was influenced already by the keeping of the ordinance. But such a "perhaps" seems to me to have little weight. Paul was familiar so early with the tradition of the Last Supper that he could easily ascertain the important facts. There is every reason to believe that his account is thoroughly trustworthy. But how, then, do we explain the silence of the Gospels? I believe that we should dispense with an explanation, and fall back on the position that the consideration of possibilities is unprofitable. The Gospels are in no sense complete histories; they often only intimate, and clearly assume that the Churches for which they were composed needed only a voucher for their recollections. This is evident in Mark, and especially in the account of the Supper. He is here so brief that he seems to be merely noting the chief facts. What difficulty is there in supposing that he, and Matthew in his wake, and Luke, observing the existing custom of breaking of bread, and seeing nowhere any doubt that the Lord Himself really ordained the custom, merely set down what was necessary to explain the Lord's action?

2. *The Lord's outward and inward situation at the institution.* To determine the outward circumstances is of least importance; we must even concede that no certainty is possible respecting what might seem to be most important—the day. According to the first three Gospels, the Lord kept the Passover with His disciples, and instituted the Supper then. The Gospel of John says nothing of such an act; on the contrary, it supposes that Jesus did not keep the Passover, but was crucified early on the day when the Jews celebrated it. It seems to me unmistakable that here is a simple contradiction. I know no satisfactory explanation. For myself, I cannot help thinking that John is right. What Jesus said and did at the Supper confirms this, for it does not seem to me pervaded by ideas connected with the Passover. The words, "Do this in remembrance of Me," might suggest the Passover (Exod. xii. 14). But the idea of a memorial service is obvious enough without the Passover as an occasion; nay, if the Lord had intended to contrast the new with the old service, we should have expected to find more emphasis on the new element. But there is no such emphasis. The Lord seems to intend no contrast, but simply to express the thought that His people should repeat His action in memory of Him.

The inward situation gives greater difficulty, namely, the question as to the general state of feeling in which the Lord met death. One writer—Jülicher—thinks that Christ could not have intended a perpetual commemoration, because He expected soon to return. This is a difficult question; but He certainly said that He knew not the day and the hour (Matt. xxiv. 36). And we hear other words intimating that much must take place between His life and the end of the world. I could never convince myself that the Lord said that the completion of God's kingdom was to be expected at once. He did not say this, while He did not say the opposite. He left

the possibility open that, according to human judgment, the end might be far off or might come soon. Thus, on the one side, He exhorted to watchfulness and constant readiness; and on the other, to patient waiting. The event has shown that the end was not near. We must not say the Lord foresaw this, nor yet that He erred. Both phrases show little understanding of the way in which the Lord thought and spoke. He spoke of the things of the last days as a Prophet, not as a Thinker or Inquirer. He did not calculate; He did not forget that everything has its time; but this is the least thing to Him. In view of His entire life, it would be unquestionably wrong to say that He thought of a development of His Church through thousands of years. He was not so "historical" in spirit; before His spiritual vision clearly lay the kingdom of His Father, which will and must come, whose dawn began to shine when He Himself came into the world, for whose completion everything is prepared. If any one had told the Lord what we know, that after thousands of years His glory would not be outwardly revealed, He might have said, "What is this to Me? In My Father's eyes a thousand years are like a day." But even such a saying as this, if He had used it, might be taken in a foolish sense. We must understand that Jesus did not think like a man of the modern historical school. He saw things, not by reflection, but intuition. Only this was certain to Him—that after death, and in virtue of His own proper life, He would enter on the glory given Him from the beginning of the world. This stood before His vision, and yet He shrank from death. The latter is the proof that He was no fanatic. He did not, in imagination, leap over the dread struggle awaiting Him. He was not intoxicated with the hope of future glory; but He did not give up the confidence that His Father would exalt Him, and acknowledge Him as His Son and the true Messiah. Thus He inwardly accepted all the suffering appointed Him; and, on the other hand, He rejoiced in "that day" when everything should be new for Him in His Father's kingdom. Nay, this day was at hand. In the saying in Matthew, which shows that at the Supper He looked for a new growth of the vine which should soon refresh Him, the saying, "with you," is strange; it is not found in Mark and Luke; it may be an addition. The saying of Jesus is no doubt to be understood figuratively, and points beyond the present to the life awaiting Him when death is past—the life of rest with God. With this Jesus comforted Himself when His soul was troubled unto death.

3. *A standing memorial of the Lord's dying.* The Lord might be sure that His disciples would not forget Him; but a general remembrance is not enough; they were to remember His *death.* Nay, how could they forget this? They might, in the lapse of time, come to remember only the glory of Christ—to look upwards and forwards with the eye of faith and hope. But, by the Lord's will, they were also to look backwards, and not to regard His earthly life and His death as something merely past. Here lies the mystery of the Supper. The longer and the more carefully I consider, the more I regard it as the surest of facts, that by His action Jesus intended to set His death before His disciples' eyes in its necessity and abiding significance. We cannot be absolutely sure what words the Lord uttered when He broke the bread and gave the cup; the moment was so solemn, so impressive, that it always remained vivid to the disciples; but it is intelligible that not so much the several words, as rather the action and the manner, abode in their memory. The impression was the chief matter. The Lord did not speak like some one formally making a testament and dictating a last will. He was never more prophetic than when, in the Last Supper, quite simply but quite clearly, He told His disciples once more what was to happen to Him because it *must.* They were not without presentiments and apprehensions, but were full of hope. The rejoicing with which, along with Jesus as Messiah, they entered into *His*

city still echoed in their souls. Then Jesus dispersed their illusions; and His object was not merely to guard against the great offence which lay before them; no, the offence was to be deeply stamped on their souls; they were never to think of Him apart from the cross.

Jülicher takes Christ's twofold action as a twofold parable. Jesus once *spoke* in parables, and His custom was, in keeping with the style of Hebrew poetry, to present the same thought twice under similar images. We think of the parables of the mustard seed and leaven, of the new piece on an old garment and of the new wine in old skins, of the lost sheep and lost coin. It is the same here, in the breaking of bread and pouring of wine. This discourse reminds one of the way in which the old prophets acted (see Jer. xiii. and Ezek. iv.; also Acts xxi. 10). The Lord's manner here was unique. Without art or parade, on the spur of the moment, what He did was perfectly clear to the witnesses. If there had been no express command of the Lord to do the same that He did, it is almost impossible to me, considering this manner of the Lord's action, to think that they would venture to repeat what He did. This was by no means probable,—the narrative might be illustrated by the representation of an eye-witness; nor need we find fault if those who were not eye-witnesses did what the Lord had done; but, unless the eye-witnesses are conscious of a command or wish of the Lord addressed to them, and not only to them, but to all who would be disciples, we should hardly understand it. Perhaps, in the observing of the Supper, the words are not everywhere expressly used which Paul prescribed, "This do in remembrance of Me." The mere words with which Jesus directly accompanied His action were liturgically sufficient, if one were sure that the Lord instituted the action as an abiding custom. But even those words are not handed down uniformly. We can understand that the disciples did not retain the words in memory quite exactly. We must not think of them looking forward to the Lord's action. The disciples were certainly surprised by it—no doubt at once brought to understand it; but still so inwardly excited that they might afterwards have different recollections of particulars. In essentials the accounts are one. This should suffice us. (*Continuation to follow.*)

CARL A. VON HASE. By Dr. G. FRANK, Vienna (*Zeitschr. für wiss. Theol.*, 1895, No. 2).—After describing at length Hase's controversial stage, Dr. Frank turns to his peaceful labours, a triology of academical text-books.

1. The *Leben Jesu* (1829), the first purely scientific presentation of the lofty subject, showing how Jesus of Nazareth, by Divine appointment, through the free action of His own Spirit and the power of circumstances, became the world's Saviour. The half-orthodoxy of former days conceded that Hase treated his subject in a distinguished way, as soon as one admits a Redeemer who is Divine, because of a human perfection, while the entire series of Christological theories is, in the main, held to be a chain of errors. Twice has Hase's text-book held its ground—in the storm raised by Strauss as the Herostratus of the evangelical history, and a generation later, when Ernest Renan's tragedy of the great Son of man, written for Jewish gold, stirred men's hearts. If Hase saw the life of the Lord fringed with sacred legend, he was very far from making myth explain the whole.

2. When formerly a triumvirate of Church historians was spoken of, every one knew that Neander, Gieseler, and Hase were meant. Seeing the first two were not permitted to continue their works to the present, Hase was pre-eminently the modern historian of the Church. He writes Church history with broad culture, plastic talent, pregnant brevity, with great delight in striking characters, and with the highest æsthetic taste weaves Church art into the story. While in the hands of the neologians,

who made themselves the standard of historical truth, Church history became a history of human follies and wickedness, Hase did justice to every age by entering into its spirit. While this merit was gladly acknowledged, two objections were raised against Hase's history. Those who saw in Neander's work, in which Church history becomes a speaking proof of the Divine power of the gospel and a school of Christian edification, the only true history of the Church, missed in Hase the breath of Christian life; the grand dome, with its heaven-seeking tower, lacks the sacred sign of the cross. Appealing to his peculiar development, Hase replies, "From a thorn-bush one must not expect to gather grapes; it perhaps bears roses." Speculative theology found fault in Hase with his avoidance of general philosophic thought. "The whole is not penetrated by an idea connecting the particulars. It lacks the essential core, the idea of the motive-principle of Church history." But Church history does not proceed, like a dialectical process, as a continuous development of the idea. Originally, Hase intended to live as a Church historian only, by his compendium; but afterwards he was persuaded to publish his lectures as a great Church history in three stately volumes—a work rich in instruction for all animated by intellectual interests.

3. Hase's dogmatic system, intended, like the *Church History*, as a text-book for lectures, starts from freedom in opposition both to absolute dependence and absolute freedom, *i.e.* from relative freedom. His system may be described as an analysis of his idea of relative freedom. To the objection that such freedom is unproved, Hase replied, "The ultimate principle of a philosophical system is unprovable." For this reason a philosophical system cannot begin with an assertion requiring proof, but with a postulate. The postulate of Hase's system of religion runs, "Accomplish thy freedom!" Man is free when he resolves to be so. Freedom, as such, strives after the infinite, But human freedom is limited, both at the beginning and end. We emerge from nothing without being asked whether we will enter this earthly existence. Although there have been men who have cursed the day of their birth, they could not undo it. Just as little has any one the end in his own power; not even the right of renouncing existence is assured to him, because he cannot know whether the grave brings annihilation. The consequence of the opposition between dependence and freedom is the striving of the finite after the infinite as a means of getting rid of limitation. Since, however, relative freedom cannot realize the infinite, the only solution is for man to make the unattainable infinite his own by love. According to Schiller, love is the way to excellence. Love spans even the abyss between finite and infinite being, and is the real nature of religion. The consummation of the religious life has appeared in Christ, and in fellowship with His Spirit our life also attains this consummation. At this standpoint Hase described the historical progress of the religious spirit in Christianity, exercising free criticism upon historical matter, and only admitting as religious truths the dogmas which spring from or condition the love of God. The system blends together Christian feeling and cultured humanity.

The fact that Möhler's *Symbolik* had found no adequate Protestant reply, and the desire to break a lance for his Lord Christ, led Hase to write his *Handbuch der Protestantischen Polemik gegen die Römisch-Katholische Kirche.* The fine spirit of Hase's controversial manner, the skilful use of historical parallels and examples, the transparent clearness, the fine Socratic irony, the familiar knowledge of Catholic teaching, art, and worship,—all this combined to make Hase's work classical. There are not too many among us ready to acknowledge what is good and admirable in the papacy, in order to deal heavier blows at everything in Catholicism opposed to the spirit of Christianity. Such acknowledgment implies the strongest confidence in one's own

cause. But in order thus victoriously to conduct the case of Protestantism, there is necessary great firmness and freedom of dogmatic conviction, as well as such knowledge of Church history as can track Catholic error to its most secret hiding-places. How often, when history is appealed to as witness, does it happen that, like Balaam the son of Beor, it blesses instead of cursing! At first it seemed as if Catholics meant to ignore Hase's work. Learned Catholics talked as if Hase had refuted only the Catholicism of old women, from which it would follow that St. Thomas, Bellarmin, Perrone, and the other authors quoted, were merely advocates of "old women" Catholicism.

We may call Hase the incarnation of Jena theology in the nineteenth century, like Johann Gerhard in the seventeenth. Both were noble scholars, and therefore loved and honoured. If Gerhard moved in the scholastic form of his age, Hase was the classic, the Goethe of German theologians. A form of noble humanity, *qui nihil humani a se putavit alienum*, he stood before us, in old age, still fired with the ideas of his youth, one of the rare spirits who become dearer to us as we know them more closely. In the city church at Jena, where he had worshipped so many years, the last rites were performed. And then they carried him forth—the pride, the favourite, of his sorrowing fellow-citizens—with all ecclesiastical and academical honours, to the quiet place which he had chosen in the lovely graveyard at Jena, the resting-place of so many noble dead.

THOMAS À KEMPIS. By L. SCHULZE, Rostock (*Theol. Lit. blatt*, 1895, Nos. 14, 15). —The late Dr. Carl Hirsche, senior pastor at Hamburg, devoted many years to the study of à Kempis. The fruits appear in three volumes, published in 1873, 1883, and 1894 respectively. Dr. Hirsche was prevented by an obstinate eye affection, and then by death in 1892, from completing the third volume, which has been edited and published by his friend, Dr. Carl Bertheau ("Karl Hirsche, Prolegomena zu einer neuen Ausgabe der *Imitatio Christi* nach dem Authograph des Thomas von Kempen. Zugleich eine Einführung in sämtliche Schriften des Thomas, sowie ein Versuch zu endgiltiger Feststellung der Thatsache, dars Thomas und kein anderer der Verfasser der *Imitatio* ist." Dritter Band. Berlin: Habel, 339 s.).

Of the four sections of the third volume, the first one compares the *Imitatio* with the undoubted works of Thomas; the second one brings external proof of the authenticity, especially proof from manuscripts; the third one discusses fourteen manuscripts used in determining the time of composition; while the fourth one furnishes a masterly translation of the first book of the *Imitatio*, which the author dictated to his wife during the last days of his life. The object of the translation is to reproduce, as far as possible, the order and divisions and phraseology of the original.

The account given in the first section of the teaching of the *Imitatio*, in comparison with that of Thomas's other writings, is finely done. It is to the following effect. Life in this sinful world is a cross for every one, therefore he longs for the glory of the heavenly country. This striving finds expression in a virtuous life, which has humility for its pervading feature. The two sides of this fundamental virtue are, negatively, contempt for the world and self; and positively, devotion to God, or love to Jesus. This way of self-denial and love to God is no easy one, but a constant conflict against one's own corrupt nature, against the world and Satan. Yet in this conflict the individual does not stand alone, but Divine grace, especially sanctifying grace, of whose power the author has many experiences, helps him. The grace which is infused by grace, whose essence is love, forms the principle of holy life. By yielding to grace and advancing in it, man gains merit, which God crowns with reward. But

all these merits and all these natural gifts, even faith and love, are displeasing to God without grace and love. The conditions of receiving Divine grace depend at last on inner experience, the visitation of the soul by grace, and this partly in the form of inner suggestion, partly in temptation and comfort. The highest gifts of grace rest on compunction and ripe devotion. The flower of such inwardness is *mentis excessus raptus.* But even these moments of grace do not give perfect satisfaction, which is only found in the heavenly home. Hence constant longing and prayer for deliverance.

Hirsche rightly points out that Thomas stands on the ground of Church doctrine, and therefore opposes, not other doctrines, but wrong ways of life. Hirsche's account of Thomas's teaching is thoroughly objective, taking Thomas's own standpoint. The chief defect is the absence of all reference in the notes to the defects of Thomas's teaching in the light of the Reformation. The Scripture views of sin, atonement, faith, and righteousness might have been mentioned. But we break off, thankful for what the diligent inquirer has given us in this field. We are convinced that Hirsche's valuable labours will not merely strengthen the conviction that Thomas was the author of this precious book, but will stir up others to zealous labour to supply what is still lacking in our knowledge.

CURRENT SWISS THOUGHT.

FAITH IN THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CHRIST. By P. LOBSTEIN (*Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*).—He who has found in Jesus Christ the God with whom he is in communion, he who in that communion has received pardon of sins, life, and salvation, is assured that the life which raises us above the world, and which delivers us from the world, does not come from the world. The daily experience of the power of the work and of the Person of Christ convinces the believer that He who is the Head of the kingdom of God and the Author of salvation cannot have been the prey of death. The apparent defeat of Christ upon the cross was not an overthrow, but rather His passing into a sphere which corresponds much better than that of earth with the true nature of the Lord. The Christian soul subscribes unreservedly to that saying in the Apocalypse, "I am the First and the Last: I am He that liveth, and was dead; and, behold, I am alive for evermore, Amen; and have the keys of hell and of death" (ch. i. 18). We know that "Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more; death hath no more dominion over Him. For in that He died, He died unto sin once: but in that He liveth, He liveth unto God" (Rom. vi. 9, 10). This "life unto God" is a life for the salvation and blessing of the kingdom of believers founded by Him.

The question is, therefore—What is the full and entire signification of belief in a living Lord? Does it imply that He continues to live here below as do all those who have been great benefactors of humanity, but in a unique and extraordinary measure? Are we to understand by it that His memory, His image, His words, His spirit, have become the living possession of our race? Doubtless Christ does continue to live among us in this sense of the word. Is it possible to deny the immense effects of His work, which since His appearance extends and increases ever more and more? A new world, our Christian world, reckons by a just right the years of its existence from the date of the birth of the Saviour. But it is not merely in this empirical and historical sense that we as Christians can say of Christ, "Ours is a living Lord."

But does the phrase denote His immortality, the perpetuity of His existence in

the world beyond? Without any doubt, that existence is for each Christian a certain and immovable truth. But that truth itself does not exhaust the contents of the Christian confession. Since for all those who have been saved, for every sinner who has been received into grace, and even for all the souls of men created in the image of God, and who have quitted this life, we cherish the hope that they have not been destroyed by death, if at least they have not wilfully separated themselves from the Source of life.

The continuation of the personal existence of Christ is for the believer the continuation of the personal work of Christ. His work has neither been baffled nor arrested by death; on the contrary, that death has been the condition and the foundation of redeeming work on a far vaster and more glorious scale. Faith in a living and glorified Lord is for us neither a theological deduction nor the mythological clothing of an idea; but is the direct affirmation of our Christian experience. He who has found in the life and work of Christ the foundation of peace is led thereby to the assurance that the Person of Christ lives in an imperishable form, and at the same time, that His beneficent activity is unabated. Further, the Christian is certain that the glorified Lord, whose action is no longer bounded by time and space, is now much nearer to him than during the period of His earthly activity. "I will not leave you comfortless: I will come to you. . . . Because I live, ye shall live also;" "In the world ye shall have tribulation: but be of good cheer; I have overcome the world" (John xiv. 18, 19; xvi. 33). These words of Christ express already the blessed experience of the Christian community. Through the words of parting which the Saviour addresses to His own, faith already hears the promise which brings consolation and peace: it lays hold of the announcement of a permanent return, of an unalterable communion, of a love eternally present, which, transforming apparent loss into a supreme gain, makes the cross a symbol of victory: "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto Me" (John xii. 32).

These words bring us into the very sanctuary of living faith in the risen Lord. The literature of the New Testament speaks to us thus—with unanimous voice, though in different forms—of a glorified Lord, the End of all desire, the Object of faith, the Strength of life, the Source of consolation and hope in death. This faith in the living Head of the kingdom of God is the foundation-stone of the Church; that Church knows that the gates of hell shall never prevail against her, because He is with her always unto the end of the world.

Since the affirmation of the existence and continued activity of the living Christ rests upon religious conviction, it follows that evangelical faith in the resurrection cannot be established by historical proof. If one were forced, in order to believe in the risen Christ, to engage first of all in historical researches, he would need either to devote himself to a scientific examination of matters, or to submit servilely to the judgment of those who were better able than himself to undertake such work. In neither case could he ever arrive at the degree of assurance and at the evidence necessary for possessing, in the face of sufferings and death, a sure hold upon the hope of salvation. There must, therefore, be a means by which each Christian without exception, learned and unlearned, theologian and layman, may reach certainty upon this important question; that means is personal assurance of salvation. When the Christian comes by personal experience to possess faith in a risen Lord, he finds himself in a position to overcome obscurities and divergences in the Biblical narratives. Certain difficulties which appeared to him insurmountable will lose much of their importance. "Whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world: and this is the victory that overcometh the world, *even our faith*" (1 John v. 4).

MORALITY AND RELIGION. By L. CHOISY (*Le Chrétien Évangélique*).—One of the chief merits of an enlightened Christianity is to regard morality, not as the essence of religion (which rather consists in a feeling of dependence upon God together with an aspiration after union with Him), but as the principal *manifestation* of religion. "The principle of progress in human nature," says the missionary Casales, "does not lie in the emotions, but in the will and conscience. Only those religions which endeavour to develop in man the moral strength, succeed in educating nations so as to give them freedom and civilization. The fanaticism which destroys in the soul the sense of responsibility, and leaves only impressions or passions, is essentially a principle of immobility." The Christian religion begins by saying, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy mind:" this is religion properly so called; then without a pause it adds, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself:" this is morality.

But this obligatory connexion between the two is so little a matter of course, that with certain exceptions, which show humanity groping, as it were, after it, the rule almost everywhere outside the gospel is that religion and morality are dissociated from each other. And both in national and in individual life the tendency is in favour of the religion which, freed from the ballast of morality, pursues its disorderly course, and inflicts on humanity innumerable injuries and sufferings. The phenomenon is general; not only among pagans and Mohammedans, but among Roman Catholics, Greeks, and certain Protestants, religion frees itself willingly from morality, and leads populations astray. There is eager desire to believe in, to adore, and to persuade a God who is more or less unknown, but comparatively little to associate with one's neighbour, and to love him as one's self. A religion essentially moral is a thing, if not contrary to human nature, at least supernatural; it is the final triumph of pure religion. "After having lived independently of each other in times anterior to civilization," says M. Reville, "religion and morality begin to draw close together, and to unite, as society becomes organized. It is only in the highest forms of religion that they enter into intimate union. The great characteristic of Christianity is that in it the two can hardly be distinguished from each other." According to the teaching of the immortal pages of the gospel, God dwells in us when perfection dwells in us—perfection of being and of character; and this perfection consists in a perfect resemblance to God in holiness and charity; and these two moral dispositions imply in their turn, as necessary conditions and applications, personal temperance and purity.

M. Choisy proceeds to give many instances of religion being divorced from morality, even within the pale of Christianity. Sometimes religion has been made to consist of adherence to certain theological formulæ, or of superstitious reverence for the letter of sacred books interpreted in some fantastical manner, or observance of certain formal rites; repetition of certain magical phrases, often in an unknown tongue, the offering of costly sacrifices, pilgrimages, celebration of the rites of circumcision or of baptism, and other external actions possessing in themselves no moral significance, have been held to constitute religion. After pointing out the deplorable results which have flowed from the divorce between morality and religion, he proceeds to point out the close union between the two in the teaching of Christ, and in the purest forms of Christianity. It would, however, he remarks, be unfair and ungrateful to ignore the preparation for salvation in the teaching of the Old Testament. Religion and morality have not waited for the consummation of their union until the appearance of Christ. The Decalogue traces with marvellous clearness the twofold duty of love to God and to one's neighbour, and gives an august sanction to the precepts of morality, which every heart recognizes as worthy of respect and as incumbent upon all. Yet in the

Person of Christ, the Anointed of the Lord, we have One greater than Moses. No one else has, like Him, preached a religion which is from one end to another so essentially moral. Other religions and other philosophies have approached the ideal, but Christianity has realized it, so that even an outsider like Renan has said that the religion of Christ will never be surpassed.

In the first place, Christ has taught us and shown us that God is a Father. The God of the gospel is distinguished less by the possession of infinite attributes, the contemplation of which overwhelms the worshipper, than by a moral excellence which serves as an example for human conduct. He is not a God of nature who plays with things that exist, or who is to some extent controlled by them, but a Being of compassionate heart, under whose holy paternal rule all things that breathe, from east to west, are included. None can monopolize His attention; He is not confined to any one place, but His throne is accessible to all in every region of the earth.

In the second place, the religion taught by Christ secures spiritual benefits, and is free from a degrading utilitarianism. The boon which it bestows is that of coming to resemble God in His holiness and love, and of participating in His glory. In other religions, prayer, worship, and sacrifices are all engaged in for the sake of obtaining food, clothing, children, lands, houses, wealth, or victory over enemies. "These things," said Christ, "do the Gentiles seek: but seek ye first the kingdom of God and His righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you. Be ye perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect."

In the third place, the religion of Christ is based upon the Law brought in by Moses, and does not abolish it. In the Sermon on the Mount, Christ takes the commandments which concern our relations with our neighbour. He shows what these ancient words forbid, and what they prescribe, and does not leave His hearers a breathing-space until He has led them to the very throne of God, clothed in a purity which allows them to see Him, and penetrated with a love like that of Him who causes His rain and sunshine to descend upon the evil and the good.

In the fourth place, the morality which is learned from Christ, since it is one with religion—since it is from God, through God, and for God—does not allow abatement, and forbids subtle distinctions. It is one and indivisible, like the kingdom of God, of which it is the very substance. Great commandments are not sacrificed to small, nor small to great. There is no holiness without mercy, or mercy without holiness; temperance without purity, or purity without temperance; piety without reverence for parents, or reverence for parents without piety.

But we do not possess merely the *teaching* of Christ; we have also His *life*. He is the God-Man; in His Person He realizes the union of religion and morality—they are so united in Him that it is impossible to separate the one from the other; they are mingled in the saying which was the motto of His life, "I came down from heaven, not to do Mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me; and this is the Father's will which hath sent Me, that of all which He hath given Me I should lose nothing." "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." He is the Holy and the Righteous One. Since His day morality has shone like the sun in the sky of religion, or rather it has become to religion that which the Son is to the Father, the brightness of its glory, its express image, one with it for ever and ever.

SUNDAY IN CHURCH.

By Rev. Canon Hutchings, M.A.

WHITSUN-DAY.—EVENING SECOND LESSON.

"He said unto them, Have ye received the Holy Ghost since ye believed? And they said unto him, We have not so much as heard whether there be any Holy Ghost."—Acts xix. 2.

1. The necessity for the reception of the Holy Ghost is impressed upon us in two ways by Jesus Christ. He declared that it was expedient that He should go away, in order that the Holy Ghost might come and dwell in man (John xvi. 7). Although Christ had finished His meritorious work, its benefits could not be applied to mankind until the Divine Spirit took up His residence upon earth, thereby "infusing a soul into His mystical body," and giving birth to the Church. Further, Christ ordered His disciples not to begin their missionary labours, but to tarry in Jerusalem until they were endued with the Spirit from on high (Luke xxiv. 49).

2. This great Festival of Whitsuntide is distinguished in one way amongst others, in that it is something more than the commemoration of a past event. True, it does celebrate a past event—"the coming" of the Holy Ghost, and the extraordinary gifts which accompanied it, and the signs which gave evidence of it; but the same Spirit now still dwells among us, and descends invisibly into human souls. Our joy, therefore, is not merely retrospective, but in a *present* truth. The visible ministry of the Son of God ended with His Ascension, but it was the *differentia* of the Spirit's ministry to "abide" with us "for ever" (John xiv. 16). 3. The gifts of the Spirit were communicated to others, and were not the exclusive possession of those who first received them. There was "the supply of the Spirit of Jesus Christ" (Phil. i. 19) through sacramental ministrations, whereby the Church was increased, and souls were quickened by the Presence of the Divine Guest. Of the absolute need of such ministrations, the curious incident which is recorded in this evening's Second Lesson affords a proof.

Let us consider what was defective in these "disciples;" and, how their need was met.

I. What was defective in these disciples? 1. Who were these people? They are called "disciples." Some think that this term implies that they had already some sort of relation to Christ, whilst others take the title in a general and indefinite sense. That they were Jews seems evident. They had received John's baptism, and this they would have done when they had gone to Jerusalem to keep the feast. They must have been baptized by John himself in Judæa, for John's baptism was only ministered by himself. This may be inferred from Holy Scripture (John i. 33 and iii. 22); and St. Augustine and others are of this opinion—that John's baptism was conferred only by himself, and "not by disciples or successors." There is no ground for the conjecture that these persons had been baptized by Apollos before he had been more fully instructed. 2. What, then, was wanting in these "disciples"? They had not received Christian Baptism, and so had not received remission of sins and the gift of the Spirit. The baptism of John did not confer grace, but disposed the soul towards the reception of it. "I indeed," the Baptist said, "baptize you with water unto (εἰς) repentance"—that is, to excite the people to true penitence, and to prepare them by the ablution of the body for the cleansing of the soul—but "He," Christ, "shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and fire" (Matt. iii. 11). One is the baptism

which is of water only; the other, the baptism which is "of water and the Spirit" (John iii. 5). 3. Further, their knowledge was at fault. They had not been properly instructed about the Holy Ghost. St. Paul accosted them with the direct inquiry, "Have ye received the Holy Ghost?" And they answered, "We have not so much as heard whether there be any Holy Ghost." We are not prepared to admit that wherever "the Spirit" occurs without the article, "the Personal Spirit" is not intended, but an influence or gift. Such a canon of interpretation is supposed to be required for the explanation of the text and of John vii. 39. But Jews, knowing nothing of Christ's teaching about the Holy Spirit, would know of the Holy Spirit as an influence or "operation," for the Jews gathered as much as this from the Old Testament. What they did not know about was the Divine Personality, *and* that that Divine Person could actually be received into the soul by sacraments of Christ's appointment. So in John vii. 39 it cannot mean that the Holy Ghost, as a gift, or operation, or influence from God, was "not yet" till Christ's glorification; for we read of the influence and operation of the Spirit from the first chapter of Genesis throughout the Old Testament. What it does mean is that the Divine Spirit, the *Personal* Spirit, could not take up His abode in the Church until His work in Christ was completed by His glorification; then, and not till then, the ministration of the Spirit, through the appointed channels of an organized society, began.

II. How their defects were met. 1. St. Paul administered to them Christian Baptism. It is plainly evident from this passage that the baptism of John was not enough. It did not bring them out of the old Adam into union with the New, nor impart to them the Holy Spirit. The account is brief; but if Aquila and Priscilla expounded to Apollos "the way of God more perfectly," no doubt the Apostle instructed these persons in the true doctrine of the Holy Ghost—His Divinity and Personality, His descent upon the Apostles, and the manner of the bestowal of His Personal Presence. 2. St. Paul completed the sacrament of Holy Baptism by confirming them. "He laid his hands upon them," and "the Holy Ghost came upon them." From what follows, we learn that not only the ordinary, but the extraordinary, gifts of the Spirit were communicated to them; for "they spake with tongues, and prophesied." 3. The question, what it was which led the Apostle thus somewhat bluntly to inquire of them, "Have ye received the Holy Ghost?" has often been discussed. The Apostle does not appear to have detected their defective spiritual state by any supernatural insight or intuition. Nor, again, were the extraordinary workings of the Spirit so common or usual, even in the beginnings of Christianity, that their absence would betoken some sacramental lack. It has been reasonably suggested that the omission of some outward practice "befitting Christian faith" called the Apostle's attention to their condition (Meyer). Perhaps some Christians in Ephesus had told St. Paul of the laggard state of these "out-of-date" sort of people. At any rate, they were teachable, and ready to be led on to the truth in all its fulness; and St. Paul, by instruction and by means of sacraments, brought them up to the true level.

III. Lessons. 1. We learn how faithfulness even to a fragment of truth, imparted years ago, may prepare the way for Christ in the soul. 2. Further, on such a day as this we are reminded how essential it is to be fully instructed in the doctrine of the Spirit, and to be made His temple by Baptism and Confirmation. 3. Thirdly, though we may not look for the *extraordinary* gifts of the Spirit, which do not sanctify, we possess, if we are in a state of grace, His ordinary gifts; and we should show them forth in our lives, as the first Christians manifested the Spirit's Presence so often by the exercise of miraculous powers. 4. The ignorance of these Ephesian "disciples" about the Personality of the Holy Ghost, and His transmission, may set us thinking

whether we have thoroughly grasped the truth about Him, and whether we believe in our hearts that He is given to us, when we rightly receive the ordinances of Christ's appointment.

TRINITY SUNDAY.—EVENING FIRST LESSON.

"And the Lord appeared unto him in the plains of Mamre: and he sat in the tent door in the heat of the day; and he lift up his eyes and looked, and lo, three men stood by him: and when he saw them, he ran to meet them from the tent door, and bowed himself toward the ground."—GEN. xviii. 1, 2.

1. This Festival of Trinity Sunday, which forms the conclusion of Whitsuntide, is unlike all those Festivals which lead up to it, in that it does not celebrate any distinct historic fact of Christianity. The Nativity of Christ or His Ascension are events which took place at a certain time, so the Personal Presence of the Spirit was, we know, vouchsafed fifty days after the Resurrection; but the truth in which we express our faith to-day is timeless, for it concerns the Being of the Eternal God.

2. But the truth, though eternal, the "heavenly dogma" of the Trinity, was only fully revealed to man "in these last days." Not until our Lord gave the *form* of Baptism—"baptizing" "in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost"—was the Divine life clearly and finally made known to man. The Jews received the doctrine of the Divine Oneness, which had to be engrained upon their mind, so as to be preserved in the presence of idolatrous nations or polytheistic beliefs. The revelation to Israel is summed up in the words, "The Lord our God is one Lord" (Deut. vi. 4). But, at the same time, there were glimpses of the mystery of the Holy Trinity, or of a plurality in the Godhead, which become visible through the light which the New Testament throws back upon them; and it is evident that the Church, in the choice of the First Lessons for to-day, has selected chapters in the Old Testament where some of those intimations may be found. This appearance of God to Abraham forms one of them.

3. There is one further remark to make before entering upon the immediate subject of the text. Our Church is commonly and rightly said always to appeal to antiquity in support of doctrine and practice. But in the prominence which is given to Trinity Sunday, it may be seen she believes that the Church, not only in the first centuries, but in all ages, is under the guidance of the Holy Ghost. Thus the Festival of to-day is solemnly observed, though it can only be traced back to the tenth or eleventh centuries, and was not fixed for this Sunday until the days of Pope John XXII., that is, early in the fourteenth century.

We may take for points for consideration, the vision; the revelation; and the conduct of Abraham.

I. THE VISION. 1. There are many visions recorded in Holy Scripture; *e.g.* we read how God appeared to our first parents (Gen. iii.); how He spoke to Cain (Gen. iv. 9); and so to Noah, Hagar, Abraham, Lot, Jacob,—all in the Book of Genesis. In this way He made man acquainted with "heavenly and Divine things" by some representation of a supernatural order. Those who believe in the existence of an invisible world will have no difficulty in believing what Scripture teaches about these Divine manifestations. 2. It is evident from the narrative, that the vision in this Lesson was what we should now call an objective vision; that is, it was not vouchsafed directly to the intellect or imagination, but to the eye of sense. Abraham "lift up his eyes and looked," and saw the "three men;" as the three disciples saw on the mount with their visual organs their transfigured Master. 3. Abraham saw—"three men stood over

against him." He speaks of them differently as "men," and "angels," and "Lord." This is very mysterious. It would seem that "the Lord" appeared through the instrumentality of angels, and that they became visible through assuming the form of man. In the Epistle to the Hebrews (xiii. 2) there is an evident allusion to this event, and to the angelic nature of these visitors. Angels appeared as men; as they did at the sepulchre of Christ, and on the mount at His Ascension. They were permitted to clothe themselves with the human form as with a vesture, thereby bringing themselves within the range of human senses, and typifying the real union between the spiritual and material natures which the Son of God should achieve in the Incarnation.

II. The revelation. 1. The opening words, "the Lord appeared to him," seem to teach, at the back of all, the Divine Unity. The patriarch's use of both the singular and plural pronouns in vers. 3 and 4 has been pointed out as a possible indication of oneness as well as plurality in these visitants (Wordsworth). At any rate, there is something very peculiar in Abraham's language. 2. The earliest patristic interpreters of the passage find in this "triad" of men a glimpse of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity; but, of course, the vision can only be used as a confirmation of what is already believed about God from the full revelation of the New Testament; and as such, this narrative is chosen by the Church as a Lesson to-day. 3. Similarly, when we have accepted the teaching of the Church and of the New Testament respecting the Divine Nature, we can find traces of a trinity in all directions, in "matter, space, energy, time." That space has three dimensions; and time is divided into past, present, and future; and matter is either solid, fluid, or gaseous, may be reflections or illustrations of the doctrine of the Trinity; so the cryptic characters of Old Testament history are deciphered by the light which the gospel throws back upon them, and become subordinate witnesses to the Mystery which we are dwelling upon especially to-day. They are of value as converging lines of evidence, which are seen at a great distance to be making for the same point; obscure indications—like the Hebrew plural (Gen. i. 26), which might have been only *Nomen Majestatis*, but when read in the light of Christ's teaching are discerned to be faint fore-gleams of future revelations about the Being of God. 4. Without entering upon differences of versions, it seems plain, from what has already been advanced, that Abraham speaks at one time as if there were three visitors; at another, one. And the whole doctrine to which we have given an assent to-day may be included in the formula of St. Augustine—"Tres et Unus" (Newman, *Grammar of Assent*)—there are Three Persons, but One Personal God. God "reiterates" His Personality in three ways, so that He is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; and religion, like Abraham with regard to the visitors, takes in turn the different aspects of the Divine Life—now the Unity, then the Triplicity, of the Divine Being—leaving to the theologian the work of combining and reconciling seeming contrarieties.

III. The conduct of Abraham. The wording of the narrative may be taken as indicating certain dispositions which are suitable on Trinity Sunday. 1. The spirit of inquiry. Abraham "lift up his eyes and looked." For the mind to fasten itself with attention and reverent inquiry upon the dogma is right. Upon those truths which we believe, we afterwards exercise reason; not with the idea of being able to fathom the Infinite, but for the purpose of knowing more and more of God. 2. Then, the earnest desire of going forth to meet whatever lights or unveilings of Divine things God may vouchsafe to us, is depicted by the patriarch in that "he ran to meet them." "Visions," says an American writer, "bring tasks." What the understanding sees, the will must actively respond to. 3. Further, we read he "bowed himself toward the ground." There must be awe in dealing with Divine revelations.

The critical faculty must be held under due restraint by a holy fear and apprehension of the sacredness and mysteriousness of the Word and manifestation. 4. The proposal of hospitality on the part of Abraham towards these mysterious visitors, now apparently human, now angelic, now Divine, showed that richness in good works and readiness to distribute, that sociable disposition (1 Tim. vi. 18), which in creatures is a reflection of the diffusiveness of Divine beneficence, and is of great price in the sight of God.

IV. Lessons. 1. To exercise faith and devotion before the throne of the Triune God. 2. To cultivate the disposition of the patriarch; to draw near to God with the spirit of humble inquiry, earnest desire, deep reverence, and with that loving hospitality which He is still willing to receive in the persons of the poor. "Who knows," says St. Ambrose, "whether you are receiving God when you think it only a guest?" for the Lord has taught us, "I was a Stranger, and ye took Me in." 3. To cherish a sense of the value of the Truth about God; for "this is eternal life, to know Thee, the only true God."

FIRST SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—EVENING FIRST LESSON.

"Only Rahab the harlot shall live, she and all that are with her in the house, because she hid the messengers that we sent."—Josh. vi. 17.

1. We read in the First Lesson to-night how Jericho was taken and destroyed. The weapons of the children of Israel were "not carnal, but mighty through God to the pulling down of strong holds" (2 Cor. x. 4). First, Joshua was encouraged by the appearance of "the captain of the Lord's host," probably the Archangel Michael, who said, "See, I have given into thy hand Jericho." The first verse of the sixth chapter, as it has been often observed, is parenthetical. Without touching the question whether this vision is that of a Divine or angelic being, it is evident, either way, that its purpose is to inspire Joshua with faith in the success of an enterprise which, viewed in relation to natural causes, must have seemed hopeless. Secondly, the people had to be tested by the strangeness of what they had to do in order to capture Jericho—to go six days round the city walls in procession, bearing the ark, the priests carrying rams' horns; and on the seventh day to "compass the city seven times;" and then, at the loud blast of the ram's horn and trumpet, the walls should fall down.

2. The question has been discussed—Why did Joshua send spies to Jericho? Was there any lack of faith in this action? But Joshua only did what Moses had done before (Numb. xiii. 17). Or, again, he was justified in doing this, because it was "an act of human prudence" (Tostatus); Joshua, therefore, "did not sin in this." Apart, however, from the character of this scheme, there were two results from it—one, the increase of courage in Israel at the knowledge of the terror of the inhabitants of the land; the other, the rescue of Rahab, which is evidently the Divine purpose of this transaction.

3. There were two episodes in the taking of Jericho; one good, one bad—that of Rahab, and that of Achan. There is something picturesque and romantic in the story of Rahab; rich in spiritual and prophetic suggestiveness, but not devoid of moral difficulty.

Let us briefly consider the person; the action; and the lessons.

I. The person. 1. Rahab was an inhabitant of Jericho, a heathen woman, who lived amongst idolaters. She has, therefore, been regarded as a type of the ingathering

of the Gentiles into the Church of Christ. 2. Further, she is termed "an harlot." Attempts have been made to interpret the word in the original as "hostess," but this is a mistake as to derivation (Gesenius). The LXX. and Vulgate render it as in the English Bible. That she might have kept an inn or lodging-house is more than probable from the narrative; and, perhaps, the stalks of flax upon the roof and the scarlet line may indicate that she also carried on some business for which such materials would be wanted. However this might be, she was, as she is again and again called in the Old Testament and in the New, a "harlot" (Josh. ii. 1; vi. 17, 25; Heb. xi. 31; Jas. ii. 25). 3. She was moved by faith. It is singular that, like Abraham, her example is described in the New Testament, in one place (Heb. xi. 31) as an instance of faith; in another, of works (Jas. ii. 25). So Abraham's offering up of Isaac is set forth as a pattern of faith (Heb. xi. 17) and of works (Jas. ii. 21). "Faith cometh by hearing," and this poor heathen woman of impure life had not heard of the wonderful works of God in vain (Josh. ii. 9, 10). She is a witness of the possibility of repentance from deep and gross sin, in the midst of abominable idolatry. She stood alone, but was faithful to the gleam of light which broke upon her darkened soul. "*By faith* the harlot Rahab perished not" with the sinful inhabitants of Jericho.

II. The action. 1. She hid the spies under the stalks of flax on the house-top. She lied to the King of Jericho's messengers, saying the men were gone when she had concealed them on the roof; and finally, having secured by an oath the safety of herself and family, she let them down through a window on the wall, and so they escaped and came to Joshua, and told him all that they had discovered. 2. In this, Rahab has been first charged with lack of patriotism. No doubt she *did* value the knowledge of the true God more than the preservation of Jericho, but she knew that the Lord had given the land to the children of Israel. High as the love of country may stand, the love of God must certainly be higher. By faith she postponed "patriotism to religion" (Vaughan). There seems no further vindication of her conduct on this score necessary. 3. A further charge, and a more serious one, is that of untruthfulness. Here, first, we must take into consideration the level of morality with which this woman was so familiar in that heathen city, that the moral intuition of veracity must have been at least much impaired. Further, though mendacity can never be justified in itself, there are rare times and occasions when one virtuous end of action for the nonce sets aside another; when the claim, for instance, of benevolence rises higher than that of truthfulness: as when you tell an assassin that your father, his intended victim, has gone to the right, when you know he has gone to the left. Greek and Anglican writers regard preservation of life as "a just cause" for deception, though Augustine appears to think the untruth is still sinful. Whilst no one can approve of untruthfulness or deceit, or regard it as a "virtuous end of action;" yet every one can see that on some rare occasion one virtuous end of action may collide with another, and, if that other be not superior, it must give way.

III. Lessons. There is much to learn from this subject. 1. The faith of Rahab. Her perception of the true God was evidently (Josh. ii. 11) yet but dim; but faith is like a grain of mustard seed, "the least of all seeds," yet full of vitality and pungency. Whatever imperfection may be attributed to her methods of action, she is singled out for commendation by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, in line with patriarchs and judges, as an example of that virtue without which it is impossible to please God. Even an imperfect grasp of "things unseen," when acted upon, has a saving effect. It was no merely selfish motive which prompted her, but the safety of father, mother, brethren, and sisters. 2. This history shows

how the mercy of God reaches down to the most abandoned and depraved. Rahab heard and repented. "Aliquando meretrix fuit, nunc vero casta" (Origen). We find her name in the pedigree of David, and so of Christ, as the wife of Salmon and mother of Boaz; that "He who had come to save sinners might, being born of a sinner, blot out the sins of all" (St. Jerome). The lost soul is not only saved, but raised to this dignity in the genealogy of Christ. 3. A condition of safety was, not to go out of the doors of the house (Josh. ii. 19). Similarly, none were to leave the house when the Passover was killed (Exod. xii. 21). This represents the necessity of being in the Church of Christ. The Fathers drew this lesson from this restriction, and Bishop Pearson emphasizes the same: "As none of the inhabitants of Jericho could escape the fire or sword but such as were within the house of Rahab, so none shall ever escape the eternal wrath of God which belong not to the Church of God." 4. The sign of deliverance, the "line of scarlet thread in the window," has always been taken as a symbol of the Blood of Christ, through whom alone we have redemption. It may be said that the Fathers have "a passion for allegorical interpretation;" but when we find St. Clement of Rome, who, with this exception, never indulges in mystical meanings (Keble), asserting that the scarlet line teaches us that "through the blood of the Lord there is redemption for all," it seems that the explanation of the "ordained friend of St. Paul and St. Peter," a practical person, must have some value. If the uplifted brazen serpent was, as we know it was, a type of the Crucifixion, surely the scarlet cord which saved from destruction may in like manner be a type of the precious Blood of Christ. The practical lessons are the importance of faith, penitence, fellowship with the Church, and devotion to the Saviour's Passion.

SECOND SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—EVENING FIRST LESSON.

"They fought from heaven; the stars in their courses fought against Sisera."—JUDG. v. 20.

1. The First Lessons to-day contain an account, first in prose and then in song, of a celebrated victory over a pagan king and his general, who had "mightily oppressed" the children of Israel in the north of Palestine for twenty years (Judg. iv. 3). This tyrant—Jabin—had "nine hundred chariots of iron;" and Israel was without "shield or spear," so that the only hope of deliverance was in the intervention of God. His main agents were Deborah, an inspired woman; Barak, a courageous man; and Jael, the wife of Heber the Kenite.

2. Of the "difficulties" in the narrative no one can be insensible. The character and conduct of Jael have afforded, it has been said, "a stock argument with the assailants of the Bible" (Liddon); but it is our purpose now only to touch upon that branch of the subject. It seems to be sufficient to say, with regard to this, that treachery in the eyes of a "savage tribe," in the days of the Judges, would be very differently viewed than it is by us here and now. The moral standard would be different, and must be taken into consideration; and further, that whilst we admire the motive which possessed the soul of Jael in destroying the enemy of God, we may deprecate the method of its execution.

3. It is not with Deborah, or Barak, or Jael we are directly concerned, but with an incident in the battle, which is recorded in the text. "The stars in their courses fought against Sisera." Let us regard the words, first in their literal; and secondly, in the figurative sense.

I. THE LITERAL SENSE. 1. This Lesson is a song of thanksgiving. It reminds us at once of the duty of gratitude to God at all times, but especially after any great

deliverance. The miracle of the cleansing of the lepers puts in a picture the rarity of thanksgiving—when ten pray, but one gives thanks. 2. Then, this song was a spontaneous outburst of praise immediately after the reception of the blessing. Thanksgiving was, as it should be, prompt. 3. The victory was ascribed to God: "Praise ye the Lord for the avenging of Israel." Thanksgiving is only possible when there is faith, when the eye of the soul penetrates beyond what are called "second causes," and traces the events of this life to the Providence of God. 4. But a particular instrument which God employed for carrying out His purposes is recognized in the text: "the stars," etc. Viewed literally, what is meant by this? It is the description of some wonder wrought by God in the battle, which aided the overthrow of Jabin's host and Jabin's general. It is sometimes explained by saying that a great storm of rain and hail beat against the foes of Israel: "There came down from heaven a great storm, with a vast quantity of rain and hail, and the wind blew the rain in the face of the Canaanites" (Josephus, *Antiq.*, v. 5). Similarly, we read of a thunderstorm leading to the discomfiture of the Philistines (1 Sam. vii. 10; see also 2 Kings iii.). Others have taken the passage still more literally, and thought that the stars helped God's people by prolonging the light, so that they were able to pursue their enemies after sunset; or, that there was a peculiar glittering brightness which flashed from the gems of heaven, or some meteoric appearance which filled their foes with terror. Perhaps the former is the more simple interpretation, and accounts for the inundation of the river Kishon, which was so swelled by the rainfall that it carried away in its currents numbers of the retreating host. But whatever may be the right explanation of the phenomenon, Israel ascribed the victory to God's power: "So God subdued on that day Jabin" (Judg. iv. 23).

II. The figurative sense. 1. "The stars in their courses" have been supposed to represent the angels of God. It may be enough to quote Scott—who has an "abhorrence" for mystical interpretation—in this connexion. He says, "The angels are called 'morning stars' (Job xxxviii. 7), and their assistance may be here meant." 2. Warfare against evil is one part of the angels' functions. Holy Scripture recounts their military operations. "There was war in heaven: Michael and his angels fought against the dragon" (Rev. xii. 7). St. Jude describes another altercation (ver. 9). Daniel relates a third (x. 13). And again, at the end of the world (1 Thess. iv. 16; 2 Thess. ii. 8), the angels "shall sever the wicked from among the just," and consign them to punishment (Matt. xiii. 49, 50). 3. We may not know *how* these spiritual beings "fought against Sisera," any more than we can tell how the angel of the Lord caused the pestilence in the days of David (1 Chron. xxi. 15); but we do know that angels are the ministers of God (Ps. civ. 4), and carry out His behests. 4. If the stars represent the angels of God, then, on the other hand, the victory over Sisera, and the instrument by which it was achieved, form an apt image of the overthrow of Satan's power by the Cross. The prophecy, "the seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head," is depicted by the death of Sisera with the nail in his temples, especially as the word for nail means "a wooden stake," and so may be a figure of Christ's cross. As St. Paul promises his converts that "the God of peace shall shortly bruise Satan under" their "feet" (Rom. xvi. 20), so the death of Sisera is a material illustration of the victory of Christ's Church over the powers of evil and their leader. The song of Deborah with regard to Jael finds its consummation in the Magnificat of Mary, vast as is the moral distance between the two; and the woman with the "crown of twelve stars" (Rev. xii. 1) is dimly foreshadowed by the wife of Heber the Kenite, who smote Israel's foe in the tent in the plain of Zaanaim.

III. Lessons. 1. When this Lesson is said to contain "praise of Jael's perfidy,"

and that from the lips of an inspired prophetess; it may be urged in reply, that it is a commendation of the brave deed of Jael and her disinterested zeal for the welfare of God's people, whilst the treachery which accompanied it was in keeping with the low moral condition of the age and person—with "the light of the times." 2. We may learn from the general subject the duty of thanksgiving, and that its fulfilment involves a belief in the doctrine of Divine Providence. 3. According to the literal interpretation of the text, we are led to the conviction that even such matters as the weather may be guided by God to fulfil His purposes, and that His directing touch is effective in a region far beyond the ken of human science, which can only extend to the proximate causes of things. 4. The spiritual meaning should remind us that the angels of God assist us in our conflict with the evil one, and by Divine appointment "succour and defend us on earth;" so that, in our struggles with the power of darkness, we may take the words of the prophet as a ground of confidence, "Fear not: for they that be with us are more than they that be with them" (2 Kings vi. 16).

THIRD SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—EVENING FIRST LESSON.

"And Samuel told him every whit, and hid nothing from him. And he said, It is the Lord: let Him do what seemeth Him good."—1 Sam. iii. 18.

1. The Church brings before us in this evening's First Lesson the character of Eli, and Samuel's relations with him. It is a touching scene—the boy of twelve, the old man of ninety-eight; the dawn of life and its clouded sunset. Samuel was oppressed by the terrible message with which God had entrusted him, and naturally shrank from disclosing it to Eli, but summoned up courage to tell him "every whit"—when the aged judge and priest replied in the words of the text.

2. We have in this narrative an instance of God's heavy judgment upon sin. Eli had a not uncommon fault—he was weak in the matter of reproof. His sons were grasping and licentious. They "knew not the Lord," though ministering at the tabernacle. Their conduct brought religion into contempt, and God "forsook the tabernacle in Shiloh, even the tent which He had pitched among men." Eli was content with *words* of rebuke when sterner measures were needed. This is hardly a case in which any caviller can take exception to "the principle" of Divine punishments for sin, when the scandal which the conduct of these "sons of Belial" caused is taken into consideration. Severe as the chastisements were, they were merited, when moral pollution desecrated the very service of the sanctuary (Jer. xxiii. 1).

3. But the immediate words of the text lead us to contemplate the light rather than the shadow, and direct us to the more pleasant task of commenting upon virtue rather than vice.

Let us see what virtue Eli manifests in the text; then, how he displayed it; and, what lessons may be drawn from the subject.

I. The virtue. 1. It was conformity to the Will of God. Viewed in relation to God, this virtue is based upon the realization of His goodness, and that therefore His will is always just and good and wise. 2. Further, that nothing happens unless it is designed or permitted by Him. Even the punishments which follow upon sin are not only penal, but remedial. Eli's instinctive expression, "It is the Lord," reveals the habit of his soul to discern God's hand in all things. He saw at once that Samuel's announcement was a declaration of Divine wrath against the iniquity of his house, for he knew "the Lord had called the child." 3. But the words express the entire resignation of his own will to the will of God. In this lies the virtue. It was not a mere emotion, but an act of what within him must have been a

habit. Difficult occasions do not create virtues, but call them into operation. This spiritual perception of the occurrences of life, and readiness to surrender his will to God, must have been formed before this supreme moment of trial, or the vista of sorrows would have provoked an utterance of rebellion or despair. 4. Holy Scripture supplies us with many instances of conformity of will to God, which is a law which holds good throughout the spiritual sphere, as that of gravitation does in the natural sphere: *e.g.* the answer of the Shunammite, when her child had died, "It is well," or "Peace" (2 Kings iv. 26). Again, Job's wonderful resignation, expressed by the words, "The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away; blessed be the Name of the Lord" (Job i. 21). So the response of the Blessed Virgin, a condition of the Incarnation, "Be it unto me according to thy word" (Luke i. 38). Or, again, the self-surrender of St. James and St. John, in the reply to the question, "Are ye able to drink of the cup that I shall drink of," etc.? "We are able" (Matt. xx. 22).

II. How displayed. 1. *Promptly.* There was no hesitation or delay. We know how, when some great loss is broken to us, for a time we are apt to be overwhelmed, dazed, and bewildered with grief, and want a little pause before we can gather ourselves together again and attempt to cry, "Not my will, but Thine, be done." But with the aged Eli, the accents of resignation followed immediately upon the announcement of the evils which would befall him and his house. He apparently sustained the shock without perturbation, though evidently a man of deep affections. 2. *Humbly.* Such a disclosure would have been bitter from any one's lips, but how much more galling when it came from a little child—devoted, too, to the service of God! Men often disdain to be corrected by their juniors, but Eli displayed no such sensitiveness. Though judge and priest, he heard with humbleness of mind the tale of woes and denunciation from the lips of the innocent child, and expressed the justice of what God was about to bring upon him. Most painful and humiliating, and, as far as this life was concerned, irretrievable; yet no word of murmuring or self-defence escaped from his mouth. 3. *Absolutely.* "Let Him do what seemeth Him good." Not "what seemeth good *to me.*" This is true liberty of spirit. But for the defect of character in the matter of rebuke, Eli presents us with a bright example. There was in him that trustfulness which is such a beautiful feature of the character of David: "Let us fall now into the hand of the Lord; for His mercies are great: and let me not fall into the hand of man" (2 Sam. xxiv. 14). Back, ages before the Incarnation, and the witness of His Life who could say, "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me" (John iv. 34), and before the Spirit of God dwelt amongst men; in a time when the world was yet in its "moral childhood," and at a period of national degeneracy, old Eli manifested in wonderful perfectness that in which all human goodness consists,—"to be conformed to the will of God." St. Jerome cried out, when he read Job i. 21, "O man evangelical before the gospel, apostolic before apostolic teaching!" So the greatness of Eli's prompt, humble, and absolute resignation is accentuated by the consideration of the time when he lived and the circumstances of the period.

III. Lessons. 1. We are warned, by the judgments upon Eli and his family, of the momentousness of the duty of rebuking sin, and especially on the part of parents, rulers, and priests. Natures inclined to shrink from this task should recall the history in this lesson. 2. The practice of conforming the will to God in all the events of life, and that with the same features of promptness, lowliness, and entirety as Eli manifested, is the chief lesson from the text. 3. Further, to remember that we can learn conformity from the self-surrender of Christ to His Father's will, especially in His Passion and death, and that we are aided in the production of this grace by the presence of the Holy Ghost; so that to say, "Not my will, but Thine, be done," is

easier for us than it was for Eli. 4. The root of his conformity of will comes to view at the moment of his death. He bore up when he heard the tidings of the great slaughter of the people, and that his two sons, Hophni and Phinehas, were dead; but when he was told that the ark of God was taken, he fell backward and died. Evidently God, and the things of God—notwithstanding his past great and culpable negligence—held the first place in his heart; hence this submission to His Will.

SUNDAY IN SCHOOL.

THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS.

MARK xvi. 1–8.

THE Christianity of to-day which easily commands the loyalty of a very large, if not the largest, best, and most highly cultivated portion of humanity, is not only an undeniable fact, but it is a stupendous fact, a superb fact, and there is no explanation or account to be given of this fact save the one given by the federation itself, that Jesus Christ rose from the dead. If any persons doubt whether Jesus Christ did indeed rise from the dead, it is necessary for them to explain not only why the Church exists and is mistaken in her eighteen centuries' assumption that Christ did rise and that His risen life is the secret of her life, but they must also furnish some other adequate account of a movement in history so extensive and important as the origin, growth, and power of Christianity.

From whence did Christianity come and of what is it the product, if it is not the product of the risen and glorified Christ? It is necessary to give some account of an organization so wide and powerful and so tenacious of existence. Some of the world's profoundest thinkers and most learned men have sought for such an explanation of Christianity.

When we consider the American commonwealth with its sixty millions of people, its elaborate form of government, its varied social and civil aspects, its vast industrial developments, and its wonderful history, we find that it dates backward to a certain beginning, gets all its meaning from that beginning, has come to be what it is from that beginning, and seemingly could never have existed at all but for that beginning—and that beginning was the arrival of a little company of pilgrims who landed in midwinter on Plymouth Rock. He who doubts the landing of the Pilgrim Fathers must show not only why sixty millions of people are mistaken in believing that they did land, and that their landing was the beginning of that national life, but must also explain how this belief arose and became so universal; how it happens that traces of such an origin are to be found everywhere in all departments of the national fabric, in its religious and educational institutions, and, besides this, must furnish some other adequate account of the origin, development, and character of the American nation.

In the same way, he who doubts or denies the resurrection of Jesus Christ must show not only why more than a hundred millions of the best and most intelligent people on earth are mistaken in believing that He did rise, and that His resurrection is the beginning of their spiritual and corporate life, but he must also explain how this belief arose and why it has become so general; how it happens that traces of such an origin are to be found everywhere, in all departments of organic Christian life; and besides all this, he must furnish some other adequate account of the origin, development, and character of the strongest and best civilization on the face of the

earth. The man who is equal to such a task has not yet been found. It is obvious that this method of reasoning is the same as that adopted by Paul and recorded for us in the fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians. He points to the Church as it existed in his day; to the five hundred brethren, some of whom had fallen asleep; to Cephas, to James, to himself as the least of the apostles,—and asks how these witnesses are to be accounted for and disposed of if Jesus Christ did not rise from the dead.

Accepting the facts as they then were, any other supposition than the actual resurrection of Jesus Christ was an incredible absurdity. Observe the real force of this statement, which is that if Christ did not rise, then Christianity—a visible, palpable, organic reality—is itself a false witness, and not merely that certain people calling themselves Christians are false witnesses. There is no Church, no preaching, no faith, except as Christ rose from the dead.

If we now attempt to go a step further, and seek to enter the more difficult world of thought, feeling, and knowledge; the mental, spiritual, ethical world which lies behind things seen and exists not in institutions, rites, ceremonies, ordinances, and a wide federation, but in something deeper, truer, and more subtile; something about which it is hard to admit that we can be mistaken—the world of sin, righteousness, hopes, fears, aspirations, and spiritual life—we shall at once find certain convictions, widespread, dear to all sorts of people, and which have exercised a most powerful and permanent influence upon their lives and characters. These convictions relate to personal, mental, and moral history; profess to give an account of changes wrought in man's nature, and periods of development through which the soul has passed; and these convictions or exercises, which have so much to do with man's spiritual history, agree in referring themselves to a single event as the inspiring and efficient cause from which alone they have sprung or could spring, and that cause is the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. Such an experience of the soul is found, for example, in the knowledge of sins forgiven. The forgiveness of sins is a reality. As the blind man in the temple, after he had received his sight, was able to say, "One thing I know, that, whereas I was blind, now I see," and to refer his cure to the Person by whom it had been wrought; so the pardoned sinner is able to say, "One thing I know, that whereas I was under condemnation and guilt, now all such condemnation and guilt have passed away, and have passed away through the power of Jesus and the resurrection." Can this verdict be set aside? Not easily. This experience of sins forgiven persistently refers itself to the risen Christ as its cause. It will accept no other explanation, and dwells on the Name of Jesus as sweetest music. The verdict of thousands of sensible, honest people in every age is that pardon and peace in the soul, as felt realities, come to them from the risen Jesus. Shall we say that this universal consciousness is mistaken?

In the same way it might be shown that men are conscious in themselves of being reconciled to God, so that fear and distrust are removed and they have fellowship with the Father and His Son Jesus Christ; and this invariably refers itself back to the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, as the source from which it sprang and the energy by which it is sustained. Here, then, we find curiously wrought into the very structure of modern Christian experience, so that it is part of that experience, what may be called constructive proof in the very nature of things that Jesus Christ rose from the dead. He who doubts His resurrection must find some other sufficient cause for these moral transformations. This also explains our Lord's declaration, "Ye are My witnesses."

We have now seen both in the external organization of the Church, in its rites, ceremonies, institutions, and also in the inward experience of those who are Christ's,

that there is an unwitting and indestructible testimony to the fact declared by the angel to the women, "He is risen; He is not here." The belief is as reasonable as it is comfortable. We may hold it with intellectual peace. It is the verdict of Nature herself, taking Nature in the larger sense of all human experience and history.—EDWARD BEECHER MASON.

THE WALK TO EMMAUS.

LUKE xxiv. 13–32.

WE study to-day an incident in the resurrection-life of Jesus which is unique. It is in the narrative of Luke, and no other evangelist records it. It is true that in Mark xvi. 12 it is said, "He appeared in another form unto two of them, as they walked, and went into the country," but all critical editors of the manuscripts reject the last twelve verses of this chapter. This reference in Mark is but an extract from the record of Luke. Most precious is this testimony of the appearance of Jesus after His resurrection to the anonymous traveller and his companion at Emmaus. Of the two men, the name of one is given, Cleopas, but of the other the name stands in shadow. Can it be any other than that of the author of the Gospel which contains this incident? It was a walk of probably six or seven miles out from Jerusalem, which these two disciples took on that beautiful spring evening. They proceeded from the Western Gate over toward the plateau, where lay the place called Hot Springs. Their minds were full of the great events which had taken place in Jerusalem, their hearts were full and their forebodings were heavy. The mystery of life and the strange ways of Providence occupied their thoughts. Exactly how Jesus was changed in His physical appearance we do not know, but He was transformed so that Mary had not only supposed "Him to be the gardener," but even here the two men did not know the One whom they loved best. Was it because they were so preoccupied? Or was it because Jesus had been changed in appearance by the might and mystery of death or by the greater might and mystery of the resurrection-life? In any event they did not recognize Him. Jesus, like a good teacher, and as in a former case (John i. 38) in order to be heard, began by causing His hearers to speak for themselves. Jesus for all time is the model of a good teacher as well as of a Saviour, Friend, Redeemer. After the first surprise concerning possible ignorance of the great events of the past few days, the two with eager dialogue tell their story. They utter their faith in Jesus of Nazareth as a true "Prophet mighty in deed and word before God and all the people." They had the right idea of a prophet. Then with gentle rebuke their fellow-traveller began both to open their eyes, veiled before the Scriptures, and to reveal the testimony of prophets to this same Jesus of Nazareth.

I. JESUS REAFFIRMS THE TRUTH AND GLORY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT SCRIPTURES. The statement of the text in ver. 27 carries yearning to every Christian heart. How we all wish we had been there to study theology under Jesus Christ! Jesus, by His own long study of the Scriptures, had found Himself in them everywhere. He was not like the unstable man. He looked into the mirror of God's Word, and forgot not what manner of man He was. He soon came to be conscious of the full truth that He was the Messiah. Furthermore, He never forgot who the Messiah was and what He ought to be. He suffered His Father's will. He Himself bore witness, not only this time but on previous occasions, that the Scriptures testified of Him. It was the light which filled His own heart that rayed forth to the Emmaus travellers. Often it is the old story of the blind men judging the elephant—one having felt his tusk,

another his hide, another his tail. Jesus has taught us to study the Bible in its true proportions and relations. The Old Testament will always be a New Testament to him who reads it aright. Blessed is the man who takes his opinions and convictions from the Book itself, and not from what men have said about it! The original text always before tradition or scholasticism! "The testimony of Jesus is the spirit of prophecy."

II. THE MEAL AS A MEANS OF GRACE. Our Lord's very manner of breaking the bread was more than a means of grace; it was His own chosen method of opening their eyes to the recognition of Himself. What a precious example is that of Jesus! He sanctifies the meal, and makes it a school of manners, a means of grace, a method of recognition of things and persons heavenly. Hunger in itself is a brute instinct, the act of taking food is but an animal habit; yet how vast is the gulf of difference between the ravenous bird or beast of prey and that of the Christian family! One can discern real gentlemen or ladies almost immediately by the way they eat. How beautiful the custom of grace at meals! how precious the example of Jesus! How uplifting, how improving, how intrinsically appropriate the habit and custom of giving thanks to God before we partake of His bounties! What genuine ingratitude and fetid infidelity to affirm that "we have no one to thank but the cook and ourselves" for our dinner! What is true of the daily meal is even more true of the Eucharist. There we renew our vows, cultivate our friendship with Jesus, and, like the two disciples at the table, recognize afresh our Divine Lord and Master.

III. JESUS OUR EXAMPLE IN CONCEALMENT OF REALITY. In rudimentary or savage life it must be much more easy to speak the truth, always, than in civilized life. How hard it sometimes seems to be polite and yet to be absolutely sincere! In civilization life is complex. Oftentimes we are placed in difficult circumstances, where dissimulation (using the word only in its exact literal sense) is necessary. How far can we carry dissimulation without speaking untruth? In our old version of the New Testament (Rom. xii. 9) it is said, "Let love be without dissimulation." Here, in order to get at the exact sense, even in the unrevised form, it is well to quote what the *Tatler* (paper No. 213) says, "It will be necessary to observe that the learned make a difference between simulation and dissimulation. Simulation is a pretence of what is not, and dissimulation is concealment of what is." Now, as matter of fact, Jesus in the wisdom of love did not "dissimulate" (in the evil sense of the word). He simply concealed what He had a right to conceal, just as in the case of John vii. 2–14. So, in the walk to Emmaus, He had joined these travellers, but was not responsible for their imagination or impressions, any more than Elisha was for the preconceived notions of Naaman. So, as an independent traveller, He has perfect moral right to "make as though He would have gone further." It is not implied that He said anything to indicate that He would go further, but simply that He was passing on. Jeremy Taylor, in his sermon on "Christian Simplicity," well says, in commenting on the incident of Jesus at Emmaus, "In the nature of the thing it is proper and natural by an offer to give an occasion to another to do a good action, and in case it succeeds not, then to do what we intended not, and so the offer was conditional." Jesus then did not simulate, making pretence of what is not, but in the right and literal sense of the word He dissimulated, that is, simply concealed His purpose in order to draw out His disciples.—WILLIAM ELLIOT GRIFFIS.

PETER AND THE RISEN LORD.

JOHN xxi. 4–17.

THE local setting of the incident is essential to a proper understanding of the force of meaning in the lesson. The perspective gives us the Galilæan Lake—a sheet of water only about thirteen miles in length by six miles in breadth. To this day it is regarded as a very romantic body of water, not only because of its associations, but also for its natural peculiarities and beauties. It lies in a deep basin, encompassed by rocky and precipitous sides, that in places shelve down into sandy beaches, where fishermen land their boats and spread their nets. A company of the disciples, who had been aforetime engaged in fishing along its shores, had been all night unsuccessfully drawing their nets; in the haze of the early morning they discern one upon the shore whom they do not recognize, who calls out to them in regard to their success; they are compelled to answer that they have caught nothing during the entire night. He bids them, in persuasive tones, to cast the net upon the right side of the boat. Instinctively they obey, and now are "not able to draw it for the multitude of fishes." No one asks the mysterious personage, "Who art thou?" for all recognize the risen Lord. He invites them to the miraculous breakfast, and signalizes the occasion by restoring to Peter his apostolic authority and functions.

What we call the Christ-like spirit is so manifest as to be particularly noticeable. The delicacy of approach, the tender nature of the questions, thrice repeated, naturally suggested, without naming it, the thrice-repeated denial. The spirit of infinite tenderness that breathed in look as well as word must have comforted the penitent Peter and been as balm to his wounded spirit, conscious, painfully conscious, of his recent unfaithfulness. His replies indicate, also, that a great change had come over the hitherto self-confident disciple. And when, upon the part of his Lord, the question is strangely thrice repeated, there is nothing of the old-time impatience and lack of self-control, but a quiet trust in his own conscious sincerity that, his unquestioning faith assumes, must be known to his Master.

It is exceedingly interesting to note, with care, the questions of the Christ and the answers of the penitent and loving Peter, that precede his gradual yet ultimately full investiture of the restored functions of the apostolic office.

In order to get the force of meaning, it is necessary for us to realize, in some degree, the nicer shadings of meaning of the original Greek, both in the questions and their answers. There are two Greek words, alike rendered "love" in our translation, but which have a different force of meaning; the one is used in the first two questions of our Lord, the other in the last question, and in each of the answers of Peter. The love of the first two questions signifies the love of will, of judgment, or of moral feeling—nearly our English word "to prize." The love in the answer and in the last question is simply affectional, love springing from the natural sensibility. The Lord asks him if he prizes Him more than do these others. Formerly, as we have seen, Peter had been very vehement in his protestations. "Although all shall be offended, yet will not I." Taught by his recent sad experiences, he makes now no comparisons with others, but meekly appeals to the Lord's own knowledge of his heart. "I love Thee tenderly from the heart," is the full force of his reply. There is without doubt a special significance also, in the deliverances of the Lord, in reply to the three answers of Peter. The nice and yet important gradations in the distinctions between lambs, the full-grown sheep, and something implied in the last reply, which does not appear in the translation, which is an intimation of the guiding and governing functions of a shepherd—these suggest a full restoration to favour and to

the responsibilities of an apostle. How Peter himself understood this he shows, subsequently, in his own Epistle (1 Pet. v. 2, 3), in which he gives directions to those pastors of the Churches that had charge of the flocks of the good Shepherd.

Love to Jesus is the condition of the pastoral office, to which he is now reappointed. To provide wholesome food for Christ's sheep and lambs is the first and last thing. The love of the shepherd who tends and leads and guards is the central spring of all, and this will manifest itself in outward acts of care and devotion. The lambs are to be tenderly cared for, the sheep are to be fed, the whole flock is to be guarded and governed.—ELIJAH HORR.

THE SAVIOUR'S PARTING WORDS.

LUKE xxiv. 44–53.

HAD familiarity not dulled the edge of novelty, how full of thrilling interest to every one would be these verses that form our lesson to-day! They are the parting words of Him who spake as never man spake—the last recorded utterances of the Son of man and the Son of God. Last words, even when spoken by ordinary mortals, are always full of pathetic interest for the friends who hear them, however insignificant and commonplace in themselves. Truly the most significant parting message is this that ever fell from lips. It tells us that He who spake was the Messiah, the Christ of God. To the supreme hour of His death had led all the events in the history of the world. Notice that, until the very last, our Lord maintains and asserts His claim upon the adoration of the world. Our Saviour's message is for all. To every one of us is given our subject, our field, our mission. To every one of us is pointed out the Source of our power.

I. OUR MESSAGE IS REPENTANCE AND REMISSION OF SINS IN THE NAME OF JESUS CHRIST.

II. BUT, AGAIN, THE FIELD WHICH IS GIVEN TO EVERY CHRISTIAN TO CULTIVATE IS ALSO INDICATED HERE. How graciously our Lord seems to trust the limited intelligence of His people! How generously He seems to take it for granted that sooner or later His words will be understood! He spoke to a narrow-minded, bigoted, intensely sectarian people, and yet He told them that the message must be given to "all nations," that the field was the world. With few explanations, with little amplification of the great thought, He seems to have thrust it out among His disciples, having faith in its inherent vitality. The nineteenth century, beyond all others, has comprehended it. Only now, and scarcely even yet, are we able to know how wide our field is. To the disciples of Christ, the world at most meant the narrow limits of the Roman empire. And yet the "beginning," now as then, is at Jerusalem—our Jerusalem, our Church, our community, our family. Beginning there, the message must be carried everywhere.

III. But not only did our Lord in these parting words give us the subject of our message, and the field in which it is to be proclaimed—HE GAVE US OUR SPECIAL MISSION AS WELL. We are *witnesses* of these things. It is as though He feared we would say with Moses, "I am not eloquent; send by whom Thou wilt send. Proclaim Thy message to the ends of the earth, but not by me." So He takes away all excuse, and tells us that *we all are His witnesses of these things.* The witness need not be a preacher. The witness may not be eloquent or learned. This is a Christian's business in the world—to let others know what he has seen; to declare what Christ is to him; to show by his life that he has been transformed by the touch of the Sinless One; to show that he knows something of the power of the resurrection-truth to transform, and make strong, and gentle, and sweet, and true.

IV. HERE, TOO, IN THIS LESSON, DO WE FIND THE SOURCE OF OUR POWER AS WITNESSES. The promise of the Father is the gift of the Holy Spirit. We know how soon in the early Church this promise of power was fulfilled. The second chapter of Acts is the sequel to this promise, and should be read in connexion with it. The last word having been spoken, the disciples went out with Jesus on the hillside, apparently to a spot where they could see the village which He loved so well—the village of Mary and Martha and Simon and Lazarus. Here, so near the spot with which is associated that which was most human as well as that which was most Divine in our Lord's life, He lifted up His hands in benediction, and while He pronounced the words of blessing He parted from them and was carried up into heaven. Our curiosity is not gratified, our cravings for a glimpse within the pearly portals are left unsatisfied, but the facts we know. Our work is here. Into the parted heavens we cannot peer. But in the mean time, as we return to our Jerusalem, to our home, to our routine work, as did the disciples, may it be with great joy! Their Lord was taken from them, and yet they were continually in the temple blessing God. Their only earthly hope had vanished into the air, so far as they could see, and yet we never read of their abounding and abiding joy until now, for now they knew who it was that had claimed and received their allegiance. Now they understood the work He had given them to do. No wonder that their seemingly hopeless commission filled them with rejoicing, for they had learned the secret of their strength. No task can be too appalling, no witness-bearing can be too difficult, no field can be too large, no message can be too stern and uncompromising, for those who are endued with power from on high.—FRANCIS E. CLARK.

THE BOOK CRITIC.

CENTRAL TRUTHS AND SIDE ISSUES. By ROBERT G. BALFOUR, Minister of the Free New North Church, Edinburgh. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1895.

THE title of this little book is somewhat misleading. The work is full of "side issues," while "central truths" are conspicuous by their absence, except when they chance to be quoted or to be set up as a mark for disparaging criticism. Mr. Balfour is a kind of theological Rip van Winkle, who might be referred, as a preliminary exercise, to the famous passage in Heine which records the death of the Jewish Deity. Perhaps, were he to ponder the words of the German Aristophanes, "They are bringing the sacrament to a dying God," he might at length come to perceive that, although blasphemy is not a common characteristic of modern theology, it often finds its counterpart in a conscious or unconscious refusal to be helpful. A writer who adopts the estimate of the value of the Fourth Gospel implied in chapter i., and who evidently supposes that all the New Testament documents are of equal authority (pp. 83, *et seq.*), may be pardoned for unconsciousness, and for consequent expenditure of time upon matters of antiquarian interest—a pursuit abhorrent to the competent theologian in these days. A similar plea can hardly be pressed for the following: "If proof be demanded of the fact that a promise was made to the Son of eternal life to His people as the reward of the successful accomplishment of His work, we would point to these words of Paul, in the beginning of his Epistle to Titus, 'In hope of eternal life, which God, who cannot lie, promised before times eternal.' The apostle is here speaking of his own personal hope of eternal life, and he grounds it on a promise made by God

before times eternal. To whom was that promise made? Not to Paul himself, *for he was then unborn, and a promise cannot be made to one who is as yet non-existent*" (p. 62); nor for this: "Was there ever such a travesty of the design and end of the crucifixion of our Lord? . . . If this was all that Christ meant to accomplish by His death—to free us from the Jewish Law and its curse, by abolishing that Law—alas for us! Who is to free us from the still more awful *curse of God's universal law*—a curse which we have all incurred—a law which shall never be abolished? And how could the Law condemn itself by putting Christ to death? The Law did not put Christ to death. It had no fault to find with Him; He had obeyed it perfectly. Besides, *the Law is a mere abstraction; it could not kill*" (p. 132). Nor, finally, is it possible to plead unconsciousness as an apology for the extraordinary compilation of the closing chapter, in which the bodily qualities of the blessed dead are enumerated with much detail. If, then, the book be devoted exclusively to scraps, interesting to the theological *chiffonnier*, maybe, and to aspects of the unknowable, interesting to nobody, it would be unfair to Mr. Balfour were we to suppress the fact that on p. 79 he presents a useful analysis of elements involved in the doctrine of redemption. But, with this exception, the book is likely to be more a hindrance than a help to those who desire to realize the Christian life practically, rather than merely to arrive in heaven "somehow," and to escape the other place by an equally vague process. R. M. WENLEY.

THE DAISIES OF NAZARETH. By HUGH MACMILLAN, D.D., LL.D., F.R.S.E. London: Religious Tract Society. 1894.

TRAVELLERS in Palestine note the delight with which, in this distant land, they come upon meadows carpeted with the familiar daisy of their own country, though of somewhat larger growth and more self-assertion. Naming his book from the subject of the first chapter, Dr. Macmillan here publishes some of his charming addresses to young people, combining, as no one knows better how to unite the two, the teaching of nature and grace. The flora of a district remains unaltered for ages, and the daisies that now meet the eye on the beautiful slope of Nazareth must have fallen under the glance of the Saviour of mankind, as He stood, a lowly Youth, at the door of the carpenter's cottage. From the nature and antecedents of this composite and most perfect of flowers, Dr. Macmillan draws lessons concerning the division of labour, the beauty of order, the necessity of prudence; he sees in this "Cinderella of flowers" an epitome of the formation of the world, the action of the same laws or forces which regulate the universe. We will quote one paragraph, which gives the key-note of all our author's strains: "So full was Jesus of the wise natural lore acquired on the hills of Nazareth, that the very first words He uttered when He began His public ministry on the neighbouring heights of the Horns of Hattin were, 'Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow.' He commenced His teaching by telling men, not of high and mystic things afar off in the heavens, but of common, familiar things at their own door. It was not a revelation that they needed, but eyes to see; and the kingdom of heaven was within them. In considering carefully and lovingly the mysteries of growth in one of the lilies of the field beside their path, they would know more of the nature and the ways of God than if heaven had opened above their heads. Reverence for God was to be reached through reverence for one of those little things which He had made." This is the spirit that moulds and permeates the present volume, minute scientific knowledge being utilized to teach spiritual truths, and that without forcing or disproportion. Thus from the blade-stage of